G.R. No.

L-7995 May 31, 1957

LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely
affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila,respondents.

Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent City Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.

LABRADOR, J.:

I. The case and issue, in general

This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental
and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It
also poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually
exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and
country from the alien retailer. Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national
aspirations for economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and urge for national survival and welfare, into a
concrete and tangible measures designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the
country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify
the enactment?

II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180

Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it nationalizes the retail trade business. The
main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations,
partnerships, or corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on
May 15, 1954, who are allowed to continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law, until
their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration
of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a
provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the laws on nationalization, control
weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the
establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business, (6) a
provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present for registration with the proper authorities a verified
statement concerning their businesses, giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their
offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business
who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation.

III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the
provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to
enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing
its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal
protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not
expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and
those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the
spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.

In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of
the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the
Act has only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed; (4) as regards hereditary
succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of
statutory origin.

IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved

a. The police power. —

There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but petitioner claims that its exercise in this
instance is attended by a violation of the constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. But before
proceeding to the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be well to bear in mind certain basic and
fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the determination of the ever recurrent conflict between police power and the
guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are the due process and
equal protection clauses related to it? What is the province and power of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the
courts? These consideration must be clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the case may be brought
forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.

It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives
its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be
co-extensive with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the
most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society
and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has become almost
boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human
foresight. Otherwise stated, as we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing
and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State
seeks to attain or achieve interest or welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the
State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal
protection clause.

b. Limitations on police power. —

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following provisions of our Constitution:

SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)

These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom in democracies, are not limited to
citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.
(Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)

c. The, equal protection clause. —

The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or
the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or
by territory within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies
alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)

d. The due process clause. —

The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power. Is there public
interest, a public purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's
purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the matter
involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used,
or is it not merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask when the due process test is
applied.

The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent
than real. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said,
the indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be no absolute power,
whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy.
So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and persons may be classified
into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The
police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist between
purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.

e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —

Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It must not be overlooked, in the first
place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the
policy of the State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or reasonableness and wisdom, of any
law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or of the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve
public interest. On the other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have nevertheless evinced a
reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative. They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent
or palpable arbitrary and unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to override
legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.

V. Economic problems sought to be remedied

With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue involved. If the disputed legislation
were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there would be no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative
power. But it goes further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes more
complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as society itself, which from the immemorial has always
been open to residents, irrespective of race, color or citizenship.

a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation. —

In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that they produce, the dealer, of course, is
unknown. But as group life develops and families begin to live in communities producing more than what they consume and
needing an infinite number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages develop into big
communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's importance is enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards
of living, in which man's needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer comes as essential
as the producer, because thru him the infinite variety of articles, goods and needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach
of consumers. Retail dealers perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and supplies
are ministered to members of the communities comprising the nation.

There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the community. He ministers to the resident's daily
needs, food in all its increasing forms, and the various little gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his
customers around his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices needed for the daily cooking. He has
cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew them or darn the clothes that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly
peddler, the owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so much a part of
day-to-day existence.

b. The alien retailer's trait. —

The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of population (Time there was when he
was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly but gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the
cities and big centers of population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of community life appear,
ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their agricultural produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable
fact that in many communities the alien has replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit, and the
patience and forbearance of a slave.

Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent neighbors and
customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and forgives. The community takes note of him, as he
appears to be harmless and extremely useful.

c. Alleged alien control and dominance. —

There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about the controlling and dominant position
that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy. Food and other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the
residents mostly through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance, but apparent control
over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware, textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores
of other goods and articles. And were it not for some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the
Acefa, his control over principal foods and products would easily become full and complete.

Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one breath it is said that the fear is unfounded
and the threat is imagined; in another, it is charged that the law is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed
nationalism. Alienage, it is said, is not an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the retail business make
control virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an issue of fact merits serious consideration. The others are
matters of opinion within the exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and decide.

The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black and white. Between the constitutional
convention year (1935), when the fear of alien domination and control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders
with fears and misgivings, and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act (1954), official statistics
unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by the alien of the retail trade, as witness the following
tables:

Assets Gross Sales

Year and Retailers Per cent Per cent

No.-Establishments Pesos Pesos
Nationality Distribution Distribution
1941:

Filipino .......... 106,671 200,323,138 55.82 174,181,924 51.74

Chinese ........... 15,356 118,348,692 32.98 148,813,239 44.21

Others ............ 1,646 40,187,090 11.20 13,630,239 4.05

1947:

Filipino .......... 111,107 208,658,946 65.05 279,583,333 57.03

Chinese ........... 13,774 106,156,218 33.56 205,701,134 41.96

Others ........... 354 8,761,260 .49 4,927,168 1.01

1948: (Census)

Filipino .......... 113,631 213,342,264 67.30 467,161,667 60.51

Chinese .......... 12,087 93,155,459 29.38 294,894,227 38.20

Others .......... 422 10,514,675 3.32 9,995,402 1.29

1949:

Filipino .......... 113,659 213,451,602 60.89 462,532,901 53.47

Chinese .......... 16,248 125,223,336 35.72 392,414,875 45.36

Others .......... 486 12,056,365 3.39 10,078,364 1.17

1951:

Filipino ......... 119,352 224,053,620 61.09 466,058,052 53.07

Chinese .......... 17,429 134,325,303 36.60 404,481,384 46.06

 Others .......... 347 8,614,025 2.31 7,645,327 87

AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT

Item Gross
Year and Retailer's
Assets Sales
Nationality
(Pesos) (Pesos)

1941:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 1,633

Chinese .............................................. 7,707 9,691

Others ............................................... 24,415 8,281

1947:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 2,516

Chinese ........................................... 7,707 14,934

Others .............................................. 24,749 13,919

1948: (Census)

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,111

Chinese ............................................. 7,707 24,398

Others .............................................. 24,916 23,686

1949:

Filipino ............................................. 1,878 4,069

Chinese .............................................. 7,707 24,152

Others .............................................. 24,807 20,737

1951:

Filipino ............................................. 1,877 3,905

Chinese ............................................. 7,707 33,207

Others ............................................... 24,824 22,033

(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census,
issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics, Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)

The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on Filipino establishments already include
mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily small..

The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien participation has steadily increased during
the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the
numerical gap through their assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very many Filipino
retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien invests more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more,
and gains much more. The same official report, pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade,
remarks that the Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by respondents, the native
investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.

d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention. —

It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that is the legislature's target in the
enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have been adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the
existence of this alien dominance and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other things, that "it
is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing
of the Philippine Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and the events since
then have not been either pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on
the patrimony clause of the Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general preoccupation
of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought under their control the commercial and other economic
activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil. Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the
constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in connection with the nationalistic provisions of the Constitution,
he says:

But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the country is not desirable and that if such a
situation should remain, political independence alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is
not big enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of recent formation and hence,
largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to
step in and assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of the nation in somewhat the
same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it (the Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the
protection of the nation not only against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien
interests in the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)

Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino businessmen, manufacturers and
producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from alien control, and they express sentiments of economic independence.
Witness thereto is Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino Businessmen, and a
similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National Convention of Manufacturers and Producers. The man in
the street also believes, and fears, alien predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not only
to control but to alien stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to be a fact, a reality proved by official
statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that compose the Filipino community.

e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. —

But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the predominance alone; there is a
prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly endanger the national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and
action and thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters
as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the market, and even the
choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy
and of the complete subservience of national economy and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. Nationals,
producers and consumers alike can be placed completely at their mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is
desired to be prescribed by the aliens, because the producer or importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or because a new
competing article offers bigger profits for its introduction. All that aliens would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article,
eliminating it from their stocks, offering the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the prescribed article, or
its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find the article suddenly out of circulation.
Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of alien domination. Grave abuses have
characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens. It is a fact within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly
overlook or ignore in the interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public that alien
participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable practices, the mention of a few of which would
suffice for our purposes; that at some time or other they have cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice,
creating artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have hoarded essential foods to
the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so much so that the Government has had to establish the National Rice
and Corn Corporation to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have violated price
control laws, especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No.
1168), authorizing their immediate and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have secret combinations
among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply and demand; that they have connived to boycott
honest merchants and traders who would not cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and
enterprise. They are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and out of the land, violated
import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision and contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they
have engaged in corrupting public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption in the
Government. As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both by the Government and by their own lawful
diplomatic representatives, action which impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above practices.

The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in the future. The present dominance of
the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war
or other calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing goods among nationals; what
we have are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and
big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or
emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even
become the potential enemy of the State.

f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. —

We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the disputed law is not the product of racial
hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their
authorized representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been saddled upon it rightly or
wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the public, nay of the national security itself, and indisputably
falls within the scope of police power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the supreme
welfare of its citizens.

VI. The Equal Protection Limitation

a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The next question that now poses solution is, Does the law deny the equal
protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien
and the national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his adopted country; his stay here is
for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate
nor immoral, but he is naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily stays and
makes his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his Filipino customers as would prevent him fro m
taking advantage of their weakness and exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his
beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that the alien retailer has shown such utter
disregard for his customers and the people on whom he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation,
radical as it may seem.

Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine contribution to national income and
wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that
would help the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely transient and
temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting the very important function of retail distribution to his hands.

The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out above, their secret manipulations of stocks
of commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the
nation of which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the exercise of the trade by the
nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully
justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State
to prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no
reason or ground for a legitimate distinction can be found between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. —

The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens, which are actual and real, furnish sufficient
grounds for legislative classification of retail traders into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the
legislature's classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since the Court finds that the
classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the
classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within its legitimate
prerogative and it can not declare that the act transcends the limit of equal protection established by the Constitution.

Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is not curtailed or denied by
the equal protection of the laws clause. The legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of
the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition to the authorities we have earlier
cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly
defined the application of equal protection clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:

. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the state the power to classify in the
adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only
when it is without any reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some reasonable basis does
not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some
inequality. 3. When the classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that
would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the
classification in such a law must carry the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially
arbitrary."

c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. —

The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification has already been affirmatively decided
in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the United States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136,
where the validity of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein limiting the
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States,
thus denying the right to aliens, it was held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the encouragement of Philippine
shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power,
and all presumptions are in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic ownership of vessels
engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does not violate the equal protection of the law and due process or law
clauses of the Philippine Bill of Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice
Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:

"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts licensing gaming houses, retailers of
spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of
which is to encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other nations. Almost every
commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of
American shipping is contemplated, in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an
American character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is to
confer on her American privileges, as contra distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners;
in surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade
coastwise, that this whole system is projected."

The rule in general is as follows:

Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise justified simply because the
limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class
than for similar classes than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status between citizens
and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)

In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing of hawkers and peddlers, which
provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or has declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was
held valid, for the following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are supposed to have
regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and the court cannot question this judgment and conclusion.
In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E. 309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from engaging
in the traffic of liquors, was found not to be the result of race hatred, or in hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but
was based on the belief that an alien cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life as to enable him to
appreciate the relation of this particular business to our entire social fabric", and was not, therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke
vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926), the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of
Cincinnati prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly irrational discrimination
against aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to a
legitimate object of legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and that it could not state that the legislation is
clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the legislative appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice
of methods for controlling an apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case to the
one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the business of pawn brooking was considered as having
tendencies injuring public interest, and limiting it to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens
the right to engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also
in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens are judicially known to have different interests,
knowledge, attitude, psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the business of pawnbroker,
pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of
Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for
the decision was the court's findings that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the
health, or even the convenience of the community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a
California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible to citizenship was held void, because
the law conflicts with Federal power over immigration, and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of
the waters and the fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further added that the law was the
outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry. However, two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing
rights have been treated traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania,
1897), a state law which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was
declared void because the court found that there was no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from
the daily wage of an employee.

d. Authorities contra explained. —

It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United States hold that the distinction between
aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for classification. But in this decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either
arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility, and there was no question of
public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States Supreme Court
declared invalid a Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in any language other than English, Spanish or
any other local dialect, but the main reasons for the decisions are: (1) that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be
no other system of distribution, and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be deprived of
their right to be advised of their business and to direct its conduct. The real reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief
that no public benefit would be derived from the operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of
something indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an ordinance conferring
powers on officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries both as to persons and place, was declared invalid, but the
court said that the power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination which attended the administration
and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine,
1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore no
reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification was proposed.

The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said, aliens do not naturally possess the
sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help
bolster the nation's economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the national owes to
the land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been shown on many occasions and instances, especially in
times of crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive
home the reality and significance of the distinction between the alien and the national, thus:

. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without the intimate knowledge of our laws,
customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology
from our fellow countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born, whose allegiance is first to
their own country, and whose ideals of governmental environment and control have been engendered and formed under entirely
different regimes and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well disposed toward the
United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said
enough so that obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible reason for
making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations against aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .
 VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.

a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive. —

We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been stated by the highest authority in the
United States that:

. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or
capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .

xxx xxx xxx

So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt
whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted
to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override
it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus
officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)

Another authority states the principle thus:

. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the scope of the police power in a
constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire
whether the restriction it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it
imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the persons whom it affects, must not be for
the annoyance of a particular class, and must not be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)

In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:

. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. . . .

Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of constitutionality:

In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police power to regulate the operation of a
business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has a
sufficient foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive, and capricious use of that
power, without substantial relation to the health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the public.

b. Petitioner's argument considered. —

Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges long ago recognized as essential
to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the
legislature to prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on an incorrect assumption and premise,
i.e., that in this country where the occupation is engaged in by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest
creditable and unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate danger to their economic peace,
tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly
abused by the alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the
occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and
emergency.

The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and ignores the facts and circumstances, but
this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the
illegitimate and pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus correctly stated the
answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free
national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and
privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all
circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not
merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of reasonableness.

The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied the bill, which later was enacted into
law:

This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Philippines from
having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who
owe no allegiance to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have no permanent stake in
our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our destiny. All aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the
mercy of other people.

In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who are not citizens of the Philippines of
their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks to take away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a
power that can be wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national security it respects existing rights.

The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.

If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence is none the less legitimate. Freedom
and liberty are not real and positive if the people are subject to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of
their own race or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination, is one of the
noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can
infringe the constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people can never be beyond the
limits of legislative authority.

c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative action. —

The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional restrictions of due process on the attainment
of such a noble motive as freedom from economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of
the Constitution must have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation that would promote the supreme
happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the precise issue now before us, they expressly made their voice clear; they
adopted a resolution expressing their belief that the legislation in question is within the scope of the legislative power. Thus they
declared the their Resolution:

That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of retail trade; but it abstain from
approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is convinced
that the National Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and American citizens the privilege to
engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the
Memorandum for the Petitioner.)

It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a
principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the
Philippines the exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article XIV, it is provided
that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of the public utility shall be granted except to
citizens of the Philippines." The nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid
down as a primary objective of the Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with the same purpose and spirit underlying
many of the provisions of the Constitution is unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?

The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in the approval of the radical measures is,
therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant to its duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight
of the nationals with the complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the demands of public interest
and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to face the
problem and meet, through adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to national
economy.

d. Provisions of law not unreasonable. —

A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how reasonable the Legislature has been. The law
is made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during
the rest of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of aliens. The right or privilege is
denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In the deliberations of the Court on this case, attention was called to the
fact that the privilege should not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision
would defeat the law itself, its aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It
is well settled that the Court will not inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative
judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every
presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not
annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a
violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness, and we find the provisions are not unreasonable.
These principles also answer various other arguments raised against the law, some of which are: that the law does not promote
general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of employment; that prices will increase because of the elimination
of competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be general
breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are directed against the supposed
wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.

VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law

A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title thereof is misleading or deceptive, as
it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The
constitutional provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:

No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.

What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise the legislators or the public of the
nature, scope and consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory
consideration of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the term "regulate"
does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express the
two main purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or nationalization. Both of
these have always been included within the term regulation.

Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors.
(Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page 41 of Answer.)

Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title
to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors, etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an actprohibiting the sale of such liquors to
minors and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly included within the subject of regulating the
sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)

The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and prohibition of acts usually done in
connection with the thing to be regulated. While word regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no
absolute reason why it should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in connection with a thing the best or
only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton, 162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of
Answer.)

The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that the title need not be an index to the
entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, See. 4803, p. 345.) The above rule was followed the title of the
Act in question adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore, the law also contains
other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may not be included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were
the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling within the
scope of the title which would have made the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle
governing the drafting of statutes, under which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all
other provisions found in the body of the Act.

One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of
the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice,
action and study of the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators have been appraised
of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the prohibition provisions. The legislators took active interest in the
discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign against its
approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore,
be overruled.

IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations

Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation thereby of the Charter of the United
Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the
Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of
the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere
recommendation or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the
United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred the fact that members of the United Nations
Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world
laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.

The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be
violated by the law in question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same
terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all
other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from
engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or
restrict the scope of the police power of the State (plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)

X. Conclusion

Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to
national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and
control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its
own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the
due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us
to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary — and that in any case such matter
falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may
not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled
the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or
surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.

Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have been made less harsh in its impact on
the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when
the time comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative
authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies
against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.

The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:

I agree to the proposition, principle or rule that courts may not inquire into the wisdom of an the Act passed by the Congress and
duly approved by the President of the Republic. But the rule does not preclude courts from inquiring and determining whether the
Act offends against a provision or provisions of the Constitution. I am satisfied that the Act assailed as violative of the due process
of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution does not infringe upon them, insofar as it affects
associations, partnership or corporations, the capital of which is not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines, and aliens,
who are not and have not been engaged in the retail business. I am, however, unable to persuade myself that it does not violate
said clauses insofar as the Act applies to associations and partnerships referred to in the Act and to aliens, who are and have
heretofore been engaged in said business. When they did engage in the retail business there was no prohibition on or against them
to engage in it. They assumed and believed in good faith they were entitled to engaged in the business. The Act allows aliens to
continue in business until their death or voluntary retirement from the business or forfeiture of their license; and corporations,
associations or partnership, the capital of which is not wholly owned by the citizens of the Philippines to continue in the business
for a period of ten years from the date of the approval of the Act (19 June 1954) or until the expiry of term of the existence of the
association or partnership or corporation, whichever event comes first. The prohibition on corporations, the capital of which is not
wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, to engage in the retail business for a period of more than ten years from the date of
the approval of the Act or beyond the term of their corporate existence, whichever event comes first, is valid and lawful, because
the continuance of the existence of such corporations is subject to whatever the Congress may impose reasonably upon them by
subsequent legislation.1 But the prohibition to engage in the retail business by associations and partnerships, the capital of which
is not wholly owned by citizen of the Philippines, after ten years from the date of the approval of the Act, even before the end of
the term of their existence as agreed upon by the associates and partners, and by alien heirs to whom the retail business is
transmitted by the death of an alien engaged in the business, or by his executor or administrator, amounts to a deprivation of their
property without due process of law. To my mind, the ten-year period from the date of the approval of the Act or until the
expiration of the term of the existence of the association and partnership, whichever event comes first, and the six-month period
granted to alien heirs of a deceased alien, his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, do not cure the defect of the law,
because the effect of the prohibition is to compel them to sell or dispose of their business. The price obtainable at such forced sale
of the business would be inadequate to reimburse and compensate the associates or partners of the associations or partnership, and
the alien heirs of a deceased alien, engaged in the retail business for the capital invested in it. The stock of merchandise bought
and sold at retail does not alone constitute the business. The goodwill that the association, partnership and the alien had built up
during a long period of effort, patience and perseverance forms part of such business. The constitutional provisions that no person
shall be deprived of his property without due process of law2 and that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the
laws3 would have no meaning as applied to associations or partnership and alien heirs of an alien engaged in the retail business if
they were to be compelled to sell or dispose of their business within ten years from the date of the approval of the Act and before
the end of the term of the existence of the associations and partnership as agreed upon by the associations and partners and within
six months after the death of their predecessor-in-interest.

The authors of the Constitution were vigilant, careful and zealous in the safeguard of the ownership of private agricultural lands
which together with the lands of the public domain constitute the priceless patrimony and mainstay of the nation; yet, they did not
deem it wise and prudent to deprive aliens and their heirs of such lands. 4

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that section 1 of the Act, insofar as it compels associations and partnership referred to
therein to wind up their retail business within ten years from the date of the approval of the Act even before the expiry of the term
of their existence as agreed upon by the associates and partners and section 3 of the Act, insofar as it compels the aliens engaged
in the retail business in his lifetime his executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, are invalid, for they violate the due
process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution.
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE,
BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV,
ILOILO CITY, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but hear me first!" It is this cry
that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.

The said executive order reads in full as follows:

WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering of carabaos
not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with respect to age;

WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the prohibition against
inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the prohibition against
interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive Order and provide for the disposition of the
carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by the
Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:
SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in
violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to
charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit,
in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos.

SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.

(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President

Republic of the Philippines

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner sued
for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of
P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no
longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive
order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has now come
before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao
or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without
according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due process. He complains that
the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is also a challenge to the improper exercise
of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution. 4

While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question raised there
was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be considered enforceable. We
imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this Court did not, as contended by the
Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. That is an entirely different matter.

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional questions, they
are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the highest tribunal. 6 We
have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or rules of
court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all cases involving the constitutionality of
certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be made in the first instance by these lower courts.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in fact may
be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will be the time to
make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts should not follow the
path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On the contrary, they should
probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the
affliction.

Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or
loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule instead of
merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that the laws were
faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided thereunder that
whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever the legislature failed or
was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he could, in order to meet the exigency,
issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of law. As there is no showing of any exigency
to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive
order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a
phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more
appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.

It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language to avoid
controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process clause, however, this
rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a proposal to delineate it more clearly
was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the
Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was sustained by the body. 10

The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt necessary
because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable
command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity of the due process
clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or constricting its protection as the changing times and
circumstances may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine themselves in
a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the clause whenever indicated.
Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to be "gradually ascertained by the
process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the
U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due process — and in so doing sums it all up — as nothing
more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play." 12

When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth not
proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law of the land,
they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark of the free society.
The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the ages, as a ringing reminder to
all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair
and open hearing of his cause.

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before an
opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the question; the
other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation of the issues in
contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in leading to the correct ruling
after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A judgment based on less that this
full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or
worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed with
because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the
jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the ancient
rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the State, is entitled to
"the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College
Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to
be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance,
would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty catchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted exceptions.
The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such presumption is based on human
experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are
instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a
nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety
and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be
summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his
return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy
houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due
process in view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and
present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due
process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of
the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the
least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The
individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him
still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually
limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to
the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the
venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of
individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.

It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in Executive
Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the
reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for
the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset the need for such a measure. In the
face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on these traditional beasts of burden, the
government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect and preserve them.

A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and
slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been convicted
thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the Supreme Court. The
conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which
were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these animals and the reduction of their number had
resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the
scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more
effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals. The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid
exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under consideration was required
by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter
of carabaos for human consumption, so long as these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably
necessary" limitation on private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their
slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the luxury of animal food,
even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably and dangerously affected.

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to speak,
has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method chosen in the basic
measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly oppressive upon individuals, again
following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of these animals except where they are at least
seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the necessary permit, the executive order will be
conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their improvident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with
equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the
original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the carabaos but on their movement,
providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from
one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means employed and
the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the
carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier
to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive order, it could be
easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animals for the purpose of
preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit their transfer as, not to be
flippant dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction
that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being
transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was sustained
because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial and conviction of the accused.
Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately
impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only
after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was ordered confiscated upon his
failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The measure struck at once and pounced upon
the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with notwithstanding the
usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary action may be validly taken in
administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In the exceptional cases accepted,
however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit, the immediacy of the problem sought to
be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The properties
involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason why the offense
prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused being accorded all the
rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v. Angeles, 21 Executive Order No.
626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which
alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in the
questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other
similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to
deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.)
The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition it is. It is laden with perilous
opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable
guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their
options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity and by what criteria shall they be
chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their
own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized
within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to
conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is
violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately
condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed
offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally,
also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the
distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's carabaos is not
liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that time presumptively valid,
and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent of him, being a mere
subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own responsibility alone, refuse to execute
it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had the competence, for all their superior authority,
to question the order we now annul.

The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would never have
reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become a faitaccompli despite its invalidity.
We commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have ended in that pump boat in Masbate and
another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon
forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever they are
ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and impress. Rights, as
weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society,
if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of the
Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the petitioner. No
costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 131652. March 9, 1998]

BAYANI M. ALONTE, petitioner, vs. HON. MAXIMO A. SAVELLANO JR., NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

[G.R. No. 131728. March 9, 1998]

BUENAVENTURA CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. JUDGE MAXIMO SAVELLANO, JR., THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and JUVIELYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN, respondents.
 DECISION
VITUG, J.:

Pending before this Court are two separate petitions, one filed by petitioner Bayani M. Alonte, docketed G.R. No. 131652,
and the other by petitioner Buenaventura Concepcion, docketed G.R. No. 131728, that assail the decision of respondent Judge
Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., of the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 53, of Manila finding both petitioners guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The two petitions were consolidated.
On 05 December 1996, an information for rape was filed against petitioners Bayani M. Alonte, an incumbent Mayor of Bian,
Laguna, and Buenaventura Concepcion predicated on a complaint filed by Juvie-lyn Punongbayan. The information contained the
following averments; thus:

That on or about September 12, 1996, in Sto. Tomas, Bian, Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the above
named accused, who is the incumbent mayor of Bian, Laguna after giving complainant-child drinking water which made her dizzy
and weak, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with said JUVIELYN
PUNONGBAYAN against her will and consent, to her damage and prejudice.

That accused Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion without having participated as principal or accessory assisted in the commission
of the offense by bringing said complainant child to the rest house of accused Bayani `Arthur Alonte at Sto. Tomas, Bian, Laguna
and after receiving the amount of P1,000.00 left her alone with Bayani Alonte who subsequently raped her.

Contrary to Law.[1]

The case was docketed Criminal Case No. 9619-B and assigned by raffle to Branch 25 of the RTC of Bian, Laguna, presided
over by Judge Pablo B. Francisco.
On 13 December 1996, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through her counsel Attorney Remedios C. Balbin, and Assistant Chief State
Prosecutor (ACSP) Leonardo Guiyab, Jr., filed with the Office of the Court Administrator a Petition for a Change of Venue
(docketed Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC) to have the case transferred and tried by any of the Regional Trial Courts in
Metro Manila.
During the pendency of the petition for change of venue, or on 25 June 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, assisted by her parents
and counsel, executed an affidavit of desistance, quoted herein in full, as follows:

AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE

I, JUVIE-LYN YAMBAO PUNONGBAYAN, 17 years of age, a resident of No. 5 Uranus Street, Congressional Avenue
Subdivision, Quezon City, duly assisted by private legal counsel and my parents, after having duly sworn in accordance with law,
depose and say:

1. That I am the Complainant in the rape case filed against Mayor Bayani `Arthur Alonte of Bian, Laguna, with the RTC-Branch
25 of Bian, Laguna;

2. That the case has been pending for some time, on preliminary issues, specifically, (a) change of venue, filed with the Supreme
Court; (b) propriety of the appeal to the Court of Appeals, and after its denial by said court, brought to the Office of the President,
on the veracity of the findings of the Five-Man Investigating Panel of the State Prosecutors Office, and the Secretary of Justice,
and (c) a hold-departure order filed with the Bian Court;

3. That the legal process moves ever so slowly, and meanwhile, I have already lost two (2) semesters of my college
residence. And when the actual trial is held after all the preliminary issues are finally resolved, I anticipate a still indefinite
suspension of my schooling to attend the hearings;

4. That during the entire period since I filed the case, my family has lived a most abnormal life: my father and mother had to give
up their jobs; my younger brother, who is in fourth grade, had to stop his schooling, like myself;

5. That I do not blame anyone for the long, judicial process, I simply wish to stop and live elsewhere with my family, where we
can start life anew, and live normally once again;

6. That I pray that I be allowed to withdraw my complaint for rape and the other charge for child abuse wherein the Five-Man
Investigating Panel of the Office of the State Prosecutor found a prima facie case although the information has not been filed, and
that I will not at any time revive this, and related cases or file new cases, whether, criminal, civil, and/or administrative, here or
anywhere in the Philippines;

7. That I likewise realize that the execution of this Affidavit will put to doubt my credibility as a witness-complainant;

8. That this is my final decision reached without fear or favor, premised on a corresponding commitment that there will be no
reprisals in whatever form, against members of the police force or any other official of officer, my relatives and friends who
extended assistance to me in whatever way, in my search for justice.

"WHEREOF, I affix my signature this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.

"(Sgd) JUVIE-LYN Y. PUNONGBAYAN

Complainant

"Assisted by:

(Sgd) ATTY. REMEDIOS C. BALBIN

Private Prosecutor

"In the presence of:

(Sgd) PABLO PUNONGBAYAN

Father

(Sgd) JULIE Y. PUNONGBAYAN

Mother

"SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 25 day of June, 1997, in Quezon City.

"(Sgd) Illegible
Administering Officer"[2]

On 28 June 1997, Atty. Ramon C. Casino, on behalf of petitioners, moved to have the petition for change of venue dismissed
on the ground that it had become moot in view of complainant's affidavit of desistance. On 22 August 1997, ACSP Guiyab filed
his comment on the motion to dismiss. Guiyab asserted that he was not aware of the desistance of private complainant and opined
that the desistance, in any case, would not produce any legal effect since it was the public prosecutor who had direction and
control of the prosecution of the criminal action. He prayed for the denial of the motion to dismiss.
On 02 September 1997, this Court issued a Resolution (Administrative Matter No. 97-1-12-RTC), granting the petition for
change of venue. The Court said:

"These affidavits give specific names, dates, and methods being used to abort, by coercion or corruption, the prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 9619-B. It is thus incorrect for oppositors Alonte and Concepcion to contend that the fear of the petitioner, her
private counsel and her witnesses are too generalized if not fabricated. Indeed, the probability that in desisting from pursuing her
complaint for rape, petitioner, a minor, may have succumbed to some illicit influence and undue pressure. To prevent possible
miscarriage of justice is a good excuse to grant the petition to transfer the venue of Criminal Case No. 9619-B from Bian, Laguna
to the City of Manila.

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Change of Venue from Bian, Laguna to the City of Manila is granted. The Executive
Judge of RTC Manila is ordered to raffle Crim. Case No. 9619-B to any of its branches.The judge to whom Crim. Case No.
9619-B shall be raffled shall resolve the petitioner's Motion to Resume Proceedings filed in Br. XXV of the RTC of Bian, Laguna
and determine the voluntariness and validity of petitioner's desistance in light of the opposition of the public prosecutor, Asst.
Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab. The branch clerk of court of Br. XXV of the RTC of Bian, Laguna is ordered to
personally deliver to the Executive Judge of Manila the complete records of Crim. Case No. 9619-B upon receipt of this
Resolution."[3]

On 17 September 1997, the case, now re-docketed Criminal Case No. 97-159955 by the Clerk of Court of Manila, was
assigned by raffle to Branch 53, RTC Manila, with respondent Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding.
On 07 October 1997, Juvie-lyn Punongbayan, through Attorney Balbin, submitted to the Manila court a "compliance" where
she reiterated "her decision to abide by her Affidavit of Desistance."
 In an Order, dated 09 October 1997, Judge Savellano found probable cause for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of
petitioners Alonte and Concepcion without prejudice to, and independent of, this Courts separate determination as the trier of facts,
of the voluntariness and validity of the [private complainant's] desistance in the light of the opposition of the public prosecutor,
Asst. Chief State Prosecutor Leonardo Guiyab.
On 02 November 1997, Alonte voluntarily surrendered himself to Director Santiago Toledo of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI), while Concepcion, in his case, posted the recommended bail of P150,000.00.
On 07 November 1997, petitioners were arraigned and both pleaded not guilty to the charge. The parties manifested that they
were waiving pre-trial. The proceedings forthwith went on. Per Judge Savellano, both parties agreed to proceed with the trial of
the case on the merits.[4] According to Alonte, however, Judge Savellano allowed the prosecution to present evidence relative only
to the question of the voluntariness and validity of the affidavit of desistance. [5]
It would appear that immediately following the arraignment, the prosecution presented private complainant Juvie-lyn
Punongbayan followed by her parents. During this hearing, Punongbayan affirmed the validity and voluntariness of her affidavit
of desistance. She stated that she had no intention of giving positive testimony in support of the charges against Alonte and had no
interest in further prosecuting the action. Punongbayan confirmed: (i) That she was compelled to desist because of the harassment
she was experiencing from the media, (ii) that no pressures nor influence were exerted upon her to sign the affidavit of desistance,
and (iii) that neither she nor her parents received a single centavo from anybody to secure the affidavit of desistance.
Assistant State Prosecutor Marilyn Campomanes then presented, in sequence: (i) Punongbayans parents, who affirmed their
signatures on the affidavit of desistance and their consent to their daughters decision to desist from the case, and (ii) Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Alberto Nofuente, who attested that the affidavit of desistance was signed by Punongbayan and her parents
in his presence and that he was satisfied that the same was executed freely and voluntarily. Finally, Campomanes manifested that
in light of the decision of private complainant and her parents not to pursue the case, the State had no further evidence against the
accused to prove the guilt of the accused. She, then, moved for the "dismissal of the case" against both Alonte and Concepcion.
Thereupon, respondent judge said that "the case was submitted for decision." [6]
On 10 November 1997, petitioner Alonte filed an "Urgent Motion to Admit to Bail." Assistant State Prosecutor
Campomanes, in a Comment filed on the same date, stated that the State interposed no objection to the granting of bail and in fact
Justice and Equity dictates that it joins the accused in his prayer for the granting of bail.
Respondent judge did not act on the application for bail.
On 17 November 1997, Alonte filed anew an Urgent Plea to Resolve the Motion for Bail. On even date, ASP Campomanes
filed a Manifestation deeming "it proper and in accord with justice and fair play to join the aforestated motion.
Again, the respondent judge did not act on the urgent motion.
The records would indicate that on the 25th November 1997, 1st December 1997, 8th December 1997 and 10th December
1997, petitioner Alonte filed a Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Motion for Early Resolution, respectively, in respect of his
application for bail. None of these motions were acted upon by Judge Savellano.
On 17 December 1997, Attorney Philip Sigfrid A. Fortun, the lead counsel for petitioner Alonte received a notice from the
RTC Manila, Branch 53, notifying him of the schedule of promulgation, on 18 December 1997, of the decision on the case. The
counsel for accused Concepcion denied having received any notice of the scheduled promulgation.
On 18 December 1997, after the case was called, Atty. Sigrid Fortun and Atty. Jose Flaminiano manifested that Alonte could
not attend the promulgation of the decision because he was suffering from mild hypertension and was confined at the NBI clinic
and that, upon the other hand, petitioner Concepcion and his counsel would appear not to have been notified of the
proceedings. The promulgation, nevertheless, of the decision proceeded in absentia; the reading concluded:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two (2) accused Mayor Bayani Alonte and Buenaventura `Wella
Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of RAPE, as defined and penalized under Article 335(2) in
relation to Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, for which each one of the them is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indivisible penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA or imprisonment for twenty (20) years and one (1) day to
forty (40) years.

In view thereof, the bail bond put up by the accused Buenaventura `Wella Concepcion for his provisional liberty is hereby
cancelled and rendered without any further force and effect.

SO ORDERED.[7]

On the same day of 18th December 1997, petitioner Alonte filed a motion for reconsideration. Without waiting for its
resolution, Alonte filed the instant "Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam" for "Certiorari, Prohibition, Habeas Corpus, Bail, Recusation of
respondent Judge, and for Disciplinary Action against an RTC Judge." Petitioner Concepcion later filed his own petition
for certiorari and mandamus with the Court.
Alonte submits the following grounds in support of his petition seeking to have the decision nullified and the case remanded
for new trial; thus:

The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a
Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) without affording the petitioner his Constitutional right to due process of law (Article III, 1,
Constitution).

The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a
Decision in the case a quo in violation of the mandatory provisions of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, specifically, in the
conduct and order of trial (Rule 119) prior to the promulgation of a judgment (Rule 120; Annex A).

The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in total disregard of
the Revised Rules on Evidence and existing doctrinal jurisprudence, he rendered a Decision in the case a quo (Annex A) on the
basis of two (2) affidavits (Punongbayans and Balbins) which were neither marked nor offered into evidence by the prosecution,
nor without giving the petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine the affiants thereof, again in violation of petitioners right to due
process (Article III, 1, Constitution).

The respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he rendered a
Decision in the case a quo without conducting a trial on the facts which would establish that complainant was raped by petitioner
(Rule 119, Article III, 1, Constitution), thereby setting a dangerous precedent where heinous offenses can result in conviction
without trial (then with more reason that simpler offenses could end up with the same result). [8]

On the other hand, Concepcion relies on the following grounds in support of his own petition; thus:

1. The decision of the respondent Judge rendered in the course of resolving the prosecutions motion to dismiss the case is a patent
nullity for having been rendered without jurisdiction, without the benefit of a trial and in total violation of the petitioners right to
due process of law.

2. There had been no valid promulgation of judgment at least as far as petitioner is concerned.

3. The decision had been rendered in gross violation of the right of the accused to a fair trial by an impartial and neutral judge
whose actuations and outlook of the case had been motivated by a sinister desire to ride on the crest of media hype that
surrounded this case and use this case as a tool for his ambition for promotion to a higher court.

4. The decision is patently contrary to law and the jurisprudence in so far as it convicts the petitioner as a principal even though he
has been charged only as an accomplice in the information. [9]

The petitions deserve some merit; the Court will disregard, in view of the case milieu, the prematurity of petitioners'
invocation, i.e., even before the trial court could resolve Alonte's motion for reconsideration.
The Court must admit that it is puzzled by the somewhat strange way the case has proceeded below. Per Judge Savellano,
after the waiver by the parties of the pre-trial stage, the trial of the case did proceed on the merits but that -

"The two (2) accused did not present any countervailing evidence during the trial. They did not take the witness stand to refute or
deny under oath the truth of the contents of the private complainant's aforementioned affidavit which she expressly affirmed and
confirmed in Court, but, instead, thru their respective lawyers, they rested and submitted the case for decision merely on the basis
of the private complainant's so called 'desistance' which, to them, was sufficient enough for their purposes. They left everything to
the so-called 'desistance' of the private complainant." [10]

According to petitioners, however, there was no such trial for what was conducted on 07 November 1997, aside from the
arraignment of the accused, was merely a proceeding in conformity with the resolution of this Court in Administrative Case No.
97-1-12-RTC to determine the validity and voluntariness of the affidavit of desistance executed by Punongbayan.
It does seem to the Court that there has been undue precipitancy in the conduct of the proceedings. Perhaps the problem
could have well been avoided had not the basic procedures been, to the Court's perception, taken lightly. And in this shortcoming,
looking at the records of the case, the trial court certainly is not alone to blame.
Section 14, paragraphs (1) and (2), of Article III, of the Constitution provides the fundamentals.
"(1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

"(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to
be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial,
and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the
production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable."

Jurisprudence[11] acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular, require (a) that the court or tribunal
trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully
acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and (d) that judgment is
rendered only upon lawful hearing.[12]
The above constitutional and jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own criminal justice
system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted
statement that procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a "law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds
upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."[13]
The order of trial in criminal cases is clearly spelled out in Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court; viz:

"Sec. 3. Order of trial. - The trial shall proceed in the following order:

"(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability.

"(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising from the issuance of any provisional
remedy in the case.

"(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to
present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue.

"(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs the parties to argue
orally or to submit memoranda.

"(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a lawful
defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly."

In Tabao vs. Espina,[14] the Court has underscored the need to adhere strictly to the above rules. It reminds that -

"x x x each step in the trial process serves a specific purpose. In the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of an accused requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to present his defense. So, with the
prosecution as to its evidence.

"Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into consideration the rights of all the parties to the case,
whether in the prosecution or defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges are sworn not only to uphold the law but also to
do what is fair and just. The judicial gavel should not be wielded by one who has an unsound and distorted sense of justice and
fairness.[15]

While Judge Savellano has claimed in his Comment that -

"Petitioners-accused were each represented during the hearing on 07 November 1997 with their respective counsel of
choice. None of their counsel interposed an intention to cross-examine rape victim Juvielyn Punongbayan, even after she attested,
in answer to respondent judge's clarificatory questions, the voluntariness and truth of her two affidavits - one detailing the rape
and the other detailing the attempts to buy her desistance; the opportunity was missed/not used, hence waived. The rule of case
law is that the right to confront and cross-examine a witness 'is a personal one and may be waived.'" (emphasis supplied) -

it should be pointed out, however, that the existence of the waiver must be positively demonstrated. The standard of waiver
requires that it "not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences."[16] Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right,
and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.[17] The Solicitor General has aptly discerned a few of
the deviations from what otherwise should have been the regular course of trial: (1) Petitioners have not been directed to present
evidence to prove their defenses nor have dates therefor been scheduled for the purpose; [18] (2) the parties have not been given the
opportunity to present rebutting evidence nor have dates been set by respondent Judge for the purpose; [19] and (3) petitioners have
not admitted the act charged in the Information so as to justify any modification in the order of trial. [20] There can be no short-cut
to the legal process, and there can be no excuse for not affording an accused his full day in court. Due process, rightly occupying
the first and foremost place of honor in our Bill of Rights, is an enshrined and invaluable right that cannot be denied even to the
most undeserving.
This case, in fine, must be remanded for further proceedings. And, since the case would have to be sent back to the court a
quo, this ponencia has carefully avoided making any statement or reference that might be misconstrued as prejudgment or as
pre-empting the trial court in the proper disposition of the case. The Court likewise deems it appropriate that all related
proceedings therein, including the petition for bail, should be subject to the proper disposition of the trial court.
Nevertheless, it is needful to stress a few observations on the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant.
Firstly, the affidavit of desistance of Juvie-Lyn Punongbayan, hereinbefore quoted, does not contain any statement that
disavows the veracity of her complaint against petitioners but merely seeks to "be allowed to withdraw" her complaint and to
discontinue with the case for varied other reasons. On this subject, the case of People vs. Junio,[21] should be instructive. The
Court has there explained:

The appellants submission that the execution of an Affidavit of Desistance by complainant who was assisted by her mother
supported the `inherent incredibility of prosecutions evidence is specious. We have said in so many cases that retractions are
generally unreliable and are looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. The unreliable character of this document is
shown by the fact that it is quite incredible that after going through the process of having accused-appellant arrested by the police,
positively identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring the humiliation of a physical examination of her private parts,
and then repeating her accusations in open court by recounting her anguish, Maryjane would suddenly turn around and declare
that `[a]fter a careful deliberation over the case, (she) find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant criminal prosecution.

Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an afterthought which should not be given probative value. It would be a
dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before the court of justice simply because the witness who has given it later on
changed his mind for one reason or another. Such a rule will make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses.Because affidavits of retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant witnesses, usually
for monetary consideration, the Court has invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly unreliable. [Flores vs. People, 211
SCRA 622, citing De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128; People vs. Galicia, 123 SCRA 550.] [22]

The Junio rule is no different from ordinary criminal cases. For instance, in People vs. Ballabare,[23] a murder case, the Court
has ruled:

The contention has no merit. To begin with, the Affidavit executed by eyewitness Tessie Asenita is not a recantation. To recant a
prior statement is to renounce and withdraw it formally and publicly. [36 WORDS AND PHRASES 683, citing Pradlik vs. State,
41-A 2nd, 906, 907.] In her affidavit, Tessie Asenita did not really recant what she had said during the trial. She only said she
wanted to withdraw her testimony because her father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., was no longer interested in prosecuting the case
against accused-appellant. Thus, her affidavit stated:

3. That inasmuch as my father, Leonardo Tacadao, Sr., the complainant therein, was no longer interested to prosecute the case as
manifested in the Sworn Affidavit of Desistance before the Provincial Prosecutor, I do hereby WITHDRAW and/or REVOKE my
testimony of record to confirm (sic) with my fathers desire;

It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny by the court and the parties simply because an affidavit
withdrawing the testimony is subsequently presented by the defense. In the first place, any recantation must be tested in a public
trial with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected by it to cross-examine the recanting witness. In this case,
Tessie Asenita was not recalled to the witness stand to testify on her affidavit. Her affidavit is thus hearsay. It was her husband,
Roque Asenita, who was presented and the matters he testified to did not even bear on the substance of Tessies affidavit. He
testified that accused-appellant was not involved in the perpetration of the crime.

In the second place, to accept the new evidence uncritically would be to make a solemn trial a mockery and place the investigation
at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. [De Guzman vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 184 SCRA 128, 134, citing People vs.
Morales, 113 SCRA 683.] For even assuming that Tessie Asenita had made a retraction, this circumstance alone does not require
the court to disregard her original testimony. A retraction does not necessarily negate an earlier declaration. [People vs. Davatos,
229 SCRA 647.] For this reason, courts look with disfavor upon retractions because they can easily be obtained from witnesses
usually through intimidation or for monetary considerations. [People vs. Clamor, 198 SCRA 642.] Hence, when confronted with a
situation where a witness recants his testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the original testimony solely on the basis of
the recantation. They should determine which testimony should be given credence through a comparison of the original testimony
and the new testimony, applying the general rules of evidence. [Reano vs. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 525.] In this case we
think the trial court correctly ruled.[24]

It may not be amiss to state that courts have the inherent power to compel the attendance of any person to testify in a case
pending before it, and a party is not precluded from invoking that authority. [25]
Secondly, an affidavit of desistance by itself, even when construed as a pardon in the so-called "private crimes," is not a
ground for the dismissal of the criminal case once the action has been instituted. The affidavit, nevertheless, may, as so earlier
intimated, possibly constitute evidence whose weight or probative value, like any other piece of evidence, would be up to the
court for proper evaluation. The decision in Junio went on to hold -

While `[t]he offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed
by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the
above named persons, as the case may be, [Third par. of Art. 344, The Revised Penal Code.] the pardon to justify the dismissal of
the complaint should have been made prior to the institution of the criminal action. [People vs. Entes, 103 SCRA 162, cited by
People vs. Soliao, 194 SCRA 250, which in turn is cited in People vs. Villorente, 210 SCRA 647.] Here, the motion to dismiss to
which the affidavit of desistance is attached was filed after the institution of the criminal case. And, affiant did not appear to be
serious in `signifying (her) intention to refrain from testifying since she still completed her testimony notwithstanding her earlier
affidavit of desistance. More, the affidavit is suspect considering that while it was dated `April 1992, it was only submitted
sometime in August 1992, four (4) months after the Information was filed before the court a quo on 6 April 1992, perhaps dated
as such to coincide with the actual filing of the case.[26]

In People vs. Miranda,[27] applying the pertinent provisions of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which, in full, states -

"Art. 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape, and acts of lasciviousness. The crimes
of adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended spouse.

"The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in
any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.

"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the
offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the
above named persons, as the case may be.

"In cases of seduction, abduction, acts of lasciviousness and rape, the marriage of the offender with the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this paragraph shall also be
applicable to the coprincipals, accomplices and accessories after the fact of the above-mentioned crimes." -

the Court said:

"Paragraph 3 of the legal provision above quoted prohibits a prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness,
except upon a complaint made by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has
been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not prohibit the continuance of a prosecution if
the offended party pardons the offender after the cause has been instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of said cause. The only
act that according to article 344 extinguishes the penal action and the penalty that may have been imposed is the marriage between
the offended and the offended party." [28]

In People vs. Infante,[29] decided just a little over a month before Miranda, the Court similarly held:

"In this court, after the case had been submitted, a motion to dismiss was filed on behalf of the appellant predicated on an affidavit
executed by Manuel Artigas, Jr., in which he pardoned his guilty spouse for her infidelity. But this attempted pardon cannot
prosper for two reasons. The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code which is in question reads: 'The offended
party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he
shall have consented or pardoned the offenders.' This provision means that the pardon afforded the offenders must come before
the institution of the criminal prosecution, and means, further, that both the offenders must be pardoned by the offended party. To
elucidate further, article 435 of the old Penal Code provided:'The husband may at any time remit the penalty imposed upon his
wife. In such case the penalty imposed upon the wife's paramour shall also be deemed to be remitted.' These provisions of the old
Penal Code became inoperative after the passage of Act No. 1773, section 2, which had the effect of repealing the same. The
Revised Penal Code thereafter expressly repealed the old Penal Code, and in so doing did not have the effect of reviving any of its
provisions which were not in force. But with the incorporation of the second paragraph of article 344, the pardon given by the
offended party again constitutes a bar to the prosecution for adultery. Once more, however, it must be emphasized that this pardon
must come before the institution of the criminal prosecution and must be for both offenders to be effective - circumstances which
do not concur in this case."[30]

The decisions speak well for themselves, and the Court need not say more than what it has heretofore already held.
Relative to the prayer for the disqualification of Judge Savellano from further hearing the case, the Court is convinced
that Judge Savellano should, given the circumstances, be best excused from the case.Possible animosity between the personalities
here involved may not all be that unlikely. The pronouncement of this Court in the old case of Luque vs. Kayanan[31] could again
be said: All suitors are entitled to nothing short of the cold neutrality of an independent, wholly-free, disinterested and unbiased
tribunal. Second only to the duty of rendering a just decision is the duty of doing it in a manner that will not arouse any suspicion
as to the fairness and integrity of the Judge.[32] It is not enough that a court is impartial, it must also be perceived as impartial.
The Court cannot end this ponencia without a simple reminder on the use of proper language before the courts. While the
lawyer in promoting the cause of his client or defending his rights might do so with fervor, simple courtesy demands that it be
done within the bounds of propriety and decency. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions hardly can be justified
nor can have a place in the dignity of judicial forum. Civility among members of the legal profession is a treasured tradition that
must at no time be lost to it.
Finally, it may be opportune to say, once again, that prosecutors are expected not merely to discharge their duties with the
highest degree of excellence, professionalism and skill but also to act each time with utmost devotion and dedication to
duty.[33] The Court is hopeful that the zeal which has been exhibited many times in the past, although regrettably a disappointment
on few occasions, will not be wanting in the proceedings yet to follow.
WHEREFORE, conformably with all the foregoing, the Court hereby RULES that -

(a) The submission of the "Affidavit of Desistance," executed by Juvie-Lyn Y. Punongbayan on 25 June 1997, having been filed
AFTER the institution of Criminal Case No. 97-159935, DOES NOT WARRANT THE DISMISSAL of said criminal case;

(b) For FAILURE OF DUE PROCESS, the assailed judgment, dated 12 December 1997, convicting petitioners is declared NULL
AND VOID and thereby SET ASIDE; accordingly, the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings; and

(c) Judge Maximo A. Savellano, Jr., presiding Judge of Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, is ENJOINED from
further hearing Criminal Case No. 97-159935; instead, the case shall immediately be scheduled for raffle among the other
branches of that court for proper disposition.

No special pronouncement on costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104961 October 7, 1994

CONGRESSMAN FRANCISCO B. ANIAG, JR., petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SPECIAL TASK FORCE, respondents.

Ronolfo S. Pasamba for petitioner.

BELLOSILLO, JR., J.:

PETITIONER assails in this petition (for declaratory relief, certiorari and prohibition) the following resolutions of the
Commission on Elections: Resolution No. 2327 dated 26 December 1991 for being unconstitutional, and Resolution No. 92-0829
dated 6 April 1992 and Resolution No. 92-0999 dated 23 April 1992, for want of legal and factual bases.

The factual backdrop: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on 11 May 1992, the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued on 11 December 1991 Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the "Gun
Ban," promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons, on security
personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or
maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. 1 Subsequently, on 26 December 1991 COMELEC issued Resolution No.
2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms,
organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. 2

On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives, wrote
petitioner who was then Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the return of the two (2) firearms 3 issued to him by
the House of Representatives. Upon being advised of the request on 13 January 1992 by his staff, petitioner immediately
instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from petitioner's house at Valle Verde and return them to Congress.

Meanwhile, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, the Philippine National Police (PNP) headed by Senior
Superintendent Danilo Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some twenty (20) meters away from its entrance.
About thirty minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it approached the
checkpoint. They searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the
car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. He explained that he was ordered by petitioner to get the firearms from the
house and return them to Sergeant-at-Arms Taccad of the House of Representatives.

Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest. The referral did not include
petitioner as among those charged with an election offense. On 15 January 1992, the City Prosecutor ordered the release of
Arellano after finding the latter's sworn explanation meritorious. 4

On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light on the circumstances mentioned in Arellano's sworn
explanation. Petitioner not only appeared at the preliminary investigation to confirm Arellano's statement but also wrote the City
Prosecutor urging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was
complying with it when apprehended by returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was petitioner's driver, not a security
officer nor a bodyguard.5

On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters, recommended that the case
against Arellano be dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge against petitioner be also dismissed. 6

Nevertheless, on 6 April 1992, upon recommendation of its Law Department, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 92-0829
directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of B.P. Blg. 881 otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of R.A. No. 7166; 7 and petitioner to show cause why he should not be
disqualified from running for an elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Sec. 32, 33 and 35
of R.A. 7166, and
Sec. 52, par. (c), of B.P. Blg. 881.8

On 13 April 1992, petitioner moved for reconsideration and to hold in abeyance the administrative proceedings as well as the
filing of the information in court.9 On 23 April 1992, the COMELEC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 10 Hence, this
recourse.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327. He argues that the rules and regulations of an administrative
body must respect the limits defined by law; that the Omnibus Election Code provides for the disqualification of any
person/candidate from running for or holding a public office, i.e., any person who has either been declared by competent authority
as insane or incompetent or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for
which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude; that gunrunning,
using or transporting firearms or similar weapons and other acts mentioned in the resolution are not within the letter or spirit of the
provisions of the Code; that the resolution did away with the requirement of final conviction before the commission of certain
offenses; that instead, it created a presumption of guilt as a candidate may be disqualified from office in situations (a) where the
criminal charge is still pending, (b) where there is no pending criminal case, and (c) where the accused has already been acquitted,
all contrary to the requisite quantum of proof for one to be disqualified from running or holding public office under the Omnibus
Election Code, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt. As a result, petitioner concludes, Resolution No. 2327 violates the
fundamental law thus rendering it fatally defective.

But, the issue on the disqualification of petitioner from running in the

11 May 1992 synchronized elections was rendered moot when he lost his bid for a seat in Congress in the elections that ensued.
Consequently, it is now futile to discuss the implications of the charge against him on his qualification to run for public office.

However, there still remains an important question to be resolved, i.e., whether he can be validly prosecuted for instructing his
driver to return to the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives the two firearms issued to him on the basis of the
evidence gathered from the warrantless search of his car.

Petitioner strongly protests against the manner by which the PNP conducted the search. According to him, without a warrant and
without informing the driver of his fundamental rights the policemen searched his car. The firearms were not tucked in the waist
nor within the immediate reach of Arellano but were neatly packed in their gun cases and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of the
car. Thus, the search of his car that yielded the evidence for the prosecution was clearly violative of Secs. 2 and 3, par. (2), Art. III,
of the Constitution. 11

Petitioner further maintains that he was neither impleaded as party respondent in the preliminary investigation before the Office of
the City Prosecutor nor included in the charge sheet. Consequently, making him a respondent in the criminal information would
violate his constitutional right to due process.

Petitioner disputes the charge that he violated Sec. 33 of R.A. 7166, which prohibits any candidate for public office during the
election period from employing or availing himself or engaging the services of security personnel or bodyguards since, admittedly,
Arellano was not a security officer or bodyguard but a civilian employee assigned to him as driver by the House of
Representatives. Specifically, petitioner further argues, Arellano was instructed to return to Congress, as he did, the firearms in
compliance with the directive of its Sergeant-at-Arms pursuant to the "Gun Ban," thus, no law was in fact violated. 12

On 25 June 1992, we required COMELEC to file its own comment on the

petition13 upon manifestation of the Solicitor General that it could not take the position of COMELEC and prayed instead to be
excused from filing the required comment. 14

COMELEC claims that petitioner is charged with violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), in relation to Sec. 263, of B.P. Blg. 881 which
provides that "the principals, accomplices and accessories, as defined in the Revised Penal Code, shall be criminally liable for
election offenses." It points out that it was upon petitioner's instruction that Arellano brought the firearms in question outside
petitioner's residence, submitting that his right to be heard was not violated as he was invited by the City Prosecutor to explain the
circumstances regarding Arellano's possession of the firearms. Petitioner also filed a sworn written explanation about the incident.
Finally, COMELEC claims that violation of
the "Gun Ban" is mala prohibita, hence, the intention of the offender is immaterial. 15

Be that as it may, we find no need to delve into the alleged constitutional infirmity of Resolution No. 2327 since this petition may
be resolved without passing upon this particular issue. 16
As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority. However, this is not
absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the
seizure of evidence in plain view,17 as well as the search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared are not
illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. 18

Petitioner contends that the guns were not tucked in Arellano's waist nor placed within his reach, and that they were neatly packed
in gun cases and placed inside a bag at the back of the car. Significantly, COMELEC did not rebut this claim. The records do not
show that the manner by which the package was bundled led the PNP to suspect that it contained firearms. There was no mention
either of any report regarding any nervous, suspicious or unnatural reaction from Arellano when the car was stopped and searched.
Given these circumstances and relying on its visual observation, the PNP could not thoroughly search the car lawfully as well as
the package without violating the constitutional injunction.

An extensive search without warrant could only be resorted to if the officers conducting the search had reasonable or probable
cause to believe before the search that either the motorist was a law offender or that they would find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to the commission of a crime in the vehicle to be searched. 19 The existence of probable cause justifying the
warrantless search is determined by the facts of each case. 20 Thus, we upheld the validity of the warrantless search in situations
where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused, or where the accused was acting suspiciously,
and attempted to flee. 21

We also recognize the stop-and-search without warrant conducted by police officers on the basis of prior confidential information
which were reasonably corroborated by other attendant matters, e.g., where a confidential report that a sizeable volume of
marijuana would be transported along the route where the search was conducted and appellants were caught in flagrante
delicto transporting drugs at the time of their arrest; 22 where apart from the intelligence information, there were reports by an
undercover "deep penetration" agent that appellants were bringing prohibited drugs into the country; 23 where the information that
a Caucasian coming from Sagada bringing prohibited drugs was strengthened by the conspicuous bulge in accused's waistline, and
his suspicious failure to produce his passport and other identification papers; 24 where the physical appearance of the accused fitted
the description given in the confidential information about a woman transporting marijuana; 25 where the accused carrying a
bulging black leather bag were suspiciously quiet and nervous when queried about its contents; 26 or where the identity of the drug
courier was already established by police authorities who received confidential information about the probable arrival of accused
on board one of the vessels arriving in Dumaguete City. 27

In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters from the entrance to the Batasan Complex to
enforce Resolution
No. 2327. There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading them
to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning,
transporting firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any indication from the package
or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying circumstances
specifically pointing to the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not be valid. The action then of the policemen
unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and the security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution.
Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose
in any proceeding.

It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search constitutes an implied waiver of petitioner's right to
question the reasonableness of the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the firearms.

While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it however stressed that "guidelines shall be made to ensure
that no infringement of civil and political rights results from the implementation of this authority," and that "the places and
manner of setting up of checkpoints shall be determined in consultation with the Committee on Firearms Ban and Security
Personnel created under Sec. 5, Resolution No. 2323." 28 The facts show that PNP installed the checkpoint at about five o'clock in
the afternoon of 13 January 1992. The search was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes later. It was not shown that news of
impending checkpoints without necessarily giving their locations, and the reason for the same have been announced in the media
to forewarn the citizens. Nor did the informal checkpoint that afternoon carry signs informing the public of the purpose of its
operation. As a result, motorists passing that place did not have any inkling whatsoever about the reason behind the instant
exercise. With the authorities in control to stop and search passing vehicles, the motorists did not have any choice but to submit to
the PNP's scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout albeit innocent would raise suspicion and provide probable cause for the
police to arrest the motorist and to conduct an extensive search of his vehicle.

In the case of petitioner, only his driver was at the car at that time it was stopped for inspection. As conceded by COMELEC,
driver Arellano did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the
operation,29 driver Arellano being alone and a mere employee of petitioner could not have marshalled the strength and the courage
to protest against the extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if there was any,
could not be more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano's part to the search, and "consent" given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional guaranty.

Moreover, the manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the due process clause of the
Constitution. The facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the PNP with violation of the Omnibus Election
Code. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for such offense. The non-disclosure by the City
Prosecutor to the petitioner that he was a respondent in the preliminary investigation is violative of due process which requires
that the procedure established by law should be obeyed. 30

COMELEC argues that petitioner was given the change to be heard because he was invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor
regarding the circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver, and that petitioner in fact submitted a sworn letter of explanation
regarding the incident. This does not satisfy the requirement of due process the essence of which is the reasonable opportunity to
be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his defense. 31 Due process guarantees the observance of both
substantive and procedural rights, whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule of
court. 32 In Go v. Court of Appeals,33 we held
that —

While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional in its fundament, since it has in fact been
established by statute, it is a component part of due process in criminal justice. The right to have a preliminary investigation
conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty
is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right . . . . [T]he right to an opportunity to avoid a process painful to
anyone save, perhaps, to hardened criminals is a valuable right. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be
to deprive him of the full measure of his right to due process.

Apparently, petitioner was merely invited during the preliminary investigation of Arellano to corroborate the latter's explanation.
Petitioner then was made to believe that he was not a party respondent in the case, so that his written explanation on the incident
was only intended to exculpate Arellano, not petitioner himself. Hence, it cannot be seriously contended that petitioner was fully
given the opportunity to meet the accusation against him as he was not apprised that he was himself a respondent when he
appeared before the City Prosecutor.

Finally, it must be pointed out too that petitioner's filing of a motion for reconsideration with COMELEC cannot be considered as
a waiver of his claim to a separate preliminary investigation for himself. The motion itself expresses petitioner's vigorous
insistence on his right. Petitioner's protestation started as soon as he learned of his inclusion in the charge, and did not ease up
even after COMELEC's denial of his motion for reconsideration. This is understandably so since the prohibition against carrying
firearms bears the penalty of imprisonment of not less than one (1) year nor more than six (6) years without probation and with
disqualification from holding public office, and deprivation of the right to suffrage. Against such strong stance, petitioner clearly
did not waive his right to a preliminary investigation.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The warrantless search conducted by the Philippine National Police on 13
January 1992 is declared illegal and the firearms seized during the warrantless search cannot be used as evidence in any
proceeding against petitioner. Consequently, COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829 dated 6 April 1992 being violative of the
Constitution is SET ASIDE.

The temporary restraining order we issued on 5 May 1992 is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Romero, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, Padilla and Bidin, JJ., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur, and reiterate my objections to checkpoints in general as originally expressed in my dissent in the case of Valmonte v. De
Villa, 178 SCRA 217, where I said:
The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints it would sustain and fraught with serious
threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security ignores the
fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national
security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of
probable cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at "establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may be stopped and searched at random and at
any time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of
arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.

xxx xxx xxx

Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with the
Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.

I hope the colleagues I have behind on my retirement will reconsider the stand of the Court on checkpoints and finally dismantle
them altogether as an affront to individual liberty.

VITUG, J., concurring:

The ultimate hypothesis of sound governance is not might but the willingness of the governed to accept and subordinate
themselves to authority.

When our people gave their consent to the fundamental law of the land, they did not renounce but, to the contrary, reserved for
themselves certain rights that they held sacred and inviolable.

One such right is the privilege to be so secured "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose." Their sole conceded proviso to this rule is when a search warrant or a warrant of
arrest is lawfully issued. There are, to be sure, known exceptions, predicated on necessity and justified by good reasons, when
warrantless searches and seizures are allowed. It is in this context that I appreciate the ratio decidendi of the Court in Valmonte vs.
De Villa (178 SCRA 211). In giving its imprimatur to the installation of checkpoints, the Court clearly has based its decision on
the existence at the time of what has been so described as an "abnormal" situation that then prevailed. Evidently, the Court did not
have the intention to have its ruling continue to apply to less aberrant circumstances than previously obtaining.

The question has been asked: Between the security of the State and its due preservation, on the one hand, and the
constitutionally-guaranteed right of an individual, on the other hand, which should be held to prevail? There is no choice to my
mind not for any other reason than because there is, in the first place, utterly no need to make a choice. The two are not
incompatible; neither are they necessarily opposed to each other. Both can be preserved; indeed, the vitality of one is the strength
of the other.

There should be ways to curb the ills of society so severe as they might seem. A disregard of constitutional mandates or an abuse
on the citizenry, I am most certain, is not the answer. It might pay to listen to the words of Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz when he
said, "(u)nless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with
the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty."

It is a welcome note that in the subsequent case of Bagalihog vs. Fernandez (198 SCRA 614), the Court has expressed:

This guaranty is one of the greatest of individual liberties and was already recognized even during the days of the absolute
monarchies, when the king could do no wrong. On this right, Cooley wrote: "Awe surrounded and majesty clothed the King, but
the humblest subject might shut the door of his cottage against him and defend from intrusion that privacy which was as sacred as
the kingly prerogatives.

The provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The mere fact that in the private respondent's view the crime involved is "heinous"
and the victim was "a man of consequence" did not authorize disregard of the constitutional guaranty. Neither did "superior
orders" condone the omission for they could not in any case be superior to the Constitution.

While it gives me great comfort to concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, in hisponencia, I would
express, nonetheless, the humble view that even on the above constitutional aspect, the petition could rightly be granted.
REGALADO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. in his opinion wherein he concurs with the majority ruling that with respect to petitioner Aniag,
Resolution No. 92-0829 of respondent commission should be set aside, not because of an unconstitutional warrantless search but
by reason of the fact that he was not actually charged as a respondent in the preliminary investigation of the case.

With regard to petitioner's driver, Ernesto Arellano, although he was not impleaded as a co-petitioner in the present recourse, the
nullification of said Resolution No. 92-0829 necessarily applies to him and redounds to his benefit. To the extent, therefore, that
the majority opinion thereby reinstate the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor dismissing the charge against Arellano, I
concur in that result.

However, even as a simple matter of consistency but more in point of law, I dissent from the rationale submitted therefor, that is,
that Arellano was the victim of an unlawful search without a warrant. The pertinent facts stated by the majority readily yield the
conclusion that there was consent on the part of Arellano to the search of the car then under his control, particularly of its baggage
compartment where the firearms were discovered. As held in People vs. Excela, et al.,1 consent to a search may be given expressly
or impliedly, and as early as People vs. Malasugui,2the settled rule is that a search may be validly conducted without a warrant if
the person searched consented thereto.

I would prefer to sustain the exoneration of Ernesto Arellano on the justifying circumstance that he was acting in obedience to
what he innocently believed to be a lawful order of a superior, that is, the instructions of his employer, petitioner Aniag, who was
himself acting upon and in compliance with Resolution No. 2323 of respondent commission which was implemented by the
Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives.

The said justifying circumstance provided in paragraph 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code can be given suppletory effect to
special laws like B.P. Blg. 881 and R.A. No. 7166 by force of Article 10 of the same Code. There is no prohibition therefor in the
cited provisions of B.P. Blg. 881 in relation to R.A. No. 7166, nor is there any legal impossibility for such suppletory application
whether by express provision or by necessary implication. And even if the order of petitioner Aniag may be considered as illegal,
Arellano acted thereon in good faith3 and under a mistake of fact as to its legality, hence his exculpation is ineludibly
dictated. Ignorantia facti excusat.

It being evident from the very records and the factual findings adopted in the majority opinion that no error was committed by the
Office of the City Prosecutor in dismissing the charge against Ernesto Arellano for lack of sufficient grounds to engender a well
founded belief that a crime had been committed and that he was probably guilty thereof, 4 respondent commission acted with
grave abuse of discretion in arriving at a contrary conclusion and directing his prosecution in its Resolution No. 92-0829.

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

I regret that I can concur only in the result, viz., the granting of the petition.

Considering the specific issues raised by the petitioner which, as stated in the exordium of the majority opinion, are whether (a)
COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, dated 26 December 1991, is unconstitutional, and (b) COMELEC Resolutions No. 92-0829,
dated 6 April 1992, and No. 92-0999, dated 23 April 1992, have legal and factual bases, I am unable to agree with the specific
disposition declaring (a) illegal the warrantless search conducted by the Philippine National Police (PNP) on 13 January 1992, (b)
inadmissible
in evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner the firearms seized during such warrantless search, and (c) unconstitutional
COMELEC Resolution
No. 92-0829.

1. Having declined to rule on the constitutionality of Resolution

No. 2327 because "this petition may be resolved without passing upon this particular issue" (first paragraph, page 10, Ponencia),
this Court may no longer inquire into the constitutionality of the spot checkpoints authorized to be established thereunder. And
whether the warrantless search conducted by the PNP at the checkpoint was valid, it being assumed that it would have been,
provided there existed a probable cause therefor, is a question of fact whose presentation in this case is either procedurally
premature, or one which this Court cannot, with definiteness, resolve considering the obvious paucity of the facts before it. The
most the majority opinion can state is that "[t]here was no evidence to show that the police were impelled to do so because of a
confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description furnished by their informant
were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any
indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen." Nothing more
could be expected at this stage since the records of the proceedings conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor and the
COMELEC are not before this Court. A declaration of invalidity of the warrantless search and of the inadmissibility in evidence
of the firearms seized would thus be premature.

It may additionally be relevant to state that the search was not in connection with the crime of illegal possession of firearms,
which would have been factually and legally baseless since the firearms involved were licensed and were duly issued to the
petitioner by the House of Representatives, but for the violation of the gun ban which was validly decreed by the COMELEC
pursuant to its constitutional power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum; and recall (Section 2(1), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution), its statutory authority to have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring
free, orderly, and honest elections (Section 52, Omnibus Election Code), and its statutory authority to promulgate rules and
regulations implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws which the COMELEC is required to enforce
and administer (Section 52(c), Id.; Section 35, R.A. No. 7166), in relation to paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election
Code which prohibits the carrying of firearms outside the residence or place of business during the election period unless
authorized in writing by the COMELEC, and Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 which prohibits any person from bearing, carrying, or
transporting firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle, or public
conveyance, even if such person is licensed to possess or carry the same during the election period, unless authorized in writing by
the COMELEC.

In this case, the petitioner himself admits that on 10 January 1992 he was requested by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of
Representatives to return the two firearms issued to him, and that on 13 January 1992, he instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano,
to pick up the firearms from his (petitioner's) house at Valle Verde and to return them to the House of Representatives. That day
was already within the election period, which commenced the day earlier pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2314 (In The
Matter of Fixing The Schedule of Activities in Connection With the Elections of National and Local Officials on May 11, 1992),
promulgated on 20 November 1991. Considering then that the offense for which he was to be charged was for the violation of
paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, which, in view of his
aforesaid admissions, renders unnecessary the offer in evidence of the seized firearms, I fail to grasp the rationale of a ruling on
the admissibility in evidence of the firearms.

2. COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829, dated 6 April 1992, should not be set aside on the ground of unconstitutionality. It simply
directed the filing of an information against the petitioner and Arellano for the violation
of paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, and directed the
petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position, pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Sections 32, 33, and 35 of R.A. No. 7166 and paragraph (c), Section 52 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Insofar as Arellano is concerned, he is not a petitioner in this case. Moreover, as to him, the resolution was nothing
more than a disapproval of the recommendation of the Office of the City Prosecutor to dismiss the complaint against him. As
against the petitioner, there was no denial of due process because the petitioner was later heard on his motion for reconsideration.
Moreover, the right of an accused to a preliminary investigation is not a creation of the Constitution; its origin is statutory
(Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinglupa, Inc. vs. Dominguez, 205
SCRA 92 [1992]).

The fatal flaw of Resolution No. 92-0829 lies in its directive to file the information against the petitioner despite the fact that he
was never formally charged before the Office of the City Prosecutor. There was only an "'unofficial' charge imputed against" him.
The COMELEC then acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction.

I vote then to grant the petition, but solely on the ground that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in directing the
filing of an information against the petitioner for the violation of paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in
relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166.

Melo, J., concurs.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., concurring:

I concur, and reiterate my objections to checkpoints in general as originally expressed in my dissent in the case of Valmonte v. De
Villa, 178 SCRA 217, where I said:

The sweeping statements in the majority opinion are as dangerous as the checkpoints it would sustain and fraught with serious
threats to individual liberty. The bland declaration that individual rights must yield to the demands of national security ignores the
fact that the Bill of Rights was intended precisely to limit the authority of the State even if asserted on the ground of national
security. What is worse is that the searches and seizures are peremptorily pronounced to be reasonable even without proof of
probable cause and much less the required warrant. The improbable excuse is that they are aimed at "establishing an effective
territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political
development of the National Capital Region." For these purposes, every individual may be stopped and searched at random and at
any time simply because he excites the suspicion, caprice, hostility or malice of the officers manning the checkpoints, on pain of
arrest or worse, even being shot to death, if he resists.

xxx xxx xxx

Unless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with the
Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty.

I hope the colleagues I have behind on my retirement will reconsider the stand of the Court on checkpoints and finally dismantle
them altogether as an affront to individual liberty.

VITUG, J., concurring:

The ultimate hypothesis of sound governance is not might but the willingness of the governed to accept and subordinate
themselves to authority.

When our people gave their consent to the fundamental law of the land, they did not renounce but, to the contrary, reserved for
themselves certain rights that they held sacred and inviolable.

One such right is the privilege to be so secured "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose." Their sole conceded proviso to this rule is when a search warrant or a warrant of
arrest is lawfully issued. There are, to be sure, known exceptions, predicated on necessity and justified by good reasons, when
warrantless searches and seizures are allowed. It is in this context that I appreciate the ratio decidendi of the Court in Valmonte vs.
De Villa (178 SCRA 211). In giving its imprimatur to the installation of checkpoints, the Court clearly has based its decision on
the existence at the time of what has been so described as an "abnormal" situation that then prevailed. Evidently, the Court did not
have the intention to have its ruling continue to apply to less aberrant circumstances than previously obtaining.

The question has been asked: Between the security of the State and its due preservation, on the one hand, and the
constitutionally-guaranteed right of an individual, on the other hand, which should be held to prevail? There is no choice to my
mind not for any other reason than because there is, in the first place, utterly no need to make a choice. The two are not
incompatible; neither are they necessarily opposed to each other. Both can be preserved; indeed, the vitality of one is the strength
of the other.

There should be ways to curb the ills of society so severe as they might seem. A disregard of constitutional mandates or an abuse
on the citizenry, I am most certain, is not the answer. It might pay to listen to the words of Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz when he
said, "(u)nless we are vigilant of our rights, we may find ourselves back to the dark era of the truncheon and the barbed wire, with
the Court itself a captive of its own complaisance and sitting at the death-bed of liberty."

It is a welcome note that in the subsequent case of Bagalihog vs. Fernandez (198 SCRA 614), the Court has expressed:

This guaranty is one of the greatest of individual liberties and was already recognized even during the days of the absolute
monarchies, when the king could do no wrong. On this right, Cooley wrote: "Awe surrounded and majesty clothed the King, but
the humblest subject might shut the door of his cottage against him and defend from intrusion that privacy which was as sacred as
the kingly prerogatives.

The provision protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty but are nevertheless to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. The mere fact that in the private respondent's view the crime involved is "heinous"
and the victim was "a man of consequence" did not authorize disregard of the constitutional guaranty. Neither did "superior
orders" condone the omission for they could not in any case be superior to the Constitution.

While it gives me great comfort to concur with my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, in hisponencia, I would
express, nonetheless, the humble view that even on the above constitutional aspect, the petition could rightly be granted.

REGALADO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I join Mr. Justice Davide, Jr. in his opinion wherein he concurs with the majority ruling that with respect to petitioner Aniag,
Resolution No. 92-0829 of respondent commission should be set aside, not because of an unconstitutional warrantless search but
by reason of the fact that he was not actually charged as a respondent in the preliminary investigation of the case.

With regard to petitioner's driver, Ernesto Arellano, although he was not impleaded as a co-petitioner in the present recourse, the
nullification of said Resolution No. 92-0829 necessarily applies to him and redounds to his benefit. To the extent, therefore, that
the majority opinion thereby reinstate the resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor dismissing the charge against Arellano, I
concur in that result.

However, even as a simple matter of consistency but more in point of law, I dissent from the rationale submitted therefor, that is,
that Arellano was the victim of an unlawful search without a warrant. The pertinent facts stated by the majority readily yield the
conclusion that there was consent on the part of Arellano to the search of the car then under his control, particularly of its baggage
compartment where the firearms were discovered. As held in People vs. Excela, et al.,1 consent to a search may be given expressly
or impliedly, and as early as People vs. Malasugui,2the settled rule is that a search may be validly conducted without a warrant if
the person searched consented thereto.

I would prefer to sustain the exoneration of Ernesto Arellano on the justifying circumstance that he was acting in obedience to
what he innocently believed to be a lawful order of a superior, that is, the instructions of his employer, petitioner Aniag, who was
himself acting upon and in compliance with Resolution No. 2323 of respondent commission which was implemented by the
Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives.

The said justifying circumstance provided in paragraph 6, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code can be given suppletory effect to
special laws like B.P. Blg. 881 and R.A. No. 7166 by force of Article 10 of the same Code. There is no prohibition therefor in the
cited provisions of B.P. Blg. 881 in relation to R.A. No. 7166, nor is there any legal impossibility for such suppletory application
whether by express provision or by necessary implication. And even if the order of petitioner Aniag may be considered as illegal,
Arellano acted thereon in good faith3 and under a mistake of fact as to its legality, hence his exculpation is ineludibly
dictated. Ignorantia facti excusat.

It being evident from the very records and the factual findings adopted in the majority opinion that no error was committed by the
Office of the City Prosecutor in dismissing the charge against Ernesto Arellano for lack of sufficient grounds to engender a well
founded belief that a crime had been committed and that he was probably guilty thereof, 4 respondent commission acted with
grave abuse of discretion in arriving at a contrary conclusion and directing his prosecution in its Resolution No. 92-0829.

DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring and dissenting:

I regret that I can concur only in the result, viz., the granting of the petition.

Considering the specific issues raised by the petitioner which, as stated in the exordium of the majority opinion, are whether (a)
COMELEC Resolution No. 2327, dated 26 December 1991, is unconstitutional, and (b) COMELEC Resolutions No. 92-0829,
dated 6 April 1992, and No. 92-0999, dated 23 April 1992, have legal and factual bases, I am unable to agree with the specific
disposition declaring (a) illegal the warrantless search conducted by the Philippine National Police (PNP) on 13 January 1992, (b)
inadmissible
in evidence in any proceeding against the petitioner the firearms seized during such warrantless search, and (c) unconstitutional
COMELEC Resolution
No. 92-0829.

1. Having declined to rule on the constitutionality of Resolution

No. 2327 because "this petition may be resolved without passing upon this particular issue" (first paragraph, page 10, Ponencia),
this Court may no longer inquire into the constitutionality of the spot checkpoints authorized to be established thereunder. And
whether the warrantless search conducted by the PNP at the checkpoint was valid, it being assumed that it would have been,
provided there existed a probable cause therefor, is a question of fact whose presentation in this case is either procedurally
premature, or one which this Court cannot, with definiteness, resolve considering the obvious paucity of the facts before it. The
most the majority opinion can state is that "[t]here was no evidence to show that the police were impelled to do so because of a
confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description furnished by their informant
were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any
indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen." Nothing more
could be expected at this stage since the records of the proceedings conducted by the Office of the City Prosecutor and the
COMELEC are not before this Court. A declaration of invalidity of the warrantless search and of the inadmissibility in evidence
of the firearms seized would thus be premature.
It may additionally be relevant to state that the search was not in connection with the crime of illegal possession of firearms,
which would have been factually and legally baseless since the firearms involved were licensed and were duly issued to the
petitioner by the House of Representatives, but for the violation of the gun ban which was validly decreed by the COMELEC
pursuant to its constitutional power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum; and recall (Section 2(1), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution), its statutory authority to have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring
free, orderly, and honest elections (Section 52, Omnibus Election Code), and its statutory authority to promulgate rules and
regulations implementing the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code or other laws which the COMELEC is required to enforce
and administer (Section 52(c), Id.; Section 35, R.A. No. 7166), in relation to paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election
Code which prohibits the carrying of firearms outside the residence or place of business during the election period unless
authorized in writing by the COMELEC, and Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166 which prohibits any person from bearing, carrying, or
transporting firearms or other deadly weapons in public places, including any building, street, park, private vehicle, or public
conveyance, even if such person is licensed to possess or carry the same during the election period, unless authorized in writing by
the COMELEC.

In this case, the petitioner himself admits that on 10 January 1992 he was requested by the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of
Representatives to return the two firearms issued to him, and that on 13 January 1992, he instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano,
to pick up the firearms from his (petitioner's) house at Valle Verde and to return them to the House of Representatives. That day
was already within the election period, which commenced the day earlier pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2314 (In The
Matter of Fixing The Schedule of Activities in Connection With the Elections of National and Local Officials on May 11, 1992),
promulgated on 20 November 1991. Considering then that the offense for which he was to be charged was for the violation of
paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, which, in view of his
aforesaid admissions, renders unnecessary the offer in evidence of the seized firearms, I fail to grasp the rationale of a ruling on
the admissibility in evidence of the firearms.

2. COMELEC Resolution No. 92-0829, dated 6 April 1992, should not be set aside on the ground of unconstitutionality. It simply
directed the filing of an information against the petitioner and Arellano for the violation
of paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166, and directed the
petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position, pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 2327, in relation to Sections 32, 33, and 35 of R.A. No. 7166 and paragraph (c), Section 52 of the Omnibus
Election Code. Insofar as Arellano is concerned, he is not a petitioner in this case. Moreover, as to him, the resolution was nothing
more than a disapproval of the recommendation of the Office of the City Prosecutor to dismiss the complaint against him. As
against the petitioner, there was no denial of due process because the petitioner was later heard on his motion for reconsideration.
Moreover, the right of an accused to a preliminary investigation is not a creation of the Constitution; its origin is statutory
(Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod ng mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinglupa, Inc. vs. Dominguez, 205
SCRA 92 [1992]).

The fatal flaw of Resolution No. 92-0829 lies in its directive to file the information against the petitioner despite the fact that he
was never formally charged before the Office of the City Prosecutor. There was only an "'unofficial' charge imputed against" him.
The COMELEC then acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want or excess of jurisdiction.

I vote then to grant the petition, but solely on the ground that the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in directing the
filing of an information against the petitioner for the violation of paragraph (q), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, in
relation to Section 32 of R.A. No. 7166.

Melo, J., concurs.

G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008

SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, petitioners,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioners Spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez seeking to annul and set
aside the Resolutions, dated 11 June 20041 and 27 January 20052 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in E.O. Case No.
2000-36. In the Resolution of 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Bancdirected the Law Department to file the appropriate
Information with the proper court against petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for violation of Section 10(g)
and (j)3 in relation to Section 45(j)4 of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as The Voter’s Registration Act of
1996.5 Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration thereon was denied.

The factual antecedents leading to the instant Petition are presented hereunder:

On 12 July 2000, private respondent Dennis Garay, along with Angelino Apostol 6 filed a Complaint-Affidavit7 with the
COMELEC thru the Office of the Election Officer in Burauen, Leyte, charging petitioners with violation of Section
261(y)(2)8 and Section 261(y)(5)9 of the Omnibus Election Code, similarly referred to as Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and Section
1210 of Republic Act No. 8189.

Private respondent deposed, inter alia, that: petitioners are of legal ages and residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street,
Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City; on 9 May 2000 and 11 May 2000, petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R.
Romualdez, applied for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, as evidenced by
Voter Registration Record Nos. 42454095 and 07902952, respectively; in their sworn applications, petitioners made false and
untruthful representations in violation of Section 10 11 of Republic Act Nos. 8189, by indicating therein that they are residents of
935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa
Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City, and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV,
Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823; and that petitioners,
knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in said applications corresponding to the
length of time which they have resided in Burauen, Leyte. In fine, private respondent charged petitioners, to wit:

Respondent-spouses, Carlos Sison Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez committed and consummated election offenses in
violation of our election laws, specifically, Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (2), for knowingly making any false or
untruthful statements relative to any data or information required in the application for registration, and of Sec. 261, paragraph (y),
subparagraph (5), committed by any person who, being a registered voter, registers anew without filing an application for
cancellation of his previous registration, both of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881), and of Sec. 12, RA 8189 (Voter
Registration Act) for failure to apply for transfer of registration records due to change of residence to another city or
municipality."12

The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence
so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution
of the same.

Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss13 dated 2 April 2001. They contended therein that they did not
make any false or untruthful statements in their application for registration. They avowed that they intended to reside in Burauen,
Leyte, since the year 1989. On 9 May 2000, they took actual residence in Burauen, Leyte, by leasing for five (5) years, the house
of Juanito and Fe Renomeron at No. 935, San Jose Street in Burauen, Leyte. On even date, the Barangay District III Council of
Burauen passed a Resolution of Welcome, expressing therein its gratitude and appreciation to petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for
choosing the Barangay as his official residence.14

On 28 November 2003, Atty. Maria Norina S. Tangaro-Casingal, COMELEC Investigating Officer, issued a Resolution,
recommending to the COMELEC Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division), the filing of the appropriate
Information against petitioners, disposing, thus:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division), RECOMMENDS to file the
necessary information against Carlos Sison Romualdez before the proper Regional Trial Court for violation of Section 10 (g) and
(j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of Republic Act 8189 and to authorize the Director IV of the Law Department to designate a
Comelec Prosecutor to handle the prosecution of the case with the duty to submit periodic report after every hearing of the case.15

On 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc found no reason to depart from the recommendatory Resolution of 28 November 2003,
and ordered, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Law Department is hereby directed to file the appropriate information with the proper
court against respondents CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA ROMUALDEZ for violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in
relation to Section 45 (j) of the Republic Act No. 8189. 16

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon.

Acting on the Motion, the COMELEC found no cogent reason to disturb the assailed En Banc Resolution of 11 June
2004,17 rationalizing, thus:

However, perusal of the records reveal (sic) that the arguments and issues raised in the Motion for Reconsideration are merely a
rehash of the arguments advanced by the Respondents in [their] Memorandum received by the Law Department on 17 April 2001,
the same [w]as already considered by the Investigating Officer and was discussed in her recommendation which eventually was
made as the basis for the En Banc’s resolution.

As aptly observed by the Investigating Officer, the filing of request for the cancellation and transfer of Voting Registration Record
does not automatically cancel the registration records. The fact remains that at the time of application for registration as new voter
of the herein Respondents on May 9 and 11, 2001 in the Office of Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte their registration in
Barangay 4419-A, Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame Quezon City was still valid and subsisting. 18

On 12 January 2006, Alioden D. Dalaig, Director IV, Law Department of the COMELEC filed with the RTC, Burauen, Leyte,
separate Informations against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez19 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189, and against petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez 20 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189, subsequently docketed as Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4185 and Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4183,
respectively. Moreover, separate Informations for violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189
were filed against petitioners.21

Hence, petitioners come to us via the instant Petition, submitting the following arguments:

RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR

IN EXCESS OF ITS JURISDICTION; and

II

COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PREMISED ITS RESOLUTION ON A MISAPPREHENSION
OF FACTS AND FAILED TO CONSIDER CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT
CONCLUSION.22

On 4 May 2006, petitioners filed a Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for
Indirect Contempt,23 alleging that two separate Informations, both dated 12 January 2006, were filed with the RTC by the
COMELEC against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No.
8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9184; and for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No.
8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9185. Similarly, the Motion alleged that the COMELEC filed with the RTC, two separate
Informations, both dated 12 January 2006, against petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez, charging her with the same offenses as those
charged against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez, and thereafter, docketed as Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9182, and No.
BN-06-03-9183.

On 20 June 2006, this Court issued a Resolution24 denying for lack of merit petitioners’ Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of
Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt.

We shall now resolve, in seriatim, the arguments raised by petitioners.

Petitioners contend that the election offenses for which they are charged by private respondent are entirely different from those
which they stand to be accused of before the RTC by the COMELEC. According to petitioners, private respondent’s complaint
charged them for allegedly violating, to wit: 1) Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code, and 2)
Section 12 of the Voter’s Registration Act; however, the COMELEC En Bancdirected in the assailed Resolutions, that they be
charged for violations of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of the Voter’s Registration Act. Essentially, petitioners
are of the view that they were not accorded due process of law. Specifically, their right to refute or submit documentary evidence
against the new charges which COMELEC ordered to be filed against them. Moreover, petitioners insist that Section 45(j) of the
Voter’s Registration Act is vague as it does not refer to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an
election offense; hence, it runs contrary to Section 14(1) 25 and Section 14(2),26 Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

We are not persuaded.

First. The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched in a language which embraces the
allegations necessary to support the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No.
8189.

A reading of the relevant laws is in order, thus:

Section 10(g) and Section 10(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, provide as follows:

SEC. 10 – Registration of Voters. - A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or
municipality wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an
application form for registration as prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any date
during office hours after having acquired the qualifications of a voter.

The application shall contain the following data:

xxxx

(g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;

xxxx

(j) A statement that the application is not a registered voter of any precinct;

The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of the applicant, clear and legible rolled prints of his
left and right thumbprints, with four identification size copies of his latest photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at the expense
of the Commission.

Before the applicant accomplishes his application for registration, the Election Officer shall inform him of the qualifications and
disqualifications prescribed by law for a voter, and thereafter, see to it that the accomplished application contains all the data
therein required and that the applicant’s specimen signatures, fingerprints, and photographs are properly affixed in all copies of
the voter’s application.

Moreover, Section 45(j) of the same Act, recites, thus:

SEC. 45. Election Offense. – The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act:

xxxx

(j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.

Significantly, the allegations in the Complaint-Affidavit which was filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC, support the
charge directed by the COMELEC En Banc to be filed against petitioners with the RTC. Even a mere perusal of the
Complaint-Affidavit would readily show that Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 was specifically mentioned therein. On the
matter of the acts covered by Section 10(g) and (j), the Complaint-Affidavit, spells out the following allegations, to wit:

5. Respondent-spouses made false and untruthful representations in their applications (Annexes "B" and "C") in violation of the
requirements of Section 10, RA 8189 (The Voter’s Registration Act):

5.1 Respondent-spouses, in their sworn applications (Annexes "B" and "C", claimed to be residents of 935 San Jose [S]treet,
Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa [S]treet, Bagong
Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct
No. 4419-A, a copy of the Certification issued by Hon. Emmanuel V. Gozon, Punong Barangay, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
Quezon City is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof, as Annex "D";

5.2 Respondent-spouses knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in their applications
(Annexes "B" and "C") corresponding to the length of time they have resided in Burauen, Leyte;

6. Respondent-spouses, in (sic) all intents and purposes, were and still are residents and registered voters of Quezon City, as
evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823, respectively; photocopies of which are hereto attached as
Annexes "E" and "F"[.] Likewise, attached is a "Certification" (Annex "G") of Ms. Evelyn B. Bautista, Officer-in-Charge of the
Office of the Election Officer, Fourth District, Quezon City, dated May 31, 2000, together with a certified copy of the computer
print-out of the list of voters of Precinct No. 4419-A (Annex "G-1" ) containing the names of voters Carlos Romualdez and
Erlinda Reyes Romualdez. The Certification reads as follows:

"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that as per office record MR. CARLOS ROMUALDEZ and MS. ERLINDA REYES ROMUALDEZ are
registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct Number 4419A with voters affidavit
serial nos. 26195824 and 26195823, respectively.

This certification is issued for whatever legal purpose it may serve."

7. Respondent-spouses, registered as new voters of the Municipality of Burauen, Leyte, [in spite of] the fact that they were and
still are, registered voters of Quezon City as early as June 22, 1997;

7.1 That, Double Registration is an election offense.

A person qualified as a voter is only allowed to register once.

If a person registers anew as a voter in spite of a subsisting registration, the new application for registration will be disapproved.
The registrant is also liable not only for an election offense of double registration, but also for another election offense of
knowingly making any false or untruthful statement relative to any data or information required in the application for registration.

In fact, when a person applies for registration as a voter, he or she fills up a Voter Registration Record form in his or her own
handwriting, which contains a Certification which reads:

"I do solemnly swear that the above statements regarding my person are true and correct; that I possess all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications of a voter; that the thumbprints, specimen signatures and photographs appearing herein are mine; and
that I am not registered as a voter in any other precinct."27

Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election offenses charged against them by private
respondent are entirely different from those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC.
In the first place, there appears to be no incongruity between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the
Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to be covered
by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently,
the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC, were
based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.

Petitioners buttress their claim of lack of due process by relying on the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary.28Citing Lacson,
petitioners argue that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or
Information; and that the object of such written accusations was to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge
against him, as will enable him to make his defense. Let it be said that, in Lacson, this court resolved the issue of whether under
the allegations in the subject Informations therein, it is the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over
the multiple murder case against therein petitioner and intervenors. In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the
jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence presented by the
parties at the trial.29 Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption
or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being
conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information. 30

Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due process because, as we have said, the charges
contained in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based on the
same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the criminal charges in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges
contained in the Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that,
petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or submit documentary evidence against the charges that the COMELEC
filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the allegations in
private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint
Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum
before the said body. Finding that due process was not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with
the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners were reasonably apprised of the nature and description of the
charges against them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary investigations were conducted whereby petitioners were
informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to adduce controverting
evidence for their defense. In all these stages, petitioners actively participated.

The instant case calls to our minds Orquinaza v. People,31 wherein the concerned police officer therein designated the offense
charged as sexual harassment; but, the prosecutor found that there was no transgression of the anti-sexual harassment law, and
instead, filed an Information charging therein petitioner with acts of lasciviousness. On a claim that there was deprivation of due
process, therein petitioner argued that the Information for acts of lasciviousness was void as the preliminary investigation
conducted was for sexual harassment. The court held that the designation by the police officer of the offense is not conclusive as it
is within the competence of the prosecutor to assess the evidence submitted and determine therefrom the appropriate offense to be
charged.

Accordingly, the court pronounced that the complaint contained all the allegations to support the charge of acts of lasciviousness
under the Revised Penal Code; hence, the conduct of another preliminary investigation for the offense of acts of lasciviousness
would be a futile exercise because the complainant would only be presenting the same facts and evidence which have already been
studied by the prosecutor.32 The court frowns upon such superfluity which only serves to delay the prosecution and disposition of
the criminal complaint.33

Second. Petitioners would have this court declare Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 vague, on the ground that it contravenes
the fair notice requirement of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of thereof.
Petitioners submit that Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 makes no reference to a definite provision of the law, the violation
of which would constitute an election offense.

We are not convinced.

The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application.34 However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in
the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This Court has declared that facial invalidation 35 or an "on-its-face" invalidation of
criminal statutes is not appropriate.36 We have so enunciated in no uncertain terms in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 37 thus:

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces"
statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service
when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to
other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness
challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found
vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.'" (underscoring supplied)

"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity." While mentioned in passing
in some cases, the void-for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v.
Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause, not because it was
vague. Adiong v. Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held that a
portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not because of vagueness.

Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not
have even reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of "actual case
and controversy" and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v.
Harris, this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:

"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the
statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided."

For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a "manifestly strong medicine"
to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its
provisions that have allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has
been charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring to the fore the purported
ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge. An appropriate "as applied"
challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No.
8189—the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law covering provisions which are
alien to petitioners’ case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing
case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory.

We further quote the relevant ruling in David v. Arroyo on the proscription anent a facial challenge: 38

Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects legitimate state interest in
maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered "harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, it was
held:

It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and when such summary
action is inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an
exception to our traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise
unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct even if
expressive falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining
comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.

Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only "spoken
words" and again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017
pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last
resort," and is "generally disfavored;" The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional
adjudication is the principle that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it
may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court. A writer and scholar in
Constitutional Law explains further:

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of
constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her;
if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper
applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties
and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the
rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad
law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart
from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not
courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the court
to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect
on the speech of those third parties.

In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws
and defects, not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.

Xxx xxx xxx

And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even
attempt to show whether this situation exists.

Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.

Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is subject to the same principles
governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And
like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.
Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a
sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. 39 This Court
has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude.40

As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) is,
without doubt, crystal in its specification that a violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense.
The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The challenged provision renders itself to no other interpretation. A reading of the
challenged provision involves no guesswork. We do not see herein an uncertainty that makes the same vague.

Notably, herein petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged provision, the import or meaning of which they do not understand.
This is in stark contrast to the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan42 where therein petitioner sought for statutory definition of
particular words in the challenged statute. Even then, the Court in Estrada rejected the argument.

This Court reasoned:

The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general
terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to define
every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define
each and every word in an enactment.Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so
define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the
legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law."

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural,
plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special
legal meaning to those words. The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to
use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.

Perforce, this Court has underlined that an act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its
wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the
details in advance as in all other statutes.43

The evident intent of the legislature in including in the catena of election offenses the violation of any of the provisions of
Republic Act No. 8189, is to subsume as punishable, not only the commission of proscribed acts, but also the omission of acts
enjoined to be observed. On this score, the declared policy of Republic Act No. 8189 is illuminating. The law articulates the
policy of the State to systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated
list of voters. A reading of Section 45 (j) conjointly with the provisions upon which petitioners are charged, i.e., Sections 10 (g)
and (j) would reveal that the matters that are required to be set forth under the aforesaid sections are crucial to the achievement of
a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters. The factual information required by the law is sought not for mere
embellishment.

There is a definitive governmental purpose when the law requires that such facts should be set forth in the application. The periods
of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration delve into the matter of residency, a requisite which a voter must
satisfy to be deemed a qualified voter and registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality
wherein he resides. Of even rationality exists in the case of the requirement in Section 10 (j), mandating that the applicant should
state that he/she is not a registered voter of any precinct. Multiple voting by so-called flying voters are glaring anomalies which
this country strives to defeat. The requirement that such facts as required by Section 10 (g) and Section 10 (j) be stated in the
voter’s application form for registration is directly relevant to the right of suffrage, which the State has the right to regulate.

It is the opportune time to allude to the case of People v. Gatchalian44 where the therein assailed law contains a similar provision
as herein assailed before us. Republic Act No. 602 also penalizes any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of the
Act. The Court dismissed the challenged, and declared the provision constitutional. The Court in Gatchalian read the challenged
provision, "any of the provisions of this [A]ct" conjointly with Section 3 thereof which was the pertinent portion of the law upon
which therein accused was prosecuted. Gatchalian considered the terms as all-embracing; hence, the same must include what is
enjoined in Section 3 thereof which embodies the very fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted. This Court ruled
that the law by legislative fiat intends to punish not only those expressly declared unlawful but even those not so declared but are
clearly enjoined to be observed to carry out the fundamental purpose of the law.45 Gatchalian remains good law, and stands
unchallenged.
It also does not escape the mind of this Court that the phraseology in Section 45(j) is employed by Congress in a number of our
laws.46 These provisions have not been declared unconstitutional.

Moreover, every statute has in its favor the presumption of validity.47 To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative.48 We hold that petitioners
failed to overcome the heavy presumption in favor of the law. Its constitutionality must be upheld in the absence of substantial
grounds for overthrowing the same.

A salient point. Courts will refrain from touching upon the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the
very lis mota. In the case at bar, the lis mota is the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC in finding probable cause
for the filing of criminal charges against petitioners.

Third. Petitioners maintain that the COMELEC En Banc, premised its finding on a misapprehension of facts, and committed grave
abuse of discretion in directing the filing of Informations against them with the RTC.

We are once again unimpressed.

The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the COMELEC finds statutory expression under Section 265 49 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. 50 The task of the COMELEC whenever any election offense
charge is filed before it is to conduct the preliminary investigation of the case, and make a determination of probable cause. Under
Section 8(b), Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the investigating officer makes a determination of whether there is a
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed. 51 In Baytan v. COMELEC,52 this Court, sufficiently elucidated on
the matter of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses, viz:

It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the COMELEC's sound
discretion. The COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for
violation of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offense and malpractices. Generally, the Court
will not interfere with such finding of the COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates
from the COMELEC's exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election
laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law. 53

It is succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of probable cause by the COMELEC in the absence of grave abuse
of discretion. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.54

According to the COMELEC En Banc, the investigating officer, in the case at bar, held that there was sufficient cause for the
filing of criminal charges against petitioners, and found no reason to depart therefrom. Without question, on May 9 and 11 of 2001,
petitioners applied for registration as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the
existence of petitioners’ registration records as registered voters of Precinct No. 4419-A of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
District IV, Quezon City. The directive by the COMELEC which affirmed the Resolution 55 of 28 November 2000 of Investigating
Officer Atty. Tangaro-Casingal does not appear to be wanting in factual basis, such that a reasonably prudent man would conclude
that there exists probable cause to hold petitioners for trial. Thus, in the aforesaid Resolution, the Investigating Officer, found:

A violation therefore of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense.

In the instant case, when respondents Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez filed their respective applications for registration
as new voters with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte on May 9 and 11, 2001, respectively, they stated under
oath that they are not registered voters in other precinct (VRR Nos. 42454095 and 07902941). However, contrary to their
statements, records show they are still registered voters of Precinct No. 4419-A, barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV,
Quezon City, as per VRR Nos. 26195825 and 26195823. In other words, respondents’ registration records in Quezon City is (sic)
still in existence.

While it may be true that respondents had written the City Election Officer of District IV, Quezon City for cancellation of their
voter’s registration record as voter’s (sic) therein, they cannot presume that the same will be favorably acted upon. Besides, RA
8189 provides for the procedure in cases of transfer of residence to another city/municipality which must be complied with, to wit:

"Section 12. Change of Residence to Another City or Municipality. – Any registered voter who has transferred residence to
another city or municipality may apply with the Election Officer of his new residence for the transfer of his registration records.
The application for transfer of registration shall be subject to the requirements of notice and hearing and the approval of the
Election Registration Board, in accordance with this Act. Upon approval, of the application for transfer, and after notice of such
approval to the Election Officer of their former residence of the voter, said Election Officer shall transmit by registered mail the
voter’s registration record to the Election Officer of the voter’s new residence."

They cannot claim ignorance of the abovestated provision on the procedure for transfer of registration records by reason of
transferred new residence to another municipality. Based on the affidavit executed by one Eufemia S. Cotoner, she alleged that the
refusal of the Assistant Election Officer Ms. Estrella Perez to accept the letter of respondents was due to improper procedure
because respondents should have filed the required request for transfer with the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte. Despite this
knowledge, however, they proceeded to register as new voters of Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of their previous
registrations in Quezon City.

In their subsequent affidavit of Transfer of Voters Registration under Section 12 of Republic Act 8189, respondents admitted
that they erroneously filed an application as a new voter (sic) with the office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, by reason
of an honest mistake, which they now desire to correct. (underscoring ours).

Respondents lose sight of the fact that a statutory offense, such as violation of election law, is mala prohibita. Proof of criminal
intent is not necessary. Good faith, ignorance or lack of malice is beside the point. Commission of the act is sufficient. It is the act
itself that is punished.

xxxx

In view of the foregoing, the Law Department respectfully submits that there is probable cause to hold respondents Carlos
Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for trial in violation of Section 10(g) and (j) in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No.
8189. There is no doubt that they applied for registration as new voters of Burauen, Leyte consciously, freely and voluntarily.56

We take occasion to reiterate that the Constitution grants to the COMELEC the power to prosecute cases or violations of election
laws. Article IX (C), Section 2 (6) of the 1987 Constitution, provides:

(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and
where appropriate, prosecute cases or violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses,
and malpractices.

This power to prosecute necessarily involves the power to determine who shall be prosecuted, and the corollary right to decide
whom not to prosecute.57 Evidently, must this power to prosecute also include the right to determine under which laws
prosecution will be pursued. The courts cannot dictate the prosecution nor usurp its discretionary powers. As a rule, courts cannot
interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. 58Its rationale cannot be doubted. For the business
of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure of the prosecution to
prosecute.59 Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts
to rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense. 60

Fourth. In People v. Delgado,61 this Court said that when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the
preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the Information in the
proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must
be subject to the approval of the court. The records show that Informations charging petitioners with violation of Section 10(g)
and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 had been filed with the RTC. The case must, thus, be allowed to take
its due course.

It may be recalled that petitioners prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before this Court to restrain the COMELEC from executing its Resolutions of 11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005. In a Resolution
dated 20 June 2006, this Court En Banc denied for lack of merit petitioners’ Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt. Logically, the normal course of trial is expected to have continued in the
proceedings a quo.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions, dated 11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005 of the
COMELEC En Banc are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 84818 December 18, 1989

PHILIPPINE COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE LUIS A. ALCUAZ, as NTC Commissioner, and NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION, respondents.

Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa for petitioner.

Victor de la Serna for respondent Alcuaz.

REGALADO, J.:

This case is posed as one of first impression in the sense that it involves the public utility services of the petitioner Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT, for short) which is the only one rendering such services in the
Philippines.

The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the
National Telecommunications Commission (hereafter, NTC), dated September 2, 1988, which directs the provisional reduction of
the rates which may be charged by petitioner for certain specified lines of its services by fifteen percent (15%) with the
reservation to make further reductions later, for being violative of the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative power and a denial of procedural, as well as substantive, due process of law.

The antecedental facts as summarized by petitioner 2 are not in dispute. By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was
granted "a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee may select,
station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international satellite communications." Under this franchise, it was
likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services
from the communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals."

Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner puts on record that it undertook the following activities and established the following
installations:

1. In 1967, PHILCOMSAT established its provisional earth station in Pinugay, Rizal.

2. In 1968, earth station standard "A" antenna (Pinugay I) was established. Pinugay I provided direct satellite communication links
with the Pacific Ocean Region (the United States, Australia, Canada, Hawaii, Guam, Korea, Thailand, China [PROC], New
Zealand and Brunei) thru the Pacific Ocean INTELSAT satellite.
3. In 1971, a second earth station standard "A" antenna(Pinugay III) was established. Pinugay II provided links with the Indian
Ocean Region (major cities in Europe, Middle East, Africa, and other Asia Pacific countries operating within the region) thru the
Indian Ocean INTELSAT satellite.

4. In 1983, a third earth station standard "B" antenna (Pinugay III) was established to temporarily assume the functions of Pinugay
I and then Pinugay II while they were being refurbished. Pinugay III now serves as spare or reserved antenna for possible
contingencies.

5. In 1983, PHILCOMSAT constructed and installed a standard "B" antenna at Clark Air Field, Pampanga as a television
receive-only earth station which provides the U.S. Military bases with a 24-hour television service.

6. In 1989, petitioner completed the installation of a third standard "A" earth station (Pinugay IV) to take over the links in Pinugay
I due to obsolescence. 3

By designation of the Republic of the Philippines, the petitioner is also the sole signatory for the Philippines in the Agreement and
the Operating Agreement relating to the International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) of 115 member
nations, as well as in the Convention and the Operating Agreement of the International Maritime Satellite Organization
(INMARSAT) of 53 member nations, which two global commercial telecommunications satellite corporations were collectively
established by various states in line with the principles set forth in Resolution 1721 (XVI) of the General Assembly of the United
Nations.

Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits to:

1. Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company;

2. Philippine Global Communications, Inc.;

3. Eastern Telecommunications Phils., Inc.;

4. Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. ITT; and

5. Capitol Wireless, Inc.

or their predecessors-in-interest. The satellite services thus provided by petitioner enable said international carriers to serve the
public with indispensable communication services, such as overseas telephone, telex, facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live
television in full color, and television standard conversion from European to American or vice versa.

Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission,
now respondent NTC. However, pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was placed under the
jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing of rates.
Implementing said Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to apply for the requisite certificate of public
convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates
therefor.

Consequently, under date of September 9, 1987, petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application 4 for authority to continue
operating and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining since 1967, to continue providing
the international satellite communications services it has likewise been providing since 1967, and to charge the current rates
applied for in rendering such services. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to operate
and maintain the above mentioned facilities, provide the services and charge therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for.

On September 16, 1987, petitioner was granted a provisional authority to continue operating its existing facilities, to render the
services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then charging. This authority was valid for six (6) months from the date
of said order. 5 When said provisional authority expired on March 17, 1988, it was extended for another six (6) months, or up to
September 16, 1988.

The NTC order now in controversy had further extended the provisional authority of the petitioner for another six (6) months,
counted from September 16, 1988, but it directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction of fifteen
percent (15%) on the present authorized rates. Respondent Commissioner ordered said reduction on the following ground:
The Commission in its on-going review of present service rates takes note that after an initial evaluation by the Rates Regulation
Division of the Common Carriers Authorization Department of the financial statements of applicant, there is merit in a
REDUCTION in some of applicant's rates, subject to further reductions, should the Commission finds (sic) in its further
evaluation that more reduction should be effected either on the basis of a provisional authorization or in the final consideration of
the case. 6

PHILCOMSAT assails the above-quoted order for the following reasons:

1. The enabling act (Executive Order No. 546) of respondent NTC empowering it to fix rates for public service communications
does not provide the necessary standards constitutionally required, hence there is an undue delegation of legislative power,
particularly the adjudicatory powers of NTC;

2. Assuming arguendo that the rate-fixing power was properly and constitutionally conferred, the same was exercised in an
unconstitutional manner, hence it is ultra vires, in that (a) the questioned order violates procedural due process for having been
issued without prior notice and hearing; and (b) the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and confiscatory, thus
constitutive of a violation of substantive due process.

I. Petitioner asseverates that nowhere in the provisions of Executive Order No. 546, providing for the creation of respondent NTC
and granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of Executive Order No. 196, placing petitioner under the jurisdiction of respondent NTC,
can it be inferred that respondent NTC is guided by any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers. While
petitioner in its petition-in-chief raised the issue of undue delegation of legislative power, it subsequently clarified its said
submission to mean that the order mandating a reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial
power to respondent NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express conferment by the legislative body.

Whichever way it is presented, petitioner is in effect questioning the constitutionality of Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196 on
the ground that the same do not fix a standard for the exercise of the power therein conferred.

We hold otherwise.

Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its
exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated
power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rate, its act must both be
non- confiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed
standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which
the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just.
However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. 7

It becomes important then to ascertain the nature of the power delegated to respondent NTC and the manner required by the
statute for the lawful exercise thereof.

Pursuant to Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196, respondent NTC is empowered, among others, to determine and prescribe rates
pertinent to the operation of public service communications which necessarily include the power to promulgate rules and
regulations in connection therewith. And, under Section 15(g) of Executive Order No. 546, respondent NTC should be guided by
the requirements of public safety, public interest and reasonable feasibility of maintaining effective competition of private entities
in communications and broadcasting facilities. Likewise, in Section 6(d) thereof, which provides for the creation of the Ministry
of Transportation and Communications with control and supervision over respondent NTC, it is specifically provided that the
national economic viability of the entire network or components of the communications systems contemplated therein should be
maintained at reasonable rates. We need not go into an in-depth analysis of the pertinent provisions of the law in order to conclude
that respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest,
reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative
power.

II. On another tack, petitioner submits that the questioned order violates procedural due process because it was issued motu
proprio, without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a hearing. Petitioner laments that said order was based merely on
an "initial evaluation," which is a unilateral evaluation, but had petitioner been given an opportunity to present its side before the
order in question was issued, the confiscatory nature of the rate reduction and the consequent deterioration of the public service
could have been shown and demonstrated to respondents. Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate fixing-power of
NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are necessary and the absence thereof
results in a violation of due process.
Respondents admit that the application of a policy like the fixing of rates as exercised by administrative bodies is quasi-judicial
rather than quasi-legislative: that where the function of the administrative agency is legislative, notice and hearing are not required,
but where an order applies to a named person, as in the instant case, the function involved is adjudicatory. 8 Nonetheless, they
insist that under the facts obtaining the order in question need not be preceded by a hearing, not because it was issued pursuant to
respondent NTC's legislative function but because the assailed order is merely interlocutory, it being an incident in the ongoing
proceedings on petitioner's application for a certificate of public convenience; and that petitioner is not the only primary source of
data or information since respondent is currently engaged in a continuing review of the rates charged.

We find merit in petitioner's contention.

In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission, 9 we made a categorical classification as to when the rate-filing
power of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative, thus:

Moreover, although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates- when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all
enterprises of a given kind throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character, such is not the nature of the order
complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of
fact-based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office-that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its
invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to
introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion
drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words, in making said finding of fact, respondent performed a function partaking of a
quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing.

This rule was further explained in the subsequent case of The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribel, et al. 10 to wit:

It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative body is legislative, notice of hearing is not
required by due process of law (See Oppenheimer, Administrative Law, 2 Md. L.R. 185, 204, supra, where it is said: 'If the nature
of the administrative agency is essentially legislative, the requirements of notice and hearing are not necessary. The validity of a
rule of future action which affects a group, if vested rights of liberty or property are not involved, is not determined according to
the same rules which apply in the case of the direct application of a policy to a specific individual) ... It is said in 73 C.J.S. Public
Administrative Bodies and Procedure, sec. 130, pages 452 and 453: 'Aside from statute, the necessity of notice and hearing in an
administrative proceeding depends on the character of the proceeding and the circumstances involved. In so far as generalization
is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that notice and hearing are
not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the exercise of executive, administrative,
or legislative functions; but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts are particular
and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to
notice and hearing. 11

The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication.
Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no other. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact,
although patently superficial, that there is merit in a reduction of some of the rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of
petitioner's financial statements-without affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of
the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction. No rationalization was offered nor were the attending
contingencies, if any, discussed, which prompted respondents to impose as much as a fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction. It is not
far-fetched to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its rates vis-a-vis the viability of its business
requirements. The rates it charges result from an exhaustive and detailed study it conducts of the multi-faceted intricacies
attendant to a public service undertaking of such nature and magnitude. We are, therefore, inclined to lend greater credence to
petitioner's ratiocination that an immediate reduction in its rates would adversely affect its operations and the quality of its service
to the public considering the maintenance requirements, the projects it still has to undertake and the financial outlay involved.
Notably, petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who issued the report on which
respondent NTC based its questioned order.

At any rate, there remains the categorical admission made by respondent NTC that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its
quasi-judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental
to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature. This postulate is bereft of merit.

While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order,
temporary though it may be, is not exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the
requirement of reasonableness. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary and
confiscatory manner. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the applicability of a different
rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by
the applicable law. In the case at bar, the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service Act which provides:
Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and
hearing in accordance with the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions mentioned and saving
provisions to the contrary:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which shall be imposed, observed and followed thereafter by any public
service; ...

There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to respondent NTC, there being no limiting, excepting, or
saving provisions to the contrary in Executive Orders Nos. 546 and 196.

It is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a
hearing, whether the order be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial whether the same is made upon a complaint, a
summary investigation, or upon the commission's own motion as in the present case. That such a hearing is required is evident in
respondents' order of September 16, 1987 in NTC Case No. 87-94 which granted PHILCOMSAT a provisional authority "to
continue operating its existing facilities, to render the services it presently offers, and to charge the rates as reduced by them
"under the condition that "(s)ubject to hearing and the final consideration of the merit of this application, the Commission may
modify, revise or amend the rates ..." 12

While it may be true that for purposes of rate-fixing respondents may have other sources of information or data, still, since a
hearing is essential, respondent NTC should act solely on the basis of the evidence before it and not on knowledge or information
otherwise acquired by it but which is not offered in evidence or, even if so adduced, petitioner was given no opportunity to
controvert.

Again, the order requires the new reduced rates to be made effective on a specified date. It becomes a final legislative act as to the
period during which it has to remain in force pending the final determination of the case. 13An order of respondent NTC
prescribing reduced rates, even for a temporary period, could be unjust, unreasonable or even confiscatory, especially if the rates
are unreasonably low, since the utility permanently loses its just revenue during the prescribed period. In fact, such order is in
effect final insofar as the revenue during the period covered by the order is concerned. Upon a showing, therefore, that the order
requiring a reduced rate is confiscatory, and will unduly deprive petitioner of a reasonable return upon its property, a declaration
of its nullity becomes inductible, which brings us to the issue on substantive due process.

III. Petitioner contends that the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its implementation would virtually result in a cessation of its
operations and eventual closure of business. On the other hand, respondents assert that since petitioner is operating its
communications satellite facilities through a legislative franchise, as such grantee it has no vested right therein. What it has is
merely a privilege or license which may be revoked at will by the State at any time without necessarily violating any vested
property right of herein petitioner. While petitioner concedes this thesis of respondent, it counters that the withdrawal of such
privilege should nevertheless be neither whimsical nor arbitrary, but it must be fair and reasonable.

There is no question that petitioner is a mere grantee of a legislative franchise which is subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal
by Congress when the common good so requires. 14 Apparently, therefore, such grant cannot be unilaterally revoked absent a
showing that the termination of the operation of said utility is required by the common good.

The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public utilities is limited by the consideration that it
is not the owner of the property of the utility, or clothed with the general power of management incident to ownership, since the
private right of ownership to such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the regulatory power. The power to regulate is
not the power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with
due regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons. Any regulation, therefore, which
operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights
is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws. 15

Hence, the inherent power and authority of the State, or its authorized agent, to regulate the rates charged by public utilities should
be subject always to the requirement that the rates so fixed shall be reasonable and just. A commission has no power to fix rates
which are unreasonable or to regulate them arbitrarily. This basic requirement of reasonableness comprehends such rates which
must not be so low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be oppressive. 16

What is a just and reasonable rate is not a question of formula but of sound business judgment based upon the evidence 17 it is a
question of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. 18 In
determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also to consider the given situation, requirements and opportunities of the
utility. A method often employed in determining reasonableness is the fair return upon the value of the property to the public
utility. Competition is also a very important factor in determining the reasonableness of rates since a carrier is allowed to make
such rates as are necessary to meet competition. 19

A cursory perusal of the assailed order reveals that the rate reduction is solely and primarily based on the initial evaluation made
on the financial statements of petitioner, contrary to respondent NTC's allegation that it has several other sources of information
without, however, divulging such sources. Furthermore, it did not as much as make an attempt to elaborate on how it arrived at the
prescribed rates. It just perfunctorily declared that based on the financial statements, there is merit for a rate reduction without any
elucidation on what implications and conclusions were necessarily inferred by it from said statements. Nor did it deign to explain
how the data reflected in the financial statements influenced its decision to impose a rate reduction.

On the other hand, petitioner may likely suffer a severe drawback, with the consequent detriment to the public service, should the
order of respondent NTC turn out to be unreasonable and improvident. The business in which petitioner is engaged is unique in
that its machinery and equipment have always to be taken in relation to the equipment on the other end of the transmission
arrangement. Any lack, aging, acquisition, rehabilitation, or refurbishment of machinery and equipment necessarily entails a major
adjustment or innovation on the business of petitioner. As pointed out by petitioner, any change in the sending end abroad has to
be matched with the corresponding change in the receiving end in the Philippines. Conversely, any in the receiving end abroad has
to be matched with the corresponding change in the sending end in the Philippines. An inability on the part of petitioner to meet
the variegations demanded be technology could result in a deterioration or total failure of the service of satellite communications.

At present, petitioner is engaged in several projects aimed at refurbishing, rehabilitating, and renewing its machinery and
equipment in order to keep up with the continuing charges of the times and to maintain its facilities at a competitive level with the
technological advances abroad. There projected undertakings were formulated on the premise that rates are maintained at their
present or at reasonable levels. Hence, an undue reduction thereof may practically lead to a cessation of its business. While we
concede the primacy of the public interest in an adequate and efficient service, the same is not necessarily to be equated with
reduced rates. Reasonableness in the rates assumes that the same is fair to both the public utility and the consumer.

Consequently, we hold that the challenged order, particularly on the issue of rates provided therein, being violative of the due
process clause is void and should be nullified. Respondents should now proceed, as they should heretofore have done, with the
hearing and determination of petitioner's pending application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity and in which
proceeding the subject of rates involved in the present controversy, as well as other matter involved in said application, be duly
adjudicated with reasonable dispatch and with due observance of our pronouncements herein.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is GRANTED and the order of respondents, dated September 2, 1988, in NTC Case No. 87-94
is hereby SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued under our resolution of September 13, 1988, as specifically directed
against the aforesaid order of respondents on the matter of existing rates on petitioner's present authorized services, is hereby
made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino and
Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the ponencia of Justice Regalado and join him in the erudite and thorough discussion of the respondent's authority.
However, I have reservations about our continuing to abide by the dictum that in the exercise of quasi-legislative power, notice
and hearing are not required. I believe that this doctrine is ripe for re- examination.

Senators and Congressmen are directly elected by the people. Administrative officials are not. If the members of an administrative
body are, as is so often the case, appointed not on the basis of competence and qualifications but out of political or personal
considerations, it is not only the sense of personal responsibility to the electorate affected by legislation which is missing. The
expertise and experience needed for the issuance of sound rules and regulations would also be sorely lacking.

Congress never passes truly important legislation without holding public hearings. Yet, administrative officials who are not
directly attuned to the public pulse see no need for hearings. They issue rules and circulars with far reaching effects on our
economy and our nation's future on the assumption that the head of an agency knows best what is good for the people. I believe
that in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers, administrative agencies, much, much more than Congress, should hold hearings
and should be given guidelines as to when notices and hearings are essential even in quasi-legislation.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the ponencia of Justice Regalado and join him in the erudite and thorough discussion of the respondent's authority.
However, I have reservations about our continuing to abide by the dictum that in the exercise of quasi-legislative power, notice
and hearing are not required. I believe that this doctrine is ripe for re- examination.

Senators and Congressmen are directly elected by the people. Administrative officials are not. If the members of an administrative
body are, as is so often the case, appointed not on the basis of competence and qualifications but out of political or personal
considerations, it is not only the sense of personal responsibility to the electorate affected by legislation which is missing. The
expertise and experience needed for the issuance of sound rules and regulations would also be sorely lacking.

Congress never passes truly important legislation without holding public hearings. Yet, administrative officials who are not
directly attuned to the public pulse see no need for hearings. They issue rules and circulars with far reaching effects on our
economy and our nation's future on the assumption that the head of an agency knows best what is good for the people. I believe
that in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers, administrative agencies, much, much more than Congress, should hold hearings
and should be given guidelines as to when notices and hearings are essential even in quasi-legislation.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I concur in the ponencia of Justice Regalado and join him in the erudite and thorough discussion of the respondent's authority.
However, I have reservations about our continuing to abide by the dictum that in the exercise of quasi-legislative power, notice
and hearing are not required. I believe that this doctrine is ripe for re- examination.

Senators and Congressmen are directly elected by the people. Administrative officials are not. If the members of an administrative
body are, as is so often the case, appointed not on the basis of competence and qualifications but out of political or personal
considerations, it is not only the sense of personal responsibility to the electorate affected by legislation which is missing. The
expertise and experience needed for the issuance of sound rules and regulations would also be sorely lacking.

Congress never passes truly important legislation without holding public hearings. Yet, administrative officials who are not
directly attuned to the public pulse see no need for hearings. They issue rules and circulars with far reaching effects on our
economy and our nation's future on the assumption that the head of an agency knows best what is good for the people. I believe
that in the exercise of quasi-legislative powers, administrative agencies, much, much more than Congress, should hold hearings
and should be given guidelines as to when notices and hearings are essential even in quasi-legislation.

G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.

LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion for
reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority
opinion of this Court:

1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una determinada,
termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el pago de los salarios segun
costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;

2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y
que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de
ser empleados u obreros de la misma;

3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin
ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron como consecuencia de un paro forzoso,
no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su
negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado
deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority of
this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:

1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it
necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the
records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.

2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from the
States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.

4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)

5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective representation are highly
essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)

6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in
Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation
of American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.

7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc.,
and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.

8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could
not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.

9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily
mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union,
Inc.

In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the respondent
National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the
Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this,
however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases
of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize
certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record
of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the
exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired
during the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic
conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no
evidentiary value.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when
its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of
Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises
judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute
arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in
accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention,
arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising
from differences as regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between
landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved
exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of
the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as
existing and proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the
dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable
agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study all
industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for
such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the
"inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of
industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official
investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in
agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of
the separation of governmental powers.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion
to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to
point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it
to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall
not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform
its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to
the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award,
order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute
or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to
this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to
carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be
free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999,
82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56
S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence,
without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or
persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."

(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs.
McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law
is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844,
promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and
Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National
Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15;
Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the
rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar
provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which
would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and
Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220,
225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders
without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by
confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and
meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the
controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but
their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer
any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial
fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation, and
may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem
necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the
volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States
the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final
decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement
between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst
for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc.,
it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the
petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National
Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and
functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his
substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be
expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to
the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and
reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By
and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the
movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be
remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant
and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 99327 May 27, 1993
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, FATHER JOAQUIN BERNAS, S. J., DEAN CYNTHIA ROXAS-DEL
CASTILLO, JUDGE RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR., JUSTICE VENICIO ESCOLIN, FISCAL MIGUEL ALBAR, ATTYS.
MARCOS HERRAS, FERDINAND CASIS, JOSE CLARO TESORO, RAMON CAGUIOA, and RAMON ERENETA.
petitioners,
vs.
HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the RTC-Makati, Br. 134, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, JR. ERNEST
MONTECILLO, ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO AMADO SABBAN, DALMACIO LIM JR., MANUEL ESCONA and
JUDE FERNANDEZ, respondents.

Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Benson & Jimenes for petitioners.

Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los Angeles for petitioner Cynthia Roxas-del Castillo.

Fabregas, Calida & Remollo for private respondents.

ROMERO, J.:

In 1975, the Court was confronted with a mandamus proceeding to compel the Faculty Admission Committee of the Loyola
School of Theology, a religious seminary which has a working arrangement with the Ateneo de Manila University regarding
accreditation of common students, to allow petitioner who had taken some courses therein for credit during summer, to continue
her studies.1 Squarely meeting the issue, we dismissed the petition on the ground that students in the position of petitioner possess,
not a right, but a privilege, to be admitted to the institution. Not having satisfied the prime and indispensable requisite of
a mandamus proceeding since there is no duty, much less a clear duty, on the part of the respondent to admit the petitioner, the
petition did not prosper.

In support of its decision, the Court invoked academic freedom of institutions of higher learning, as recognized by the
Constitution, the concept encompassing the right of a school to choose its students.

Eighteen (18) years later, the right of a University to refuse admittance to its students, this time in Ateneo de Manila University
proper, is again challenged.

Whereas, in the Garcia case referred to in the opening paragraph, the individual concerned was not a regular student, the
respondents in the case at bar, having been previously enrolled in the University, seek re-admission. Moreover, in the earlier case,
the petitioner was refused admittance, not on such considerations as personality traits and character orientation, or even inability
to meet the institution's academic or intellectual standards, but because of her behavior in the classroom. The school pointedly
informed her that ". . . it would seem to be in your best interest to work with a Faculty that is more compatible with your
orientations."

On the other hand, students who are now being refused admission into petitioner University have been found guilty of violating
Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The case attracted
much publicity due to the death of one of the neophytes and serious physical injuries inflicted on another.

Herein lies an opportunity for the Court to add another dimension to the concept of academic freedom of institutions of higher
learning, this time a case fraught with social and emotional overtones.

The facts which gave rise to this case which is far from novel, are as follows:

As a requisite to membership, the Aquila Legis, a fraternity organized in the Ateneo Law School, held its initiation rites on
February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, for students interested in joining its ranks. As a result of such initiation rites, Leonardo "Lennie" H.
Villa, a first year student of petitioner university, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital on February 10,
1991. He was not the lone victim, though, for another freshman by the name of Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the
Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion.

In a notice dated February 11, 1991, petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee2 which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding
the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24)
hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime,
they were placed on preventive suspension.3 Through their respective counsels, they requested copies of the charges and pertinent
documents or affidavits.
In a notice dated February 14, 1991, the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written
statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of
Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." 4

Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge on or before February 18, 1991;
otherwise, they would be deemed to have waived their right to present their defenses.

On February 20, 1991, petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board composed of petitioners Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Justice
Venicio Escolin, Atty. Marcos Herras, Fiscal Miguel Albar and Atty. Ferdinand Casis, to hear the charges against respondent
students.

In a letter dated February 20, 1991, respondent students were informed that they had violated Rule No. 3 of the Rules on
Discipline contained in the Law School Catalogue. Said letter also states: "The complaint/charge against you arose from
initiations held on February 8-10, 1991. The evidence against you consist of testimonies of students, showing your participation in
acts prohibited by the School regulations." Finally, it ordered respondent students to file their written answers to the above charge
on or before February 22 1991, otherwise they would be deemed to have waived their defenses. 5

In a motion dated February 21, 1991, respondent students, through counsel, requested that the investigation against them be held
in abeyance, pending action on their request for copies of the evidence against them. 6

Respondent students were then directed by the Board to appear before it at a hearing on February 28, 1991 to clarify their answer
with regard to the charges filed by the investigating committee for violation of Rule No. 3. However, in a letter to a petitioners
dated February 27, 1991, counsel for respondent students moved to postpone the hearing from February 28, 1991 to March 1,
1991.7

Subsequently, respondent students were directed to appear on March 2, 1991 for clarificatory questions.8 They were also informed
that:

a) The proceedings will be summary in nature in accordance with the rules laid down in the case of Guzman vs. National
University;9

b) Petitioners have no right to cross-examine the affiants-neophytes;

c) Hazing which is not defined in the School catalogue shall be defined in accordance with the proposed bill of Sen. Jose Lina,
Senate Bill No. 3815;

d) The Board will take into consideration the degree of participation of the petitioners in the alleged hazing incident in imposing
the penalty;

e) The Decision of the Board shall be appealable to the President of the University, i. e., Respondent Joaquin Bernas S. J.

On March 5, 1991, petitioner Bernas wrote Dean Castillo that, "in cases where the Disciplinary Board is not prepared to impose
the penalty of dismissal, I would prefer that the Board leave the decision on the penalty to the Administration so that this case be
decided not just on the Law School level but also on the University level." 10

In a resolution dated March 9, 1991, the Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School
Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. The Board found that respondent students acted as master
auxiliaries or "auxies" during the initiation rites of Aquila Legis, and exercised the "auxies privilege," which allows them to
participate in the physical hazing. Although respondent students claim that they were there to assist and attend to the needs of the
neophytes, actually they were assigned a definite supportive role to play in the organized activity. Their guilt was heightened by
the fact that they made no effort to prevent the infliction of further physical punishment on the neophytes under their care. The
Board considered respondent students part and parcel of the integral process of hazing. In conclusion, the Board pronounced
respondents guilty of hazing, either by active participation or through acquiescence. However, in view of the lack of unanimity
among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University
Administration.11 Petitioner Dean del Castillo waived her prerogative to review the decision of the Board and left to the President
of the University the decision of whether to expel respondents or not.

Consequently, in a resolution dated March 10, 1991, petitioner Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, as President of the Ateneo de Manila
University, accepted the factual findings of the Board, thus: "that as Master Auxiliaries they exercised the 'auxie's privilege;' that
even assuming they did not lay hands on the neophytes," respondents students are still guilty in accordance with the principle that
"where two or more persons act together in the commission of a crime, whether they act through the physical volition of one or of
all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose will contributes to the wrongdoing is responsible for the whole."
Fr. Bernas, in describing the offense which led to the death of Leonardo Villa, concluded that the "offense of the respondents can
be characterized as grave and serious, subversive of the goals of Christian education and contrary to civilized behavior."
Accordingly, he imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. 12

In a resolution dated March 18, 1991 and concurred in by petitioner Fr. Bernas, 13 the Board excluded respondent students Abas
and Mendoza from the coverage of the resolution of March 10, 1991, inasmuch as at the time the latter resolution was
promulgated, neither had as yet submitted their case to the Board. Said resolution also set the investigation of the two students on
March 21, 1991.

On March 18, 1991, respondent students filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, a petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction 14 alleging that they were currently enrolled
as students for the second semester of school year 1990-91. Unless a temporary restraining order is issued, they would be
prevented from taking their examinations. The petition principally centered on the alleged lack of due process in their dismissal.

On the same day, Judge Madayag issued a temporary restraining order the enjoining petitioners from dismissing respondent
students and stopping the former from conducting hearings relative to the hazing incident.15

Hearings in connection with the issuance of the temporary restraining order were then held. On April 7, 1991, the temporary
restraining order were issued on March 18, 1991 lapsed. Consequently, a day after the expiration of the temporary restraining
order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board composed of Atty.(s) Jose Claro Tesoro, Ramon Caguioa, and Ramon Ereñeta to
investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza.

Respondent students reacted immediately by filing a Supplemental Petition of certiorari, prohibition and mandamuswith prayer
for a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction, to include the aforesaid members of the Special Board, as additional
respondents to the original petition.16

Petitioners moved to strike out the Supplement Petition arguing that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the
original petition which alleged lack of due process in the conduct of investigations by the Disciplinary Board against respondent
students; that a supplemental petition cannot be admitted without the same being set for hearing and that the supplemental petition
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order will, in effect, extend the previous restraining order beyond its mandatory 20-day
lifetime.17 Acting on the urgent motion to admit the supplemental petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order, Judge
Amin, as pairing judge of respondents Judge Capulong, granted respondent students' prayer on April 10, 1991. 18

On May 17, 1991, respondent Judge ordered petitioners to reinstate respondent students. Simultaneously, the court ordered
petitioners to conduct special examinations in lieu of the final examinations which allegedly the students were not allowed to take,
and enjoined them to maintain the status quo with regard to the cases of Adel Abas and Zosimo Mendoza pending final
determination of the issue of the instant case. Lastly, it directed respondent students to file a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.19

On the same date, May 17, 1991, the Special Board investigating petitioners Abas and Mendoza and directed the dropping of their
names from its roll of students.20

The following day or on May 21, 1991, respondent judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction upon posting by respondents of
a bond dated May 17, 1991 in the amount of P50,000.00.

Hence, this special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining
the enforcement of the May 17, 1991 order of respondent judge. 21

In the case at bar, we come to grips with two relevant issues on academic freedom, namely: (1) whether a school is within its
rights in expelling students from its academic community pursuant to its disciplinary rules and moral standards; and (2) whether
or not the penalty imposed by the school administration is proper under the circumstances.

We grant the petition and reverse the order of respondent judge ordering readmission of respondent students. Respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion when he ruled that respondent students had been denied due process in the investigation of
the charges against them.

It is the threshold argument of respondent students that the decision of petitioner Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S. J., then President of the
Ateneo de Manila University, to expel them was arrived at without affording them their right to procedural due process. We are
constrained to disagree as we find no indication that such right has been violated. On the contrary, respondent students' rights in a
school disciplinary proceeding, as enunciated in the cases of Guzman v. National University,22 Alcuaz v. PSBA, Q.C.
Branch23 and Non v. Dames II24 have been meticulously respected by petitioners in the various investigative proceedings held
before they were expelled.

Corollary to their contention of denials of due process is their argument that it is Ang Tibay case25 and not the Guzman case which
is applicable in the case at bar. Though both cases essentially deal with the requirements of due process, the Guzman case is
more apropos to the instant case, since the latter deals specifically with the minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of
disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus:

(1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the
right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence
against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.26

It cannot seriously be asserted that the above requirements were not met. When, in view of the death of Leonardo Villa, petitioner
Cynthia del Castillo, as Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students on February 11, 1991 to
submit within twenty-four hours their written statement on the incident,27 the records show that instead of filing a reply,
respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. 28 While of the students mentioned in the February 11,
1991 notice duly submitted written statements, the others failed to do so. Thus, the latter were granted an extension of up to
February 18, 1991 to file their statements.29

Indubitably, the nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices dated February 14 and 20,
1991.30 It is to be noted that the February 20, 1991 letter which quoted Rule No. 3 of its Rules of Discipline as contained in the
Ateneo Law School Catalogue was addressed individually to respondent students. Petitioners' notices/letters dated February 11,
February 14 and 20 clearly show that respondent students were given ample opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf and to
answer the charges leveled against them.

The requisite assistance of counsel was met when, from the very start of the investigations before the Joint Administration
Faculty-Student Committee, the law firm of Gonzales Batiler and Bilog and Associates put in its appearance and filed pleadings in
behalf of respondent students.

Respondent students may not use the argument that since they were not accorded the opportunity to see and examine the written
statements which became the basis of petitioners' February 14, 1991 order, they were denied procedural due process. 31 Granting
that they were denied such opportunity, the same may not be said to detract from the observance of due process, for disciplinary
cases involving students need not necessarily include the right to cross examination. An administrative proceeding conducted to
investigate students' participation in a hazing activity need not be clothed with the attributes of a judicial proceeding. A closer
examination of the March 2, 1991 hearing which characterized the rules on the investigation as being summary in nature and that
respondent students have no right to examine affiants-neophytes, reveals that this is but a reiteration of our previous ruling
in Alcuaz.32

Respondent students' contention that the investigating committee failed to consider their evidence is far from the truth because the
February 14, 1992 ordered clearly states that it was reached only after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies
of several witnesses.33 Similarly, the Disciplinary Board's resolution dated March 10, 1991 was preceded by a hearing on March 2,
1991 wherein respondent students were summoned to answer clarificatory questions.

With regard to the charge of hazing, respondent students fault petitioners for not explicitly defining the word "hazing" and allege
that there is no proof that they were furnished copies of the 1990-91 Ateneo Law School Catalogue which prohibits hazing. Such
flawed sophistry is not worthy of students who aspire to be future members of the Bar. It cannot be overemphasized that the
charge filed before the Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee and the Disciplinary Board is not a criminal
case requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt but is merely administrative in character. As such, it is not subject to the rigorous
requirements of criminal due process, particularly with respect to the specification of the charge involved. As we have had
occasion to declare in previous cases a similar nature, due process in disciplinary cases involving students does not entail
proceedings and hearings identical to those prescribed for actions and proceedings in courts of justice. 34 Accordingly, disciplinary
charges against a student need not be drawn with the precision of a criminal information or complaint. Having given prior notice
to the students involved that "hazing" which is not defined in the School Catalogue shall be defined in accordance with Senate Bill
No. 3815, the proposed bill on the subject of Sen. Jose Lina, petitioners have said what needs to be said. We deem this sufficient
for purposes of the investigation under scrutiny.

Hazing, as a ground for disciplining a students, to the extent of dismissal or expulsion, finds its raison d' etre in the increasing
frequency of injury, even death, inflicted upon the neophytes by their insensate "masters." Assuredly, it passes the test of
reasonableness and absence of malice on the part of the school authorities. Far from fostering comradeship and esprit d' corps, it
has merely fed upon the cruel and baser instincts of those who aspire to eventual leadership in our country.

Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they
failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals.35

It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of
law,36 as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to
their dismissal from petitioner university.

Lastly, respondent students argue that we erred in issuing a Temporary Restraining Order since petitioners do not stand to suffer
irreperable damage in the event that private respondents are allowed to re-enroll. No one can be so myopic as to doubt that the
immediate reinstatement of respondent students who have been investigated and found by the Disciplinary Board to have violated
petitioner university's disciplinary rules and standards will certainly undermine the authority of the administration of the school.
This we would be most loathe to do.

More importantly, it will seriously impair petitioner university's academic freedom which has been enshrined in the 1935, 1973
and the present 1987 Constitutions.

At this juncture, it would be meet to recall the essential freedoms subsumed by Justice Felix Frankfurter in the term "academic
freedom" cited in the case of Sweezy v. New Hampshire,37 thus: (1) who may teach: (2) what may be taught; (3) how it shall be
taught; and (4) who may be admitted to study.

Socrates, the "first of the great moralists of Greece," proud to claim the title "gadfly of the State" has deservedly earned for
himself a respected place in the annals of history as a martyr to the cause of free intellectual inquiry. To Plato, this great teacher of
his was the "best, the most sensible, and the most sensible, and the most just man of his age." In 399 B.C., he willingly quaffed the
goblet of hemlock as punishment for alleged "corruption" of the youth of Athens. He describes in his own words how this charge
of "corruption," the forerunner of the concept of academic freedom, came about:

Young men of the richer classes, who have not much to do, come about me of their own accord: they like to heart the pretenders
examined, and they often imitate me, and examine others themselves; there are plenty of person, as they soon discover, who think
that they know something, but really know little or nothing; and then those who are examined by them instead of being angry with
themselves are angry with me. This confounded Socrates, they say; this villainous misleader of youth. And then if somebody asks
them, Why, what evil does he practice or teach? they do not know, and cannot tell; but in order that they may not appear to be at a
loss, they repeat the ready-made charges which are used against all philosophers about teaching things up in the clouds and under
the earth, and having no gods, and making the worse appear the better cause; for they do not like to confess that their pretense of
knowledge has been detected — which is the truth; and as they are numerous and ambitious and energetic, and are all in battle
array and have persuasive tongues, they have filled your ears with their loud and inveterate calumnies. 38

Since Socrates, numberless individuals of the same heroic mold have similarly defied the stifling strictures of authority, whether
State, Church, or various interest groups, to be able to give free rein to their ideas. Particularly odious were the insidious and
blatant attempts at thought control during the time of the Inquisition until even the Medieval universities, renowned as intellectual
centers in Europe, gradually lost their autonomy.

In time, such noble strivings, gathering libertarian encrustations along the way, were gradually crystallized in the cluster of
freedoms which awaited the champions and martyrs of the dawning modern age. This was exemplified by the professors of the
new German universities in the 16th and 17th centuries such as the Universities of Leiden (1554), Helmstatdt (1574) and
Heidelberg (1652). The movement back to freedom of inquiry gained adherents among the exponents of fundamental human
rights of the 19th and 20th centuries. "Academic freedom", the term as it evolved to describe the emerging rights related to
intellectual liberty, has traditionally been associated with freedom of thought, speech, expression and the press; in other words,
with the right of individuals in university communities, such as professors, researchers and administrators, to investigate, pursue,
discuss and, in the immortal words of Socrates, "to follow the argument wherever it may lead," free from internal and external
interference or pressure.

But obviously, its optimum impact is best realized where the freedom is exercised judiciously and does not degenerate into
unbridled license. Early cases on this individual aspect of academic freedom have been stressed the need for assuring to such
individuals a measure of independence through the guarantees of autonomy and security of tenure. The components of this aspect
of academic freedom have been categorized under the areas of: (1) who may teach and (2) how to teach.
It is to be realized that this individual aspects of academic freedom could have developed only pari passu with its institutional
counterpart. As corporate entities, educational institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the right to establish
their policies, academic and otherwise, unhampered by external controls or pressure. In theFrankfurter formulation, this is
articulated in the areas of: (1) what shall be taught, e.g., the curriculum and (2) who may be admitted to study.

In the Philippines, the Acts which are passed with the change of sovereignty from the Spanish to the American government,
namely, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 made no mention of the rights now subsumed under
the catch-all term of "academic freedom." This is most especially true with respect to the institutional aspect of the term. It had to
await the drafting of the Philippine Constitutions to be recognized as deserving of legal protection.

The breakthrough for the concept itself was found in Section 5 of the 1935 Constitution which stated: "Universities established by
the State shall enjoy academic freedom." The only State University at that time, being the University of the Philippines, the
Charter was perceived by some as exhibiting rank favoritism for the said institution at the expense of the rest.

In attempt to broaden the coverage of the provision, the 1973 Constitution provided in its Section 8(2): "All institutions of higher
learning shall enjoy academic freedom." In his interpretation of the provision, former U.P. President Vicente G. Sinco, who was
also a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, declared that it "definitely grants the right of academic freedom to the
University as an institution as distinguished from the academic freedom of a university professor." 39

Has the right been carried over the to the present Constitution? In an attempt to give an explicit definition with an expanded
coverage, the Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of the 1986 came up with this formulation: "Academic freedom
shall be enjoyed by students, by teachers, and by researchers." After protracted debate and ringing speeches, the final version
which was none too different from the way it was couched in the previous two (2) Constitutions, as found in Article XIV, Section
5(2) states: "Academic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning." In anticipation of the question as to
whether and what aspects of academic freedom are included herein, ConCom Commissioner Adolfo S. Azcuna explained: "Since
academic freedom is a dynamic concept, we want to expand the frontiers of freedom, especially in education, therefore, we shall
leave it to the courts to develop further the parameters of academic freedom." 40

More to the point, Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon asked: "When we speak of the sentence 'academic freedom shall be
enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning,' do we mean that academic freedom shall be enjoyed by the institution itself?"
Azcuna replied: "Not only that, it also includes . . . . " Gascon finished off the broken thought,— "the faculty and the students."
Azcuna replied: "Yes."

Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology,41 we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition that admission to an institution
of higher learning is discretionary upon a school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While
under the education Act of 1982, students have a right "to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing curricula and to
continue their course therein up to graduation," such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary
standards laid down by the academic institution.42

"For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of
students. This . . . extends as well to parents . . . as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, individually and
collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools." 43

Such rules are "incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the successful management of the college. The
rules may include those governing student discipline." 44 Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing
university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not merely to the smooth
and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic groves as collectively, the students
demanded and plucked for themselves from the ponoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of
"right to education" forgetting that, in Holfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that is, their duty to learn under the
rules laid down by the school.

Considering that respondent students are proud to claim as their own a Christian school that includes Theology as part of its
curriculum and assidously strives to turn out individuals of unimpeachable morals and integrity in the mold of the founder of the
order of the Society of Jesus, St. Ignatius of Loyola, and their God-fearing forbears, their barbaric and ruthless acts are the more
reprehensible. It must be borne in mind that universities are established, not merely to develop the intellect and skills of the
studentry, but to inculcate lofty values, ideals and attitudes; nay, the development, or flowering if you will, of the total man.
In essence, education must ultimately be religious — not in the sense that the founders or charter members of the institution are
sectarian or profess a religious ideology. Rather, a religious education, as the renowned philosopher Alfred North Whitehead said,
is "an education which inculcates duty and reverence." 45 It appears that the particular brand of religious education offered by the
Ateneo de Manila has been lost on the respondent students.

Certainly, they do not deserve to claim such a venerable institution as the Ateneo de Manila University as their own a minute
longer, for they may foreseeably cast a malevolent influence on the students currently enrolled, as well as those who come after
them.

Quite applicable to this case is our pronouncement in Yap Chin Fah v. Court of Appeals that: "The maintenance of a morally
conducive and orderly educational environment will be seriously imperiled if, under the circumstances of this case, Grace
Christian is forced to admit petitioner's children and to reintegrate them to the student body." 46 Thus, the decision of petitioner
university to expel them is but congruent with the gravity of their misdeeds. That there must be such a congruence between the
offense committed and the sanction imposed was stressed in Malabanan v. Ramento.47

Having carefully reviewed the records and the procedure followed by petitioner university, we see no reason to reverse its
decision founded on the following undisputed facts: that on February 8, 9 and 10, 1991, the Aquila Legis Fraternity conducted
hazing activities; that respondent students were present at the hazing as auxiliaries, and that as a result of the hazing, Leonardo
Villa died from serious physical injuries, while Bienvenido Marquez was hospitalized. In light of the vicious acts of respondent
students upon those whom ironically they would claim as "brothers" after the initiation rites, how can we countenance the
imposition of such nominal penalties as reprimand or even suspension? We, therefore, affirm petitioners' imposition of the penalty
of dismissal upon respondent students. This finds authority and justification in Section 146 of the Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools.48

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED; the order of respondent Judge dated May 17, 1991 reinstating respondents
students into petitioner university is hereby REVERSED. The resolution of petitioner Joaquin Bernas S. J., then President of
Ateneo de Manila University dated March 1991, is REINSTATED and the decision of the Special Board DISMISSING
respondent students ADEL ABAS and ZOSIMO MENDOZA dated May 20, 1991 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

Griño-Aquino, J., is on leave.

SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE G.R. No. 178552
ENGAGEMENT NETWORK, INC., on
behalf of the South-South Network (SSN) Present:
for Non-State Armed Group Engagement,
and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., CORONA, C.J.,
Petitioners, CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
- versus - NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE PERALTA,
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE BERSAMIN,
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE DEL CASTILLO,
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, ABAD,
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL VILLARAMA, JR.,
DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF THE PEREZ,
INTERIOR AND LOCAL MENDOZA, and
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF SERENO, JJ.
FINANCE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER, THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
Respondents.

x ------------------------------- x

KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU),

represented by its Chairperson Elmer Promulgated:
Labog, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO October 5, 2010
UNO (NAFLU-KMU), represented by its
National President Joselito V. Ustarez and
Secretary General Antonio C. Pascual, and G.R. No. 178554
CENTER FOR TRADE UNION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS, represented by its
Executive Director Daisy Arago,
Petitioners,

- versus -

HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his

capacity as Executive Secretary,
NORBERTO GONZALES, in his capacity
as Acting Secretary of National Defense,
HON. RAUL GONZALES, in his capacity
as Secretary of Justice, HON. RONALDO
PUNO, in his capacity as Secretary of the
Interior and Local Government, GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his
capacity as AFP Chief of Staff, and
DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR
CALDERON, in his capacity as PNP Chief
of Staff,
Respondents.

x ------------------------------------ x

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN

(BAYAN), GENERAL ALLIANCE
BINDING WOMEN FOR REFORMS,
INTEGRITY, EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP
AND ACTION (GABRIELA), KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP),
MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED
CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES
(MCCCL), CONFEDERATION FOR
UNITY, RECOGNITION AND
ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE),
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG
MAHIHIRAP (KADAMAY),
SOLIDARITY OF CAVITE WORKERS,
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS
(LFS), ANAKBAYAN, PAMBANSANG
LAKAS NG KILUSANG G.R. No. 178581
MAMAMALAKAYA (PAMALAKAYA),
ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED
TEACHERS (ACT), MIGRANTE,
HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR
DEMOCRACY (HEAD), AGHAM,
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR., DR.
BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, RENATO
CONSTANTINO, JR., SISTER MARY
JOHN MANANSAN OSB, DEAN
CONSUELO PAZ, ATTY. JOSEFINA
LICHAUCO, COL. GERRY CUNANAN
(ret.), CARLITOS SIGUION-REYNA, DR.
CAROLINA PAGADUAN-ARAULLO,
RENATO REYES, DANILO RAMOS,
EMERENCIANA DE LESUS, RITA
BAUA, REY CLARO CASAMBRE,
Petitioners,

- versus -
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in
her capacity as President and
Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SECRETARY RAUL GONZALES,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY
NORBERTO GONZALES,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY
RONALDO PUNO. DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO
TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES,
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA),
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU
OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF
CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE
CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL
CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN.
OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP,
including its intelligence and investigative
elements, AFP CHIEF GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON,
Respondents.
x ------------------------------------ x
KARAPATAN, ALLIANCE FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF PEOPLES
RIGHTS, represented herein by Dr.
Edelina de la Paz, and representing the
following organizations: HUSTISYA,
represented by Evangeline Hernandez and
also on her own behalf;
DESAPARECIDOS, represented by Mary
Guy Portajada and also on her own behalf,
SAMAHAN NG MGA EX-DETAINEES
LABAN SA DETENSYON AT PARA SA
AMNESTIYA (SELDA), represented by
Donato Continente and also on his own
behalf, ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT
FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE (EMJP),
represented by Bishop Elmer M. Bolocon,
UCCP, and PROMOTION OF CHURCH
PEOPLES RESPONSE, represented by Fr.
Gilbert Sabado, OCARM,
Petitioners,

- versus -
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in
her capacity as President and
Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARTY EDUARDO ERMITA,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY
NORBERTO GONZALES,
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT SECRETARY
RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO
TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES,
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA),
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU
OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF
CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE G.R. No. 178890
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE
CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL
CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN.
OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP,
including its intelligence and investigative
elements, AFP CHIEF GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON,
Respondents.

x------------------------------------ x

THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE

PHILIPPINES (IBP), represented by Atty.
Feliciano M. Bautista, COUNSELS FOR
THE DEFENSE OF LIBERTY(CODAL),
SEN. MA. ANA CONSUELO A.S.
MADRIGAL and FORMER SENATORS
SERGIO OSMEA III and WIGBERTO E.
TAADA,
Petitioners,

- versus -

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO

ERMITA AND THE MEMBERS OF THE
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL (ATC),
Respondents.

x------------------------------------- x

BAGONG ALYANSANG
MAKABAYAN-SOUTHERN TAGALOG
(BAYAN-ST), GABRIELA-ST,
KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHYANG
MAGSASAKA-TIMOG
KATAGALUGAN (KASAMA-TK),
MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED
CITIZENS FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES
(MCCCL), PEOPLES MARTYRS,
ANAKBAYAN-ST, PAMALAKAYA-ST,
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY,
RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT
OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
(COURAGE-ST), PAGKAKAISAT
UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA
LAGUNA (PUMALAG), SAMAHAN NG
MGA MAMAMAYAN SA TABING
RILES (SMTR-ST), LEAGUE OF
FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), BAYAN
MUNA-ST, KONGRESO NG MGA
MAGBUBUKID PARA SA REPORMANG
AGRARYO KOMPRA, BIGKIS AT
LAKAS NG MGA KATUTUBO SA
TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (BALATIK),
SAMAHAN AT UGNAYAN NG MGA
MAGSASAKANG KABABAIHAN SA
TIMOG KATAGALUGAN
(SUMAMAKA-TK), STARTER, LOSOS
RURAL POOR ORGANIZATION FOR
PROGRESS & EQUALITY, CHRISTIAN
NIO LAJARA, TEODORO REYES,
FRANCESCA B. TOLENTINO,
JANNETTE E. BARRIENTOS, OSCAR T.
LAPIDA, JR., DELFIN DE CLARO,
SALLY P. ASTRERA, ARNEL SEGUNE
BELTRAN,
Petitioners,

- versus -

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in
her capacity as President and
Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY
NORBERTO GONZALES, G.R. No. 179157
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMEN T SECRETARY
RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF
FINCANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO
TEVES, NATIONAL SECURITY
ADVISER NORBERTO GONZALES,
THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA),
THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION (NBI), THE BUREAU
OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF
CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE
SERVICE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF
THE PHILIPPINES (ISAFP), THE
ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE
CENTER ON TRANSNATIONAL
CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN.
OSCAR CALDERON, THE PNP,
including its intelligence and investigative
elements, AFP CHIEF GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 179461

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), An Act to Secure the
State and Protect our People from Terrorism, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,[1] signed into law on March 6,
2007.
Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007,[2] petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a
non-government organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU),
National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and Human Rights
(CTUHR), represented by their respective officers[3] who are also bringing the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554.
The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for
Reforms, Integrity, Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Movement of
Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties (MCCCL), Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government
Employees (COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap (KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of
Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya (PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned
Teachers (ACT), Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their respective officers,[4] and
joined by concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister Mary
John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr.
Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178581.
On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees
Laban sa Detensyon at para sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and Promotion of
Church Peoples Response (PCPR), which were represented by their respective officers [5] who are also bringing action on their
own behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178890.

On August 29, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Counsels for the Defense of Liberty (CODAL),[6] Senator Ma.
Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmea III, and Wigberto E. Taada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed
as G.R. No. 179157.

Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the
Southern Tagalog Region,[7] and individuals[8] followed suit by filing on September 19, 2007 a petition for certiorari and
prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.

Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council[9] composed of, at the time of the filing of the
petitions, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign
Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and
Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of
the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National
Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support
agencies for the Anti-Terrorism Council like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation,
Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence Service of the AFP, Anti-Money Laundering Center, Philippine
Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative elements.

The petitions fail.

Petitioners resort to certiorari is improper

Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court is clear:
 Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying
the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of
their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same.

In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.[10]

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last
two superfluous.

Petitioners lack locus standi

Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness
which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.[11]

Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary[12] summarized the rule on locus standi, thus:

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of
the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show
not only that the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby in some
indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is
lawfully entitled or that it is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act
complained of.

For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2)
the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected communist fronts by the government, especially the
military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the transcendental importance doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers.
While Chavez v. PCGG[13] holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has
experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation
belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of
harmful conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.

Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA
9372.

KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been
subjected to close security surveillance by state security forces, their members followed by suspicious persons and vehicles with
dark windshields, and their offices monitored by men with military build. They likewise claim that they have been branded as
enemies of the [S]tate.[14]
Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet
to show any connection between the purported surveillance andthe implementation of RA 9372.

BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT,
Migrante, HEAD and Agham, petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of
respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)
and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging, according to petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of
proscription without following the procedure under the law. [15] The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No. 179461 pleads the
same allegations.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged tagging of petitioners.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of
common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide
in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that
judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a
judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally
known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready
determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.

Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men generally
in the course of the ordinary experiences of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by
mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts which are universally
known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed,
provided, they are of such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming
part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide
variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court
cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a
fact of which the court has no constructive knowledge.[16] (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to
substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its
effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging.
The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed
link to the CPP and NPA. They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in
direct injury to their organization and members.

While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the United States of America [17] (US) and the
European Union[18] (EU) have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court
takes note of the joint statement of Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo
Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations.[19] Such statement
notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as
domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From
July 2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much
less an actual, prosecution or proscription under RA 9372.

Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casio,
Rafael Mariano and Luzviminda Ilagan,[20] urged the government to resume peace negotiations with the NDF by removing the
impediments thereto, one of which is the adoption of designation of the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist
organizations. Considering the policy statement of the Aquino Administration[21] of resuming peace talks with the NDF, the
government is not imminently disposed to ask for the judicial proscription of the CPP-NPA consortium and its allied
organizations.

More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific interests in the questions being raised.[22] Of
recent development is the filing of the first case for proscription under Section 17[23] of RA 9372 by the Department of Justice
before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against the Abu Sayyaf Group.[24] Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any
link to the Abu Sayyaf Group.

Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion
charges against them.

In Ladlad v. Velasco,[25] the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed in 2006 against then Party-List Representatives
Crispin Beltran and Rafael Mariano of Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casio and Saturnino
Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the dismissed rebellion charges were petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina
Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo Ramos; and accused of being front organizations for
the Communist movement were petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA, PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY,
LFS and COURAGE.[26]

The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners. For one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to
the enactment of RA 9372, and dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised Penal
Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made more imminent by the enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it
easier to charge a person with rebellion, its elements not having been altered.

Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no relation to prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be
overemphasized that three years after the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been charged.
Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the
Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the
law.

The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members
with standing.[27] The IBP failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its
constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected
under RA 9372.
Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject of political surveillance, also lacks locus
standi. Prescinding from the veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim of political surveillance, the Court finds that she has not
shown even the slightest threat of being charged under RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto
Taada and Senator Sergio Osmea III, who cite their being respectively a human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage
of RA 9372. Outside these gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has been pinpointed.

Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently
state that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, which must be settled early and are of far-reaching
implications, without mention of any specific provision of RA 9372 under which they have been charged, or may be
charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe litigants with locus
standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the laws enforcement. To
rule otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general
public.

Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when
there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress, [28]whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal
interest in the proceeding.[29]

RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of
the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law.

It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus
standi. Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.

Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.[30] (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,[31] the Court ruled that the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural
or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion. [32]

Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC [33] cannot be more emphatic:

[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciabledefinite and concrete, touching on
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand;
that is, it must concern a real and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to
be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in
nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the Municipality of Makati into a Highly Urbanized City was held to
be premature as it was tacked on uncertain, contingent events.[34]Similarly, a petition that fails to allege that an application for a
license to operate a radio or television station has been denied or granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable
controversy, and merely wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem. [35]

The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on Elections[36] for failure to cite any specific
affirmative action of the Commission on Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on
Elections,[37] to rule on the religious freedom claim of the therein petitioners based merely on a perceived potential conflict
between the provisions of the Muslim Code and those of the national law, there being no actual controversy between real litigants.

The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory grounds goes on ad infinitum.

The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest
suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the requirement that there must
be sufficient facts to enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.[38]
Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,[39] allowed the pre-enforcement review of a
criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a credible threat of prosecution and should not be
required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.[40] The plaintiffs therein filed an action
before a federal court to assail the constitutionality of the material support statute, 18 U.S.C. 2339B (a) (1), [41] proscribing the
provision of material support to organizations declared by the Secretary of State as foreign terrorist organizations. They claimed
that they intended to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of two such organizations.

Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the
challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable
controversy.[42]
Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372
forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity that they seek to do.No demonstrable threat has been established, much less
a real and existing one.

Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and supposedly being tagged as communist fronts in no way
approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory
opinion, which is not its function.[43]

Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original
jurisdiction. Then again, declaratory actions characterized by double contingency, where both the activity the petitioners intend to
undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of
ripeness.[44]

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the
surreal and merely imagined. Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be
abused.[45] Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events before courts may step in to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein

certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted

Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism [46] under RA 9372
in that terms like widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and coerce the government to give in to an
unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present
case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to outline the schools of thought on whether the
void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are equally applicablegrounds to assail a penal statute.

Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of limiting the application of the two doctrines to free
speech cases. They particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan [47] and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.[48]

The Court clarifies.

At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word intervene in Section 5[49] of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act was intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. The Court stated that the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have
special application only to free-speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. [50] It added that, at
any rate, the challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was charged, is not vague.[51]
While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,[52] the Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal
statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject
election offense[53] under the Voters Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in
precise language.[54]

The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion[55] of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estrada case, where the
Court found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime
of plunder.

The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the concept of a facial invalidation as opposed to
an as-applied challenge. He basically postulated that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial
review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the
main Estrada decision, reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of
possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech
and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify
allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that
his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow specificity." The possible harm to society
in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech
of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly
broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting
from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented
from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in
the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech
cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained
in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are
sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative
act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant
may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in
some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others."

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed
for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect
to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard
to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other
situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in
the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes
found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on
its face and in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that
they might be applied to parties not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes
a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions to be made
 without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out
in Younger v. Harris

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy,
the impact on the legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and
amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results
in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever
way they might be decided.

For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong
medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining the
constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a case must be
examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.[56] (Underscoring supplied.)

The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for
a facial or as-applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation
(under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights).

To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it
violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms.[58]

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute
prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected. [59]

A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied challenge.

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an
examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also
on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally
protected speech or activities.[60]

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle[61] in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as
grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge
against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.

The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the
exercise of which should not at all times be abridged. [62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes
that generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and
penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights.[63]

The Court reiterated that there are critical limitations by which a criminal statute may be challenged and underscored that an
on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed.[64]

[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental
rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial
challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes
may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in
the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal
requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A
facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court
to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial
challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there
would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere showing that,
as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied
to him.[65] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and,
owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected
speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad
regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself
only to facts as applied to the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules
of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to
him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its
improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights
of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges
are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not
merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court
construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the
concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to
bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause others not before the court to
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.[66] (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring supplied.)

In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two cases, [67] observed that the US Supreme
Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,[68] and that claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words.[69] In Virginia v. Hicks,[70] it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation
that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression. [71]
Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners,
a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372 is legally
impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them

While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder
Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to review the law on its face and in its
entirety.[72] It stressed that statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular
defendant.[73]

American jurisprudence[74] instructs that vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light
of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity.

For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally
vague, developing a doctrine hailed as among the most important guarantees of liberty under law. [75]

In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized in examining the
constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases,[76] the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance
penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the
Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three
cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute,
unlike in the present case.

There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to

permit a facial analysis of its validity

From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be culled: (1)
the offender commits an act punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under any of the
enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and
extraordinary fear and panic among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give
in to an unlawful demand.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of unlawful
demand in the definition of terrorism[77] must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free
speech clause.

The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the
operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to
an unlawful demand. Given the presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative
component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected speech.
Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of
the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to
launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful
transaction. An analogy in one U.S. case[78] illustrated that the fact that the prohibition on discrimination in hiring on the basis of
race will require an employer to take down a sign reading White Applicants Only hardly means that the law should be analyzed as
one regulating speech rather than conduct.
Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish
socially harmful conduct nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case
where the expression figures only as an inevitable incident of making the element of coercion perceptible.

[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances brought about through
speaking or writing. But it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course
of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of
language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of
speech and press would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade
as well as many other agreements and conspiracies deemed injurious to society. [79](italics and underscoring
supplied)

Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they merely evidence a prohibited conduct. [80] Since
speech is not involved here, the Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.

IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of the therein subject penal statute as applied to
the therein petitioners inasmuch as they were actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness grounds. The
Court in said cases, however, found no basis to review the assailed penal statute on its face and in its entirety.

In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on
vagueness grounds, since the therein plaintiffs faced a credible threat of prosecution and should not be required to await and
undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of seeking relief.

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA
9372. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of terrorism is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds
litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor
allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.