Chapter 15 ex post facto law

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle,

vs.
ROMAN VILO, defendant-appellant.

Felix D. Agcaoili for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Martiniano P. Vivo for appellee.

PARAS, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the People's Court convicting the appellant, Roman Vilo, of
the complex crime of treason with murder and imposing upon him the death penalty and a fine of
P10,000 with costs.

Appellant's attorney de oficio admits that the People's Court correctly found the appellant guilty of
the following overt acts: (1). The apprehensions and torture on April 15, 1944, Carcar, Cebu, of
Amando Satorre, Ireneo Medel, Maximo Satorre and Eusebio Rezada, and the killing of Mando
Satorre, all due to their connection with the resistance movement. (2). The apprehensions on April
15, 1944, in Carcar, Cebu, of Laureano Raponoya, suspected guerrilla member, and his delivery to
the Japanese who tortured him. (3). The apprehension, torture and killing of one Segundo in
March, 1944, in Pinamungahan, Cebu, because the latter was a guerrilla volunteer guard. And the
only plea invoked in behalf of the appellant is that he acted under duress.

In support of this plea, it is alleged that on March 25, 1942, the appellant was inducted into the
USAFFE organization; that after four months he was arrested, with forty-two others, by the
Japanese who tortured them, as a result of which the appellant was hospitalized for two months;
that he was thereafter made to join the puppet Philippine Constabulary, with station at different
places in the Province of Cebu. Even if these allegation are true, they are not sufficient to show
that, when the appellant committed the acts imputed to him, he was acting under any apparent
threat of harm from the Japanese, much less from any Filipino superiors. That the appellant had
previously been arrested or made to join the Constabulary, did not amount to an order to our threat
upon him, leaving him without any choice other than to perform the specific acts of which he was
convicted, especially when the specific acts of which said acts took place about two years after
appellant's alleged torture by the Japanese. Moreover, the way the appellant killed his victims —
by bayoneting them and by further slashing the knees of one so as to make the latter's body fit into
his grave, — is rather inconsistent with the attitude of one who might have acted reluctantly and
under compulsion.

Upon the other hand, it is admitted in the brief for the prosecution that the count regarding the
arrest by the necessary two witnesses. Even so, the other two counts warrant appellant's
conviction. Adherence to the enemy is of course deducible from appellant's overt acts, particularly
from the circumstances that all those apprehended, tortured and killed were members of or
suspected of having connection with the guerrilla movement.
The People's Court, however, erred in the classifying the crime as treason with murder. The killing
of Amando Satorre and one Segundo is charged as an element of treason, and it therefore
"becomes identified with the latter crime and cannot be the subject of a separate punishment, or
used in combination with treason to increase the penalty as article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
provided." (People vs. Prieto, L-399, 45 Off. Gaz., 3329.1 See also People vs. Labra, L-386, 46
Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 1], 159)2, This notwithstanding, the death penalty is still imposable upon
the appellant in view of the presence of two proven aggravating circumstances, namely armed
band and the use of torture and other atrocities on the victim, Instead of the usual and less painful
method of execution; but on the ground presently to be stated, said penalty necessarily has to be
lowered to reclusion perpetua.

Eight Justice, including the writer of this opinion, believe that the appellant merits the death
penalty, but one Justice disagree. Under article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that
the death penalty shall not be imposed when all the Justices are not unanimous in their voting as to
the property of the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of death cannot be imposed upon
the appellant. The Judiciary Act of 1948 (No. 296), approved on June 17, 1948, however, provides
that "whenever the judgment of the lower court imposes the death penalty, the case shall be
determined by eight Justices of Court," and that, "when eight Justices fail to reach a decision as
herein provided, the penalty next lower in degree than the death penalty shall be imposed" (section
9), with the result that under this legal provision the death penalty is impossible as long as there
are eight Justices voting therefore. The majority of this Court are of the opinion that the new law
may be given retroactive effect so as to cover the case at bar involving an offense committed prior
to the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1948. They argue that the matter referring to the number
of Justices necessary for the imposition of the death penalty is merely one of procedure, and that
unanimity was previously required in view merely of the small composition of this Court, — a
person that has ceased to exist because there are now eleven Justices.

The writer hereof believes, upon the other hand, that the new law should not be given retroactive
effect if it is not be to ex post facto. After the inclusion of the provisions of article 46 in Revised
Penal Code, no, accused could be sentenced to death except when there was unanimity among the
Justices as to the propriety of the penalty; and this requisite correspondingly accorded the accused
a substantive right. It is plain, and therefore easy to see, that there can be no more substantive
legal provision than that which determines the question whether or not an accused will be
sentenced to death. The provision can indeed de likened to that referring to mitigating or
aggravating circumstances upon which the proper period of the penalty prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code is dependent. In my opinion, article 47 required unanimity in order to give the
assurance that, when a death sentence is meted out, there can absolutely be no room for any doubt
as to the propriety of the penalty, implied from the absence of any dissent. The following may be
cited in support of the theory of the writer of this opinion:

The crime in question was committed prior to the enforcement of Act No. 1773 of the Philippine
Commission, which went into effect on the 11th of October 1907. Although the complaint was
filed by the fiscal on the 18th of January, 1908, it is not lawful; to attribute retroactive effect to the
said Act of the Philippine Commission for the reason that, even though it refers to a matter of
procedure, it does not contain any clauses making it retroactive in its effects, and furthermore, the
provisions thereof if applied now are prejudicial to the accused.

Hence, in view of the terms of the aforesaid article 433 of the Penal Code, the proceedings
instituted by virtue of the complaint file by the fiscal can not be sustained, as they were brought
without the necessary previous complaint of the aggrieved husband, and in violation of the
criminal law; therefore, the said proceedings, together with the judgment rendered therein, are
decidedly null and void. (U. S. vs. Gomez and Coronel, 22 Phil., 279, 282- 283.)

To give effect to the view that the Judiciary Act of 1948, should be given only prospective
application, the writer hereof is constrained to switch his vote to the imposition of reclusion
perpetua upon the appellant who otherwise should have deserved the penalty of death.

With the modification that the appellant is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the appealed judgment
is affirmed.

So ordered with costs.

■ people vs ferrer
Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the Anti-
Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion
against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers,
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for
being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the
Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and
Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge 2.)
Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of safeguard
of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members of the CPP
regardless of voluntariness.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and
similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the
Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow
the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal
means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines.
Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable.
Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be
made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false
evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to
death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under oath.
Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom if
thought, assembly and association.
Issues:

(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the
substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute
be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute
specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill of
attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies
not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their successors.
The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was

acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element
of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a
member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and
encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after
approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is
given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section 8.
The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having been
made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine
Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the
Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of
“Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and
statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further
stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the prohibition
of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and PRESERVATION
of DEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to
proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose is to
overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a FOREIGN
POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully and
knowingly done by overt acts.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme
Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.

■
The United States vs Torcuata Gomez and Ramon CoronelFacts:


Torcuata Gomez was lawfully married to Fabiano Martinez Lao. Although his marriage was
notdissolved, he lived with Narciso Coronel and had marital relations in the same house
inOroqueta, Misamis.


In this case it has been fully proven that Ramon Narciso Coronel, by reason of his living in
thehouse of Torcuata Gomez, a woman lawfully married to Fabiano Martinez, contracted with
herillicit and hence adulterous relations which lasted for a period of seventeen months, from
April,1906, to September, 1907.


Under RPC:Article 434 of the said code reads:No penalty shall be imposed for the crime of
adultery except upon the complaint of theaggrieved husband.The latter can enter a complaint
against both guilty parties, if alive, and never, if he hasconsented to the adultery or pardoned either
of the culprits. lawphil.net


The crime in question was committed prior to the enforcement of Act No. 1773 of the
PhilippineCommission, which went into effect on the 11th of October, 1907.


Issue:WON, in view of the fact that no complaint was brought by the aggrieved husband,
FabianoMartinez Lao, it would be lawful to sustain the proceedings and the condemnatory
judgment appealedfrom, merely by virtue of the complaint presented by the provincial fiscal of
Misamis.Held:The crime in question was committed prior to the enforcement of Act No. 1773 of
the PhilippineCommission, which went into effect on the 11th of October, 1907. Although the
complaint was filed bythe fiscal on the 18th of January, 1908, it is not lawful to attribute
retroactive effects to the said Act of the Philippine Commission for the reason that, even though it
refers to a matter of procedure, it doesnot any clause making it retroactive in its effects, and
furthermore, the provisions thereof if applied noware prejudicial to the accused.

CASE DECISION:
THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TORCUATA GOMEZ and RAMON NARCISO
CORONEL, Defendants-Appellants.

Ramon Narciso Coronel, on his own behalf.

Perfecto Salas, for appellant Torcuata Gomez.

Attorney-General Villamor, for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE; PRIVATE CRIME; ADULTERY. — According

to the old legislation, public prosecutors are not under obligation to prosecute, among other crimes
of a private nature, that of adultery defined and punished by article 433 of the Penal Code,
inasmuch as the right to bring the corresponding criminal action rests only with the aggrieved
husband, so that, according to article 434, no penalty may be imposed for such crime except by
virtue of the complaint filed by the aggrieved husband.

2. ID.; ID.; ID. — By General Orders, No. 58 which together with amendatory laws enacted by
the Philippine Commission is the present law of criminal procedure the right of the aggrieved
party was recognized as an exception with respect to crimes of a private nature specified in the
Penal Code, the provisions of which, in relation to the exercise of a criminal action governed by
the former law of procedure, remained in force.

3. ID.; ID.; ID. — The lack of a complaint or charge duly drawn up and preferred by the aggrieved
husband can not be cured by one presented by a provincial fiscal, because such a substitution is
not authorized by any provision of the law.

4. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RETROACTIVE EFFECT; EX POST FACTO LAWS. —

Act No. 1773 of the Philippine Commission, which went into force on the 11th of October, 1907,
can not be applied retroactively, notwithstanding the fact that it is a statute dealing with criminal
procedure, because such application is not therein provided for, and, furthermore, because its
provisions are prejudicial to the defendants; therefore, said Act can not be applied to a crime
committed prior to the time it went into force, without violating the provisions of article 22 of the
Penal Code.

DECISION

TORRES, J. :
The complaint upon which these proceedings were brought is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The undersigned fiscal charges Torcuata Gomez and Ramon Narciso Coronel with the crime of
adultery committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the beginning of the year 1906, until the 30th of September, 1-907, in the
municipality of Oroquieta, Province of Misamis, P. I., the said Torcuata Gomez, maliciously, and
feloniously, and being then lawfully married to Fabiano Martinez Lao, without the said marriage
having been in any manner dissolved, at tempted to lie and did lie with Ramon Narciso Coronel;
knowing that the said Torcuata Gomez is a married woman whose marriage is not dissolved, he
lay with her, and afterwards lived in marital relations with her in the same house in the said
municipality of Oroquieta, with public scandal, all contrary to law. — Jimenez, Province of
Misamis, this the 18th day of January, 1908. — (Signed) Jose de la Rama, provincial fiscal of
Surigao, Misamis, and Agusan."cralaw virtua1aw library

The case was proceeded with through all its stages against both the accused; the husband as the
aggrieved party did not file any charge, although he testified as a witness in the case. On the 25th
of January, 1908, the trial judge, considering that the crime of adultery had been proven and that
the guilt of the accused Torcuata Gomez and Ramon Narciso Coronel had been established,
sentenced each one of them to the penalty of three years, six months, and twenty-one days of
prision correccional, to the accessory penalties, and costs. From said judgment the accused have
appealed.

In this case it has been fully proven that Ramon Narciso Coronel, by reason of his living in the
house of Torcuata Gomez, a woman lawfully married to Fabiano Martinez, contracted with her
illicit and hence adulterous relations which lasted for a period of seventeen months, from April,
1906, to September, 1907. There being no necessity of considering the allegations of the defense,
this decision will be limited to deciding whether, in view of the fact that no complaint was brought
by the aggrieved husband, Fabiano Martinez Lao, it would be lawful to sustain the proceedings
and the condemnatory judgment appealed from, merely by virtue of the complaint presented by
the provincial fiscal of Misamis.

Proceedings instituted for crimes defined and punished by the Penal Code in force are regulated
by the law of criminal procedure, that is, General orders No. 58, and that law recognizes as an
exception the right of the offended party in crimes of a private nature, in respect to which the
provisions of the Penal Code were still in force; in the application of said provisions, as regards
the prosecution, those of the former law of procedure have continued to be observed, since they
are in perfect harmony with the code now in force, and the public prosecutor is under no
obligation to prosecute, among other crimes of a private nature, that of adultery, which is defined
in article 433 of the Penal Code, since the offended husband alone is entitled to bring, such action
before the courts.
Article 434 of the said code reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"No penalty shall be imposed for the crime of adultery except upon the complaint of the aggrieved
husband.

"The latter can enter a complaint against both guilty parties, if alive, and never, if he has consented
to the adultery or pardoned either of the culprits."cralaw virtua1aw library

So that, under the provisions of the foregoing article, no complaint or charge having been
presented by the husband, Fabiano Martinez, against the parties accused of said crime, no valid
judgment could be entered nor could any proceedings be brought against them, in view of the fact
that proceedings are instituted in order to prosecute for a crime and to punish the guilty; the
absence of a complaint or charge by the aggrieved husband can not be substituted by the
complaint filed by the provincial fiscal of Misamis as such a substitution is not authorized by law.

Such has always been the constant and genuine interpretation of the provision of the criminal law
in relation to this crime, according to the doctrine laid down by the supreme court of Spain when
applying a similar article of the Penal Code of that country, as appears in its decisions of January
17, 1874, and January 16, 1875.

The crime in question was committed prior to the enforcement of Act No. 1773 of the Philippine
Commission, which went into effect on the 11th of October, 1907. Although the complaint was
filed by the fiscal on the 18th of January, 1908, it is not lawful to attribute retroactive effects to the
said Act of the Philippine Commission for the reason that, even though it refers to a matter of
procedure, it does not contain any clause making it retroactive in its effects, and furthermore, the
provisions thereof if applied now are prejudicial to the accused.

Hence, in view of the terms of the aforesaid article 433 of the Penal Code, the proceedings
instituted by virtue of the complaint filed by the fiscal can not be sustained, as they were brought
without the necessary previous complaint of the aggrieved husband, and in violation of the
criminal law; therefore, the said proceedings, together with the judgment rendered therein, are
decidedly null and void.

On these grounds all the proceedings in this case together with the judgment appealed from, are
hereby held to be null and void; the bond executed by the accused is set aside with costs de oficio.
So ordered.

■ Lovett v. United States

Posted on September 12, 2014 | Constitutional Law | Tags: Constitutional Law Case Briefs
328 U.S. 303 (1946)

Facts: Congress attached legislative rider §304 onto the Wartime Urgent Deficiency Appropriation
of 1943 that forbid the executive branch from paying three employees – who Congress had found
guilty of “subversive activity” – their salaries unless they were reappointed with the advice and
consent of the Senate. President made a signing statement that said that he believed that it was
unconstitutional. What did it prohibit? Can’t be paid for past and future actions from funds; House
would not pass any appropriation without this rider attached.

Holding: Majority did not reach the constitutional issue; the employees were entitled to recover
b/c the rider left the government’s salary obligations to them wholly intact. Court found that the
prohibition amounted to a bill of attainder and there was no judicial tribunal that found them guilty
of any crime

Bill of attainder: “A legislative act which inflicts punishment without a judicial trial.”
Rationale: No balancing was done here b/c the Constitution specifically prohibits bills of attainder.
So all the court had to find here was whether or not this piece of legislation was a bill of attainder.

In addition, the appropriation was allocating provisions for the future.

Lovett and War Powers: Lovett supports proposition that Congress may not use its national
security powers to “micro manage” the conduct of war of foreign policy. Dicta asserts that
Congress can’t direct the conduct of campaigns, and can’t in the disguise of “rules for the
governance” of the army impair the authority of the President as Commander in Chief.

This kind of structural trespass is usually a question of degree to be resolved by a functional

balancing test under separation of powers analysis.
Congress can limit, but it’s a weighing function.
Lovett and Appropriations Limitations: Supreme Court has, on rare occasions, struck down
legislation for intruding impermissibly on Pres’ inherent constitutional authority/exercise of
national security powers. Congress can’t through mere appropriation measures accomplish that
which by direct legislative action would be beyond its constitutional authority.

■ Garner vs board of public works of los angeles

see your ssave web pages

■ katigbak vs solicitor genera (see save web pages)

ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK and MERCEDES K. KATIGBAK, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, EPIFANIO VILLEGAS, ARTURO XAVIER, PONCIANO
FERNANDO, ROSENDO DOMINGO and LEONARDO LUCENA, defendants-appellees.

G.R. No. L-19329 December 22, 1989

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALEJANDRO KATIGBAK and MERCEDES K. KATIGBAK defendants-appellants.

Augusto Kalaw for plaintiffs-appellants.

NARVASA, J.:

These cases were certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals for resolution on appeal, 1 since
the central issue involved is the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1379, "An Act Declaring
Forfeiture in Favor of the State of Any Property Found To Have Been Unlawfully Acquired by
Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for the Proceedings Therefor. 2 As posed by the
referral resolution, 3 the question is whether or not said statute.

...en cuanto autoriza la confiscacion en favor del Estado de las propiedades ilegalmente adquiridas
por un funcionario o empleado del Gobierno antes de la aprobacion de la ley ... es nula y anti-
constitutional porque:

(a) es una Ley ex-post facto que autoriza la confiscacion de una propiedad privada adquirida
antes de la aprobacion de la ley y obliga el funcionario o empleado publico a explicar como
adquirio sus propiedades privadas, compeliendo de esta forma a incriminarse a si mismo, y en
cierto modo autoriza la confiscacion de dicha propiedad sin debido proceso de la ley; y

(b) porque autoriza la confiscacion de inmuebles previamente hipotecados de buena fe a una

persona.

The proceedings at bar originated from two (2) actions filed with the Court of First Instance of
Manila.

The first was Civil Case No. 30823, instituted by the Spouses Alejandro Katigbak and Mercedes
Katigbak. In their complaint they prayed that: (1) the Solicitor General be enjoined from filing a
complaint against them for forfeiture of property under the above mentioned R.A. No. 1379; (2)
said statute be declared unconstitutional in so far as it authorizes forfeiture of properties acquired
before its approval, or, alternatively, a new preliminary investigation of the complaint filed against
Alejandro Katigbak by NBI officers be ordered; (3) properties acquired by Alejandro Katigbak
when he was out of the government service be excluded from forfeiture proceedings; and (4) the
NBI officers and the Investigating Prosecutor (Leonardo Lucena) be sentenced to pay damages.

The second action was Civil Case No. 31080, commenced by petition 4 filed by the Republic of
the Philippines against Alejandro Katigbak, his wife, Mercedes, and his son, Benedicto, seeking
the forfeiture in favor of the State of the properties of Alejandro Katigbak allegedly gotten by him
illegally, in accordance with R.A. No. 1379. Said properties were allegedly acquired while
Katigbak was holding various positions in the government, the last being that of an examiner of
the Bureau of Customs; and title to some of the properties were supposedly recorded in the names
of his wife and/or son.

The cases were jointly tried. The judgment thereafter rendered 5 (1) dismissed the complaint and
the counterclaim in Civil Case No. 30823, the first action; and (2) as regards Civil Case No.
31080, ordered "that from the properties (of Katigbak) enumerated in this decision as acquired in
1953,1954 and 1955, shall be enforced a lien in favor of the Government in the sum of
P100,000.00. 6 The judgment also declared that the "impatience of the Investigating Prosecutor"
during the preliminary inquiry into the charges filed against Katigbak for violation of R.A. No.
1379 did not amount to such arbitrariness as would justify annulment of the proceedings since,
after all, Katigbak was able to fully ventilate his side of the case in the trial court; 7 that R.A. No.
1379 is not penal in nature, its objective not being the enforcement of a penal liability but the
recovery of property held under an implied trust; 8 that with respect to things acquired through
delicts, prescription does not run in favor of the offender; 9 that Alejandro Katigbak may not be
deemed to have been compelled to testify against his will since he took the witness stand
voluntarily. 10 The Katigbaks moved for reconsideration and/or new trial. The Trial Court refused
to grant a new trial but modified its decision by reducing the amount of "P 100,000.00 in the
dispositive portion ... to P80,000.00." 11

Appeal was taken from this verdict of the Court of Appeals by the Katigbaks which appeal, as
earlier stated, was certified to this Court.

No less than 18 errors have been attributed by the Katigbaks to the Court a quo. 12 They concern
mainly the character of R.A. No. 1379 as an ex-post facto law, principally because it imposes the
penalty of forfeiture on a public officer or employee acquiring properties allegedly in violation of
said R.A. No. 1379 at a time when that law had not yet been enacted. 13

Whatever persuasiveness might have been carried by the ruling on the issue of the learned Trial
Judge in 1961, the fact is that the nature of R.A. No. 1379 as penal was in 1962 clearly and
categorically pronounced by this Court in Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr. 14 Citing voluminous authorities,
the Court in that case declared that "forfeiture to the State of property of a public officer or
employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such ... and his other lawful
income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... has been held ... to partake of the
nature of a penalty"; and that "proceedings for forfeiture of property although technically civil in
form are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of defendants in criminal cases
from the obligation to be witnesses against, themselves is applicable thereto. 15 The doctrine was
reaffirmed and reiterated in 1971 in republic v. Agoncillo. 16 And germane is the 1977 ruling of
the Court in de la Cruz v. Better Living, Inc. 17 involving among others the issue of the validity
and enforceability of a written agreement alleged to be in violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices-Act to the effect that "the provisions of
said law cannot be given retro active effect."

The forfeiture of property provided for in Republic Act No. 1379 being in the nature of a penalty;
and it being axiomatic that a law is ex-post facto which inter alia "makes criminal an act done
before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act," or,
"assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes a penalty or deprivation of
a right for something which when done was lawful," it follows that penalty of forfeiture prescribed
by R.A. No. 1379 cannot be applied to acquisitions made prior to its passage without running
afoul of the Constitutional provision condemning ex post facto laws or bills of attainder. 18 But
this is precisely what has been done in the case of the Katigbaks. The Trial Court declared certain
of their acquisitions in 1953, 1954 and 1955 to be illegal under R.A. No. 1379 although made
prior to the enactment of the law, and imposed a lien thereon "in favor of the Government in the
sum of P100,000.00." Such a disposition is, quite obviously, constitutionally impermissible.

As to the issue of whether or not the Prosecuting Fiscal, Leonardo Lucena, should be made
answerable for damages because the filing of the forfeiture proceedings, Civil Case No. 31080,
resulted from a preliminary investigation which was allegedly conducted by Fiscal Lucena in an
arbitrary and highhanded manner, suffice it to state that the trial court found no proof of any
intention to persecute or other ill motive underlying the institution of Civil Case No. 31080. The
trial court further found that during the preliminary investigation by Fiscal Lucena on September
13, 19, 24, 25 and 26, 1956, Alejandro Katigbak was assisted by reputable and competent counsel,
Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez and Atty. Antonio Carag. The mere fact that the preliminary
investigation was terminated against the objection of Katigbak's counsel, does not necessarily
signify that he was denied the right to such an investigation. What is more, the Trial Court's
factual conclusion that no malice or bad faith attended the acts of public respondents complained
of, and consequently no award of damages is proper, cannot under established rule be reviewed by
this Court absent any showing of the existence of some recognized exception thereto.

The foregoing pronouncements make unnecessary the determination of the other issues.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court a quo, in so far as it pronounces the acquisitions of
property by the appellants illegal in accordance with Republic Act No. 1379 and imposes a lien
thereon in favor of the Government in the sum of P80,000.00 is hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE, but is AFFIRMED in all other respects. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.