Case Issue Ruling

Petitioner Company now maintains

that its right to procedural due
process has been violated when it Considering the various postponements granted in its behalf, the claimed denial of due process appeared
was precluded from presenting further totally bereft of any legal and factual support. xxx Hence, this Court is not prepared to affix its imprimatur
evidence in support of its stand and to such an illegal scheme and dubious maneuvers.
when its request for further
postponement was denied.

KIOK LOY, doing business under the

name and style SWEDEN ICE CREAM
PLANT, petitioner,
Petitioner further contends that the
vs.
National Labor Relations the Company made no counter proposal whatsoever all of which conclusively indicate lack of a sincere
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
Commission's finding of unfair labor desire to negotiate.
COMMISSION (NLRC) and
practice for refusal to bargain is not
PAMBANSANG KILUSAN NG
supported by law and the evidence Even during the period of compulsory arbitration before the NLRC, petitioner Company's approach and
PAGGAWA (KILUSAN), respondents.
considering that it was only on May attitude-stalling the negotiation by a series of postponements, non-appearance at the hearing conducted,
24, 1979 when the Union furnished and undue delay in submitting its financial statements, lead to no other conclusion except that it is
them with a copy of the proposed unwilling to negotiate and reach an agreement with the Union.
Collective Bargaining Agreement

finally, that the Collective Bargaining

Agreement approved and adopted by
Such a stand and the evidence in support thereof should have been presented before the Labor Arbiter
the National Labor Relations
which is the proper forum for the purpose.
Commission is unreasonable and
lacks legal basis.
 Where the employer did not even bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union,
whether petitioner is guilty of unfair
there is a clear evasion of the duty to bargain collectively.[6]In the case at bar, petitioner's actuation show
labor practice by refusing to bargain
a lack of sincere desire to negotiate rendering it guilty of unfair labor practice.
with the union when it unilaterally
suspended the ongoing negotiations
In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process there must be a valid petition for
for a new Collective Bargaining
certification election raising a legitimate representation issue. Hence, the mere filing of a petition for
Agreement (CBA) upon mere
certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiation by the employer.
information that a petition for
certification has been filed by another
[Besides], the petition was filed outside the sixty-day freedom period. Hence, the filing thereof was barred
legitimate labor organization?
by the existence of a valid and existing collective bargaining agreement.

COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN,

petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATION OF
EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY OF
LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS,
respondents. Just two days later after the negotiations started , or on March 29, 1996, petitioner dismissed the union
president for alleged insubordination

xxx nevertheless, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters of law and pursuant to
the tenets of equity and fair play.

whether the termination of the union
president amounts to an interference
of the employees' right to self-
organization?
The factual backdrop of the termination of Ms. Ambas leads us to no other conclusion that she was
dismissed in order to strip the union of a leader who would fight for the right of her co-workers at the
bargaining table. [She] had been working for the petitioner for ten (10) years already. In fact, she was a
recipient of a loyalty award. Moreover, for the past ten (10) years her working schedule was from Monday
to Friday. However, things began to change when she was elected as union president and when she
started negotiating for a new CBA.

When management refused to treat the charge of insubordination as a grievance within the scope of the
Grievance Machinery, the action of the College in finally dismissing her from the service became arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical, and therefore violated Ms. Ambas' right to due process
 petitioner union should have requested or demanded that such promise or undertaking be incorporated in
the CBA. [Although] petitioner union's assertion that it had insisted on the incorporation of the same
proposal may have a factual basis considering the allegations in the aforementioned joint affidavit of its
members, Article 252 also states that the duty to bargain does not compel any party to agree to a
proposal or make any concession. Hence, petitioner union may not validly claim that the proposal
embodied in the Minutes of the negotiation forms part of the CBA that it finally entered into with private
whether or not private respondent respondent.
committed an unfair labor practice in
SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA TOP
its refusal to grant across-the-board a CBA is not an ordinary contract but one impressed with public interest.[13] It goes without saying,
FORM MANUFACTURING UNITED
wage increases in implementing however, that only provisions embodied in the CBA should be so interpreted and complied with. Where a
WORKERS OF THE PHILIPPINES
Wage Orders Nos. 01 and 02, proposal raised by a contracting party does not find print in the CBA,[14] it is not a part thereof and the
(SMTFM-UWP), its officers and
proponent has no claim whatsoever to its implementation.
members, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
The mere fact that the proposal in question was not included in the CBA indicates that no contractual
HON. JOSE G. DE VERA and TOP
commitment thereon was ever made by private respondent as no agreement had been arrived at by the
FORM MANUFACTURING PHIL., INC.,
parties.
respondents.

whether or not there was a significant

wage distortion of the wage structure
Such issue is question of fact. Hence, as ruled by the then-NLRC commissioner, the wage orders were
in private respondent as a result of
implemented meaningfully, debunking the claim that there was wage distortion as itemized in the WO's.
the manner by which said wage
orders were implemented.
 The circumstances that occurred during the negotiation do not show that the suggestion made by Diokno
to Divinagracia is an anti-union conduct The records show that after the initiation of the collective
bargaining process, with the inclusion of Umali in the Unions negotiating panel, the negotiations pushed
through. The complaint was made only on August 16, 1993 after a deadlock was declared by the Union on
June 15, 1993. The accusation occurred after the arguments and differences over the economic
provisions became heated and the parties had become frustrated. It happened after the parties started to
(a) whether or not the Union was able
involve personalities.
to substantiate its claim of unfair labor
practice against the Bank arising from
respondents did not refuse to bargain collectively with the complaining union because they accepted
the latters alleged interference with its
some of the demands while they refused the others even leaving open other demands for future
choice of negotiator; surface
discussion
bargaining; making bad faith non-
economic proposals; and refusal to
The records show that the Banks counter-proposals on the non-economic provisions or political provisions
furnish the Union with copies of the
did not put up for grabs the entire work of the Union and its predecessors. As can be gleaned from the
STANDARD CHARTERED BANK relevant data;
Banks counter-proposal, there were many provisions which it proposed to be retained.
EMPLOYEES UNION (NUBE),
petitioner, vs. The Honorable MA.
While the refusal to furnish requested information is in itself an unfair labor practice, and also supports the
NIEVES R. CONFESOR, in her capacity
inference of surface bargaining,[55] in the case at bar, Umali, in a meeting dated May 18, 1993, requested
as SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
the Bank to validate its guestimates on the data of the rank and file. However, Umali failed to put his
EMPLOYMENT; and the STANDARD
request in writing as provided for in Article 242(c) of the Labor Code:
CHARTERED BANK, respondents.

(b) whether or not the public

respondent acted with grave abuse of it cannot be said that the public respondent acted in capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment,
discretion amounting to lack or excess equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or excess thereof. Neither was it shown that the public respondent
of jurisdiction when she issued the exercised its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility.
assailed order and resolutions

the approval of the CBA and the release of signing bonus do not necessarily mean that the Union waived
its ULP claim against the Bank during the past negotiations. After all, the conclusion of the CBA was
whether or not the petitioner is
included in the order of the SOLE, while the signing bonus was included in the CBA itself. Moreover, the
estopped from filing the instant action.
Union twice filed a motion for reconsideration respecting its ULP charges against the Bank before the
SOLE.

GERARDO F. RIVERA, ALFRED A.
RAMISO, AMBROCIO PALAD, DENNIS
R. ARANAS, DAVID SORIMA, JR.,
JORGE P. DELA ROSA, and ISAGANI
ALDEA, petitioners, vs. HON.
EDGARDO ESPIRITU in his capacity as
Chairman of the PAL Inter-Agency Task
Force created under Administrative
Order No. 16; HON. BIENVENIDO
LAGUESMA in his capacity as Secretary
of Labor and Employment; PHILIPPINE
AIRLINES (PAL), LUCIO TAN, HENRY September 27, 1998, stipulating the
SO UY, ANTONIO V. OCAMPO,
MANOLO E. AQUINO, JAIME J.
BAUTISTA, and ALEXANDER O.
BARRIENTOS, respondents.
GENERAL MILLING CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, GENERAL MILLING
CORPORATION INDEPENDENT
LABOR UNION (GMC-ILU), and RITO
MANGUBAT, respondents.
The assailed agreement is clearly not the act of a tribunal, board, officer, or person exercising judicial,
Is an original action for certiorari and quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. xxx Instead, what exists is a contract between a private firm and
prohibition the proper remedy to annul one of its labor unions, albeit entered into with the assistance of the Task Force. The first and second
the PAL-PALEA agreement of requisites for certiorari and prohibition are therefore not present in this case. Hence, although the
September 27, 1998 petitioners (PAL) asks for the perusal of facts which is not proper in the highest court, the case
nonetheless pushed through as it is imbued with public interest (PAL is a national flag carrier)
The primary purpose of a CBA is the stabilization of labor-management relations in order to create a
climate of a sound and stable industrial peace. In the case at bar, the assailed PAL-PALEA agreement
was the result of voluntary collective bargaining negotiations undertaken in the light of the severe financial
situation faced by the employer, with the peculiar and unique intention of not merely promoting industrial
peace at PAL, but preventing the latter's closure. It was PALEA, as the exclusive bargaining agent of
Is the PAL-PALEA agreement of
PALs ground employees, that voluntarily entered into the CBA with PAL. It was also PALEA that
voluntarily opted for the 10-year suspension of the CBA.
suspension of the PAL-PALEA CBA
unconstitutional and contrary to public
The legal effect of a contract is not determined alone by any particular provision disconnected from all
policy?
others, but from the whole read together.The aforesaid provisions, taken together, clearly show the intent
of the parties to maintain union security during the period of the suspension of the CBA. Its objective is to
assure the continued existence of PALEA during the said period. . It is State policy to promote unionism to
enable workers to negotiate with management on an even playing field and with more persuasiveness
than if they were to individually and separately bargain with the employer.
It is indisputable that when the union requested for a renegotiation of the economic terms of the CBA on
November 29, 1991, it was still the certified collective bargaining agent of the workers, because it was
seeking said renegotiation within five (5) years from the date of effectivity of the CBA on December 1,
1988. It was obvious that GMC had no valid reason to refuse to negotiate in good faith with the union. For
refusing to send a counter-proposal to the union and to bargain anew on the economic terms of the CBA,
finding GMC guilty of unfair labor
the company committed an unfair labor practice under Article 248 of the Labor Code. GMC failed in its
practice for violating the duty to
duty under Article 252. What it did was to devise a flimsy excuse, by questioning the existence of the
bargain collectively and/or interfering
union and the status of its membership to prevent any negotiation.
with the right of its employees to self-
organization,
The CA likewise found that the letters between February to June 1993 by 13 union members signifying
their resignation from the union clearly indicated that GMC exerted pressure on its employees. The
records show that GMC presented these letters to prove that the union no longer enjoyed the support of
the workers. We agree with the CAs conclusion that the ill-timed letters of resignation from the union
members indicate that GMC had interfered with the right of its employees to self-organization.
By its acts, no less than its action which bespeak its insincerity, [the petitioner] has forfeited whatever
imposing upon GMC the draft CBA rights it could have asserted as an employer. But an erring party should not be allowed to resort with
proposed by the union for two years to impunity to schemes feigning negotiations by going through empty gestures. Thus, by imposing on GMC
begin from the expiration of the the provisions of the draft CBA proposed by the union, in our view, the interests of equity and fair play
original CBA. were properly served and both parties regained equal footing, which was lost when GMC thwarted the
negotiations for new economic terms of the CBA.

DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY, Petitioner,
vs.
DE LA SALLE UNIVERSITY
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (DLSUEA- specifically, a violation of Article
NAFTEU), Respondent.
petitioner erred in suspending collective bargaining negotiations with the union and in placing the union
funds in escrow considering that the intra-union dispute between the Aliazas and Bañez factions was not
[can the petitioner be absolved
a justification.
petitioner from respondent’s charge of
committing an unfair labor practice, or
Neither can petitioner seek refuge in its defense that as early as November 2003 it had already released
the escrowed union dues to respondent and normalized relations with the latter. The fact remains that
248(g) in relation to Article 252 of the
from its receipt of the July 28, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of Labor in OS-AJ-0015-2003 until its
Labor Code
receipt of the November 17, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of Labor in OS-AJ-0033-2003, petitioner
failed in its duty to collectively bargain with respondent union without valid reason.

BUKLOD ÑG SAULOG TRANSIT,
Petitioner, vs. MARCIANO CASALLA, election shall issue on the basis of the
ET ALS., Respondents.
The trial court found that the collective bargaining agreement entered into by and between the Saulog
Transit, Inc. and the Buklod ñg Saulog Transit on 15 July 1953 (Exhibit 10; chan
roblesvirtualawlibraryAnnex D) “does not touch in substantial terms the rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, and other conditions of employment of all the employees in the company but seeks to
establish merely a grievance procedure for drivers, conductors and inspectors who are members of the
Buklod ñg Saulog..
whether or not an order of certification
The trial court took, however, into consideration the agreement and found that the first agreement being
incomplete does not bar a certification election; and as to the supplementary agreement the Court held
evidence established.
that it having been entered into after the filing of the petition for a certification election the same cannot
and does not bar a certification election.

In these circumstances we are of the opinion that the collective bargaining agreement entered into on 15
July 1953 is no bar to a certification election at the instance of at least 10 per cent of the employees in an
appropriate collective bargaining unit, pursuant to section 12, paragraphs (a), (b) and (c), Republic Act
No. 875.

MARCOPPER MINING
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. computation of the CBA increase, the
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and NATIONAL MINES
AND ALLIED WORKERS UNION
(NAMAWU-MIF), respondents.
what should be the basis for the
basic wage without the COLA or the
so-called integrated basic wage
which, by mandate of E.O. No. 178, is no question [however] that as of 1 May 1987, as mandated by E.O. No. 178, the basic wage of workers,
includes the COLA.
To state outright that the parties intended the basic wage to remain invariable even after the advent of EO
178 is unfounded and presumptuous; a claim as such inevitably works to the utmost disadvantage of the
workers and runs counter to the constitutional guarantee of affording protection to labor.
Thus,
[While] the principle that the CBA is the law between the contracting parties stands strong and true, there
or the statutory minimum wage, was increased with the integration of the COLA. [This is] in the light of the
fact that compliance with the law is mandatory and beyond contractual stipulation by and between the
parties; consequently, whether or not petitioner intended the basic wage to include the COLA becomes
immaterial.