Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988

LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH
XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.

Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.

Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.

City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the resolution of the Court is whether or not a criminal case for bigamy
pending before the Court of First Itance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him.

The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting
thru Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo
C. Donato with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to
Branch XXXII of said court. The information was filed based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B.
Abayan.

On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner
contracted on September 26, 1978, which action was docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case
was based on the ground that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was
petitioner Donato's second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married
to a certain Rosalinda R. Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity
interposed the defense that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage
license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by private respondent to
obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the subsequent or second
marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and deported themselves as husband and
wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as evidenced by a joint affidavit
executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage license was dispensed
with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional character.

Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment of
his second marriage filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined
or decided before the criminal case can proceed.

In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case
of Landicho vs. Relova. 1 The order further directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can proceed
as scheduled.

A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds for
suspension of proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which
was a much later case than that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.

The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April 14, 1980, for
lack of merit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is
a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal.3 It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it
that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must
appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution
would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually comes into play
in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised
in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused
in a criminal case.5

The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue
before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not
determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was
petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for
annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.

Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void
on the ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only
sometime later when he was required to answer the civil action for anulment of the second marriage. The
doctrine elucidated upon by the case of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied to the present case. Said
case states that:

The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a
bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil
actions as to warrant the suspension of the case. In order that the case of annulment of
marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused, it
must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was
obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second
marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the crime of
bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was
indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been
contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner
who filed the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was
only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party
complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null
and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage
was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the
outcome of the case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent
 courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore,
he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has
not abused much less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend the hearing as
sought by petitioner.

In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has
been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.

Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case
and as such it should be the one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the case at
bar is markedly different. In the aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with
bigamy for having contracted a second marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela
Cruz was also the one who filed an action for annulment on the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished
from the present case wherein it was private respondent Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed
a complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through
deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's marriage was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a
judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the second marriage of De la Cruz was null and void,
thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. In the present case, there
is as yet no such judgment in the civil case.

Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on
prejudicial questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to
the bigamy case against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was
obtained by means of duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent
marriage was an involuntary one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding
elements do not exist in the case at bar.

Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal
case. The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been
living with private respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the
benefit of marriage. Thus, petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent
through force, violence, intimidation and undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the
fact that both petitioner and private respondent executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived
together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for five years, one month and one day until their
marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it was private respondent who
eventually filed the civil action for nullity.

Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only when Civil Case No.
E-02627 was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the solemnization of
the second marriage that petitioner came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was secured
through the use of force, violence, intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with
private respondent until November 1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato
was already previously married.

In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent Judge did not err in
his earlier order. There is no pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627
before proceedings in the criminal action for bigamy can be undertaken.
Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent
judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We
make no pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Griño-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. L-48157 March 16, 1988

RICARDO QUIAMBAO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ADRIANO OSORIO, ZENAIDA GAZA BUENSUCERO, JUSTINA GAZA BERNARDO, and FELIPE
GAZA, respondents-appellees, LAND AUTHORITY, intervenor-appellant.

FERNAN, J.:
This case was certified to Us by the Court of Appeals as one involving pure questions of law pursuant to Section 3, Rule 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.

The antecedents are as follows:

In a complaint for forcible entry filed by herein private respondents Zenaida Gaza Buensucero, Justina
Gaza Bernardo and Felipe Gaza against herein petitioner Ricardo Quiambao before the then Municipal
Court of Malabon, Rizal, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 2526, it was alleged that private respondents
were the legitimate possessors of a 30,835 sq. m. lot known as Lot No. 4, Block 12, Bca 2039 of the
Longos Estate situated at Barrio Longos, Malabon Rizal, by virtue of the Agreement to Sell No. 3482
executed in their favor by the former Land Tenure Administration [which later became the Land Authority,
then the Department of Agrarian Reform]; that under cover of darkness, petitioner surreptitiously and by
force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, entered into a 400 sq. m. portion thereof, placed bamboo posts
"staka" over said portion and thereafter began the construction of a house thereon; and that these acts of
petitioner, which were unlawful per se, entitled private respondents to a writ of preliminary injunction and to
the ejectment of petitioner from the lot in question.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, and upon denial thereof, filed his Answer to the
complaint, specifically denying the material allegations therein and averring that the Agreement upon which
private respondents base their prior possession over the questioned lot had already been cancelled by the
Land Authority in an Order signed by its Governor, Conrado Estrella. By way of affirmative defense and as
a ground for dismissing the case, petitioner alleged the pendency of L.A. Case No. 968, an administrative
case before the Office of the Land Authority between the same parties and involving the same piece of
land. In said administrative case, petitioner disputed private respondents' right of possession over the
property in question by reason of the latter's default in the installment payments for the purchase of said lot.
Petitioner asserted that his administrative case was determinative of private respondents' right to eject
petitioner from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial question which bars a judicial action until after its
termination.

After hearing, the municipal court denied the motion to dismiss contained in petitioner's affirmative
defenses. It ruled that inasmuch as the issue involved in the case was the recovery of physical possession,
the court had jurisdiction to try and hear the case.

Dissatisfied with this ruling, petitioner filed before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XII,
Caloocan City in Civil Case No. C-1576 a petition for certiorari with injunction against public respondent
Judge Adriano Osorio of the Municipal Court of Malabon and private respondents, praying for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent judge to suspend the hearing in the ejectment case
until after the resolution of said petition. As prayed for, the then CFI of Rizal issued a restraining order
enjoining further proceedings in the ejectment case.

In his answer, respondent municipal judge submitted himself to the sound discretion of the CFI in the
disposition of the petition for certiorari. Private respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the
petition, maintaining that the administrative case did not constitute a prejudicial question as it involved the
question of ownership, unlike the ejectment case which involved merely the question of possession.

Meanwhile, the Land Authority filed an Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in Civil Case No. C-1576
alleging the pendency of an administrative case between the same parties on the same subject matter in
L.A. Case No. 968 and praying that the petition for certiorari be granted, the ejectment complaint be
dismissed and the Office of the Land Authority be allowed to decide the matter exclusively.

Finding the issue involved in the ejectment case to be one of prior possession, the CFI dismissed the
petition for certiorari and lifted the restraining order previously issued. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal order, adopted in toto by Intervenor Land Authority was denied for lack of
merit. Hence, this appeal filed by petitioner Quiambao and intervenor Land Authority with the Court of
Appeals, and certified to Us as aforesaid.

The instant controversy boils down to the sole question of whether or not the administrative case between
the private parties involving the lot subject matter of the ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question
which would operate as a bar to said ejectment case.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another
tribunal. 1 The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a situation where civil and
criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in both cases are similar or so closely related that an
issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the
existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of
the latter pending final determination of the former.

The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the Revised
Rules of Court are: [a] the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue in the
criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
The actions involved in the case at bar being respectively civil and administrative in character, it is obvious
that technically, there is no prejudicial question to speak of. Equally apparent, however, is the intimate
correlation between said two [2] proceedings, stemming from the fact that the right of private respondents
to eject petitioner from the disputed portion depends primarily on the resolution of the pending
administrative case. For while it may be true that private respondents had prior possession of the lot in
question, at the time of the institution of the ejectment case, such right of possession had been terminated,
or at the very least, suspended by the cancellation by the Land Authority of the Agreement to Sell executed
in their favor. Whether or not private respondents can continue to exercise their right of possession is but a
necessary, logical consequence of the issue involved in the pending administrative case assailing the
validity of the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award of the disputed portion to
petitioner. If the cancellation of the Agreement to Sell and the subsequent award to petitioner are voided,
then private respondents would have every right to eject petitioner from the disputed area. Otherwise,
private respondent's light of possession is lost and so would their right to eject petitioner from said portion.

Faced with these distinct possibilities, the more prudent course for the trial court to have taken is to hold
the ejectment proceedings in abeyance until after a determination of the administrative case. Indeed, logic
and pragmatism, if not jurisprudence, dictate such move. To allow the parties to undergo trial
notwithstanding the possibility of petitioner's right of possession being upheld in the pending administrative
case is to needlessly require not only the parties but the court as well to expend time, effort and money in
what may turn out to be a sheer exercise in futility. Thus, 1 Am Jur 2d tells us:

The court in which an action is pending may, in the exercise of a sound discretion, upon
proper application for a stay of that action, hold the action in abeyance to abide the outcome
of another pending in another court, especially where the parties and the issues are the
same, for there is power inherent in every court to control the disposition of causes on its
dockets with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants. Where the
rights parties to the second action cannot be properly determined until the questions raised
in the first action are settled the second action should be stayed.2

While this rule is properly applicable to instances involving two [2] court actions, the existence in the instant
case of the same considerations of Identity of parties and issues, economy of time and effort for the court,
the counsels and the parties as well as the need to resolve the parties' right of possession before the
ejectment case may be properly determined, justifies the rule's analogous application to the case at bar.

Fortich-Celdran, et al. vs. Celdran, et al., 19 SCRA 502, provides another analogous situation. In sustaining
the assailed order of the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental ordering the suspension of the
criminal case for falsification of public document against several persons, among them the subscribing
officer Santiago Catane until the civil case involving the issue of the genuineness of the alleged forged
document shall have been decided, this Court cited as a reason therefor its own action on the
administrative charges against said Santiago Catane, as follows:

It should be mentioned here also that an administrative case filed in this Court against
Santiago Catane upon the same charge was held by Us in abeyance, thus:

"As it appears that the genuineness of the document allegedly forged by

respondent attorneys in Administrative Case No. 77 [Richard Ignacio
Celdran vs. Santiago Catane, etc., et al.] is necessarily involved in Civil
Case No. R-3397 of the Cebu Court of First Instance, action on the herein
complaint is withheld until that litigation has finally been decided.
Complainant Celdran shall inform the Court about such decision."3
If a pending civil case may be considered to be in the nature of a prejudicial question to an administrative
case, We see no reason why the reverse may not be so considered in the proper case, such as in the
petition at bar. Finally, events occuring during the pendency of this petition attest to the wisdom of the
conclusion herein reached. For in the Manifestation filed by counsel for petitioner, it was stated that the
intervenor Land Authority which later became the Department of Agrarian Reform had promulgated a
decision in the administrative case, L.A. Case No. 968 affiriming the cancellation of Agreement to Sell No.
3482 issued in favor of private respondents. With this development, the folly of allowing the ejectment case
to proceed is too evident to need further elaboration.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Civil Case No. 2526 of the then Municipal Court of
Malabon, Rizal is hereby ordered DISMISSED. No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 112381 March 20, 1995

ISABELO APA, MANUEL APA and LEONILO JACALAN, petitioners,

vs.
HON. RUMOLDO R. FERNANDEZ, HON. CELSO V. ESPINOSA, and SPS. FELIXBERTO TIGOL, JR.
and ROSITA TAGHOY TIGOL, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a special civil action of certiorari to set aside orders of respondent Judge Rumoldo R. Fernandez of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54, at Lapu-Lapu City, denying petitioners oral motion for the suspension
of their arraignment in Criminal Case No. 012489, entitled: "People of the Philippines v. Isabelo Apa;
Manuel Apa and Leonilo Jacalan," as well as their motion for reconsideration.

Criminal Case No. 012489 is a prosecution for violation of P.D. 772 otherwise known as the Anti-Squatting
Law. The information alleges:

That on February 1990, or prior thereto, in Agus, Lapulapu City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused [herein petitioners Isabelo
Apa, Manuel Apa and Dionisio Jacalan], conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with
one another, without the knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take advantage of the absence or tolerance of the
said owner by occupying or possessing a portion of her real property, Lot No. 3635-B of
 Opon Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13250, situated in Agus
Lapulapu City, whereon they constructed their respective residential houses against the will
of Rosita Tigol, which acts of the said accused have deprived the latter of the use of a
portion of her land, to her damage and prejudice because despite repeated demands the
said accused failed and refused, as they still fail and refuse to vacate the premises above-
mentioned.

Petitioners moved for the suspension of their arraignment on the ground that there was a prejudicial
question pending resolution in another case being tried in Branch 27 of the same court. The case, docketed
as Civil Case No. 2247-L and entitled "Anselmo Taghoy and Vicente Apa versus Felixberto Tigol, Jr. and
Rosita T. Tigol, et al.," concerns the ownership of Lot No. 3635-B. 1 In that case, petitioners seek a
declaration of the nullity of TCT No. 13250 of Rosita T. Tigol and the partition of the lot in question among
them and private respondent Rosita T. Tigol as heirs of Filomeno and Rita Taghoy. The case had been filed
in 1990 by petitioners, three years before May 27, 1993 when the criminal case for squatting was filed
against them.

On August 25, 1993, the trial court denied the petitioners' motion and proceeded with their arraignment.
Petitioners, therefore, had to enter their plea (not guilty) to the charge.

On September 2, 1993, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but their motion was denied by the
court in its order dated September 21, 1993. Hence, this petition.

The only issue in this case is whether the question of ownership of Lot No. 3635-B, which was pending, in
Civil Case No. 2247-L, is a prejudicial question justifying suspension of the proceedings in the criminal
case against petitioners.

We hold that it is.

A prejudicial question is a question which is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that its resolution is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. To
justify suspension of the criminal action, it must appear not only that the civil case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution is based but also that the decision of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case would be decisive of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 2 Rule 111, §5
provides:

Sec. 6. Elements of prejudicial question. — The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial
questions are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.

In the criminal case, the question is whether petitioners occupied a piece of land not belonging to them but
to private respondent and against the latter's will. As already noted, the information alleges that "without the
knowledge and consent of the owner, ROSITA TIGOL" petitioners occupied or took possession of a portion
of "her property" by building their houses thereon and "deprived [her] of the use of portion of her land to her
damage and prejudice.

Now the ownership of the land in question, known as Lot 3635-B of the Opon cadastre covered by TCT No.
13250, is the issue in Civil Case 2247-L now pending in Branch 27 of the RTC at Lapulapu City. The
resolution, therefore, of this question would necessarily be determinative of petitioners criminal liability for
squatting.
In fact it appears that on February 23, 1994, the court trying the civil case rendered a decision nullifying
TCT No. 13250 of private respondent and her husband and declared the lot in question to be owned in
common by the spouses and the petitioners as inheritance from their parents Filomeno and Rita Taghoy.
While private respondents claim that the decision in that case is not yet final because they have filed a
motion for new trial, the point is that whatever may be the ultimate resolution of the question of ownership,
such resolution will be determinative of the guilt or innocence of petitioners in the criminal case. Surely, if
petitioners are co-owners of the lot in question, they cannot be found guilty of squatting because they are
as much entitled to the use and occupation of the land as are the private respondent Rosita T. Tigol and her
family.3

Private respondents argues that even the owner of a piece of a land can be ejected from his property since
the only issue in such a case is the right to its physical possession. Consequently, they contend, he can
also be prosecuted under the Anti-Squatting Law.

The contention misses the case is the essential point that the owner of a piece of land can be ejected only
if for some reason, e.g., he has let his property to the plaintiff, he has given up its temporary possession.
But in the case at bar, no such agreement is asserted by private respondent. Rather private respondent
claims the right to possession based on her claim of ownership. Ownership is thus the pivotal question.
Since this is the question in the civil case, the proceedings in the criminal case must in the meantime be
suspended.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and respondent judge is ordered to SUSPEND the proceedings in
Criminal Case No. 012489 until the question of ownership in Civil Case No. 2247-L has been resolved with
finality and thereafter proceed with the trial of the criminal case if the civil case is decided and terminated
adversely against petitioners. Otherwise he should dismiss the criminal case.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado and Puno, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000]

MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and

HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC,
Branch 139, Makati City, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to
review and set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A.
Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No.
98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden
Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati city, Branch 61." The said Order denied
petitioners prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes
from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against
petitioner on the ground that the pending petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at
the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City. [1]
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, [2] petitioner filed a
petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.[3]
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was
petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros
Salting.[4] Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage [5] under Article
334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour before the City
Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable
cause and ordered the filing of an Information [6] against them. The case, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 236176, was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest,
filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the
criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of
his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge
Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order [7] dated August 31, 1998.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an
Order dated December 9, 1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case,
petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari,
questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and December 9, 1998 issued by Judge
Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. [8] In an
Order[9] dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition
for certiorari. Said Court subsequently issued another Order[10] dated February 23, 1999,
denying his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.
Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage
based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial
question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against
him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result
from the civil case for annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the
civil case, the trial court might declare the marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's
complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit petitioner because the evidence
shows that his marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that
the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if the
criminal case will be suspended, until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that if
petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason of psychological incapacity then by reason of
the arguments submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has never existed; and that,
accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because he was never
before a married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related
to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed. [11]
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial
question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal
action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil
case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined.
Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
"The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void."
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals,[12] this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that
for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous
marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void,
whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The pertinent
portions of said Decision read:
"xxx Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well
invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than
remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution and
 separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for
the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an
earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void."
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a
final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of
the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage
should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent
pronouncement that his marriage is void from the beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Reloval[13] cited in Donato vs. Luna[14] where
this Court held that:
"xxx Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by
petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts
and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy."
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to judgment of
the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held
as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge
of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does
not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 148595 July 12, 2004

SPOUSES ANTONIO S. PAHANG and LOLITA T. PAHANG, petitioners,

vs.
HON. AUGUSTINE A. VESTIL, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court- Branch 56, Mandaue City,
DEPUTY SHERIFF, Regional Trial Court-Branch 56 and METROPOLITAN BANK and TRUST
COMPANY, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang, for the
nullification of the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59157.

The Antecedents

On January 5, 1996, the petitioners, Spouses Antonio and Lolita Pahang, received a short-term loan of one
million five hundred thousand pesos (P1,500,000.00) from the respondent Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company payable on December 27, 1996. The loan was covered by Non-Negotiable Promissory Note No.
1906013 and was, likewise, secured by a real estate mortgage on a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 29607. 4 As the petitioners failed to pay the loan, the interest and the penalties
due thereon, the respondent foreclosed the real estate mortgage extrajudicially. As a consequence, the
mortgaged property was sold at public auction on January 8, 1998 to the respondent bank as the highest
bidder. A certificate of sale was executed by Pasnonito D. Antiporda as Ex-Officio Sheriff in favor of the
respondent on January 14, 1998 and was registered with the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City on
January 27, 1998.

On December 29, 1998, the respondent wrote the petitioners that the one-year redemption period of the
property would expire on January 27, 1999. 5 Instead of redeeming the property, the petitioners filed, on
January 19, 1999, a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial sale against the respondent bank and the
Sheriff in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu (Mandaue City), Branch 56, docketed as Civil Case No. MAN-
3454.6 Therein, the petitioners alleged that the respondent bloated their obligation of P1,500,000.00
to P2,403,770.73 by including excessive past due interest, penalty charges, attorney’s fees and sheriff’s
expense. They claimed that such exorbitant charges were made to frustrate their chance to pay the loan,
and to ensure that the respondent bank would be the highest bidder during the auction sale. They also
asserted that the respondent failed to remit to the Sheriff the purchase price of the property and was,
likewise, guilty of fraud, collusion, breach of trust or misconduct in the conduct of the auction sale of their
property. Besides praying for injunctive relief, the petitioners prayed for the following alternative reliefs:

3. After trial on the merits, and after determination of plaintiffs’ true obligation with defendant bank,
to declare the foreclosure on the subject property as null and void, and to allow the plaintiffs to pay
 the same; as alternative prayer, to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the subject real property based on
the amount determined and established as true and exact obligation of plaintiffs to defendant bank. 7

After the expiration of the one-year redemption period, the respondent consolidated its ownership over the
foreclosed property. Consequently, TCT No. 44668 was issued by the Register of Deeds in its name. On
July 23, 1999, the respondent filed a Petition for Writ of Possession before the RTC of Mandaue City
(Branch 56), docketed as LRC Case No. 3.8

The petitioners, citing the ruling of this Court in Belisario v. The Intermediate Appellate Court,9 opposed the
petition on the ground that the core issue in their complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 constituted a
prejudicial question, which warranted a suspension of the proceedings before the court. The petitioners
averred that the filing of their complaint within the period to redeem the foreclosed property was equivalent
to an offer to redeem the same, and had the effect of preserving such right. They also asserted that the
respondent acted in bad faith in procuring the title over the property despite the pendency of their complaint
in Civil Case No. MAN-3454.

On March 28, 2000, the RTC of Mandaue City, Branch 56, rendered a decision in LRC Case No. 3 granting
the petition and ordering the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the respondent. 10

Citing the case of Javelosa v. Court of Appeals,11 and Gawaran v. Court of Appeals,12 the RTC ruled that
since the petitioners failed to redeem the property within one year from the foreclosure, the respondent was
entitled to a writ of possession as a necessary consequence of the readjudication of ownership and the
corresponding issuance of the original certificate. 13 The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the
decision, but the court issued an order denying the motion, stating that it was merely its ministerial function
to issue a writ of possession.14

The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
59157 for the nullification of the March 28, 2000 Decision and the May 19, 2000 Order of the RTC.
Thepetitioners alleged that the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction in granting the petition of the respondent bank for a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3
instead of suspending the proceedings therein based on the ruling of this Court in Belisario vs. The
Intermediate Appellate Court.15

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Finding that the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in ordering the issuance of the writ of
possession, the CA rendered a decision on March 2, 2001, dismissing the petition. 16 Citing the rulings of
this Court in Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals 17 and Navarra v. Court of Appeals,18 the CA explained that
the pendency of a separate proceeding questioning the validity of the mortgage and the extrajudicial
foreclosure thereof cannot bar the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser at public
auction. The appellate court ruled that after a title on the property has been consolidated in the mortgagee,
the issuance of a writ of possession becomes a ministerial act of the trial court. Furthermore, the right of
the respondent bank to possess the property was based on its right of ownership as a purchaser of the
properties in the foreclosure sale. The CA explained that the ruling in the Belisariocase was inapplicable
because it involved a complaint to enforce the repurchase of the foreclosed property within the period of
redemption, whereas, the complaint filed by the petitioners in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 was for the
annulment of the mortgage or extrajudicial sale which was not equivalent to an offer to redeem the
property.19

The Present Petition

The motion for reconsideration of the petitioners of the decision, having been denied by the appellate court,
the petitioners filed this instant petition, assigning the following errors:

1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING PETITIONERS’ RIGHT OF

REDEMPTION OVER THEIR FORECLOSED PROPERTY AS HAVING EXPIRED ON JANUARY
26, 1999, IN THE LIGHT OF THEIR PENDING COMPLAINT TO ANNUL THE FORECLOSURE
FILED BEFORE THE EXPIRATION OF THE ONE-YEAR REDEMPTION PERIOD, ON THE
GROUND OF FRAUD, AND CONSIDERING FURTHER THEIR SPECIFIC PRAYER THEREOF
FOR DETERMINATION OF THEIR TRUE OBLIGATION WITH PRIVATE RESPONDENT, AND TO
ALLOW THEM TO PAY THE SAME AND/OR TO REDEEM THEIR FORECLOSED PROPERTY.20

2. PETITIONERS’ COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF THE FORECLOSURE OF THEIR

PROPERTY WITH A PRAYER FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND INJUNCTION TO
STOP THE ISSUANCE OF A DEFINITE DEED OF SALE AND CONSOLIDATION OF TITLE OF
THEIR PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, WHILE GIVING PREFERENCE AND
ACTING WITH DISPATCH ON PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S PETITION FOR ISSUANCE OF WRIT
OF POSSESSION ON THE SAME PROPERTY, BY GRANTING THE WRIT OF POSSESSION
THEREON THEREBY RENDERING MOOT AND ACADEMIC PETITIONERS’ PRAYERS IN THEIR
COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT OF FORECLOSURE.21

3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THE DECISION OF THIS

HONORABLE SUPREME COURT IN THE CASE OF BELISARIO VS. THE INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT, G.R. NO. L-73503, WHEREBY "THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT TO
ENFORCE REPURCHASE WITHIN THE PERIOD FOR REDEMPTION IS EQUIVALENT TO AN
OFFER TO REDEEM AND HAS THE EFFECT OF PRESERVING THE RIGHT OF REDEMPTION"
INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE OF PETITIONERS.22

4. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE FACT THAT
THE ISSUE OR ISSUES JOINED IN THE COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT BEFORE
RESPONDENT JUDGE DOCKETED AS CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-4353 (sic) IS A PREJUDICIAL
QUESTION TO THE ISSUE RAISED IN THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF POSSESSION IN LRC
CASE NO. 3.23

5. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HAVING FAILED TO CONSIDER THE

VALID CAUSES OF ACTION OF PETITIONERS IN THEIR COMPLAINT FOR ANNULMENT IN
CIVIL CASE NO. MAN-4354 (sic).24

The threshold issues are as follows: (a) whether or not the complaint of the petitioners in Civil Case No.
MAN-3454 for annulment of extrajudicial sale is a prejudicial question to the petition of the respondent bank
for the issuance of a writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3; and, (b) whether or not the RTC committed a
grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in granting the petition of the
respondent in LRC Case No. 3 and in issuing the writ of possession in its favor.

The issues being interrelated, the Court shall resolve the same simultaneously.

The petitioners contend that their complaint in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 and the respondent’s petition for a
writ of possession in LRC Case No. 3 were raffled to Branch 56 of the RTC. Although their complaint in
Civil Case No. MAN-3454 was for the nullification of the extrajudicial sale at public auction on the ground of
fraud, they also prayed, as an alternative remedy, that they be allowed to redeem the property based on
the amount to be determined by the court after trial. Hence, they assert, the filing of their complaint before
the expiry of the redemption period to enforce their right of redemption was equivalent to a formal offer to
redeem the property and had the effect of preserving their right of redemption. They argue that the RTC
should have suspended the proceedings in LRC Case No. 3 pending the final resolution of Civil Case No.
MAN-3454 so as not to render moot and academic the latter case, conformably with the ruling of the Court
in Belisario vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court,25 after all, the two cases were pending before the same
court. The petitioners, thus, aver that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction in granting the petition of the respondent bank for a writ of possession in LRC
Case No. 3. They, likewise, aver that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the decision of the trial
court and declared, thus:

Further, as to the applicability of the case of Belisario vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. L-
73503, Aug. 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 101, 108), suffice it to say, that the cause of action therein was to
enforce the repurchase of the foreclosed property within the period of redemption, which the
Supreme Court held that it has the effect of preserving the right of redemption. Whereas, Civil Case
No. MAN-3454 filed by the petitioners is for the annulment of mortgage or extrajudicial sale, which
is not in effect an offer to redeem. Verily, the pendency of said civil case does not preserve the right
of redemption of the petitioners after the period of redemption. 26

The Court’s Ruling

The contentions of the petitioners have no merit.

A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue
involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into play in a
situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue
that must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue
raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case. The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two
conflicting decisions.27

In the present case, the complaint of the petitioners for Annulment of Extrajudicial Sale is a civil action and
the respondent’s petition for the issuance of a writ of possession of Lot No. 3-A, Block 1, Psd-07-021410,
TCT No. 44668 is but an incident in the land registration case and, therefore, no prejudicial question can
arise from the existence of the two actions. 28 A similar issue was raised in Manalo vs. Court of
Appeals,29 where we held that:

At any rate, it taxes our imagination why the questions raised in Case No. 98-0868 must be
considered determinative of Case No. 9011. The basic issue in the former is whether the
respondent, as the purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, may be compelled to
have the property repurchased or resold to a mortgagor’s successor-in-interest (petitioner); while
that in the latter is merely whether the respondent, as the purchaser in the extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings, is entitled to a writ of possession after the statutory period for redemption has expired.
The two cases, assuming both are pending, can proceed separately and take their own direction
independent of each other.30

The focal issue in Civil Case No. MAN-3454 was whether the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage executed by the petitioners in favor of the respondent bank and the sale of their property at
public auction for P2,403,770.73 are null and void, whereas, the issue in LRC Case No. 3 was whether the
respondent bank was entitled to the possession of the property after the statutory period for redemption
had lapsed and title was issued .
Our ruling in Belisario has no application in this case because in the said case, no prejudicial question was
involved. We merely held therein that the filing of an action to enforce redemption within the period of
redemption is equivalent to a formal offer to redeem, and should the Court allow the redemption, the
redemptioner should then pay the amount already determined. In fine, the filing of an action by the
redemptioner to enforce his right to redeem does not suspend the running of the statutory period to redeem
the property, nor bar the purchaser at public auction from procuring a writ of possession after the statutory
period of redemption had lapsed, without prejudice to the final outcome of such complaint to enforce the
right of redemption.31

The remedy of the petitioners from the assailed decision of the RTC in LRC Case No. 3 was to appeal by
writ of error to the Court of Appeals. 32 However, instead of appealing by writ of error, the petitioners filed
their petition for certiorari. Certiorari is not proper where the aggrieved party has a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy at law. Moreover, the error of the trial court in granting the respondent bank a writ of
possession, if at all, was an error of judgment correctible only by an ordinary appeal.

It bears stressing that the proceedings in a petition and/or motion for the issuance of a writ of possession,
after the lapse of the statutory period for redemption, is summary in nature. 33 The trial court is mandated to
issue a writ of possession upon a finding of the lapse of the statutory period for redemption without the
redemptioner having redeemed the property. It cannot be validly argued that the trial court abused its
discretion when it merely complied with its ministerial duty to issue the said writ of possession. 34

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59157 is AFFIRMED.

Cost against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.

Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.

A.P. Salvador for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily
procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.

The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of
Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint
upon the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant
Geluz, ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit.
On appeal, Court of Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of three
justices as against two, who rendered a separate dissenting opinion.

The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through
her aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were
legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her
aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage with the plaintiff, she again
became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy
proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less
than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her
sister Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on
Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was
again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine
currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to
the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages.
Upon application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon
the provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to
be error, for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not
cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil
Code, "la criatura abortiva no alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no
nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being
incapable of having rights and obligations.

Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one
injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child
on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs.
In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its
pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or
juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality
of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same
article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be
subsequently born alive: "provided it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the
present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not
had for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs.
Northampton, 52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be
those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased,
his right to life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services
from an unborn child, they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal
development of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to
its loss, and the disappointment of their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to
exemplary damages, if the circumstances should warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently
because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the appellant
herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and affections.
The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that
the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was likewise aware of the
first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or
pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning
of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal
cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a
large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an
"indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion
which his wife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than
mercenary; and that his primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was
purged of an unworthy member rather than turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with
that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both,
instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which not only he, but also his
wife, would be the beneficiaries.

It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical
necessity to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely
condemned; and the consent of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or
illegality of the act does not justify an award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no
factual or legal basis.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners
for their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may
warrant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., took no part.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 135083. May 26, 1999]

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and
the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates for
vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V. Daza
III.The results of the election were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.

In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,[2] the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the petition
of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private respondent on the
ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code, persons with dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The COMELECs Second Division
said:

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo

Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May
11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an
American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and misrepresented
himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is
registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born in
1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States, San
Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American citizen
under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not
lose his Filipino citizenship.
Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a
Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.
The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to be
elected?
Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios
Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.

On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration. [3] The motion remained
pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.

Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the COMELEC,
the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the
proclamation of the winner.

On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. [4] Petitioners
motion was opposed by private respondent.

The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered its
resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed the
ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor of the
City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. [5] The pertinent portions of the resolution of the
COMELEC en banc read:

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,

California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.
He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the age
of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport as
travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine Bureau
of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This, however, did not
result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce Philippine
citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he registered
himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998, which effectively
renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under Philippine law, he no longer
had U.S. citizenship.
At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest
number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one
hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival,
Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four
(100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959)
votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred
seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in
favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving private
international law which may well be settled before the highest court (Cf. Frivaldo vs.
Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).
WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the
Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the respondents
certificate of candidacy.
We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a candidate
for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998, elections.
ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers, upon
proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo Luis
Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening of
August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.

This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC en
banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati
City.Petitioner contends that

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:
1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he was
already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter and
voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the
City of Makati;
C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division
adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be
declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold the
elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent Manzano whether
petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not an original party in the
case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioners motion for leave to intervene
granted.

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot bring
this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:

Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed to
initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or
proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such action
or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of
either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be
adversely affected by such action or proceeding.
....
Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for
intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication
of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenors rights may be fully
protected in a separate action or proceeding.
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an
interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City [who]
cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be ultimately
disqualified by final and executory judgment.

The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the election
for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out only second to
private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at that time. Certainly,
petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought
to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,[6] reiterated in several cases,[7] only applies to cases in
which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to
the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time petitioner filed a
Motion for Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998, there had been no proclamation of the winner,
and petitioners purpose was precisely to have private respondent disqualified from running for [an]
elective local position under 40(d) of R.A. No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the
disqualification proceedings), a registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so
was petitioner since the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the
highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to intervene at
that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from 6 of R.A.
No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is
strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after
election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.

The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari. As
the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition properly deals not
only with the denial of petitioners motion for intervention but also with the substantive issues
respecting private respondents alleged disqualification on the ground of dual citizenship.

This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses dual
citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified from running for any
elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship. This provision is incorporated in the Charter
of the City of Makati.[8]

Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides with
him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has
command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local
elective office.

To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a
result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. [9] For instance, such a situation may arise when
a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a
state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on
his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV)
of our Constitution, it is possible for the following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual
citizenship:

(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of
jus soli;

(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers country such children are citizens of that country;

(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered citizens,
unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.

There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing any
act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the constitutional
provisions on citizenship.
 Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes,
by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.

With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This provision was included
in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its necessity as
follows:[10]

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I have
circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual
allegiance - and I reiterate a dual allegiance - is larger and more threatening than that of
mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never insidious. That
is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on foreign soil. And so,
I do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of
the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the triennial
elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce which consists
of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as well as a Taipei
ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese community is represented
in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in Taiwan. And until recently, the
sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the Peoples Republic of China, they have the
Associated Legislative Council for overseas Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia
including some European and Latin countries were represented, which was dissolved
after several years because of diplomatic friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese
were also represented in that Overseas Council.
When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of allegiance
of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts, may be said to
be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also took close note of the
concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including Commissioner
Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of thorough assimilation,
and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always been worried about minority
claims on our natural resources.
Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore, China
or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial places in
downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of common
knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to endure a
capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening unemployment and
social unrest.
And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating a
new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as
follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE
DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual
allegiance, thus:[11]

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual

citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty
which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be repugnant
to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself which
implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in terms of
rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the obligation to
rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this, Commissioner
Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of those debates, I
think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of naturalizations since the decision
to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples Republic of China was made in 1975,
a good number of these naturalized Filipinos still routinely go to Taipei every October
10; and it is asserted that some of them do renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign
government maybe just to enter into the spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of
the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep
concern about double citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is
repugnant to our sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said
that this could be left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the
scale of the problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us
say, potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in
effect, or regulate double citizenship?

Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission

was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their
countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual citizenship in R.A. No. 7160,
40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance. Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual
allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their
status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different
states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission,
pointed out: [D]ual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws
on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is
considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control.[12]

By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It may
be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on 40(d) between
Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:[13]

SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: Any person with
dual citizenship is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present Constitution, Mr.
President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is a foreigner is a natural-
born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural born citizen, upon reaching the
age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.

On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her
father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the person to
run for a local government position?

SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would want
to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.

SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the country of
the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are such countries
in the world.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an
election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.

SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under the
Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without any overt
act to claim the citizenship.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans example, if he
does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is really
 interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: I am a
Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.

SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will always
have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution of the
Republic.

SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also
acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.

This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty [14] of which at the time he is a subject
or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the
Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,[15] it was held:

[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he

renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that he
owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by law is
satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is valid or
fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the province
and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law duly
enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should
interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese Law of
Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be applying not what
our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a foreign government
has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It must be resisted by all
means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon the sovereign will and
power of the people of this Republic.

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September 4,
1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while the
United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a national
both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held that, by
participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent effectively renounced
his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now he is solely a Philippine national.
 Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is not
sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made when
private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made when he
reached the age of majority.

In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the
United States, which provided that A person who is a national of the United States, whether by birth or
naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign state or
participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign territory. To be sure
this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Afroyim v. Rusk[16] as
beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign relations. However, by filing a
certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine
citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private respondents certificate of
candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements made under oath:

6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR NATURALIZED) NATURAL-

BORN

....

10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN LORENZO,

CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .

11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND
DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE FAITH
AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL ORDERS AND
DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED AUTHORITIES OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS OBLIGATION UPON
MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION OR PURPOSE OF
EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED HEREIN ARE TRUE AND
CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.

The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC it was held:[17]

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under
Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for any
elective local position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent reason
to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of allegiance
and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment, Frivaldo wrote
that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his American citizenship-long
before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the interim-when he abandoned
and renounced his US citizenship but before he was repatriated to his Filipino
citizenship.
On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:
By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship when
he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for Governor in
1988, in 1992, and in 1995.Every certificate of candidacy contains an oath of allegiance
to the Philippine Government.
These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic that
such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any showing of
capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance contained in
private respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his American
citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioners contention that, to be effective, such renunciation
should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since no law requires the
election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.

Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an
American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American passport
which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit in this. Until
the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual citizenship. The acts attributed
to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American nationality before the termination of
his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v. COMELEC[18] applies mutatis mutandis to
private respondent in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the
mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is
not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that he
is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed,
there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even
no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We consider that the renunciation
needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be express, it stands to reason that there can
be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no renunciation, either express or
implied.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is

not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without
mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively
repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.

On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered with
the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his profession as an
artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,[19] we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath as a
naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in commercial
documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against
any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but subsequently
does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., on leave.
Pardo, J., no part.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 153883. January 13, 2004]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. CHULE Y.
LIM, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
stemmed from a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao
del Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4933.

In her petition, respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in
Buru-an, Iligan City. Her birth was registered in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte but
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Kauswagan transferred her record of birth to
Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth
have four erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected.

The trial court then issued an Order,[1] which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be sufficient in form and substance, let the
hearing of this case be set on December 27, 1999 before this Court, Hall of Justice,
Rosario Heights, Tubod, Iligan City at 8:30 oclock in the afternoon at which date, place
and time any interested person may appear and show cause why the petition should not
be granted.
Let this order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the City of Iligan and
the Province of Lanao del Norte once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks at the
expense of the petitioner.
Furnish copies of this order the Office of the Solicitor General at 134 Amorsolo St.,
Legaspi Vill., Makati City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iligan City at
Quezon Ave., Pala-o, Iligan City.
SO ORDERED.

During the hearing, respondent testified thus:

 First, she claims that her surname Yu was misspelled as Yo. She has been
using Yu in all her school records and in her marriage certificate. [2] She
presented a clearance from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) [3] to
further show the consistency in her use of the surname Yu.

Second, she claims that her fathers name in her birth record was written as
Yo Diu To (Co Tian) when it should have been Yu Dio To (Co Tian).

Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been
Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married. Only her
deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her
being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen.

Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate that she was a
legitimate child when she should have been described as illegitimate
considering that her parents were never married.

Placida Anto, respondents mother, testified that she is a Filipino citizen as

her parents were both Filipinos from Camiguin. She added that she and her
daughters father were never married because the latter had a prior subsisting
marriage contracted in China.

In this connection, respondent presented a certification attested by officials

of the local civil registries of Iligan City and Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte that
there is no record of marriage between Placida Anto and Yu Dio To from 1948 to
the present.

The Republic, through the City Prosecutor of Iligan City, did not present any
evidence although it actively participated in the proceedings by attending
hearings and cross-examining respondent and her witnesses.

On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondents petition and
rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, to set the records of the petitioner
straight and in their proper perspective, the petition is granted and the Civil Registrar of
Iligan City is directed to make the following corrections in the birth records of the
petitioner, to wit:
1. Her family name from YO to YU;
2. Her fathers name from YO DIU TO (CO TIAN) to YU DIOTO (CO TIAN);
3. Her status from legitimate to illegitimate by changing YES to NO in answer to the
question LEGITIMATE?; and,
4. Her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino.
SO ORDERED.[4]

The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of

Appeals which affirmed the trial courts decision. [5]

Hence, this petition on the following assigned errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE CORRECTION OF THE

CITIZENSHIP OF RESPONDENT CHULE Y. LIM FROM CHINESE TO FILIPINO
DESPITE THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT NEVER DEMONSTRATED ANY
COMPLIANCE WITH THE LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ELECTION OF
CITIZENSHIP.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ALLOWING RESPONDENT TO CONTINUE

USING HER FATHERS SURNAME DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT RESPONDENT
IS AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD.[6]

To digress, it is just as well that the Republic did not cite as error
respondents recourse to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court to effect what
indisputably are substantial corrections and changes in entries in the civil
register. To clarify, Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the
procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If
the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure
to be adopted is adversary. This is our ruling in Republic v. Valencia[7]where we
held that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true
facts established under Rule 108 provided the parties aggrieved by the error
avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. An appropriate
adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed,
where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite
partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and
considered.[8]

As likewise observed by the Court of Appeals, we take it that the Republics

failure to cite this error amounts to a recognition that this case properly falls
under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court considering that the proceeding
can be appropriately classified as adversarial.

Instead, in its first assignment of error, the Republic avers that respondent
did not comply with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship
when she reached the age of majority. It cites Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935
Constitution, which provides that the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a
Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless,
upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship.
[9] Likewise, the Republic invokes the provision in Section 1 of Commonwealth

Act No. 625, that legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect
Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention in a statement to be signed
and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer
oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the
Constitution and the Government of the Philippines. [10]

Plainly, the above constitutional and statutory requirements of electing

Filipino citizenship apply only to legitimate children. These do not apply in the
case of respondent who was concededly an illegitimate child, considering that
her Chinese father and Filipino mother were never married. As such, she was
not required to comply with said constitutional and statutory requirements to
become a Filipino citizen. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother,
respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. Stated differently, she is
a Filipino since birth without having to elect Filipino citizenship when she
reached the age of majority.

In Ching, Re: Application for Admission to the Bar, [11] citing In re Florencio
Mallare,[12] we held:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino,
and no other act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges
attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543; Serra vs. Republic, L-4223, May 12,
1952; Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111,
June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-
Filipino divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.[13]

This notwithstanding, the records show that respondent elected Filipino

citizenship when she reached the age of majority. She registered as a voter in
Misamis Oriental when she was 18 years old. [14] The exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of
election of Philippine citizenship.[15]

In its second assignment of error, the Republic assails the Court of Appeals
decision in allowing respondent to use her fathers surname despite its finding
that she is illegitimate.

The Republics submission is misleading. The Court of Appeals did not allow
respondent to use her fathers surname. What it did allow was the correction of
her fathers misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can
remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for
her to use her fathers surname.

We agree with the Court of Appeals when it held:

Firstly, Petitioner-appellee is now 47 years old. To bar her at this time from using her
fathers surname which she has used for four decades without any known objection from
anybody, would only sow confusion. Concededly, one of the reasons allowed for
changing ones name or surname is to avoid confusion.
Secondly, under Sec. 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, the law regulating the use of
aliases, a person is allowed to use a name by which he has been known since childhood.
Thirdly, the Supreme Court has already addressed the same issue. In Pabellar v. Rep. of
the Phils.,[16] we held:
Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 142, which regulates the use of aliases, allows a
person to use a name by which he has been known since childhood (Lim Hok Albano v.
Republic, 104 Phil. 795; People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679; Republic v. Taada, infra).
Even legitimate children cannot enjoin the illegitimate children of their father from
using his surname (De Valencia v. Rodriguez, 84 Phil. 222).[17]

While judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname, [18] there
is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has
already been using since childhood.[19]

The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false
impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the
proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future
mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in
general.[20] In this case, the Republic has not shown that the Yu family in China
would probably be prejudiced or be the object of future mischief. In respondents
case, the change in the surname that she has been using for 40 years would
even avoid confusion to her community in general.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is

DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68893 dated
May 29, 2002, is AFFIRMED.Accordingly, the Civil Registrar of Iligan City is
DIRECTED to make the following corrections in the birth record of respondent
Chule Y. Lim, to wit:
1. Her family name from YO to YU;
2. Her fathers name from YO DIU TO (CO TIAN) to YU DIOTO (CO TIAN);
3. Her status from legitimate to illegitimate by changing YES to NO in answer to the
question LEGITIMATE?; and,
4. Her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino.
SO ORDERED.