LAW+107 CREDIT REVIEWER Digests

AMPP [Property] TSN based on the Lectures of
Notes 1st Semester SY 2017-2018 Atty. Suarez

July 26 – Peroy
Title V. Possession
Under Art. 427, the following may be the subject of ownership:

1. Things, and
2. Rights
Under Art. 428, the owners have the right to enjoy the thing. Part of the enjoyment of the thing is
the use, possession, and fruits.
Part of the right to enjoy is possession.
Possession has 2 concepts:

1. Jus Possidendi – This is the right to possess. This is a mere incident of ownership. It is
included in the right of ownership. That is what is what we call right to possession or jus
possidendi. Right to possess springs from ownership, such that possession is an incident of
ownership. Once you own something, you have the right to enjoy and possess it.
2. Jus Possessionis – This is the right of possession, a possession independent of Ownership.
You can possess something but the possession is not with respect to ownership because you
do not own the thing.
Example: Lessee of a building. He is not the owner of the thing. The lessee has a right of
possession. He does not have the right to possess as that is for the lessor/owner.
This Title of the New Civil Code speaks about the right to possession and the rules of the right of
possession.
Art. 427 onwards talks about right to possession. Art. 523 onwards talks about the rules of the right
to possession and the rules of the right of possession. That right possession independent of
ownership.
Art. 523. Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. (430a)
Possession is either:
1. Holding of a thing, or
2. Enjoyment of a right
Under Art. 427, ownership pertains to things and rights. That is the same thing in possession under
Art. 523.
Possession of things and possession of rights have particular terms:

1. Hold – a thing, therefore you possess it
2. Exercise – a right, therefore you possess it
Classification of Property as to its material existence:

1. Tangible or Corporeal – it is material. You can see it.
2. Intangible or Incorporeal – exists by fiction of law. The law gives them a juridical identity.
Part of this is are Rights.
Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 1

Contributor: Barrios


Intangible – Since we cannot materially hold them, when we possess those properties, we exercise
the rights to those properties. In order for you to own the thing, you must exercise the rights.
Example:
In a co-ownership. The 3rd requisite is the recognition of ideal shares.
The thing, subject of co-ownership, is material. A car, building, land. It is subject to your senses.
The ideal share (aliquot, spiritual share), you only recognize it because you cannot material hold it.
You know you are a co-owner, you are the absolute owner of your ideal share, and you can exercise
your right as a co-owner by virtue of your ideal share.
Correlate Art. 523 with Art. 530 and 531.
Art. 523 means [referring to Art. 531] either you

1. Materially occupy or hold a thing, or
2. Exercise a right
Art. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object
of possession. (437)
What may you possess?

Things or rights which are susceptible of being appropriated.
For you to possess something, you must be able to appropriate it.
Art. 531. Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right,
or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right. (438a)
This talks about the acquisition of possession. In general, it can either be by:
1. Material occupation of the thing
2. Exercise of a right
These things, material occupation of a thing or exercise of a right, those are forms of actual
possession. You actually possess a thing or a right because you hold a thing or exercise a right.
The next 2 are means of acquiring possession such that they are not actual possession. These are
what we call quasi-possession or constructive possession.
Forms of constructive possession:

1. First,
“by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will”
Meaning, in any form of possession, there must be dominion or control over the right or right for
you to say that you possess it.



Example: Art. 1164. The creditor has the right over the thing from the time the obligation to deliver
it arises. However, he shall have no real right over it until it is delivered. There are 2 rights under
this article, the personal right and the real right. Personal right of the creditor allows him to demand
the delivery of the thing. When the thing is actually delivered, the creditor acquires a real right over
the thing. The fact that the creditor can demand the delivery of the thing means the thing is subject
to the will of the creditor.
For you to possess something, it must be subject to your dominion or control, not the literal fact of
holding.
2. Second,
“by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right”
Rights are intangible property and you cannot hold it. You exercise them if you have any document
or proof that you already acquired or possess that right.
Example: Interest in a condominium unit is evidenced by a certificate of stock in a condominium

unit. The intangible interest is evidenced by the certificate of stock issued to you. The legal formality
showing proof of your right is the certificate of stock.
What are the requisites that a person possesses a thing or right?

1. There must be occupancy, apprehension, or taking
It may be actual possession (for tangible property) or exercise of a right (for intangibles).
2. Animus possidendi (intent to possess)

You must have an intent to possess that thing or exercise a right.
Example: In Criminal law, crimes against property or possession of drugs, there must be
animus possidendi, intent to possess. That also applies to property. You must intend to
possess it.
That is why you can exercise rights even if you don’t literally hold it because you have an
intention to possess those rights.
3. Possession must be by virtue of one’s own right

Some authors only have 2 requisites. Some authors add a third.
Possession must be a result of your own right, the right to possess or of possession. It is not
necessary that you own the thing, what is important is you own the right.
Degrees of possession:
1. Mere holding
You possess the thing without any title or right.
Example: object of theft – thief does not have title to that object
2. Juridical possession
Possession with a juridical tie. You have a valid claim or right over it but you occupied it
not in the concept of an owner. There must be a preexisting juridical relation and you possess
the thing not in the concept of an owner for there to be juridical possession.
Example: a lessee or usufructuary – you have a juridical relationship with regard to the thing.
You have a valid claim by virtue of your possession but you are not the owner. Your



possession is not a perfect possession, that is a juridical possession, possession by virtue of

a juridical relationship.
3. Real possessory right

Possession with just title or possession sufficient to transfer ownership. You only have a just
title or title sufficient to transfer ownership but you acquired your title or right not from the
actual owner of the thing.
Example: If A purchased a land from B. B took possession but paid using counterfeit money.
B then sold to C who did not know of the defect. A has the right to rescind. B counter that C
did not know that B defrauded A. C is a buyer in good faith and has a possessory right, he
has a right to valid claim by virtue of the sale from B to C. But the right of C did not originate
from the owner as B should not have been the owner, it should have been A. C has a real
possessory right over the land because he is a purchaser for value or a buyer in good faith.
4. Right of ownership (Possession with title of dominion)

Perfect type of possession. Type of possession derived from the right of ownership or
possession of just title derived from the proper owner.
First 3 degrees are Right of possession.

Fourth degree is the Right to possess. By virtue or incident of ownership.
Classification of possession is under Art. 524 to Art. 526.
As to manner of exercise of right of possession:

Art. 524. Possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of another. (413a)
2 Manners of exercise of right of possession:

1. Under one’s own name
Ownership. You have a right to possession because you are the owner.
2. In the name of another

Limited right acknowledging the rights pertaining to another who is the actual owner.
Example: A as Agent of B. A possesses the land but not in the concept of an owner but as an
agent of B, who is the actual owner. Payment of taxes by A is under the name of B. You
exercise the right of possession but only as a representative of the owner.
3 Types/Kinds of Possesion in the name of another:

1. Voluntary
By virtue of a contract.
Example: Contract of Agency over a thing. Voluntary means of acquiring possession but you
possess that in the name of another.
2. Necessary
Either the law or order of the court that provides a person has a right of possession in the
name of another.
Example: Art. 225 FC, joint legal guardianship of parents over the property of unemancipated
child. That is provided by law. The mother and father has the right of possession, it is not



voluntary, but by virtue of necessity, it is required by the FC. Parents do not occupy in the
form of an owner.
3. Unauthorized
You have a right of possession in the name of another but it is unauthorized.
Example: Art. 532. Merely possess or exercise a right of possession but in the meantime, it
is unauthorized. During the time that it is unauthorized, you have no right of possession.
You only acquire your right upon ratification of the owner. You only acquire the perfect right
of possession from the time it was authorized by the owner, that the holder may possess not
under the holder’s name but still under the owner’s name.
Such as contracts entered by unauthorized agent. Even if by virtue of contract, that contract
is still unenforceable until ratified by the owner.
Art. 532. Possession may be acquired by the same person who is to enjoy it, by his legal
representative, by his agent, or by any person without any power whatever: but in the last case,
the possession shall not be considered as acquired until the person in whose name the act of
possession was executed has ratified the same, without prejudice to the juridical consequences of
negotiorum gestio in a proper case. (439a)
July 27 – Alcomendras
Art. 525. The possession of things or rights may be had in one of two concepts: either in the
concept of owner, or in that of the holder of the thing or right to keep or enjoy it, the ownership
pertaining to another person.
Possession must be in the concept of an owner so that the benefit of acquisitive prescription will
apply. If you possess something by mere tolerance, you do not possess it in the concept an owner
but only in the concept of a holder. You recognize someone as the actual owner of the land.
Concept of an owner: Pertains to what other people know about the possession of a person. The
perspective does not come from the actual possessor. It is public such that the people will know that
you are occupying the land as if you are the owner. If you are possessing something in the concept
of an owner, you are possessing it against the whole world. That’s why you may benefit from
acquisitive prescription.
Concept of a holder: Opposite of concept of an owner. A holder acknowledges in another a superior

right of ownership whether his belief is right or wrong.
Example: By virtue of being a lessee, you have a right to use the thing you are renting. With regard
to the thing, you possess it in a concept of a holder. No matter how long is the lease agreement, you
cannot acquire it by virtue of prescription since you acknowledge that ownership resides with the
lessor. With respect to your leasehold right, you possess it in a concept of an owner.
Art. 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.



He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.
Classification of possession as to awareness of title. The belief that you are a possessor in good faith
must come from you. Possession in the concept of an owner does not mean that you are in good
faith right away.
The title here is a just title.
Example: Land granted to you by the government. You occupy it for 50 years. You have acquired
just title over the land. However, the land turns out to be a forest land thus not alienable and
disposable. Since you are mistaken that the land was agricultural, it may still be the basis of your
good faith because it was a mistake upon a doubtful question of law.
Art. 527. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a
possessor rests the burden of proof.
Good faith is always presumed. The one who alleges bad faith has the burden of proof.
Art. 528. Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case and from
the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses the thing
improperly or wrongfully.
Possession in good faith will be legally interrupted from the time there is a legal notice apprising
that person that your possession was not in good faith. That is when your possession is legally
interrupted. It then loses its character of being possessed in good faith. It will revert into bad faith.
***Different from what Atty. Suarez discussed.
Ordinary prescription – 10 years. Good faith and just title.

Extraordinary prescription – 30 years. Bad faith.
Example: A possessed it for 4 years. B gives you a notice that he is the real owner of the land. The 4
years possession was in good faith. From the time of the legal interruption which was made through
the notice by B, A was already in bad faith. He should then possess it for 30 years – extraordinary
prescription – for acquisitive prescription to set in. Under the principle of tacking, you prorate your
period of possession in good faith and bad faith.
Art. 529. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it
was acquired, until the contrary is proved.
If you possess something in bad faith, your possession in bad faith will continue until the time facts
exist that your possession was in good faith.
Example: A is a Lessee but does not recognize Lessor B’s ownership. He was possessing it in the
concept of an owner in bad faith for 15 years. But it was under a lease to own. Possession in bad



faith turns out to be possession in good faith. Instead of occupying it for 15 years more to acquire it,
since facts exist that he was in good faith, he will only need 5 more years to acquire it in good faith.
August 1, 2017 - Manligoy
What happened in the case Sanchez vs CA?
LILIA SANCHEZ VS CA
JUNE 20, 2003 | G.R. NO. 152766 | 404 SCRA 540
FACTS:
Lilian Sanchez constructed a house on a 76-square meter lot owned by her parents-in-law. The
lot was registered with Eliseo Sanchez, Marilyn Sanchez, Lilian Sanchez, Nenita Sanchez, Susana
Sanchez and Felipe Sanchez as co-owners.
On 20 February 1995, the lot was registered in the name of private respondent Virginia Teria by
virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale allegedly executed by the six co-owners in her favor. Petitioner,
however, claimed that she did not affix her signature on the document and subsequently refused
to vacate the lot, thus prompting Teria to file an action for recovery of possession of the lot.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to her 1/6 share of the co-owned property
HELD AND RATIO: YES. The lower courts failed to pass upon the issue of co-ownership present
in the case at hand.
Co-ownership, whether established by law or by agreement of the co-owners, the property or
thing held pro-indiviso is impressed with a fiducial nature so that each co-owner becomes a
trustee for the benefit of his co-owners and he may not do any act prejudicial to the interest of his
co-owners. Thus, the legal effect of an agreement to preserve the properties in co-ownership is to
create an express trust among the heirs as co-owners of the properties. Co-ownership is a form of
trust and every co-owner is a trustee for the others.
Before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual or co-owner can claim title
to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire land or thing.
Article 493 of the Civil Code gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to
freely sell and dispose of it, i.e., his undivided interest. He may validly lease his undivided interest
to a third party independently of the other co-owners. But he has no right to sell or alienate a
concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because his right over the
thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any physical adjudication.
Although assigned an aliquot but abstract part of the property, the metes and bounds of petitioner’s
lot has not been designated. As she was not a party to the Deed of Absolute Salevoluntarily entered
into by the other co-owners, her right to 1/6 of the property must be respected. Partition needs to
be effected to protect her right to her definite share and determine the boundaries of her
property. Such partition must be done without prejudice to the rights of private respondent
Virginia Teria as buyer of the 5/6 portion of the lot under dispute.



In co-ownership, what can the other party sell? Whenever you discuss co-ownership, you use the
legal terms. He can sell the undivided share. How much was sold to TESDA? So, when a co-owner
sells his undivided share, what kind of act is this? What are the three acts that need consent? What
kind of consent is required? What are the three acts in co-ownership? What is Article 487?
Art. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
What kind of act is that? Act of preservation of the thing owned in common. Whose consent is
required in act of preservation?
Going back to the case, what act was made by the five (5) co-owners when they saw the property?
I’m not talking about the right but the act of the co-owners. The act that we taled about is the act of
preservation of the thing. You have to eject other people because you have to preserve the thing
owned in common. Under Article 487, if you want to file an ejectment and you are a co-owner, you
don’t need their consent. You don’t need the consent of the co-owner. You can file an ejectment
case against somebody else occupying the co-owned property.
What act was performed by the five co-owners? It is an act of alteration. What is an act of alteration?
It is a change of the use of the thing which is more or less permanent and it prejudices the enjoyment
of the co-owner of the use of the thing. Okay. So that sale was an act of alteration. What kind of
consent is required here? Unanimous consent and in this case, Lilia Sanchez did not consent to the
same and therefore, under Article 493, even though a co-owner has the right to sell, he only has the
right to sell his ideal undivided share.
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute
another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which
may be alloted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.
What was the effect then of the sale by the five co-owners? Relationship between Lilia and the buyer?
What is the effect of sale by a co-owner of his or her undivided share? The buyer clearly steps into
the shoes of the selling co-owners and since the selling co-owners are merely co-owner, the buyer
now becomes a co-owner with Lilia.
Etong si Lilia, she had the property surveyed. What happened? What did she discover when she had
the property surveyed? When she had the property surveyed, she discovered that Lilia was occupying
more than 1/6 of the entire property because how much is her undivided share in the property? 1/6
and so Ofelia told Lilia to remove the portion that exceed the 1/6. So, what happened? What did
Lilia do? Now, did Ofelia have the right to do that? Why? What is the provision that applies?
Under Article 486, what does it state?
Art. 486. Each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in
accordance with the purpose for which it is intended and in such a way as not to injure the
interest of the co-ownership or prevent the other co-owners from using it according to their
rights. The purpose of the co-ownership may be changed by agreement, express or implied.



So, what does this provision mean? In relation to Ofelia and Lilia, if you are the co-owner, and you
are a 1/6 co-owner, how much of the co-owned property can you use? Is there a definite 1/6 in the
property? So how can she use that 1/6? How much of the property can she use? Let’s change that
property into a car. Each of the co-owner may use the thing in owned in common. That is the essence
of co-ownership. There’s no partition yet and we are talking about undivided shares and therefore,
when there is a co-ownership between Ofelia and Lilia, Lilia has the right to use the entire property
under … if she uses it in accordance with the purpose for which it was held. She did not go against
the purpose.
Now, when can she be … to 1/6 of the property? After partition na but while the co-ownership
exists, each co-owner has the right to use the entire property. Are we clear? So, let’s compare two
(2) cases which are very very important.
Under …, the … or undivided thing or rights belongs to different persons. Now, in the case of
Herrera vs Fangonil, the property of Jimenez and included in that property is lot 6 and 7. Now,
before he died, the father Fabian mortgaged Lot 6 and 7 and then he died and the mortgage was
foreclosed and there is a one-year redemption period for real property. What did Carmen do? She
redeemed Lot 6 and 7 that was inherited by her and the siblings from the parents. Now, according
to Carmen, when she redeemed Lot 6 and 7, she became the full owner thereof. Is she correct? The
answer is No. If a co-owner redeems co-owned property, she does not become a full owner of that
property. She merely performs an act of preservation which she could do unilaterally without the
consent of the other co-owners provided the act is for the preservation of the property owned in
common. So, the effect is this. She redeems the property for and in behalf of the co-ownership but
she can ask her co-owners for reimbursement of their pro-rata share in the redemption rights. So,
that is the effect if one co-owner redeems co-owned property and how did they become co-owners
of these lots? What is the process of co-ownership? In this case, they became co-owners by
succession. When the parents died, the children automatically inherited the lots from the parents.
HERRERA vs FANGONIL
GR 169356 | August 28, 2007
Facts:
Herrera and the Fangonils are the children of the late Fabian Fangonil and Maria LlorenFangonil
of Tubao, La Union. The spouses died intestate leaving their 7 children properties among which
are the subject properties in this case: parcel 6 and parcel 7.
Fabian when was still alive, obtained a loan and sale with right to repurchase the said properties.
The parcels were only repurchased by Carmen Fangonil-Herrera (petitioner) after her parents died.
When Carmen’s siblings filed a petition for judicial partition, Carmen opposed the same and
claimed that she be declared the sole owner of parcels 6 and 7.
She insists that her act of paying for the repurchase and release from mortgage of parcels 6 and 7
was on the understanding with her parents that she would thereafter be the owner thereof. She
asserts that her exercise of acts of ownership over parcels 6 and 7, to the exclusion of her parents
and siblings, reveals she is the exclusive owner of these lots.



She cites several circumstances in support of her contention that respondents never considered
parcels 6 and 7 part of the estate of their parents and are not co-owners thereof.
1) First, petitioner presented real estate tax receipts indicating that she had been the one
paying for the realty taxes of the property.
2) petitioner asserts she has been the only one hiring tenants for and benefiting from the
produce of parcels 6 and 7.
3) the non-attempt of respondents to partition parcels 6 and 7 within 10 years from the
death of the Fangonil spouses, as well as to reimburse her if indeed such was the
agreement, demonstrates that they never considered the said parcels part of the estate
of their parents.
Issue: Is Herrera the sole/exclusive owner of the subject parcels of land?
Ruling:
PETITIONER’S POSSESSION OF PARCELS 6 AND 7 DID NOT RIPEN INTO SOLE AND
EXCLUSIVE OWNERSHIP THEREOF.First, prescription applies to adverse, open, continuous, and
exclusive possession. In order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to the other
co-owners, the following elements must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co -owners; (2) that such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon
must be clear and convincing.
CLEARLY, PETITIONER CANNOT CLAIM ADVERSE POSSESSION IN THE CONCEPT OF AN

OWNER WHERE SHE VOLUNTARILY EXECUTED DOCUMENTS STATING THAT SHE WAS A
MERE CREDITOR AND/OR CO-OWNER. Mere silent possession by a co -owner; his receipt of
rents, fruits or profits from the property; his erection of buildings and fences and the planting of
trees thereon; and the payment of land taxes cannot serve as proofs of exclusive ownership, if it
is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession which
unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.
In this case, we find that petitioner effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership.
Petitioners only act of repudiation of the co-ownership was when she refused to honor the
extrajudicial settlement in 1994.
Alternatively, possession by a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse
to the other co -owners, but in fact as beneficial to all of them. A co-ownership is a form of trust,
with each owner being a trustee for each other. Mere actual possession by one will not give rise
to the inference that the possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to
possession of the property. Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-
owner as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire
by prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership.
An action to demand partition among co-owners is imprescriptible, and each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property.



Now, compare this case to Balus vs Balus.
The difference against Fangonil case, in Fangonil, the parents died while the property was owned
by them and therefore there was succession. It made the children co-owners. In the case of Balus,
when Balus died, he was no longer the owner of the property he mortgaged. Because the mortgage
was foreclosed, the Bank was the highest bidder and the bank consolidated its title and so he lost
ownership. There is nothing to inherit. The three heirs had nothing to inherit and the two siblings
who … the property cannot redeem but bought the property and therefore the one who bought the
property thinking the owners of the property, there was no source of co-ownership in this case. So
you have to be very very careful when analyzing the situation because there are different effects.
Change one thing ang the effect is different.
BALUS vs BALUS
GR No. 168970 | January 15, 2010
Facts:
Rufo Balus owned a parcel of land which he used as security for a loan from the Rural Bank of
Maigo. He failed to pay, so the mortgaged property was foreclosed and was subsequently sold to
the Bank. The property was not redeemed, so more than two years after the auction, or on January
25, 1984, the sheriff executed a Definite Deed of Sale in the Bank's favor. Rufo died on July 6,
1984.
On October 10, 1989, the children of Balus (Celestino, Saturnino, and Leonarda) executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate. They admitted knowledge of the fact that their father mortgaged
the subject property to the Bank and that they intended to redeem the same at the soonest possible
time.
Three years after, Saturnino and Leonarda bought the subject property from the Bank. A transfer
certificate title was issued in their name. Meanwhile, Celestino continued possession of the
subject lot.
Saturnino and Leonarda filed a complaint contending that they had already informed Celestino
that they were the new owners, but the latter still refused to surrender possession. Celestino argued
that the Extrajudicial settlement provided a provision retaining co-ownership by repurchasing the
property. Thus, co-ownership was retained when his siblings purchased the property--making him
entitled to 1/3 of the property.
Issue: Whether co-ownership continued to exist even after the transfer of title to the bank
Ruling:
The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death. Also, what can
only be inherited are those transmissible rights and obligations existing at the time of a person’s
death.



In this case, a new title was issued in the Bank's name before Rufo died on July 6, 1984. Thus, it
acquired exclusive ownership of the lot during the lifetime of Rufo.
Thus, in this case, the heirs never inherited the subject lot from their father. There is no co-
ownership to talk about and no property to partition, as the disputed lot never formed part of the
estate of their deceased father.
Did you take up the Condominium Law? What is a condominium? What is the situation if you are a
condominium unit owner? As the co-owner of the common areas, what are the responsibilities under
the Article 488? What is the concept of perpendicular ownership under Article 490?
The advent of Condominium Law, this concept was … because we now have the Condominium
Corporation wherein the unit owners become members or stockholders of the condominium
corporation and it does not require pro-rata in the sense that if the roof repair and the cost is
1,000,000 and there are 100 members of the corporation, those on … is the members will pay the
monthly dues. Whatever money is collected will be used to pay the repairs. Hindi na siya pro-rata
just like an ordinary co-ownership, pro rata yan when it comes to expenses but for a condominium
corporation because of the existence of the condominium corporation, that’s not applicable
anymore. Another thing is the co-owned areas are not registered in the names of the condominium
unit owners but in the name of the condominium corporation wherein the condominium unit
owners are members or stockholders. So that is the difference between a condominium corporation
and an ordinary co-ownership.
Let’s go the last important topic in co-ownership and what is that? What is the very important topic
in co-ownership? Partition under Article 494.
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not
exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
What is the essence of Article 494? Is co-ownership an ideal situation? What is the proof that co-
ownership is discouraged by law? Anyone can get out of the co-ownership at anytime except for
those exceptions provided for by Article 494.
So if you have A, B, C and D, D can get out. Can A, B and C remain? Yes, they can. It is their
prerogative. D can ask for partial partition wherein his undivided share will be recognized and



delineated and the metes and bounds of his share will be established so that he can demand from
the co-ownership of his share but the rest can remain as co-owners.
What is the more important portion of Article 494? An action for partition does not prescribe. For as
long as there is a co-ownership, a co-owner can get out even if the co-ownership will exist for a
hundred years. A co-owner can definitely get out of the co-ownership. What’s the exception? It’s
very easy. You just have to read the provisions.
However, when can a co-owner not file an action for partition? For as long as the co-owners
recognize each other as co-owners, the action to pertition will never prescribe but there are times
when a co-owner can acquire ownership of the entire property. The general rule is you cannot
acquire ownership of the entire property as long the other co-owners expressly or implied recognizes
the co-ownership. Jurisprudence tells us that he can become an exclusive owner of the property if
the following provisions are met:
1. It was made known to the others that he is definitely repudiating the co-ownership and
claims ownership of the entire property.
2. There must be clear and convincing evidence of such repudiation and clear and convincing
evidence of knowledge on the part of the others that he repudiated.
3. Other requirements are possession and the prescriptive period is 10 years.
In the case of De Lima vs CA, we have Lino De Lima who is the owner of a lot, Lot 775. When he
died, his only heirs is three sibling, Rolando, Galileo and Juanita. Those siblings became co-owners
of the property of Lino De Lima. Now after the death of Lino, the titles of the property was changed
to the heirs of Lino De Lima represented by Galileo De Lima. It was in 1950 when the title was in
the name of the legal heirs. However, four years later, Galileo and his brothers executed an extra-
judicial declaration of heirs decaling that he was the only heir of his brother in his affidavit and by
the strength of said affidavit, the Register of Deeds cancelled the title in the name of the legal heirs
and issued a new TCT in the name of Galileo De Lima. That was in 1954. In 1968, 14 years later,
here comes the other heirs, Rolando and Juanita, filed an action for partition with the court against
Galileo claiming to be co-owners of the property and under Article 404, an action for partition can
be made at any time. So, it does not prescribe. The question here is has the action prescribed? And
the answer is YES. Why? Because it has been 14 years since the title of the property was transferred
to the name of Galileo de Lima and that is already in compliance with Letter a and letter b because
if you have a registered title in your name, that is notice to the whole world. The prescriptive period
started to run from such registration in 1954 and the prescriptive period based on constructive trust,
which you don’t have to understand right now, is 10 years.
DE LIMA vs CA
G.R. NO. L-46296 | 201 SCRA 641 | SEPTEMBER 24, 1991
Facts:
Lino Delima acquired Lot. No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale
on installments from the government. After his demise in 1921 he had his three brothers and a
sister listed as his heirs. The heirs were Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima, and
Vicente Delima. A new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in the name of the Legal Heirs of
Lino Delima represented by Galileo Delima. On September 22, 1953, Galileo executed an



affidavit of Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs adjudicating to himself the subject property

excluding the other heirs. He declared the lot to be of his own and paid for its taxes. On February
29, 1968, the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed with the Court of First Instance
of Cebu an action for reconveyance and partition of property and for the annulment of the
certificate of title issued plus damages against their Uncle Galileo. Vicente Delima was also later
included as party defendant for his refusal to help in the action.
The trial court decided in favor of the petitioners rendering the TCT No. 3009 null and void and
declaring Vicente, the Heirs of Juanita, the Heirs of Eulalio and the Heirs of Galileo to be owners
of the property, each sharing a pro-indiviso share of one-fourth of the whole. The respondents,
Heirs of Galileo Delima, appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision in their
favor. It upheld the claim of Galileo that the other brothers and sisters have already waived their
rights to the property being that it was Galileo alone that paid for the balance of the purchase
price and the realty taxes for the property.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners’ action for partition is already barred by the statutory period provided
by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive
prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shared in the disputed property?
Held:
Yes, Article 494 (5) of the Civil Code provides that: “No prescription shall run in favor of a co-
owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognized
the co-ownership.” By this it is therefore understood that possession by a co-owner will not be
presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to benefit all. Being that Galileo was holding
the property in representation of the co-owners; he was therefore acting as an administrator who
took care of the property yet still having the ultimate obligation to deliver the property to his co-
owners.
However, this rule shall no longer apply when one of the co-owners begin to claim the absolute
and exclusive ownership and denies the others any share therein. The imprescriptability of the
action for partition shall no longer apply since Galileo is adversely claiming lone ownership over
the property. In order that a possession be considered adverse amounting to a repudiation of the
co-ownership, the following elements must concur: (1) that the trustee has performed the
unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; (2) that such positive acts of
repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust; and (3) that the evidence thereon should
be clear and conclusive.
Since Galileo, having executed a deed of partition and obtained subsequent to that the
cancellation of the old title and the creation of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner
of the property, he thereby in effect denied and repudiated the ownership of the other co-owners
over their shares. From this act, the statute of limitations started to run. Since an action for
reconveyance



But for other cases, when it is just information given to the co-owners, that is not enough one needs
to comply with letter b, there must be proof of repudiation.
So tomorrow, we are going to discuss 2 more cases in co-ownership which involve legal redemption.
August 2, 2017 - Pahayahay
Title V. - POSSESSION
CHAPTER 1
POSSESSION AND THE KINDS THEREOF
So let us go to possession.
I understand that you already reached Article 540 (referring to the discussion of Atty. Alabastro). So
I assume that you are very very familiar with the provisions on possession. So let us review.
Article 523. Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.
Article 524. Possession may be exercised in one's own name or in that of another.
Let us go to the case of Piedad v. Spouses Gurieza, GR No. 207525, June 10, 2014.
When Bonifacio assigned here caretakers and he left for one [year/week?] and the ... of the caretakers
is that the Gurieza Spouses, he did not lose possession. He was still in possession. According to
Article 523, possession is the holding of the thing. It is not necessary that one holds it physically.
The possession includes Article 524, it says that, possession may be exercises in the name of another.
So Gureiza Spouses, possess the property in the name of Bonifacio. So Bonifacio is still the possessor.
Bonifacio Piedad v. Spouses Gurieza

GR No. 207525 | June 10, 2014
Facts
The instant case stemmed from a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages filed by
Bonifacio against Sps. Gurieza. In his complaint, Bonifacio alleged that he is the absolute owner
of the 1/3 middle portion of a parcel of residential land designated as Lot 1227, which he
acquired through intestate succession from his late father who inherited the same from the latter’s
parents, Alejandro Piedad (Alejandro) and Tomasa Villaray (Tomasa). He also claimed that his
ownership of the subject lot took place even before his father’s death and was validated through
a Deed of Confirmation of an Adjudication and Partition (Deed of Confirmation) executed by
Alejandro and Tomasa’s legal heirs.
Further, Bonifacio alleged that before migrating to Hawaii, he built a bungalow on the subject
lot and assigned numerous caretakers to look after it, the last of which were Sps. Gurieza.
Sometime in 2005, however, Sps. Gurieza allegedly took interest of the bungalow and the
subject lot after learning from an employee of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) that Lot 1227 is public land. Using such information, Sps. Gurieza had the
subject lot declared under their name for tax purposes, caused a subdivision survey of Lot 1227,



and filed an application for survey authority and titling with the Bureau of Land Management,
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR, Bayombong, Nueva
Vizcaya (CENRO-DENR Nueva Vizcaya).
When Bonifacio learned of Sps. Gurieza’s acts, he authorized Ofelia Bay-ag to file a protest
before the DENR which deferred further action on their (Sps. Gurieza’s) application before it.
Thereafter, Bonifacio sent his daughter, Maria Inspiracion Piedad-Danao (Danao), to the country
to personally demand that Sps. Gurieza vacate the subject lot unconditionally; and for this
purpose, Danao initiated a complaint before the barangay court. However, during the mediation
proceedings, Sps. Gurieza refused to heed Danao’s demand and even challenged her to go to
higher courts. Thus, Bonifacio was constrained to file the instant case as his last resort.
In their defense, Sps. Gurieza denied Bonifacio’s claim and maintained that in 1974, the subject
lot was a vacant and virginal public land and that the DENR allowed them to possess and occupy
the same in the concept of an owner. As such, they acquired the same through acquisitive
prescription. They likewise assailed the authenticity and validity of the Deed of Confirmation,
contending that it was only signed by a few heirs of Alejandro and Tomasa.
Issue
WON Bonifacio had a better right of possession over the subject lot.
Held
Bonifacio had clearly established his cause of action for unlawful detainer. The following
established facts impel this conclusion:
First, the evidence shows that as early as the 1950s, Bonifacio already had possession of the
subject lot and even built a bungalow-type house thereon. Moreover, when he migrated to
Hawaii, Bonifacio appointed numerous caretakers to the said house and lot, the last being Sps.
Gurieza. Thus, despite his migration to Hawaii, Bonifacio never relinquished said possession
over the house and lot. Consistent with Article 524 of the Civil Code, it is well-settled that “[i]t
is not necessary that the owner of a parcel of land should himself occupy the property as
someone in his name may perform the act. In other words, the owner of real estate has
possession, either when he himself is physically in occupation of the property, or when another
person who recognizes his rights as owner is in such occupancy.” Thus, the Sps. Gurieza’s stay
on the subject lot was only made possible through the mere tolerance of Bonifacio.
Second, when Bonifacio learned that Sps. Gurieza declared the subject lot under their name for
tax purposes, caused a subdivision survey of Lot 1227, and filed an application for survey
authority and titling with the CENRO-DENR Nueva Vizcaya, he immediately took steps to
terminate their tolerated stay on the subject lot and house and demanded that they leave
immediately, rendering the Sps. Gurieza’s stay on the subject lot illegal.
Third, instead of vacating the subject lot, Sps. Gurieza defied Bonifacio’s demand and asserted
their ownership over the same. Moreover, they even challenged Danao to go to the courts to
have them removed from such lot. In effect, Sps. Gurieza was able to unlawfully withhold
possession of the subject lot from Bonifacio.



Lastly, Bonifacio, through Danao, made his final demand to Sps. Gurieza on January 14, 2008,
as evidenced by a Certificate to File Action issued by the Barangay Captain of the area where
the subject lot was located, stating that the Sangguniang Barangay had tried to settle the dispute
between the parties but failed to do so, and filed his complaint on June 24, 2008, or within the
one (1) year period from his last demand.
Article 525. The possession of things or rights may be had in one of two concepts: either in the
concept of owner, or in that of the holder of the thing or right to keep or enjoy it, the ownership
pertaining to another person.
Let us go to the case of Bukidnon Doctor's v. Metrobank, GR No. 161882, July 8, 2005. This case
is under Article 525. The issue here is whether or not Metrobank has the material possession of the
property. When Metrobank applied for a writ of possession, because Bukidnon Doctor's was still
occupying the lots. The SC said you do not have to apply for a writ of possession if you are already
in possession. That is superfluous. The proper action would be to file for unlawful detainer. Uhm, a
writ of possession is easy no, you have to file that ... Pinahirapan ng SC ang Metrobank. Because
physically, Metrobank was not in possession. Legally, Metrobank was in possession because of
Article 525.
Bukidnon Doctor's v. Metrobank

GR No. 161882 | July 8, 2005
Facts
Sometime in 1995, petitioner Bukidnon Doctors’ Hospital, Inc., obtained a loan of P25 million
from respondent Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company to be used for the construction of its
hospital. To secure this loan, the petitioner mortgaged six parcels of land located in Valencia,
Bukidnon, registered in the name of Dr. Rene Sison and Rory P. Roque, President and
Administrator, respectively, of the petitioner. Upon petitioner’s default in the payment of the
loan, the mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed and the mortgaged lots were sold in a public
auction to respondent bank, being the sole and highest bidder. The petitioner failed to redeem
the properties within the period of redemption. Forthwith, the respondent consolidated its
ownership over the properties and was issued new certificates of title on 1 October 2001.
Earlier, in a letter received by the respondent, the petitioner expressed its desire to continue
staying in the subject premises so that the operation of the hospital erected thereon would not
be disrupted. For that purpose, the petitioner proposed to pay rent in the amount of P100,000
per month for a period of, but not limited to, three years. On 17 December 2001, the respondent
agreed to lease the properties but subject to the following terms: (1) the monthly rental would be
P200,000 with a one month advance rental and a deposit equivalent to three months rental; (2)
the effectivity of the lease contract would be from June 2001; and (3) the contract would be
subject to review every six months. The terms finally agreed upon by the parties, as culled from
respondent’s letter to the petitioner of 30 May 2002, were (1) a monthly rental of P150,000, and
(2) the effectivity of the lease contract in November 2001.
In its letter, the respondent asked the petitioner to vacate the leased premises within fifteen days.
The petitioner refused, invoking the subsisting lease agreement. The respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) an Ex Parte Motion for a Writ of Possession.



Issue
WON Metrobank is entitled to a writ of possession.
Held
Yes. The law and jurisprudence are clear that in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, an order
for a writ of possession issues as a matter of course, upon proper motion, after the expiration of
the redemption period without the mortgagor exercising the right of redemption, or even during
the redemption period provided a bond is posted to indemnify the debtor in case the foreclosure
sale is shown to have been conducted without complying with the requirements of the law or
without the debtor violating the mortgage contract. The rationale for the ministerial issuance of
a writ of possession is to put the foreclosure buyer in possession of the property sold without
delay, since the right to possession is founded on ownership of the property.
However, in the instant case, a writ of possession was not the correct remedy for the purpose of
ousting the petitioner from the subject premises. It must be noted that possession is the holding
of a thing or the enjoyment of a right. It is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the
exercise of a right, or by the fact that a thing or right is subject to the action of one’s will, or by
the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right. “By material occupation
of a thing,” it is not necessary that the person in possession should be the occupant of the
property; the occupancy can be held by another in his name.
In other words, an owner of a real estate has possession, either when he himself is physically
occupying the property, or when another person who recognizes his rights as owner is occupying
it.
So, these concepts are a bit abstract. We are talking about possession here but we are not only
talking about physical possession, we are talking about legal. How do you understand the legal term
possession. It is not just physically holding.
Article 526. He is deemed a possessor in good faith who is not aware that there exists in his
title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
He is deemed a possessor in bad faith who possesses in any case contrary to the foregoing.
Mistake upon a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith.
Article 527. Good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of
a possessor rests the burden of proof.
What is Article 526? It tells us who is deemed to be a possessor in good faith. Memorize! If I ask,
who is a possessor in good faith? Why? You do not know the mind of a person. You do not know if
that person is in good faith or in bad faith, you can only deem him to be one. And he is deemed to
be a possessor in good faith if he is not aware, he does not know that there exist in his title or mode
of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it. I will not accept your own words! When we talk about
who is deemed to be in possessor of good faith, you have to use the exact terms. It is very easy to
memorize.



So when is one deemed to be a possessor in bad faith? When he is aware. Okay. So, the cases are
not so nice. You have to look at the factual circumstances. But good faith under Article 527 is always
presumed even though in truth and in fact that person is aware of any flaw in his title or mode of
acquisite which invalidates it. There is this presumption of good faith and therefore, one who alleges,
he must prove it, he has the burden of proof.
Article 528. Possession acquired in good faith does not lose this character except in the case
and from the moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not unaware that he possesses
the thing improperly or wrongfully.
Under Article 528, because there is a presumption, every possessor is presumed to be a possessor
in good faith. When does he lose this character? This presumption that he is in good faith? When
does he lose it? What is the operative phrase there? When is the exact time that he is not deemed in
good faith anymore? You just have to choose among the phrases there. When is the exact point in
time? [BV na si Maam]
August 3 part 1 – Peroy
What is that particular point in time?

From the moment facts exist. That is the only thing you can see, the proof that the possessor is no
longer unaware. What is going on in the head of the possessor, nobody knows. The operative
phrase is “from the moment facts exist”.
Example: letter signed by the owner of the land sent to the possessor saying that “You are not the
owner.” That is a fact, a
proof.
That’s Art. 528.
Art. 529. It is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it
was acquired, until the contrary is proved. (436)
This is a presumption. Just read that.
Art. 530. Only things and rights which are susceptible of being appropriated may be the object
of possession. (437)
What can be possessed?

Property. We learned that property is an object which may be or can be appropriated. Only those
that may be appropriated can be possessed.
We cannot possess property of public dominion and those prohibited by law.
ACQUISITION OF POSSESSION



Art. 531. Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right,
or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal
formalities established for acquiring such right. (438a)
[Recap recitation by Atty. S of Atty. A’s lesson]
How is possession acquired

1. By material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right
You physical use it or exercise the right
Example: Membership in Manila Polo Club – that is a right, it is intangible. It relates to the
right to use the facilities. When you exercise that right, by playing sports there, you are in
possession of that right.
2. By subjection to the action of our will

There is no actual physical custody by the possessor to acquire possession if there is an
agreement between the two properties to transfer possession.
Example: A borrows the car of B. B says the car is in Abreeza and gives A the keys. From
the moment the keys are handed to A, he acquires possession thereof. He is already
considered a possessor under the law because they agreed. Once A returns the car, B
already acquires possession of the car. We are not talking about ownership, only
possession. It may relate to something that you borrowed, you don’t have to be the owner
of the thing.
3. By constructive possession or proper acts and legal formalities established by acquiring

such rights
There is no physical change of hands. It is the proper acts and legal formalities undertaken
by the parties.
Example: By signing documents, transfer of shares of stock from one person to another,
upon execution, the other person acquires possession of the shares of stock.
You don’t have to go through 1, 2 and 3 to acquire possession. It’s either 1, 2, or 3.
Somodio v. CA
GR 82680, August 13, 1994
FACTS:
Somodio paid ½ of the purchase price for a parcel of land. He started to construct a house but was
left unfinished when he was employed in a faraway area. He allowed Ayco to occupy the land but
when he tried to demand Ayco to vacate the premises, the latter refused to do so. Purisima also
occupied the land without consent from Somodio.
ISSUE:
WON Somodio had enjoyed priority over the possession of the land?
HELD:



Yes. He was able to take possession by planting trees and started construction of his house.
Possession in the eyes of the law doesn’t mean that a man has to have his feet on every square
meter of ground before it can be said he is in possession.
Somodio acquired by number 1, material occupation. There are 2 occupants now. Ayco, who was
allowed, therefore, he acquired possession under number 2, by action of the will, there was an
agreement.
Somodio filed an unlawful detainer because Ayco’s possession was lawful in the beginning but
later became unlawful. As to Purisma, Somodio filed for forcible entry, as Purisima entered
through stealth. Purisima did not acquire possession in any of those 3 valid ways. Purisima is not
considered a possessor. That is why 2 different cases were filed as there were 2 different
circumstances. The non-acquisition of legal possession by Purisima making Somodio still the
possessor.
The fact that he [Somodio] acquired possession by material occupation does not require him to
stay there forever and not leave the place to retain the possesson that he acquired. He can leave.
Once the possession is acquired, he possesses it even if he leaves.
Pajuyo v.CA and Guevarra.

GR 146364, June 3, 2004
FACTS:
Pajuyo purchased the rights over a property from Pedro Perez. Thereafter, he constructed a house
and he and his family lived there. Later, Pajuyo agreed to let Guevarra live in the house for free
provided that Guevarra maintain cleanliness and orderliness of the house. They also agreed that
Guevarra should leave upon demand. But when Pajuyo later told Guevarra that he needed the
house, Guevarra refused, hence an ejectment case was filed.
ISSUE:
WON Pajuyo acquired possession of the house?
HELD:
Yes. Under number 1, material occupation and exercise of rights. He took possession once he
built his house there and occupied this lot. Guevarra entered into a kasunduan with Pajuyo.
Pajuyo acquired possession from Guevarra under number 2, subjection to the action of the will.
Both of them acquired possession.
[Suko si Maam sa reporter. Take note, you must be able to identify in which of the 3 ways the
possession was acquired, otherwise, possession was not lawfully acquired.]
As to the allegation of both them being squatters, the court cannot leave them as is. The SC said
that the application of pari delicto in a case of ejection must not be applied as it might result to the
parties taking the law into their own hands. The court must determine the superiority of possession
as an urgent matter.



They both had possession . To determine who had lawful possession, you look at priority. We will
go to that under Art. 538.
It is to determine whether or not lawful possession was acquired. Again, we are not talking about
ownership, possession lang.
August 3 Part 2 – Alcomendras
Art. 532. Possession may be acquired by the same person who is to enjoy it, by his legal
representative, by his agent, or by any person without any power whatever: but in the last case,
the possession shall not be considered as acquired until the person in whose name the act of
possession was executed has ratified the same, without prejudice to the juridical consequences of
negotiorum gestio in a proper case.
Who may acquire possession?
1. Person who is to possess it

2. Authorized person
3. Unauthorized person
Equatorial Realty vs Mayfair
A parcel of land has two buildings. Carmelo, the owner, entered into a lease of contract with Mayfair
over it for 20 years which also gives Mayfair the right of first refusal if Caremalo decides to sell the
land. Despite such provision, Carmelo sold it to Equatorial. Mayfair then filed an action to annul the
sale between Carmelo and Equatorial. During the pendency of the case, Mayfair continued to
occupy the premises. Equatorial asked for rent. Mayfair paid. The court decided in favor of Mayfair
and annulled the sale. Carmelo was ordered to sell the property to Mayfair.
Issue: did EQUATORIAL, when he entered into a sale with Carmelo, acquire constructive possession
of the property.
Held: NO. Equatorial never took physical possession. Mayfair was still in possession. In view of
Mayfair’s timely objection to the sale through filing a court action, the execution of a contract of
sale as a constructive delivery is a legal fiction. When there is an impediment to the passing of the
property from the hands of the vendor to the vendee, fiction yields to reality and the delivery has
not been effected.
Comments: Payment of the rentals does not imply actual delivery since there was no contract
between them. Mayfair only did so in order to remain on the property and prevent imminent
eviction.
Erickson vs City of Pasig
Ericsson Telecommunications, Inc. is engaged in the design, engineering, and marketing of

telecommunication facilities/system. In an Assessment Notice dated October 25, 2000 issued by



the City Treasurer of Pasig City, petitioner was assessed a business tax deficiency for the years
1998 and 1999 amounting to P9,466,885.00 and P4,993,682.00, respectively, based on its gross
revenues as reported in its audited financial statements for the years 1997 and 1998. Petitioner
filed a Protest claiming that the computation of the local business tax should be based on gross
receipts and not on gross revenue.
Issue: whether the local business tax on contractors should be based on gross receipts or gross
revenue.
Held: Gross receipts. Receipt of income may be actual or constructive. We have held that the
withholding process results in the taxpayers constructive receipt of the income withheld.
By analogy, we apply to the receipt of income the rules on actual and constructive possession
provided in Articles 531 and 532 of our Civil Code.
Article 531 of the Civil Code clearly provides that the acquisition of the right of possession is
through the proper acts and legal formalities established therefor. The withholding process is one
such act. There may not be actual receipt of the income withheld; however, as provided for in
Article 532, possession by any person without any power whatsoever shall be considered as
acquired when ratified by the person in whose name the act of possession is executed.
In our withholding tax system, possession is acquired by the payor as the withholding agent of the
government, because the taxpayer ratifies the very act of possession for the government. There is
thus constructive receipt.
There is, therefore, constructive receipt, when the consideration for the articles sold, exchanged or
leased, or the services rendered has already been placed under the control of the person who sold
the goods or rendered the services without any restriction by the payor.
Comments: Erickson did not physically posses the tax but there was constructive possession of the
tax. It was an agent of the government. Eventually, the tax will go to the government. This falls under
number 2 of Article 532. Erickson is an authorized agent that constructively acquired possession of
the tax for the government. The tax shall be turned over to it eventually.
Art. 533. The possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without
interruption and from the moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted.
One who validly renounces an inheritance is deemed never to have possessed the same.
When a person dies, ownership is automatically transmitted to the heirs. 533 says not only
ownership but also possession. It is deemed transmitted without interruption. But the inheritance
must be accepted. If you renounce, you are deemed to never have possessed what you inherited.
HEIRS OF LASAM VS UMENGAN



Isabel Cuntapay had four children by her first husband, Domingo Turingan. When Domingo
Turingan passed away, Isabel Cuntapay remarried Mariano Lasam. She had two other children by
him, namely: Trinidad and Rosendo. Heirs of Rosendo Lasam (son of Isabel Cuntapay by her second
husband) filed with the MTCC a complaint for unlawful detainer against Vicenta Umengan, who
was then occupying the subject lot.
Heirs of Rosendo Lasam alleged that they are the owners of the subject lot, having inherited it from
their father. Rosendo Lasam was allegedly the sole heir of the deceased Pedro Cuntapay through
Isabel Cuntapay. During his lifetime, Rosendo Lasam allegedly temporarily allowed Vicenta
Umengan to occupy the subject lot sometime in 1955.
In the present case, Lasam base their claim of right to possession on the theory that their father,
Rosendo Lasam, was the sole owner of the subject lot by virtue of the newly discovered last will
and testament of Isabel Cuntapay bequeathing the same to him. Umengan is allegedly holding the
subject lot by mere tolerance of Rosendo Lasam and, upon the Lasam’s formal demand on her to
vacate the same, Umengan’s right to possess it has expired.
On the other hand, Umengan hinges her claim of possession on the legal conveyances made to her
by the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her first husband, namely, Maria, Rufo, Sado and
Abdon. These conveyances were made through the sale and donation by the said siblings of their
respective portions in the subject lot to respondent as evidenced by the pertinent deeds.
Issue: who has a better right to possess
Held: Umengan. The right of an heir to dispose of the decedents property, even if the same is under
administration, is based on the Civil Code provision stating that the possession of hereditary property
is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the moment of the death of the
decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. Where there are however, two or more heirs, the
whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs.
Contrary to the assertion of Lasam, the conveyances made by the children of Isabel Cuntapay by her
first marriage to respondent are valid insofar as their pro indiviso shares are concerned. These
conveyances, as evidenced by the deed of donation and deed of sale, coupled with the fact that she
has been in possession of the subject lot since 1955, establish that Umengan has a better right to
possess the same as against Lasam whose claim is largely based on Isabel Cuntapays last will and
testament which, to date, has not been probated; hence, has no force and effect and under which
no right can be claimed by petitioners
Art. 534. On who succeeds by hereditary title shall not suffer the consequences of the wrongful
possession of the decedent, if it is not shown that he was aware of the flaws affecting it; but the
effects of possession in good faith shall not benefit him except from the date of the death of the
decedent.



Example: F was in possession of a parcel of land for three years knowing that A owned it through
acrretion. When he died, S inherited the land. 9 years after F, died the real owner A filed an action
of reconveyance. The action will not prosper. S already acquired it through ordinary prescription
which only requires 10 years of OCEAN possession. There was continued possession since F’s
possession of 3 years was tacked to S’s 9 years possession. There’s already been 12 years of
uninterrupted possession which was enough to acquire ownership. Take note this only applies to
unregistered land.
If both F and S were in bad faith, the period should be 30 years.
Note: The son is presumed to be in good faith even if the father possessed it in bad faith from the
time the father dies. Good faith starts from the death of the decedent. It stands for as long as no one
can prove that there are facts which exist showing that he was aware of the bad faith of his father.
Art. 535. Minors and incapacitated persons may acquire the possession of things; but they need
the assistance of their legal representatives in order to exercise the rights which from the
possession arise in their favor.
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is
a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive another
of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse
to deliver the thing.
This talks about a situation of how possession cannot be acquired.
Example: Unregistered parcel of land. In 1980, X possesses it in bad faith. He knows that A owns it.
In 1985, he was driven out of his possession through force. Goons kicked him out of the land. Y
now possesses the land. Y did not acquire possession of the land despite his material possession. As
long as X objects, Y will never acquire possession. X files an action for forcible entry being a prior
possessor who was evicted through FISTS. In 1990, court returned X’s possession. In 2017, A filed
an action for reconveyance. It will not prosper. X’s possession is deemed to be 37 years. The 10
years that he was physically ousted will be counted in his favor.
We learned that under Article 536, possession cannot be acquired through force or intimidation.
We also discussed the objection to be made by the possessor who was removed by force or
intimidation. He may file the proper action.
Art. 536. In no case may possession be acquired through force or intimidation as long as there
is a possessor who objects thereto. He who believes that he has an action or a right to deprive
another of the holding of a thing, must invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder
should refuse to deliver the thing.
Now Article 537 is actually a continuation of Article 536 because 537 says that the acts merely
tolerated and those clandestinely and without the knowledge of the possessor of the thing or by
violence do not affect. So, Article 537 is actually related to forcible entry, clandestinely without the



knowledge, force or by violence. Anybody who is removed by force, violence etc., possession is not
affected.
Art. 537. Acts merely tolerated, and those executed clandestinely and without the knowledge of
the possessor of a thing, or by violence, do not affect possession.
What is the importance of this provision? Because we are living up to what is deemed prescription
here and possession is not something that is desired. One desires ownership. Ownership is possible
if the possession is continuous. So if you are possessor inside a parcel of land and is removed by
force or violence clandestinely etc, his possession is not affected. He is still deemed to be in
possession.
For the 1st part, acts merely tolerated. Let’s say we have a possessor of a parcel of land and he allows
somebody to live there. If you remember that case of Aviola vs CA where the Binanans were allowed
to live there in the property, does that make the possession of the possessor shared? No. The
possession is still exclusive. The one who agreed to live there has not really acquired possession. So
exclusive, OCEN possession, open, continuous, exclusive.
Article 538 is really beneficial. A possessor who wants to acquire ownership by possession. That is
why Article 538 says, possession as a fact cannot be ratified at the same time in two different
personalities. There can be only one possessor, a lawful possessor for purposes of acquisitive
prescription unless they are co-possessors.
Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different
personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of
possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer
in possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all
these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination
of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.
So Article 538 continues. What if there is an issue as to who is the actual possessor? Legally speaking,
then those are the rules, Article 538. Who is the lawful possessor? Remember the case of Somodio
vs CA. He actually left the place to go somewhere and there was Aiko and Purisima on his property.
So, si Aiko was allowed by him to stay there. That is already tolerated. So that does not affect his
possession even though he left. He is considered a present possessor. What about Purisima? Purisima
entered clandestinely without the knowledge of Somodio. The possession of Somodio was still not
affected and therefore he is the present possessor of the property.
SOMODIO vs CA
G.R. No. 82680 | August 15, 1994
Facts:
On October 21, 1974, Jose Ortigas conveyed to Wilfredo Mabugat the possession of a residential
lot in General Santos City. Nicanor Somodio paid one-half of the purchase price. Thus, Mabugat
executed an Affidavit of Trust expressly recognizing the right of petitioner over one-half undivided
portion. The land was partitioned into two portions, Somodio took the western part. Immediately



after the partition, Somodio took possession of his portion and planted thereon ipil-ipil trees,
coconut trees and other fruit-bearing trees.
In 1976, Somodio began constructing a structure on his lot. It was however left unfinished when
he went to North Cotabato. In October 1977, Somodio allowed Felomino Ayco to transfer the
latter’s hut to the lot in question. Six years later, Somodio demanded that Ayco vacate the
premises. On August 23, 1983, Somodio filed an action for unlawful detainer against Ayco at the
MTC.
On June 26, 1983, Ebenecer Purisima entered the land and constructed a house thereon. 4 days
later, Somodio, in the same court, filed against Purisima a complaint for forcible entry. These two
cases were consolidated.
Purisima contended that the lot was a portion of the land subject of his application for
miscellaneous sales patent with the Bureau of Lands. The lot was actually a gift to his father, a
geodetic engineer for having surveyed the parcel of land comprising of Lots Nos. 6427 and 6328
for the Small Farmers Fishpond Association, Inc. Ayco anchored his right to possess on Purisima’s
evidence.
Issue: Who had the prior possession of the land in question and thus have better rights?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Nicanor Somodio had the better right to possess. Somodio took
possession of the property sometime in 1974 when he planted the property to coconut trees, ipil-
ipil trees and fruit trees. In 1976, he started the construction of a building on the property. It is
immaterial that the building was unfinished and that he left for Kidapawan for employment
reasons and visited the property only intermittently. Possession in the eyes of the law does not
mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can be said that
he is in possession.
Article 531 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides: Possession is acquired by the material
occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is subject to the action of our
will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities established for acquiring such right.
The Supreme Court noted that priority in time should be the pivotal cog in resolving the issue of
possession. Even if the Court of Appeals is correct in its finding that petitioner started introducing
improvements on the land only in 1981, he still enjoyed priority of possession because respondent
Purisima entered the premises only in 1983. Even if Purisima's father surveyed the property of
help to his cause or Lot No. 6328-X was in payment of his fee for the services of his father and
that he caused the construction of a perimeter wall in the area, these facts do not mean that
Purisima himself had prior possession.
Prior possession over the property, however, is not synonymous with his right of ownership over
the same. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an
estate.



What if there are two possessors there? There are two? Wala na tayong magawa. They are
outnumbered. They will be considered as lawful possessors. If the date of possession is the same,
the one who presents the title. What kind of title are we talking about? Well, if you have the Transfer
Certificate of Title or Original Certificate of Title, then so much the better because you are the owner.
What if nobody has a title? We have the case of Pajuyo vs CA and Guevarra. Remember that case?
It has to be determined who is the possessor. Now, what kind of title do we have or required here?
It could be equitable title, deed of sale, an agreement, kasunduan and all those things. If all things
are equal, then the Court will decide in proper proceedings.
PAJUYO vs CA and GUEVARRA

GR No. 146364 | June 3, 2004
Remedios is the occupant of a parcel of land with some structures in Quezon City. She leased a
portion of the property to Tessie for a monthly fee of P400 beginning 1998. At first, Tessie paid
the monthly rent but stopped paying rent in January 1999. She found out that Remedios did not
actually own the property as it was government-owned. Remedios admitted not owning the
property. According to her, it was merely turned over to her by her father-in-law who was the
caretaker of the property. She then made use of it by renting it out. Because of Tessie’s refusal to
pay rent, Remedios filed a case for unlawful detainer against her.
The Supreme Court:
“The Court finds the petition meritorious. “The facts of this case are closely akin to those in Pajuyo
v. Court of Appeals, wherein the Court refused to subscribe to the reasoning that if the plaintiff is
merely a squatter on the disputed land, then he does not have the right to demand the ejectment
of another usurper. In Pajuyo, both parties were also squatters. Pajuyo bought the rights over a
250-square meter portion of public land from a person who had no title over said land, and then
built a house thereon. Subsequently, Pajuyo entered into a Kasunduan with Guevarra wherein the
former allowed the latter to occupy the house for free provided Guevarra maintains and cleans
the house and upon Pajuyo’s demand, Guevarra would voluntarily vacate said house. After the
lapse of almost 10 years, Pajuyo demanded that Guevarra vacate the house, but the latter refused.
Pajuyo then filed an ejectment case against Guevarra.
Resolving in favor of Pajuyo, the Court explained:
The only question that the courts must resolve in ejectment proceedings is – who is entitled to the
physical possession of the premises, that is, to the possession de facto and not to the possession
de jure. It does not even matter if a party’s title to the property is questionable, or when both
parties intruded into the public land and their applications to own the land have yet to be
approved by the proper government agency. Regardless of the actual condition of the title to the
property, the party in peacable quiet possession shall not be thrown out by a strong hand, violence
or terror. Neither is the unlawful withholding of property allowed. Courts will always uphold
respect for prior possession.
xxxx



Courts must resolve the issue of possession even if the parties to the ejectment suits are squatters.
The determination of priority and superiority of possession is a serious and urgent matter that
cannot be left to the squatters to decide. To do so would make squatters receive better treatment
under the law. x x x
xxxx
We are aware of our pronouncement in cases where we declared that “squatters and intruders
who clandestinely enter into titled government property cannot, by such act, acquire any legal
right to said property.” We made this declaration because the person who had title or who had
the right to legal possession over the disputed property was a party in the ejectment suit and that
party instituted the case against squatters or usurpers.
In this case, the owner of the land, which is the government, is not a party to the ejectment case.
This case is between squatters. Had the government participated in the case, the courts could
have evicted the contending squatters, Pajuyo and Guevarra.
Since the party that has title or a better right over the property is not impleaded in this case, we
cannot evict on our own the parties. Such a ruling would discourage squatters from seeking the
aid of the courts in settling the issue of physical possession. Stripping both the plaintiff and the
defendant of possession just because they are squatters would have the same dangerous
implications as the application of the principle of pari delicto. Squatters would then rather settle
the issue of physical possession among themselves than seek relief from the courts if the plaintiff
and defendant in the ejectment case would both stand to lose possession of the disputed property.
This would subvert the policy underlying actions for recovery of possession. (Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing, it is quite clear that even if herein petitioner has no title to the property in
question, such fact should not affect the determination of who as between herein parties is entitled
to physical possession of the contested property. Even the invalidity of the verbal lease agreement
between petitioner and respondent does not automatically mean that petitioner had no right to
demand the eviction of respondent. In Pajuyo, the Court held that the Kasunduan, or agreement
allowing the defendant to stay in the house of the plaintiff, could not be considered void for
purposes of ascertaining who between the contending parties has a right to physical possession
of the property in dispute.
The Court had this to say:
Guevarra should know that there must be honor even between squatters. Guevarra freely entered
into the Kasunduan. Guevarra cannot now impugn the Kasunduan after he had benefited from it.
The Kasunduan binds Guevarra.
The Kasunduan is not void for purposes of determining who between Pajuyo and Guevarra has a
right to physical possession of the contested property. The Kasunduan is the undeniable evidence
of Guevarra’s recognition of Pajuyo’s better right of physical possession. Guevarra is clearly a
possessor in bad faith. The absence of a contract would not yield a different result, as there would
still be an implied promise to vacate.
xxxx



Pajuyo’s withdrawal of his permission to Guevarra terminated the Kasunduan. Guevarra’s

transient right to possess the property ended as well. Moreover, it was Pajuyo who was in actual
possession of the property because Guevarra had to seek Pajuyo’s permission to temporarily hold
the property and Guevarra had to follow the conditions set by Pajuyo in the Kasunduan. Control
over the property still rested with Pajuyo and this is evidence of actual possession.
Pajuyo’s absence did not affect his actual possession of the disputed property. Possession in the
eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground
before he is deemed in possession. One may acquire possession not only by physical occupation,
but also by the fact that a thing is subject to the action of one’s will. Actual or physical occupation
is not always necessary.
xxxx
Since Pajuyo has in his favor priority in time in holding the property, he is entitled to remain on
the property until a person who has title or a better right lawfully ejects him.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The foregoing ruling of the Court applies squarely to the present case. Petitioner and respondent
are both squatters on the public land involved. Respondent admitted that she entered into a verbal
lease agreement with petitioner. The validity of such lease is of no moment in determining who
has a better right to possess the disputed property, because such agreement is merely evidence of
respondent’s recognition of petitioner’s superior right of physical possession.
Thus, possession of the property in dispute rightfully belongs to petitioner.
The Court noted, however, that the MeTC Decision did not discuss any reason for its award of
attorney’s fees.1âwphi1 In Del Rosario v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that the court must
explicitly state in the body of the decision, and not only in the dispositive portion thereof, the
legal reason for the award of attorney’s fees. The MeTC’s award of attorney’s fees not having been
sufficiently explained, the same must be deleted.”
FIRST DIVISION, G.R. NO. 154565, November 30, 2006, REMEDIOS RAMOS, Petitioner,
 vs. TESSIE PABAS, Respondent.
Now, have you reached Article 1544 in Sales? Article 1544 talks about double sales. If the property
is sold to two or more persons, who will be the owner? Those are the rules under 1544. It’s different
for possessors. It’s different for ownership.
Let’s go to the case of Wong vs Carpio. This is similar to the case of Equatorial Realty. If you look at
the facts, we don’t even have to rely on Article 531, no. 3 because both of them actually acquired
possession by material occupation. Both of them … the property. Mercado harvested the fruits. He
did not stay there but by going there and harversting the fruits, planting something or whatever, he
acquired material passion. What about Mercado? The same. When he went there, there was no
possessor in his eyes, so he … material possession.



So let’s say, for example, there are two possessors. Both of them are in possession. Both of them
acquired possession under the law. Who is preferred? Definitely the one who is longer in possession
and that is Mercado.
WONG vs CARPIO
GR No. L-50264 | October 21, 1991
Facts:
Manuel Mercado acquired his rights to possess the land in litigation from William Giger by virtue
of a deed of sale with right to repurchase which was executed in 1972 for a consideration of
P3,500.00. In 1972, Mercado began harvesting only the coconut fruits and he paid the taxes on
the land for Mr. Giger. He went periodically to the land to make copra but he never placed any
person on the land in litigation to watch it. Neither did he reside on the land. Neither did he put
any sign or hut to show that he is in actual possession.
In 1973, William Giger again asked an additional amount of P2,500.00 from Mercado and so he
required William Giger to sign a new deed of Pacto de Retro Sale on November 5,1973 at Davao
City before Notary Public Gregorio C. Batiller. Before July, 1976, Ignacio Wong went to the land
in litigation to find out if there were other people residing there or claiming it besides the owner
and he found none. So, in July, 1976, Ignacio Wong bought the parcel of land in litigation from
William Giger and his wife Cecilia Valenzuela.
Wong placed laborers on the land in suit, built a small farm house after making some clearings
and fenced the boundaries. He also placed signboards. September 27, 1976, plaintiff Manuel
Mercado again went to the land in suit to make copras. That was the time the matter was brought
to the attention of the police of Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur and the incident entered in the police
blotter.
November 18, 1976, defendant Wong ordered the hooking of the coconuts from the land in
litigation and nobody disturbed him. November 29, 1976, Wong received a copy of Mercado's
complaint for forcible entry with summons to answer which is the case now before the Court.
During the pendency of this instant complaint for forcible entry, spouses William Giger and
Cecilia Valenzuela filed a case for reformation of instrument with the Court of First Instance of
Digos, Davao del Sur against Mercado
ISSUE: Who was in possession as a fact?
RULING: MERCADO!
Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different personalities except
in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of possession, the present
possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessions, the one longer in possession, if the dates
of possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if these conditions are equal, the
thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its possession or ownership
through proper proceedings (Art. 538, Civil Code).



Possession is acquired by the material occupation of a thing or the exercise of a right, or by the
fact that it is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper acts and legal formalities for
acquiring such right."; and that the execution of a sale thru a public instrument shall be equivalent
to the delivery of the thing, unless there is stipulation to the contrary . . .. If, however,
notwithstanding the execution of the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the enjoyment and
material tenancy of the thing and make use of it herself, because such tenancy and enjoyment are
opposed by another, then delivery has not been effected.
Applying the above pronouncements on the instant case, it is clear that possession passed from
vendor William Giger to private respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the first sale a retro,
and accordingly, the later sale a retrain favor of petitioner failed to pass the possession of the
property because there is an impediment — the possession exercised by private respondent.
Let’s go to Cequena. In this case, Sinforoso was the original possessor of the land and then the
daughter of Sinforoso …. Now, Margarito is the brother of Sinforoso. In 1953, Margarito entered the
property. He paid taxes thereon. So there is also material occupation. So there are two possessors.
Margarito, the brother of Sinforoso and Honorata the daughter but sometime in 1985, Honorata was
ousted by Margarito. Now, under Article 537, was Honorata’s possession affected? NO because
they were physically removed by violence and so the possession by Honorata was not affected.
Honorata was able to return pero hindi naputol yung possession niya and therefore they are both
present possessors. So, who is the preferred possessor? Honorata because they have the lawful
possessor of the property.
CEQUENA vs BOLANTE
GR No. 137944 | April 6, 2000
FACTS
The case at bar involves a situation where 2 parties are in possession of the same property. The
property in question was originally owned by Sinforoso. When Sinforoso died in 1930, his
daughter and wife continued to reside in the subject property. His brother, Margarito, also took
possession of the land and cultivated it. Before Sinforoso’s death in 1926, he was able to declare
the land for taxation and paid the same.
When Honorata, daughter of Sinforoso, came of age, she paid realty taxes for the subject property
for the years 1932-1948 under her name. Margarito, on the other hand, declared the lot for
taxation in his name beginning 1953. When Margarito died, his son continued cultivating the
land. In 1985, Honorata became the single possessor of the lot when she physically ousted the
heirs of Margarito from the property.
ISSUE
(1) Who is the preferred possessor of the property? (Art. 538)
(2) WON Honorata acquired the property through acquisitive prescription. (Art. 540)
(3) WON Honorata does not have to prove ownership because her just title is presumed. (Art.
541)
HELD



(1) Honorata is the lawful possessor of the property.
Honorata has been in possession for a longer period. She was able to prove that her
possession was tacked with her father since Sinforoso declared the land for taxation in
1926. On the other hand, Margarito acquired joint possession only in 1953. Under 538
of the CC, the one who is in first possession shall prevail.
(2) YES.
The requisites were complied with because (a) there was actual possession by Honorata
since 1926 until present and (b) the possession by Honorata was in the concept of the
owner. Here, Honorata has been in possession for more than 10 years since 1926 and this
was disturbed only on 1953 when Margarito claimed the land. From 1926 to 1953, 27
years have passed, well beyond the 10 years required by law for the ordinary prescriptive
period of imoovables.
Thus, when Margarito disturbed Honorata’s possession in 1953, her possession had
already ripened into ownership.
(3) NO. Honorata still has to prove ownership.
What is presumed under 541 is the existence of just title if the possession is in the concept
of an owner. Honorata here still needs to prove that she possessed the land on good faith
for the required number of years in order to be considered the owner.
Possession that ripens to ownership
“Before one can register his title over a parcel of land, the applicant must show that (a) he, by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945 or earlier”
(Essence: possession in the concept of an owner in relation to Registration)
Let’s go to the case of Spouses Apostol. So, take note that the rules on double possession actually
do not matter if there is an owner. So even if you are a possessor or a prior possessor for the longest
time, you cannot say that he is the legal possessor, he is entitled to possess if the property has an
owner like in this case, Chua already has a TCT in their names. Therefore, even if they just came in
because they bought the property, then whatever reason Apostil made, it does not matter anymore.
So, what should be done is to file a proper action, accion reinvidicatoria to challenge the ownership
but not in an unlawful detainer case because in an unlawful detainer case, the issue is physical
possession. So these rules only apply if there is no owner to speak of.
SPOUSES APOSTOL vs CA
GR No. 125375 | June 17, 2004



Facts:
On September 3, 1993, the respondents, Spouses Emmanuel and Edna Chua, filed a complaint
for unlawful detainer against the petitioners, Spouses Elpidio and Amelia Apostol.
The respondents alleged that they had contracted with the Spouses Paulo and Georgina Pascua
for the purchase of a parcel of land. The petitioners (SPS. APOSTOL), who were present during
the negotiations, verbally assured the respondents (SPS. CHUA) that they would vacate the
property within ten (10) days from the execution of the sale. The petitioners then acknowledged
that their stay in the property was only upon the tolerance of its former owners (SPS.PASCUA).
On June 7, 1993, the Spouses Pascua executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the property and the
improvements thereon in favor of the respondents for P1,000,000. On the basis of the said deed,
the respondents were issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 87610 over the property on
June 8, 1993. Despite demands, however, the petitioners refused to vacate the property.
The respondents executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over the property, stating that they could
not cause the registration of the said deeds because the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 198936
was in the possession of Teresita B. Jimenez, a former co-owner of the property. The respondents
further alleged that Luz Pascua (Former Owner), in her letter to the Register of Deeds dated August
6, 1979, confirmed that she failed to turn over the owner’s duplicate of TCT No. 198936 because
the same was in the possession of Jimenez, who, in turn, gave it to Jose J. Burgos. Thereafter, on
May 15, 1980, Luz Pascua filed a Complaint against the petitioners in the RTC of Quezon City for
rescission and damages docketed as Civil Case No. 29895 but the same was dismissed on
December 19, 1983 for lack of interest to prosecute. Paulo Pascua filed a similar complaint against
the petitioners in the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 88-523, but the same was, likewise,
dismissed. Finally, the petitioners alleged that the Spouses Pascua’s possession of the property
after the sale thereof to the respondents was by mere tolerance.
In the meantime, the petitioners filed a complaint against the respondents, the Spouses Chua, the
Spouses Pascua, and the Register of Deeds in the RTC of Quezon City, for annulment of deed of
sale and TCT No. 86338, and for reconveyance with damages. The petitioners alleged that they
had been in possession of the property since 1973; their adverse claim over the property was
annotated on June 20, 1979 as Entry No. PE 8812; Luz Pascua died on December 2, 1984 but
Paulo Pascua did not inherit the property from her because the same had already been sold to the
respondents; Paulo Pascua executed a falsified affidavit for self-adjudication over the property on
the basis of which he was able to secure, on May 20, 1993, TCT No. 86338.
Issue:
In the present recourse, the petitioners, the Spouses Apostol, assert the following: (a) their
possession of the property since 1976 preceded the sale of the property to the private respondents;
(b) the respondents were purchasers of the property in bad faith; and, (c) in declaring that the
petitioners had priority of possession of the property on the sale thereof by Luz Pascua and Paulo
Pascua way back in 1976 and 1977, the RTC did not thereby collaterally attack the title of the
respondents over the property. According to the petitioners, an inflexible adherence to the
proscription against a collateral attack of a torrens title may result to gross injustice.
HELD:



The petitioners claim that, as alleged in their answer to the complaint for unlawful detainer, the
respondents’ title over the property is a nullity; hence, the complaint for unlawful detainer against
the petitioners should be dismissed for lack of merit. Such allegation does not help their present
recourse. Under Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled, except in a direct
proceeding for that purpose in accordance with law. The issue of the validity of the title of the
respondents can only be assailed in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.12 Whether or
not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the
court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer.13
The following issues are now the subject of Civil Case No. Q-94-19352 before the RTC of Quezon
City: (1) whether the respondents were buyers in bad faith; (2) the validity of the deed of absolute
sale over the property executed by the Spouses Pascua in favor of the respondents; and (3) the
validity of the title issued to and in the names of the respondents. Hence, the Court shall no longer
delve into such issues.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 38333 is AFFIRMED.
Now, let’s go to the next provision, Article 539.
Art. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession; and should he be disturbed
therein he shall be protected in or restored to said possession by the means established by the
laws and the Rules of Court.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry may within ten days from the filing
of the complaint present a motion to secure from the competent court, in the action for forcible
entry, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court
shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof.
Article 539 is still related to what we discussed, 536, 537 and 538 but it is now under effects of
possession. So, 539 talks about the rights of the possessor. We have to differentiate these from the
rights of the owner. The three rights. A possessor has the right to be respected of his possession. If
you are a prior possessor, you cannot be kicked out by force, intimidation, strategy and etc. and if
his possession is disturbed, to be protected of said right and to be restored to such possession through
legal means.
What if the possessor is lawful as long as he is a present possessor, a prior possessor, he can file an
ejectment case. The case filed depends on the situation. Accion publiciana talks about the right to
possess while forcible entry is merely physical possession. So, let’s focus on forcible entry. That is
the thrust of Article 539. So why … If you are removed. If your possession is disturbed and you are
removed through FISTS, can you file forcible entry? You object to your dispossession, so you file the
proper forcible entry case. So you have to wait until the case is finished for you to recover possession.
Article 539 says there are ways of recovering possession quickly and that is within 10 days after the
filing of the action for forcible entry, to file an action for preliminary court injuction to restore you
to your possession and then the court will decide on your motion within 30 days. So ang minimum
period of 50 days or 60 days, 2 months. In a case, it could be 5 years or 10 year, it depends. It could



go all the way to the Supreme Court. If ikaw ang dispossessed, you have to wait until the decision
of the Court but if you know the benefit given by Article 539, you can recover possession within a
few months.
Now, let’s go to the provisions of acquisitive prescription. Article 540 says only the possession
acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as a title for acquiring dominion. In order
to acquire ownership by prescription, it must be in the concept of owner. What does this concept
mean? The possessor acts as if he is the owner. What are the acts of a co-owner? He constructs a
building, plant permanent trees, pay the realty taxes, apply for a tax …. These are acts of ownership
that would show that the possession is in the concept of an owner.
Art. 540. Only the possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as a title
for acquiring dominion.
Take note Article 540 talks about unregistered land. If there’s a TCT or there’s an OCT, it doesn’t
matter if you are possessing in the concept of an owner, you will be removed under Article 448 or
449. Okay? So, what are the requisites for acquiring dominion?
1. Ownership of a parcel of land or any other property

2. Possession must be actual or constructive
3. It must be in the concept of owner
Possession in the concept of owner has a benefit. Possession in the concept of owner, you have this
benefit of the presumption that you have a just title and you cannot be obligation to show or prove
it. Now, what is just title? It is very important to know exactly the meaning of just title because just
title is a requisite in ordinary acquisitive prescription. Just title is there is a mode of acquiring
ownership but the grantor is not the owner. What is the most common way of acquiring ownership?
Let’s say delivery after sale. Mr. X bought a car from Mr. Y and he paid for the car, and it was
delivered. There is a mode of acquiring ownership which is delivery but in truth and in fact is that
Mr. Y is not the owner of the car. So, there is a mode of acquiring ownership but the grantor is not
the owner of the car. So Mr. X who buys a car from someone who is not the owner, will he acquire
ownership over the car? NO because the spring cannot rise higher than the source. If your source is
not the owner, how can you be the owner? You cannot. You merely step into the shoes of your
source and so, what he merely acquires is just title which is very important in ordinary acquisitive
prescription. However, 541 is saying that if you possess in the concept of owner, you don’t have to
prove that you have just title. It is presumed and the one who is alleging that you don’t have title
will have to prove it. That is a rebuttable presumption. So, the benefits of a possessor in the concept
of owner is that presumption. You cannot be obliged to show the document or prove his right.
In the case of Cequena vs Bolante, according to Honorata, the daughter of Sinforoso, she said that I
and the predecessor in interest, Sinforoso, possess the land since 1926 continuously and exclusively
in the concept of owner until 1953. Ilang years yan? 27 years. Margarito entered in 1953. Was the
possession of Honorata affected? No. In 1956 which is 30 years, according to …, he acquired
ownership of the land which is unregistered and therefore she does not have to prove this anymore
because Article 541 says that a possessor in the concept of owner, …, is she correct? The Supreme
Court said NO. What you don’t have to prove is your just title but if you are talking about legal
owner through acquisitive prescription, whether it is ordinary or extraordinary, ordinary is good
faith, extraordinary is bad faith, you have to prove it. You have to prove the number of years, that



the possession is continuous, exclusive, etc., the only thing that is presumed is the existence of just
title and besides in her case, for 30 years, it is already sufficient for extraordinary acquisitive
prescription. It does not require just title in extraordinary pag bad faith. Just title is only required for
ordinary prescription. So, you have to analyze the situation. The only thing that is in pursuit is just
title. In this case, it is not really needed.
August 9, 2017 – Pahayahay
What is Just Title?

ü It is that title where, although there was a mode of transferring ownership, still something is
wrong, because the grantor is NOT the owner.
Article 541. A possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he
possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it.
Let us go to the kinds of title in relation to Prescription.
Kinds of Titles
1. True and Valid Title.
The person who owns something and he sells let us say a car. X sells a car to Y. What is transferred
to Y is a True and Valid Title.
2. Colorable Title
This is what we call Just Title.
3. Putative Title
There is no mode of transfer of ownership at all.
What do you mean by a mode of transfer of ownership? If you are interested then you look at Book
III, it will give us the modes of acquiring ownership. So, we already said that delivery is the mode
of acquiring ownership. So that is the easiest mode to understand.
So, now we look at the requisites for acquisitive prescription. If the property is movable, the period
is 4 years. If immovable, then 10 years and needs good faith and just title. For ordinary acquisitive
prescription, there are three requisites. For extraordinary, you only need 8 years for movable and 30
years for immovable. If you are not in good faith, then you are in bad faith.
Article 542. The possession of real property presumes that of the movables therein, so long as
it is not shown or proved that they should be excluded.
You have to know the distinction between acquisition of ownership through prescription and
registration. Let us see if you could spot the difference. Let us go to the case of Spouses Recto v. RP,
GR No. 160421, October 4, 2004. The issue here is WON Sps. Recto can apply for registration.
What are the requisites for application of registration? Are the requisites complied with? Yes.
Requisites for Application of Registration (PD1529)

1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, has been in OCEN posession
and occupation of the subejct land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945.



2. The land subject of the applicable is alienable and disposable of the public domain.
Spouses Recto v. RP
GR No. 160421 | October 4, 2004
Facts
On February 19, 1997, petitioner spouses Philip Recto and Ester C. Recto, filed with the an
application for registration of title under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree. They also prayed in the alternative that their petition for
registration be granted pursuant to Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, or the Public Land Act.
Issue
WON petitiones complied with all the requisites.
Held
Yes. Having met all the requirements for registration of title including the presentation of
sufficient evidence to identify the land sought to be registered, there is no more need to remand
the case before the trial court for the presentation of the tracing cloth plan.
So also, there is no doubt that Lot 806 is an alienable land of the public domain having been
released and certified as such on December 31, 1925. As further certified by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office of the DENR, the entire area of Lot 806 is an
agricultural land; within an alienable and disposable zone; not within a reservation area nor
within a forest zone; and does not encroach upon an established watershed, riverbed, and
riverbank protection. Petitioners were thus able to successfully meet the requisite for original
registration of title, to wit: open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of an alienable and disposable land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
or earlier.
Let us go to Heirs of Gamos v. Heirs of Frando, GR No. 149117, December 16, 2004. So, if you
were listening to the first case of Recto, it was an application for registration of a parcel of land. The
SC said yes, because all of the requisites were complied with. Those three.
Now, this case of Gamos is a hybrid of the first case. Because the SC did not only give the application
of registration, in fact, Frando filed a sales application. Meaning, she wanted to buy the land. This
is alienable and disposable land of the public domain. She did not ask to register but she wanted to
buy and she actually bought it. The land was awarded to her. So, for that alone, she already acquired
ownership of the land. Granting arguendo that she did not apply for sales application, and she did
not pay a certain amount. Granting arguendo that she just possessed the land from 1925. Here
comes Frando, was able to apply for registration for that particular property. Under the Land
Registration Act, an OCT is issued in the name of Gamos. So, was that registration valid? The SC
said, NO, because Frando and her children Gimpes already acquired ownership of the property
because of acquisitive prescription.
So, ipso facto, upon acquisition of ownership, upon reaching the 30-year period, Frando and her
heirs Gimpes, acquired ownership and the property was ipso jure, converted into private property.



What about the entry of the ... to the property sometime in 1952? So kulang. The SC said that their
entry was merely tolerated. Therefore, that did not affect the possession of Frando and the heirs.
Heirs of Gamos v. Heirs of Frando

GR No. 149117 | December 16, 2004
Facts
Juliana Frando was in possession of a parcel of land. Since 1925, she had planted several trees
and other plants thereon, including coconuts, pili, bananas and cacao. Sometime in 1946, the
property was traversed by a national road that effectively divided it into two portions,
denominated as Lot Nos. 7 and 1855. She then filed for sales application for the two lots. In
1956, an Order/Award over the lots were granted to her by the Director of Lands. However, she
learned that in 1969, Gamos was awarded a free patent over Lot 1855. Frando claims that the
award is null and void since the Lot was already acquired by her through prescription as she has
been residing on the land since 1925
Issue
WON Frando acquired the land through prescription
Held
Yes. Juliana Frando is deemed to have acquired equitable title to the property, because she
proved her open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable
and disposable land of the public domain. Possession of a parcel of agricultural land of the public
domain for the prescribed period of 30 years ipso jureconverts the lot into private property. The
mere application for a patent, coupled with the fact of exclusive, open, continuous and notorious
possession for the required period is sufficient to vest in the applicant the grant applied for. In
sum, the application by Juliana Frando for a sales patent, coupled with her open, exclusive,
uninterrupted and notorious possession of the land applied for is, for all purposes, equivalent to
a patent already perfected and granted.
Let us look at the case of Mangahas v. CA, GR No. 95815, March 10, 1999. So here, this is an
illustration of acquisitive prescription. It has nothing to do with registration. The subject here is
public agricultural land. So take note that one can acquire ownership of public land which are
alienable and disposable if there is possession in the concept of an owner and the number of years
required. If it is ordinary you need good faith and just title. But, if you look at the case of Mangahas?
Was there any attempt to register? Wala. Why? Because the possession did not start from June 12,
1945. That is why there are a lot of unregistered land. Because if you want to register an alienable
and disposable land of the public domain, you have to comply those requisites. You have to prove
possession since that particular date. But just because you have not registered the property, it does
not mean that you are not the owner because acquisitive prescription already sets in as long as those
requisites are present. That is why you have heard so and so the owner of the land but is not
registered because of that requirement.
Mangahas v. CA
GR No. 95815 | March 10, 1999
Facts



Petitioner theorized that with the length of possession of his predecessors-in-interest, the spouses
Rodil, tacked to his own possession, the total period of possession in his favor would suffice to
vest in him the ownership of the property under the law on prescription.
Issue
WON Mangahas acquired ownership of the land by acquisitive prescription.
Held
NO. As found by the lower court below, petitioner had admitted, contrary to his disclaimer, that
the possession of the spouses Rodil, from whom he traces the origin of his supposed title,
commenced only in April 1955. Petitioner can not now feign ignorance of such judicial
admission which he has resolutely repudiated in his present petition. Acquisition of ownership
under the law on prescription cannot be pleaded in support of petitioner’s submission that
subject land has ipso jure become his private property.
Now, private unregistered land, it can also be acquired through acquisitive prescription. Who can
give us an example? Private land can be registered. If you can prove that you have acquried
ownership through prescription. That is why I have said that the Heirs of Gamos is a hybrid case,
because the SC said, under Formerly Justice Panganiban, possession of agricultural land, prescribes
for a period of 30 years, ipso jure converts the lot into private property. There is a definition there.
The land is no longer public land. It is converted to private property so you can register. Parang
ganun. Since it is already a private land, you do not need to prove that June 12, 1945... So you just
be aware of the rulings of the SC.
So you can be the owner of a parcel of land through acquisitive prescription but perhaps you cannot
register. But because you acquired ownership through acquisitive prescription, then it is converted
into a private land and then you can register. Because private land originally that can be registered.
Let us go to the case of Mario Titong v. CA, GR No. 111141, March 6, 1998. Very simple, he
transferred the ... he now said that because he occupied that strip of land for more than 20 years, he
is already acquired ownership thereof by prescription. But for acquisitive prescription 30 years is
required for extraordinary. For ordinary, it requires good faith and just title as provided by Article
1170. So, he did not acquire ownership of that strip of land because of the fact he moved the river
from one place to another.
Mario Titong v. CA
GR No. 111141 | March 6, 1998
Facts
Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of 3.2800
hectares, more or less, surveyed as Lot No. 3918, and declared for taxation purposes in his name.
He claims that on three separate occasions in September 1983, private respondents, with their
hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an area of approximately two (2)
hectares, and began plowing the same under pretext of ownership. Private respondents denied
this allegation, and averred that the disputed property formed part of the 5.5-hectare agricultural
land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in-interest, Pablo Espinosa on August 10,
1981.



In his testimony, petitioner identified Espinosa as his adjoining owner, asserting that no
controversy had sprouted between them for twenty years until the latter sold Lot No. 3479 to
private respondent Victorico Laurio. This was corroborated by Ignacio Villamor, who had
worked on the land even before its sale to Espinosa in 1962. The boundary between the land
sold to Espinosa and what remained of petitioner’s property was the old Bugsayon river. When
petitioner employed Bienvenido Lerit as his tenant in 1962, he instructed Lerit to change the
course of the old river and direct the flow of water to the lowland at the southern portion of
petitioner’s property, thus converting the old river into a riceland.
Issue
WON Titong acquired the property by acquisitive prescription.
Held
Petitioner’s claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through possession for more
than twenty (20) years is likewise unmeritorious. While Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that
“(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession of ten years,” this provision of law must be read in conjunction with Art.
1117 of the same Code. This article states that “x x x (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things
requires possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.” Hence, a
prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of
ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena
fe (with color of title and good faith). The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable
belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit
his ownership. For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came
into possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition
of ownership or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any
right.
Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. As aptly
observed by the trial court, the plaintiff’s admitted acts of converting the boundary line (Bugsayon
River) into a ricefield and thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting
deprivation of the rights of others and therefore “tantamount to bad faith.” To allow petitioner to
benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio (no
man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing). Extraordinary acquisitive
prescription cannot similarly vest ownership over the property upon petitioner. Art. 1137 of the
Civil Code states that “(o)wnership and other real rights over immovables prescribe through
uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.”
Petitioner’s alleged possession in 1962 up to September 1983 when private respondents entered
the property in question spanned twenty-one (21) years. This period of time is short of the thirty-
year requirement mandated by Art. 1137.
August 16, 2017 - Pahayahay
So last time, we looked at the Doctrine of Irreinvindicability. We have learned that there is a general
rule, there is an exception, exception to the exception. So we looked at when the owner can recover
without reimbursement, when the owner can recover but must reimburse. And then we have special
laws. So if the item was bought in Victoria Plaza by the possessor, and there is a real owner, there



is this provision under the Code of Commerce, the owner can no longer recover. And under the
principle of estoppel under 1005, the owner by precluded form denying the seller's authority to sell.
So let us go to the cases. Let us look at a situation where the owner can recover without paying
reimbursement to the possessor. Let us look at the case of Del Rosario v. Lucena, GR No. L-3546,
September 13, 1907. This is an application of the exception wherein the owner can recover without
reimbursing the possessor because the owner was unlawfully deprived of his movable and the
indication or proof that there was unlawful deprivation was the fact that Praxedes Flores was
convicted of estafa.
Del Rosario v. Lucena

GR No. L-3546 | September 13, 1907
Facts
The property involved here is a jewelry. This jewelry is owned by Pia Del Rosario who in turn,
entrusted the same to Praxedes Flores for the sole purpose of selling it on commission basis.
However, instead of selling it, Praxedes Flores pledged the jewelry to Teresa Verches, without
the knowledge and consent of Pia Del Rosario.
Now, Pia wants to recover the jewelry from Teresa Verches but Teresa here refused to do so
unless Pia would first reimburse her for the amount of the pledge.
Issue
WON Pia can recover the jewelry from Teresa without reimbursement.
Held
YES. Pia can recover the jewelry without necessity of reimbursing Teresa simply because this
case falls under the exception to the general rule under Article 559 of the Civil Code. The
exception provides that, "The real owner can recover such movable from the possessor without
reimbursing him if the owner has either (1) lost the movable, or (2) has been unlawfully
deprived of the thing.
Here, Pia may not have lost the jewelry but she is considered to have been unlawfully or illegally
deprived of the jewelry which is evident by virtue of the conviction of Praxedes Flores for the
crime of Estafa, (which was derived from the fact that Praxedes Flores pledged the jewelry to
Teresa Verches without the knowledge and consent of Pia Del Rosario.)
Teresa Verches, cannot likewise claim for reimbursement under the exception to the exception
because it only applies if the possessor has acquired the movable at a public sale. Here, there
was clearly no public sale. Teresa acquired possession of the jewelry through a private
transaction with Praxedes Flores.
Therefore, Teresa is entitled to recover her jewelry without necessity of reimbursing Teresa for
the amount of the pledge given to Praxedes Flores.
In the case of Varela v. Finnick, GR No. L-3890, Jan. 2, 1908, the facts are a similar. It is just that
the jewelry was not pawned to a person but to a pawnshop. So, same effect. The owner can recover
without reimbursement.



Let us go to Aznar v. Yapdiangco, GR No. L-18536, March 31, 1965. So, Article 1506 applies to a
seller who has a voidable title. You know what a voidable title is. Something that is valid until
annulled. But in this case, the seller of the car, Marella, did not have any kind of title because the
important thing is, the mode of transferring ownership, there was no delivery, the car was never
delivered to him. It was stolen and therefore application by Santos of 1506 is not proper. Article 559
is the applicable provision here. Do not forget 1506 because this was also mentioned by the SC in
the case of EDCA.
Aznar v. Yapdiangco
GR No. L-18536 | March 31, 1965
Facts
Teodoro Santos advertised the sale of his FORD FAIRLANE 500 in a newspaper. On L. De Dios
went to the house of Teodoro and talked to his son Ireneo Santos and said that his uncle Vicente
Marella is interested in buying the said car.
The next day, Ireneo went to the house of Marella and they agreed to the price of P14,700 on
the understanding that it will be paid after the car has been registered in the latter’s name.
A deed of sale was executed and the registration was changed to the name of Marella. Ireneo
went to Marella to get the payment and deliver the car who informed him that he is P2,000 short
of the money and that they need to go to his sister to get it. Ireneo, together with De Dios and
an unidentified man went to a house.
Once inside, De Dios asked Ireneo to wait in the sale. After waiting in vain, he went down and
discovered that the car was gone.
Marella was able to sell the car to plaintiff-appellant Jose Aznar and while attending to
registration, the car was seized by Phil. Constabulary due to the report of the incident.
Issue
Between the two parties, who has the better right?
Held
Teodoro Santos has the better right. Marella did not have any title to the property under litigation
because the same was never delivered to him. He may have the contract but he never acquired
valid title. Although the keys to the car may have been given to the unidentified companion, it
may be done only because that companion took them to the place where the sister of Marella
was supposed to live. The car was evidently stolen and that the buyer did not acquire any valid
title thereto.
Let us go to the case of EDCA Publishing v. Santos, GR No. 80298, April 26, 1990. What was the
basis of EDCA for taking the books away from Santos? Legal Basis? So, the SC in this case discussed
the case of Tagatac v. Jimenez, what happened here?
In Tagatac v. Jimenez,13 the plaintiff sold her car to Feist, who sold it to Sanchez, who sold it to
Jimenez. When the payment check issued to Tagatac by Feist was dishonored, the plaintiff sued



to recover the vehicle from Jimenez on the ground that she had been unlawfully deprived of it
by reason of Feist's deception. In ruling for Jimenez, the Court of Appeals held:
The point of inquiry is whether plaintiff-appellant Trinidad C. Tagatac has been unlawfully
deprived of her car. At first blush, it would seem that she was unlawfully deprived thereof,
considering that she was induced to part with it by reason of the chicanery practiced on her
by Warner L. Feist. Certainly, swindling, like robbery, is an illegal method of deprivation of
property. In a manner of speaking, plaintiff-appellant was "illegally deprived" of her car, for
the way by which Warner L. Feist induced her to part with it is illegal and is punished by law.
But does this "unlawful deprivation" come within the scope of Article 559 of the New Civil
Code?
So, the case of Tagatac, we have here the original owner of the car who is Tagatac, sold the car to
Feist. Delivered the car to Feist. Feist sold the car to Sanchez. And Sanchez tried to ... Jimenez. Now,
Feist issued a Post Dated Check but the check bounced. Therefore, by the time the check bounced,
the car was already in the possession of Jimenez. So the circumstances in Tagatac, is similar to EDCA
who delivered the books to Cruz and Cruz delivered to Santos. Here, the check of Cruz also
bounced. So is Article 559 applicable in a sense that EDCA and Tagatac can recover the thing. The
SC said in both cases, NO. Why? Because we are not talking about Jimenez and Santos as mere
possessors who merely acquired just title. Here, in ever scenario there was delivery. And it is always
emphasized that in a contract of sale, it is the delivery of the item that transfers ownership, whether
or not, there was payment. That is the general rule.
So, according to the SC, because there was fraud and deceit exercised by both Cruz and Feist when
they issued checks. So there was fraud, therefore, when the books or the car was delivered, it was
by virtue of a voidable contract of sale, valid until annulled. The problem is Tagatac never annulled
the sale with Feist, and so on and so forth. So, until annulled, everything is valid and therefore the
application of Article 1506 is proper here. In the earlier case, Aznar v. Yapdiangco, Article 559 is
applicable. Here it is 1506 because there is a mode of transfer which is delivery.
EDCA Publishing v. Santos

GR No. 80298 | April 26, 1990
Facts
EDCA Publishing sold 406 books to a certain Professor Jose Cruz who ordered these by
telephone, which was agreed to be payable on delivery. The books were subsequently delivered
to him with the corresponding invoice, and he paid with a personal check.
Cruz then sold the 120 of the books to Leonor Santos who asked for verification, and was then
showed the invoice for the books.
EDCA became suspicious when Cruz ordered another set of books even before his check cleared.
Upon investigation, EDCA found that he wasn’t the person he claimed to be (Dean in DLSU).
EDCA had the police capture Cruz, as well as seize the books from Santos. Santos demanded
the return of the books.
RTC granted the writ of preliminary attachment.
Subsequent dishonor of a check, which did not render the contract of sale void does not amount
to unlawful deprivation of property.



Issue
Whether or not the owner was unlawfully deprived of the property?
Held
No. Santos was a good faith buyer after taking steps to verify the identity of the seller. When she
was showed the invoice, she reasonably believed that he was a legitimate seller.
With regard to unlawful deprivation, EDCA was not unlawfully deprived of the property by mere
failure of consideration. There was already a perfected contract of sale. Proof was even
substantiated when EDCA gave the invoice as proof of payment upon delivery of the books. This
did not amount to unlawful taking, because by the delivery of EDCA to Cruz, ownership of the
books already transferred to him.
Let us go to the case of Ledesma v. CA, GR No. 86051, Sep. 1, 1992. Here, Article 559 does not
apply in this case because Article 559 only applies if the possessor is already the owner. Here,
Ledesma acquired ownership of the car because Citiwide delivered the car to that person Armando,
and there was ownership upon delivery, despite the fact that his check bounced. When Armando
delivered the car to Ledesma, there was also a transfer of ownership. Ledesma became the owner.
So what is Article 559 doing there. It has no significance whatsoever because Article 559 applies
only to that case of Pia and Praxedes, there was no delivery from Pia to Praxedes. Praxedes was
supposed to return it. So when Praxedes sold it to Verches, Verches was only a possessor.
Ledesma v. CA
GR No. 86051 | Sep. 1, 1992
Facts
Two motor vehicles—Honda Gemini and Holden Premiere Model—were purchased from
Citiwide Motors by a person who identified himself as Jojo Consunji. He bought the vehicles
purportedly for his father. Upon delivery to him of the vehicles, he paid a manager’s check drawn
against PCIB. The check though was dishonored by the bank on the ground that the check’s
value has been materially altered. This was reported to the police authorities and it was found
out that the person misrepresenting himself was actually Suarez who had a long line of criminal
cases against him for his modus operandi. The Holden car was recovered after being abandoned
somewhere in Quezon City. The Honda on the other hand, was discovered to be sold to
Ledesma. Ledesma averred he purchased the vehicle in good faith from one Neyra, as evidenced
by his certificate of registration. Citiwide Motors was able to recover.
Issue
WON Article 559 is applicable.
Held
No. There was a perfected unconditional contract of sale between Citiwide Motors and Suarez.
The subsequent dishonor of the check merely amounted to failure of consideration which doesn't
render a contract of sale void, but merely allows the prejudiced party to sue for specific
performance or rescission of the sale. This being the case, Citiwide motors wasn't unlawfully
deprived of the property. It is thus not entitled to the return of the vehicle from Ledesma who
bought the property in good faith and for consideration.



August 17 – Peroy
BPI Family Bank v. Franco

GR 123498, Nov 23, 2007
Facts:
Tevesteco opened a savings and current account with BPI Family Bank San Franciso del Monte
branch. Ten days later, FMIC opened a time deposit account with a deposit of P100M with the
same branch.
It was Franco who introduced the president of Tevesteco to the branch manager of BPI Family
Bank to facilitate Tevesteco’s business transactions. As consideration, Franco received P2M from
Tevestico, which amount he deposited in three accounts with the same branch.
Pursuant to an Authority to Debit purportedly signed by FMIC’s officers, P80M was debited by BPI
Family Bank from FMIC’s time deposit account and credited to Tevesteco’s current account.
Franco’s P2M was part of the P80M.
It appears, however, that the signatures of FMIC’s officers on the Authority to Debit were forged.
Unfortunately, Tevesteco had already withdrawn more than P37M, including the P2M paid to
Franco.
In a separate case where FMIC filed a complaint against BPI Family bank for the recovery of the
P80M, the SC found BPI Family Bank liable to FMIC.
In the meantime, BPI Family Bank freezed Franco’s accounts and refused to release Franco’s
deposits therein despite his demands. As such, he filed a complaint against BPI Family Bank.
On the other hand, BPI Family bank insists that the legal consequence of FMIC’s forgery claim is
that the money transferred by BPI Family Bank to Tevesteco is its own, and considering that it was
able to recover possession of the same when the money was redeposited by Franco, it had the
right to set up its ownership thereon and freeze Franco’s accounts. BPI Family bank cites Article
559 of the Civil Code.
Issue: WON Article 559 is applicable
Ruling:
No. To begin with, the movable property mentioned in Article 559 of the Civil Code pertains to a
specific or determinate thing. In this case, the deposit in Franco’s accounts consists of money
which, albeit characterized as a movable, is generic and fungible.
Significantly, while Article 559 permits an owner who has lost or has been unlawfully deprived of
a movable to recover the exact same thing from the current possessor, BPI-FB simply claims
ownership of the equivalent amount of money, i.e., the value thereof, which it had mistakenly
debited from FMIC’s account and credited to Tevesteco’s, and subsequently traced to Franco’s
account. It staked its claim on the money itself which passed from one account to another,
commencing with the forged Authority to Debit.



Money bears no earmarks of peculiar ownership. Its primary function is to pass from hand to hand
as a medium of exchange, without other evidence of its title. Thus, inasmuch as what is involved is
not a specific or determinate personal property, Article 559 is inapplicable to the instant case.
[Summary: Art. 559 only applies to specific or determinate things. Does not apply to fungible or
generic things]
BPI said that it owns the money that is in the name of Franco. Franco is the possessor. BPI is the
owner. BPI said that it was unlawfully deprived of that money because of some scam created by
the other company. Since it found the money in Franco’s account, as the owner who was
unlawfully deprived of that money, BPI said it can recover. Recovery is one of the rights of an
owner. Can BPI use that analogy?
What was the analogy used by BPI? According to BPI, if Mr. X is a TV repairman, he has many TVs
in his shop. Mr. Y stole the TV from X, and sold the TV to Z. The TV broke and Z had it repaired
by X. X realized that it was his stolen TV that he was unlawfully deprived of. X decides to
appropriate it for himself and not return the TV to Z, because according to X he is the rightful
owner. That is the analogy given by BPI. BPI said, that’s my money that is in the account of
Franco, I was unlawfully deprived of it. So, it froze the account so it can recover from Franco
pursuant to Art. 559.
Art. 559 only applies if the owner want to recover the thing that he was unlawfully deprived of,
like a TV. That particular TV. BPI’s analogy was correct but was not in all fours with the situation
because what was to be recovered is generic, money. Not specific or determinate. The exact bills
or the exact coins are not found in Franco’s account. It’s just the equivalent. BPI can cite other
laws to freeze it, example General Banking Act but not Art. 559.
Tip: Don’t answer the problem by giving the facts. You are only throwing back to the teacher what
is given to you. Give legal basis. Relate the legal basis to the facts.
Art. 560. Wild animals are possessed only while they are under one's control; domesticated or
tamed animals are considered domestic or tame if they retain the habit of returning to the premises
of the possessor. (465)
There are 3 kinds of animals under Art. 560:

1. Wild animals – are really wild. You can possess a wild animal if it’s under one’s control.
2. Domesticated or Tamed – formerly wild. Wild animals become domesticated. If a wild
animal becomes under control of a person, then that animal becomes domesticated or
tamed.
3. Domestic or Tame – are those that you buy from pet shops or children of existing animals,
of pets already.
Domesticated animals can be considered tame already if they have the habit of returning. Under
control meaning nakatali sya, siguro domesticated sya if you just release it and it still comes back
to you, then it’s status is considered domestic or tame.



Art. 561. One who recovers, according to law, possession unjustly lost, shall be deemed for all
purposes which may redound to his benefit, to have enjoyed it without interruption. (466)
What is the significance of Art. 561?

S: For acquisitive prescription.
In the earlier example of Santos who was unlawfully deprived of the car. Let’s say Santos is a mere
possessor not the owner of the car and he was unlawfully deprived of it by Marela. Marela sold it
to Aznar. Aznar was a drug dealer who used the car to transport drugs. Anzar was able to use the
car for 3 years. Santos who was in possession of the car for 3 years needs 3 more years to acquire
ownership by prescription. And so it was returned to Santos after 3 years. 1 year of his possession,
3 years of Aznar’s possession. Is he deemed to have enjoyed the possession of the car without
interruption?
S: No. It is not deemed that he has enjoyed the possession of the car. Art. 561 only applies that it
will redound to his benefit. The car was used for illegal acts, it will not redound to his benefit if it
will be deemed that he possessed the car.
This article only applies if it redounds to his benefit. If he is going to get prosecuted for dealing
with drugs just so that he can acquire the possession of the car by prescription, what will he
choose? Art. 561 has a caveat, only if it redounds to his benefit.
Title VI. USUFRUCT
Introduction to Usufruct
Recall the Rights of an owner:

1. Right to enjoy
2. Right to dispose
3. Right to recover or vindicate
3 Subtypes of Right to Enjoy:

1. Right to possess – jus possidendi
2. Right to use – jus utendi
3. Right to the fruits – jus fruendi
Art. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving
its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. (467)
Art. 562 provides that “… right to enjoy”. Don’t forget our basic right. Included in the right to
enjoy is the use and the to keep.
“to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless
the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides”
An owner has the right to enjoy his property. He also has the right to give that right to enjoy to
somebody else. He can limit his right to enjoy by giving that right to somebody else. That is the
concept of usufruct. It gives the right to enjoy the property of another.



But with the right to enjoy comes the obligation to preserve its form and substance. That is the
basic concept of usufruct. There are many kinds, but that is the most basic concept.
Usufruct, according to many authors, is a real right. Even though it’s a real right, it is temporary, it
is not permanent. Which authorizes the holder of the usufruct to enjoy all of the benefits which
result from normal enjoyment or exploitation of another’s property. With the obligation to return at
the designated time either the same thing or its equivalent.
What can be the object of usufruct?

Any kind of property,
1. Real or personal
2. Sterile or productive
3. Rights – because the rights are considered property, usufruct may be created over a right as
long as it is not strictly personal or intransmissible; and as long as it has an independent
existence
Here we have the formula. The combination of jus utendi and jus fruendi is called usufruct.
1. Naked Ownership + Usufruct = Full Ownership
2. Full Ownership – Usufruct = Naked Ownership
3. Full Ownership – Naked Ownership = Usufruct
The rights of an owner that he can exercise anytime are the rights to enjoy and right to dispose.
The right to recover is exercised when his property is taken away. Right to recover is a standby
right.
If there’s a usufruct, the owner gives the right to enjoy to another person but he retains for himself
the right to dispose.
If the owner is left with only the right to dispose, then his ownership is stripped naked. He is left
with “naked ownership”. The formula is in in #1 above.
Owner of Naked Title – The owner who is left with the right to dispose. His title is now naked. But
he has a nickname “naked owner” (for brevity).
Nota bene: you should not use “naked owner” because it’s not a legal term. That’s just created by
teachers. Big deduction will be given if you use “naked owner” in your answers. Only ma’am is
allowed to use that term.
Art. 562 sets the general idea of usufruct, the right to enjoy property of another. And the person is
called usufructuary.
Usufructuary – the one who is given the usufruct. Has the obligation to “preserve the form and
substance” of the thing that he’s given the right to enjoy. That is the general concept.
“unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.”

In other words, usufruct doesn’t have to be what Art. 562 says it is.



For example: I am the owner of a car. I will give W the car in usufruct, “sirain mo ha, abusuhin
mo, sirain mo”. I did not only give the right to enjoy, but also the right to dispose. Can somebody
say that is wrong and I cannot do that because Art. 562 says he has to preserve the thing? Art. 562
is only a pangsalo if there is no agreement. Whatever it is in the agreement, that will prevail over
Art. 562. The agreement between the naked owner (NO) and usufructuary that will govern, or if
there is a special law which provides otherwise. Or a provision here that goes against Art. 562.
Art. 562 is a general concept only. If there is no special law or agreement, Art. 562 governs.
Earlier, we talked about money in BPI v. Franco. SC clearly said that Art. 559 does not apply to
money because it is not specific, money is generic.
Can there be usufruct over a sum of money? We know that usufruct can have as its object personal
or real property, rights, etc. Money is personal. Is that allowed?
According to the SC in Alunan v. Veloso an En Banc case, Yes, there can be a usufruct over a sum
of money. But this is not the usufruct under Art. 562 because 562 is only applicable if your
usufructuary of the money is keeping it in your drawer or safe. Money is consumable. It’s not the
kind of usufruct under Art. 562. But still, very clear that there can be usufruct over a sum of
money.
While we were discussing Art. 448, we touched on some provisions on lease. Lease is very easy,
no need to spoon-feed the students. Lease as a subject is your responsibility. It is easy if you know
the concept.
Example: renting an apartment, that is a lease
Distinguish usufruct from lease

Lease is straightforward. X owns an apartment building with 5 doors. He leases each door to 5
different people. A,B,C,D,E are tenants/lessees. What right does the owner of the building give to
these lessees? He gives the right to enjoy, but not the entire right to enjoy. Only the right to
possess and right to use. The right to the fruits remains to the lessor.
In usufruct, the entire right to enjoy is given. The usufructuary is given the right to use and the right
to the fruits. Right to possess is also included.
In the case of Eleizegui v. Manila Lawn Tennis Club another En Banc case, the SC said that
usufruct is a right of superior degree to that which arises from a lease. Between a usufructuary and
a lessee, the usufructuary has the higher status.
As to extent, usufruct. But. The nature of the
Usufruct Lease
As to extent covers use and fruits lease only covers only a
particular or specific use
As to the Nature of the Right Usufructuary has a real right A lease becomes a real right
over the property only if it is registered or more
than 1 year.



- You have to comply with

certain requirements before
lease is considered a real
right.
As to the Creator of the Right Only the owner can create or Lessor need not be the owner
give usufruct. of the property.
- Usufruct can only be - the usufructuary can actually

constituted by the owner of lease out the property even if
the property or his agent. he is not the owner,
subletting.
As to Origin or Creation By law, will of private GR: Only by contract. An
persons, prescription. agreement between the
parties.
E: only one exception, the

forced lease under Art. 448
when it comes to the sower
and the landowner chooses
not to appropriate
As to the repairs Usufructuary has the duty to Lessee has no such duty; he
make ordinary repairs can inform the lessor lang
about the things needed to be
repaired
As to taxes Usufructuary pays for the Normally does not pay except
annual charges and taxes on for VAT
the fruits
As to other things A usufructuary may lease the The lessee cannot constitute a
property itself to another. usufruct on the property
leased.
Other minor distinctions are found in the book of Paras.
ARP notes:
Full Ownership = [Naked Ownership] + [Enjoyment]
Full Ownership = [Right to Dispose + Recover] + [Enjoyment]
1. Extended Formula
Full Ownership = [Right to Dispose + Recover] + [Right to Possess + Use + Fruits]
2. Usufruct
Usufruct = Right to Possess + Use + Fruits
Usufruct = Right to Enjoyment
3. Lease
Lease = Right to Possess + Use



Art. 563. Usufruct is constituted by law, by the will of private persons expressed in acts inter
vivos or in a last will and testament, and by prescription. (468)
3 Ways to Constitute Usufruct:

1. Legal usufruct – By Law It is the law that dictates that.
Common example: Usufruct of parents over the property of their unemancipated children,
such as child actors.
2. Voluntary or Conventional – By the will of private persons expressed in acts inter vivos or
in a will. This is the most popular. If it is inter vivos, it is by entering into a contract or
agreement. Or there can be a donation. If it is mortis causa, by way of last will and
testament.
3. Prescription – usufruct can also be acquired by prescription, like ownership.
Art. 564. Usufruct may be constituted on the whole or a part of the fruits of the thing, in favor of
one more persons, simultaneously or successively, and in every case from or to a certain day,
purely or conditionally. It may also be constituted on a right, provided it is not strictly personal
or intransmissible. (469)
The owner can enter into different kinds of usufruct. May be constituted on a whole which we call
total usufruct or a part of the fruits of the thing. This is with respect to the thing.
Example: Mr. N gives Mr. U usufruct of a durian orchard. If all of the fruits, then it is a total
usufruct.
If Mr. U is only allowed 70% of the fruits, that is partial. It depends on the owner.
As to the object.
Example: If the only thing Mr. N owns is the orchard and his house is there. If he gives everything
as usufruct to Mr. U, orchard trees plus house, that is what we call Universal, for the entire
property or patrimony of the owner.
If Mr. N has so many properties, the 5 hectare orchard is one of his properties and he gives the
orchard as usufruct. That is a Single or Particular usufruct.
How many usufructuaries can there be? It depends on the owner. He can enter into a Single
usufruct where there is one usufructuary. Or he can enter into a Multiple usufruct involving many
persons. It could be Simultaneous, A,B,C,D and E. Or Successive, A first and if A dies, B next, next
C, and so on.
Pure usufruct, without condition or term, orchard, no period, no term as to percentage of harvest.
The more popular is usufruct with a Term or Period. This day to that day. And Conditional
usufruct, you give a condition while somebody else is enjoying your property.
Art. 565. The rights and obligations of the usufructuary shall be those provided in the title
constituting the usufruct; in default of such title, or in case it is deficient, the provisions
contained in the two following Chapters shall be observed. (470)
Related to Art. 562.



“The rights and obligations of the usufructuary shall be those provided in the title constituting the
usufruct” what’s that? The agreement between the parties. The terms and conditions of the
agreement that will prevail.
Second, the law of usufruct in the Civil Code “in default of such title, or in case it is deficient”. As
mentioned under Art. 562, if the law says otherwise, then Art. 562 will not apply. We have other
provisions in the CC that are not consistent with Art. 562. In case of conflict, it is the contract that
will prevail, unless it is repugnant to the CC provisions. Must not be repugnant to mandatory
provisions.
Eleizegui v. Manila Lawn Tennis Club

GR 967, May 19, 1903
FACTS:
A contract of lease was executed on January 25, 1980 over a piece of land owned by the plaintiffs
Eleizegui (Lessor) to the Manila Lawn Tennis Club, an English association (represented by Mr.
Williamson) for a fixed consideration of P25 per month and accordingly, to last at the will of the
lessee. Under the contract, the lessee can make improvements deemed desirable for the comfort
and amusement of its members. It appeared that the plaintiffs terminated the lease right on the first
month. The defendant is in the belief that there can be no other mode of terminating the lease than
by its own will, as what they believe has been stipulated.
As a result the plaintiff filed a case for unlawful detainer for the restitution of the land claiming
that article 1569 of the Civil Code provided that a lessor may judicially dispossess the lessee upon
the expiration of the conventional term or of the legal term; the conventional term — that is, the
one agreed upon by the parties; the legal term, in defect of the conventional, fixed for leases by
articles 1577 and 1581. The Plaintiffs argued that the duration of the lease depends upon the will
of the lessor on the basis of Art. 1581 which provides that, "When the term has not been fixed for
the lease, it is understood to be for years when an annual rental has been fixed, for months when
the rent is monthly. . . ." The second clause of the contract provides as follows: "The rent of the
said land is fixed at 25 pesos per month."
The lower court ruled in favor of the Plaintiffs on the basis of Article 1581 of the Civil Code, the
law which was in force at the time the contract was entered into. It is of the opinion that the
contract of lease was terminated by the notice given by the plaintiff. The judgment was entered
upon the theory of the expiration of a legal term which does not exist, as the case requires that a
term be fixed by the courts under the provisions of article 1128 with respect to obligations which,
as is the present, are terminable at the will of the obligee.
ISSUE:
Which between a contract of usufruct and a contract of lease is superior?
HELD:
Usufruct is a right of superior degree to that which arises from a lease. It is a real right and includes
all the jus utendi and jus fruendi.



The utmost period for which a usufruct can endure, if constituted in favor of a natural person, is
the lifetime of the usufructuary; and if in favor of a juridical person, it cannot be created for more
than 30 years.
a) YES, the parties have agreed upon a term hence Art. 1581 is inapplicable.
The legal term cannot be applied under Art 1581 as it appears that there was actually an
agreement between the parties as to the duration of the lease, albeit implied that the lease is to be
dependent upon the will of the lessee. It would be absurd to accept the argument of the plaintiff
that the contract was terminated at its notice, given this implication.
Interestingly, the contract should not be understood as one stipulated as a life tenancy, and still
less as a perpetual lease since the terms of the contract express nothing to this effect, even if they
implied this idea. If the lease could last during such time as the lessee might see fit, because it has
been so stipulated by the lessor, it would last, first, as long as the will of the lessee — that is, all his
life; second, during all the time that he may have succession, inasmuch as he who contracts does
so for himself and his heirs. (Art. 1257 of the Civil Code.) The lease in question does not fall within
any of the cases in which the rights and obligations arising from a contract can not be transmitted
to heirs, either by its nature, by agreement, or by provision of law. Moreover, being a lease, then it
must be for a determinate period. (Art. 1543.) By its very nature it must be temporary, just as by
reason of its nature, an emphyteusis must be perpetual, or for an unlimited period. (Art. 1608.)
B) The duration of the lease does not depend solely upon the will of the Lessee (defendant).
It cannot be concluded that the termination of the contract is to be left completely at the will of the
lessee simply because it has been stipulated that its duration is to be left to his will.
The Civil Code has made provision for such a case in all kinds of obligations. In speaking in
general of obligations with a term it has supplied the deficiency of the former law with respect to
the "duration of the term when it has been left to the will of the debtor," and provides that in this
case the term shall be fixed by the courts. (Art. 1128, sec. 2.) In every contract, as laid down by
the authorities, there is always a creditor who is entitled to demand the performance, and a debtor
upon whom rests the obligation to perform the undertaking. In bilateral contracts the contracting
parties are mutually creditors and debtors. Thus, in this contract of lease, the lessee is the creditor
with respect to the rights enumerated in article 1554, and is the debtor with respect to the
obligations imposed by articles 1555 and 1561. The term within which performance of the latter
obligation is due is what has been left to the will of the debtor. This term it is which must be fixed
by the courts.
The only action which can be maintained under the terms of the contract is that by which it is
sought to obtain from the judge the determination of this period, and not the unlawful detainer
action which has been brought — an action which presupposes the expiration of the term and
makes it the duty of the judge to simply decree an eviction. To maintain the latter action it is
sufficient to show the expiration of the term of the contract, whether conventional or legal; in
order to decree the relief to be granted in the former action it is necessary for the judge to look into
the character and conditions of the mutual undertakings with a view to supplying the lacking
element of a time at which the lease is to expire.



The lower court’s judgement is erroneous and therefore reversed and the case was remanded with
directions to enter a judgment of dismissal of the action in favor of the defendant, the Manila Lawn
Tennis Club.
In the usufruct, there can be a usufruct without a term. Where a usufructuary can determine when
it is terminated. When it comes to lease contracts, the lessee cannot do that. Usufruct, it can be
without any term. The right of the usufructuary is superior to that of a lessee. You give the lessee
the option to terminate, para na syang usufructuary.
Moralidad v. Pernes
GR 152809, Aug 3, 2006
FACTS:
Mercedes acquired the lot property initially for the purpose of letting Arlene (Pernes) move from
Mandug to Davao City proper but later she wanted the property to be also available to any of her
kins wishing to live and settle in Davao City. Petitioner made known this intention in a document
she executed on July 21, 1986. The document reads:
I, MERCEDES VIÑA MORALIDAD, of legal age, single, having been born on the 29th day of
January, 1923, now actually residing at 8021 Lindbergh Boulevard, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., wishes to convey my honest intention regarding my properties situated at Palm Village
Subdivision, Bajada, Davao City, 9501, … and hereby declare:
1. That it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernes may build their house therein and
stay as long as they like;
2. That anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned real property should
maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one
another;
3. That anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof.
Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof;
4. That anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise
the freedom to look for his own;
5. That any proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned properties shall be allotted to my
nearest kins who have less in life in greater percentage and lesser percentage to those who are
better of in standing.
Following her retirement in 1993, petitioner came back to the Philippines to stay with the
respondents’ on the house they build on the subject property. In the course of time, their relations
turned sour because members of the Pernes family were impervious to her suggestions and
attempts to change certain practices concerning matters of health and sanitation within their
compound. For instance, Arlene’s eldest son, Myco Pernes, then a fourth year veterinary medicine
student, would answer petitioner back with clenched fist and at one time hurled profanities when
she corrected him. Later, Arlene herself followed suit. Petitioner brought the matter to the local
barangay lupon where she lodged a complaint for slander, harassment, threat and defamation
against the Pernes Family. Deciding for petitioner, the lupon apparently ordered the Pernes family
to vacate petitioner’s property but not after they are reimbursed for the value of the house they



built thereon. Unfortunately, the parties could not agree on the amount, thus prolonging the
impasse between them.
Other ugly incidents interspersed with violent confrontations meanwhile transpired, with the
petitioner narrating that, at one occasion in July 1998, she sustained cuts and wounds when
Arlene pulled her hair, hit her on the face, neck and back, while her husband Diosdado held her,
twisting her arms in the process.
Relations having deteriorated from worse to worst, petitioner, on July 29, 1998, lodged a formal
complaint before the Regional Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, charging the respondent
spouses, who were both government employees, with conduct unbecoming of public servants.
This administrative case, however, did not prosper.
Then, on August 3, 1998, petitioner filed with the MTCC of Davao City an unlawful detainer suit
against the respondent spouses. Petitioner alleged that she is the registered owner of the land on
which the respondents built their house; that through her counsel, she sent the respondent spouses
a letter demanding them to vacate the premises and to pay rentals therefor, which the respondents
refused to heed.
In their defense, the respondents alleged having entered the property in question, building their
house thereon and maintaining the same as their residence with petitioner’s full knowledge and
express consent. To prove their point, they invited attention to her written declaration of July 21,
1986, supra, wherein she expressly signified her desire for the spouses to build their house on her
property and stay thereat for as long as they like.
Issue #1: What has been constituted by the parties?
HELD:
What was constituted between the parties herein is one of usufruct over a piece of land, with the
petitioner being the owner of the property upon whom the naked title thereto remained and the
respondents being two (2) among other unnamed usufructuaries who were simply referred to as
petitioner’s kin. The Court, however, cannot go along with the CA’s holding that the action for
unlawful detainer must be dismissed on ground of prematurity.
Usufruct is defined under Article 562 of the Civil Code in the following wise:
ART. 562. Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving
its form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides.
Usufruct, in essence, is nothing else but simply allowing one to enjoy another’s property. It is also
defined as the right to enjoy the property of another temporarily, including both the jus utendi and
the jus fruendi, with the owner retaining the jus disponendi or the power to alienate the same.
It is undisputed that petitioner, in a document dated July 21, 1986, supra, made known her
intention to give respondents and her other kins the right to use and to enjoy the fruits of her
property. There can also be no quibbling about the respondents being given the right "to build
their own house" on the property and to stay thereat "as long as they like." Paragraph #5 of the
same document earmarks "proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned properties" for
the petitioner’s "nearest kins who have less in life in greater percentage and lesser percentage to
those who are better of (sic) in standing." The established facts undoubtedly gave respondents not
only the right to use the property but also granted them, among the petitioner’s other kins, the right
to enjoy the fruits thereof.
Was the document action usufruct? What determines WON an agreement is a usufruct?
S: The intention of the parties represented in the document. She intended for it to be a usufruct.



Mercedes Moralidad, is not a lawyer, she is a nurse who worked in the US. I don’t think she
knows what a usufruct is. It was just an agreement that she executed in relation to that property
she bought. However, looking at the provisions of that agreement, one can surmise and conclude
that what was constituted was usufruct. There was no mention of the term or WON Pernes are to
pay rent, kasi pag ganyan lease contract na yan. Mind you, from the beginning to the end, if you’re
waiting how much the usufructuary will have to pay, the provisions on usufruct do not state that
the usufructuary has to pay the naked owner. I’ve seen a lot of usufruct agreements and there is
always compensation because usufruct is governed by the agreement between the parties. Just
because there is nothing here in the law that the usufructuary must compensate the naked owner,
doesn’t mean that it’s not being done. This document executed by Mercedes would fall under the
provisions that we just took up.
Remember that the SC said what was constituted was one of usufructuary.
Art. 581. The owner of property the usufruct of which is held by another, may alienate it, but he
cannot alter its form or substance, or do anything thereon which may be prejudicial to the
usufructuary. (489)
Let’s go to the rights of the parties to the usufruct. The naked owner has 2 rights. Reading this
provisions, you will notice that usufruct is not about the naked owner, it is about the usufructuary.
The naked owner (NO) is just the owner of the property. He only has 2 rights under Art. 581.
Remember, the right to dispose is totally retained by the NO. He may alienate the property. The
owner can sell and the buyer must respect the usufruct but he cannot alter the form and substance
of property of usufruct, meron pang condition.
“or do anything thereon which may be prejudicial to the usufructuary”
Another right is Art. 595.
Art. 595. The owner may construct any works and make any improvements of which the
immovable in usufruct is susceptible, or make new plantings thereon if it be rural, provided that
such acts do not cause a diminution in the value of the usufruct or prejudice the right of the
usufructuary. (503)
He may construct any works, make improvements, new plantings but he must not cause a
decrease in the value of the usufruct to prejudice the usufructuary. It is the usufructuary who is
being considered here.
Those are the rights of the NO.
Rights of the Usufructuary
What about the usufructuary? Rights starting from Art. 566.
Art. 566. The usufructuary shall be entitled to all the natural, industrial and civil fruits of the
property in usufruct. With respect to hidden treasure which may be found on the land or
tenement, he shall be considered a stranger. (471)



“entitled to all the natural, industrial and civil fruits of the property in usufruct”. If the property is a
durian orchard and the usufructuary is entitled to the natural fruits, or natural grown trees and
durian, kanya din yung civil fruits pati yung renta. Civil fruits are rent. Sometimes the provisions
are really one sided. Normal situation would be the usufructuary will pay the owner some kind of
compensation, that compensation will go to the NO, not the usufructuary, as civil fruits arising
from the property.
With respect to hidden treasure, the usufructuary is considered a stranger unless he is the finder.
You already know the hidden treasure belongs to land owner. If it is discovered by another, 50%-
50% sila, usufructuary zero. But if he is the finder, he gets 50%.
Bachrach v. Seifert
GR L-2659, Oct 12, 1950
FACTS:
E. M. Bachrach, who left no forced heir except his widow Mary McDonald Bachrach, in his last
will and testament made various legacies in cash and willed the remainder of his estate as follows:
"Sixth: It is my will and do herewith bequeath and devise to my beloved wife Mary
McDonald Bachrach for life all the fruits and usufruct of the remainder of all my estate after
payment of the legacies, bequests, and gifts provided for above; and she may enjoy said usufruct
and use or spend such fruits as she may in any manner wish."
The estate of Bachrach, as owner of 108,000 shares of stock of the Atok-Big Wedge Mining
[Atok], received from Atok 54,000 shares representing 50% stock dividend on the said 108,000
shares.
On June 10, 1948, Mary, as usufructuary or life tenant of the estate, petitioned the lower
court to authorize the administrator of the estate of Bachrach, to transfer to her the said 54,000
shares of stock dividend by indorsing and delivering to her the corresponding certificate of stock,
claiming that said dividend, although paid out in the form of stock, is fruit or income and therefore
belonged to her as usufructuary or life tenant.
Sophie Siefert and Elisa Elianoff, legal heirs of the deceased, opposed said petition on the
ground that the stock dividend in question was not income but formed part of the capital and
therefore belonged not to the usufructuary but to the remainderman. While Sophie and Elisa admit
that a cash dividend is an income, they contend that a stock dividend is not, but merely represents
an addition to the invested capital.
ISSUE:
Is a stock dividend fruit or income, which belongs to the usufructuary, or is it capital or
part of the corpus of the estate, which pertains to the remainderman?
HELD:
Art. 566 of the Civil Code provides that the usufructuary shall be entitled to receive all the
natural, industrial, and civil fruits of the property in usufruct.
The 108,000 shares of stock are part of the property in usufruct. The 54,000 shares of stock
dividend are civil fruits of the original investment. They represent profits, and the delivery of the



certificate of stock covering said dividend is equivalent to the payment of said profits. Said shares
may be sold independently of the original shares. Mary is entitled to the stock dividends.
The property subject to the usufruct is the 108k shares of stock in the mining company. Civil fruits
are income derived from property. There are 2 kinds of dividends produced by shares of stock: a.
cash dividend, definitely they are civil fruits, b. stock dividend, they are considered fruit.
There was an argument there that they form part of the capital of the original number of shares of
stock.
But the SC said that there are 2 rules as to stock dividends:

1. Pennsylvania rule – court followed this rule as according to the SC this is consistent with
our corporation law.
2. Massachusetts rule – does not consider stock dividends as part of the capital. The
Pennsylvania rule says otherwise.
This is in preparation for the bar, in case it comes out. Take note of those 2 rules.
Orozco v. Araneta has the same facts as to how stock dividends are characterized. They are
considered civil fruits.
August 18, 2017 Part 1 - Manligoy
Where did we stop? Rights of the Usufructuary.
So we looked at Article 566, the Usufructuary has the right to the natural, industrial and civil fruits
and we looked at the case of Bachrach vs Seifert regarding shares of stocks in the fruits, stocks
dividends and cash dividends are considered civil fruits and this case was also cited in the case of
Orozco and Alcantara vs Araneta.
We will now continue with Article 567.
Art. 567. Natural or industrial fruits growing at the time the usufruct begins, belong to the
usufructuary.
Those growing at the time the usufruct terminates, belong to the owner.
In the preceding cases, the usufructuary, at the beginning of the usufruct, has no obligation to
refund to the owner any expenses incurred; but the owner shall be obliged to reimburse at the
termination of the usufruct, from the proceeds of the growing fruits, the ordinary expenses of
cultivation, for seed, and other similar expenses incurred by the usufructuary.
The provisions of this article shall not prejudice the rights of third persons, acquired either at
the beginning or at the termination of the usufruct.
How many times did you encounter civil fruits, industrial fruits, natural fruits? From the beginning
and even in Possession. For usufruct, we also have rules on usufruct. Article 567 talks about growing
or impending fruits.



Let’s say a usufruct is constituted on January 1 of 2010. That is the beginning of the usufruct. If there
are existing fruits there, durian trees, mango trees, etc., the fruits belong to the usufructuary. What if
the usufructuary is just going to harvest? Can the owner say “oi ako ang gumastos ng fertilization, I
was the one who paid for the labor, reimburse me”, well the provision says no. SAbi ng provision
but ofcourse kung ako ang may-ari, I will not ask for reimbursement but I will put it in the agreement.
Kung may agreement, yan ang masusunod.
Now, let’s relate it to a PGF. For example, the owner is old. … his property was possessed by PGF.
Finilan niya ng kaso eh th owner won. Etong si PGF has planted several fruit bearing trees. Eh diba
the usufruct is entitled to the fruits? Diba? So, paano yan? The fruits actually belong to the
usufructuary at the time of the beginning. So when the owner recovers his property, he now entered
into a usufruct immediately with Mr. Yu. So what to do? The pending crops, the expenses and
charges agreed will be pro-rated between the possessor, PGF, and the usufructuary. Hindi na kasama
si owner. Yung share ng owner will go to the usufructuary. Remember our discussion on pending
fruits? Pro-rating. Instead of the owner, it will be the usufructuary and the PGF over the share, pro-
rated income.
Now, what if the usufruct starts in January 1, 2010 and end on December 21 of 2015. Five years na.
So, continue yung plants, the bearing of the fruits. The definition of usufruct, merong fruits they
harvested, according to the provision, it belongs to the owner. Syempre, nagend na yung usufruct,
merong fruits, it belongs to the owner but the usufructuary is entitled to reimbursement for the
ordinary expenses and consummation and other similar expenses. If I were the owner, I will do the
opposite. Diba? Why will I reimburse the usufructuary, dapat ako ang mareimburse. So, these are
the rules when there is no agreement to the contrary. As for civil fruits, they are not included in the
provision because they accrue daily. You know that.
Art. 568. If the usufructuary has leased the lands or tenements given in usufruct, and the usufruct
should expire before the termination of the lease, he or his heirs and successors shall receive
only the proportionate share of the rent that must be paid by the lessee.
Now, we also know that the usufructuary can also lease the property to another. Ganun ka laki ang
power ng usufructuary. The general rule is, the lease executed by the usufructuary should terminate
at the end of the usufruct or earlier. So the usufruct is up to a certain day, hanggang dun lang dapat
din ang lease contract. The usufructuary cannot enter into a lease contract that is beyond the term
of the usufruct itself. So if the lease expires at the end of the usufruct, who can provide the civil
fruits? The usufruct. Kanya yun. What if the usufruct expires before the termination of the lease?
Well, there will be a pro-rating share. When does this happen? In case of lease of rural lands and if
the usufruct ends earlier than the lease, then the lease continues until the end of the agricultural
period/year to allow the lessee to harvest the produce.
Who can choose the tenant, if the property is the object of the usufruct? It is the usufructuary because
it is the usufructuary who will enter into the lease contract and not the immediate owner. I was
lookin or reviewing the cases in usufruct, the Supreme Court actually uses the term naked owner.
That shortcut is accepted but not for you. You should use the proper term.
Art. 569. Civil fruits are deemed to accrue daily, and belong to the usufructuary in proportion
to the time the usufruct may last.



Very easy for civil fruits.
Art. 570. Whenever a usufruct is constituted on the right to receive a rent or periodical pension,
whether in money or in fruits, or in the interest on bonds or securities payable to bearer, each
payment due shall be considered as the proceeds or fruits of such right.
Whenever it consists in the enjoyment of benefits accruing from a participation in any industrial
or commercial enterprise, the date of the distribution of which is not fixed, such benefits shall
have the same character.
In either case they shall be distributed as civil fruits, and shall be applied in the manner
prescribed in the preceding article.
How do we make this concrete? Let’s say we have Mr., the owner of the land. Mr. X let’s say is a
pensioner ng GSIS. He is a retired pensioner of GSIS and he receives his monthly pension. Now, he
was petitioned by his children in the US. He left eh yung kanyang GSIS pension, he gave it as
usufruct to Mr. Y. Mr. Y, you have the right to receive my GSIS pension. That is the situation here.
What are the rules? Each payment due is considered proceeds or fruits of the right. The usufruct is
the right to receive pension and the fruits of the rights will be each payment that he received and
this will be considered as civil fruits and will be applied in the manner prescribed in Article 569
which means that they are deemed to accrue daily and they shall belong to the usufructuary before
such time the usufruct may last.
Art. 571. The usufructuary shall have the right to enjoy any increase which the thing in usufruct
may acquire through accession, the servitudes established in its favor, and, in general, all the
benefits inherent therein.
What if there’s accession sa property which is the object of the usufruct? It became larger. Who
owns that? The owner according to the principles of accession. The usufructuary has the right to
enjoy any increase which the thing in usufruct may acquire through accession, enjoy the servitudes
established in its favor and enjoy all benefits inherent therein.
Art. 572. The usufructuary may personally enjoy the thing in usufruct, lease it to another, or
alienate his right of usufruct, even by a gratuitous title; but all the contracts he may enter into
as such usufructuary shall terminate upon the expiration of the usufruct, saving leases of rural
lands, which shall be considered as subsisting during the agricultural year.
The usufructuary is given the right to enjoy diba? The right to enjoy belongs to the owner but he
gives it to the usufructuary but 572 says that usufructuary, aside from personally enjoying the thing,
can actually lease it to another even without the consent of the owner. So he gives the right to enjoy
to the lessee. We already know that and the lease must not extend the period of the usufruct except
in case of rural leases but that is related to the previous provision. But, the usufructuary can also
alienate his right. So, aside from personally enjoying it, he can lease it to another and then he can
alienate or sell his right of usufruct. So, in other words, if Mr. X, the naked owner and the
usufructuary Mr. A and MR. A sells his right to Mr. B, hindi na si Mr. A ang usufructuary, sir Mr. B
na except parental usufruct which we know is created or constituted by law and usufruct granted in
consideration of his person. That cannot be alienated and we are going to take up, accion



subrogatoria, that cannot be alienated as well. You can also pledge or mortgage his right of usufruct
under Article 572. That is another right of the usufructuary.
The usufructuary does not have the right to dispose of the property which is the object of the usufruct
because that belongs to the owner but with respect to his right, his right to usufructuary, he owns
that. Therefore, he can dispose of that. So, you have to distinguish between the thing that is the
object of the usufruct which is not owned by the usufructuary from his rights as a usufructuary. We
are now discussing these rights that can be disposed of by him as the owner of the rights.
Let’s go to abnormal or imperfect usufruct or things that deteriorate. So, there are many kinds of
things. We have the regular usufruct which involves a thing that can be returned like a parcel of
land which you can return as is where the tree is there and all those things. But there are things that
deteriorate.
Art. 573. Whenever the usufruct includes things which, without being consumed, gradually
deteriorate through wear and tear, the usufructuary shall have the right to make use thereof in
accordance with the purpose for which they are intended, and shall not be obliged to return
them at the termination of the usufruct except in their condition at that time; but he shall be
obliged to indemnify the owner for any deterioration they may have suffered by reason of his
fraud or negligence.
Article 573 refers to things which are non-consumable but gradually deteriorates where impaired
like a car. If the object of the usufruct is a car, siguro the usufruct lasted fro 50 years. Siguro naman
the car will not look the same after 50 years. So, does that mean that tingnan lang yung usufructuary?
No because kaya nga use eh, usufructuary, use of the thing in accordance with the purpose for
which they are intended. He can use the car and at the termination of the usufruct, he is only
required to return the object in their condition at the time it is returned and not necessarily to restore
the thing to its original condition because it is understood that the thing is subject to wear and tear
but he is obliged to indemnify the owner for any deterioration he may have suffered by reason of
his fraud or negligence. So, if ang pintura ng car is hindi na siya ganun ka-bright and medyo dull
na. That’s fine or maybe the engine is not that fast anymore. That’s fine but if binangga bangga niya
yung kotse at wala ng kotse ano na there’s no more windshield and the tires pumutok na, things like
that, then he is liable. He must indemnify the owner by reason of his fraud or negligence.
Art. 574. Whenever the usufruct includes things which cannot be used without being consumed,
the usufructuary shall have the right to make use of them under the obligation of paying their
appraised value at the termination of the usufruct, if they were appraised when delivered. In
case they were not appraised, he shall have the right to return at the same quantity and quality,
or pay their current price at the time the usufruct ceases.
So another of common usufruct is usufruct of consumables because diba at the end of the usufruct,
you return the same ath the termination of the usufruct. This is what you call a quasi-usufruct. It’s
not really a usufruct, parang usufruct lang. So, the rule is the usufructuary can use them as if he is
the owner but at the end of the usufruct, if they were appraised when delivered, he must pay the
appraised value. If there was no appraisal, return the same kind and quantity and quality or pay the
price current at the termination of the usufruct. So, it’s not free if you make use of a consumable
thing in usufruct.



I think this is a useless exercise, usufruct of consumable. What for? For what purpose? I don’t see
any purpose.
Art. 575. The usufructuary of fruit-bearing trees and shrubs may make use of the dead trunks,
and even of those cut off or uprooted by accident, under the obligation to replace them with
new plants.
When there are fruit-bearing trees, what can the usufruct enjoy? Siyempre, the fruit thereof. You
ocannot make use of the trees. He cannot cut down the trees and turn the wood into lumber. No.
He can only harvest the fruits, generally speaking but it says under Article 575 that the usufructuary
of fruit-bearing trees and shrubs can make use of the dead trunks. If the tree is dead, wala ng fruit
yung tree. So he can use the dead trunks and that cut-off or uprooted by accident. What if there’s a
big typhoon and naputol yung mga puno? It’s very difficult to return them back to their original state.
So, obviously, because they are uprooted by a typhoon, they can no longer bear fruits. So what is
the use to the usufructuary? He can use those trees but, take note, he must replace them with new
plants if by accident. That’s Article 575.
Art. 576. If in consequence of a calamity or extraordinary event, the trees or shrubs shall have
disappeared in such considerable number that it would not be possible or it would be too
burdensome to replace them, the usufructuary may leave the dead, fallen or uprooted trunks at
the disposal of the owner, and demand that the latter remove them and clear the land.
Article 576 is a continuation of Article 575. What is the situation in Article 576? In consequence of
a calamity or extraordinary event, the trees or shrubs shall have disappeared in such a considerable
number that it would not be possible or it would be too burdensome to replace them. What if there’s
really a great flood and the entire 10 hectares, naanod. Does the usufructuary have to replace the
entire 10 hectares of huge timber or coconut trees for that matter. What can he do? He may leave
the dead, fallen or uprooted trunks at the disposal of the owner. So? Sabihin niya sa owner, please
remove these trees, the dead trees and he can demand the latter to clear the land. Ganun ka
importante si usufructuary. He can ask the owner to clear the land for him.
Art. 577. The usufructuary of woodland may enjoy all the benefits which it may produce
according to its nature.
If the woodland is a copse or consists of timber for building, the usufructuary may do such
ordinary cutting or felling as the owner was in the habit of doing, and in default of this, he may
do so in accordance with the custom of the place, as to the manner, amount and season.
In any case the felling or cutting of trees shall be made in such manner as not to prejudice the
preservation of the land.
In nurseries, the usufructuary may make the necessary thinnings in order that the remaining
trees may properly grow.
With the exception of the provisions of the preceding paragraphs, the usufructuary cannot cut
down trees unless it be to restore or improve some of the things in usufruct, and in such case
shall first inform the owner of the necessity for the work.



So, Article 577. Let’s just read it and maybe know what it is but I don’t think this provision applies.
I don’t think it applies because we have so many special laws.
If you are usufructuary of a woodland, timberland, can you or what fruits can you enjoy? Wala. Di
naman kasi sila fruit-bearing yung mga woodland. Diba? So, you can just enjoy the shade of the
tree, enjoy the chirping of the birds, that’s all but you cannot do anything. In Article 577, you cannot
enjoy the benefits which is … according to its nature. Yun na nga, yung shade.
Now, what are the specific rights of such usufructuary? If the woodland is a copse or consists of
timber for building, the usufructuary may do such ordinary cutting or felling as the owner was in the
habit of doing like the owner can cut off his own tree. It’s a criminal offense to cut off a tree …. He
may do so in accordance with the custome of the place as to the manner, amount and season.
Maybe you know, sa …, they cut trees but it’s against the law. In nurseries, he can make the
necessary thinnings in order that the remaining trees may properly grow. And the obligation is he
must ensure that felling or cutting trees be made in such manner as not to prejudice the preservation
of the land. And the exception is he cannot cut down trees unless it be to restore or improve some
of the things in usufruct and in such case shall first inform the owner of the necessity for the work.
He cannot alienate the trees because they are not considered fruits unless he need money to do
some repairs. So this provision is not applicable nowadays. I don’t think anybody would ask
questions from Article 577.
Art. 578. The usufructuary of an action to recover real property or a real right, or any movable
property, has the right to bring the action and to oblige the owner thereof to give him the
authority for this purpose and to furnish him whatever proof he may have. If in consequence of
the enforcement of the action he acquires the thing claimed, the usufruct shall be limited to the
fruits, the dominion remaining with the owner.
Now, the right to recover real property is an immovable right. You know that under Article 415,
paragraph 10. Let’s say if I have the right to file accion publiciana. Let’s say I am the owner of the
property and somebody is possessing it. So, I can file accion publiciana against that person Mr. X. I
can give that right in usufruct. I’ll give it to Mr. B. What if the property involved is a car? That is a
personal property. I can also give that right with a collection for some of money and all those things.
So this is what you call special usufruct of action to recover through the courts.
What can you recover? Real property or personal property. So if I give that right in usufruct, what
are the rights of the usufructuary? The usufructuary can file a case. So definitely, he must have a
special power of attorney to do that and as the usufructuary is given the right to file the case, he can
oblige the owner to give him authority, yun the SPA, and furnish him with whatever proof is needed
for recovery which the owner may have.
So, how? What is the procedure? The action will be instituted in the name of the usufructuary. aGain,
this is a 1950 law. Under the rules of civil procedure, the civil action must be in the name of the
real party in interest. So, there is a conflict with the rules on civil procedure. So, in so far as this is
concerned, just know.
What is the authority required? For purposes of property rights, as long as the naked owner is
required. (dili nako gets ang statement ni Mam). It is to prevent disturbance of his property, special



authority to the naked owner is not required. The effect of the judgment, when judgment is awarded
to the usufructuary and he gets the property, the naked ownership will belong to the owner and
what does he get out of it? He becomes the usufructuary of the property that he was able to recover.
So from usufructuary of real right to recover, he becomes usufructuary of the thing that he is able to
recover.
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements
or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or
substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such
improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage to the property.
In Article 579, the usufructuary can make improvements on the property, useful, luxurious. Yung
mga necessary hindi yan improvement. Improvements are normally useful and luxurious but it does
alter the form or substance of the property in usufruct and he shall have no right to be indemnified
but he has the option to remove the improvements should it be possible to do so without damage
and there’s an option OCENPO.
In relation to this, let’s go back to the case of Moralidad vs Pernes.
MORALIDAD vs PERNES
GR No. 152809 | August 3, 2006
Facts:
Mercedes acquired the lot property initially for the purpose of letting Arlene (Pernes) move from
Mandug to Davao City proper but later she wanted the property to be also available to any of her
kins wishing to live and settle in Davao City. Petitioner made known this intention in a document
she executed on July 21, 1986. The document reads:
I, MERCEDES VIÑA MORALIDAD, of legal age, single, having been born on the 29th day of
January, 1923, now actually residing at 8021 Lindbergh Boulevard, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
U.S.A., wishes to convey my honest intention regarding my properties situated at Palm Village
Subdivision, Bajada, Davao City, 9501, … and hereby declare:
1. That it is my desire that Mr. and Mrs. Diosdado M. Pernes may build their house therein
and stay as long as they like;
2. That anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned real property should
maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with
one another;
3. That anyone of my kins may enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use
thereof. Provided, however, that the same is not inimical to the purpose thereof;
4. That anyone of my kins who cannot conform with the wishes of the undersigned may
exercise the freedom to look for his own;
5. That any proceeds or income derived from the aforementioned properties shall be allotted
to my nearest kins who have less in life in greater percentage and lesser percentage to
those who are better of in standing.
Following her retirement in 1993, petitioner came back to the Philippines to stay with the
respondents’ on the house they build on the subject property. In the course of time, their relations



turned sour because members of the Pernes family were impervious to her suggestions and
attempts to change certain practices concerning matters of health and sanitation within their
compound. For instance, Arlene’s eldest son, Myco Pernes, then a fourth year veterinary medicine
student, would answer petitioner back with clenched fist and at one time hurled profanities when
she corrected him. Later, Arlene herself followed suit. Petitioner brought the matter to the local
barangay lupon where she lodged a complaint for slander, harassment, threat and defamation
against the Pernes Family. Deciding for petitioner, the lupon apparently ordered the Pernes family
to vacate petitioner’s property but not after they are reimbursed for the value of the house they
built thereon. Unfortunately, the parties could not agree on the amount, thus prolonging the
impasse between them.
Other ugly incidents interspersed with violent confrontations meanwhile transpired, with the
petitioner narrating that, at one occasion in July 1998, she sustained cuts and wounds when
Arlene pulled her hair, hit her on the face, neck and back, while her husband Diosdado held her,
twisting her arms in the process.
Relations having deteriorated from worse to worst, petitioner, on July 29, 1998, lodged a formal
complaint before the Regional Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, charging the respondent
spouses, who were both government employees, with conduct unbecoming of public servants.
This administrative case, however, did not prosper.
Then, on August 3, 1998, petitioner filed with the MTCC of Davao City an unlawful detainer suit
against the respondent spouses. Petitioner alleged that she is the registered owner of the land on
which the respondents built their house; that through her counsel, she sent the respondent spouses
a letter demanding them to vacate the premises and to pay rentals therefor, which the respondents
refused to heed.
In their defense, the respondents alleged having entered the property in question, building their
house thereon and maintaining the same as their residence with petitioner’s full knowledge and
express consent. To prove their point, they invited attention to her written declaration of July 21,
1986, supra, wherein she expressly signified her desire for the spouses to build their house on her
property and stay thereat for as long as they like.
Issue #3: W/N the Pernes spouses are entitled for the reimbursement for the improvements they
have introduced in the subject property.
Held:
No. If the builder is a usufructuary, his rights will be governed by Arts. 579 and 580. By express
provision of law, respondents, as usufructuary, do not have the right to reimbursement for the
improvements they may have introduced on the property.
We quote Articles 579 and 580 of the Civil Code:
Art. 579. The usufructuary may make on the property held in usufruct such useful improvements
or expenses for mere pleasure as he may deem proper, provided he does not alter its form or
substance; but he shall have no right to be indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such
improvements, should it be possible to do so without damage to the property.



Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have made on the property
against any damage to the same.
Given the foregoing perspective, respondents will have to be ordered to vacate the premises
without any right of reimbursement. If the rule on reimbursement or indemnity were otherwise,
then the usufructuary might, as an author pointed out, improve the owner out of his property. 15
The respondents may, however, remove or destroy the improvements they may have introduced
thereon without damaging the petitioner’s property.
What are the articles did they cite? They wanted to claim reimbursement based on what article?
Article 448. What is the issue now?
So you have to know what’s the status of the person asking for reimbursement is. Is the person a
builder in good faith under 448, YES, or if he is a lessee, then apply the rules on lease. It depends
on the improvements made in good faith, blah blah blah. But if it’s a usufructuary who makes
improvements on the property, Article 579 is very clear. The usufructuary is not entitled to be
reimbursed. He only has the right of removal provided there will be no damage but how can he
remove a house? So the only thing that can be done is set-off. Improvements against damages from
which he may be liable but if Mercedes wants to give them a certain amount, she is not bound by
any kind of amount. It’s up to her.
Art. 580. The usufructuary may set off the improvements he may have made on the property
against any damage to the same.
Art. 581. The owner of property the usufruct of which is held by another, may alienate it, but
he cannot alter its form or substance, or do anything thereon which may be prejudicial to the
usufructuary.
Article 581, you remember huh? It is the right of the naked owner. We discussed that already.
Art. 582. The usufructuary of a part of a thing held in common shall exercise all the rights
pertaining to the owner thereof with respect to the administration and the collection of fruits or
interest. Should the co-ownership cease by reason of the division of the thing held in common,
the usufruct of the part allotted to the co-owner shall belong to the usufructuary.
Here we have a situation where a co-owner gives his ideal share of the property in usufruct. For
example, the co-owned property is a warehouse na pinarenta. Let’s say we have A, B and C as co-
owners of a warehouse diyan sa Panacan. And they rented it out for 300K a month. So, obviously,
they each have a share of 1,000 a month na renta. Etong si co-owner A, gave in usufruct his share
of the co-ownerhsip. Pwede yun, diba and he can do so without the consent of the others because
he owns his share. He can alienate, he can dipose, he can mortgage and he can even enter into a
usufruct. So, the usufructuary in such case, takes the owner’s place. Etong si usufructuary will take
the place of the owner in the administration and collection of … with interest but the usufructuary
cannot alienate, dispose and create a real right over the property. That belongs to the naked owner.
The naked co-owner does not realy give up his co-ownership. He only gave up his right to enjoy.
He gives that to the usufructuary. The right to dispose remains with the naked owner. Now, what if



the co-owners partitioned the property? Then the usufructuary continues on the part of the allotted
to the co-owner concerned.
Let’s go now to the obligations of the Usufructuary.
So you have to understand the difference between the constitution of the usufruct. When the usufruct
is constituted, that means that they entered into a contract. For example, a usufruct is entered into
by A and B and it will commence on January 1 of 2010. That means naa nay usufruct. There’s
already a constituted usufruct on January 1, 2010. Now, what are the general obligations of the
usufructuary?
1. Before the usufruct, before even entering into a usufruct, he must make an inventory.
Syempre, so that he will know what are the proeprties that are the object of the usufruct.
2. During the usufruct, we know that you have to take care of the property
3. After the usufruct, he must return the property and indemnify in proper case.
Those are the general obligations of the usufructuary. Let’s go to the specific provisions.
Art. 583. The usufructuary, before entering upon the enjoyment of the property, is obliged:
(1) To make, after notice to the owner or his legitimate representative, an inventory of all the
property, which shall contain an appraisal of the movables and a description of the condition of
the immovables;
(2) To give security, binding himself to fulfill the obligations imposed upon him in accordance
with this Chapter.
Before entering into the usufruct, what do you mean by that? Kanina I said there is a usufruct that is
constituted. Now the inventory is made after the usufruct is constituted but before the usufruct can
start enjoying. Before he enters the property or before he takes possession of the property that is
subject of the usufruct.
So, he must make an inventory by notifying the owner. “Owner, I am now going to make an
inventory.” What should it contain? It should contain an appraisal of the movables and the
description and condition of the immovable. What are the movables? Maybe there’s a car there, a
tractor, may grass cutter, etc., ipa-appraise mo yun. What are the immovables? There’s a sawmill,
there’s a barn, and all those other things. All of those should be included in the inventory.
Aside from making an inventory, he must give security. So, that is what is required of the
usufructuary. He binds himself to fulfill the obligations imposed upon him in accordance with law.
So, these two obligations, according to our authors, are not necessarily for the right of usufruct to
begin.
So if the usufruct is effective on January 1, 2010, can he start enjoying the property? Can he enter
the property on that particular date? No. He must first make the inventory and he must first give the
security and after that, that’s the only time he can enter the property. But is there a usufruct already?
Yes. That has already been constituted.



They are merely necessary before physical possession and enjoyment of the property can be had.
The right of usufructuary is not dependent on the making of inventory and giving of security because
the right begins at the constitution of the usufruct.
Are there exceptions to these requirements of making an inventory and giving security?
Art. 584. The provisions of No. 2 of the preceding article shall not apply to the donor who has
reserved the usufruct of the property donated, or to the parents who are usufructuaries of their
children's property, except when the parents contract a second marriage.
Five … what is number 2? The giving of security does not apply to the donor who reserved the
usufruct of the property donated or to the parents who are the usufructuaries of the properties of
their children except when the parents contract a 2nd marriage. So this is normally done by a father
who donates his properties to his children so that he doesn’t have to pay estate taxes anymore when
he dies. Gipangtransfer na niya tong properties but he retains the usufruct for himself. Does he have
to give security as a usufructuary? Of course not because he is the donor of the property. That is an
exception of 584 speaking of security.
Art. 585. The usufructuary, whatever may be the title of the usufruct, may be excused from the
obligation of making an inventory or of giving security, when no one will be injured thereby.
It’s so broad. That can be used by the usufructuary any time. I think this provision has to be improved
and specify. So, when is inventory not required? Under 585, when no one can be injured thereby
and when there’s a waiver by the naked owner. Sabi ng naked owner, hwag ng magbigay ng security.
Eh, bakit ka pa magbigay? As already mentioned, the agreement or the stipulations of the usufruct
will prevail which are not in conflict with the mandatory provisions.
So those are the three instances where inventory is not required. When is giving of security not
required? Under Article 585, it is the same: when no one is injured thereby, waiver again, and
stipulations again and Article 584, when the usufructuary is the donor and parents are the usufruct
and the last one is under Article 587, when there is caucion juratoria.
Art. 587. If the usufructuary who has not given security claims, by virtue of a promise under
oath, the delivery of the furniture necessary for his use, and that he and his family be allowed
to live in a house included in the usufruct, the court may grant this petition, after due
consideration of the facts of the case.
The same rule shall be observed with respect to implements, tools and other movable property
necessary for an industry or vocation in which he is engaged.
If the owner does not wish that certain articles be sold because of their artistic worth or because
they have a sentimental value, he may demand their delivery to him upon his giving security for
the payment of the legal interest on their appraised value.
August 18, 2017 Part 2 – Pahayahay
Let us continue.



So, what if the usufructuary fails to give security? Article 586 says:
Article 586. Should the usufructuary fail to give security in the cases in which he is bound to
give it, the owner may demand that the immovables be placed under administration, that the
movables be sold, that the public bonds, instruments of credit payable to order or to bearer be
converted into registered certificates or deposited in a bank or public institution, and that the
capital or sums in cash and the proceeds of the sale of the movable property be invested in safe
securities.
The interest on the proceeds of the sale of the movables and that on public securities and
bonds, and the proceeds of the property placed under administration, shall belong to the
usufructuary.
Furthermore, the owner may, if he so prefers, until the usufructuary gives security or is excused
from so doing, retain in his possession the property in usufruct as administrator, subject to the
obligation to deliver to the usufructuary the net proceeds thereof, after deducting the sums
which may be agreed upon or judicially allowed him for such administration.
So there is ... usufruct, constituted on everyone accredited (?). Wala mang security, so the
usufructuary cannot physically take possession of the property. Eh the property is a 10 hectare fruit
orchard na fruit bearing. Paano na ba yan? So the owner has already given the right to enjoy to
another. He cannot go inside this whole property and so what can he do? He can demand that the
movable be placed under administration. He can also demand that the movables be ...
Now, what is the share of the usufructuary? The usufructuary has a share of the net proceeds of the
sale of the movable. And interest in the proceeds of the property claimed under administration. So
he has ... title to the interest. So not the sale thereof but the interest. So legal interest is 6%. What
are the other alternative of the owner? He may retain in his possession the property in usufruct as
administrator. So he administer his own properties. But he has the obligation to deliver the principal
to the net proceeds. Imagine siya ang administrator pero ang income will go to the usufructuary after
deducting the sums which may be agreed upon or judicially allowed by him for such administration.
The net proceeds belong to the usufructuary.
So that is 586. What are the options of the naked owner, the usufructuary cannot enter the property
yet. Let us go to Article 587, Caucion Juratoria.
Article 587. If the usufructuary who has not given security claims, by virtue of a promise under
oath, the delivery of the furniture necessary for his use, and that he and his family be allowed
to live in a house included in the usufruct, the court may grant this petition, after due
consideration of the facts of the case.
The same rule shall be observed with respect to implements, tools and other movable property
necessary for an industry or vocation in which he is engaged.
If the owner does not wish that certain articles be sold because of their artistic worth or
because they have a sentimental value, he may demand their delivery to him upon his giving
security for the payment of the legal interest on their appraised value.



Okay so, what is a caucion juratoria? It is actually a promise under oath. It is a sworn duty to take
good care of the property and return same at the end of the usufruct. It takes the place of the bond
or security and is based on necessity and humanity as when a poor family acquires by inheritance,
the usufruct of a badly needed house.
This is not applicable to everyone. It only applies to persons whom cannot afford to give security.
The usufructuary is in dire need of these things but he cannot give the security requires. So, instead
of giving security, we will just make a promise under oath that we will take good care of everything
that is a subject of the usufruct. So, very limited.
Now, if the naked owner would say, wag ka na magbigay ng security, then there is no need for
caucion juratoria. It is required if security is required. But the thing is, isn't it easier to just go to a
bonding company and pay the premium because it is very tedios to file a petition in court that
usufructuary, it is not enough to just execute a sworn document. He must file the proper petition in
court and ask the court to allow the delivery of the house, furnitures, etc.
Now, what is the next part of Article 587? It is not related to caucion juratoria. It is misplaced. It
should be a continuation of Article 586. Kasi diba the option of the owner, the movable to be placed
under his administration... eh kung, ... may sentimental value, merong mga painting in the house,
there are lots of painting, and it has a lot of antique furnitures. So what can he do? He can demand
deliberately, kunin nalang niya. But he must be the one to give security for the payment of legal
interests or for their appraised value. The important thing is, when constituting usufruct, make sure
that there is a provision there that is totally against 586.
Article 588. After the security has been given by the usufructuary, he shall have a right to all
the proceeds and benefits from the day on which, in accordance with the title constituting the
usufruct, he should have commenced to receive them.
Article 589. The usufructuary shall take care of the things given in usufruct as a good father of
a family.
So that is the diligence required of a usufructuary.
Article 590. A usufructuary who alienates or leases his right of usufruct shall answer for any
damage which the things in usufruct may suffer through the fault or negligence of the person
who substitutes him.
Now, we know that the usufructuary has a right to alienate or lease his right. What if the lessee,
remember ha, that thing is still owned by the naked owner. What if the lessee destroys the thing?
What is the assignee of the usufruct destroys the thing? It is the usufructuary who cna answer for any
damage suffered through the fault or negligence of the person who substitutes him.
Okay, let us go to a usufruct on a flock or herd of livestock.
Art. 591. If the usufruct be constituted on a flock or herd of livestock, the usufructuary shall
be obliged to replace with the young thereof the animals that die each year from natural causes,
or are lost due to the rapacity of beasts of prey.



If the animals on which the usufruct is constituted should all perish, without the fault of the
usufructuary, on account of some contagious disease or any other uncommon event, the
usufructuary shall fulfill his obligation by delivering to the owner the remains which may have
been saved from the misfortune.
Should the herd or flock perish in part, also by accident and without the fault of the
usufructuary, the usufruct shall continue on the part saved.
Should the usufruct be on sterile animals, it shall be considered, with respect to its effects, as
though constituted on fungible things.
What are the fruits of animals? The young, diba? So according to Article 591, if the usufruct be
constituted on a flock or herd of livestock, the usufructuary shall be obliged to replace with the
young thereof the animals that die each year from natural causes, or are lost due to the rapacity
of beasts of prey. To whom does the young of the animals belong? Sa usufructuary yan kasi fruits
yan diba. Natural fruit of the animals. So he can sell the young, kanya yan. Fruits. What if the
animals die, not the young. Then he has to replace them with a young. He can use the young to
replace. But he is only obliged if the animals die from natural causes or lost due to the rapacity of
beasts of prey.
What if they all perish because of some kind of like bird flu? That is not the fault of the
usufructuary. What is his obligation? He shall deliver to the owner the remains which may have
been saved from the misfortune but he has no obligation to replace.
What if the usufruct is constituted on sterile animals? Walang young. What will we do with that?
It shall be considered with respect to its effects as though constituted on fungible things.They are
sterile, so he can use them, he can sell them but he has to replace. It has to be treated as fungibles.
Let us go to repairs.
Article 592. The usufructuary is obliged to make the ordinary repairs needed by the thing given
in usufruct.
By ordinary repairs are understood such as are required by the wear and tear due to the natural
use of the thing and are indispensable for its preservation. Should the usufructuary fail to make
them after demand by the owner, the latter may make them at the expense of the usufructuary.
Who is obliged to make the repairs on the property? 592 says: The usufructuary is obliged to make
the ordinary repairs. What are ordinary repairs?
2 Requisites of Ordinary Repairs

1. They are required by the ordinary wear and tear due to the natural use of the thing.
2. They are indispensable for the preservation of the thing.
So let us say the object of the usufruct is a car. Yung kotse, nahilis na yung gulong. Wala na. It
cannot be used anymore. Well, so it is a wear and tear. So maybe it can be considered as
indispensable for its preservation. So both must be present.



So, when it comes to ordinary repairs, it is the obligation of the usufructuary to make them.
Now, what is the effect of the failure of the usufructuary to make repairs after the naked owner, sabi
ng nakedowner, why are you not using the truck to deliver the harvest? Bakit ka nag hire ng truck.
Meron naman tayong truck. Sabi ng owner, palitan natin yung gulong. So the nakedowner may
make them at the expense of the usufructuary.
Article 593. Extraordinary repairs shall be at the expense of the owner. The usufructuary is
obliged to notify the owner when the need for such repairs is urgent.
Now, extraordinary repairs, shall be at the expense of the owner. Now, what are extraordinary
repairs? There are three kinds.
Three Kinds of Extraordinary Repairs

1. Those which is required by the wear and tear but not indispensable for preservation.
2. Those not caused by the wear and tear but indispensable for preservation.
3. Those not caused by the wear and tear and not indispensable for preservation.
So among the three kinds of extraordinary repairs, the important one is the one that is not caused by
the wear and tear but indispensable for preservation.
The usufructuary is obliged to notify the owner when the need for such repairs is urgent. Because
it is indispensable for preservation. If hindi indispensable, he does not have to inform the
nakedowner.
Now, Article 594.
Article 594. If the owner should make the extraordinary repairs, he shall have a right to demand
of the usufructuary the legal interest on the amount expended for the time that the usufruct
lasts.
Should he not make them when they are indispensable for the preservation of the thing, the
usufructuary may make them; but he shall have a right to demand of the owner, at the
termination of the usufruct, the increase in value which the immovable may have acquired by
reason of the repairs.
If the owner should make the extraordinary repairs well then he can ask for legal interest on the
amount expended for the time that the usufruct lasts.
So, let us say, the owner had to make an extraordinary repair that costs 1M Pesos. He can charge
6% legal interest. So if he makes a repair, he can ask for 6% interest per annum.
Let us go to Article 596.
Article 596. The payment of annual charges and taxes and of those considered as a lien on the
fruits, shall be at the expense of the usufructuary for all the time that the usufruct lasts.



So what are these? What does the usufructuary oblige to work out? Annual charges on the fruits.
Kanya yan. So, if it is rentals, civil fruits, he has to pay back for that. That is 596.
Article 597. The taxes which, during the usufruct, may be imposed directly on the capital, shall
be at the expense of the owner.
If the latter has paid them, the usufructuary shall pay him the proper interest on the sums which
may have been paid in that character; and, if the said sums have been advanced by the
usufructuary, he shall recover the amount thereof at the termination of the usufruct.
Article 597 talks about the realty taxes, taxes imposed directly on the capital. This is at the expense
of the nakedowner. So upon payment of the owner, he can demand from the usufructuary legal
interest in the amount paid.
Now what if the usufructuary paid for the realty taxes? What if nasa abroad yung owners, so siya
ang nag bayad. He can advance. He can pay for the taxes. Can he ask for reimbursement right away?
The answer is NO. He can only recover the amount he paid at the termination of the usufruct. And
he is entitled to retain the property until he is reimbursed by the naked-owner.
So let us look at the case of Bislig Bay v. Government of Surigao, GR No. L-9023, November 13,
1956. Here, Bislig Bay constructed a road going to its concession area. Part of the road was its
property, and part of the road is a government property. So, Bislig Bay, the owner of that should pay
realty taxes on the road that is on its property. But on the road that is on government property is not
obliged because Bislig Bay is merely a usufructuary of that road. Although there is no agreement
between the government and Bislig Bay, then circumstances would point out to ... using the road
maintaining the road and all other obligations under the provisions that we took up.
Bislig Bay v. Government of Surigao

GR No. L-9023 | November 13, 1956
Facts
Bislig Bay Lumber Co., Inc. is a timber concessionaire of a portion of public forest located in the
provinces of Agusan and Surigao. With a view to developing and exploiting its concession, the
company constructed at its expense a road from the barrio Mangagoy into the area of the
concession in Surigao, with a length of approximately 5.3 kilometers, a portion of which, or
about 580 linear meters, is on a private property of the company. The expenses incurred by the
company in the construction of said road amounted to P1 13,370, upon which the provincial
assessor of Surigao assessed a tax in the amount of P669.33.
Of this amount, the sum of P595.92 corresponds to the road constructed within the area of the
concession. This was paid under protest. Later, the company filed an action for its refund in the
Court of First Instance of Manila alleging that the road is not subject to tax. Defendant filed a
motion to dismiss on two grounds (1) that the venue is improperly laid, and (2) that the complaint
states no cause of action; but this motion was denied. Thereafter, defendant filed its answer
invoking the same defenses it set up in its motions to dismiss. In the meantime, Congress
approved Republic Act No. 1125 creating the Court of Tax Appeals, whereupon plaintiff moved
that the case be forwarded to the latter court as required by said Act. This motion however, was



denied and, after due trial, the court rendered decision ordering defendant to refund to plaintiff
the amount claimed in the complaint This is an appeal from said decision.
Issue
WON Bislig Bay is obliged to pay the realty taxes.
Held
No. The road that was constructed by appellee belongs to the government by right of accession
not only because it is inherently incorporated or attached to the timber land leased to appellee
but also because upon the expiration of the concession, said road would ultimately pass to the
National government (Articles 440 and 445, new Civil Code; Tabotabo vs. Molero, 22 Phil.,
418). In the second place, while the road was constructed by appellee for, under the lease
contract entered into by the appellee and the government its use can also be availed of by the
employees of the government and by the public in general. Since the road in question cannot be
considered as an improvement which belongs to appellee, although in part it is for its benefit, it
is clear that the same cannot be subject of assessment within the meaning of section 2 of
Commonwealth Act No. 470. A real tax, being a burden upon the capital, should be paid by the
owner of the land and not by a usufructuary (Mercado vs. Rizal, 67 Phil., 608; Article 597, new
Civil Code). Appellee is but a partial usufructuary of the road in question.
So this case of a Board of Assessment v. Samar Mining, GR No. 28034, February 27, 1971 is similar
to Bislig Bay case. So we will not discuss this anymore.
Next case. The case of Mercado v. Real, GR No. 45534, April 27, 1939. Okay so there are different
kinds of usufruct agreements wherein the usufructuary does not possess the property but merely gets
the fruit and that is the kind of agreement entered into between Mercado and Rizal. Mercado is the
usufructuary. So on an annual basis, income is delivered to her. One day, kulang ang dineliver na
income sa kanya. She asked why? Dineduct daw yung realty tax. So, sabi ng nakedowner, ah oo
nga pala it is my responsibility but according to Article 597, since you advanced the taxes, then we
will return it to you at the termination of the usufruct. Lifetime usufruct yun, so what is she going to
do with it? So, is the nakedowner correct? No. Because second paragraph only applies if he
voluntarily paid for the taxes. That was not the case. The nakedowner deducted. And therefore, the
first part is applicable. It is at the expense of the owner so the owner must reimburse her right away
and not wait until the termination of the usufruct.
Mercado v. Real
GR No. 45534 | April 27, 1939
Facts
The properties left by the deceased Paciano Rizal y Mercado belonged, in usufruct, to nine heirs
and, in naked ownership, to seven others. The plaintiffs are two of the nine usufructuaries and
the defendant is one of the naked owners.
In 1932, 1933 and 1934, the amount of P6,503.80 was paid for the tax of these lands. Of this
amount the naked owners made the plaintiffs pay P1,445.29, or P722.64 each, representing one-
ninth of the taxes paid during the aforesaid years. As the plaintiffs were not agreeable to this
payment, because they were mere usufructuaries, and they contend that the duty devolves upon



the naked owners, this amount was deducted from the products corresponding to them and
applied to the payment of land tax.
The plaintiffs alleged that, the naked owners being the ones under a duty to pay the tax for the
lands, they should recover the amount which was deducted from their share of the fruits and
applied, against their will, to the payment of the tax. The naked owners, with the exception of
the defendant, agreed with this contention and paid to each of the plaintiffs the sum of P206.47,
which is one-seventh of the P1,445.29 deducted from the products of the land corresponding to
the plaintiffs.
The present action was brought to compel the defendant to pay also to the plaintiffs the amount
of P206.47.
Issue
WON Mercado is entitled to reimbursement.
Held
Yes. Pursuant to the provision of article 505 of the Civil Code, the tax directly burdens the capital,
that is, the real value of the property and should be paid by the owner. It is contended, however,
that under the second paragraph of the aforesaid article, if the usufructuary should pay the tax,
he would be entitled to reimbursement for the amount thereof only upon the expiration of the
usufruct, and the usufruct being still afoot, it is premature for the plaintiffs, as usufructuaries who
advanced the payment of the tax, to bring the action for the recovery of what they paid. There
is, however, no basis for this reasoning. The plaintiffs did not pay the tax. They objected to this
payment. They did not consent to the deduction thereof from their share in the products, and
much less to the application thereof to this payment which they believe they are not bound to
make. In fact they did not make the payment; the naked owners were the ones who made it
without their consent and with money belonging to them as their share of the fruits coming to
them in their capacity as usufructuaries.
August 21 Part 1 – Peroy
Let’s go to Art. 598.
Art. 598. If the usufruct be constituted on the whole of a patrimony, and if at the time of its
constitution the owner has debts, the provisions of Articles 758 and 759 relating to donations shall
be applied, both with respect to the maintenance of the usufruct and to the obligation of the
usufructuary to pay such debts.
The same rule shall be applied in case the owner is obliged, at the time the usufruct is constituted,
to make periodical payments, even if there should be no known capital. (506)
Situation:
1. Where the usufructuary gave his entire patrimony to usufruct. Everything he owns he
constituted.
2. And at time of the constitution of the usufruct he had debt to pay. He does not have the
right to enjoy any of his property.



He only has the right to dispose. He has no income, civil, industrial fruits, wala. But he has
to give periodical payments for his debts, and others like child support, country club
membership. How can the naked owner (NO) pay? Is the usufructuary required to pay?
Art. 598, if there is stipulation relating the debts of the NO, apply Art. 758. These are provisions on
donation. Pay only from prior debts and not for debts contracted after the constitution of the
usufruct.
Art. 758. When the donation imposes upon the donee the obligation to pay the debts of the donor,
if the clause does not contain any declaration to the contrary, the former is understood to be liable
to pay only the debts which appear to have been previously contracted. In no case shall the donee
be responsible for the debts exceeding the value of the property donated, unless a contrary
intention clearly appears. (642a)
It says here pay only for the debts up to the value of the property subject of the usufruct, that is the
requirement under Art. 758.
It also says “Unless there is a declaration to the contrary”, unless the contrary is intended. It is the
title constituting the usufruct that should be prevail.
If I’m the NO, would I give everything to a usufruct knowing that I have debts to pay and monthly
amortizations and payments and child support? Definitely, I will provide in the agreement that the
usufructuary has to pay for these things. In other words, it’s still the agreement that would prevail.
This particular provision, stipulation to pay the debts, don’t really have that much of an impact
because may stipulation na nga, if there is an agreement to the contrary, what is the point of the
stipulation?
Art. 759. There being no stipulation regarding the payment of debts, the donee shall be
responsible therefor only when the donation has been made in fraud of creditors.
The donation is always presumed to be in fraud of creditors, when at the time thereof the donor
did not reserve sufficient property to pay his debts prior to the donation. (643)
What if there is no stipulation or agreement?

According to Art. 759, the usufructuary is not obliged to pay as a general rule. But the usufruct is
obliged to pay if the usufruct is constituted in fraud of creditors.
If an NO gives his entire patrimony and he has debts to pay, doesn’t that constitute fraud of
creditors? Definitely it was. It is presumed if at the time of the constitution of the usufruct, the
naked owner did not reserve sufficient property to pay for his debts. If it is made in fraud of
creditors, the usufructuary has to pay.
At the end of the day, this provision [referring to Art. 598 yata] does not occur, because the
usufructuary is obliged to pay for the debt. Because it is presumed.
There is another situation under Art. 598.



Situation:
If the person donated everything but reserved to himself the usufructuary thereof.
Example: Mr. X has a lot of property and he donated all of them to his children (children are all
NO) and the usufruct belongs with Mr. X. Are the NOs obliged to pay? No, since the debt does not
belong to the NO, it belongs to the usufructuary. If that is the case, the usufructuary has to pay for
everything, not the NO.
Art. 599. The usufructuary may claim any matured credits which form a part of the usufruct if he
has given or gives the proper security. If he has been excused from giving security or has been able
to give it, or if that given is not sufficient, he shall need the authorization of the owner, or of the
court in default thereof, to collect such credits.
The usufructuary who has given security may use the capital he has collected in any manner he
may deem proper. The usufructuary who has not given security shall invest the said capital at
interest upon agreement with the owner; in default of such agreement, with judicial authorization;
and, in every case, with security sufficient to preserve the integrity of the capital in usufruct. (507)
I’m not really sure what matured credits are.
That is the situation in front of you.

Situation:
Regarding the the collection of matured credits. And collect the matured credits even without the
approval of the NO if he has given security. But he must get the approval of the court if he has not
given a security or is exempted or has entered into caucion juratoria.
According to Art. 599, makukuha ng usufructuary yung matured credits, he may “use the capital
he has collected in any manner he may deem proper”. Pwede nya i-shopping, all those things.
Kanya na yun.
But if he has not given security, the matured credits that he got, he must “invest the said capital at
interest upon agreement with the owner”. If there is no agreement, he must get judicial
authorization.
“and, in every case, with security sufficient to preserve the integrity of the capital in usufruct”
I think you have to be […] on the money. Just take note of that.
Art. 600. The usufructuary of a mortgaged immovable shall not be obliged to pay the debt for the
security of which the mortgage was constituted.
Should the immovable be attached or sold judicially for the payment of the debt, the owner shall
be liable to the usufructuary for whatever the latter may lose by reason thereof. (509)
There are times when the object of the usufruct, example a parcel of land with orchard, barn and
all those things, the property is 5 hectares and is actually mortgaged to the bank. If it is mortgaged
the bank who pays the monthly amortization? The naked owner.
Is the usufructuary required to pay monthly amortization?



Art. 600: No, he is not. That is the obligation of the NO.
What if the NO failed to pay the monthly amortization and the property is foreclosed, or attached
and sold in a public auction? What is the effect to the usufructuary?
“owner shall be liable to the usufructuary for whatever the latter may lose by reason thereof”.
According to jurisprudence, what are the possible options of the NO with regard to the
usufructuary? He can constitute a usufruct over an equivalent estate. Example, if the estate was
foreclosed, if he has another parcel of land, he can constitute a usufruct over that to replace the
one that was lost.
Or he can pay a periodic pension according to the law. Sya pa ang mag bayad sa usufructuary, or
any other similar ways.
Let’s look at the case of Hemedes v. CA.
Hemedes v. CA
GR 107132, Oct 8, 1999
FACTS:
The instant controversy involves a question of ownership over an unregistered parcel of land,
situated in Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. It was originally owned by the late Jose Hemedes, father of
Maxima Hemedes and Enrique D. Hemedes. Jose Hemedes executed a document entitled
Donation Inter Vivos With Resolutory Condition whereby he conveyed ownership over the subject
land, together with all its improvements, in favor of his third wife, Justa Kauapin, subject to the
following resolutory conditions:
(a) Upon the death or remarriage of the DONEE, the title to the property donated shall revert to
any of the children, or their heirs, of the DONOR expressly designated by the DONEE in a public
document conveying the property to the latter; or
(b) In absence of such an express designation made by the DONEE before her death or remarriage
contained in a public instrument as above provided, the title to the property shall automatically
revert to the legal heirs of the DONOR in common.
Pursuant to the first condition abovementioned, Justa Kausapin executed a Deed of Conveyance of
Unregistered Real Property by Reversion conveying to Maxima Hemedes the subject property
except the possession and enjoyment of the said property which shall remain vested in Justa
Kausapin during her lifetime, or widowhood and which upon her death or remarriage shall also
automatically revert to, and be transferred to Maxima Hemedes.
Maxima Hemedes and her husband Raul Rodriguez constituted a real estate mortgage over the
subject property in its favor to serve as security for a loan which they obtained in the amount of
P6,000.00., R & B Insurance extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage since Maxima Hemedes failed
to pay the loan even after it became due. The land was sold at a public auction with R & B
Insurance as the highest bidder and a certificate of sale was issued by the sheriff in its favor. Since
Maxima Hemedes failed to redeem the property within the redemption period, R & B Insurance
executed an Affidavit of Consolidation. The annotation of usufruct in favor of Justa Kausapin was
maintained in the new title.



Despite the earlier conveyance of the subject land in favor of Maxima Hemedes, Justa Kausapin
executed whereby she transferred the same land to her stepson Enrique D. Hemedes, pursuant to
the resolutory condition in the deed of donation executed in her favor by her late husband Jose
Hemedes. Enriques D. Hemedes sold the property to Dominium Realty and Construction
Corporation (Dominium). Dominium leased the property to its sister corporation Asia Brewery,
Inc. (Asia Brewery) who, even before the signing of the contract of lease, constructed two
warehouses made of steel and asbestos costing about P10,000,000.00 each. Upon learning of Asia
Brewerys constructions upon the subject property, R & B Insurance sent it a letter informing the
former of its ownership of the property as evidenced by TCT No. 41985 issued in its favor and of
its right to appropriate the constructions since Asia Brewery is a builder in bad faith.
Dominium and Enrique D. Hemedes filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Binan,
Laguna for the annulment of TCT No. 41985 issued in favor of R & B Insurance and/or the
reconveyance to Dominium of the subject property. Specifically, the complaint alleged that
Dominium was the absolute owner of the subject property by virtue of the deed of sale executed
by Enrique D. Hemedes, who in turn obtained ownership of the land from Justa Kausapin, as
evidenced by the Kasunduan. The plaintiffs asserted that Justa Kausapin never transferred the land
to Maxima Hemedes and that Enrique D. Hemedes had no knowledge of the registration
proceedings initiated by Maxima Hemedes.
ISSUE:
WON the usufructuary rights of Justa impair the ownership rights of Maxima?
HELD:
No. In the title obtained by Maxima, Justa’s usufructuary was included. There is no way that it
impaired the validity of Maxima’s ownership.
Applying Art. 581 and Art. 600, as the NO may valid alienate the property. Art. 600 allows the
NO to mortgage the said property. But in this case, Maxima is liable for the loss of Justa.
It is clear under this provision, and because the right to dispose is retained by the NO, included in
the right to dispose is the right to sell, mortgage, alienate, etc. here comes the owner, mortgaging it
in good faith. Now, the owner is R&B.
What is now the relationship between R&B and Justa? R&B is the NO and Justa is the usufructuary.
Take note, under Art. 600, if the property is lost because of such mortgage and foreclosure, then
the original NO is liable to the usufructuary. “That the latter, may by reason thereof”. The
provision is not specific that there is a loss. There may be instances where the usufructuary did not
lose anything, as what happened in this case. Because the usufruct was annotated on the title of
the property, it is carried on and on. And all the successors-in-interest of the NO are bound by the
usufruct. And if right now, R&B who is the owner, it is merely an NO. the spring cannot rise higher
than the source. If the one who mortgage the property is a mere NO, then the usufructuary rights
are given to Justa. Every other successor-in-interest of Maxima is an NO. The usufructuary rights of
Justa re retained until the present even though how many owners have passed through that
property.



In the event that the property is lost because of some other law, then Art. 600 is very clear. The
original NO is liable, the one who constituted the usufruct is liable for whatever the latter may lose
by reason thereof.
We have already mentioned the options provided by jurisprudence. Take note that there is no
automatic loss here. If the property is attached, sold, etc, the usufructuary does not lose his
usufructuary rights automatically.
Art. 601. The usufructuary shall be obliged to notify the owner of any act of a third person, of
which he may have knowledge, that may be prejudicial to the rights of ownership, and he shall be
liable should he not do so, for damages, as if they had been caused through his own fault. (511)
Generally, it is the usufructuary who is in possession and use of the property, he is the one who
will know any act of a 3rd person. The property may be used for hideouts of rebels, etc. that is the
job of the usufructuary to notify the NO.
If the usufructuary does not, then he will be liable for the damages. In the case where the coconut
trees are cut off from the land of the NO by outsiders, the NO does not have to look for all the
outsiders. It is simply the usufructuary’s liability as if it was caused through his own fault.
There are 3 instances when the usufructuary is required to notify the NO, and that is under Art.
601. Remember the extraordinary repairs necessary for preservation, he has to inform the NO
about it. If he does not inform, the usufructuary shall make the repairs himself and the inventory.
The usufructuary must inform the NO that he is going to conduct the inventory so that the NO can
actually can actually attend or send a representative. If the NO is not informed, the NO is not
bound by the inventory. If the count is 3 tractors remaining out of 5, usufructuary is liable for the
other 2. There must be somebody there to represent the NO so the inventory will coincide with
each other.
Remember under possession, any action brought because of possession that is in good faith or bad
faith shall be borne by the possessor. Why not the owner? What will the owner do? The owner is
the passive party here, same with the usufructuary. The expenses brought with regard to the
usufruct shall be borne by the usufructuary. Because the usufructuary has more rights and more
obligations than the NO.
EXTINGUISHMENT OF USUFRUCT
Art. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:

(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) By the expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any
resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription. (513a)



How is usufruct extinguished?

1. Death of the usufructuary
Death of the NO does not extinguish the usufruct. The heirs of the NO are bound by the
usufruct. But 603 is clear, death of the usufruct extinguishes unless provided otherwise.
In the book of Paras there are exceptions. In the case of multiple usufruct, as long as one
usufructuary is alive, there’s still a live usufructuary. Another exception according to Paras
is Art. 606, but I disagree with that exception. For me, the only exception is “unless the
contrary intention appears”
2. Expiration of the period

There are usufruct agreements that for a certain period only. As for the 1st 2 grounds, it is
whichever comes first. If expiration happens before death, extinguished na. if death
happens before expiration, extinguished also.
Fulfillment of any resolutory condition provided in the usufruct. Moralidad v. Pernes

illustrates this.
Moralidad v. Pernes
Facts:
[Refer to the digest above.]
Issue # 2: W/N the usufruct has been extinguished?
Held: Yes, due to the failure of the Pernes spouses to comply with the conditions of their
agreement. (Occurence of the resolutory condition.)
The term or period of the usufruct originally specified provides only one of the bases for the right
of a usufructuary to hold and retain possession of the thing given in usufruct. There are other
modes or instances whereby the usufruct shall be considered terminated or extinguished. For sure,
the Civil Code enumerates such other modes of extinguishment:
ART. 603. Usufruct is extinguished:

(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) By expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any resolutory
condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription. (Emphasis supplied.)
The document executed by the petitioner dated July 21, 1986 constitutes the title creating, and sets
forth the conditions of, the usufruct. Paragraph #3 thereof states "[T]hat anyone of my kins may
enjoy the privilege to stay therein and may avail the use thereof. Provided, however, that the same
is not inimical to the purpose thereof. What may be inimical to the purpose constituting the
usufruct may be gleaned from the preceding paragraph wherein petitioner made it abundantly
clear "that anybody of my kins who wishes to stay on the aforementioned property should



maintain an atmosphere of cooperation, live in harmony and must avoid bickering with one
another." That the maintenance of a peaceful and harmonious relations between and among kin
constitutes an indispensable condition for the continuance of the usufruct is clearly deduced from
the succeeding Paragraph #4 where petitioner stated "[T]hat anyone of my kins who cannot
conform with the wishes of the undersigned may exercise the freedom to look for his own." In fine,
the occurrence of any of the following: the loss of the atmosphere of cooperation, the bickering or
the cessation of harmonious relationship between/among kin constitutes a resolutory condition
which, by express wish of the petitioner, extinguishes the usufruct.
From the pleadings submitted by the parties, it is indubitable that there were indeed facts and
circumstances whereby the subject usufruct may be deemed terminated or extinguished by the
occurrence of the resolutory conditions provided for in the title creating the usufruct, namely, the
document adverted to which the petitioner executed on July 21, 1986.
As aptly pointed out by the petitioner in her Memorandum, respondents’ own evidence before the
MTCC indicated that the relations between the parties "have deteriorated to almost an irretrievable
level." There is no doubt then that what impelled petitioner to file complaints before the local
barangay lupon, the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, and this instant complaint for
unlawful detainer before the MTCC is that she could not live peacefully and harmoniously with
the Pernes family and vice versa.
Thus, the Court rules that the continuing animosity between the petitioner and the Pernes family
and the violence and humiliation she was made to endure, despite her advanced age and frail
condition, are enough factual bases to consider the usufruct as having been terminated.
The resolutory condition was fulfilled. They failed to maintain an atmosphere of cooperation.
Hence, the extinguishment of the usufruct.
3. Merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person

When a father donates the NO to his son reserving the usufruct for himself and states there
that the upon his death the usufruct will go to his son. Upon his death, there is a merger,
the son becomes the full owner of the property.
4. Renunciation of the usufructuary

Usufructuary renounces, not the naked owner. If a usufructuary is no longer interested, he
can renounce and it causes the extinguishment of usufruct. Renunciation must be willing
and voluntary, must not be because of threats, violence, etc, by the NO.
Usufructuary does not need the consent of the NO to renounce the usufruct because the
right to usufruct is his own property. As owner of the right, he has the right to dispose.
5. Total loss of the thing

If the property is destroyed or totally lost. By no fault of the NO, it extinguishes the
usufruct.
6. Termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct

Relate to the discussion in accession. Possession. If Mr. B entered into a usufruct
agreement with Mr. U. and Mr. X who is the real owner comes and files and accion
publiciana against B and X wins. Usufruct is terminated because B has no right to enter
into this agreement because only the owner of the property is allowed even if B is a
possessor in good faith.



7. Prescription
Acquisitive prescription by a stranger of the usufruct. Here the usufruct is no longer
entitled. Or the naked ownership. Acquisitive and extinctive prescription also applies to
the usufruct itself. If it applies to full ownership, It applies to usufruct.
This list is not exclusive, there are other causes for extinguishment.
Examples:
1. Annulment. If it was constituted by force, once the vice ceases, it may be annulled.
2. Rescission. Violation of the provisions of the agreement. If indicated in the agreement that
the usufruct will be rescinded if there is a major violation. That can also be done.
3. Agreement of the parties. This is the best way. Both of them agrees.
4. Legal causes. Reaching the age of majority extinguishes parental usufruct.
However, usufruct is not extinguished by abuse or misuse of the thing. Unless by the virtue of
abuse or misuse the thing has been totally lost.
It is not extinguished by the non-fulfillment of the suspensive condition because the usufruct never
came to exist.
Art. 604. If the thing given in usufruct should be lost only in part, the right shall continue on the
remaining part. (514)
Self-explanatory.
Art. 605. Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town, corporation, or association for more
than fifty years. If it has been constituted, and before the expiration of such period the town is
abandoned, or the corporation or association is dissolved, the usufruct shall be extinguished by
reason thereof. (515a)
That is when it comes to corporations. I’m not sure when it comes to towns and LGUs because
they have different charters. But a corporation has a life of 50 years only. 50 years lang. When the
corporation is dissolved after that period, the usufruct is extinguished.
“If it has been constituted, and before the expiration of such period the town is abandoned, or the
corporation or association is dissolved, the usufruct shall be extinguished by reason thereof” just
like death.
Art. 606. A usufruct granted for the time that may elapse before a third person attains a certain age,
shall subsist for the number of years specified, even if the third person should die before the period
expires, unless such usufruct has been expressly granted only in consideration of the existence of
such person. (516)



This is what Paras is saying is an exception to the rule that death of a usufructuary extinguishes the
usufruct.
Here, there is a 3rd person involved and it is not the usufructuary who dies but the 3rd person.
Example: Mr. N is an NO who is a good friend of Mr. U. Mr. N offers his property as usufruct to
Mr. U, “the usufruct will last until your son (who is now 5yo) is 20yo, then the usufruct will be
terminated”. If the son dies when he is 10yo, the usufruct will not end, it will still subsist because
this is just parang using the son, but the usufruct is actually for 15 years. It will exist for 15 years.
What if Mr. N says “do you have money for his education? I will give you my property in usufruct.
What does your son want to be? Oh, he wants to be a policeman. How long will that take? Siguro
by the time he is 20yo he will be a policeman. Sige, I will give you a usufruct for you to have
enough to pay tuition so he can become a policeman.” If the son dies at the age of 10 years,
usufruct is extinguished because it is expressly granted only upon the existence of such 3rd person.
A death of a 3rd person and not the usufructuary.
This particular provision, I think, should stand on its own as Art. 606.
Art. 607. If the usufruct is constituted on immovable property of which a building forms part, and
the latter should be destroyed in any manner whatsoever, the usufructuary shall have a right to
make use of the land and the materials.
The same rule shall be applied if the usufruct is constituted on a building only and the same
should be destroyed. But in such a case, if the owner should wish to construct another building, he
shall have a right to occupy the land and to make use of the materials, being obliged to pay to the
usufructuary, during the continuance of the usufruct, the interest upon the sum equivalent to the
value of the land and of the materials. (517)
[Break]
RIVERA VS RIVERA
Wilfredo Rivera and his wife, Loreto Inciong, acquired several parcels of land. Loreto died, leaving
Wilfredo and their two daughters, Evangeline and Brigida Liza, as her surviving heirs. About eleven
(11) years later, Loreto’s heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her one-half share of the
conjugal estate, adjudicating all the properties in favor of Evangeline and Brigida Liza; Wilfredo
waived his rights to the properties, with a reservation of his usufructuary rights during his lifetime.
Wilfredo lawfully possessed and occupied the two (2) parcels of land but taking advantage of his
absence due to his hospital confinement, the petitioners and Star Honda, Inc. took possession and
caused the renovation of the building on the property. In December 2002, the petitioners and Star
Honda, Inc., with the aid of armed men, barred him from entering the property.
He filed a forcible entry case. However, he died during the pendency of the case.
Issue: WON his heirs may recover the property in his stead



Held: No. The judgment in an ejectment case is conclusive between the parties and their
successors-ininterest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action; hence, it is
enforceable by or against the heirs of the deceased. However, Wilfredo was holding the property
as usufructuary. Without need, however, of any further dispute or litigation, the right to the
usufruct is now rendered moot by the death of Wilfredo since death extinguishes a usufruct under
Article 603(1) of the Civil Code. This development deprives the heirs of the usufructuary the right
to retain or to recover possession of the property even if the ejectment· judgment directs its
restitution.
Thus, what actually survives under the circumstances is the award for damages by way of
compensation. The heirs of Wildfedo shall succeed to the computed total award.
Comments: when Wilfredo came back, he was not allowed to enter in the property where he was
a usufractuary. Thus he filed an ejectment case. He won but he died during the pendency. So can
his heirs recover possession? The SC said no because he was merely a usufuctary and upon his
death, usufructuary was extinguished. The heirs cannot recover possession. They are only entitled
to damages.
Art. 607. If the usufruct is constituted on immovable property of which a building forms part, and
the latter should be destroyed in any manner whatsoever, the usufructuary shall have a right to
make use of the land and the materials.
The same rule shall be applied if the usufruct is constituted on a building only and the same should
be destroyed. But in such a case, if the owner should wish to construct another building, he shall
have a right to occupy the land and to make use of the materials, being obliged to pay to the
usufructuary, during the continuance of the usufruct, the interest upon the sum equivalent to the
value of the land and of the materials.
Situation: the usufruct is constituted on a land where there is a building. If the usufruct is on a
parcel of land, the building is included. One can also enter into a usufruct only on the building
and excluding the land.
What happens? The building is destroyed.
Effect of usufruct over the land: Can make use of the land and the remaining materials.
Effect of usufruct over building: Because of total loss, usufruct is extinguished. But usufruct also
can make use of the land and the remaining materials. If the naked owner does not rebuild, the
situation will continue.
If the naked owner constructs another building, the usufruct over the land and building will
continue.
Right of naked owner: he shall have a right to occupy the land and to make use of the materials to
construct the building. He must pay legal interest to the usufractuary for the value of the land and
materials until the termination of usufruct.



Art. 608. If the usufructuary shares with the owner the insurance of the tenement given in
usufruct, the former shall, in case of loss, continue in the enjoyment of the new building, should
one be constructed, or shall receive the interest on the insurance indemnity if the owner does
not wish to rebuild.
Should the usufructuary have refused to contribute to the insurance, the owner insuring the
tenement alone, the latter shall receive the full amount of the insurance indemnity in case of
loss, saving always the right granted to the usufructuary in the preceding article.
Rule on Insurance Proceeds
Building destroyed before expiration of usufruct. There is an insurance policy. The insurance will
pay the naked owner for the loss of the building.
If Usufruct contributed:
a. If naked owner rebuilds - he shares with the naked owner the insurance given
b. If does not rebuild - he shall receive interest to the insurance indemnity. Insurance will be given
to naked owner
If did not contribute: owner shall receive full amount of insurance proceeds and apply Article 607.
Art. 609. Should the thing in usufruct be expropriated for public use, the owner shall be obliged
either to replace it with another thing of the same value and of similar conditions, or to pay the
usufructuary the legal interest on the amount of the indemnity for the whole period of the usufruct.
If the owner chooses the latter alternative, he shall give security for the payment of the interest.
Object of usufruct is expropriated. Just compensation is paid to the naked owner. If property is
expropriated for public use, the usufruct is gone but the usufruct agreement still exists. Therefore,
naked owner still has to replace property or pay legal interest until the termination of the usufruct
LOCSIN VS VALENZUELA
Ramona R. Locsin, Teresita Guanzon, Celia R. Sibug, Maria Rosa R. Perez, Editha Ylanan and Ana
Marie R. Benedicto were co-owners of a large tract of agricultural land. A portion of this land,
known as Lot No. 2-C-A-3 and consisting of an area of 60.07464 hectares, was subject to the
lifetime usufructuary rights of respondent Helen Schon. The land was occupied by tenant-tillers.
On 22 October 1972, after the onset of the martial law administration, the tract of land owned in
common by petitioners, including the portion thereof subject to Helen Schon's usufructuary rights,
fell within the scope of the "Operation Land Transfer" under PD NO 27.
Petitioners insist that the payments made by private respondent tenants to private respondent
Helen Schon beginning on 21 October 1972 should be considered as amortization payments for
the price of the land and as such should belong to the landowners and not to the usufructuary.
Upon the other hand, private respondent Helen Schon urges that those amounts should pertain to



her considering that her rights as usufructuary persist during her lifetime and have not been
extinguished by operation of the Land Reform Law.
Issue: As between the naked owners and the usufructuary, who should be entitled to the amounts
paid by the tenants
Held: We believe and so hold that Lot No. 2-C-A-3 having been declared part of the land reform
area and subjected to Operation Land Transfer, the payments made on and after 21 October 1972
by the private respondent tenants-farmers constituted amortization payments on the cost of the
land that they were required to pay. These payments, therefore, legally pertain the landowners as
part of the compensation for the dominion over land of which they were deprived.
This is not to say that respondent Helen Schon lost any and all rights upon the promulgation of
Presidential Decree No. 27. For it was not the Government or any of its agencies which took over
ownership of the land nor was such land devoted subsequently to "public use", since ownership was
transferred directly from former landowner to the tenant-tiller as new landowner, for the use and
benefit exclusively of the new landowner. While, however, Article 609 of the Civil Code may not
be strictly applicable, we believe that the situation contemplated in Article 609 is sufficiently close
to that which resulted from application of Presidential Decree No. 27 to the land here involved.
It follows that respondent Helen Schon, so long as her rights as usufructuary persist under the
instrument which gave birth to such rights, would be entitled to a replacement reasonably equivalent
to the land previously burdened with her usufructuary right, or to legal interest on the amount of the
indemnity or cost of the land paid by private respondent tenants-farmers and the Land Bank.
Again, if property is expropriated for public use, the usufruct is gone but the usufruct agreement still
exists. Therefore, naked owner still has to replace property or pay legal interest until the termination
of the usufruct which in this case is until Helen’s death since she is a lifetime usufractuary. 609 is
applied here by analogy because the property is already gone. It was given to the tenant-farmers.
PD 27 did not extinguish the usufruct agreement but only the usufruct to the land.
Art. 610. A usufruct is not extinguished by bad use of the thing in usufruct; but if the abuse should
cause considerable injury to the owner, the latter may demand that the thing be delivered to him,
binding himself to pay annually to the usufructuary the net proceeds of the same, after deducting
the expenses and the compensation which may be allowed him for its administration.
Even if the usufractuary is abusive, it is not a ground for extinguishment. The owner may demand
that the thing be deliverd to him if it causes considerable injury to him. However, the usufractuary
must be paid the net proceeds since it still belongs to him.
Art. 611. A usufruct constituted in favor of several persons living at the time of its constitution
shall not be extinguished until death of the last survivor. (521)
Art. 612. Upon the termination of the usufruct, the thing in usufruct shall be delivered to the
owner, without prejudice to the right of retention pertaining to the usufructuary or his heirs for
taxes and extraordinary expenses which should be reimbursed. After the delivery has been made,
the security or mortgage shall be cancelled.



Regular Usufruct involving non-consumable:

It must be returned.
Rights and Obligations of Usufrcut:

1. Retain until reimbursed for taxes he voluntarily paid and extraordinary repairs end expenses
2. Remove improvements provided there is no damage or set them off against damage caused
Rights and Obligations of Naked Owner:

1. Cancel the security/mortgage provided that the usufruct complied with his obligations
2. If there is a rural lease, he must respect the usufractuary until end of agricultural year.
3.. Make the necessary reimbursements to the usufractuary.
WEE VS DE CASTRO
NOTE: Please refer to Ate Kem’s digest J
Comments: How will you gauge the length of the lease if it is a verbal agreement? If you don’t have
a written agreement, you look at how payment is made. If it’s made on a monthly basis, it is expired
upon the end of the month until the lessor accepts the next payment of rental. Then it is renewed
only again for one month. After the month is over and the next month there’s no more acceptance
of payment, possession which originally was lawful is now unlawful. Unlawful detainer is proper
action to file. This is 1687 on the term of the lease.
CUENCO VS TTSC
Cuenco leased from TTSC for a period of two (2) years, from May 8, 1992 to May 8, 1994, the
Talisay Tourist Sports Complex, to be operated as a cockpit. The lease was extended for another
four (4) years, or until May 8, 1998. Under the Contract of Lease,1 it was stipulated that petitioner
shall, like a good father of the family. Furthermore, petitioner would give a deposit equivalent to
six (6) months rental to answer for whatever damages may be caused to the premises during the
period of the lease. However, upon the expiration of the least, they overstayed for two months.
Issue: WON the over stay should be charged against deposit
Held: Yes. This two (2) months over-stay of petitioner in the leased premises should be charged
against the deposit. Because there was no renewal of the lease contract, it is understood that the
continued use of the premises is on a monthly basis with the rental in the amount previously
agreed upon by the parties, in accordance with Articles 167039 and 168740 of the Civil Code. By
way of rental for the two-month overstay, the amount of ₱195,833.34 should be deducted from
the amount of deposit paid by petitioner to respondent company.
Comments: those who enter into lease contracts do not pay the last two months of the rent because
the rentals can be applied to the deposit. Despite this provision, there’s nothing wrong if the lessor
puts in the lease contract that the deposit cannot be applied to the rentals. The lessee cannot demand
that the rent will be applied to the deposit. The lessee has to pay for the whole duration. In this case,
the lessee did not pay for two months. The only choice is to deduct it from the deposit.



LOPEX VS UMALE-COSME
Gloria Umale-Cosme owns an apartment building in Quezon City while Lani Lopez is a lessee of
one of the units in the buIding. The monthly rental was ₱1340 as of 1999. On April 19, 1999 Umale-
Cosme filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioner in the MeTC of Quezon City on
thegrounds of expiration of contract of lease and nonpayment of rentals since December 1998.
Lopez’ answer denies that she defaulted, that Umale-Cosme did not collect the rentals as they fell
due in order to make it appear that she was in arrears and that she had been depositing her monthly
rentals in a bank in trust for Umale-Cosme since February 1999.
The CA ruled that Lopez may be ejected on the ground of termination of lease contract upon finding
that respondent admitted that the apartment unit was leased to her by petitioner on a month to
month basis. Article 1673 (1) of the Civil Code provides that the lessor may judicially eject the lessee
when the period agreed upon, or that which is fixed for the duration of leases under Articles 1682
and 1687, has expired. Article 1687 of the same Code provides that if the period the lease has not
been fixed, it is understood to be from year to year, if the rent agreed upon is annual; from month
to month, if it is monthly; from week to week, if the rent is weekly; and from day to day, if the rent
is to be paid daily.
ISSUE: Won the lease is with a definite period
HELD: Yes. It is well-settled that where a contract of lease is verbal and on a monthly basis, the lease
is one with a definite period which expires after the last day of any given thirty-day period. The
rentals being paid monthly, the period of such lease is deemed terminated at the end of each month.
Thus, respondents have every right to demand the ejectment of petitioners at the end of each month,
the contract having expired by operation of law. Without a lease contract, petitioner has no right of
possession to the subject property and must vacate the same.
Corollarily, petitioner’s ejectment, in this case, is only the reasonable consequence of his unrelenting
refusal to comply with the respondents’ demand for the payment of rental increase agreed upon by
both parties. Moreover, in the instant petition for review, petitioner herself alleged that she has been
occupying the leased premises and paying the monthly rentals without fail since 1975.
Hence, petitioner’s argument that the contract of lease between her and respondent lacked a definite
period and that corollarily, she may not be ejected on the ground of termination of period does not
hold water.
Comment: there’s no such thing as indefinite lease. There’s always a period if its verbal. The period
depends on the payment. If the payment is monthly and on the 1st day of the next month the lessee
is still there but the owner does not object, there is an implied renewal of the lease. The lessee, if he
extends for one day, must pay again which is equivalent to another month’s lease even if he stays
only for one more day. Pro-rated is not allowed unless he pays daily.
FLORENTINO v SUPERVALUE
Florentino is a lessee of Supervalue. Florentino is the owner of empanada royale – a food cart
business entered into a contract of lease with SM. The contract was good for 4 months and after the



end of the contract both parties had the option to either renew or terminate the contract. Forentino
and SM was able to renew the contract several times that it even lasted for a year. However, SM
terminated the contract with Florentino for the following violations: introducing a new variety of
empanada without the approval of SM. The store management then ordered the foreclosure of the
space and along with it were the personal belongings of the petitioner. Florentino demanded for the
return of her personal belongings and of the security deposit that she has given SM and for
reimbursement.
ISSUE: WON Florentino can claim for reimbursement on the improvements that she has made
HELD: No. Florentino is no longer entitled for reimbursment on the improvements that she has done
on her stall.
Article 1678: If the lessee makes in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use
for which the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the
lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one half of the of the improvements at
that time. should the lessor refused to reimburse said amount the lessee may remove the
improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer damages thereby. He shall not, however,
cause any more impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.
Being mere lesees, Florentino’s occupation of the premises would continue only for the life of the
lease. Plainly they cannot be considered as possessors nor builders in good faith. Since petitioner’s
interest in the store space is merely that of the lessee under the lease contract, she cannot therefore
be considered a builder in good faith. Consequently, respondent may appropriate the improvements
introduced on the leased premises without any obligation to reimburse the petitioner for the sum
expended.
Comments: the lease contract had certain provisions that Florentino did not follow. She made
improvements even if it was not allowed under the contract. 1678 applies only if you followed the
provisions of the lease contract. That’s when you are considered to be in good faith.
Now we go to another topic. We jump easement because it’s very long.
Let’s start with Article 694 dealing with Nuisance.
Art. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.



Article 694 gives us a definition of what is a nuisance. It can be any act, omission, establishment. It
could be a business, condition of property or anything else. So that enumeration is not exclusive.
Anything which 1-5. There are five kinds or five effects.
The first one is it injures or endangers the health or safety of others. So, the example given by our
authors is a house in danger of falling especially houses along the street or houses falling apart.
Another example given is explosives factory which could explode without notice.
The next one is “annoys or offends the senses”. Anything that offends any of our senses like the sense
of smell. Anything that smells really … like mga burning of tires or fumes and vapors from factories
or sense of hearing. The example given by the authors is too much horn blowing or videoke at 3 am
by somebody who is tone ….
No. 3, “shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality”. This number 3 is relative. IT depends on
time and place. The standard of morality changes as well even though in our country, in the past
women wear very conservative outfits but now you see, most of the people are walking around with
short shorts. This instance depends on the time, place and standards of morality of countries and
people. We as a country are relatively conservative. We don’t see naked pictures on the wall. In
other countries, it’s just nothing or very ordinary. In Netherland specifically in Amsterdam where
naked women are displayed in the windows. You can choose any naked woman you want. Ganun
sila ka liberal. Maybe for them it’s not a nuisance but for us, it shocks us.
Fourth, “obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of
water”. Anything that blocks the road. That building constructions there, I don’t even know if they
even have a permit for that. They are blocking the road. The thing is you know that is a nuisance.
That’s only a two-lane road and now it’s a ¾ lane. Mga sidewalk vendors that are already occupying
the road.
Fifth, “hinders or impairs the use of the property”. Informal settlers. If you cannot use your own
property because somebody is there, so there is a nuisance.
Meron pala akong example sa No. 4 who are always blocking the road, them! Indians. They perfectly
fit under Article 694, paragraph 4.
Those are the five kinds of Nuisance.
Let’s go to Article 695.
Art. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance,
danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that is not
included in the foregoing definition.
Article 695 says that there are two kinds of nuisance, Public and Private. A public nuisance affects
a community, neighborhood or a considerable number of persons although the extent of the
annoyance, danger or damage upon individual may be unequal. A private nuisance is one that



is not a public nuisance. So there can a nuisance that will affect only one person. We will
see that in the cases.
Now, despite this classification under the Civil Code, the Supreme Court somehow is swayed
towards another classification of nuisance which is an old classification. Nuisance per se vis a vis
nuisance per accidens. A nuisance per se is always a nuisance at all times and under all
circumstances. Other definitions you will see when we discuss the cases Nuisance per accidens is
a nuisance only because of its location or certain attendant circumstances.
Let’s go to this kinds of nuisance called an attractive nuisance. What is this? It is a dangerous
instrumentality or applicance which is likely to attract children. The doctrine of attractive nuisances,
one maintains an estate or premises, an attractive nuisance without exercising due care to prevent
children from playing therewith are liable to a child who is injured thereby even if the child is
technically a trespasser in the premises.
What is the basis for liability when one maintains an attractive nuisance? The effect is an invitation
to children. So, safeguards against must then be set-up and highest degree of diligence must be
exercised. This is the topic that is separate and distinct from the entire provision of nuisance. Let’s
discuss the case related to this, Hidalgo vs Balandan.
HIDALGO vs BALANDAN
91 PHIL 448
Attractive nuisance does not mean that just because one is attractive and it’s dangerous, it’s already
attractive nuisance. So, the swimming pool or water tank is not considered despite the fact that it is
attractive and dangerous at the same time, it’s not considered an attractive nuisance because it’s
merely an invitation of the work of nature. So all the … you see, the bodies of water like the river,
there maybe a lake or a pond, and it’s so easy for people to jump in. So if there’s an artificial bucket
of water, how can that be considered an attractive nuisance if there are other bodies of water lying
around? And so, the owner of the ice plant cannot be held liable on the ground that bodies of water,
the pools and the water tank are not considered attractive nuisance.
So, what can be considered attractive nuisance? A gun lying around. It’s attractive for children. How
many times have you hear about a kid shooting a kapwa kid with a gun because he just happened
to pick up a gun from somewhere. Diba? So that is definitely an attractive nuisance and the owner
of the gun must take precaution that it cannot be made available to children even though the child
is considered a trespasser and the gun is left there on the table, nobody is watching it and the child
jumps over the fence, the owner of the gun can be held liable for the death of the child who was
playing that gun.
For one thing to be considered attractive, it must be something that God will not make as a nuisance
but that it was made by man. Anything that is an … of God’s work cannot be considered an attractive
nuisance.
Let’s go to the next provision, Article 696.



Art. 696. Every successive owner or possessor of property who fails or refuses to abate a nuisance
in that property started by a former owner or possessor is liable therefor in the same manner as
the one who created it.
If you are the owner of something and that something is a nuisance, there is a limitation to your right
to enjoy like the owner of a karaoke machine. Any owner of a videoke can enjoy the videoke but
he should not use it at two or three in the morning while all the other neighbors are asleep. So, there
is a limitation or modification of ownership because the right to enjoy can be limited.
But who can be liable for the nuisance or the damage cause by a nuisance? One who creates the
nuisance. I’m not saying that it’s the manufacturer of the videoke machine who can be liable. One
who creates the nuisance. One who participates in the nuisance and maintaining it, one who
continues an existing nuisance and one who refuses to abate the nuisance. So even if the nuisance
was started by A but B participates in starting it and C adopts it and D continues it and E refuses to
abate it, they are all liable for damages caused by the nuisance.
And Article 697 says that the abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person
injured to recover damages for its past existence. So Let’s say we have an explosives factory in a
certain area and it already exploded so many times and people got hurt, injured and so the owner
packed up and removed the explosives factory from that area. What about those injured people,
those already injured? That is not a defense. If you abate a nuisance, one could still be held liable
for damages for its past existence.
Art. 697. The abatement of a nuisance does not preclude the right of any person injured to
recover damages for its past existence.
Article 698, lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance whether public or private. So may an action
for abate for a nuisance prescribe? The answer is NO. It is according to Article 1143 paragraph 2,
an action to abate a public or private nuisance is not extinguished by prescription. It will never
prescribe.
Art. 698. Lapse of time cannot legalize any nuisance, whether public or private.
So now what is the remedy of a person who is affected by a nuisance or if it’s a public nuisance, it
affects the community, what are the remedies against him? Article 699 says there are three remedies
against a public nuisance.
Art. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
(1) A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance: or
(2) A civil action; or
(3) Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
We have:



1. Criminal prosecution under the RPC or any local ordinance. Going back to that obituary,
that is situated beside our subdivision, there’s this lady who lives right next to the obitual
and she kept on complaining and writing to the … office and you know complaining to all
government agencies about the stench and the smell caused by the obitual. Nakahearing
ang mga tao dun na nirereklamo sila, gusto silang paalisin. So they became upset. What did
they do? Nagtapon ng mga … waste dun sa yar of that lady. So, in this case, she could file
the proper criminal case. Meaning, look for a crime related to that nuisance in the RPC. She
could file for malicious mischief against those people. Any crime that would fit into that
existence of nuisance is possible under Article 699. You file a criminal case.
2. The next is civil action. The civil action is for abatement of nuisance. You ask the court to
order the nuisance abated by factories, etc. That is what the plaintiff will ask the court in a
civil action. It is also advisable to ask not only the abatement of nuisance but also for
damages for the damage suffered by that person who is affected by the nuisance.
3. The next is extra-judicial abatement. Under 1 and 2, one has to go to court in order to abate
the nuisance. In number 3, one can do it without going to the court but has a very specific
requirement which we’ll go to later.
Now, Article 700 says that the District Health Officer shall take care that one or all of the remedies
against a public nuisance are availed of, whatever that is.
Art. 700. The district health officer shall take care that one or all of the remedies against a public
nuisance are availed of.
Art. 701. If a civil action is brought by reason of the maintenance of a public nuisance, such
action shall be commenced by the city or municipal mayor.
Well this is from the old civil code, 1950. We might have our own charter on who will be responsible
for filing a civil action against the maintenance of a public nuisance. When it’s no longer the mayor,
then whoever is in the charter. It’s just under the new civil code.
Art. 702. The district health officer shall determine whether or not abatement, without judicial
proceedings, is the best remedy against a public nuisance.
Don’t mind this provision. We don’t know whether this is still applicable.
Art. 703. A private person may file an action on account of a public nuisance, if it is specially
injurious to himself.
So, as we know, when it’s a public nuisance that must be abated, there are three remedies. First two
are cases but 703 says even though it is not a public nuisance and it is a private nuisance, a private
person may file an action in a …. If it’s a public nuisance, under 701, it should be the mayor but
703 says a private person may file an action, whether it’s criminal or civil, on account of public
nuisance, if its especially injurious to himself. Private persons are not precluded from filing civil or
criminal action for abatement of public nuisance. The only requirement is that the nuisance is
especially injurious to himself.



Art. 704. Any private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by
removing, or if necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without
committing a breach of the peace, or doing unnecessary injury. But it is necessary:
(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the
nuisance;
(2) That such demand has been rejected;
(3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the
assistance of the local police; and
(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.
Article 704 talks about extra-judicial abatement. A private person may abate a public nuisance
without going to court. He can do so by removing the nuisance or by destroying it without
committing a breach of peace or doing unnecessary injury. It is necessary that the requisites are
complied with.
(1) That demand be first made upon the owner or possessor of the property to abate the
nuisance;
(2) That such demand has been rejected;
(3) That the abatement be approved by the district health officer and executed with the
assistance of the local police; and
(4) That the value of the destruction does not exceed three thousand pesos.
So a very concrete example of this public nuisance, which is especially injurious to me, what …
kung madami masyado. You go to the eskinita. Maliit lang ang eskinita which is a one lane street
and it’s preventing you from going to the street but the houses there in the eskinitas in Buhangin are
very close to the road. Ang mga doors nila nasa boundaries na ng road. So ano ang gagawin nila?
You go there and you see things put there in the road. That’s a public nuisance under no. 4, it
obstructs or interferes the free passage of any public highway. So, everytime I pass through that road,
I need to detour and go around. If I follow the law, I have the right to demand but it’s so hard. In
actual, I don’t think this is done.
August 23 – Barrios
August 23, 2017
So what we took up so far, how to abate a public nuisance.

According to the provision, it is the mayor who should file for an action in court. But Article 700
also says that, oh it’s 700+ something [Article 703] that a private person may also institute the proper
court actions if the nuisance is specially injurious to him.



Article 703. A private person may file an action on account of a public nuisance, if it is
So for public nuisance, there are three ways:

1. Criminal Action
2. Civil Action
3. Extrajudicial Abatement
But what if the Nuisance is a Private Nuisance? How could it be abated?

There are only two ways:
Article 705. The remedies against a private nuisance are:

1. A civil action; or
2. Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
So no criminal action, only civil action and extrajudicial abatement.

And what is the procedure for extrajudicial abatement? The same, with how to abate a Public
Nuisance, the same procedure.
Article 706. Any person injured by a private nuisance may abate it by removing, or if
necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the nuisance, without committing a
breach of the peace or doing unnecessary injury. However, it is indispensable that the
procedure for extrajudicial abatement of a public nuisance by a private person be followed.
So how can a private person injured by a Private Nuisance abate it? We have Article 706, the same
[with Public Nuisance]
Article 707. A private person or a public official extrajudicially abating a nuisance shall be
liable for damages:
(1) If he causes unnecessary injury; or
(2) If an alleged nuisance is later declared by the courts to be not a real nuisance.
So, one who undergoes extrajudicial abatement must be sure that the alleged nuisance is a real
nuisance.
Now let us go to our cases.
We’ll start with the old cases, as we also have new cases, we'll see.
Bengzon v Province of Pangasinan
Bengzon is a resident of Pangasinan. He has a two-storey house which is adjacent to the water
system of province of Pangasinan, approximately close to his house. Prior the construction of the
said water system, Bengzon had no knowledge of it, of its erection, conduct of its maintenance, the
manner of the operation of the pumps, etc. Bengzon protested then on how the water system has
been operating, that it causes a constant annoyance, discomfort and danger both to the property of
the plaintiff and the health and comport of himself and his family. He asked to be indemnified for
the total value of his house so he and his family can transfer to another place and establish a new



residence thereon due to the nuisance caused by said water system erected by the province of
Pangasinan close to his house.
So the issues here are, first, whether or not the said water system is a nuisance, and second, is
whether or not the civil action for damages is proper.
The Supreme Court held Yes on both issues, that the water system erected close to his house is a
nuisance pursuant to Article 694 (1) because the chimney emits smoke, gases of crude oil and
gasoline and that at times the smoke blinds him.
And also under paragraph 2 of Article 694 because it annoys and offends the senses due to
the vibrations, smoke, odor and sparks coming from the plant during its operation, not only during
the day but during the night as well.
Article 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property,
or anything else which:
This water system could have been erected at an uninhabited place without exposing the risks and
discomfort to society. Therefore, the civil action for damages is proper when availed of by an injured
party, wherein there is a direct injury to himself or his family, like in this case. Furthermore, the
action for abatement of nuisance was not availed of in this case but what Bengzon is asking is for
the payment of damages or for indemnity of the full value of his house so that he and his family can
transfer to another place due the nuisance caused by the water system erected by the province of
Pangasinan.
Maam: What kind of nuisnace do we have here? Why?

Reporter: Public nuisance maam, because the said water system affects the community--
Maam: The water system itself?
Reporter: The noise, vibrations, odor, smoke caused by the operation of said water system maam.
Maam: So is it a nuisance per se or is it a nuisance per accidens?
Reporter: Nuisance per se maam
Maam: Nuisance is a nuisance under all circumstances, at all times wherever it may be located or
found, and whatever the condition, so the water system cannot exist because it is a nuisance per se,
is that it?
No it is not! Because a nuisance per se should not exist! You mean the water system cannot exist?!
What makes it a nuisance? The smoke, the sound, from the chimney.
It is a public nuisance, and only a nuisance per accidens. As you can see, here, he filed a civil case,
not necessarily for abatement, it could be for damages. He's asking for damages, so he could move
because it is more practical for him to get out of there than to remove that station. So it was the
proper action that is why he did not ask for its abatement so he just asked the Court to remove
himself from that area where the nuisance is.
BENGZON vs. THE PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN

G.R. No. L-41941 January 9, 1936
FACTS:



Bengzon filed an action for damages for maintaining a nuisance continuously injurious to the
Bengzon and his family by reason of the maintenance and operation of a stand pipe, pumping
station and open reservoir for the storage of water upon the premises immediately adjacent to the
Bengzon’s residence.
Bengzon owns a house constructed of wood and covered with nipa in the Province of Pangasinan
He and his family have resided there for twenty-seven years. Upon the adjacent lot the Province
of Pangasinan constructed a water system. Within the base of this cylindrical tank there are three
machines: One electrical, one gasoline and one crude oil. On the side of the tank nearest the
plaintiff's residence and at a distance of 3.4 meters is a chimney which rises to about the height
of the gable of the house. The tank itself is 3.8 meters from the house of the plaintiff.
So Bengzon protested to the governor of the province for the manner in which the plant was being
operated and asked that he be indemnified for the value of his house and lot so that he might
move his family and his effects to another residence.
ISSUE: WON the operation of the water system is a nuisance
HELD:
Yes. The Court held that after making an ocular inspection of the plant and hearing the testimony
of the witnesses, the trial court came to the conclusion that although the operation of the pumps
and the tank creates some annoyance and discomfort to the plaintiff, these are but ordinary and
incidental to the reasonable conduct of the Province of Pangasinan’s water system.
The evidence as a whole leaves us with clear conviction that the construction and operation of
this pumping plant in such close proximity to the plaintiff's residence has rendered the same
practically uninhabitable without exposing to risk the comfort, health and, in case of fire, even
the live of the plaintiff and his family.
We find from the preponderance of the evidence that the fair present value of the appellant's
premises involved in this suit is P3,000; and as, under the circumstances, the maintenance of the
nuisance is practically tantamount to an expropriation.
So let us compare this case with Velasco v Manila Electric Company

Velasco here bought a parcel of land to which he constructed his house. Manila electric built a
substation approximately 20 meters away from Velasco's house. Upon completion of said
substation, it emits a continuous noise and in between the house of Velasco and the substation,
there is nothing that would block the noise coming from said station. Velasco filed for the abatement
of said substation, that it constitutes a nuisance under Article 694 (1) and (2).
Article 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property,
or anything else which:



So the issue in this case is whether or not such noise may be considered a nuisance
The Supreme Court said that a noise may be considered a nuisance but only when it affects the
comfort of the people in the vicinity up to an unreasonable extent. So a noise can only be actionable
if it passes the limits of being reasonable. The Supreme Court also discussed that there is no fixed
standard in determining whether or not the noise is already unreasonable. That it must be case to
case basis. So they laid the test to determine the same: whether the noise affects injuriously the
health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent. The Supreme Court
said that the noise alone does not constitute automatically a nuisance, only when it is viewed
collectively and if it passes the test can it only be considered unreasonable, thus being a nuisance.
In this case, there is enough proof in the form of the measurement of the noise as well as medical
certificates provided by the director of health, which shows that the volume of the station's noise is
up to this extent, which annoyed Velasco, ultimately made him suffer diseases like anxiety.
Therefore, the noise from the station was considered nuisance by the Supreme Court.
Maam: Yes, there are many factors to consider for it to be a nuisance, the noise, the smell. Like in
the case of a videoke machine, even if the volume is not even that high, if it is used during the day
then it may not be considered as a nuisance because it is really noisy during the day. But if it used
at night, even if it is not that high, and that it is heard by people in the surrounding area, perhaps it
is a nuisance. So there are factors to consider.
In this case, even the humming of the substation was not really audible that everyone can hear it,
but in the case of Velasco, since he was very close to it, and that it was a continuous sound that
never ends, that it even caused anxiety on his part, it already affected his psyche, then yes, it is a
nuisance.
So what was the solution of the Supreme Court here, does he get out of the place or what?
Reporter: The remedy provided by the Supreme Court was to build a wall of sound absorbent
material between the house of Velasco and the station.
Maam: So here, the Supreme Court made a win-win solution for both wherein both of Velasco and
the station can remain there. Because the only complaint of Velasco was the noise, if there is smoke
like in Bengzon, then it is quite impossible to stop that. So the Supreme Court here looked for a good
solution.
VELASCO vs. MANILA ELECTRIC Co.

G.R. No. L-18390 August 6, 1971
FACTS:
Velasco owns a lot, built a house thereon. Later, Manila Electric started the construction of a sub-
station near Velasco’s house.
It is undisputed that a sound unceasingly emanates from the substation.
Velasco contends that the sound constitutes an actionable nuisance under Article 694 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, reading as follows:
Article 703. A private person may file an action on account of a public nuisance, if it is



A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business condition of property or anything

else which:
(1) Injuries or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses;
Because subjection to the sound since 1954 had disturbed the concentration and sleep of said
appellant, and impaired his health and lowered the value of his property.
So, he sought a judicial decree for the abatement of the nuisance and asked that he be declared
entitled to recover compensatory, moral and other damages
ISSUE: Whether this sound constitutes an actionable nuisance or not is the principal issue in this
case.
HELD:
Yes, the sound generated by the station is a nuisance.
A noise may constitute an actionable nuisance, but it must be a noise which affects injuriously
the health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent.
The Court said the sound emitted by the appellee's substation transformers is of much higher level
than the ambient sound of the locality. The measurements taken by Dr. Almonte, who is not
connected with either party, and is a physician to boot, appear more reliable. The conclusion
must be that the noise continuously emitted, day and night, constitutes an actionable nuisance for
which the appellant is entitled to relief, by requiring the appellee company to adopt the necessary
measures to deaden or reduce the sound at the plaintiff's house, by replacing the interlink wire
fence with a partition made of sound absorbent material, since the relocation of the substation is
manifestly impracticable and would be prejudicial to the customers of the Electric Company who
are being serviced from the substation.
Let's look at the case of Ayala v Barretto

The residents of Calle General Solano filed a case against the establishment and operation a
proposed Brewery Plant on the ground that it is a nuisance to them. But it is to note, that Calle
General Solano, most of the properties there are being leased as warehouses or factory, etc. Also,
the biggest lot therein, there are factories there, like the San miguel brewery plant, which is closer
to said Calle General Solano than the proposed Brewery Plant.
The issue is whether or not the proposed Brewery plant is a nuisance

The Supreme Court said it is not. Because the appropriateness to where the proposed plant is located
will be the determining factor if it is a nuisance. It is clear that Calle General Solano was no longer
a purely residential area, it was becoming an industrial center, and the residents therein cannot
complain of the general conduct of business in said area. The proposed plant was to be operated in
a standard that would cause minimal offense to the residents. Also, the san miguel brewery was a
lot closer to the residents than the proposed one. Thus the proposed plant cannot be a nuisance.



Maam: Okay thank you, in this case there was no plant yet! It was a mere proposal. So it is impossible
to prevent the construction of a possible nuisance, that is what they did! But the Supreme Court said
that the area in which the area the plant was going to be built is already an industrial area that has
other factories! To consider a plant as a nuisance also depends on the location. If it is not a residential
area anymore, if that plant would emit fumes or sounds obnoxious to people, that particular
proposed plant cannot be considered a nuisance because the place is not a residential area.
AYALA vs BARRETTO
G.R. No. L-9966 February 14, 1916
FACTS:
This is a suit for a permanent injunction against the erection and operation of a combined brewery
and ice plant on Calle General Solano in the city of Manila, on the ground that it will be a
nuisance.
Petitioners Ayala et al. are residents or property owners on Calle General Solano. This area where
the New plant is to be erected used to be a residential area but is now more commonly used as
an industrial area. There are now upon this street a coal yard, a warehouse, and a cigarette factory,
all very near the proposed location of the defendant's brewery, and there are also a public school
and a club on the street. There is also large power plant of the electric railroad and light company,
consuming about 50 tons of coal per day. To the north of this street are sawmills and lumberyards
and to the west, across the river, are located large warehouses and a large tobacco factory [a lot
more but you get the idea, that it’s an industrial area]
It appears that the locality in question is gradually being transformed from a fashionable residence
district into an industrial center
ISSUE: WON the proposed plant is a nuisance to be abated under the law
HELD:
No it is not. We have come to the conclusion that the locality surrounding the site of the proposed
plant has not sufficiently the impress of a residential district as to justify us in holding that the
plant will be incongruous with its surroundings. This conclusion is made easier in view of the fact
that another brewery is in fact closer to several of the plaintiffs than that of the defendants will be.
The fact that this latter brewery is not on the same street is immaterial. Distance is what counts in
a matter of this kind. Noise, smells, and smoke are no respecters of streets.
Is there evidence of record that the proposed plant will be operated so carelessly as to materially
increase the noise, smells, and smoke emanating therefrom? We think not. On the contrary, the
evidence is that a brewery, properly run, is not an unbearable neighbor and that the defendants
are installing modern machinery in every respect.
Also it must be noted that there exists a San Miguel Brewery Plantation much nearer to the
residents of said area than the proposed Plant.
For the defense, there is evidence of engineers and others that there will be no noise, vibrations,
or smells, and but little, if any, smoke which will materially affect nearby residents
We think that the preponderating weight of the evidence is to the effect that the new brewery will
be operated with a minimum of offense to nearby residents, and that in view of the semi-industrial
character of the locality, what noise, etc., is produced, cannot be held to be unreasonable.
Let’s compare that to Canlas v Aquino @24mins



In this case, the sps Canlas… xxx [di kaayo nako masabtan, so supplanted facts from the case
instead]
Spouses Canlas operates and maintains a Hospital in the barrio of San Jose, municipality of
Concepcion, province of Tarlac. Respondent Jaime Tayag had obtained a permit to construct a rice
mill in front of the Canlas Clinic, just across the street.
Spouses Canlas filed a complaint against Tayag alleging that construction of his rice mill would have
to be stopped altogether "because the smoke, vapor, palay husk dust and dirt and the constant noise
generated from the operation of said ricemill would not be conducive to the quiet, cleanliness,
tranquillity and fresh air and wholesome atmosphere needed and prescribed in the hospital area, its
environs and surroundings for the health, comfort and well-being of its inmates and patients", and
"that the Bureau of Hospitals has made it clear that if and should the said ricemill be eventually
constructed and begin operation, the permit already issued for the said hospital . . .would be revoked
and cancelled and the Canlas Clinic itself would be ordered closed
Maam: What was the complaint about?

It was about the smoke, vapor, palay husk dust and dirt and the constant noise to be generated from
the operation of said ricemill, if eventually constructed.
Maam: What is the nuisance there? Not the construction per se, because of course it will cause some
noise. The nuisance is the effect of the rice mill's operations!
Take note that in this case, the Supreme Court actually allowed the filing of an action to prevent a
nuisance. Not only abatement of an existing nuisance is a civil action, but also prevention of a
possible nuisance! And a rice mill, it emits a lot of dust! That will affect the hospital across the street,
so to prevent that from happening, so it is possible to file a civil action for that. The only thing in the
other case of Ayala v Barretto, was that the plant, although it may affect the residence, it is already
an area where there are other plants and factories. But here, this is more specific because there is a
hospital, and rice mill is going to be built in front of it. So this could probably fall under private
nuisance, in a sense that it is clearly the hospital, but then, if it was a residential house, and the
family would complain, I’m not so sure how the Supreme Court would rule on this. So again, this is
a nuisance per accidens because a rice mill is not considered a nuisance per se that it cannot exist.
It is just a nuisance per accidens, the location, it cannot be constructed in front of a hospital.
CANLAS vs AQUINO
G.R. No. L-16815 July 24, 1961
FACTS:
Spouses Canlas operates and maintains a Hospital in the barrio of San Jose, municipality of
Concepcion, province of Tarlac. Respondent Jaime Tayag had obtained a permit to construct a
rice mill in front of the Canlas Clinic, just across the street.
Spouses Canlas filed a complaint against Tayag alleging that construction of his rice mill would
have to be stopped altogether "because the smoke, vapor, palay husk dust and dirt and the
constant noise generated from the operation of said ricemill would not be conducive to the quiet,
cleanliness, tranquillity and fresh air and wholesome atmosphere needed and prescribed in the
hospital area, its environs and surroundings for the health, comfort and well-being of its inmates
and patients", and "that the Bureau of Hospitals has made it clear that if and should the said
ricemill be eventually constructed and begin operation, the permit already issued for the said
hospital . . .would be revoked and cancelled and the Canlas Clinic itself would be ordered closed



ISSUE: WON the action filed by spouses Canlas would prosper in view of the possible nuisance
which the operation of the rice mill, to be constructed, may cause
HELD:
Yes. Indeed, the main action was filed by petitioners herein for the purpose of joining and
prohibiting Tayag from the constructing a rice mill, so that, upon the construction thereof, said
action would become futile. Besides, the intention of respondent Judge to prohibit the
continuance of the operation of said rice mill, should it later be found to be a nuisance, is not
sufficient to offset the harm already done to the operation of the hospital, specially the injury
suffered by the patients therein and the public in general, which are hardly susceptible of
estimation or compensation. Needless to say, by permitting Tayag to construct his building, and
purchase and install the machinery for the operation of the rice mill, respondent Judge exposed
him to much greater damage than that which could possibly have resulted had the writ of
preliminary injunction been maintained until the final disposition of the case.
So let's go to Espiritu vs Municipal Council
We have Espiritu, a market vendor in the market in the town of pozorrubio. This market was was
destroyed during the war. So they made make shift stalls, and small residences, in the town plaza.
After the market was rehabilitated, and upon the petition of several civic organizations for the
vendors to vacate the town plaza, the municipal council issued a resolution for the vendors to vacate
said plaza. The vendors refused. So a case was filed by said vendors to prohibit the municipal
council from evicting them from said plaza.
The issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not the make shift stalls and residences by the
vendors in the town plaza is a nuisance which may be abated under the law
Supreme Court said yes, it is considered public nuisance. Nuisance under Article 694 because these
stalls obstructs or hinders the use of the property which is the town plaza. And since the town plaza
is a property of public dominion, dedicated for public use and open to the public in general, the
community or the people as a whole cannot anymore use that portion occupied by these vendors.
Thus, under Article 695, this is a public nuisance, affecting the community or a number of people
as a whole.
Maam: How about the other issue, on abatement, how were these stalls removed?
Reporter: They were removed through the resolution issued by the municipal council. The Supreme
Court allowed it.
Maam: Can the municipal council abate a nuisance? [Yes, but the alleged nuisance needs to be
declared first as a nuisance by the Court]
VICTORIANA ESPIRITU vs THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL
G.R. No. L-11014 January 21, 1958
FACTS:



During the last world war, the market building of the town of Pozorrubio was destroyed, and after
Liberation, the market vendors began constructing temporary and make-shifts stalls, even small
residences, on a portion of the town plaza
The Municipal Council of Pozorrubio received petitions from civic organizations like the
Women's Club and the Puericulture Center, for the removal of the market stalls on the plaza,
which were being used not only as stalls, but also for residence purposes, said organization
desiring to convert said portion of the plaza into a children's park
As a result, the Municipal Council of Pozorrubio No. 20, Series of 1951, stating that the public
market had already been rehabilitated, and ordering the occupants and owners of the structures
on the plaza to remove their buildings within sixty days from receipt of the resolution
Some of the market stall building owners filed a petition for prohibition in the Cour of First Instance
of Pangasinan against the Municipal Council
ISSUE: WON the stalls are nuisances subject to abatement according to law
HELD:
Yes, these stalls are public nuisances which may be abated in accordance with the law.
Article 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of

property, or anything else which:
xxx
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
The court said that “There is absolutely no question that the town plaza cannot be used for the
construction of market stalls, specially of residences, and that such structures constitute a nuisance
subject to abatement according to law. Town Plazas are properties of public dominion, to be
devoted to public use and to be made available to the public in general. They are outside the
commerce of man and cannot be disposed of or even leased by the municipality to private parties.
While in case of war or during an emergency, town plazas may be occupied temporarily by
private individuals, as was done and as was tolerated by the Municipality of Pozorrubio, when
the emergency has ceased, said temporary occupation or use must also cease, and the town
officials should see to it that the town plazas should ever be kept open to the public and free from
encumbrances or illegal private constructions”
NOTE: The declaration of the stalls as a nuisance should have come first before the Municipal
Council ordered its removal. Declaration of a nuisance first, then Abatement of said nuisance.
Compare this case with that of Iloilo Cold Storage v Municipal Council
Iloilo cold storage constructed an ice plant. Nearby, there were residents and they complained that
the smoke coming from said plant is injurious to their health. After investigation, the Municipal
council that said complaints were well-founded; they found that the plant was a nuisance and passed
a resolution that the ililo ice storage should fix the smoke coming from their plant, if they cannot,
then ice plant should be closed.



The issue to be resolved here is whether or not the iloilo municipal has the power to declare the
iceplant as a nuisance
Also, whether or not the abatement is proper.
The Supreme Court held that, as to the first issue, No. While the municipal council has the authority
to abate a nuisance, the power to declare a nuisance rests with the ordinary courts. Declaration of
a nuisance and Abatement of nuisance are different.
As to the second issue, the closing down of the ice plant is not proper as there was yet a declaration
by the court that said ice plant is indeed a nuisance.
Ma’am: Okay, so take note that declaring something as a nuisance is different from the abatement
proceedings. Before a nuisance can be abated, unless it is an extrajudicial abatement, one has to go
to court. And the Court has to declare that something as a nuisance. Because that is still debatable
whether or not that establishment is a nuisance. So once the Court declares something as a nuisance,
then that is the time it can be abated. The Court does not abate a nuisance, it has no power to do
that. The Court merely declares something as a nuisance and order it to be abated. Once it is
declared as a nuisance, then the municipal council can issue a resolution on how the Nuisance will
be abated. But the declaration itself, belongs to the court. Because evidence needs to be presented
to the Court, by both sides.
In this case, Iloilo cold storage was not given the opportunity to be heard, to defend itself, or even
to make proposals on how to prevent those fumes and vapors coming out of its establishment,
affecting the residence in the area. All of these things have to go to Court, so that the parties would
be given the chance to present their side. As you will learn, when you reach civil procedure, a case
is not only terminated when the Court renders a decision, we have what we call an amicable
settlement, a compromise agreement, where the parties can enter into a win-win situation.
So in Espiritu v Municipal Council, the Supreme Court declared those stalls to be a nuisance. The
procedure was just reversed, nauna yung pag tanggal, and then the declaration itself. But the proper
procedure is to have something declared a nuisance first, and then comes the abatement. So the
civil action under the Civil Code does not have to be an action for abatement. It can be anything
that the plaintiff deems suitable for him, for the nuisance whether he removes himself, or whatever
needs to be done, like in the case of Velasco, not necessarily just the removal of that establishment
which is alleged to be a nuisance.
ILOILO ICE AND COLD STORAGE COMPANY vs THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO
G.R. No. L-7012 March 26, 1913
FACTS:
ILOILO ICE AND COLD STORAGE Co. constructed an ice and cold storage plant in the city of
Iloilo. Some time after the plant had been completed and was in operation, nearby residents made
complaints to the defendant that the smoke from the plant was very injurious to their health and
comfort. Thereupon the defendant appointed a committee to investigate and report upon the
matters contained in said complaints. The committee reported that the complaints were well-
founded. They then ordered said company to proceed with the elevation of said smokestacks, and



if not done, the municipal president will execute the order requiring the closing or suspension of
operations of said establishment.
ISSUE: WON it was proper for the Municipal Council to order the suspension of the ice storage
HELD:
No, it was not proper. Whether a particular thing is a nuisance is generally a question of fact, to
be determined in the first instance before the term nuisance can be applied to it. This is certainly
true of a legitimate calling, trade, or business such as an ice plant
It is clear that municipal councils have, under the code, the power to declare and abate nuisances,
but it is equally clear that they do not have the power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a
nuisance when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can they authorize the extrajudicial
condemnation and destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation, or use is not
such. These things must be determined in the ordinary courts of law.
In the present case it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a
legitimate industry, beneficial to the people, and conducive to their health and comfort. If it be in
fact a nuisance due to the manner of its operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere
resolution of the board. The petitioner is entitled to a fair and impartial hearing before a judicial
tribunal.
It is said that the plaintiff cannot be compelled to build its smokestack higher if said stack is in
fact a nuisance, for the reason that the stack was built under authority granted by the defendant,
and in accordance with the prescribed requirements
August 24 Part 1 – Manligoy and Peroy
Let’s continue with our cases. Our last case was Iloilo Cold Storage vs Municipal Council. We will
skip to the other cases. Let’s go the Lucena Grand Central Terminal vs JAC Liner.
LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL vs JAC LINER

GR No. 148339 | February 23, 2005
Facts:
Respondent, JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to and
from Lucena City, assailed, via a petition for prohibition and injunction against the City of Lucena,
its Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena before the RTC
They claim that City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 17781 as unconstitutional on the ground that, the
same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and
a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.



• The Lucena Grand Central Terminal is the permanent common terminal as this is the entity
which was given the exclusive franchise by the Sangguniang Panglungsod under Ordinance
No. 1631
o These ordinances, by granting an exclusive franchise for twenty five years, renewable for
another twenty five years, to one entity for the construction and operation of one common
bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City, to be located outside the city proper,
were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been
caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city.
ISSUES:
WON the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted the subject
ordinances. NO.
HELD:
The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion
in the City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State.
With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a single location, the
subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and jeepney terminals within Lucena,
including those already existing, and allow the operation of only one common terminal located
outside the city proper, the franchise for which was granted to petitioner. The common carriers
plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close down their existing terminals
and use the facilities of petitioner.
Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. If terminals lack
adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets
instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be
instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the
specifications.
Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are encroaching upon public roads, they
are not obstacles. The buses which indiscriminately load and unload passengers on the city streets
are. The power then of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments and obstacles
does not extend to terminals.
Neither are terminals public nuisances as petitioner argues. For their operation is a legitimate
business which, by itself, cannot be said to be injurious to the rights of property, health, or comfort
of the community. But even assuming that terminals are nuisances due to their alleged indirect
effects upon the flow of traffic, at most they are nuisance per accidens, not per se. Unless a thing
is nuisance per se, however, it may not be abated via an ordinance, without judicial proceedings
What is a public nuisance? What happened was the Municipal Council passed an ordinance creating
a centralized bus terminal and passed another ordinance prohibiting the existing bus terminals
owned by the different bus companies from operating. IN effect, closing them down. So can a



municipal council close the bus terminal which is an alleged nuisance by a mere passing of an
ordinance? How do you abate a nuisance as we learned under the Civil Code? How?
This case of Lucena is affirming what the Supreme Court said in Iloilo cases. A municipal council
cannot by municipal ordinance determine whether something is a nuisance. It can only abate a
nuisance if already declared by the Court. Is there an instance where the Municipal Council can?
Let’s go back. What kind of classification was used by the Supreme Court? Did the Supreme Court
define nuisance per se in that case? What the Supreme Court said that the bus terminals cannot be
considered a nuisance. Granting arguendo that they be considered nuisance, they are at most
nuisance per accidens and not nuisance per se. The Supreme Court concluded that unless a thing is
a nuisance per se, it may not be abated by an ordinance without judicial proceedings. In other
words, there is an implication here that if a nuisance is a nuisance per se, always a nuisance at all
times and at all circumstances, a nuisance per se should not exist because at all times and at all
circumstances. It could be summarily abated. Did the Supreme Court give us a basis for summary
abatement of a nuisance per se?
Let’s see if we can actually find out what the legal basis of the Supreme Court is. Let’s go to the case
of Ganvayco vs Government.
GANVAYCO vs GOVERNMENT
GR No. 177807 | October 11, 2011
Facts:
In 1950s, retired justice Emilio Gancayco bought a parcel of land located in EDSA. Then on March
1956, Quezon City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904 requiring the construction of arcades for
commercial buildings to be constructed. At the outset, it bears emphasis that at the time
Ordinance No. 2904 was passed by the city council, there was yet no building code passed by
the national legislature. Thus, the regulation of the construction of buildings was left to the
discretion of local government units. Under this particular ordinance, the city council required
that the arcade is to be created by constructing the wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a
few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building owner is not allowed to construct his
wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor.
In effect, property owners relinquish the use of the space for use as an arcade for pedestrians,
instead of using it for their own purposes.
The ordinance covered the property of Justice Gancayco. Subsequently, sometime in 1965, Justice
Gancayco sought the exemption of a two-storey building being constructed on his property from
the application of Ordinance No. 2904 that he be exempted from constructing an arcade on his
property.
On 2 February 1966, the City Council acted favorably on Justice Gancayco’s request and issued
Resolution No. 7161, S-66, “subject to the condition that upon notice by the City Engineer, the
owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at his own expense
when public interest so demands.”



Decades after, in March 2003, MMDA conducted operations to clear obstructions along EDSA,
in consequence, they sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging that a portion of
his building violated the National Building Code.
MMDA appealed with the CA. CA held that the MMDA went beyond its powers when it
demolished the subject property. It further found that Resolution No. 02-28 only refers to
sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila, thus
excluding Justice Gancayco’s private property. Lastly, the CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed
with the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances.
Issues: WHETHER OR NOT THE WING WALL OF JUSTICE GANCAYCO’S BUILDING IS A

PUBLIC NUISANCE
Ruling:
The fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an
arcade is an indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing
walls do not per se immediately and adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact
that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not necessarily make that structure a
nuisance. Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building, the city
council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat
to the safety of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against
summarily demolishing the structure.
Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per se and order its
condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance
when such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and
destruction of that as a nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things
must be determined and resolved in the ordinary courts of law.
There is a limitation actually on one’s ownership. The ordinance required landowners along EDSA
to provide a walkway for the pedestrians. Justice Ganvayco constructed a building along EDSA and
there was no …. So what did he …? Justice Ganvayco asked the Municipal Council to exempt him
because? What does that mean?
If you’re a pedestrian, what will a wing wall do to you? What will you do?
[Maam illustrates it on the board] the pedestrians will have to go around. Magsiksikan sila dito, they
will have to pass by the street. In other words, the Judge asked for an exception that in the middle
of EDS there is his building that is straight occupying this property from the ground floor up to
whatever floor. That is a wing wall, you cannot walk freely anymore. But that is his property, so he
asked for an exception. The building was there until what year? MMDA started in 2003, that is when
MMDA went to him and demanded for removal so the pedestrians can freely walk along EDSA. Sya
lang yung may blockage e.
Wing wall of the building is a nuisance per se according to the SC?

S: No, it is not a nuisance per se since it does not affect legally the persons or property.



Iba yung “not a nuisance” and “not a nuisance per se”. What happened here was the MMDA alleged
that the wing walls are a public nuisance and it had the right under its charter to remove a public
nuisance. SC said that a public nuisance cannot be removed just like that. You have to undergo all
the procedures – a criminal case, asking for extra-judicial abatement, etc, hindi pwede. Pwede lang
if? Public nuisance, one has to go to court. Summary abatement is allowed if?
S: nuisance per se
What is a nuisance per se in that case? How did the SC define?

If it affects the immediate safety of persons and property and it may be summarily abated.
What is the basis for abatement of a nuisance per se? What is the legal basis? As cited by the SC?
The undefined law of necessity. That is the basis for summary abatement of a nuisance per se.
because a nuisance per se is a nuisance at all times under all circumstances, it doesn’t matter where
it is. The SC said a nuisance per se affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.
This wing wall, definitely, if you follow this definition in Gancayco is a nuisance per se because the
safety of the pedestrians will be affected. They will have to walk along EDSA to cross or go around
the building of Gancayco. The SC said, Justice Sereno said, the fact that the municipal council
approved the request for exemption is already an indication that it is not a nuisance per se. I don’t
know how you make that, but for me, definitely, I’m not in favor of this decision because it is very
biased. Gancayco is a former SC justice, that was the ruling in this case. But I want you to be able
to see why the SC is always going through that issue of nuisance per se because the MMDA did not
go through the proper court proceedings in removing the wing walls. The wing walls existed for 50
years. 1966 yung building to 2003 when it was removed, almost 50 years. The SC said that only
when it is a nuisance per se that you can do that. Because it is a public nuisance which is not the
same as a nuisance per se one has to go through the procedure laid down in Art. 699 and 700.
Do not forget the basis for summary abatement of a nuisance per se the undefined law of necessity.
What law? It is undefined, there is no number. But it is necessary. It is always, always, cited by the
SC, this undefined law of necessity.
Let’s look at Rana v. Lee Wong.
Rana v. Lee Wong

G.R. No. 192861, June 30, 2014
Facts:
Teresita and the spouses Shirley and Ruben (Spouses Wong) are co-owners of a property located in
Peace Valley Subdivision, near a 10-meter subdivision road. On the opposite side of the road are
the lots of the other protagonists, Wilson and Rosario (Spouses Uy) and Reynaldo and Linda (Spouses
Rana).
The lot of the Rana spouses stand about two meters higher than the lot of of the spouses Uy, while
that of the spouses Wong are level with the road. To level the portion of the road with their gate, the
Rana spouses elevated and cemented a portion of the road sometime in 1997, and backfilled a
portion of the perimeter fence they share with the spouses Uy but without erecting a retaining wall.



When the matter was referred to the barangay authorities and nothing happened, the spouses Uy
and Ong as well as Teresita filed a complaint for abatement of nuisance (Civil Case No. CEB-20893)
to declare the improvements introduced by the spouses Rana as a nuisance which affected their
engross and egress, since they now have to practically jump over the elevated portion to come in
and out of their properties, while the backfilling constitutes a danger to the spouses Uy’s family
because seeping rainwater from the Rana property might cause its sudden collapse.
In their answer, the spouses Rana countered that there was no existing road prior to the construction
of their property; they merely developed it and the plaintiffs have no need for it since they face
another road, Justice St., The backfilling was not necessary either considering the natural elevation
of their property. The spouses Wong then filed a motion, granted by the trial court, to allow them to
bring in heavy machineries to develop the subject road, which they did, leveling the subject road
and limiting the ingress and egress of the spouses Rana and trapping their vehicle.
They thus filed a Supplemental Complaint praying for the restoration of the subject road, as well as
award of moral and exemplary damages. In the meantime, the spouses Rana filed another civil case
(CEB-21296), this time alleging that the spouses Uy encroached upon their property.
In their answer, the spouses Uy denied any encroachment and insisted that a survey they
commissioned revealed that while they encroached upon a 3-square meter portion of the Rana
property, the latter also encroached upon their property by 7-square meters, hence they have a
bigger cause of action. The RTC appointed 3 commissioners to conduct a survey of the lots and
determine the proper metes and bounds. The cases were consolidated by the RTC and a Decision
rendered in Civil Case No. CEB-20893 that while the spouses Rana guilty of developing the subject
road to their sole advantage, the Wong spouses were equally guilty of abuse in implementing its
Order allowing them to develop the property, thus they were both in bad faith and no relief can be
granted unto them. The backfilling was ordered a nuisance and the spouses Rana were ordered to
remove it. In Civil Case No. CEB-21296, the trial court dismissed both cases for failure of the parties
to substantiate bad faith on the other, despite a finding by the commissioner that Uy’s property
encroached on Rana’s by 2 square meters.
Issue:
WON the subject portion is a nuisance.
Held:
In the present cases, Wong, et al. availed of the remedy of judicial abatement and damages against
Sps. Rana, claiming that both the elevated and cemented subject portion and the subject backfilling
are "nuisances" caused/created by the latter which curtailed their use and enjoyment of their
properties.
With respect to the elevated and cemented subject portion, the Court finds that the same is not a
nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the community. It was
built primarily to facilitate the ingress and egress of Sps. Rana from their house which was admittedly
located on a higher elevation than the subject road and the adjoining Uy and Wong-Ong properties.
Since the subject portion is not a nuisance per se(but actually a nuisance per accidens as will be
later discussed) it cannot be summarily abated. As such, Wong, et al.’s demolition of Sps. Rana’s
subject portion, which was not sanctioned under the RTC’s November 27, 1997 Order, remains
unwarranted. Resultantly, damages ought to be awarded in favor of Sps. Rana particularly that of (a)



nominal damages59 – for the vindication and recognition of Sps. Rana’s right to be heard before the
court prior to Wong, et al.’s abatement of the subject portion (erroneously perceived as a nuisance
per se) – and (b) temperate damages60 – for the pecuniary loss owing to the demolition of the subject
portion, which had been established albeit uncertain as to the actual amount of loss.
Take note that Ong Wong actually availed the proper remedy, to file a civil action for the
abatement of the nuisance which is the elevated road. Unfortunately, Ong Wong went beyond,
they only file a motion to bring in equipment. That’s all. Instead of limiting it to their own
property, they went beyond the limitations of the granted motion and removed the elevated
portion. So, in essence what Wong did was to summarily abate the nuisance even before it was
declared as such by the court. WON it is a nuisance, nobody answered, but WON the summary
abatement done by Wong is proper, SC said it is not proper because it is not a nuisance per se. SC
borrowed the definition under Gancayco “By its nature, it can not be said to be injurious to rights
of property, of health or of comfort of the community”.
Since the elevated road is not a nuisance per se, but merely a nuisance per accidens, it cannot be
summarily abated. SC again, defined a nuisance one which "affects the immediate safety of
persons and property and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity”. Do
not forget that.
TELMO V. BUSTAMANTE
The complaint alleged that respondent is a co-owner of a real property of 616 square meters in Brgy.
Halang, Naic, Cavite, known as Lot 952-A and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-957643
of the Register of Deeds of Cavite. Petitioner and Elizalde Telmo (Telmos) are the owners of the two
(2) parcels of land denominated as Lot 952-B and 952-C, respectively, located at the back of
respondents lot. When his lot was transgressed by the construction of the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay
Road, respondent offered for sale the remaining lot to the Telmos. The latter refused because they
said they would have no use for it, the remaining portion being covered by the roads 10-meter
easement.
The complaint further alleged that, on May 8, 2005, respondent caused the resurvey of Lot 952-A
in the presence of the Telmos. The resurvey showed that the Telmos encroached upon respondents
lot. Petitioner then uttered, Hanggat ako ang municipal engineer ng Naic, Cavite, hindi kayo
makakapagtayo ng anuman sa lupa nyo; hindi ko kayo bibigyan ng building permit.
On May 10, 2005, respondent put up concrete poles on his lot. However, around 7:00 p.m. of the
same day, the Telmos and their men allegedly destroyed the concrete poles. The following day,
respondents relatives went to Brgy. Chairman Consumo to report the destruction of the concrete
poles. Consumo told them that he would not record the same, because he was present when the
incident occurred. Consumo never recorded the incident in the barangay blotter.
Respondent complained that he and his co-owners did not receive any just compensation
from the government when it took a portion of their property for the construction of the Noveleta-
Naic-Tagaytay Road. Worse, they could not enjoy the use of the remaining part of their lot due to
the abusive, Illegal, and unjust acts of the Telmos and Consumo.



ISSUE: WON property claimed and enclosed with concrete posts by respondent was validly taken
by the National Government through its power of eminent domain, pursuant to Executive Order No.
113, as amended by Executive Order No. 253, creating the Noveleta-Naic-Tagaytay Road. In this
context, petitioner contends that the concrete posts erected by respondent were a public nuisance
under Article 694 (4)
HELD: Petitioner contends that respondents concrete posts were in the nature of a nuisance per se,
which may be the subject of summary abatement sans any judicial proceedings. Again, we disagree.
A nuisance per se is that which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity.[31] Evidently, the concrete posts summarily
removed by petitioner did not at all pose a hazard to the safety of persons and properties, which
would have necessitated immediate and summary abatement. What they did, at most, was to pose
an inconvenience to the public by blocking the free passage of people to and from the national road.
Comments: concrete posts encroaching on something is not a nuisance per se that can be summarily
abated.
TAMIN VS. CA
Petitioner municipality represented by its mayor Real filed in the RTC a complaint for the ejectment
of respondents. It is alleged that the municipality owns a parcel of residential land located in
Zamboanga del Sur and the said parcel of land was reserved for public plaza under PD 365 and that
during the mayor, the municipality leased the area to the defendants subject to the condition that
they should vacate the place in case it is needed for public purposes and the defendants paid the
rentals religiously until 1967. They refused to vacate the said land despite the efforts of the
government since money is allocated for the construction of a municipal gymnasium within the
public plaza and such construction could not continue because of the presence of the buildings
constructed by the defendants.
ISSUE: WON the municipality has a cause of action for the abatement of public nuisance under
Article 694 of the Civil Code.
Held: Yes based on the definition of a nuisance provided for in the CC which states that “Art. 694.
A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property or anything else
which: … hinders or impairs the use of the property.” Article 695. Nuisance is either public or
private. A public nuisance affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable number of
persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be equal.”
Article 699 provides for the following remedies against public nuisance. In the present case, the
municipality chose to file a civil action for the recovery of possession of the parcel of land
occupied by the PR. Under the Local Government Code, the Sangguniang Bayan has to first pass
an ordinance before summarily abate a public nuisance.
Considering the facts in the complaint is true then the writ of possession and writ of demolition



would have been justified. A writ of demolition would have been sufficient to eject the private
respondent.
Comments: The subject of the case is not a nuisance per se. There can be no summary abatement.
RP VS MIJARES
Philcomsat owned the subject property. The land hosts the Philippine Space Communication
Center which is charged of the country’s telecommunucations development. It was declared by
PD 1845 as a security zone
The Southern Pinugay farmers entered the land and built their houses and made other
improvements therein.
Mayor Ferrera ordered the demolition of the houses they made there and the demolition is
successful
Ferrera contended that the demoltion is proper as the farmers are not one of the beneficiaries of
philcomsat so their entry to the prop is illegal and they can be considered a nuisance
Issue: WON the improvements can be considered a nuisance
Held: Yes. The court held that there is a law that governs the use of the subject land but the court
also applied the provisions of the building code and urban development and housing act where it
allows the eviction and demolition of squatters that occupy danger areas and other public places
as well as when ruinous structures are placed and constructed.
In the case at bar, the subject land was a security zone and its operations should not be
s=disrupted. Therefore, any thing that hampers its effective performance can be removed
Comments: Not only nuisance per se can be summarily abated if there’s a special law that grants
the removal of that object. The special law will prevail over the civil law.
SORIANO V. LAGUARDIA
On August 10, 2004, at around 10 pm, Eliseo Soriano, host of the TV Program Ang Dating Daan,
made the following remarks:
“Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;

Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang
gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba!
O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa putang babae yan.
Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.”
Two days after, before the MTRCB, complaints were lodged by Jessie Galapon and seven others,
all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo calling for the suspension of the said TV program.Thus, MTRCB
suspended the show for 20 days in relation to PD 1986 of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure.
Soriano reasons out the notion of religious freedom, saying that what he uttered was religious
speech, and that said remarks were made in exercise of his religious freedom. Hence, this petition.
Issue: WON the remarks made by Soriano is a nuisance which may be subjected to administrative
suspension.



Held: Yes. The Supreme Court cited the case of Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica
Foundation, a 1987 American landmark case. The ruling in the case stressed that in determining
whether or not a thing is a nuisance, its context and a lot of variables should be considered. As what
the ponente, Justice Sutherland, said in the case, nuisance may be merely a right thing in the wrong
place, like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard. That when FCC finds that a pig has entered
the parlor, the exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is obscene.
Relating it to the case, the MTRCB, under its laws, may then suspend the show without having to
wait for a declaration that said remarks were indeed obscene, considering that it have been already
uttered. Thus, the administrative suspension made by MTRCB was proper, the remarks made by
Soriano is a nuisance that falls under the laws of the MTRCB which may be subjected to suspension.
Comments: In what situation will the pig be in the barnyard? If the show was rated X. MTRCB, as
the regulatory body, can summarily abate because it is a nuisance under paragraph 3. You don’t
need a special law since there is a body tasked to stop something that is not proper. You can
summarily abate just like in this case where Soriano’s remarks were definitely not proper.
AQUINO VS MUNICIPALITY OF MALAY
Petitioner is the president and chief executive officer of Boracay Island West Cove Management
Philippines, Inc. (Boracay West Cove). On January 7, 2010, the company applied for a zoning
compliance with the municipal government of Malay, Aklan.2 While the company was already
operating a resort in the area, and the application sought the issuance of a building permit covering
the construction of a three-storey hotel over a parcel of land measuring 998 sqm. located in Sitio
Diniwid, Barangay Balagab, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan, which is covered by a Forest Land Use
Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT) issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) in favor of Boracay West Cove.
Through a Decision on Zoning dated January 20, 2010, the Municipal Zoning Administrator denied
petitioner’s application on the ground that the proposed construction site was within the “no build
zone” demarcated in Municipal Ordinance 2000-131 (Ordinance).
Petitioner appealed the denial action to the Office of the Mayor but despite follow up, no action
was ever taken by the respondent mayor. A Cease and Desist Order was issued by the municipal
government, enjoining the expansion of the resort, and on June 7, 2011, the Office of the Mayor of
Malay, Aklan issued the assailed EO 10, ordering the closure and demolition of Boracay West Cove’s
hotel.
Petitioner contents that the hotel cannot summarily be abated because it is not a nuisance per se,
given the hundred million peso-worth of capital infused in the venture. And the Municipality of
Malay, Aklan should have first secured a court order before proceeding with the demolition.
Whereas respondent argued that the demolition needed no court order because the municipal mayor
has the express power under the Local Government Code (LGC) to order the removal of illegally
constructed buildings.
ISSUE: WON a judicial proceedings be conducted first before the LGU can order the closure and
demolition of the property in question.
HELD: No. Generally, LGUs have no power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such
a thing is a nuisance per se.



Despite the hotel’s classification as a nuisance per accidens, however, we still find in this case that
the LGU may nevertheless properly order the hotel’s demolition. This is because, in the exercise of
police power and the general welfare clause, property rights of individuals may be subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the
government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful
businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare.
Under the law, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the
requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition.
One such piece of legislation is the LGC, which authorizes city and municipal governments, acting
through their local chief executives, to issue demolition orders. Under existing laws, the office of
the mayor is given powers not only relative to its function as the executive official of the town; it has
also been endowed with authority to hear issues involving property rights of individuals and to come
out with an effective order or resolution thereon.20 Pertinent herein is Sec. 444 (b) (3) (vi) of the
LGC, which empowered the mayor to order the closure and removal of illegally constructed
establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits.
Comments: The hotel were not granted the proper permit but they continued to construct and
operate. This was the basis for the Mayor’s power to order the demolition. It did not follow the
requirements. Because it was a nuisance per accidens, the permits were not issued. The non issuance
of the permits and illegal construction and operation of the hotel gave the mayor the authority to
order the closure and removal pursuant to the Local Government Code.
When something is considered a nuisance, you don’t only look at the Civil Code. There are other
laws that can be applied and invoked.
- END -





LAW+107 CREDIT REVIEWER Digests

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

LAW+107 CREDIT REVIEWER Digests

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

AMPP [Property] TSN based on the Lectures of

Notes 1st Semester SY 2017-2018 Atty. Suarez

Under Art. 427, the following may be the subject of ownership:

Part of the right to enjoy is possession.

Possession has 2 concepts:

Possession of things and possession of rights have particular terms:

Classification of Property as to its material existence:

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 1

Correlate Art. 523 with Art. 530 and 531.

Art. 523 means [referring to Art. 531] either you

What may you possess?

For you to possess something, you must be able to appropriate it.

Forms of constructive possession:

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 2

Example: Interest in a condominium unit is evidenced by a certificate of stock in a condominium

What are the requisites that a person possesses a thing or right?

2. Animus possidendi (intent to possess)

3. Possession must be by virtue of one’s own right

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 3

possession is not a perfect possession, that is a juridical possession, possession by virtue of

3. Real possessory right

4. Right of ownership (Possession with title of dominion)

First 3 degrees are Right of possession.

Classification of possession is under Art. 524 to Art. 526.

As to manner of exercise of right of possession:

2 Manners of exercise of right of possession:

2. In the name of another

3 Types/Kinds of Possesion in the name of another:

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 4

Concept of a holder: Opposite of concept of an owner. A holder acknowledges in another a superior

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 5

The title here is a just title.

***Different from what Atty. Suarez discussed.

Ordinary prescription – 10 years. Good faith and just title.

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 6

August 1, 2017 - Manligoy

What happened in the case Sanchez vs CA?

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 7

Under Article 486, what does it state?

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 8

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 9

Issue: Is Herrera the sole/exclusive owner of the subject parcels of land?

CLEARLY, PETITIONER CANNOT CLAIM ADVERSE POSSESSION IN THE CONCEPT OF AN

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 10

Now, compare this case to Balus vs Balus.

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 11

Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 12

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 13

affidavit of Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs adjudicating to himself the subject property

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 14

August 2, 2017 - Pahayahay

Article 523. Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.

Bonifacio Piedad v. Spouses Gurieza

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 15

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 16

Bukidnon Doctor's v. Metrobank

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 17

Alcomendras | Manligoy | Pahayahay | Peroy 18

August 3 part 1 – Peroy

What is that particular point in time?

That’s Art. 528.

This is a presumption. Just read that.