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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR


BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President ,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and
FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing, respondents.

ESCOLIN, J.:

Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section
6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated,
petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:

a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200,
234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404,
406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574,
594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961,
1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278,
1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-
1847.

b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153,
155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224,
226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-
289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358,
362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498,
501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642,
665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-
1178,1180-1278.

c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.

d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529,
1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-
1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-
1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800,
1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836,
1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870,
1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984,
1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.

e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507,
509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-
568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-
786, 788-852, 854-857.

f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81,
92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.

g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.

The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the
ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or
prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being
"aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:

SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person


unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a
duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the
use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts
with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant,
immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to
Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.

Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public
right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific
interest for their petition to be given due course.

The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to
a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the
public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are
to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of
public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings
are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient
to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary
Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].

Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper
party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special
election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for
this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:

We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition
that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right
is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that
it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always
dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the
reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the
rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may
well lead to error'

No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by
counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different
from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to
these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty
of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of
this character.

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the
aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced
by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If
petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of
any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this
case.

Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non
requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity
dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions
as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...

The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a
long line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in
those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of
publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.

Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand,
the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication
in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:

Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative
acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all
executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no
general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance
to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required
so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the
President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...

The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws
taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a
power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass
media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the
President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential
decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la
denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno
en uso de su potestad.5

The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative
duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of
public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion
whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.

The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for
their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall
within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of
persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that
they have been circularized to all concerned. 6

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound
by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio
Teehankee said in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:

In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part
of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand
that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish
the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know
where to obtain their official and specific contents.

The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced
or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the
past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage
District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:

The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring
no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged
decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v.
Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as
to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent
ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become
vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon
accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it
is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.

Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.

Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the


Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored.
The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."

From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential
decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos.
1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither
the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are
available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished
PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the
Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of
the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected
thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering
the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from
prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official
Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take
effect immediately.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.

SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of
Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have
binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.

1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not
be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be
gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to
do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any
other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold
would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless
published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana
so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances".
Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what
is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am
likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such
notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government
"must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to
the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the
doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose
of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so
published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based
on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where
such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is
not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover,
where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still
be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by
infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am
not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code
itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception,
"unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A
later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would
be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as
earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of
equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under
certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are
commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based
on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article
3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable
from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which
are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to
a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall
take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading
that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the
Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil
Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it
has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date
of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after
its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to
the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the
retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette.
The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things
may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as
to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a
different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide
for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it
authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the
Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal
and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has
a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official
Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.

DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):

There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of
Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have
binding force and effect.

I shall explain why.


1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if
made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or
executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not
be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be
gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to
do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any
other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold
would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the
interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless
published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana
so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances".
Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what
is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.

2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first
paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The
Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process
requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not
necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am
likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the
extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law
without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such
notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette. 2

3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government
"must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to
the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and
unknowable. 4 Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the
doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the
ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose
of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so
published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted
themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of
publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based
on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be
inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where
such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of
course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is
not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover,
where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still
be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by
infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application.
That is as far as it goes.

4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that
publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am
not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code
itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception,
"unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment,
Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A
later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a
different rule.

5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that
presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would
be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as
earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a
pronouncement.

I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.

Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice
Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of
equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under
certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play
and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are
commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based
on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents,
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people
officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.

Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article
3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable
from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.

Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which
are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to
a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process.
The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall
take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading
that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the
Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil
Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the
simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law
itself before the completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by
the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:


I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it
has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date
of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after
its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to
the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the
retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their
effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette.
The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite
for their effectivity, if said laws already provide for their effectivity date.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things
may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as
to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a
different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may
prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.

Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide
for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it
authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and
distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates
what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and
resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is
noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only
"important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the
Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal
and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as
Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has
a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the
Constitution, can assume that role.

In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness.
However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official
Gazette.

Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such
publication being in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

Footnotes

1 Section 6. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shag
be recognized, access to official records, and to documents and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, shag be afforded the citizens subject to such
limitation as may be provided by law.

2 Anti-Chinese League vs. Felix, 77 Phil. 1012; Costas vs. Aidanese, 45 Phil. 345;
Almario vs. City Mayor, 16 SCRA 151;Parting vs. San Jose Petroleum, 18 SCRA
924; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392.

3 16 Phil. 366, 378.

4 Camacho vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 80 Phil 848; Mejia vs. Balolong, 81 Phil.
486; Republic of the Philippines vs. Encamacion, 87 Phil. 843; Philippine Blooming
Mills, Inc. vs. Social Security System, 17 SCRA 1077; Askay vs. Cosalan, 46 Phil.
179.

5 1 Manresa, Codigo Civil 7th Ed., p. 146.

6 People vs. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640; Balbuena et al. vs. Secretary of Education, et
al., 110 Phil. 150.

7 82 SCRA 30, dissenting opinion.

8 308 U.S. 371, 374.

9 93 Phil.. 68,.

10 The report was prepared by the Clerk of Court after Acting Director Florendo S.
Pablo Jr. of the Government Printing Office, failed to respond to her letter-request
regarding the respective dates of publication in the Official Gazette of the presidential
issuances listed therein. No report has been submitted by the Clerk of Court as to the
publication or non-publication of other presidential issuances.

11 129 SCRA 174.

Fernando, CJ.:

1 Separate Opinion of Justice Plana, first paragraph. He mentioned in tills connection


Article 7, Sec. 21 of the Wisconsin Constitution and State ex rel. White v. Grand
Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing the Constitution of Indiana, U.S.A

2 Ibid, closing paragraph.


3 Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty 104 (1960).

4 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law, 3 (1924).

5 Cf. Nunez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982, 111
SCRA 433.

6 Cf. Alalayan v. National Power Corporation, L-24396, July 29, 1968, 24 SCRA 172.

Teehankee, J.:

1 People vs. de Dios, G.R. No. 11003, Aug. 3l, 1959, per the late Chief Justice
Paras.

2 Notes in brackets supplied.

3 Respondents: comment, pp. 14-15.

Plana, J.:

* See e.g., Wisconsin Constitution, Art. 7, Sec. 21: "The legislature shall provide
publication of all statute laws ... and no general law shall be in force until published."
See also S ate ex rel. White vs. Grand Superior Ct., 71 ALR 1354, citing Constitution
of Indiana, U.S.A.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

G.R. No. L-63915 December 29, 1986

LORENZO M. TAÑ;ADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR


BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.

RESOLUTION

CRUZ, J.:

Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential
decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was "otherwise provided," as when
the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their
approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the necessity for the
publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision. 1Specifically, they ask the following questions:

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability"?

2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?

3. What is meant by "publication"?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws
of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and
that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2

In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a
request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the
clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication
required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be
made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by
three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments. Came
next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a Rejoinder in
view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court. Responding, he
submitted that issuances intended only for the internal administration of a government agency or for
particular persons did not have to be 'Published; that publication when necessary must be in full and
in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under reconsideration was not binding
because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as follows:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year
after such publication.

After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original petition
and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion and so hold, that the clause "unless it is
otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself,
which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the
law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the
usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present
Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code which did not
become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided. "

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether.
The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public
knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e
effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply
because they did not know of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which
must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at
all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and
indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President
Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and t to the public as
a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in
the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of
the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required
of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored
individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the
Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details"
of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social Welfare
on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the head of a
government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of office
uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the Local
Government Code.

We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably
of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. 7 The evident
purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for publication
in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as
the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and another merely acknowledged
the need for due publication without indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary
for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to lay
down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.

There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official Gazette,
considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general
circulation could better perform the function of communicating, the laws to the people as such
periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The trouble,
though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As far as
we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The Solicitor General has not
pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet
been published.

At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if
we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is
merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political departments of the
government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to
pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made in the Official
Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity after fifteen days from such
publication or after a different period provided by the legislature.

We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith or at least as soon as possible, to give
effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not
suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the
executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however, that
we do not need to examine at this time.

Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an advisory
opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.

The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open
society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to public
cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty residing in the
people and all government authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the work of
their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of expression
and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make
full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that
cannot feint parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the legislature,
in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., and Paras, JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa,
I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had
promulgated and made effective thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc.
Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and
abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past
regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential
decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the
case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting
Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax
on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance
of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players
Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made
effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the
people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At
the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is
saying.
A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is
properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette
as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as
purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need
of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle
posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and
unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common tool of
tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the
fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as
distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a
statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the
Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section
35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed
medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a
constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an
amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication
effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

Separate Opinions

FERNAN, J., concurring:

While concurring in the Court's opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang Pambansa,
I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which the previous dispensation had
promulgated and made effective thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters of instructions, etc.
Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the legislature been used and
abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill as it happened in the past
regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad spectacle of two presidential
decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different subject matters. In point is the
case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on March 19, 1980, one granting
Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon the then President's nephew and the other imposing a tax
on every motor vehicle equipped with airconditioner. This was further exacerbated by the issuance
of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting Philippine citizenship to basketball players
Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George Still

The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made
effective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures to the
people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern.

FELICIANO, J., concurring:

I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz. At
the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court is
saying.
A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval thereof, is
properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the Official Gazette
as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should not be regarded as
purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or enactment and without need
of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide with the constitutional obstacle
posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of prescriptions which are both unknown to and
unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has been throughout history a common tool of
tyrannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the
fundamental principle of legality in the relations between a government and its people.

At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official Gazette, as
distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is embodied in a
statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out in Article 2 of the
Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Section
35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette as the prescribed
medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code could, without creating a
constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing, for instance, for publication
either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the country. Until such an
amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code must be obeyed and publication
effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other medium.

Footnotes

1 Rollo pp. 242-250.

2 Ibid, pp. 244-248.

3 Id, pp. 271-280.

4 Id, pp. 288-299.

5 Id, pp. 320-322.

6 136 SCRA 27,46.

7 Rollo, p. 24,6.

8 Justices Venicio Escolin (ponente), Claudio Teehankee. Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, and


Lorenzo Relova.

9 Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Vicente Abad-Santos,
Efren 1. Plana Serafin P. Cuevas. and Nestor B. Alampay.

10 Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.

11 Justice B. S. de la Fuente.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 103144. April 4, 2001]

PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES


CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR
AND EMPLOYMENT, VIVENCIO DE MESA, RODRIGO MIKIN and
CEDRIC LEYSON, respondents.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari from the Order dated November 25, 1991 issued by public
respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment. The November 25, 1991 Order affirmed en
toto the August 29, 1988 Order of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(hereinafter the POEA) which found petitioner liable for three (3) counts of illegal exaction, two
(2) counts of contract substitution and one count of withholding or unlawful deduction from
salaries of workers in POEA Case No. (L) 85-05-0370.
Petitioner Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
Philsa) is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment. Sometime in January 1985, private respondents, who were recruited by petitioner for
employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the amount of P5,000.00 for
private respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de
Mesa and Cedric P. Leyson[1].
After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi
Arabia on January 29, 1985. They then began work for Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign
principal of petitioner.
While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a second contract on
February 4, 1985 which changed some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the
reduction of some of their benefits and privileges[2]. On April 1, 1985, their foreign employer
allegedly forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48 hours to
60 hours a week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they
refused to sign this third contract, the services of private respondents were terminated by Al-
Hejailan and they were repatriated to the Philippines[3].
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa the
return of their placement fees and for the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of
their contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case before the POEA against petitioner Philsa
and its foreign principal, Al-Hejailan., with the following causes of action:
1. Illegal dismissal;
2. Payment of salary differentials;
3. Illegal deduction/withholding of salaries;
4. Illegal exactions/refund of placement fees; and
5. Contract substitution.[4]
The case was docketed as POEA Case No. (L) 85-05-0370.
Under the rules of the POEA dated May 21, 1985, complaints involving employer-employee
relations arising out of or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
employment, including money claims, are adjudicated by the Workers Assistance and
Adjudication Office (hereinafter the WAAO) thru the POEA Hearing Officers[5]. On the other
hand, complaints involving recruitment violations warranting suspension or cancellation of the
license of recruiting agencies are cognizable by the POEA thru its Licensing and Recruitment
Office (hereinafter the LRO).[6] In cases where a complaint partakes of the nature of both an
employer-employee relationship case and a recruitment regulation case, the POEA Hearing Officer
shall act as representative of both the WAAO and the LRO and both cases shall be heard
simultaneously. In such cases, the Hearing Officer shall submit two separate recommendations for
the two aspects of the case.[7]
In the case at bench, the first two causes of action were in the nature of money claims arising
from the employer-employee relations and were properly cognizable by the WAAO. The last two
causes of action were in the nature of recruitment violations and may be investigated by the
LRO. The third cause of action, illegal deduction/withholding of salary, is both a money claim and
a violation of recruitment regulations and is thus under the investigatory jurisdiction of both the
WAAO and the LRO.
Several hearings were conducted before the POEA Hearing Officer on the two aspects of
private respondents complaint. During these hearings, private respondents supported their
complaint with the presentation of both documentary and testimonial evidence. When it was its
turn to present its evidence, petitioner failed to do so and consequently, private respondents filed
a motion to decide the case on the basis of the evidence on record.[8]
On the aspects of the case involving money claims arising from the employer-employee
relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA rendered a decision dated August 31, 1988[9], the
dispositive portion of which reads:

CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering


respondent PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT AND SERVICE
CORPORATION to pay complainants, jointly and severally with its principal Al-
Hejailan, the following amounts, to wit:

1. TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE SAUDI RIYALS


(SR2,225.00) to each complainant, representing the refund of their unpaid separation
pay;

2. ONE THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR1,000.00) for V.A. de Mesa alone,


representing the salary deduction from his March salary;
3. TWO THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR2,000.00) each for R.I. Mikin and C.A.P.
Leyson only, representing their differential pay for the months of February and
March, 1985; and

4. Five percent (5%) of the total awards as and by way of attorneys fees.

All payments of the abovestated awards shall be made in Philippine Currency


equivalent to the prevailing exchange rate according to the Central Bank at the time of
payment.

All other claims of complainants as well as the counterclaims of respondent are


dismissed for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.[10]

Under the Rules and Regulations of the POEA, the decision of the POEA-Adjudication Office
on matters involving money claims arising from the employer-employee relationship of overseas
Filipino workers may be appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (hereinafter the
NLRC)[11]. Thus, as both felt aggrieved by the said POEA Decision, petitioner and private
respondents filed separate appeals from the August 31, 1988 POEA Decision to the NLRC.
In a decision dated July 26, 1989[12], the NLRC modified the appealed decision of the POEA
Adjudication Office by deleting the award of salary deductions and differentials. These awards to
private respondents were deleted by the NLRC considering that these were not raised in the
complaint filed by private respondents. The NLRC likewise stated that there was nothing in the
text of the decision which would justify the award.
Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC
in a Resolution dated October 25, 1989.
Private respondents then elevated the July 26, 1989 decision of the NLRC to the Supreme
Court in a petition for review for certiorari where it was docketed as G.R. No. 89089. However, in
a Resolution dated October 25, 1989, the petition was dismissed outright for insufficiency in form
and substance, having failed to comply with the Rules of Court and Circular No. 1-88 requiring
submission of a certified true copy of the questioned resolution dated August 23, 1989.[13]
Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of the August 31, 1988 decision of the POEA on
private respondents money claims, the POEA issued a separate Order dated August 29,
1988[14] resolving the recruitment violations aspect of private respondents complaint. In this Order,
the POEA found petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution, and unlawful
deduction. The dispositive portion of this August 29, 1988 POEA Order reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds herein respondent PHILSA


International Placement and Services Corporation liable for three (3) counts of illegal
exaction, two (2) counts of contract substitution and one count of withholding or
unlawful deduction from salaries of workers.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered to refund the placement fees in the amount
of P2,500.00 to Rodrigo L. Mikin, P4,000.00, each, to Vivencio A. de Mesa and
Cedric A.P. Leyson plus restitution of the salaries withheld in the amount of
SR1,000.00 to Vivencio A. de Mesa.

Moreover, respondents license is hereby suspended for eight (8) months to take effect
immediately and to remain as such until full refund and restitution of the above-stated
amounts have been effected or in lieu thereof, it is fined the amount of SIXTY
THOUSAND (P60,000.00) PESOS plus restitution,

SO ORDERED.

In line with this August 29, 1988 Order, petitioner deposited the check equivalent to the claims
of private respondents and paid the corresponding fine under protest. From the said Order,
petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was subsequently denied in an Order dated
October 10, 1989.
Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the decision of the POEA thru the LRO suspending
or canceling a license or authority to act as a recruitment agency may be appealed to the Ministry
(now Department) of Labor and Employment.[15] Accordingly, after the denial of its motion for
reconsideration, petitioner appealed the August 21, 1988 Order to the Secretary of Labor and
Employment. However, in an Order dated September 13, 1991[16], public respondent Secretary of
Labor and Employment affirmed en toto the assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but this was likewise denied in an Order dated November 25, 1991.
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari where petitioner raises the following grounds for the
reversal of the questioned Orders:
I.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF


JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING
PETITIONER GUILTY OF ILLEGAL EXACTIONS. THE FINDING IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE. AND IN ANY EVENT, THE LAW ON WHICH
THE CONVICTION IS BASED IS VOID.
II.

THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF


JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
PENALIZING PETITIONER WITH CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION. IN THE
PREMISES, THE CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION IS VALID AS IT IMPROVED
THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
EMPLOYMENT.
III.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING
PETITIONER LIABLE FOR ILLEGAL DEDUCTIONS/WITHHOLDING OF
SALARIES. FOR THE SUPREME COURT ITSELF HAS ALREADY
ABSOLVED PETITIONER FROM THIS CHARGE.

With respect to the first ground, petitioner would want us to overturn the findings of the
POEA, subsequently affirmed by the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, that
it is guilty of illegal exaction committed by collecting placement fees in excess of the amounts
allowed by law. This issue, however, is a question of fact which cannot be raised in a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.[17] As we have previously held:

It should be noted, in the first place, that the instant petition is a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. An extraordinary remedy, its
use is available only and restrictively in truly exceptional cases wherein the action of
an inferior court, board or officer performing judicial or quasi-judicial acts is
challenged for being wholly void on grounds of jurisdiction. The sole office of the
writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does not
include correction of public respondent NLRC's evaluation of the evidence and factual
findings based thereon, which are generally accorded not only great respect but even
finality.[18]

The question of whether or not petitioner charged private respondents placement fees in
excess of that allowed by law is clearly a question of fact which is for public respondent POEA,
as a trier of facts, to determine.As stated above, the settled rule is that the factual findings of quasi-
judicial agencies like the POEA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but at times even finality if
such findings are supported by substantial evidence.[19]
On this point, we have carefully examined the records of the case and it is clear that the ruling
of public respondent POEA that petitioner is guilty of illegal exaction is supported by substantial
evidence. Aside from the testimonial evidence offered by private respondents, they also presented
documentary evidence consisting of receipts issued by a duly authorized representative of
petitioner which show the payment of amounts in excess of those allowed by the POEA. In
contrast, petitioner did not present any evidence whatsoever to rebut the claims of private
respondents despite the many opportunities for them to do so.
Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA
Memorandum Circular No. II, Series of 1983, which enumerated the allowable fees which may be
collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication.
There is merit in the argument.
In Taada vs. Tuvera[20], the Court held, as follows:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private
laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen
days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly
delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only
the personnel of the administrative agency and the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued
by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by
their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Applying this doctrine, we have previously declared as having no force and effect the
following administrative issuances: a) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of
Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation
of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories[21]; b) Letter of Instruction No. 416 ordering the
suspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper mining companies to the national
government[22]; c) Memorandum Circulars issued by the POEA regulating the recruitment of
domestic helpers to Hong Kong[23]; d) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the
Philippine International Trading Corporation regulating applications for importation from the
Peoples Republic of China[24]; and e) Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the
Department of Budget and Management discontinuing the payment of other allowances and fringe
benefits to government officials and employees[25]. In all these cited cases, the administrative
issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they were not published or filed with
the National Administrative Register as required by the Administrative Code of 1987[26].
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared ineffective as
the same was never published or filed with the National Administrative Register.
POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable schedule of
placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders. Under
the said Order, the maximum amount which may be collected from prospective Filipino overseas
workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was apparently issued in compliance with the provisions
of Article 32 of the Labor Code which provides, as follows:

Article 32. Fees to be paid by workers. Any person applying with a private fee-
charging employment agency for employment assistance shall not be charged any fee
until he has obtained employment through its efforts or has actually commenced
employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the approved receipt clearly
showing the amount paid. The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of
allowable fees. (italics supplied)
It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances
which should be published for its effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation[27]. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No.
2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National Administrative Register,
the same is ineffective and may not be enforced.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues however that the imposition of administrative
sanctions on petitioner was based not on the questioned administrative circular but on Article 32
and Article 34 (a)[28] of the Labor Code.
The argument is not meritorious. The said articles of the Labor Code were never cited, much
less discussed, in the body of the questioned Orders of the POEA and Secretary of Labor and
Employment. In fact, the said Orders were consistent in mentioning that petitioners violation of
Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 was the basis for the imposition of administrative
sanctions against petitioner. Furthermore, even assuming that petitioner was held liable under the
said provisions of the Labor Code, Articles 32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code presupposes the
promulgation of a valid schedule of fees by the Department of Labor and Employment.Considering
that, as previously discussed, Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 embodying such a
schedule of fees never took effect, there is thus no basis for the imposition of the administrative
sanctions against petitioner. Moreover, under Book VI, Chapter II, Section 3 of the Administrative
Code of 1987, (r)ules in force on the date of the effectivity of this Code which are not filed within
three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party
or persons. Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2 was never filed with the
National Administrative Register, the same cannot be used as basis for the imposition of
administrative sanctions against petitioner.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the questioned administrative circular
is not among those requiring publication contemplated by Taada vs. Tuvera as it is addressed only
to a specific group of persons and not to the general public.
Again, there is no merit in this argument.
The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private
employment agencies or authority holders, does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling
in Taada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres[29], the
administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely
Philippine and Hong Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and
still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper publication, the said circulars may not be
enforced or implemented.
Our pronouncement in Taada vs. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and
regulations must be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to
a valid delegation. The only exceptions are interpretative regulations, those merely internal in
nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules and guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not been shown to fall under any of these
exceptions.
In this regard, the Solicitor Generals reliance on the case of Yaokasin vs. Commissioner of
Customs[30] is misplaced. In the said case, the validity of certain Customs Memorandum Orders
were upheld despite their lack of publication as they were addressed to a particular class of persons,
the customs collectors, who were also the subordinates of the Commissioner of the Bureau of
Customs. As such, the said Memorandum Orders clearly fall under one of the exceptions to the
publication requirement, namely those dealing with instructions from an administrative superior
to a subordinate regarding the performance of their duties, a circumstance which does not obtain
in the case at bench.
With respect to the second ground, petitioner would want us to review the findings of fact of
the POEA regarding the two counts of alleged contract substitution. Again, this is a question of
fact which may not be disturbed if the same is supported by substantial evidence. A reading of the
August 29, 1988 Order of the POEA shows that, indeed, the ruling that petitioner is guilty of two
(2) counts of prohibited contract substitution is supported by substantial evidence. Thus:

2. As admitted by respondent, there was definitely a contract of substitution in the first


count. The first contract was duly approved by the Administration and, therefore, the
parties are bound by the terms and condition thereof until its expiration. The mere
intention of respondents to increase the number of hours of work, even if there was a
corresponding increase in wage is clear violation of the contract as approved by the
Administration, and notwithstanding the same, the amendment is evidently contrary to
law, morals, good customs and public policy and hence, must be shunned (Art. 1306,
Civil Code of the Philippines, Book III, Title I, Chapter 1, Article 83, Labor Code of
the Philippines, as amended). Moreover, it would appear that the proposed salary
increase corresponding to the increase in number of work bonus may just have been a
ploy as complainant were (sic) thereafter not paid at the increased rate.

As to contract substitution in the second part, a third contract was emphatically


intended by respondent to be signed by complainants which, however, was not
consummated due to the adamant refusal of complainants to sign thereon. Mere
intention of the respondent to commit contract substitution for a second time should
not be left unpunished. It is the duty of this Office to repress such acts by teaching
agencies a lesson to avoid repetition of the same violation.[31]

With respect to the third ground, petitioner argues that the public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion in holding petitioner liable for illegal deductions/withholding of salaries
considering that the Supreme Court itself has already absolved petitioner from this
charge. Petitioner premises its argument on the fact that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC
absolving it from private respondent de Mesas claim for salary deduction has already attained
finality by reason of the dismissal of private respondents petition for certiorari of the said NLRC
decision by the Supreme Court.
Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC has attained finality
by reason of the dismissal of the petition for certiorari assailing the same. However, the said NLRC
Decision dealt only with the money claims of private respondents arising from employer-employee
relations and illegal dismissal and as such, it is only for the payment of the said money claims that
petitioner is absolved. The administrative sanctions, which are distinct and separate from the
money claims of private respondents, may still be properly imposed by the POEA. In fact, in the
August 31, 1988 Decision of the POEA dealing with the money claims of private respondents, the
POEA Adjudication Office precisely declared that respondents liability for said money claims is
without prejudice to and independent of its liabilities for the recruitment violations aspect of the
case which is the subject of a separate Order.[32]
The NLRC Decision absolving petitioner from paying private respondent de Mesas claim for
salary deduction based its ruling on a finding that the said money claim was not raised in the
complaint[33]. While there may be questions regarding such finding of the NLRC, the finality of the
said NLRC Decision prevents us from modifying or reviewing the same. But the fact that the claim
for salary deduction was not raised by private respondents in their complaint will not bar the POEA
from holding petitioner liable for illegal deduction or withholding of salaries as a ground for the
suspension or cancellation of petitioners license.
Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA, on its own initiative, may conduct the
necessary proceeding for the suspension or cancellation of the license of any private placement
agency on any of the grounds mentioned therein.[34] As such, even without a written complaint
from an aggrieved party, the POEA can initiate proceedings against an erring private placement
agency and, if the result of its investigation so warrants, impose the corresponding administrative
sanction thereof. Moreover, the POEA, in an investigation of an employer-employee relationship
case, may still hold a respondent liable for administrative sanctions if, in the course of its
investigation, violations of recruitment regulations are uncovered.[35] It is thus clear that even if
recruitment violations were not included in a complaint for money claims initiated by a private
complainant, the POEA, under its rules, may still take cognizance of the same and impose
administrative sanctions if the evidence so warrants.
As such, the fact that petitioner has been absolved by final judgment for the payment of the
money claim to private respondent de Mesa does not mean that it is likewise absolved from the
administrative sanctions which may be imposed as a result of the unlawful deduction or
withholding of private respondents salary. The POEA thus committed no grave abuse of discretion
in finding petitioner administratively liable of one count of unlawful deduction/withholding of
salary.
To summarize, petitioner should be absolved from the three (3) counts of illegal exaction as
POEA Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 could not be the basis of administrative
sanctions against petitioner for lack of publication. However, we affirm the ruling of the POEA
and the Secretary of Labor and Employment that petitioner should be held administratively liable
for two (2) counts of contract substitution and one (1) count of withholding or unlawful deduction
of salary.
Under the applicable schedule of penalties imposed by the POEA, the penalty for each count
of contract substitution is suspension of license for two (2) months or a fine of P10,000.00 while
the penalty for withholding or unlawful deduction of salaries is suspension of license for two (2)
months or fine equal to the salary withheld but not less than P10,000.00 plus restitution of the
amount in both instances[36]. Applying the said schedule on the instant case, the license of petitioner
should be suspended for six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it should be ordered to pay fine in the
amount of P30,000.00. Petitioner should likewise pay the amount of SR1,000.00 to private
respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa as restitution for the amount withheld from his salary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 13, 1991 and November 25, 1991
Orders of public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment are hereby MODIFIED. As
modified, the license of private respondent Philsa International Placement and Services
Corporation is hereby suspended for six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it is hereby ordered to pay
the amount of P30,000.00 as fine. Petitioner is likewise ordered to pay the amount of SR1,000.00
to private respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa. All other monetary awards are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, p. 24.
[2]
Rollo, p. 25.
[3]
Ibid.
[4]
Rollo, p. 87.
[5]
POEA Rules and Reg. (1985), Book VI, Rule II, Sections 2 and 4.
[6]
POEA Rules and Reg. (1985), Book II, Rule VI, Section 3.
[7]
POEA Rules and Reg. (1985), Book VI, Rule VI, Section 1.
[8]
Rollo, p. 144.
[9]
Annex A of Petition; Rollo, pp. 24-31.
[10]
Rollo, p. 31.
[11]
POEA Rules and Reg. (1985), Book VI, Rule V, Section 2.
[12]
Annex B of Petition; Rollo, pp. 32-38.
[13]
Annex F of Comment of Private Respondents; Rollo, pp. 188-189.
[14]
Annex C of Petition; Rollo, pp. 39-46.
[15]
POEA Rules and Reg. (1985), Book II, Rule VI, Section 18.
[16]
Annex D of Petition, Rollo, pp. 47-51.
[17]
Building Care Corp. vs. NLRC, February 26, 1997.
[18]
Flores vs. NLRC, 253 SCRA 494.
[19]
San Miguel Corp. vs. Ernesto Javate, et al., January 27, 1992; GRF Shipping Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC, 190 SCRA
418.
[20]
136 SCRA 27.
[21]
Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee vs. Court of Appeals, 196
SCRA 263.
[22]
Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 208 SCRA 726.
[23]
Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs. Torres, 212 SCRA 298.
[24]
Philippine International Trading Corporation vs. Angeles, 263 SCRA 421.
[25]
De Jesus vs. Commission on Audit, 294 SCRA 152.
[26]
Administrative Code of 1987, Book VII, Chapter 2, Section 3.
[27]
Philippine International Trading Corporation vs. Angeles, supra.
[28]
Labor Code. Article 34. Prohibited Practices. It shall be unlawful for any individual, entity, licensee or holder
of authority:
(a) To charge or accept, directly or indirectly, any amount greater than that specified in the schedule of allowable fees
prescribed by the Secretary of Labor, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than actually received by him as a
loan or advance.
[29]
212 SCRA 298.
[30]
180 SCRA 599.
[31]
Rollo, p. 44.
[32]
Rollo, p. 30.
[33]
Rollo, p. 37.
[34]
POEA Rules and Reg. (1985), Book II, Rule VI, Section 3.
[35]
POEA Rules and Reg. (1985), Book VI, Rule VI, Section 1.
[36]
Rollo, p. 45.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100335. April 7, 1993.

UNCIANO PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE, INC. (now UNCIANO COLLEGES & GENERAL HOSPITAL,
INC.); MIRANDO C. UNCIANO, SR., DOMINADOR SANTOS AND EDITHA MORA, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, Honorable LOURDES K. TAYAO-JAGUROS, in her capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Manila; ELENA VILLEGAS thru VICTORIA
VILLEGAS; and TED MAGALLANES thru JACINTA MAGALLANES, respondents.

Bernardo P. Fernandez for petitioners.

Free Legal Assistance Group for private respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RULE WHEN A DOCTRINE OF THE SUPREME COURT IS
OVERRULED AND A DIFFERENT VIEW IS ADOPTED. — In the case of People v. Jabinal, (G.R.
No. 82499, 178 SCRA 493 [1989]), it is a settled rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled
and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not
apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; PROVISIONAL REMEDIES; PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION; PURPOSE. — As


to the question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, the
case of Capitol Medical Center, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. discussed exhaustively the
purpose in issuing said writ: "The sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or
mandatory, is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. The status quo is
the last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the controversy (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso,
76 Phil. 225). It may only be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or
interests and for no other purpose during the pendency of the principal action (Calo vs. Roldan, 76
Phil. 445). It should only be granted if the party asking for it is clearly entitled thereto (Climaco vs.
Macaraeg, 4 SCRA 930; Subido vs. Gopengco, 27 SCRA 455; Police Commission vs. Bello, 37
SCRA 230). Inasmuch as a mandatory injunction tends to do more than to maintain the status quo, it
is generally improper to issue such an injunction prior to the final hearing (Manila Electric Railroad
and Light Co. vs. Del Rosario, 22 Phil. 433). It may, however, issue 'in cases of extreme urgency;
where the right is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in
complainant's favor; where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his
protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing one; and where the effect of the mandatory
injunction is rather to reestablish and maintain a preexisting continuing relation between the parties,
recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation. Indeed, the writ
should not be denied the complainant when he makes out a clear case, free from doubt and dispute.'
(Commissioner of Customs vs. Cloribel, et al., 19 SCRA 235)."

DECISION

NOCON, J p:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking reversal of the decision 1 of public respondent Court
of Appeals dated February 7, 1991, in CA-G.R. SP No. 21020; and its resolution dated June 3, 1991.

The antecedent facts are, as follows:

On April 16, 1990, private respondents Elena Villegas and Ted Magallanes, thru their mothers,
Victoria Villegas and Jacinta Magallanes, respectively, filed before the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Branch 21, a petition for injunction and damages with prayer for a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioners Unciano Paramedical College, Inc. (now
Unciano Colleges and General Hospital, Inc.), Mirando C. Unciano, Sr., Dominador Santos, Editha
Mora, Dr. Evelyn Moral and Laureana Vitug, docketed as Civil Case No. 90-52745. Among other
things, they alleged therein that:

"6.01. Around the latter part of July 1989, the above-named students initiated a petition proposing to
the school authorities the organization of a student council in the school. They solicited support of
their petition from the studentry by asking the students to endorse the same with their signatures.
They were able to get at least 180 signatures.

"6.02. On August 18, 1989, Elena Villegas and a certain student named Solomon Barroa were
summoned to the Office of Dr. Moral and were admonished not to proceed with the proposal
because, according to her, the school does not allow and had never allowed such an organization.
"6.03. On September 12, 1989, when news leaked out that the above-named students would be
barred from enrollment, they sought confirmation with respondent Dr. Moral, Dean of Discipline, who
told them 'it's not true unless you violate the rules and regulations of the school and if you still insist
with your student council.'

"6.04. On October 28, 1989, in compliance with an announcement to see the Dean of Nursing, the
above-named students met with Dean Vitug and Dr. Moral who informed them that they would be
barred from enrollment for the second semester because they supposedly harassed a female
student, invited an outsider to the school to speak before the students, and also because the school
has an arrangement with the Department of Education, Culture and Sports not to allow their students
to put up a student council. Dr. Moral advised them to get their Honorable Dismissal, and warned
them that if she herself were to give it, it would be marked `expelled.'

"6.05. On November 6, 1989, the students again approached Dr. Moral who informed them that they
were no longer allowed to enroll because they are allegedly members of the National Union of
Students of the Philippines (NUSP) and the League of Filipino Students (LFS), officers of the student
organization they organized, and, moreover 'drug addicts.' The students asked for proof of these
accusations but were not given any, and were told by Dr. Moral that the school has people
investigating for (sic) them but she did not disclose their identities nor provide any proof to support
her allegations.

"6.06. On November 13, 1989, a few days after petitioners retained the services of counsel FREE
LEGAL ASSISTANCE GROUP (FLAG), counsel sent a letter to Mr. Mirando Unciano, President of
the College, demanding that the constitutional requirements of due process be complied with prior to
unilaterally dismissing the students, and requesting that a conference be held prior to 17 November
1989, as the enrollment deadline was fast approaching . . .:

"6.07. On 17 November 1989, acceding to the demand, a meeting was held, attended by Dr. Moral,
Dean Vitug, Mr. Rustico Lopez, the students, and their counsel. Due, however, to the inability of Dr.
Moral to resolve the problem in the absence of the College President and their legal counsel, the
meeting was reset to November 22, 1989 upon Dr. Moral's request. However, notice was sent to the
students' counsel from Unciano Paramedical College resetting the meeting to November 27, 1989
stating that the President will attend personally therein . . .

"6.08. On 27 November 1989, due to the absence of the school's legal counsel and the President
who allegedly just arrived from the United States, Dr. Moral again requested that the meeting be
reset. A verbal altercation occurred between the parties due to the delaying tactics of the school
officials and the failure to resolve the problem by their continuous refusal to discuss the merits of the
accusations against the students. The meeting, attended by Dr. Moral, Dean Vitug and Dean
Dominador Santos, ended with the school officials' request that it be reset for 29 November 19B9
and that the students bring their parents or guardian with them at said meeting. The students agreed
to this request and their counsel prepared a written summary of the matters discussed and agreed
during the meeting. The school officials refused to sign it, however . . .

"6.09. On 29 November 1989, the students were informed that the President had unilaterally refused
to allow them to enroll and it was up to their parents to request or appeal to the school officials to
change their decision. Mrs. Victoria Villegas and Mrs. Jacinta Magallanes wrote to the school
officials to request that their children be allowed to enroll . . . Dr. Moral informed them that the Board
of Trustees will have to decide on these requests.

"6.10. On 11 December 1989, the students were informed that the Board of Trustees had refused to
grant the parents' request." 2
On May 16, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective May 17, 1990,
enjoining petitioner school from not enrolling private respondents in its College of Nursing and
setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on June 4, 1990. 3

Petitioners filed an opposition to the prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction on the ground that
private respondents are not entitled thereto and have no clear legal right to the relief demanded. On
the same date, the trial court issued an order, the pertinent parts of which, read:

"xxx xxx xxx

"It is the opinion of the Court that there will be irreparable injury to the petitioners if they are not
allowed to enroll. At least they will miss another semester.

"On the other hand, the injuries mentioned by Dr. Unciano, in particular the withdrawal of the other
students and the school will lose money if the petitioners are allowed to enroll is still a speculation,
and may not take place.

"In view thereof, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for issuance of a preliminary mandatory
injunction, ordering the respondents to allow petitioners to enroll for the first semester of school year
1990-1991, upon filing by petitioners of a bond in the amount of P2,000.00 each.

"xxx xxx xxx

"SO ORDERED." 4

On June 11. 1990, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued. 5

On June 13, 1990, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the Order of June 4, 1990 was denied. 6

Elevating the matter to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction, the same was dismissed on February 7, 1991 for lack of merit. 7 Said the court:

"The arguments advanced in support of the petition are mainly anchored on the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of ALCUAZ, et al. vs. Philippine School of Business Administration,
Quezon City Branch (PSBA), et al., L-76353, May 2, 1988; 161 SCRA 7 where it was held that —

'It is beyond dispute that a student once admitted by the school is considered enrolled for one
semester. It is provided in Paragraph 137 (of the) Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, that
when a college student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire
semester. Likewise, it is provided in the Manual, that the 'written contracts' required for college
teachers are for 'one semester.' It is thus evident that after the close of the first semester, the PSBA-
QC no longer has any existing contract either with the students or with the intervening teachers . . .

"However, in the more recent case of Ariel Non, et al. vs. Hon. Sancho Dames II, et al., G.R. No.
89317, May 20, 1990 (185 SCRA 523), the Supreme Court, abandoned and overruled its decision in
Alcuaz and declared thus:

The Court, in Alcuaz, anchored its decision on the 'termination of contract' theory. But it must be
repeatedly emphasized that the contract between the school and the student is not an ordinary
contract. It is imbued with public interest, considering the high priority given by the Constitution to
education and the grant to the State of supervisory and regulatory powers over all educational
institutions [See Art. XIV, Secs. 1-2, 4(1).]

'Respondent school cannot justify its actions by relying on Paragraph 137 of the Manual of
Regulations for Private School which provides that '(w)hen a student registers in a school, it is
understood that he is enrolling for the entire semester for collegiate courses,' which the Court in
Alcuaz construed as authority for schools to refuse enrollment to a student on the ground that his
contract, which has a term of one semester, has already expired.

'The 'termination of contract' theory does not even find support in the Manual. Paragraph 137 merely
clarifies that a college student enrolls for the entire semester. It serves to protect schools wherein
tuition fees are collected and paid on an installment basis, i.e. collection and payment of the
downpayment upon enrollment and the balance before examinations. Thus, even if a student does
not complete the semester for which he was enrolled, but has stayed on for more than two weeks,
he may be required to pay his tuition fees for the whole semester before he is given his credentials
for transfer. This is the import of Paragraph 137, subsumed under Section VII on Tuition and Other
Fees, which in its totality provides:

'137. When a student registers in a school, it is understood that he is enrolling for the entire school
year for elementary and secondary courses, and for the entire semester for collegiate courses. A
student who transfers or otherwise withdraws, in writing, within two weeks after the beginning of
classes and who has already paid the pertinent tuition and other school fees in full or for any length
of time longer than one month may be charged ten per cent of the total amount due for the term if he
withdraws within the first week of classes, or twenty per cent if within the second week of classes,
regardless of whether or not he has actually attended classes. The student may be charged all the
school fees in full if he withdraws anytime after the second week of classes. However, if the transfer
or withdrawal is due to a justifiable reason, the student shall be charged the pertinent fees only up to
and including the last month of attendance.'

'Clearly, in no way may Paragraph 137 be construed to mean that the student shall be enrolled for
only one semester, and that after the semester is over his re-enrollment is dependent solely on the
sound discretion of the school. On the contrary, the Manual recognizes the right of the student to be
enrolled in his course for the entire period he is expected to complete it. Thus, Paragraph 107 states:

'Every student has the right to enroll in any school, college or university upon meeting its specific
requirement and reasonable regulation: Provided, that except in the case of academic delinquency
and violation of disciplinary regulation, the student is presumed to be qualified for enrollment for the
entire period he is expected to his (sic) complete his course without prejudice to his right to transfer.'

'This 'presumption' has been translated into a right in Batas Pambansa Blg. 232, the 'Education Act
of 1982.' Section 9 of this act provides:

'SEC. 9. Rights of Students in School. — In addition to other rights, and subject to the limitations
prescribed by law and regulations, students and pupils in all schools shall enjoy the following rights:

xxx xxx xxx

12. The right to freely choose their field of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their
course therein up to graduation, except in cases of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary
regulations.' " 8
On June 3, 1991, the motion for reconsideration was denied, again, for lack of merit. 9 Hence, the
present petition.

Petitioners raise this lone issue:

"WHETHER OR NOT THE NON DOCTRINE SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO


GOVERN AND INVALIDATE THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF INCIDENTS THAT TOOK PLACE PRIOR
TO ITS ADOPTION AND WHICH INCIDENTS WERE PROPER AND VALID UNDER THE ALCUAZ
DOCTRINE PREVAILING AT THE TIME SAID INCIDENTS TOOK PLACE." 10

Petitioners argue that under the then prevailing Alcuaz doctrine which was promulgated on May 2,
1988, the contract between them and private respondents was validly terminated upon the end of
the first semester of school year 1989-1990. Although said doctrine was later abandoned in Non, et
al. v. Dames II, et al., supra, this case was promulgated much later, or on May 20, 1990, when the
termination of the contract between them had long become fait accompli. Settled is the rule that
when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine is applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith
thereof, conformably with the case of People v. Jabinal, G.R. No. L-30061, 55 SCRA 607 (1974).
Thus, the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued by the trial court with grave abuse of
discretion.

We agree with the arguments of petitioners.

The ruling in the Non case should not be given a retroactive effect to cases that arose before its
promulgation on May 20, 1990, as in this case, which was filed on April 16, 1990. If it were
otherwise, it would result in oppression to petitioners and other schools similarly situated who relied
on the ruling in the Alcuaz case, promulgated on May 2, 1988, which recognized the termination of
contract theory. We had an opportunity to resolve a similar issue in National Service Corporation, et
al. v. NLRC. 11 In this case, petitioner claimed that as a government corporation (by virtue of its
being a subsidiary of the National Investment and Development Corporation, a subsidiary wholly
owned by the Philippine National Bank, which in turn is a government owned corporation), the terms
and conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the civil service law, rules and
regulations. In support thereof, petitioner cited the ruling in National Housing Corporation v. Juco, 12
that employees of government owned or controlled corporations are governed by the civil service
law, rules and regulations, we rejected this claim of petitioner and held that:

"It would appear that, in the interest of justice, the holding in said case should not be given
retroactive effect, that is, to cases that arose before its promulgation on 17 January 1985. To do
otherwise would be oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated, because under the
same 1973 Constitution but prior to the ruling in National Housing Corporation vs. Juco, this Court
had recognized the applicability of the Labor Code to, and the authority of the NLRC to exercise
jurisdiction over, disputes involving terms and conditions of employment in government-owned or
controlled corporations, among them, the National Service Corporation (NASECO)." 13

In addition, We reiterate Our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v. Jabinal, supra, that it is
a settled rule that when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new
doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old
doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.

Coming now to the question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, the case of Capitol Medical Center, Inc., et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al. 14 discussed
exhaustively the purpose in issuing said writ:
"The sole object of a preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, is to preserve the
status quo until the merits of the case can be heard. The status quo is the last actual peaceable
uncontested status which preceded the controversy (Rodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil. 225). It may only
be resorted to by a litigant for the preservation or protection of his rights or interests and for no other
purpose during the pendency of the principal action (Calo vs. Roldan, 76 Phil. 445). It should only be
granted if the party asking for it is clearly entitled thereto (Climaco vs. Macaraeg, 4 SCRA 930;
Subido vs. Gopengco, 27 SCRA 455; Police Commission vs. Bello, 37 SCRA 230).

Inasmuch as a mandatory injunction tends to do more than to maintain the status quo, it is generally
improper to issue such an injunction prior to the final hearing (Manila Electric Railroad and Light Co.
vs. Del Rosario, 22 Phil. 433). It may, however, issue 'in cases of extreme urgency; where the right
is very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor
where there is a willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest and remonstrance,
the injury being a continuing one and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to re-
establish and maintain a pre-existing continuing relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily
interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation. Indeed, the writ should not be denied
the complainant when he makes out a clear case, free from doubt and dispute.' (Commissioner of
Customs vs. Cloribel, et al., 19 SCRA 235.)." 15

In the present case, the contract between the parties was validly terminated upon the end of the first
semester of school year 1989-1990, or in October, 1989. This is the status quo. The trial court
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction which ordered
petitioners to allow private respondents "to enroll for the first semester of school year 1990-1190." 16
Guided by the Capitol case, certainly, this writ will not restore the status quo but will go a step
backward, then restore the condition preceding the status quo. Private respondents do not possess
any clear legal right to re-enroll, corollarily, petitioners are not obliged legally to re-admit them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated
February 7, 1991 and its resolution dated June 3, 1991 are SET ASIDE. The orders of the trial court
dated June 4, 1990 and June 13, 1990 and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction are likewise
SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ ., concur.

Footnotes

1. Penned by Justice Arturo B. Buena with the concurrence of Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes
and Justice Cancio C. Garcia.

2. Pp. 47-51, Rollo.

3. P. 55, Rollo.

4. Pp. 63-64, Rollo.

5. P. 75, Rollo.

6. Pp. 76-77, Rollo.


7. P. 41, Rollo.

8. Pp. 37-41, Rollo.

9. P. 45, Rollo.

10. P. 238, Rollo.

11. G.R. No. 69870, 168 SCRA 122 (1988).

12. G.R. No. 64313, 134 SCRA 172 (1985).

13. At pp. 132-133.

14. G.R. No. 82499, 178 SCRA 493 (1989).

15. At pp. 503-504.

16. P. 75, Rollo.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961

EMETERIO CUI, plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, defendant-appellee.

G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.


E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, absolving
defendant Arellano University from plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the plaintiff, and
dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of proof thereon.

In the language of the decision appealed from:

The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established by the agreement
of facts Exhibits X and by the respective oral and documentary evidence introduced by the
parties, it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949 took up
preparatory law course in the defendant University. After finishing his preparatory law course
plaintiff enrolled in the College of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-1949.
Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first
semester of the fourth year. During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in
defendant law college, Francisco R. Capistrano, brother of the mother of plaintiff, was the
dean of the College of Law and legal counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for
the last semester of his law studies in the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition
fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R. Capistrano having severed his connection with
defendant and having accepted the deanship and chancellorship of the College of Law of
Abad Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law college and enrolled for the last
semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad Santos University graduating
from the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all the time he was studying
law in defendant university was awarded scholarship grants, for scholastic merit, so that his
semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the ends of semester and when his
scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition fees paid by plaintiff to
defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to and including the
first semester of his last year in the college of law or the fourth year, is in total P1,033.87.
After graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar examination.
To secure permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of his records in defendant
Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed transcripts. The
defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant refunded to
him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examination without those transcripts,
plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff seeks to
recover from defendant in this case.

Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he was made
to sign the following contract covenant and agreement:

"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right
to transfer to another school without having refunded to the University (defendant) the
equivalent of my scholarship cash.

(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".

It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38,
series of 1949, on the subject of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private schools, colleges
and universities," reading:

1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show that some schools offer
full or partial scholarships to deserving students — for excellence in scholarship or for
leadership in extra-curricular activities. Such inducements to poor but gifted students should
be encouraged. But to stipulate the condition that such scholarships are good only if the
students concerned continue in the same school nullifies the principle of merit in the award of
these scholarships.

2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such
scholarships are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to
these scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they
decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered
merely to attract and keep students in a school.

3. Several complaints have actually been received from students who have enjoyed
scholarships, full or partial, to the effect that they could not transfer to other schools since
their credentials would not be released unless they would pay the fees corresponding to the
period of the scholarships. Where the Bureau believes that the right of the student to transfer
is being denied on this ground, it reserves the right to authorize such transfer.

that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that plaintiff asked the Bureau of Private
Schools to pass upon the issue on his right to secure the transcript of his record in defendant
University, without being required to refund the sum of P1,033.87; that the Bureau of Private Schools
upheld the position taken by the plaintiff and so advised the defendant; and that, this
notwithstanding, the latter refused to issue said transcript of records, unless said refund were made,
and even recommended to said Bureau that it issue a written order directing the defendant to
release said transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented to the court for judicial action."
As above stated, plaintiff was, accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay under protest, said sum
of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar examination in 1953. Subsequently, he brought this
action for the recovery of said amount, aside from P2,000 as moral damages, P500 as exemplary
damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses of litigation.

In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of Private Schools, namely,
that the provisions of its contract with plaintiff are valid and binding and that the memorandum
above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise, set up a counterclaim for P10,000.00 as damages,
and P3,000 as attorney's fees.

The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract between plaintiff and the
defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the
latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not. The lower court resolved this question
in the affirmative, upon the ground that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private
Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory, not mandatory in nature; and that,
although the contractual provision "may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to quit
studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply because he wanted to follow the
example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its brief that the aforementioned
memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void because said officer had no
authority to issue it, and because it had been neither approved by the corresponding department
head nor published in the official gazette.

We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, the question whether
plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not to transfer from defendant University to the Abad Santos
University. The nature of the issue before us, and its far reaching effects, transcend personal
equations and demand a determination of the case from a high impersonal plane. Neither do we
deem it essential to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for, regardless of the same,
we are of the opinion that the stipulation in question is contrary to public policy and, hence, null and
void. The aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound principle of public policy. As the
Director of Private Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter, Exhibit B, to the defendant,

There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the contract entered
into between Cui and Arellano University on September 10, 1951 was void as against public
policy. In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case
127, the court said: 'In determining a public policy of the state, courts are limited to a
consideration of the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of
government officers.' It might take more than a government bureau or office to lay down or
establish a public policy, as alleged in your communication, but courts consider the practices
of government officials as one of the four factors in determining a public policy of the state. It
has been consistently held in America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of
public policy, as applied to the law of contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold
a transaction which its object, operation, or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the
public welfare, to sound morality or to civic honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S.
139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811; Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano
University understood clearly the real essence of scholarships and the motives which
prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949, it should have not entered into a
contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a direct violation of our
Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the Director of Private Schools
because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. And finally, in
Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order to
declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to
consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or
is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security
of individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound
policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in
school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships award is a
business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution.
Thus conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But what is
morals? Manresa has this definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles
of morality which have received some kind of social and practical confirmation. The practice
of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not good customs
nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private
institutions as in Arellano University. The University of the Philippines which implements
Section 5 of Article XIV of the Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to
gifted children, does not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the
scholarships if they transfer to other schools. So also with the leading colleges and
universities of the United States after which our educational practices or policies are
patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep brilliant
students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in
whom society has an established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis supplied.)

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered
sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the
legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and
dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades, Dizon, De Leon and Natividad,
JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., reserves his vote.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974


THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees,
vs.
JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-
appellee.

Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.

ANTONIO, J.:p

Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused
guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one
(1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his
conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa.1

The complaint filed against the accused reads:

That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the
poblacion, Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a person not
authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his
possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with
one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary
permit or license to possess the same.

At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial
was accordingly held.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the
ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed
to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment
as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential
Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them
the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.

Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His
appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:

Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be
an effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and
order in the province of Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of
trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the
detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the
undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or as soon as you have
qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally
of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in
this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be
clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered
sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate
separation from the service. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in
G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a
firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of
your duties.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by
taking your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us.

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FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:

Kind: — ROHM-Revolver

Make: — German

SN: — 64

Cal:— .22

On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas
as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted
persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order
condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to
possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the
performance of his duties.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as
Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs.
Macarandang2 and People vs. Lucero.3 The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence
of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the
Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to
possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its
decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and
ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases
of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court
considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent.

Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero,


supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of
conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a
certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial
Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of
crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that
while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit,
nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and
Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and
detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are
exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero,
We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to
the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to
effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and
by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground:

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful
for any person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition
therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended
by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides that
"firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or
marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards
in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors,
and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms
are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of
their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he
is not exempt. ... .

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in
1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the
matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our
decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in
this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero,
or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of
the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he
accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws
mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying
or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The
interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law
originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative
intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous
authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation
placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down
in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time
appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial
court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this
Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively,
and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that
the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine
enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his
possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be
absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held
not to be punishable.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with
costs de oficio.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164.

2 106 Phil. (1959), 713.

3 103 Phil. (1958), 500.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,


vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and
August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent
is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the
marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on
April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United
States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila,
(the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be
ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with right
to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court
wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of
June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground
that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in
the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to
appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in
a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committed which,
in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be
useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this
case within the exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in
the Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that
they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal
funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail
over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and
declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest
Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal
fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who
appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over
private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California,
authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground
of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor community
obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of
KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear
on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further
contesting, subject to the following:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.


2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending
in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to
local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal
Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court
of competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control
over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly
exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his
own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her
heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.
Footnotes

1 Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs. People, 114 SCRA 348 (1982).

2 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).

3 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.

4 p. 98, Rollo.

5 "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.

6 cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras, Civil Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p.
52; Salonga, Private International Law, 1979 ed., p. 231."

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998]

FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA


DANDAN,* respondents.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J .:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18
May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their
relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing
their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On
23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a
certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the
U.S.A., she married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed
a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration
concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina
Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo
Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named
in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the
appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon
motion of the oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30
April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of
the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and
Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo,
intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent
and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent
as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same
day, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten
(10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the
declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed
without the required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao[1] which held that "a foreign divorce between
Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386)
was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"[2] disregarded the divorce between
petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the
death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal
properties due to lack of judicial approval.[3] On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing
that marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the
alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As
regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987[4] only petitioner
and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net
hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs.[5]
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present
proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis
who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of
birth. Thus on 15 February 1988[6] partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan
children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto
Padlan, and petitioner to the other half.[7] Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it
was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April
1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous
marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors
allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing,
in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive
shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided
as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on
11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February
1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings.[8] On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.[9]
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that
there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the
heirship of the Padlan children or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of the decedent;
and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper heir of the
decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on established facts and
admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there
is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan
children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly
acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan;[10] nor
as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimate
surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appear
during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs
and distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth
of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others,
the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she
had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above
quoted procedural rule.[11] To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such
remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.[12] Reading between the lines,
the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from
Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her
citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of
documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or
opposing the evidence.Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by
merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision
she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.
Romillo Jr.[13] that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set
for hearing.[14] Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her
citizenship.[15] The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded
to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and
were married in the Philippines."[16] It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding
on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied
with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as
to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court must
have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino
citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very
well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; [17] it did not merit
enlightenment however from petitioner.[18] In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship is
brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript
of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original
of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof
before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered
that she was since 1954.[19] Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was
obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase
the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings
to be conducted by the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering
the case returned to the trial court for further proceedings.
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited
only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent's
claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April
1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a
bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil
Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship.[20]
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared in
contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping,[21] the same lacks
merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and same
essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and
issue.[22] The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed
before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of
certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the
existence of forum shopping.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals
ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null
and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs
is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-
half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel,
Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's
brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the
reception of evidence by the trial court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as
the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the
present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Mendoza, and Martinez, JJ., concur.
*
The name of private respondent Blandina Dandan appears as Blandina Padlan in the proceedings before the lower
courts.
[1]
No. L-19671, 29 November 1965, 15 SCRA 355.
[2]
Id., p. 367.
[3]
Then Art. 190 of the Civil Code provided that in the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlement,
the separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in virtue of a judicial
order. Quite in relation thereto, then Art. 191, par. 4 of the same Code provided that the husband and the wife may
agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval.
[4]
Decision penned by Judge Tomas V. Tadeo Jr. of RTC-Br. 105, Quezon City; Appendix "A" of Brief for the
Oppositors-Appellants; CA Rollo, p. 15.
[5]
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides that should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the
other half.
[6]
Appendix "B" of Brief for the Oppositors-Appellants; See Note 4.
[7]
Article 998 of the Civil Code provides that if a widow or widower survives with illegitimate children, such widow
or widower shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the illegitimate children or their descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, to the other half.
[8]
Decision penned by Justice Pacita Caizares-Nye with the concurrence of Justices Romeo J. Callejo Jr. and Delilah
Vidallon-Magtolis; Rollo, p. 39.
[9]
Id., p. 42.
[10]
Id., p. 180.
[11]
Rollo, p. 196.
[12]
CA Rollo, p. 29.
[13]
G. R. No. 68470, 8 October 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
[14]
CA Rollo, p. 30.
[15]
Record on Appeal, pp. 24-26.
[16]
Rollo, p. 206.
[17]
Brief of Oppositors-Appellants, p. 13; CA Rollo, p. 15.
[18]
Brief of Appellee; Id., p. 17.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 225-226.
[20]
Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, 1979 Ed., Vol. III, p.
264.
[21]
Rollo, pp. 129-132.
[22]
Professional Regulation Commission v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 117817, 9 July 1998.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 167109 February 6, 2007

FELICITAS AMOR-CATALAN, Petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, ORLANDO B. CATALAN and MEROPE E.
BRAGANZA, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69875 dated
August 6, 2004, which reversed the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City,
Branch 44, in Civil Case No. D-10636, declaring the marriage between respondents Orlando B.
Catalan and Merope E. Braganza void on the ground of bigamy, as well as the Resolution3 dated
January 27, 2005, which denied the motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan married respondent Orlando on June 4, 1950 in Mabini,


Pangasinan.4Thereafter, they migrated to the United States of America and allegedly became
naturalized citizens thereof. After 38 years of marriage, Felicitas and Orlando divorced in April 1988.5

Two months after the divorce, or on June 16, 1988, Orlando married respondent Merope in
Calasiao, Pangasinan.6 Contending that said marriage was bigamous since Merope had a prior
subsisting marriage with Eusebio Bristol, petitioner filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage with damages in the RTC of Dagupan City7 against Orlando and Merope.

Respondents filed a motion to dismiss8 on the ground of lack of cause of action as petitioner was
allegedly not a real party-in-interest, but it was denied.9 Trial on the merits ensued.

On October 10, 2000, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is declared in favor of plaintiff Felicitas Amor Catalan and against
defendants Orlando B. Catalan and Merope E. Braganza, as follows:

1) The subsequent marriage of Merope Braganza with Orlando B. Catalan is declared null
and void ab initio;

2) The defendants are ordered jointly and severally to pay plaintiff by way of moral damages
the amount of P300,000.00, exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and
attorney’s fees in the amount of P50,000.00, including costs of this suit; and

3) The donation in consideration of marriage is ordered revoked and the property donated is
ordered awarded to the heirs of Juliana Braganza.

Furnish copies of this Decision to Atty. Napoleon B. Arenas, Jr. and Atty. Nolan Evangelista.

SO ORDERED.10
Respondents appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of the
RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby GRANT the appeal and consequently REVERSE
and SET ASIDE the appealed decision. We likewise DISMISS Civil Case No. D-10636, RTC, Branch
44, Dagupan City. No costs.

SO ORDERED.11

After the motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition for review raising
the following issues:

I.

WHETHER PETITIONER HAS THE REQUIRED STANDING IN COURT TO QUESTION THE


NULLITY OF THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN RESPONDENTS;

II.

WHETHER THE FAILURE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS TO DECLARE THE QUESTIONED


MARRIAGE VOID CONSTITUTES REVERSIBLE ERROR.12

Petitioner contends that the bigamous marriage of the respondents, which brought embarrassment
to her and her children, confers upon her an interest to seek judicial remedy to address her
grievances and to protect her family from further embarrassment and humiliation. She claims that
the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in not declaring the marriage void despite
overwhelming evidence and the state policy discouraging illegal and immoral marriages.13

The main issue to be resolved is whether petitioner has the personality to file a petition for the
declaration of nullity of marriage of the respondents on the ground of bigamy. However, this issue
may not be resolved without first determining the corollary factual issues of whether the petitioner
and respondent Orlando had indeed become naturalized American citizens and whether they had
actually been judicially granted a divorce decree.

While it is a settled rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-
examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case,14 there
are, however, exceptions to this rule, like when the findings of facts of the RTC and the Court of
Appeals are conflicting, or when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based.15

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that petitioner and respondent Orlando were
naturalized American citizens and that they obtained a divorce decree in April 1988. However, after
a careful review of the records, we note that other than the allegations in the complaint and the
testimony during the trial, the records are bereft of competent evidence to prove their naturalization
and divorce.

The Court of Appeals therefore had no basis when it held:

In light of the allegations of Felicitas’ complaint and the documentary and testimonial evidence she
presented, we deem it undisputed that Orlando and Felicitas are American citizens and had this
citizenship status when they secured their divorce decree in April 1988. We are not therefore dealing
in this case with Filipino citizens whose marital status is governed by the Family Code and our Civil
Code, but with American citizens who secured their divorce in the U.S. and who are considered by
their national law to be free to contract another marriage. x x x16

Further, the Court of Appeals mistakenly considered the failure of the petitioner to refute or contest
the allegation in respondents’ brief, that she and respondent Orlando were American citizens at the
time they secured their divorce in April 1988, as sufficient to establish the fact of naturalization and
divorce.17 We note that it was the petitioner who alleged in her complaint that they acquired
American citizenship and that respondent Orlando obtained a judicial divorce decree.18 It is settled
rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.19

Divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces
are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2)
limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.20 A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the
foreigner.21 However, before it can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it, which must be proved
considering that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.22

Without the divorce decree and foreign law as part of the evidence, we cannot rule on the issue of
whether petitioner has the personality to file the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. After
all, she may have the personality to file the petition if the divorce decree obtained was a limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro; or the foreign law may restrict remarriage even after the divorce decree
becomes absolute.23 In such case, the RTC would be correct to declare the marriage of the
respondents void for being bigamous, there being already in evidence two existing marriage
certificates, which were both obtained in the Philippines, one in Mabini, Pangasinan dated December
21, 1959 between Eusebio Bristol and respondent Merope,24 and the other, in Calasiao, Pangasinan
dated June 16, 1988 between the respondents.25

However, if there was indeed a divorce decree obtained and which, following the national law of
Orlando, does not restrict remarriage, the Court of Appeals would be correct in ruling that petitioner
has no legal personality to file a petition to declare the nullity of marriage, thus:

Freed from their existing marital bond, each of the former spouses no longer has any interest nor
should each have the personality to inquire into the marriage that the other might subsequently
contract. x x x Viewed from another perspective, Felicitas has no existing interest in Orlando’s
subsequent marriage since the validity, as well as any defect or infirmity, of this subsequent
marriage will not affect the divorced status of Orlando and Felicitas. x x x26

True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married,
or even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the
nullity of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate "proper interest" can file the same. A
petition to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest27 and must be based on a cause of action.28 Thus, in Niñal v.
Bayadog,29 the Court held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the
nullity of the marriage of their deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional
rights.
1awphi1.net

Significantly, Section 2(a) of The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took effect on March 15, 2003, now specifically provides:
SECTION 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. —

(a) Who may file. — A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely
by the husband or the wife.

xxxx

In fine, petitioner’s personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage cannot be
ascertained because of the absence of the divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it. Hence, a
remand of the case to the trial court for reception of additional evidence is necessary to determine
whether respondent Orlando was granted a divorce decree and whether the foreign law which
granted the same allows or restricts remarriage. If it is proved that a valid divorce decree was
obtained and the same did not allow respondent Orlando’s remarriage, then the trial court should
declare respondents’ marriage as bigamous and void ab initio but reduce the amount of moral
damages from ₱300,000.00 to ₱50,000.00 and exemplary damages from ₱200,000.00 to
₱25,000.00. On the contrary, if it is proved that a valid divorce decree was obtained which allowed
Orlando to remarry, then the trial court must dismiss the instant petition to declare nullity of marriage
on the ground that petitioner Felicitas Amor-Catalan lacks legal personality to file the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for its proper
disposition. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.


Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1Rollo, pp. 14-24. Penned by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion and concurred in by
Associate Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Eliezer R. De los Santos.

2 Records, pp. 164-168. Penned by Judge Crispin C. Laron.

3 Rollo, pp. 33-34.

4 Records, p. 4.

5 Id. at 1.

6 Id. at 5.

7 Id. at 1-3.

8 Id. at 10-12.

9 Id. at 19.

10 Id. at 167-168.

11 Rollo, p. 54.

12 Id. at 6-7.

13 Id. at 8-9.

14
Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. 146021, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA
261, 267-268.

15 Id.

16 Rollo, pp. 22-23.

17 Id. at 22.

18 Records, p. 1.

19 Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 123.

20 Garcia v. Recio, 418 Phil. 723, 735-736 (2001).


21 Roehr v. Rodriguez, 452 Phil. 608, 617 (2003).

22 Republic v. Orbecido III, supra.

23 Garcia v. Recio, supra at 736.

24 Records, p. 7.

25 Id. at 5.

26 Rollo, p. 23.

27 RULES OF COURT, Rule 3, Sec. 2.

28 RULES OF COURT, Rule 2, Sec. 1.

29 384 Phil. 661 (2000).

THIRD DIVISION

EDGAR SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743


Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
Austria-Martinez,
Callejo, Sr., and
Chico-Nazario, JJ.
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
Respondent.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x

RODOLFO SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 134029


Petitioner,

- versus -
Promulgated:
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS
alias FELICIDAD SAN LUIS,
Respondent. February 6, 2007

x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and
set aside the September 12, 1995[2] and January 31, 1996[3] Resolutions of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and
its May 15, 1998Resolution[4] denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his
lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia
Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased
Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with
whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an
American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce[5] before the Family Court of the
First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a
Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14,
1973.[6]

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.[7] He had no
children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership
assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a
petition for letters of administration[8] before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which
was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.

Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of
his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village,
Alabang, Metro Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal
spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that
the decedent left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued
at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid
debts. Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that
letters of administration be issued to her.

On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo
by his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss[9] on the grounds of improper venue
and failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent
has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry
Lee.

On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother
Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal[10] of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial
court issued an Order[11] denying the two motions to dismiss.

Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March


5, 1994 her opposition[12] thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing
that while Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he
regularly went home to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila
which they bought sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that
the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she
claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph
2,[13] Article 26 of the Family Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.[14]
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately
filed motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to
dismiss.[15] They asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be
given retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo
because this would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256[16] of the Family
Code.

On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first
marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos
from hearing the case.

On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order[17] denying the motions
for reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed
the legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile,
the motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic [18] because then
Acting Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan
pending the resolution of said motion.

Mila filed a motion for inhibition[19] against Judge Tensuan on November 16,
1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration[20] from the Order
denying their motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and
law on which it was based.

On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order[21] granting the


motion for inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul
T. Arcangel.

On April 24, 1995,[22] the trial court required the parties to submit their
respective position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of
respondent to file the petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested[23] that he is
adopting the arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position
papers on June 14,[24] and June 20,[25] 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent
was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because
her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the
decree of absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not
valid in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It
also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively
applied because it would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate children.

Respondent moved for reconsideration[26] and for the disqualification[27] of


Judge Arcangel but said motions were denied.[28]

Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the
orders of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the
dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and
October 24, 1994 are REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings.[29]

The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court,
the term place of residence of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or
domicile. It noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in
Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of
administration was properly filed in Makati City.

The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry
respondent by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[30] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[31] It found that the
marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the
decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State
of Hawaii. As a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to
contract a subsequent marriage with respondent. Thus

With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of


the Family Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the
reason and philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, there is no justiciable
reason to sustain the individual view sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that
Article 26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state
against divorce in any form whatsoever. Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law
grants. All that the courts should do is to give force and effect to the express
mandate of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the
Foreigner on December 14, 1992,[32] the Filipino divorcee, shall x x x have
capacity to remarry under Philippine laws. For this reason, the marriage between
the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated as a bigamous marriage.

Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the
surviving spouse can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased. x x x[33]

Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for


[34]
reconsideration which were denied by the Court of Appeals.

On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant petition for
review on certiorari.[35] Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the
said petition which was granted.[36]
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue
of the subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at
the time of his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend
that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray[37] and Romualdez v.
RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City,[38]residence is synonymous with domicile which denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim
that a person can only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never
changed his domicile, the petition for letters of administration should have been filed
in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to Felicisimo was void and
bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latters marriage to
Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As
such, respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she
has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.

The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2)
whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration.
The petition lacks merit.

Under Section 1,[39] Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court
of the province in which he resides at the time of his death. In the case of Garcia
Fule v. Court of Appeals,[40] we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the
residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of
fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

[T]he term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished from


legal residence or domicile. This term resides, like the terms residing and residence,
is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather
than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
domicile still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms residence and domicile but
as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey
the same meaning as the term inhabitant. In other words, resides should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to
make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.[41] (Emphasis supplied)

It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that residence, for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with
domicile. The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case
because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between
residence for purposes of election laws and residence for purposes of fixing the
venue of actions. In election cases, residence and domicile are treated as
synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one
has the intention of returning.[42] However, for purposes of fixing venue under the
Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his
legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.[43] Hence, it is possible that a person may have his residence in one
place and domicile in another.

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled
in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in
Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted
in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale[44] dated January 5, 1983 showing that the
deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements[45] from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the
period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at 100 San
Juanico, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa. Respondent also presented proof of
membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association[46] and Ayala
Country Club, Inc.,[47] letter-envelopes[48] from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds
children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards [49] stating
that his home/city address is at 100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa
while his office/provincial address is in Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna.

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang,


Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his
estate. Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly
filed in the Regional Trial Court[50] which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time,
Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over
Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 3.[51] Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before
the RegionalTrial Court of Makati City.

Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to file the petition
for letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino
who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil
Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June
20, 1974, or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this
issue, we need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly
Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us
to rule in the affirmative.

The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[52] involved a marriage between a


foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through
a divorce obtained abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under
Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their
conjugal partnership should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties
acquired by the Filipino wife after the divorce. Thus:

In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton
vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of


matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the existing
status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them
both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as to one
party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides,
in the nature of a penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again,
that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond
of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the


husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as
petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound
by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction
over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.[53]

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she
should no longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not
be required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws,
petitioner has to be considered still married to private respondent and still
subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter
should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the
ends of justice are to be served.[54] (Emphasis added)

This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera[55] where the Court
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held
that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his
Filipino wife. The Court stated that the severance of the marital bond had the effect
of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one
would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.[56]

Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[57] the Court stated that where a


Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van
Dorn applies.[58] Although decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said
case was obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.

The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited


recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been
interpreted as severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding
the validity of a divorce obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr.
Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that if the foreigner obtains a valid
foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.[59] In Garcia v. Recio,[60] the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case in
relation to Article 26.[61]

In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,[62] the historical background


and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were
discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive
Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August
3, 1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the
laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such,
shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code,
Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36,
and 39 of the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there
as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly


celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx

Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that
the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining
a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case


of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and
consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine
law.[63] (Emphasis added)

As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a
divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the
Family Code and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law
already established through judicial precedent.

Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance


intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the
community, relief in some way should be obtainable.[64] Marriage, being a mutual
and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any
good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the
other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains
a valid divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

Petitioners cite Articles 15[65] and 17[66] of the Civil Code in stating that the
divorce is void under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in
light of this Courts rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should
not be discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.[67] In Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[68] the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and
likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the
meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its
provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be
interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative
intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
of the legislature, is to render justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance
with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be
sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when
applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a
situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them
just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a
balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is
obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly


apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without
regard to its cause and consequence. Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to
the words of a law, so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, where these words
import a policy that goes beyond them.

xxxx

More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice as the constant
and perpetual wish to render every one his due. That wish continues to motivate
this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for
decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the
facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that
it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice.[69]
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly
obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have
vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos
surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to
prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio,[70] the
Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and
divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.[71]

With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized


in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the
annotated text[72] of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that
their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they
must be alleged and proved.[73]

Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception
of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo.

Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in


1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject
petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.
Section 6,[74] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration
may be granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule
79 thereof also provides in part:

SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for


letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as
far as known to the petitioner: x x x.

An interested person has been defined as one who would be benefited by the
estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.
The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. [75]

In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has
a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the
existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the
divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with
him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered
as a co-owner under Article 144[76] of the Civil Code. This provision governs the
property relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that
the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-
ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor,
efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.[77]

Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and
the marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code
which has filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating
the property relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are
incapacitated to marry.[78] In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,[79] we held that even if the
cohabitation or the acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took
effect, Article 148 governs.[80] The Court described the property regime under this
provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of
parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless
live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said
cohabitation in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only
be up to the extent of the proven actual contribution of money, property or
industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding
shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx

In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the
issue of co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage
and an adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual
contribution in the acquisition of the property is essential. x x x

As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as
determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative
issue. Contentions must be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had
on the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the weakness of the
opponents defense. x x x[81]

In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the
surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code
or Article 148 of the Family Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of


Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial
Court which denied petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order
which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this
case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.


Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 45-66. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by Associate
Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Roberto A. Barrios.
[2]
Records, pp. 335-338. Penned by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
[3]
Id. at 391-393.
[4]
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 68. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and concurred in by Associate
Justices Demetrio G. Demetria and Roberto A. Barrios.
[5]
Records, p. 125.
[6]
Id. at 137.
[7]
Id. at 116.
[8]
Id. at 1-5.
[9]
Id. at 10-24.
[10]
Id. at 30-35.
[11]
Id. at 38.
[12]
Id. at 39-138.
[13]
When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law.
[14]
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
[15]
See Records, pp. 155-158, 160-170 and 181-192.
[16]
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested rights or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
[17]
Records, p. 259.
[18]
Id. at 260.
[19]
Id. at 262-267.
[20]
Id. at 270-272.
[21]
Id. at 288.
[22]
Id. at 301.
[23]
Id. at 302-303.
[24]
Id. at 306-311.
[25]
Id. at 318-320.
[26]
Id. at 339-349.
[27]
Id. at 350-354.
[28]
Id. at 391-393.
[29]
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 66.
[30]
Supra note 14.
[31]
G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
[32]
Parenthetically, it appears that the Court of Appeals proceeded from a mistaken finding of fact because the records
clearly show that the divorce was obtained on December 14, 1973 (not December 14, 1992) and that the marriage of
Gov. San Luis with respondent was celebrated on June 20, 1974. These events both occurred before the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
[33]
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 65.
[34]
See CA rollo, pp. 309-322, 335-340, and 362-369.
[35]
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 8-42.
[36]
Id. at 75.
[37]
52 Phil. 645 (1928).
[38]
G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408.
[39]
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons be settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the
time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his
estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, x x x.
(Underscoring supplied)
[40]
G.R. Nos. L-40502 & L-42670, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 189.
[41]
Id. at 199-200.
[42]
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, supra note 38 at 415.
[43]
See Boleyley v. Villanueva, 373 Phil. 141, 146 (1999); Dangwa Transportation Co. Inc. v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-
22795, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 124, 128-129.
[44]
Records, pp. 76-78.
[45]
Id. at 60-75.
[46]
Id. at 79.
[47]
Id. at 80.
[48]
Id. at 81-83.
[49]
Id. at 84.
[50]
The Regional Trial Court and not the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over this case because the value of
Gov. San Luis estate exceeded P200,000.00 as provided for under B.P. Blg 129, Section 19(4).
[51]
SC Administrative Order No. 3 dated January 19, 1983 states in part:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 4 of the Executive
Order issued by the President of the Philippines on January 17, 1983, declaring the reorganization
of the Judiciary, the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts in the National Capital
Judicial Region are hereby defined as follows:
xxxx
5. Branches CXXXII to CL, inclusive, with seats at Makati over the
municipalities of Las Pinas, Makati, Muntinlupa and Paraaque. x x x
[52]
Supra note 14.
[53]
Id. at 139, 143-144.
[54]
Id. at 144.
[55]
Supra note 31.
[56]
Id. at 664.
[57]
G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, 300 SCRA 406.
[58]
Id. at 414; See also Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 121.
[59]
Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p.
263.
[60]
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437.
[61]
Id. at 447.
[62]
Supra note 58.
[63]
Id. at 119-121.
[64]
Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254-255 (1916).
[65]
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
[66]
Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or
by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
[67]
Supra note 14 at 144.
[68]
G.R. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259.
[69]
Id. at 264-265, 268.
[70]
Supra note 60.
[71]
Id. at 448-449.
[72]
Records, pp. 118-124.
[73]
Supra note 60 at 451.
[74]
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If x x x a person dies intestate, administration shall
be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court,
or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve; x x x.
[75]
Saguinsin v. Lindayag,116 Phil. 1193, 1195 (1962).
[76]
Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is
void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
[77]
Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1297 (1996).
[78]
Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 151967, February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA
494, 506.
[79]
G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.
[80]
Id. at 686.
[81]
Id. at 679, 686-687.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY G.R. No. 155635


BAYOT,
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus -

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,


THE HONORABLE COURT OF CARPIO MORALES,
APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT, TINGA,

Respondents. VELASCO, JR., and

x-------------------------------------------x BRION, JJ.

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY


BAYOT,
Petitioner, G.R. No. 163979

- versus -

VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT,


Respondent. Promulgated:
November 7, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca


Makapugay Bayot impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No.
155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution[2] of the
CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,[3] granting a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot
staving off the trial courts grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,[4] docketed G.R. No.
163979, assails the March 25, 2004 Decision[5] of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case
No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application
for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution
issued by the RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of
both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San
Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage
Certificate identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an American citizen[7] born
[6]
in Agaa, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn
Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to


Marie Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebeccas marital
relationship seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the
Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was
duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court
issued Civil Decree No. 362/96,[8]ordering the dissolution of the couples marriage
and leaving them to remarry after completing the legal requirements, but giving
them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the same court
would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,[9] settling the couples property relations
pursuant to an Agreement[10] they executed on December 14, 1996.Said agreement
specifically stated that the conjugal property which they acquired during their
marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements and personal
properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa.[11]

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of
Civil Decree No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a
petition[12] dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for declaration of nullity of
marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later moved[13] and
secured approval[14] of the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of


[15]
Acknowledgment stating under oath that she is an American citizen; that, since
1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is carrying a child
not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the
Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage[16] on the
ground of Vicentes alleged psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No.
01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot,
the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also
sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for
support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered
to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP
220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss[17] on, inter alia, the
grounds of lack of cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior
judgment of divorce.Earlier, on June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the
allowance of her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her


Filipino citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that,
therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and
Rebecca commenced several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically,
Vicente filed adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other
hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.

Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss


and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[18] denying Vicentes motion to


dismiss Civil Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebeccas application for
support pendente lite, disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the
respondent is DENIED. Petitioners Application in Support of the Motion for
Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED.Respondent is hereby ordered to remit
the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php
220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings
relative to the instant Petition.

SO ORDERED.[19]

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by
Vicente as bar to the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a
matter of defense best taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of
support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery against
Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.

Following the denial[20] of his motion for reconsideration of the above August
8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.[21] His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.[22] On April 30, 2002,
the appellate court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the


petition at bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case,
enjoining the respondent court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order
dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting
further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction
bond in the amount of P250,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[23]

Rebecca moved[24] but was denied reconsideration of the


aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the
preliminary injunctive writ[25]was issued. Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of
this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her
motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are
presently being assailed in Rebeccas petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No.
155635.

Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March
25, 2004, effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental
orders the RTC issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA
Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The


Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case
No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[26]

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicentes motion to dismiss on the
basis of the following premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the
hypothetical-admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition
states a cause of action.[27] Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements
of a cause of action,[28] Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for
declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage
with Vicente declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on February
22, 1996by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an American
citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such
divorce restored Vicentes capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebeccas contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino
citizen at the time the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her
allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown
that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification
of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did not indicate the
nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having
professed to have that nationality status and having made representations to that
effect during momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b)
when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually secured
an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated
the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-
378) on March 14, 1996.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly
Filipino father in Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebeccas
representation and assertion about being an American citizen when she secured her
foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning the
validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision,


but this recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4,
2004 Resolution.[29] Hence, Rebeccas Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds
for the allowance of her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the
CA erred in enjoining the implementation of the RTCs orders which would have
entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision
submitting as follows:
I

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND


NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE
FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONERS FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS
CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE
THE COURT A QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON


ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT
BEFORE IT.
III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER


THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS
MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY
VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE


WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT,
MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.[30]

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being
determinative of the success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce


obtained abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law
of the foreigner.[31] Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing
parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino
married to another Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and morality
and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.[32]

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No.
155635, i.e., the propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate
court, resolves itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a
Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican
Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of divorce is
valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

The Courts Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case


There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and
obtained her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one,
absent proof of an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are
compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born
in Agaa, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American
territory granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was,
and may still be, a holder of an American passport.[33]

And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted,
and represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage
as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when
she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the
Affidavit of Acknowledgment[34] in which she stated being an American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau)
of Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face,
ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized
as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition
was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of
Rebeccas recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau
Associate Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:


To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY


BAYOT* whose photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially
covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other particulars are as follows:

Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953


Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown
Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none

was r e c o g n i z e d as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV,


Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-
213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and
duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement
dated June 8, 2000.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA


ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988


issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and
dates may be deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued
the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary
of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino citizen
was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of
recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October
11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No.
5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been
issued by the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the
required affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent
aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of the
1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice
that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22,
2001. There is, thus, a strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question
must be spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino


citizenship require the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by
the Bureau.Under Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative
Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked
to provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the
laws governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens. Thus, the
confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued
by the Bureau is required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002[35] on Recognition as a
Filipino Citizen clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall
automatically furnish the Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of
Recognition within 72 days from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for
confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive Order
No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued
by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate
thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.(Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport
only on June 13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued
the 1stIndorsement confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to
attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events which, to us, clearly
suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet
recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law
Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no identification certificate shall be
issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.Logically,
therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebeccas recognition as a Filipino
citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of
Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebeccas passport a few
days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a


Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino


citizen. But from the foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not
have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she
secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca
voluntarily withdrew her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No.
96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she could not show proof of her
alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while
bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14,
1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign
divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce
in the petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as annexes to said
original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex A) and Birth
Certificate of Alix (Annex B). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the Bureau
was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of
document be appended to form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship
being crucial to her case?

As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage


under Civil Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the
ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted of the
following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex A) and Divorce Decree.
It was only through her Opposition (To Respondents Motion to Dismiss dated 31
May 2001)[36] did Rebecca attach as Annex C ID Certificate No. RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis
to dismiss the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition,
taken together with Vicentes motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition to motion,
with their respective attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action,
which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97
valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be
recognized, assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino
citizen, but represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the
very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American
citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said
divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which
pertinently declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the
jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments
x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality,
42 years of age, married, domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala
Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally appeared before this
court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x and
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age,
married and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin
Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO
TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of attorney given the
19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public Enrico L. Espanol of the
City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the acts
concerning this case.[37] (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of
the United States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property
relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their
Agreement[38] executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was
rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued
on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a
foreign divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a
fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.[39] Be this as it may, the
fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and
that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, [40] the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign
court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied,
but in fact admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of
the divorce court nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the
opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of
their conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:

Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x
x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample
opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court
(now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of


a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive


upon the title to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive


evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign


judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In
this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in
personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary.[41]

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the


foreign divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr.
Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees
rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently,
bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino
citizen by force of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of
the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to
nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen
on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not
a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the countrys policy against
absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a
valid divorce is obtained.[42]

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall
be given a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce
decree obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered
severed; they are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente
and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court
formally pronounced: [T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT
and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free
to remarry after completing the legal requirements.[43]

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be


subject to a husbands obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be
obliged to live with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.[44]

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of
Art. 26 of the Family Code, providing as follows:

Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly


celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity
to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the
applicability of the second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.[45]

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact
of marriage of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their
professed citizenship during the valid divorce proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and
the Agreement executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as
regards their property relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couples
conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they
acquired during their marriage consists only of the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue,
Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued
by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name of Vicente
M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.[46] (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the


divorce court which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated
March 4, 1997, ordered that, THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the
parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in
this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby
ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of said
agreement.[47]

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the


Agreement. She is thus estopped by her representation before the divorce court from
asserting that her and Vicentes conjugal property was not limited to their family
home in Ayala Alabang.[48]

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that


Rebecca lacks, under the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of
Communications v. Trazoexplains the concept and elements of a cause of action,
thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal
right of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action
hypothetically admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations
in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants
if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment
upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if the
following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on
the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an
act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff
or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which
the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.[49]

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebeccas underlying petition before the
RTC, Vicentes motion to dismiss and Rebeccas opposition thereof, with the
documentary evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for
declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a
marriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must
show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been
defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.[50] With the valid foreign
divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her to
Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and
Rebecca to support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show
how he had discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had
been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November
27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before
her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26
years old. Hence, the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly
shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a separate civil action for
reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be proved
as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus
determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions
until the child concerned shall have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the
issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebeccas right to support pendente
lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her
petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The
dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage
for, and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is


hereby DISMISSED on the ground of mootness, while the petition for review in G.R.
No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25,
2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.


Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA


Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1]
Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 3-34.
[2]
Id. at 36-38. Penned by Associate, now Presiding, Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by
Associate Justices Andres B. Reyes, Jr. and Mario L. Guaria III.
[3]
Id. at 40-41.
[4]
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 10-43.
[5]
Id. at 575-583.
[6]
Id. at 145.
[7]
See Certification of Birth from the Government of Guam issued on June 1, 2000; rollo (G.R. No. 155635),
p. 213.
[8]
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 146-150.
[9]
Id. at 214-217.
[10]
Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 151-158.
[11]
Id. at 154.
[12]
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 206-212.
[13]
Id. at 305-306. Per a motion to withdraw dated November 8, 1996.
[14]
Id. at 213. Per Order of Judge Josefina Guevara Salonga dated November 14, 1996.
[15]
Id. at 236-237.
[16]
Id. at 126-144.
[17]
Id. at 156-204.
[18]
Id. at 123-124. Penned by Presiding Judge Alberto L. Lerma.
[19]
Id. at 338.
[20]
Id. at 125. Per Order dated November 20, 2001.
[21]
Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 512-590.
[22]
Id. at 592-593.
[23]
Id. at 38.
[24]
Id. at 852-869.
[25]
Id. at 850-851.
[26]
Supra note 5, at 583.
[27]
G.R. No. 137898, December 15, 2000, 348 SCRA 401, 409.
[28]
Enumerated in San Lorenzo Village Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116825 March 26,
1998, 288 SCRA 115, 125: (1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3)
the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.
[29]
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), p. 597.
[30]
Id. at 22-23.
[31]
Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 447.
[32]
Llorente v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124371, November 23, 2000, 345 SCRA 592, 600.
[33]
Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), pp. 388-389, issued on January 18, 1995 with expiration date on January 17,
2005.
[34]
Supra note 15.
[35]
Adopted on April 15, 1999.
[36]
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 268-292.
[37]
Id. at 147, 214-215.
[38]
Supra note 10.
[39]
Supra note 31.
[40]
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139, 143.
[41]
G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003, 404 SCRA 495, 502-503.
[42]
Id. at 501-502.
[43]
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), pp. 148, 216.
[44]
Van Dorn, supra note 40, at 144.
[45]
G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114, 122.
[46]
Rollo (G.R. No. 155635), p. 154.
[47]
Rollo (G.R. No. 163979), p. 215.
[48]
Van Dorn, supra note 44.
[49]
G.R. No. 165500, August 30, 2006, 500 SCRA 242, 251-252; citations omitted.
[50]
Azur v. Provincial Board, No. L-22333, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 50, 57-58.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.


ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and
Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.


Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.

LABRADOR, J.:

This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.,
presiding, in Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among
things the final accounts of the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen
the amount of P3,600 paid by her to Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria
Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case
of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in
accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E. Christensen. The will was
executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:

3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs.
Bernard Daney), who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is
now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.

4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my
above named daughter, MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.

xxx xxx xxx

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to
Eduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was
baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to me, nor has she been at any time adopted
by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit, Digos, Davao, Philippines,
the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine Currency
the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao
Branch of the Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos
(P100.00), Philippine Currency per month until the principal thereof as well as any interest
which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..

xxx xxx xxx

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665
Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest,
remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of
whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my
death and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....

It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project
of partition ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the
residue of the estate be transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar
as it deprives her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been
declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E.
Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the
laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to
Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of the estate in full
ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the
estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire
law thereof because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and
even if the case were decided in California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires
that the domicile of the decedent should apply, should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria
Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged natural child of the decedent, she is
deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.

The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the
State of California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the
provisions in his will are to be governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator
has the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion
over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d
952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179, Record on Appeal). Oppositor
Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration, but these were
denied. Hence, this appeal.

The most important assignments of error are as follows:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME
COURT THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN AND, CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE
INHERITANCE.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL


LAW, PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.

IV

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.

V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL
OWNERSHIP.

There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State
of California at the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he
was domiciled in the Philippines, as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in
appellee's brief:

In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the
deceased Edward E. Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y.,
U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as an appointed school teacher, was on July 1,
1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of Embarkation as the City of
San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.

In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the
following nine years until 1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in
Sacramento, California.

Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in
1928, he again departed the Philippines for the United States and came back here the
following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938, he again returned to his own country,
and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted
and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other
evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.1äw phï1.ñët

Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in
the Philippines during World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United
States but returned to the Philippines in December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6",
CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l",
"MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)

In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the
making of his last will and testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his
lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of
Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)

In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded
by the fact that he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years,
and since he came to the Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short
visits (perhaps to relatives), and considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a
home or properties in that state, which would indicate that he would ultimately abandon the
Philippines and make home in the State of California.

Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary
presence to the most permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something
more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)

As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he
resided in Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines,
for the latter was a territory of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to
have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951
he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that he appears never to have intended to
abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in accordance with the
following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.

The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of
permanent abode. But domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning.
Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has never been. And he may reside in a
place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he divides his
time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would
require his presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have
sufficient connection with the place to be called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he
treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business in hand, not giving up his
former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of choice
requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires
bodily presence of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term
used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary presence to the most
permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one.
(Goodrich, p. 29)

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, which is as follows:

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country where said property may be found.

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the
term "national law" is used therein.

There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United
States, each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force
only within the state. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can
not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than
the private law of the State of California.

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?
The decision of the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the
California Probate Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he
desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant
invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have
checked it in the California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case
cited in the decision and testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is
argued on executor's behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of
California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the abovecited case, should govern the
determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's will, such law being in
force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand,
insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine
of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred
back to the law of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.

The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:

The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers
a jural matter to a foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law
of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"

On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that
is, applied the Conflict of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law.
But once having determined the the Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is
difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to Michigan Conflict of Laws.
This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been
criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the
internal law of Illinois, thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no
compelling logical reason why the original reference should be the internal law rather than to
the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids going on a merry-go-round, but
those who have accepted the renvoi theory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by getting off at
the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of
the renvoi are a bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of
reference.

Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater
uniformity will result from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact
that the only way to achieve uniformity in this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the
two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation disagree as to whether
the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the
litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan
court rejected the renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been
brought in the Illinois courts, and they too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the
woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would switch with respect to
which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.

The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in
question, and where the validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the
Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the domicile of the parties in the divorce case,
is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the internal law. Thus, a
person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of
Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property
in Massachusetts, England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be
distributed among X's next of kin.

Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict
of laws as to intestate succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the
deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's last domicile was France, the natural thing
for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of distributions, or
whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An
examination of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to
determine how this property should be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the
national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts statute of distributions. So on
the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of action: (a)
either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French
court and apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is
what a French court would do. If it accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter
course, thus applying its own law.

This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the
forum refers to a foreign law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back
again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi in the narrower sense. The German term for this
judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol. 31, pp. 523-571.)

After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a
particular case, the further question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws
contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This is a question which, while it has
been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of frequent
discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively
designated by them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the
"Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative answer to the question postulated and the operation
of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases result in returning the main
controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)

Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the
doctrine of renvoiis that the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must
take into account the whole law of the other jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of
laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of the other jurisdiction
prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of the renvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)

The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a
country explained by Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp.
529-531. The pertinent parts of the article are quoted herein below:

The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be
understood as incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or
country, but its rules of the conflict of laws as well. According to this theory 'the law of a
country' means the whole of its law.

xxx xxx xxx


Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at
Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form of the following theses:

(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.

(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:

(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals
abroad as regards their personal statute, and desires that said personal statute shall
be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of the place where the
act in question occurred.

(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that
one of them is necessarily competent, which agree in attributing the determination of
a question to the same system of law.

xxx xxx xxx

If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an
Englishman who has died domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he
must first inquire whether the law of Belgium would distribute personal property upon death
in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the Belgian law would make the
distribution in accordance with the law of nationality — that is the English law — he must
accept this reference back to his own law.

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied
in In re Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of
California are to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle
cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such
of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of
resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign element involved is in
accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in most
matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing
the manner of distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the
time of his death will be looked to in deciding legal questions about the will, almost as
completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the devise of land. It is logical
that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of intestate
succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary
dispostion of the property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the
borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of the domicile are recognized as controlling by the
Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the recognition as in the case
of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court has
said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the
domicile of the owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in
that international comity which was one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when
business intercourse and the process of accumulating property take but little notice of
boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than ever.
(Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national
law is the internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed
two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other
jurisdictions. Reason demands that We should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its
citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we
must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to go, as so declared in Article 16 of
our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with the express mandate
thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its conflict-of-
laws rule for those domiciled abroad.

It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where
the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16
that the national law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As
explained in the various authorities cited above the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil
Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the
reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The conflict of laws rule in
California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled
in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile
can not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable
of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two
states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The
Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the
decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of
California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code
of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.

The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105;
Miciano vs. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs.
Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the
case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen
of a state in the United States but with domicile in the Philippines, and it does not appear in each
case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law similar to or identical with
Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the
Philippines, the validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the
appellant, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil
Code of California, not by the internal law of California..

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower
court with instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
Judgment reversed, with costs against appellees.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.


PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.

Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.


Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in
Civil Case No. 37089 therein. 1äwphï1.ñët

The facts of the case are as follows:

Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his
first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis,
George Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis
Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children:
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three illegitimate children:
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.

On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after
all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen;
(b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the
remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis,
and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares. 1äw phï1.ñët

Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His
will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.

The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein
including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the
three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various
amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of
P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed
the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of
their respective legacies.

On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its
"Executor's Final Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock
amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In the project of partition,
the executor — pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament — divided
the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven legitimate
children by his first and second marriages.

On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions
to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is
evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1

After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on
April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied
the national law of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.

Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11,
1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply —
Texas law or Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied
by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually
pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present
case, it is not disputed that the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule providing that the
domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in a reference
back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a
conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place
where the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in
the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not
be presumed different from ours.3Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue
that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in relation
to Article 16 of the Civil Code.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent,
in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b)
the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the
capacity to succeed. They provide that —

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.

Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct.
Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next
preceding article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil
Code, while reproducing without substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil
Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art.
16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate succession. As further
indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees
that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.

It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of
legitimes, Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For
it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.

Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills — one to govern his Texas
estate and the other his Philippine estate — arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to
govern his Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a
separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil.
867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law
cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 — now Article 16 — of the Civil Code
states said national law should govern.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under
Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So
ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ.,
concur.
Footnotes

1He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this case as one of the
oppositors-appellants; to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project of partition; to
submit his brief after paying his proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the printing
of the record on appeal; or to allow him to adopt the briefs filed by his sisters — but this
Court resolved to deny the motion.

2 San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.

3 Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA


F. LLORENTE, respondents.

DECISION
PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case raises a conflict of laws issue.


What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals [1] modifying
that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City[2] declaring
respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as Alicia), as co-owners of whatever
property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Lorenzo)
may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband
and wife.

The Facts

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States
Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to
as Paula) were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua,
Camarines Sur.[4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and
Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States
District Court, Southern District of New York.[6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was
granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the
Philippines.[7] He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having
an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.[8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate stating that the child was not
legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left blank.[9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the
couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by
the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations for Paulas
daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital
union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement
regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would
not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and
agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo
and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement was
notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for
divorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San
Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the
proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the
County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory
judgment of divorce.[11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. [13] Apparently,
Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as
Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.[14]
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. [15] Their
twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed
Llorente.[16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was
notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting
witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:

(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my


residential house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur,
Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or
belongings that may be found or existing therein;

(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my


children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal
shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located,
specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras,
Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong,
Nabua, Camarines Sur;

(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno
and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F.
Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City
Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my
lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of
Rizal, Philippines;

(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether


real or personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and
conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and
disposed of by and among themselves;

(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this


my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to
act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;

(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute
should served (sic) without bond;

(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary
dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;

(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree
in the Llorentes Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner
whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any
real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of
them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament. [17]

On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines
Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein
Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. [18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator
Lorenzo was still alive.[19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted
the will to probate.[20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.[21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition [22] for letters of
administration over Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was
Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their
marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her
children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. [23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755),
a petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.[24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave
due course to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper Bicol
Star.[26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:

Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree
granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines,
therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16,
1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente
for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled
to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her
relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under
Art. 739 (1).

On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente,
meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo
Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal
partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary
compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate
and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and
also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.

Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the


deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of
administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of
P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3)
months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and
credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the
possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and
discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or such dividends
thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just
account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other
time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this court by her
to be performed.

On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence
could not be granted.

SO ORDERED. [27]

In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted
decision.[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but
modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children legitimate
or otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him. [29] Amending its
decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate
child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free
portion of the estate.[30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. [31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the


MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties
she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.

SO ORDERED. [32]

On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision.[33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34] denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.[35]

The Issue

Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments
raised,[36] the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to
the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before
and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his
will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by
foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition
and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad.

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the


order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the
intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the
national law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found. (emphasis ours)

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.[37]
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not
admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore
the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of the decedents
domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently
proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement
that American law follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law applies when
determining the validity of Lorenzos will.[38]
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in
Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no
such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each
State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only within the
State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent
was a resident.[39] Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine
is called for or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions
in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw
the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half
(1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying
Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already
probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is
fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[41] that once
proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce
from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very
well lose her right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in
his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.[43] We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife
Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects
of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to
the determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public
instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular
officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities
established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
(underscoring ours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children
by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes,
since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status,
condition and legal capacity.[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues
best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was
executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine
law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend
the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of
successional rights to the decedent's national law.[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo
N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San
Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional
rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with
all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the
Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

In CA-G. R. SP. No. 17446, promulgated on July 31, 1995, Lipana-Reyes+, J., ponente, Torres, Jr. and
[1]

Hofilena, JJ., concurring.


In Spec. Proc. No. IR-755 (In the Matter of the Probate and Allowance of the Last Will and Testament of
[2]

Lorenzo N. Llorente, Lorenzo N. Llorente, Petitioner) and Spec. Proc. No. IR-888 (Petition for the Grant of
Letters of Administration for the Estate of Lorenzo N. Llorente, Paula T. Llorente, Petitioner), dated May 18,
1987, Judge Esteban B. Abonal, presiding.
[3]
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 51.
[4]
Exh. B, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 61.
[5]
Ibid.
This was issued pursuant to Lorenzos petition, Petition No. 4708849, filed with the U.S. Court. Exhs. H
[6]

and H-3 Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 157, 159.


[7]
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 51; Exh. B, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 61.
[8]
Ibid.
[9]
Exh. A, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 60.
[10]
Exh. B-1 Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 62.
[11]
Exh. D, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, pp. 63-64.
[12]
Exh. E, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 69.
[13]
Exh. F, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 148.
[14]
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
[15]
Comment, Rollo, p. 147.
[16]
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
[17]
Exh. A, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, pp. 3-4; Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
[18]
Docketed as Spec. Proc. No. IR-755.
[19]
Decision, RTC, Rollo, p. 37.
[20]
Ibid.
[21]
Ibid.
[22]
Docketed as Spec. Proc. No. IR-888.
[23]
Decision, RTC, Rollo, p. 38.
[24]
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
[25]
Ibid., pp. 52-53.
[26]
Ibid., p. 53.
[27]
RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 37.
[28]
Order, Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. Nos. IR-755 and 888, Rollo, p. 46.
[29]
Citing Article 335 of the Civil Code, which states, The following cannot adopt: xxx
(3) a married person, without the consent of the other spouse; xxx, the trial court reasoned that since the
divorce obtained by Lorenzo did not dissolve his first marriage with Paula, then the adoption of Raul and
Luz was void, as Paula did not give her consent to it.
[30]
Order, Regional Trial Court, Rollo, p. 47.
[31]
Docketed as CA-G. R. SP No. 17446.
[32]
Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 56.
On August 31, 1995, petitioner also filed with this Court a verified complaint against the members of the
[33]

Special Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Associate Justices Justo P. Torres, Jr., Celia Lipana-Reyes
+ and Hector Hofilena for gross ignorance of the law, manifest incompetence and extreme bias (Rollo, p.
15).
Again with Associate Justice Celia Lipana-Reyes+, ponente, concurred in by Associate Justices Justo P.
[34]

Torres, Jr. and Hector Hofilena (Former Special Thirteenth Division).


[35]
Filed on May 10, 1996, Rollo, pp. 9-36.
Petitioner alleges (1) That the Court of Appeals lost its jurisdiction over the case when it issued the
[36]

resolution denying the motion for reconsideration; (2) That Art. 144 of the Civil Case has been repealed by
Arts. 253 and 147 of the Family Code and (3) That Alicia and her children not are entitled to any share in
the estate of the deceased (Rollo, p. 19).
[37]
Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher, 110 Phil. 686 (1961).
[38]
Joint Record on Appeal, p. 255; Rollo, p. 40.
[39]
In Re: Estate of Edward Christensen, Aznar v. Helen Garcia, 117 Phil. 96 (1963).
[40]
139 SCRA 139 (1985).
[41]
300 SCRA 406 (1998).
[42]
174 SCRA 653 (1989).
The ruling in the case of Tenchavez v. Escano (122 Phil. 752 [1965]) that provides that a foreign divorce
[43]

between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present civil code is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction is NOT applicable in the case at bar as Lorenzo was no longer a
Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce.
Article 15, Civil Code provides Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
[44]

legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
(Underscoring ours)
[45]
Bellis v. Bellis, 126 Phil. 726 (1967).

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