SECOND DIVISION 1) Testimonies of Adelina Avenido-Ceno (Adelina), Climaco Avenido (Climaco) and
Tecla herself to substantiate her alleged prior existing and valid marriage with
G.R. No. 173540 January 22, 2014
PEREGRINA MACUA VDA. DE AVENIDO, Petitioner,
vs.
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.ofthe Rules of Court,
assailing the 31 August 2005 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CV No. 79444, which reversed the 25 March 2003 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 8 of Davao City, in a complaint for Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Marriage· docketed as Civil Case No. 26, 908-98.
The Facts
This case involves a contest between two women both claiming to have been
validly married to the same man, now deceased.
Respondent Tecla Hoybia Avenido (Tecla) instituted on 11 November 1998, a
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against Peregrina Macua Vda. de
Avenido (Peregrina) on the ground that she (Tecla), is the lawful wife of the
deceased Eustaquio Avenido (Eustaquio). In her complaint, Tecla alleged that her
marriage to Eustaquio was solemnized on 30 September 1942 in Talibon, Bohol
in rites officiated by the Parish Priest of the said town. According to her, the fact
of their marriage is evidenced by a Marriage Certificate recorded with the Office
of the Local Civil Registrar (LCR) of Talibon, Bohol. However, due to World War II,
records were destroyed. Thus, only a Certification3 was issued by the LCR.
During the existence of Tecla and Eustaquio’s union, they begot four (4) children,
namely: Climaco H. Avenido, born on 30 March 1943; Apolinario H. Avenido, born
on 23 August 1948; Editha A. Ausa, born on 26 July 1950, and Eustaquio H.
Avenido, Jr., born on 15 December 1952. Sometime in 1954, Eustaquio left his
family and his whereabouts was not known. In 1958, Tecla and her children were
informed that Eustaquio was in Davao City living with another woman by the
name of Buenaventura Sayson who later died in 1977 without any issue.
In 1979, Tecla learned that her husband Eustaquio got married to another
woman by the name of Peregrina, which marriage she claims must be declared
null and void for being bigamous – an action she sought to protect the rights of
her children over the properties acquired by Eustaquio.
On 12 April 1999, Peregrina filed her answer to the complaint with
counterclaim,4 essentially averring that she is the legal surviving spouse of
Eustaquio who died on 22 September 1989 in Davao City, their marriage having
been celebrated on 30 March 1979 at St. Jude Parish in Davao City. She also
contended that the case was instituted to deprive her of the properties she owns
in her own right and as an heir of Eustaquio. Trial ensued.
Tecla presented testimonial and documentary evidence consisting of:
(sic) Eustaquio;
2) Documentary evidence such as the following:
a. Certification of Loss/Destruction of Record of Marriage from 1900 to 1944
issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar, Municipality of Talibon, Bohol;5
b. Certification of Submission of a copy of Certificate of Marriage to the Office of
the Civil Registrar General, National Statistics Office (NSO), R. Magsaysay Blvd.,
Sta Mesa, Manila;6
c. Certification that Civil Registry records of births, deaths and marriages that
were actually filed in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, NSO Manila,
started only in 1932;7
d. Certification that Civil Registry records submitted to the Office of the Civil
Registrar General, NSO, from 1932 to the early part of 1945, were totally
destroyed during the liberation of Manila;8
e. Certification of Birth of Apolinario Avenido;9
f. Certification of Birth of Eustaquio Avenido, Jr.;10
g. Certification of Birth of Editha Avenido;11
h. Certification of Marriage between Eustaquio Sr., and Tecla issued by the Parish
Priest of Talibon, Bohol on 30 September 1942;12
i. Certification that record of birth from 1900 to 1944 were destroyed by Second
World War issued by the Office of the Municipal Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that
they cannot furnish as requested a true transcription from the Register of Birth of
Climaco Avenido;13
j. Certificate of Baptism of Climaco indicating that he was born on 30 March 1943
to spouses Eustaquio and Tecla;14
k. Electronic copy of the Marriage Contract between Eustaquio and Peregrina.15
On the other hand, Peregrina testified on, among others, her marriage to
Eustaquio that took place in Davao City on 3 March 1979; her life as a wife and
how she took care of Eustaquio when he already had poor health, as well as her
knowledge that Tecla is not the legal wife, but was once a common law wife of
Eustaquio.16 Peregrina likewise set forth documentary evidence to substantiate
her allegations and to prove her claim for damages, to wit:
1) Marriage Contract17 between Pregrina and the late Eustaquio showing the
date of marriage on 3 March 1979;
2) Affidavit of Eustaquio executed on 22 March 1985 declaring himself as single
when he contracted marriage with the petitioner although he had a common law
relation with one Tecla Hoybia with whom he had four (4) children namely:
Climaco, Tiburcio, Editha and Eustaquio, Jr., all surnamed Avenido;18
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 1 of 57
3) Letter of Atty. Edgardo T. Mata dated 15 April 2002, addressed to the Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of Alegria, Surigao del Norte;19 and
4) Certification dated 25 April 2002 issued by Colita P. Umipig, in her capacity as
the Civil Registrar of Alegria, Surigao del Norte.20
In addition, as basis for the counterclaim, Peregrina averred that the case was
initiated in bad faith so as to deprive her of the properties she owns in her own
right and as an heir of Eustaquio; hence, her entitlement to damages and
attorney’s fees.
On 25 March 2003, the RTC rendered a Decision21 denying Tecla’s petition, as
well as Peregrina’s counter-claim. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
For The Foregoing, the petition for the "DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE"
filed by petitioner TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO against respondent PEREGRINA
MACUA is hereby DENIED.
The "COUNTERCLAIM" filed by respondent PEREGRINA MACUA against petitioner
TECLA HOYBIA AVENIDO is hereby DISMISSED.22
Not convinced, Tecla appealed to the CA raising as error the trial court’s alleged
disregard of the evidence on the existence of her marriage to Eustaquio.
In its 31 August 2005 Decision,23 the CA ruled in favor of Tecla by declaring the
validity of her marriage to Eustaquio, while pronouncing on the other hand, the
marriage between Peregrina and Eustaquio to be bigamous, and thus, null and
void. The CA ruled:
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the
testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she
personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO
and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of
EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his
father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence
mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the
loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non, for
the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very
evidence the trial court has disregarded.24
Peregrina now questions the said ruling assigning as error, among others, the
failure of the CA to appreciate the validity of her marriage to Eustaquio. For its
part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Memorandum25dated 5 June
2008, raises the following legal issues:
1. Whether or not the court can validly rely on the "presumption of marriage" to
overturn the validity of a subsequent marriage;
2. Whether or not secondary evidence may be considered and/or taken
cognizance of, without proof of the execution or existence and the cause of the
unavailability of the best evidence, the original document; and
3. Whether or not a Certificate of Marriage issued by the church has a probative
value to prove the existence of a valid marriage without the priest who issued
the same being presented to the witness stand.26
Our Ruling
Essentially, the question before us is whether or not the evidence presented
during the trial proves the existence of the marriage of Tecla to Eustaquio.
The trial court, in ruling against Tecla’s claim of her prior valid marriage to
Eustaquio relied on Tecla’s failure to present her certificate of marriage to
Eustaquio. Without such certificate, the trial court considered as useless the
certification of the Office of the Civil Registrar of Talibon, Bohol, that it has no
more records of marriages during the period 1900 to 1944. The same thing was
said as regards the Certification issued by the National Statistics Office of Manila.
The trial court observed:
Upon verification from the NSO, Office of the Civil Registrar General, Manila, it,
likewise, issued a Certification (Exhibit "B") stating that:
records from 1932 up to early part of 1945 were totally destroyed during the
liberation of Manila on February 4, 1945. What are presently filed in this office
are records from the latter part of 1945 to date, except for the city of Manila
which starts from 1952. Hence, this office has no way of verifying and could not
issue as requested, certified true copy of the records of marriage between
[Eustaquio] and [Tecla], alleged to have been married on 30th September 1942,
in Talibon, Bohol.27
In the absence of the marriage contract, the trial court did not give credence to
the testimony of Tecla and her witnesses as it considered the same as mere self-
serving assertions. Superior significance was given to the fact that Tecla could
not even produce her own copy of the said proof of marriage. Relying on Section
3 (a) and Section 5, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the trial court declared that
Tecla failed to prove the existence of the first marriage.
The CA, on the other hand, concluded that there was a presumption of lawful
marriage between Tecla and Eustaquio as they deported themselves as husband
and wife and begot four (4) children. Such presumption, supported by
documentary evidence consisting of the same Certifications disregarded by the
trial court, as well as the testimonial evidence especially that of Adelina Avenido-
Ceno, created, according to the CA, sufficient proof of the fact of marriage.
Contrary to the trial court’s ruling, the CA found that its appreciation of the
evidence presented by Tecla is well in accord with Section 5, Rule 130 of the
Rules of Court.
We uphold the reversal by the CA of the decision of the trial court. Quite
recently, in Añonuevo v. Intestate Estate of Rodolfo G. Jalandoni,28 we said,
citing precedents, that:
While a marriage certificate is considered the primary evidence of a marital
union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of marriage.
Jurisprudence teaches that the fact of marriage may be proven by relevant
evidence other than the marriage certificate. Hence, even a person’s birth
certificate may be recognized as competent evidence of the marriage between
his parents.
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 2 of 57
The error of the trial court in ruling that without the marriage certificate, no other
proof of the fact can be accepted, has been aptly delineated in Vda de Jacob v.
Court of Appeals.29 Thus:
It should be stressed that the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract, both constituting the conditio sine qua non for the introduction of
secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very evidence they have
disregarded. They have thus confused the evidence to show due execution and
loss as "secondary" evidence of the marriage. In Hernaez v. Mcgrath, the Court
clarified this misconception thus:
x x x [T]he court below was entirely mistaken in holding that parol evidence of
the execution of the instrument was barred. The court confounded the execution
and the contents of the document. It is the contents, x x x which may not be
proven by secondary evidence when the
instrument itself is accessible. Proofs of the execution are not dependent on the
existence or non-existence of the document, and, as a matter of fact, such proofs
of the contents: due execution, besides the loss, has to be shown as foundation
for the inroduction of secondary evidence of the contents.
Evidence of the execution of a document is, in the last analysis, necessarily
collateral or primary. It generally consists of parol testimony or extrinsic papers.
Even when the document is actually produced, its authencity is not necessarily,
if at all, determined from its face or recital of its contents but by parol evidence.
At the most, failure to produce the document, when available, to establish its
execution may effect the weight of the evidence presented but not the
admissibility of such evidence.
The Court of Appeals, as well as the trial court, tried to justify its stand on this
issue by relying on Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete. But even there, we said that
"marriage may be prove[n] by other competent evidence.
Truly, the execution of a document may be proven by the parties themselves, by
the swearing officer, by witnesses who saw and recognized the signatures of the
parties; or even by those to whom the parties have previously narrated the
execution thereof. The Court has also held that "[t]he loss may be shown by any
person who [knows] the fact of its loss, or by any one who ha[s] made, in the
judgment of the court, a sufficient examination in the place or places where the
document or papers of similar character are usually kept by the person in whose
custody the document lost was, and has been unable to find it; or who has made
any other investigation which is sufficient to satisfy the court that the instrument
[has] indeed [been] lost."
In the present case, due execution was established by the testimonies of Adela
Pilapil, who was present during the marriage ceremony, and of petitioner herself
as a party to the event. The subsequent loss was shown by the testimony and
the affidavit of the officiating priest, Monsignor Yllana, as relevant, competent
and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and the loss of the marriage
contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented, secondary evidence–
testimonial and documentary–may be admitted to prove the fact of marriage.30
As correctly stated by the appellate court:In the case at bench, the celebration of
marriage between [Tecla] and EUSTAQUIO was established by the testimonial
evidence furnished by [Adelina] who appears to be present during the marriage
ceremony, and by [Tecla] herself as a living witness to the event. The loss was
shown by the certifications issued by the NSO and LCR of Talibon, Bohol. These
are relevant, competent and admissible evidence. Since the due execution and
the loss of the marriage contract were clearly shown by the evidence presented,
secondary evidence – testimonial and documentary – may be admitted to prove
the fact of marriage. In PUGEDA v. TRIAS, the
Supreme Court held that "marriage may be proven by any competent and
relevant evidence. The testimony by one of the parties to the marriage or by one
of the witnesses to the marriage has been held to be admissible to prove the fact
of marriage. The person who officiated at the solemnization is also competent to
testify as an eyewitness to the fact of marriage."
The court a quo committed a reversible error when it disregarded (1) the
testimonies of [Adelina], the sister of EUSTAQUIO who testified that she
personally witnessed the wedding celebration of her older brother EUSTAQUIO
and [Tecla] on 30 September 1942 at Talibon, Bohol; [Climaco], the eldest son of
EUSTAQUIO and [Tecla], who testified that his mother [Tecla] was married to his
father, EUSTAQUIO, and [Tecla] herself; and (2) the documentary evidence
mentioned at the outset. It should be stressed that the due execution and the
loss of the marriage contract, both constituting the condition sine qua non for
the introduction of secondary evidence of its contents, were shown by the very
evidence the trial court has disregarded.31
The starting point then, is the presumption of marriage. As early as the case of
Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,32 this Court has elucidated on the rationale behind
the presumption:
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
marriage.1âwphi1 Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is
a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in
the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the
parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be
living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established
by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334,
No. 28) Semper – praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage.
In the case at bar, the establishment of the fact of marriage was completed by
the testimonies of Adelina, Climaco and Tecla; the unrebutted the certifications
of marriage issued by the parish priest of the Most Holy Trinity Cathedral of
Talibon, Bohol.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79444 is AFFIRMED. The marriage between petitioner
Peregrina Macua Avenido and the deceased Eustaquio Avenido is hereby
declared NULL and VOID. No pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 3 of 57
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007
ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO, petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them
male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)
Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices
coming from inside the bamboo. "Oh North Wind! North Wind! Please let us
out!," the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden, the
bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male
and the other was a female. Amihan named the man "Malakas" (Strong) and the
woman "Maganda" (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and Maganda)
When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the
law recognize the changes made by a physician using scalpel, drugs and
counseling with regard to a person’s sex? May a person successfully petition for
a change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result
of a sex reassignment surgery?
On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition
for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case No. 02-105207,
impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.
Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the
spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His
name was registered as "Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio" in his certificate of live
birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as "male."
He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but
feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified himself with
girls since childhood.1 Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several
doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone
treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a
"woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent sex reassignment
surgery2 in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino
Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who
issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone
the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from
"Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."
An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the People’s Journal
Tonight, a newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive
weeks.3 Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
and the civil registrar of Manila.
On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No
opposition to the petition was made.
During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr.
and his American fiancé, Richard P. Edel, as witnesses.
On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision4 in favor of petitioner. Its
relevant portions read:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of making
his birth records compatible with his present sex.
The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.
The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.
Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in
consonance with the principles of justice and equity. With his sexual [re-
assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman,
now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioner’s misfortune to be trapped in
a man’s body is not his own doing and should not be in any way taken against
him.
Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to
anybody or the community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the
petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of the petitioner
and her [fiancé] and the realization of their dreams.
Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the
present petition despite due notice and publication thereof. Even the State,
through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering
the Civil Registrar of Manila to change the entries appearing in the Certificate of
Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioner’s first name from "Rommel Jacinto"
to MELY and petitioner’s gender from "Male" to FEMALE. 5
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG,
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals.6 It alleged that there is no
law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of sex
alteration.
On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals7 rendered a decision8 in favor of the
Republic. It ruled that the trial court’s decision lacked legal basis. There is no law
allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of birth on the
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 4 of 57
ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted
the Republic’s petition, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the
dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it
was denied.9 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and
108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.10
The petition lacks merit.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment
Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change
of name and sex. As found by the trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any
infraction thereof or for any unlawful motive but solely for the purpose of
making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female,
he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.
The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification.11 A change of name is a privilege, not a
right.12 Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.13 In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In
particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of
First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and
change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the
concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with
the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.14 It vests the power and
authority to entertain petitions for change of first name to the city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore, jurisdiction
over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the
aforementioned administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to
exclude the change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 (Change of
Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the
Rules of Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is
first filed and subsequently denied.15 It likewise lays down the corresponding
venue,16 form17 and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not
judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be
allowed:
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for
change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with
dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used
by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that first name or nickname
in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
Petitioner’s basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex
reassignment. He intended to make his first name compatible with the sex he
thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of
name does not alter one’s legal capacity or civil status.18 RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than
avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s first name for his declared purpose
may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or
reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change.19 In addition,
he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official
name.20 In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he
might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of
petitioner’s first name was not within that court’s primary jurisdiction as the
petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned, assuming
it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy
was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the
wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since
the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these
reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioner’s petition in so far as
the change of his first name was concerned.
No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On
the Ground of Sex Reassignment
The determination of a person’s sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue and the court must look to the statutes.21 In this connection, Article 412 of
the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order.
Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA
9048 in so far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or
change of such matters can now be made through administrative proceedings
and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the
ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.22 Rule 108
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 5 of 57
now applies only to substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil
register.23
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall
mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the
performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or typing an entry
in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or
misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other
existing record or records: Provided, however, That no correction must involve
the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis
supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is
not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the
applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code:24
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons
shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of
marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (7)
legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction;
(14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth.25 However, no reasonable
interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error
from" while to change means "to replace something with something else of the
same kind or with something that serves as a substitute."26 The birth certificate
of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding
to his first name and sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.
Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of
certain acts (such as legitimations, acknowledgments of illegitimate children and
naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and deaths)
and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage,
declarations of nullity of marriages, adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and changes of
name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that
touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects
are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among
those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
"Status" refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum
total of capacities and incapacities) of a person in view of his age, nationality
and his family membership.27
The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at
his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or
not. The comprehensive term status… include such matters as the beginning and
end of legal personality, capacity to have rights in general, family relations, and
its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation,
marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.28 (emphasis supplied)
A person’s sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part
of a person’s legal capacity and civil status. In this connection, Article 413 of the
Civil Code provides:
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment
and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:
SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. – The declaration of the physician
or midwife in attendance at the birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of
either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the registration of a
birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary
stamp tax and shall be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days
after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance at the birth or by either
parent of the newborn child.
In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following
facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b) sex and nationality of infant; (c) names,
citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the
mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and
(f) such other data as may be required in the regulations to be issued.
xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)
Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts
as they existed at the time of birth.29Thus, the sex of a person is determined at
birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by
examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally
recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the
time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,30 is immutable.31
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 6 of 57
When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to
ordinary meaning in the absence of a contrary legislative intent. The words determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the effects of sex
"sex," "male" and "female" as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important
the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.
common and ordinary usage, there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In
this connection, sex is defined as "the sum of peculiarities of structure and To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name
function that distinguish a male from a female"32 or "the distinction between and for correction or change of entries in the civil registry, where they may be
male and female."33Female is "the sex that produces ova or bears young"34 and filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented and what
male is "the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa for fertilizing procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person
ova."35 Thus, the words "male" and "female" in everyday understanding do not who has undergone sex reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex
include persons who have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, "words to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation laying down the
that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-known meaning are guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.
presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a
contrary."36 Since the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted person may be recognized as having successfully changed his sex. However, this
in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot be argued that the term Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything else. The
"sex" as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the
allows a post-operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the written word of its co-equal branch of government, Congress.
category "female."
Petitioner pleads that "[t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness,
For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and contentment and [the] realization of their dreams." No argument about that. The
appearance through the intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation do not
change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason. Thus, there is no fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and
legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth that, at least for them, life is indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner
certificate. seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely by the legislature,
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be not by the courts.
Changed on the Ground of Equity WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the Costs against petitioner.
principles of justice and equity. It believed that allowing the petition would cause
no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong. SO ORDERED.
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and
public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that the
petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male
fiancé. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman.37 One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a
male and a female.38 To grant the changes sought by petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family
relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has undergone
sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there
are various laws which apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the
Labor Code on employment of women,39 certain felonies under the Revised
Penal Code40 and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,41 among others. These laws underscore the
public policy in relation to women which could be substantially affected if
petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall
decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of
the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation.
The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 7 of 57
SECOND DIVISION
REPUBLIC OFG.R. No. 166676
THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus - September 12, 2008
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
Respondent.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely
questions of law and seeking a reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan
and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahans birth certificate: (1)
the name Jennifer Cagandahan changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2) gender from
female to male.
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate[2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was
registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but while growing up, she
developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted
possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was
diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and at age six,
underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At
age thirteen, tests revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has
stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then
alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion,
she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be
corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first
name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3)
consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff of the
court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr.
Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-
Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that
respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically
respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female
organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and
male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not
fully developed because of lack of female hormones, and that she has no
monthly period. He further testified that respondents condition is permanent and
recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind,
adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12,
2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown
that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for]. Petitioner has
adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing
proofs for the granting of his petition. It was medically proven
that petitioners body produces male hormones, and first his body
as well as his action and feelings are that of a male. He has
chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be
acknowledged and identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil,
Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following corrections in
the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of
the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer
Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to
MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters
registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent records are
hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal
of the abovementioned ruling.
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 8 of 57
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION
CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF
COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW
CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE
RESPONDENTS MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL
HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.[4]
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction
of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender, from
female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her
name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance
with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because while the local civil
registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition
before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.[5] The OSG
further contends respondents petition is fatally defective since it failed to state
that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was
filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated
under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[6] The OSG argues that Rule
108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and
respondents claimed medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.
[7]
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of
Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a party in the Petition for Correction of
Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the
Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or
processes in the course of the proceedings,[8] respondent is actually a male
person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected to reflect his true
sex/gender,[9] change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108,[10] and
respondent substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court.[11]
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall
present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of the province in
which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall
be signed and verified by the person desiring his name changed,
or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of
the province where the petition is filed for at least three
(3) years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's
name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form
and substance, the court, by an order reciting the purpose of the
petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and
shall direct that a copy of the order be published before the
hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in
some newspaper of general circulation published in the province,
as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall
not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four
(4) months after the last publication of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the
hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or the
proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the
Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the
date fixed in the order that such order has been published as
directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the
court shall, if proper and reasonable cause appears for changing
the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed
in accordance with the prayer of the petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in
connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil registrar of
the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is
situated, who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 9 of 57
 IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any
act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons
which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good
and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register may
be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths;
(d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage;
(f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of
filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes
of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the
civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who
have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall
be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the
court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of
the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or
claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or
correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice,
file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the
proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the
petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or correction
prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall
be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate
the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance
with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because respondents petition did
not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil
registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the correction of
name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final
determination of the case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable
parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as
falling much too short of the requirements of the rules.[13] The corresponding
petition should also implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other
persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that would be affected
thereby.[14] Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court which states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their
objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance with
Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil
registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal
issue and the court must look to the statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of
the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by
Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or typographical errors are
involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect,
Rep. Act No. 9048 removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes and
corrections in entries in the civil register.[18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of
sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change for
which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.[19]
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil
Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil
status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 10 of 57
 (1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5)
annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11)
loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14)
judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of
a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil
Code include even those that occur after birth.[20]
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or
inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A person, like respondent, with
this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who
has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the
urethral opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male
than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female reproductive tract such
as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some
features start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair,
and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are
born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the
twentieth century, medicine adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human
beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.[22] The term is now of
widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a living
thing of a gonochoristicspecies whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or
secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither exclusively male nor
female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both
male and female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most
societies, intersex individuals have been expected to conform to either a male or
female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in Western
societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their
genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or female genitals.
[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as suffering from a
disorder which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery
and/or by taking lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as
possible into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the
various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be subject to outright
denial. It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the
sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male nor truly
female.[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a
person be classified either as a male or as a female, but this Court is not
controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such
rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no
basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we determine,
based on medical testimony and scientific development
showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and
categorically female nor consistently and categorically male)
composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However, respondents
body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a
result, respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a
male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or
naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be
what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with
good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male
and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen)
there is preponderant biological support for considering him as being
male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender
classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such
persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken
unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could
have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,
[26] to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He
chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents
development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent
concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle
preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to
reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent
as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or
remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo treatment
and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly
currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who
has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the
pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial
choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 11 of 57
incompetent[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying
respondent as a male will harm other members of society who are equally
entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the
respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and
(2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other words, we
respect respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a
male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how
respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier,
considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a
change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised
in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow.
[28] The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff
implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes his preferred
gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will
conform with the change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna,
is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court
assailing the September 29, 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 12 of 57
G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2 of the Regional
Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer
(Fringer) and respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.
The facts
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married
before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59,
Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
Register No. 2004-1588.3
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they
never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with
any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one
made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .
Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13,
2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial
brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the
Assistant Prosecutor complied and reported that she could not make a
determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did
not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-
trial, hearing on the merits ensued.
Ruling of the RTC
In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the
dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment
is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and Daniel Lee
Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this
pronouncement, petitioner shall cease using the surname of respondent as she
never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a misimpression that she
remains the wife of respondent.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience
only. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted
Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship;
that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that
after the ceremony, the parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned
to the United States and never again communicated with her; and that, in turn,
she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for
citizenship. The RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a
purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a
farce and should not be recognized from its inception.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7
dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It explained that
the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their
consent to the marriage as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and
used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.
Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC
ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. The CA
stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of
getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further
explained that the parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and
never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family. It concluded that
their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign
citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.
Hence, this petition.
Assignment of Error
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A
MARRIAGE CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE, LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8
The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American
citizenship and for Fringer to be paid $2,000.00, both parties freely gave their
consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that
marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it.
According to the OSG, consent should be distinguished from motive, the latter
being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a
marriage in jest. The parties here intentionally consented to enter into a real and
valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American
citizenship would be rendered futile.
On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her
stand that her marriage was similar to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore,
void from the beginning. On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating
its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.
Ruling of the Court
The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage,
contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 13 of 57
The Court resolves in the negative. Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall
first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of
immigration.
Marriage Fraud in Immigration. The institution of marriage carries with it
concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud for the
sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages
where a couple marries only to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific
benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11 A common
limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a
child.12 Another, which is the subject of the present case, is for immigration
purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention of the couple
at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use
marriage solely to achieve immigration status.14
In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service,15 established the principal test for determining the presence of
marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the
bride and groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were
married. "This standard was modified with the passage of the Immigration
Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to
instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of
evading the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from
determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the
intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this
standard is used purely for immigration purposes and, therefore, does not
purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.
The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or
fraudulent for the limited purpose of immigration is also legally void and in
existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States
made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an
alien to stay in the country, the parties had agreed to marry but not to live
together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge
Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent
permission to stay in the country was not a marriage, there being no consent, to
wit:
x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent
is necessary to every contract; and no matter what forms or ceremonies the
parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they do
not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to
this rule: a marriage in jest is not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a
marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the spouses
agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside
world and with the understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has
served its purpose to deceive, they have never really agreed to be married at all.
They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is
not ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18
On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic
Lines,19 which declared as valid a marriage entered into solely for the husband
to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could not be
avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited
purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case of Matter of McKee,21 further
recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a
non subsisting one.
Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore,
been recognized as problematic. The problem being that in order to obtain an
immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present, United
States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose"
marriages where a couple married only to achieve a particular purpose, and
have upheld such marriages as valid.23
The Court now turns to the case at hand.
Respondent’s marriage not void. In declaring the respondent’s marriage
void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose other
than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should
not be recognized from its inception. In its resolution denying the OSG’s motion
for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the marriage was declared
void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as
they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for
the respondent to acquire American citizenship. Agreeing with the RTC, the CA
ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties
clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in
the Rubenstein case, the CA found the marriage to be similar to a marriage in
jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never
intended to enter into a marriage contract and never intended to live as husband
and wife or build a family.
The CA’s assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties’ supposed
lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the Family Code, consent is an essential
requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of
any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.
Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2)
made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires
that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective
by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such
as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24Consent must also be
conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently
understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable
consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be affected by
insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact,
there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any
vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they
understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 14 of 57
marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely
given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and
deliberately contracted the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a
real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the requirements of an
application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the
legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie
which was necessary to accomplish their goal.
In ruling that Albios’ marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized
such as akin to a marriage by way of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended
marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of
entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the
parties would not be bound. The ceremony is not followed by any conduct
indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended marriage
not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever,
hence, the absence of any genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio,
not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a complete absence
of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no
intention of being bound in any way or for any purpose.
The respondent’s marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in
jest.1âwphi1 Albios and Fringer had an undeniable intention to be bound in order
to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire American
citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further
their objective, considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an
application for citizenship. There was, thus, an apparent intention to enter into
the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose.
Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the
couple to establish a conjugal and family life. The possibility that the parties in a
marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is, however,
insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The
same Article 1 provides that the nature, consequences, and incidents of
marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A marriage may,
thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There
is no law that declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other
than what the Constitution or law declares, such as the acquisition of foreign
citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites
prescribed by law are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds
provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28
Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not
and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt
to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and
would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy
allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see
fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no children, to love one
another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes,
limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and
title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites,31are equally valid.
Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid
cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly
support a marriage.
Although the Court views with disdain the respondent’s attempt to utilize
marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot declare the marriage void. Hence,
though the respondent’s marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for
the purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and
subsisting.
Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under
Article 45 (3) of the Family Code. Only the circumstances listed under Article 46
of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure of a previous
conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a
pregnancy by another man; (3) concealment of a sexually transmitted disease;
and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or homosexuality. No other
misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to
annul a marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading
immigration laws does not qualify under any of the listed circumstances.
Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by
the injured or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party
because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter into the sham marriage.
Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing
her marriage with Fringer to be declared void would only further trivialize this
inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void in the event
the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its
benefits, or simply have no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals
cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their fraudulent schemes.
Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of
convenience; she should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an
inconvenient situation.
No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social
institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the
contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may
easily be entered into when it suits the needs of the parties, and just as easily
nullified when no longer needed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-
06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 15 of 57
G.R. No. 182438 July 2, 2014
RENE RONULO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Fr. Rene
Ronulo challenging the April 3, 2008 decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
(RTC) Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
The Factual Antecedents
The presented evidence showed that3 Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were
scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic
Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the wedding,
the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the
marriage upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a
recourse, Joey, who was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad in a
wedding gown, together with their parents, sponsors and guests, proceeded to
the Independent Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the Aglipayan
Church. They requested the petitioner, an Aglipayan priest, to perform a
ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the couple
that they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a mass for the couple on the
same date. He conducted the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride,
their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors and the rest of their invited
guests.4
An information for violation of Article 352 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended, was filed against the petitioner before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Batac, Ilocos Norte for allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony.5
The petitioner entered the plea of "not guilty" to the crime charged on
arraignment.
The prosecution’s witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne Yere, testified on the
incidents of the ceremony. Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was the
cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified that she saw the bride walk
down the aisle. She also saw the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss each
other, and sign a document.6She heard the petitioner instructing the principal
sponsors to sign the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the reception,
had lunch and took pictures. She saw the petitioner there. She also identified the
wedding invitation given to her by Joey.7
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she heard the couple declare
during the ceremony that they take each other as husband and wife.8 Days after
the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte with Atty. Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a certificate that no
marriage license was issued to the couple.9
The petitioner, while admitting that he conducted a ceremony, denied that his
act of blessing the couple was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as
contemplated by law.10
The MTC Judgment
The MTC found the petitioner guilty of violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, and imposed on him a ₱200.00 fine pursuant to Section 44 of Act No.
3613. It held that the petitioner’s act of giving a blessing constitutes a marriage
ceremony as he made an official church recognition of the cohabitation of the
couple as husband and wife.11 It further ruled that in performing a marriage
ceremony without the couple’s marriage license, the petitioner violated Article
352 of the RPC which imposes the penalty provided under Act No. 3613 or the
Marriage Law. The MTC applied Section 44 of the Marriage Law which pertinently
states that a violation of any of its provisions that is not specifically penalized or
of the regulations to be promulgated, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment of not more than one month, or
both, in the discretion of the court.
The RPC is a law subsequent to the Marriage Law, and provides the penalty for
violation of the latter law. Applying these laws, the MTC imposed the penalty of a
fine in the amount of ₱200.00.12
The RTC Ruling
The RTC affirmed the findings of the MTC and added that the circumstances
surrounding the act of the petitioner in "blessing" the couple unmistakably show
that a marriage ceremony had transpired. It further ruled that the positive
declarations of the prosecution witnesses deserve more credence than the
petitioner’s negative statements.13 The RTC, however, ruled that the basis of the
fine should be Section 39, instead of Section 44, of the Marriage Law.
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling. The CA observed that although
there is no prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage, the
law provides minimum standards in determining whether a marriage ceremony
has been conducted, viz.: (1) the contracting parties must appear personally
before the solemnizing officer; and (2) they should declare that they take each
other as husband and wife in the presence of at least two witnesses of legal
age.14 According to the CA, the prosecution duly proved these requirements. It
added that the presence of a marriage certificate is not a requirement in a
marriage ceremony.15
The CA additionally ruled that the petitioner’s criminal liability under Article 352
of the RPC, as amended, is not dependent on whether Joey or Claire were
charged or found guilty under Article 350 of the same Code.16
The CA agreed with the MTC that the legal basis for the imposition of the fine is
Section 44 of the Marriage Law since it covers violation of regulations to be
promulgated by the proper authorities such as the RPC.
The Petition
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 16 of 57
The petitioner argues that the CA erred on the following grounds: First, Article
352 of the RPC, as amended, is vague and does not define what constitutes "an
illegal marriage ceremony." Assuming that a marriage ceremony principally
constitutes those enunciated in Article 55 of the Civil Code and Article 6 of the
Family Code, these provisions require the verbal declaration that the couple take
each other as husband and wife, and a marriage certificate containing the
declaration in writing which is duly signed by the contracting parties and
attested to by the solemnizing officer.17 The petitioner likewise maintains that
the prosecution failed to prove that the contracting parties personally declared
that they take each other as husband and wife.18 Second, under the principle of
separation of church and State, the State cannot interfere in ecclesiastical affairs
such as the administration of matrimony. Therefore, the State cannot convert the
"blessing" into a "marriage ceremony."19
Third, the petitioner had no criminal intent as he conducted the "blessing" in
good faith for purposes of giving moral guidance to the couple.20
Fourth, the non-filing of a criminal case against the couple in violating Article 350
of the RPC, as amended, should preclude the filing of the present case against
him.21
Finally, Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not provide for a penalty. The
present case is not covered by Section 44 of the Marriage Law as the petitioner
was not found violating its provisions nor a regulation promulgated thereafter.22
THE COURT’S RULING:
We find the petition unmeritorious.
The elements of the crime punishable under Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
were proven by the prosecution
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer
who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The elements of
this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing officer; and (2) his
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case, the petitioner
admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Hence, the only issue to
be resolved is whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is tantamount to
the performance of an "illegal marriage ceremony" which is punishable under
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not specifically define a
"marriage ceremony" and what constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3)
and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. These provisions were
taken from Article 5523 of the New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from
Section 324 of the Marriage Law with no substantial amendments. Article 625 of
the Family Code provides that "[n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the
solemnization of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary, however, for the
contracting parties to appear personally before the solemnizing officer and
declare in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age that they take
each other as husband and wife."26 Pertinently, Article 3(3)27 mirrors Article 6
of the Family Code and particularly defines a marriage ceremony as that which
takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as
husband and wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
Even prior to the date of the enactment of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
the rule was clear that no prescribed form of religious rite for the solemnization
of the marriage is required. However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets
the minimum requirements constituting a marriage ceremony: first, there should
be the personal appearance of the contracting parties before a solemnizing
officer; and second, heir declaration in the presence of not less than two
witnesses that they take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted that the parties appeared
before him and this fact was testified to by witnesses. On the second
requirement, we find that, contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, the prosecution
has proven, through the testimony of Florida, that the contracting parties
personally declared that they take each other as husband and wife.
The petitioner’s allegation that the court asked insinuating and leading questions
to Florida fails to persuadeus. A judge may examine or cross-examine a witness.
He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and
to extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony
though that testimony may tend to support or rebut the position taken by one or
the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory questions he
propounds happen to reveal certain truths that tend to destroy the theory of one
party.28
At any rate, if the defense found the line of questioning of the judge
objectionable, its failure to timely register this bars it from belatedly invoking any
irregularity.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary Anne, and even the petitioner’s
admission regarding the circumstances of the ceremony, support Florida’s
testimony that there had indeed been the declaration by the couple that they
take each other as husband and wife. The testimony of Joey disowning their
declaration as husband and wife cannot overcome these clear and convincing
pieces of evidence. Notably, the defense failed to show that the prosecution
witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne, had any ill-motive to testify against the
petitioner.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the principle of separation of
church and State precludes the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a
marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioner’s allegation, this principle has
been duly preserved by Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that no
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of marriage is required.
This pronouncement gives any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in
conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to the requirement that the
core requirements of law be observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 1529 of the Constitution recognizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution and that our family law is based on
the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which
the State is vitally interested. The State has paramount interest in the
enforcement of its constitutional policies and the preservation of the sanctity of
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 17 of 57
marriage. To this end, it is within its power to enact laws and regulations, such as On the other hand, Section 44 of the Marriage Law states that:
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which penalize the commission of acts
resulting in the disintegration and mockery of marriage. Section 44. General Penal Clause – Any violation of any provision of this Act not
specifically penalized, or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what the petitioner conducted was authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two hundred pesos or
a marriage ceremony, as the minimum requirements set by law were complied by imprisonment for not more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the
with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a "blessing," the presence of court. [emphasis ours]
the requirements of the law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified this
"blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as contemplated by Article 3(3) of the From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find merit in the ruling of the CA
Family Code and Article 352 of the RPC, as amended. and the MTC that the penalty imposable in the present case is that covered
under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage Law.
We come now to the issue of whether the solemnization by the petitioner of this
marriage ceremony was illegal. The penalized acts under Section 39 of Act No. 3613 do not include the present
case.1âwphi1 As correctly found by the MTC, the petitioner was not found
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the essential requisites of marriage violating the provisions of the Marriage Law but Article 352 of the RPC, as
is the presence of a valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the petitioner amended. It is only the imposition of the penalty for the violation of this provision
admitted that he knew that the couple had no marriage license, yet he which is referred to the Marriage Law. On this point, Article 352 falls squarely
conducted the "blessing" of their relationship. under the provision of Section 44 of Act No. 3613 which provides for the penalty
for any violation of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper authorities;
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage ceremony despite Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which was enacted after the Marriage Law,
knowledge that the essential and formal requirements of marriage set by law is one of such regulations.
were lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was illegal. The petitioner’s
knowledge of the absence of these requirements negates his defense of good Therefore, the CA did not err in imposing the penalty of fine of ₱200.00 pursuant
faith. to Section 44 of the Marriage Law.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack of a marriage certificate WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of
negates his criminal liability in the present case. For purposes of determining if a Appeals dated April 3, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31028.
marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage certificate is not included in
the requirements provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as discussed SO ORDERED.
above.
Neither does the non-filing of a criminal complaint against the couple negate
criminal liability of the petitioner. Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not
make this an element of the crime. The penalty imposed is proper
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article 352 of the RPC, as amended,
this provision clearly provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with the
provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty provisions of the Marriage Law are
Sections 39 and 44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of the Marriage Law
provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage – Any priest or minister solemnizing
marriage without being authorized by the Director of the Philippine National
Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses to exhibit the authorization
in force when called upon to do so by the parties or parents, grandparents,
guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop or officer, priest, or minister
of any church, religion or sect the regulations and practices whereof require
banns or publications previous to the solemnization of a marriage in accordance
with section ten, who authorized the immediate solemnization of a marriage that FIRST DIVISION
is subsequently declared illegal; or any officer, priest or minister solemnizing
marriage in violation of this act, shall be punished by imprisonment for not less G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
than one month nor more than two years, or by a fine of not less than two
hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos. [emphasis ours]

Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 18 of 57

JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set
aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case
No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he
claimed that on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and intimidation
employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired
Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita
went to the City Hall of Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend
Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On the said date, the
father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before
the said Minister of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a
marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they
obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage
license was presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she
and Jaime were married civilly on 19 May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony
thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City.
Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and the
National Statistics Office. He is estopped from invoking the lack of marriage
license after having been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the following findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he
and defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a
Minister of the Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where they executed a Marriage
Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff
alleged, was an aide of defendant's father accompanied them, and who, together
with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding. That although
marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19,
1969 was indicated in the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never
applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made by him
through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a
Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr.,
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever
issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant were again wed, this
time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer
Parish Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another
marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same marriage license no. 2770792 used
and indicated. Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and reception
were jointly shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he
and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose
Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him
financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his medical
studies. Eventually, their marital relationship turned bad because it became
difficult for him to be married he being a medical student at that time. They
started living apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling before they
eventually separated in 1978. It was during this time when defendant's second
son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce
decree against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured a
judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when
his service was engaged by plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the
circumstances of his marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of Civil Registry
of San Juan where the supposed marriage license was obtained and with the
Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious wedding ceremony
was celebrated. His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994
(Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent
to and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued
Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and
September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever
issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued
him a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F")
and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted
that it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19,
1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San
Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan,
identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September
20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that
their office failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may
have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady
romantic relationship after they met and were introduced to each other in
October 1968. A model, she was compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng
Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked her to
run away with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her
family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they came back to Manila,
she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's
mother, Mrs. Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they
learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced them that she will take care
of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff was
still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites, without the
knowledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19,
1969, before a minister and where she was made to sign documents. After the
civil wedding, they had lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31,
1969, they had the church wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and
arranged, since defendant's mother just came from hospital. Her family did not
participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant further stated that there was
no sexual consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after two
months when they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 19 of 57
physician and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing
psychiatric therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic
problem compounded by his drug habit. She found out plaintiff has unusual
sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take endless
pictures of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the
knees which she called "intrafemural sex," while real sex between them was far
and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff
exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug
addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper
who breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like
amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep
and then would take barbiturates or downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried
very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has become a habit to
him. They had no fixed home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain
for about four and a half years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law
would send some financial support on and off, while defendant worked as an
English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their
marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her,
and this led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she learned that plaintiff
married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil
wedding of his daughter with the plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came
to stay with him after they returned home from Spain and have lived with him
and his wife ever since. His grandsons practically grew up under his care and
guidance, and he has supported his daughter's expenses for medicines and
hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it
was plaintiff's family that attended to all the preparations and arrangements for
the church wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the
couple wed in civil rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also stated
that she and her parents were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital
differences between plaintiff and defendant.
As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of
irreconcilable differences with defendant and in order for them to live their own
lives, they agreed to divorce each other; that when he applied for and obtained a
divorce decree in the United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the
knowledge and consent of defendant who in fact authorized a certain Atty.
Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse
testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh.
"EE") issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no.
2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the marriage contract (Exh.
"A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the
parties, the trial court made the following justifications:
Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the
lack or absence of a license renders the marriage void ab initio. It was shown
under the various certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the
office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and the more
recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no.
2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage license no.
2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh.
"A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh. "F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys
probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, x x x.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O.
Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the
Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of marriage
solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer
Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage license.
Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the
registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property
registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy
hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor General for its record and
information.7
Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20
December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed with the trial court and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court
explained that: "The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted
by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. The
presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it
becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of
San Juan testified that they "failed to locate the book wherein marriage
license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the employee
handling is already retired." With said testimony We cannot therefore just
presume that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage contract
was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of
San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the
fact that no such marriage license was issued but rather, because it "failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply put,
if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that
it would have contained an entry on marriage license no. 2720792.
xxxx
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a
mere perception of plaintiff that his union with defendant is defective with
respect to an essential requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that
ultimately was not substantiated with facts on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of
Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 20 of 57
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the following issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to
the parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the
presumption of regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage
license, arising solely from the contents of the marriage contracts in question
which show on their face that a marriage license was purportedly issued by the
Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of
validity of a marriage arising from the admitted "fact of marriage."9
At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the
certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage
License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties was
issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.
We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of
the marriage of the parties are Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for
the validity of marriage. The marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no
exception.
At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a
marriage that is null and void on the ground of absence of a marriage license
based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan. As ruled
by this Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño13:
[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office
has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court
held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a
marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case,
the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he
being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all date relative to
the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the
deceased has been sufficiently overcome. It then became the burden of
petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required
marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court,
petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a
marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But
petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an
argument that will put her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their
marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased, having been solemnized without the necessary marriage
license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license
requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the
Local Civil Registrar should be read in line with the decision in the earlier case
of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or
that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers
charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are
required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of
the applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant
data. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically
state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular entry could
not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification shall be
sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a written statement signed by an officer having
the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no
record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that
the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan in connection with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied
with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be accorded probative value.
The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, was dated 11 March 1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With
regards (sic) to Marriage License Number 2880792,16 we exert all effort but we
cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the
above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 21 of 57
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by
this Office with regards to Marriage License Number 2880792, we exert all effort
but we cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the
above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
September 20, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License
Application was filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May
19, 1969 was issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA
CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our
Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for
whatever legal intent it may serve.
San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
Local Civil Registrar
Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and
understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above
problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that the Office of
the Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine
the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded work."
Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not
such license was issued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated
that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of
the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person
was not presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former
custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his testimony could
not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or
prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court
among other things the register of application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses
received by the Office of the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal,
from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that with you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications
that your office maintains as required by the manual of the office of the Local
Civil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.
xxxx
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the
number issued by their office while with respect to license no. 2770792 the office
of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was never
issued. Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by
their office. Did you ask this 2887092, but you could not find the record? But for
the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which now, was this issued or
not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost
efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook where Marriage License No.
2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance
of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is
effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed is among the disputable
presumptions.
In one case, it was held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be
accepted and acted on where there is no other evidence to uphold the
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 22 of 57
contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima
evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or facie presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
duty has been regularly performed. x x x.21 and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.31
The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion
evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.22 or deepest sentiments. As we have said in Carating-Siayngco v.
Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor
The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.
can be overcome by other evidence as in the case at bar where the presumption
has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated 20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as we believed true in the case
at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of SO ORDERED.
diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that
absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward
the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The
courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled;
on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together
for several years producing two offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took
Jaime several years before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity.
Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready
to reward petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his
freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic
social institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a
mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The
State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The
break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their
preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.29
"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage.
Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an
institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested.
Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in
the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the case, to be in
fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the
parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be Republic of the Philippines
living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established SUPREME COURT
by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves Manila
as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio – Always presume marriage."30 THIRD DIVISION

Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 23 of 57

G.R. No. 183896 January 30, 2013
SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,
vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, questioning the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March
11, 2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760, which reversed the Decision2 in Civil Case No.
03-0382-CFM dated October 5, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
109, Pasay City, and the CA Resolution dated July 24, 2008, denying petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration of the CA Decision.
The present case stems from a petition filed by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas
(Syed) for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gloria Goo-Abbas (Gloria)
with the RTC of Pasay City, docketed as Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM, and raffled
to RTC Branch 109. Syed alleged the absence of a marriage license, as provided
for in Article 4, Chapter I, Title 1 of Executive Order No. 269, otherwise known as
the Family Code of the Philippines, as a ground for the annulment of his marriage
to Gloria.
In the Marriage Contract3 of Gloria and Syed, it is stated that Marriage License
No. 9969967, issued at Carmona, Cavite on January 8, 1993, was presented to
the solemnizing officer. It is this information that is crucial to the resolution of
this case.
At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen, testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino
citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei
Mosque in Taiwan.4 He arrived in the Philippines in December of 1992. On
January 9, 1993, at around 5 o’clock in the afternoon, he was at his mother-in-
law’s residence, located at 2676 F. Muñoz St., Malate, Manila, when his mother-
in-law arrived with two men. He testified that he was told that he was going to
undergo some ceremony, one of the requirements for his stay in the Philippines,
but was not told of the nature of said ceremony. During the ceremony he and
Gloria signed a document. He claimed that he did not know that the ceremony
was a marriage until Gloria told him later. He further testified that he did not go
to Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage license, and that he had never
resided in that area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office of the Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, to check on their marriage license, and was asked to show a
copy of their marriage contract wherein the marriage license number could be
found.5 The Municipal Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion, issued a
certification on July 11, 2003 to the effect that the marriage license number
appearing in the marriage contract he submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967,
was the number of another marriage license issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado
and Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads as follows:
11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify as per Registry Records of Marriage License filed in
this office, Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued in favor of MR.
ARLINDO GETALADO and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on January 19,
1993.
No Marriage License appear [sic] to have been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS
and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8, 1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed Azhar Abbas for whatever legal
purpose or intents it may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that Gloria had filed bigamy cases against
him in 2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite to get certification on whether or not there was a marriage
license on advice of his counsel.8
Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic (Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic appeared under a letter of authority
from the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, and brought documents
pertaining to Marriage License No. 9969967, which was issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9
Bagsic testified that their office issues serial numbers for marriage licenses and
that the numbers are issued chronologically.10 He testified that the certification
dated July 11, 2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina Encarnacion, Registrar
of the Municipality of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage License No.
9969967 was issued for Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January 19,
1993, and that their office had not issued any other license of the same serial
number, namely 9969967, to any other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own behalf, and presented Reverend Mario
Dauz, Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and May Ann Ceriola.
Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified that he was a minister of the Gospel
and a barangay captain, and that he is authorized to solemnize marriages within
the Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized the marriage of Syed Azhar
Abbas and Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on January 9, 1993.13 He
stated that the witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty. Sanchez) and Mary
Ann Ceriola.14 He testified that he had been solemnizing marriages since 1982,
and that he is familiar with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further testified that
Atty. Sanchez gave him the marriage license the day before the actual wedding,
and that the marriage contract was prepared by his secretary.16 After the
solemnization of the marriage, it was registered with the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the marriage contract and copy of the marriage
license with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to be the sponsor of the wedding of
Syed Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He
testified that he requested a certain Qualin to secure the marriage license for the
couple, and that this Qualin secured the license and gave the same to him on
January 8, 1993.19 He further testified that he did not know where the marriage
license was obtained.20 He attended the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993,
signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and witnessed the signing of the
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 24 of 57
marriage contract by the couple, the solemnizing officer and the other witness,
Mary Ann Ceriola.21
Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is
her son-in-law, and that she was present at the wedding ceremony held on
January 9, 1993 at her house.22 She testified that she sought the help of Atty.
Sanchez at the Manila City Hall in securing the marriage license, and that a week
before the marriage was to take place, a male person went to their house with
the application for marriage license.23 Three days later, the same person went
back to their house, showed her the marriage license before returning it to Atty.
Sanchez who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.24 She further
testified that she did not read all of the contents of the marriage license, and
that she was told that the marriage license was obtained from Carmona.25 She
also testified that a bigamy case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, evidenced by an information for Bigamy dated
January 10, 2003, pending before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.26
As to Mary Ann Ceriola’s testimony, the counsels for both parties stipulated that:
(a) she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on
January 9, 1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding photos and she could identify
all the persons depicted in said photos; and (c) her testimony corroborates that
of Felicitas Goo and Atty. Sanchez.
The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is her husband, and presented the
marriage contract bearing their signatures as proof.27 She and her mother
sought the help of Atty. Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and asked him to
be one of the sponsors. A certain Qualin went to their house and said that he will
get the marriage license for them, and after several days returned with an
application for marriage license for them to sign, which she and Syed did. After
Qualin returned with the marriage license, they gave the license to Atty. Sanchez
who gave it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer. Gloria testified that she and
Syed were married on January 9, 1993 at their residence.28
Gloria further testified that she has a daughter with Syed, born on June 15,
1993.29
Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy case against Syed, who had married
a certain Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the existence of the previous
marriage, and that the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 02A-03408, with
the RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already been married on August 9, 1992 in
Taiwan, but that she did not know if said marriage had been celebrated under
Muslim rites, because the one who celebrated their marriage was Chinese, and
those around them at the time were Chinese.31
The Ruling of the RTC
In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay City RTC held that no valid marriage
license was issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of
Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No. 9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite had certified that no marriage license had been issued for Gloria and
Syed.32 It also took into account the fact that neither party was a resident of
Carmona, Cavite, the place where Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued, in
violation of Article 9 of the Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one of those
exempt from the license requirement, and that the lack of a valid marriage
license is an absence of a formal requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed on
January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, and against
the respondent declaring as follows:
1. The marriage on January 9, 1993 between petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas is hereby annulled;
2. Terminating the community of property relations between the petitioner and
the respondent even if no property was acquired during their cohabitation by
reason of the nullity of the marriage of the parties.
3. The Local Civil Registrar of Manila and the Civil Registrar General, National
Statistics Office, are hereby ordered to cancel from their respective civil
registries the marriage contracted by petitioner Syed Azhar Abbas and
respondent Gloria Goo-Abbas on January 9, 1993 in Manila.
SO ORDERED.34
Gloria filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated November 7, 2005, but the RTC
denied the same, prompting her to appeal the questioned decision to the Court
of Appeals.
The Ruling of the CA
In her appeal to the CA, Gloria submitted the following assignment of errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT AS NULL AND VOID DUE TO THE ABSENCE OF A
MARRIAGE LICENSE DESPITE EVIDENCE CLEARLY SHOWING THAT THERE WAS
ONE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING, AS A REQUISITE OF A VALID
MARRIAGE, THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT A MARRIAGE
CEREMONY TOOK PLACE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES
BEFORE THE SOLEMNIZING OFFICER AND THEIR PERSONAL DECLARATION THAT
THEY TOOK EACH OTHER AS HUSBAND AND WIFE IN THE PRESENCE OF NOT
LESS THAN TWO WITNESSES OF LEGAL AGE.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING ON THE ISSUE OF ESTOPPEL BY
LACHES ON THE PART OF THE PETITIONER, AN ISSUE TIMELY RAISED IN THE
COURT BELOW.35
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 25 of 57
The CA gave credence to Gloria’s arguments, and granted her appeal. It held
that the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar failed to categorically state
that a diligent search for the marriage license of Gloria and Syed was conducted,
and thus held that said certification could not be accorded probative
value.36 The CA ruled that there was sufficient testimonial and documentary
evidence that Gloria and Syed had been validly married and that there was
compliance with all the requisites laid down by law.37
It gave weight to the fact that Syed had admitted to having signed the marriage
contract. The CA also considered that the parties had comported themselves as
husband and wife, and that Syed only instituted his petition after Gloria had filed
a case against him for bigamy.38
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
05 October 2005 and Order dated 27 January 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 109, in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED. The
marriage between Shed [sic] Azhar Abbas and Gloria Goo Abbas contracted on
09 January 1993 remains valid and subsisting. No costs.
SO ORDERED.39
Syed then filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 1, 200840 but the same
was denied by the CA in a Resolution dated July 24, 2008.41
Hence, this petition.
Grounds in Support of Petition
I Code. The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on whether or not a valid marriage
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW IN
CITING REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS AS THE SAME IS DIAMETRICALLY
INCONSISTENT AND CONTRARY TO THE COURT’S OWN FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS IN THIS CASE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING AND
SETTING ASIDE, WITHOUT ANY FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASIS, THE DECISION OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.42
The Ruling of this Court
The petition is meritorious.
As the marriage of Gloria and Syed was solemnized on January 9, 1993,
Executive Order No. 209, or the Family Code of the Philippines, is the applicable
law. The pertinent provisions that would apply to this particular case are Articles
3, 4 and 35(3), which read as follows:
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this
Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the
contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as
provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage
but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding
Chapter.
There is no issue with the essential requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code,
nor with the formal requisites of the authority of the solemnizing officer and the
conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is the marriage one that is exempt from
the requirement of a valid marriage license under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family
license had been issued for the couple. The RTC held that no valid marriage
license had been issued. The CA held that there was a valid marriage license.
We find the RTC to be correct in this instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the actual marriage license, or a copy
thereof, and relied on the marriage contract as well as the testimonies of her
witnesses to prove the existence of said license. To prove that no such license
was issued, Syed turned to the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite which had allegedly issued said license. It was there that he requested
certification that no such license was issued. In the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals43 such certification was allowed, as permitted by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court, which reads:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – A written statement signed by an officer having
the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after diligent search, no
record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office,
accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that
the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
In the case of Republic, in allowing the certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig
to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license, the Court held:
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 26 of 57
The above Rule authorized the custodian of the documents to certify that despite
diligent search, a particular document does not exist in his office or that a
particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with
the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book where they are required to
enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant
data.44
The Court held in that case that the certification issued by the civil registrar
enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to maintain records of data relative to
the issuance of a marriage license.
The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, where the marriage license of
Gloria and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a certification to the effect that no
such marriage license for Gloria and Syed was issued, and that the serial number
of the marriage license pertained to another couple, Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan. A certified machine copy of Marriage License No. 9969967 was
presented, which was issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the names of
Gloria and Syed do not appear in the document.
In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the wording of the certification, stating
that it did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of the words "despite diligent search" in
the certification, and since the certification used stated that no marriage license
appears to have been issued, no diligent search had been conducted and thus
the certification could not be given probative value.
To justify that deduction, the CA cited the case of Republic v. Court of
Appeals.45 It is worth noting that in that particular case, the Court, in sustaining
the finding of the lower court that a marriage license was lacking, relied on the
Certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated that the
alleged marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their
records. Nowhere in the Certification was it categorically stated that the officer
involved conducted a diligent search, nor is a categorical declaration absolutely
necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court to apply.
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable presumption
that an official duty has been regularly performed, absent contradiction or other
evidence to the contrary. We held, "The presumption of regularity of official acts
may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a
duty."46 No such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil
Registrar was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office,
thus the presumption must stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent search
having been conducted, as Marriage License No. 996967 was indeed located and
submitted to the court. The fact that the names in said license do not correspond
to those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn the presumption that the registrar
conducted a diligent search of the records of her office.
It is telling that Gloria failed to present their marriage license or a copy thereof to
the court. She failed to explain why the marriage license was secured in
Carmona, Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither party resided. She took
no pains to apply for the license, so she is not the best witness to testify to the
validity and existence of said license. Neither could the other witnesses she
presented prove the existence of the marriage license, as none of them applied
for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even
testify as to the contents of the license, having admitted to not reading all of its
contents. Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom Gloria and Felicitas Goo
approached for assistance in securing the license, admitted not knowing where
the license came from. The task of applying for the license was delegated to a
certain Qualin, who could have testified as to how the license was secured and
thus impeached the certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as the
testimony of her representative. As Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar still enjoys probative value.
It is also noted that the solemnizing officer testified that the marriage contract
and a copy of the marriage license were submitted to the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila. Thus, a copy of the marriage license could have simply been secured
from that office and submitted to the court. However, Gloria inexplicably failed to
do so, further weakening her claim that there was a valid marriage license issued
for her and Syed.
In the case of Cariño v. Cariño,47 following the case of Republic,48 it was held
that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar that their office had no record of
a marriage license was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said license. The
case of Cariño further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the
parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party alleging
a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the required
marriage license had been secured.49 Gloria has failed to discharge that burden,
and the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid marriage license
was issued. It cannot be said that there was a simple irregularity in the marriage
license that would not affect the validity of the marriage, as no license was
presented by the respondent. No marriage license was proven to have been
issued to Gloria and Syed, based on the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite and Gloria’s failure to produce a copy of the alleged
marriage license.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other evidence to support its conclusion that
Gloria and Syed were validly married. To quote the CA:
Moreover, the record is replete with evidence, testimonial and documentary, that
appellant and appellee have been validly married and there was compliance with
all the requisites laid down by law. Both parties are legally capacitated to marry.
A certificate of legal capacity was even issued by the Embassy of Pakistan in
favor of appellee. The parties herein gave their consent freely. Appellee admitted
that the signature above his name in the marriage contract was his. Several
pictures were presented showing appellant and appellee, before the solemnizing
officer, the witnesses and other members of appellant’s family, taken during the
marriage ceremony, as well as in the restaurant where the lunch was held after
the marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee
signing the Marriage Contract.
xxxx
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 27 of 57
The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and has [sic] one
offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who was born on 15 June 1993. It took
appellee more than ten (10) years before he filed on 01 August 2003 his Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the Family Code. We take
serious note that said Petition appears to have been instituted by him only after
an Information for Bigamy (Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was filed against
him for contracting a second or subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon
(Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not ready to reward (appellee) by declaring
the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him
to profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50
All the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony was
conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure the
absence of a valid marriage license. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it
says, "The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the
marriage void ab initio, except as stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the
Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is void
from the beginning, except those exempt from the license requirement under
Articles 27 to 34, Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again, this marriage
cannot be characterized as among the exemptions, and thus, having been
solemnized without a marriage license, is void ab initio.1âwphi1
As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul his marriage to Gloria, it may well
be that his motives are less than pure, that he seeks to evade a bigamy suit. Be
that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the respondent to
prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight of evidence
presented by petitioner. The lack of a valid marriage license cannot be attributed
to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to procure the same. The law must be
applied. As the marriage license, a formal requisite, is clearly absent, the
marriage of Gloria and Syed is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated March 11, 2008 and Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 109, Pasay City dated
October 5, 2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM annulling the marriage of
petitioner with respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby REINSTATED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013

Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 28 of 57

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,
vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011
Decision2 and the 14 March 2012 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 94226.
The Antecedent Facts
On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September
1973, he married Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three
children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan
(Sally) who was a customer in the auto parts and supplies business owned by
Benjamin’s family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United States of
America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and
wife. Sally’s father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to
appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City
where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s
marital status, assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.
Benjamin and Sally’s cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley.
During the period of their cohabitation, they acquired the following real
properties:
(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the
names of Benjamin and Sally as spouses;
(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of
Benjamin, married to Sally;
(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783
registered in the name of Sally, married to Benjamin; and
(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of
Sally as a single individual.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada,
bringing Bernice and Bentley with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy
and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using their simulated
marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration
of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the
trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it
lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial
court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with
Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the
properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice
and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became
the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the seven properties
enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her
answer.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which
the trial court denied. Sally filed a motion for reconsideration which the trial
court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction
which the Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then refused to present any
evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition before the
Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her
evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September
2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. Despite
repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence,
prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin.
The trial court gave weight to the certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig
Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only Marriage License
Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982
and the purported Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and
Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local
civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered
due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was void not because
of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly,
the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case.
The trial court did not rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and
Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial court denied Sally’s
claim for spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial
court likewise denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age
and did not ask for support.
On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37
properties she named in her answer as part of her conjugal properties with
Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to Benjamin.
Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamin’s
parents who gave the properties to their children, including Benjamin, as
advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of Benjamin and his
brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of
Benjamin’s civil status in the title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720
and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by Benjamin using his
own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money,
property or industry in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a
registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722, N-193656, and
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 29 of 57
253681 as well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783.
However, the trial court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two
condominium units were purchased from the earnings of Benjamin alone. The
trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860
and CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin
and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamin’s right to dispute his conjugal state
with Azucena in a separate proceeding.
The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that
Benjamin was married to Azucena. Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the
trial court forfeited Sally’s share in the properties covered under TCT Nos. N-
193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamin’s share
reverted to his conjugal ownership with Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on
March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and
VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared NONEXISTENT.
Respondent’s claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37)
properties under TCT Nos. 17722, 17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and
RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035, 194620,
194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629,
194630, 194631, 194632, 194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638,
194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215 is DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr.,
Roberto E. Bangayan, Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the
owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the Registry of Deeds for
Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go"
from these thirty-seven (37) titles.
Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783
are properties acquired from petitioner’s money without contribution from
respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful wife.
Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5)
properties. Respondent is ordered to submit an accounting of her collections of
income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice hereof.
Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed within thirty
(30) days from notice hereof to turn over and surrender control and possession
of these properties including the documents of title to the petitioner.
On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are
under co-ownership of the parties shared by them equally. However, the share of
respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go Bangayan and Bentley
Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership
with Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2)
properties shall be further processed pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10
of March 15, 2003.
Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section
21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.
Respondent’s claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Further, no declaration of the status of the parties’
children.
No other relief granted.
Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor,
the Solicitor General and the Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and
Caloocan.
SO ORDERED.6
Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for
Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27 August 2009,7 the trial court denied the
motion. Sally appealed the trial court’s decision before the Court of Appeals.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court did not err in submitting the case
for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings of the
case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and
Sally was duly warned to present her evidence on the next hearing or the case
would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the warning, Sally
still failed to present her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was
not around and was not subpoenaed despite the presence of her other
witnesses.
The Court of Appeals rejected Sally’s allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his
action for declaration of nullity of marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that
Benjamin’s action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there was no
evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin
contracted the second marriage with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamin’s marriage to Sally null and
void.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only
the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution of
money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties
being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to Benjamin and his siblings.
As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals
ruled that only the properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in
the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to
establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of
Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and
under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were exclusive properties of Sally in the absence
of proof of Benjamin’s actual contribution in their purchase. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of
Benjamin and Sally shall be owned by them in common, to be shared equally.
However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 30 of 57
his existing marriage with Azucena while Sally’s share shall accrue to her in the
absence of a clear and convincing proof of bad faith.
Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and
convincing evidence that would show bias and prejudice on the part of the trial
judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The
assailed Decision and Order dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No.
04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 to be exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties
under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall
be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722
shall be owned by them and common and to be shared equally but the share of
the petitioner-appellee shall accrue to the conjugal partnership under his first
marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The rest of
the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.8
Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision. In its 14
March 2012 Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied her motion.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the
trial court’s ruling that Sally had waived her right to present evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the
trial court’s decision declaring the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and
void ab initio and non-existent; and
(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with
modification the trial court’s decision regarding the property relations of
Benjamin and Sally.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
Waiver of Right to Present Evidence
Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling
that she waived her right to present her evidence. Sally alleges that in not
allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the trial
court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution.
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not
a matter of right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. 9 In this
case, Sally’s presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008.
Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11
September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008, and 28 November 2008. They were all
made at Sally’s instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November 2008,
the trial court warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence,
the case would be submitted for decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing,
despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted on presenting
Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sally’s counsel insisted
that the trial court could not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented,
disregarding the trial court’s prior warning due to the numerous resettings of the
case. Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present
her evidence because all the postponements were at her instance and she was
warned by the trial court that it would submit the case for decision should she
still fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her
evidence, she was deemed to have waived her right to present them. As pointed
out by the Court of Appeals, Sally’s continued failure to present her evidence
despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to
proceed with the case. Further, it was clear that Sally was delaying the case
because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her petition
questioning the trial court’s denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact
that the Court of Appeals did not issue any temporary restraining order as Sally
prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to protect marriage as
an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that
trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the
parties.10
Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her
marriage to Benjamin because a marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the
same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she were allowed
to present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To
prove her marriage to Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in
acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by declaring he was
"married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in their children’s birth
certificates where he stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin
introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast, Sally claims that
there was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena.
Sally further alleges that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates
of his children with Azucena.
First, Benjamin’s marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly
established before the trial court, evidenced by a certified true copy of their
marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported
marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was
valid and subsisting.
On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros),
Registration Officer II of the Local Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there
was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally. Oliveros confirmed
that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 31 of 57
of February 1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued
for the month. Oliveros further testified that the local civil registrar of Pasig City
did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The
certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of
a marriage license and absent any suspicious circumstance, the certification
enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law to
keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. 11 Clearly,
if indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was
void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12
It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with the local civil registrar and
the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta B. Javier,
Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality
of Pasig;13 Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records
Management and Archives Office, National Commission for Culture and the
Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the
National Statistics Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence proved
that there was no marriage between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the
trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in
jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her
up from expected social humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the
society especially from her parents seen as Chinese conservatives."17 In short, it
was a fictitious marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and
Bentley was not a proof of the marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court
notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernice’s birth certificate which stated
that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the
informant in Bentley’s birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally
were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were supposedly married
on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth
certificates.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null
and void ab initio and, at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the
Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except those covered by
Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In
this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a
license. It was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and
that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers
issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982.
The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage
void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent.
Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of
the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are
"inexistent and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the Court of Appeals did not
err in sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was null and void ab initio and non-existent.
Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals
affirmed in all aspects the trial court’s decision and ruled that "the rest of the
decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss bigamous
marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision
declaring that "the rest of the decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted
the trial court’s discussion that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally is not
bigamous.1âwphi1 The trial court stated:
On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that
the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage of the
petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no
evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the
face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage was void not
because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack
of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51
O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was contracting marriage
against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the
Revised Penal Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not
bigamous because there was no marriage license. The daring and repeated
stand of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any
instance, be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the
marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous, civilly or criminally as it
would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and
Azucena.23
For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage.24 In
this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just
signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed
marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not exist.
They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage.
Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and
Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution
of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their
contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-
ownership shall accrue to the absolute community of conjugal partnership
existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in
the last paragraph of the preceding Article.
The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in
bad faith.
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 32 of 57
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by
Benjamin’s father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the
petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamin’s late father himself
conveyed a number of properties to his children and their respective spouses
which included Sally x x x."25
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court
of Appeals is more in accord with the evidence on record. Only the property
covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name
of Benjamin27 with the descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered
by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name of Sally28 with the
descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-
193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.
We have ruled that the words "married to" preceding the name of a spouse are
merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.29 Such words do
not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both
spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30
Inhibition of the Trial Judge
Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit
himself from hearing the case. She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to
accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that Judge
Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his
partiality against her and in favor of Benjamin.
We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of
conscience and sound discretion on the part of the judge.31 To justify the call for
inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith, malice,
or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the
decision or order itself.32 In this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge
Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision because of Sally’s
continued refusal to present her evidence.
We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have
used uncomplimentary words in writing the decision, they are not enough to
prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in deciding
the case that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 141528 October 31, 2006
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 33 of 57
OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner,
vs.
EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raising a question of law: Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for
declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity bar a subsequent
petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?
The facts are not disputed:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar P. Mallion filed a petition1 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29, of San Pablo City seeking a declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of
Executive Order No. 209, as amended, otherwise known as the Family Code,
citing respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. SP 4341-95. After trial on the merits, the RTC denied the petition in
a decision2 dated November 11, 1997 upon the finding that petitioner "failed to
adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the grant of the relief he is
seeking."3 The appeal filed with the Court of Appeals was likewise dismissed in a
resolution4 dated June 11, 1998 for failure of petitioner to pay the docket and
other lawful fees within the reglementary period.
After the decision in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95 attained finality, petitioner filed
on July 12, 1999 another petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage with the
RTC of San Pablo City, this time alleging that his marriage with respondent was
null and void due to the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage
license. For her part, respondent filed an answer with a motion to dismiss6 dated
August 13, 1999, praying for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of res
judicata and forum shopping.
In an order7 dated October 8, 1999, the RTC granted respondent’s motion to
dismiss, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, for Forum Shopping and Multiplicity of Suits, the Motion to Dismiss
is GRANTED. This case is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was also denied in an order9 dated
January 21, 2000.
Hence, this petition which alleges, as follows:
A. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF HIS
MARRIAGE AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE
LICENSE BECAUSE OF (THE) DISMISSAL OF AN EARLIER PETITION FOR
DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF THE SAME MARRIAGE ON THE GROUND OF HIS
WIFE’S PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE,
THE TRIAL COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE WHICH HAS
PROBABLY NOT HERETOFORE BEEN DETERMINED SQUARELY AND DEFINITIVELY
BY THIS COURT, OR HAD DECIDED IT IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW.
B. IN DISMISSING PETITIONER’S PETITION FOR THE DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE LICENSE, THE TRIAL
COURT HAD CONFUSED, DISTORTED AND MISAPPLIED THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES
AND CONCEPTS ON RES JUDICATA, SPLITTING OF A CAUSE OF ACTION AND
FORUM SHOPPING.10
Petitioner argues that while the relief prayed for in the two cases was the same,
that is, the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent, the cause of
action in the earlier case was distinct and separate from the cause of action in
the present case because the operative facts upon which they were based as
well as the evidence required to sustain either were different. Because there is
no identity as to the cause of action, petitioner claims that res judicata does not
lie to bar the second petition. In this connection, petitioner maintains that there
was no violation of the rule on forum shopping or of the rule which proscribes the
splitting of a cause of action.
On the other hand, respondent, in her comment dated May 26, 2000, counters
that while the present suit is anchored on a different ground, it still involves the
same issue raised in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, that is, the validity of petitioner
and respondent’s marriage, and prays for the same remedy, that is, the
declaration of nullity of their marriage. Respondent thus contends that petitioner
violated the rule on forum shopping. Moreover, respondent asserts that
petitioner violated the rule on multiplicity of suits as the ground he cites in this
petition could have been raised during the trial in Civil Case No. SP 4341-95.
The petition lacks merit.
The issue before this Court is one of first impression. Should the matter of the
invalidity of a marriage due to the absence of an essential requisite prescribed
by Article 4 of the Family Code be raised in the same proceeding where the
marriage is being impugned on the ground of a party’s psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code?
Petitioner insists that because the action for declaration of nullity of marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity and the action for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of absence of marriage license constitute separate
causes of action, the present case would not fall under the prohibition against
splitting a single cause of action nor would it be barred by the principle of res
judicata.
The contention is untenable.
Res judicata is defined as "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. It also refers to the rule that a
final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on points
and matters determined in the former suit."11
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 34 of 57
This doctrine is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence and is founded upon the following precepts of common law,
namely: (1) public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the
State that there should be an end to litigation, and (2) the hardship on the
individual that he should be vexed twice for the same cause. A contrary doctrine
would subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals
and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the
preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.12
In this jurisdiction, the concept of res judicata is embodied in Section 47 (b) and
(c) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. — The effect of a judgment or final
order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order against a specific thing or in respect to
the probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or
in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or status of a particular
person or his relationship to another, the judgment or final order is conclusive
upon the title to the thing, the will or administration, or the condition, status or
relationship of the person; however, the probate of a will or granting of letters of
administration shall only be prima facie evidence of the death of the testator or
intestate;
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the
matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have
been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and
their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement
of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity; and,
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors
in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so
adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
The above provision outlines the dual aspect of res judicata.13 Section 47 (b)
pertains to it in its concept as "bar by prior judgment" or "estoppel by verdict,"
which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second
action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action. On the other hand,
Section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its concept as "conclusiveness of
judgment" or otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendant which ordains
that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised
in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of
action.14 Res judicata in its concept as a bar by prior judgment obtains in the
present case.
Res judicata in this sense requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (1)
the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order onthe merits;
and (4) there is -- between the first and the second actions -- identity of parties,
of subject matter, and of causes of action.15
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the first three requisites. What is in
issue is the presence of the fourth requisite. In this regard, the test to determine
whether the causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same
evidence will sustain both actions, or whether there is an identity in the facts
essential to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or evidence
would sustain both, the two actions are considered the same, and a judgment in
the first case is a bar to the subsequent action.16
Based on this test, petitioner would contend that the two petitions brought by
him seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage are anchored on separate
causes of action for the evidence necessary to sustain the first petition which
was anchored on the alleged psychological incapacity of respondent is different
from the evidence necessary to sustain the present petition which is anchored on
the purported absence of a marriage license.
Petitioner, however, forgets that he is simply invoking different grounds for the
same cause of action. By definition, a cause of action is the act or omission by
which a party violates the right of another.17 In both petitions, petitioner has the
same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What
differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. These grounds
cited by petitioner essentially split the various aspects of the pivotal issue that
holds the key to the resolution of this controversy, that is, the actual status of
petitioner and respondent’s marriage.
Furthermore, the instant case is premised on the claim that the marriage is null
and void because no valid celebration of the same took place due to the alleged
lack of a marriage license. In Civil Case No. SP 4341-95, however, petitioner
impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in
accordance with law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged
absence of a marriage license which petitioner raises now could have been
presented and heard in the earlier case. Suffice it to state that parties are bound
not only as regards every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat their
claims or demand but as to any other admissible matter which might have been
offered for that purpose and of all other matters that could have been adjudged
in that case.18
It must be emphasized that a party cannot evade or avoid the application of res
judicata by simply varying the form of his action or adopting a different method
of presenting his case. 19 As this Court stated in Perez v. Court of Appeals:20
x x x the statement of a different form of liability is not a different cause of
action, provided it grows out of the same transaction or act and seeks redress for
the wrong. Two actions are not necessarily for different causes of action simply
because the theory of the second would not have been open under the pleadings
in the first. A party cannot preserve the right to bring a second action after the
loss of the first merely by having circumscribed and limited theories of recovery
opened by the pleadings in the first.
It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. A plaintiff
is mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 35 of 57
when the suit began. A lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. The plaintiff
is bound to set forth in his first action every ground for relief which he
claims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted to
rely upon them by piecemeal in successive action to recover for the
same wrong or injury.
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to
the court, either by the pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds
upon which to expect a judgment in his favor. He is not at liberty to
split up his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a
portion of the grounds upon which a special relief is sought and leave
the rest to the presentment in a second suit if the first fails. There
would be no end to litigation if such piecemeal presentation is
allowed. (Citations omitted.)
In sum, litigants are provided with the options on the course of action to take in
order to obtain judicial relief. Once an option has been taken and a case is filed
in court, the parties must ventilate all matters and relevant issues therein. The
losing party who files another action regarding the same controversy will be
needlessly squandering time, effort and financial resources because he is barred
by law from litigating the same controversy all over again.21
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage
celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For
this reason, the Court finds that the present action for declaration of nullity of
marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred by the decision
dated November 11, 1997 of the RTC, Branch 29, of San Pablo City, in Civil Case
No. SP 4341-95.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 36 of 57

 [A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088. July 19, 1996]
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE HERNANDO
DOMAGTOY, respondent.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa,
Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in relation to
two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge
Hernando Domagtoy, which, he contends, exhibits gross misconduct as well as
inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law.
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the wedding
between Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the knowledge that the
groom is merely separated from his first wife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony between
Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994.Respondent judge holds office and has
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del
Norte. The wedding was solemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the
municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within his jurisdictional area of the
municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers away
from the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent
judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have been
used by someone else, who, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with
his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same person had
earlier filed Administrative Matter No. 94-980-MTC, which was dismissed for lack
of merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter No. OCA-IPI-95-16,
"Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," which is still pending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation
from his act of having solemnized the marriage between Gaspar Tagadan, a
married man separated from his wife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he
merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first wife have not seen each
other for almost seven years.[1] With respect to the second charge, he maintains
that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not
violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code which states that: "Marriage
may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the
court's jurisdiction; and that Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
The complaint was not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the
pleadings submitted were considered sufficient for a resolution of the case.[2]
C.
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of
complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they will not be dwelt upon. The
acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto will suffice and can
be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract between Gaspar Tagadan
and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civil status is "separated." Despite this
declaration, the wedding ceremony was solemnized by respondent judge. He
presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and Eugenio
Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla,
Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar.[3] The affidavit was not issued by the
latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknowledged before
him.In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew Gaspar Tagadan to have
been civilly married to Ida D. Pearanda in September 1983; that after thirteen
years of cohabitation and having borne five children, Ida Pearanda left the
conjugal dwelling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been
heard of for almost seven years, thereby giving rise to the presumption that she
is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit
is sufficient proof of Ida Pearanda's presumptive death, and ample reason for him
to proceed with the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
"A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as
provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse." (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In
fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a well-founded
belief that the absent spouse was already dead, a summary proceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death is necessary in order to contract a subsequent
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 37 of 57
marriage, a mandatory requirement which has been precisely incorporated into
the Family Code to discourage subsequent marriages where it is not proven that
the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or
presumptively dead, in accordance with pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding
for the declaration of his first wife's presumptive death. Absent this judicial
declaration, he remains married to Ida Pearanda. Whether wittingly, or
unwittingly, it was manifest error on the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance
of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage. Under
Article 35 of the Family Code, "The following marriage shall be void from the
beginning: (4) Those bigamous x x x marriages not falling under Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony
outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code,
thus:
"Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
x x x x x x xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or
in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-
general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsewhere, except
in cases of marriages contracted on the point of death or in remote
places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties
request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn
statement to that effect."
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications
for his having solemnized the marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma
del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states,
a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the
following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance
with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement
to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the
point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented
addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del
Rosario.[4]
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the
authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites
of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage
may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Article 8, which is a directory provision,
refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify
the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding
provision. Non-compliance herewith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinary to marry the
faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of the diocese or place
allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the
venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However, judges
who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within
said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his
court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid
down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may
subject the officiating official to administrative liability.[5]
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta.
Monica and Burgos, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in
the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the
exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced authority,
respondent judge again demonstrated a lack of understanding of the basic
principles of civil law.
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of
the law. The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention are
elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's
failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law.
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at
least, proficient in the law they are sworn to apply, more than the ordinary
laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying
the law. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like
the ones involved in instant case.[6] It is not too much to expect them to know
and apply the law intelligently.[7] Otherwise, the system of justice rests on a
shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not
learned in the law.While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment,
for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of
elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status
of married persons.
The marriage between Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered
bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage between Gaspar Tagadan
and Ida Pearanda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to
the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Considering that one of the
marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void, and the
other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said
recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more circumspect in applying the
law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law.
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 38 of 57
 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy
is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.
The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for
comment.
FIRST DIVISION
In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000]
ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta.
Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar, respondent. ALEX
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect
of Duty and Abuse of Authority. In a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12,
1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with solemnizing
marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and
not registering the marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar
alleging
"a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A. YMAN
got married and our marriage was solemnized by judge (sic) Juan
Daguman in his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar;
xxxalex
b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted as
our principal sponsor and spouses RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN; xxx
c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned me
without any reason at all;
d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog City
and wrote the City Civil Registrar to inquire regarding my Marriage
Contract;
e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of
Calbayog City that my marriage was not registered; xxxSc lex
f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar, I wrote Judge Juan
Daguman, to inquire;
g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all
the copies of the Marriage Contract were taken by Oloy (Bernardito A.
Yman);
h. That no copy was retained by Judge Daguman;
i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to
my interest such as: x law
1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;
2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our marriage
before the office of the Local Civil Registrar."
1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman had to
be solemnized by respondent in Calbayog City though outside his territory as
municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due to the following and pressing
circumstances: Sc
1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and
unable to report to his station in Sta. Margarita. In the forenoon of that
date, without prior appointment, complainant Beso and Mr. Yman
unexpectedly came to the residence of respondent in said City, urgently
requesting the celebration of their marriage right then and there, first,
because complainants said she must leave that same day to be able to
fly from Manila for abroad as scheduled; second, that for the parties to
go to another town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail
serious problems of finding a solemnizing officer and another pair of
witnesses or sponsors, while in fact former Undersecretary Pacifico
Maghacot, Sangguniang Panglunsod [member] Ramon Dean were
already with them as sponsors; third, if they failed to get married on
August 28, 1997, complainant would be out of the country for a long
period and their marriage license would lapse and necessitate another
publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go beyond their plans for the
scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would complicate her
employment abroad; and, last, all other alternatives as to date and
venue of marriage were considered impracticable by the parties;
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 39 of 57
 1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments (sic)
for a valid marriage, which respondent found all in order. Spped
1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who,
respondent realized, deserved more than ordinary official attention under
present Government policy.
2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in
good faith that by so doing he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so
that it may be not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get
married.
3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration of
the duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, which failure was
also occasioned by the following circumstances beyond the control of
respondent: Scmis
3.1. After handing to the husband the first copy of the marriage certificate,
respondent left the three remaining copies on top of the desk in his private
office where the marriage ceremonies were held, intending later to register
the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the forth (sic) in his office.
3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all the
papers relating to the said marriage but notwithstanding diligent search in
the premises and private files, all the three last copies of the certificate
were missing. Promptly, respondent invited by subpoena xxx Mr. Yman to
shed light on the missing documents and he said he saw complainant Beso
put the copies of the marriage certificate in her bag during the wedding
party. Unfortunately, it was too late to contact complainant for a
confirmation of Mr. Ymans claim. Mis sc
3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she is out
of the country, a reasonable conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the
established facts so far in this dispute. If we believe the claim of
complainant that after August 28, 1997 marriage her husband, Mr. Yman,
abandoned her without any reason xxx but that said husband admitted
"he had another girl by the name of LITA DANGUYAN" xxx it seems
reasonably clear who of the two marriage contracting parties probably
absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate. Jo spped
3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse but to
protect the public interest by trying all possible means to recover custody
of the missing documents in some amicable way during the expected
hearing of the above mentioned civil case in the City of Marikina, failing to
do which said respondent would confer with the Civil Registrar General for
possible registration of reconstituted copies of said documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August
11, 1998 found that respondent Judge " committed non-feasance in office" and
recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) with a warning
that the commission of the same or future acts will be dealt with more severely
pointing out that:
"As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar,
the authority to solemnize marriage is only limited to those municipalities
under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area of
jurisdiction. Miso
Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the
Family Code, wherein a marriage may be solemnized by a judge outside his
chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:
(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;
(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place; Nex old
(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in
which case the marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated
by them in a sworn statement to that effect.
The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.
Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when
he failed to register the marriage of complainant to Bernardito Yman.
Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code
which provides: Ncm
"It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish
either of the contracting parties the original of the marriage certificate
referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of
the certificates not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the
local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. xxx" (underscoring ours)
It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the respondent
Judge committed non-feasance in office, he also undermined the very
foundation of marriage which is the basic social institution in our society
whose nature, consequences and incidents are governed by law. Granting
that respondent Judge indeed failed to locate the duplicate and triplicate
copies of the marriage certificate, he should have exerted more effort to
locate or reconstitute the same. As a holder of such a sensitive position, he
is expected to be conscientious in handling official documents. His
imputation that the missing copies of the marriage certificate were taken by
Bernardito Yman is based merely on conjectures and does not deserve
consideration for being devoid of proof."
After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the
evaluation report of the OCA well-taken. Mani kx
Jimenez v. Republic[1] underscores the importance of marriage as a social
institution thus: "[M]arriage in this country is an institution in which the
community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to
maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the
state are largely dependent upon it. It is the interest and duty of each and every
member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition that
would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction."
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 40 of 57
With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code
provides, among others, that
"ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: Maniks
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts
jurisdiction; xxx" (Italics ours)
In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:
ART. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the
judge or in open court, in the church, chapel or temple, or in the office of
the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death
or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where
both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the
marriage may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in
a sworn statement to that effect." (Italics ours) Spped jo
As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the
judges chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: 1.] at the point of
death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon the request
of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.
In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiance
Yman was at the point of death or in a remote place. Neither was there a sworn
written request made by the contracting parties to respondent Judge that the
marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala.
What, in fact, appears on record is that respondent Judge was prompted more by
urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because complainant was
"[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than ordinary
official attention under present Government policy." Respondent Judge further
avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question, "[h]e believed in good faith
that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may
not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married." Manikan
A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also
live and abide by it and render justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts
clearly uncalled for.[2] A judge is not only bound by oath to apply the law;[3] he
must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so.[4] Certainly, judges, by the
very delicate nature of their office should be more circumspect in the
performance of their duties.[5]
If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried
solemnization of the marriage in this case only tends to degrade the revered
position enjoyed by marriage in the hierarchy of social institutions in the country.
They also betray respondents cavalier proclivity on its significance in our culture
which is more disposed towards an extended period of engagement prior to
marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital unions.Ncmmis
An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that enacted in order
to preserve so sacrosanct an inviolable social institution as marriage and the
stability of judicial doctrines laid down by superior authority should have given
respondent judge pause and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his
authority and the performance of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge is,
furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the authority or
jurisdiction of his court.[6] Thus respondent Judge should be reminded that
A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to
marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within the area of
the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court
justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as
long as the requisites of the law are complied with. However,
Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate
in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a
judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there
is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in
Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the
marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative
liability.[7]Scnc m
Considering that respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta.
Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan, Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to
solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog.[8]
Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge
should exercise extra care in the exercise of his authority and the performance of
his duties in its solemnization, he is likewise commanded to observe extra
precautions to ensure that the event is properly documented in accordance with
Article 23 of the Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that
ART. 23. - It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to
furnish either of the contracting parties, the original of the marriage contract
referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the
certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil
registrar of the place where the marriage was solemnized. Proper receipts
shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer
transmitting copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall
retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the marriage certificate, the
original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the
contracting party regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other
than those mentioned in Article 8. (Italics supplied) Sdaad
In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that
respondent Judge was less than conscientious in handling official documents. A
judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the records of the
cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for
missing records save fortuitous events.[9] However, the records show that the
loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent Judges part. This Court
reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record management and organize
their dockets in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business.
[10] It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an efficient recording and filing
system in his court because he is after all the one directly responsible for the
proper discharge of his official functions.[11]
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 41 of 57
In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined The proceedings before the RTC commenced with the filing of a Complaint[3] for
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and warned that a repetition of the same or declaration of nullity of marriage by respondent Crasus on 25 March 1997.
similar acts will be dealt with more severely. This Court adopts the According to the said Complaint, respondent Crasus married Fely on 16
recommendation of the OCA. Juris December 1961 at Bradford Memorial Church, Jones Avenue, Cebu City. As a
result of their union, they had five children Crasus, Jr., Daphne, Debbie, Calvert,
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED and Carlos who are now all of legal ages. After the celebration of their marriage,
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and
same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely. extravagant. In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America
SO ORDERED. Mi sedp (U.S.A.), leaving all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years
old, to the care of respondent Crasus. Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A.,
respondent Crasus received a letter from her requesting that he sign the
enclosed divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985,
respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their children, that
Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually had a child. In 1987,
Fely came back to the Philippines with her American family, staying at Cebu
Plaza Hotel in Cebu City. Respondent Crasus did not bother to talk to Fely
because he was afraid he might not be able to bear the sorrow and the pain she
had caused him. Fely returned to the Philippines several times more: in 1990, for
the wedding of their eldest child, Crasus, Jr.; in 1992, for the brain operation of
their fourth child, Calvert; and in 1995, for unknown reasons. Fely continued to
live with her American family in New Jersey, U.S.A. She had been openly using
the surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the U.S.A. For the
SECOND DIVISION wedding of Crasus, Jr., Fely herself had invitations made in which she was named
as Mrs. Fely Ada Micklus. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had been 13
REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 152577 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus, and there was no more
PHILIPPINES, Present: possibility of reconciliation between them. Respondent Crasus finally alleged in
Petitioner, his Complaint that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor to the family, and
Promulgated: clearly demonstrated her psychological incapacity to perform the essential
- versus- obligations of marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing,
September 21, 2005 constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36, in
CRASUS L. IYOY, relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of the Philippines.
R e s p o n d e n t.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim[4] with the RTC on 05 June 1997.
She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen since 1988 and
was now married to Stephen Micklus. While she admitted being previously
DECISION married to respondent Crasus and having five children with him, Fely refuted the
other allegations made by respondent Crasus in his Complaint. She explained
that she was no more hot-tempered than any normal person, and she may had
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: been indignant at respondent Crasus on certain occasions but it was because of
the latters drunkenness, womanizing, and lack of sincere effort to find
employment and to contribute to the maintenance of their household. She could
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, not have been extravagant since the family hardly had enough money for basic
petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor needs. Indeed, Fely left for abroad for financial reasons as respondent Crasus
General, prays for the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. had no job and what she was then earning as the sole breadwinner in the
CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001,[1] affirming the Judgment of the Regional Trial Philippines was insufficient to support their family. Although she left all of her
Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 children with respondent Crasus, she continued to provide financial support to
October 1998,[2] declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and them, as well as, to respondent Crasus. Subsequently, Fely was able to bring her
Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void on the basis of Article 36 of the Family Code of children to the U.S.A., except for one, Calvert, who had to stay behind for
the Philippines. medical reasons. While she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she
denied having herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign
the enclosed divorce papers. After securing a divorce from respondent Crasus,
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 42 of 57
Fely married her American husband and acquired American citizenship. She
argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being
an American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present
nationality. Fely also pointed out that respondent Crasus himself was presently
living with another woman who bore him a child. She also accused respondent
Crasus of misusing the amount of P90,000.00 which she advanced to him to
finance the brain operation of their son, Calvert. On the basis of the foregoing,
Fely also prayed that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and
void; and that respondent Crasus be ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she
advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary damages, attorneys
fees, and litigation expenses.
After respondent Crasus and Fely had filed their respective Pre-Trial Briefs,[5] the
RTC afforded both parties the opportunity to present their evidence. Petitioner
Republic participated in the trial through the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.[6]
Respondent Crasus submitted the following pieces of evidence in support of his
Complaint: (1) his own testimony on 08 September 1997, in which he essentially
reiterated the allegations in his Complaint;[7] (2) the Certification, dated 13 April
1989, by the Health Department of Cebu City, on the recording of the Marriage
Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely in the Register of Deeds, such
marriage celebration taking place on 16 December 1961;[8] and (3) the
invitation to the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, wherein Fely openly used
her American husbands surname, Micklus.[9]
Felys counsel filed a Notice,[10] and, later on, a Motion,[11] to take the
deposition of witnesses, namely, Fely and her children, Crasus, Jr. and Daphne,
upon written interrogatories, before the consular officers of the Philippines in
New York and California, U.S.A, where the said witnesses reside. Despite the
Orders[12] and Commissions[13]issued by the RTC to the Philippine Consuls of
New York and California, U.S.A., to take the depositions of the witnesses upon
written interrogatories, not a single deposition was ever submitted to the RTC.
Taking into account that it had been over a year since respondent Crasus had
presented his evidence and that Fely failed to exert effort to have the case
progress, the RTC issued an Order, dated 05 October 1998,[14] considering Fely
to have waived her right to present her evidence. The case was thus deemed
submitted for decision.
Not long after, on 30 October 1998, the RTC promulgated its Judgment declaring
the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely null and void ab initio, on the basis
of the following findings
The ground bearing defendants psychological incapacity
deserves a reasonable consideration. As observed, plaintiffs
testimony is decidedly credible. The Court finds that defendant
had indeed exhibited unmistakable signs of psychological
incapacity to comply with her marital duties such as striving for
family unity, observing fidelity, mutual love, respect, help and
support. From the evidence presented, plaintiff adequately
established that the defendant practically abandoned him. She
obtained a divorce decree in the United States of America and
married another man and has establish [sic] another family of
her own. Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is
married to a wife who is already married to another man in
another country.
Defendants intolerable traits may not have been apparent or
manifest before the marriage, the FAMILY CODE nonetheless
allows the annulment of the marriage provided that these were
eventually manifested after the wedding. It appears to be the
case in this instance.
Certainly defendants posture being an irresponsible wife erringly
reveals her very low regard for that sacred and inviolable
institution of marriage which is the foundation of human society
throughout the civilized world. It is quite evident that the
defendant is bereft of the mind, will and heart to comply with her
marital obligations, such incapacity was already there at the time
of the marriage in question is shown by defendants own attitude
towards her marriage to plaintiff.
In sum, the ground invoked by plaintiff which is defendants
psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations which already existed at the time of the marriage in
question has been satisfactorily proven. The evidence in herein
case establishes the irresponsibility of defendant Fely Ada Rosal
Iyoy, firmly.
Going over plaintiffs testimony which is decidedly credible, the
Court finds that the defendant had indeed exhibited
unmistakable signs of such psychological incapacity to comply
with her marital obligations. These are her excessive disposition
to material things over and above the marital stability. That such
incapacity was already there at the time of the marriage in
question is shown by defendants own attitude towards her
marriage to plaintiff. And for these reasons there is a legal
ground to declare the marriage of plaintiff Crasus L. Iyoy and
defendant Fely Ada Rosal Iyoy null and void ab initio.[15]
Petitioner Republic, believing that the afore-quoted Judgment of the RTC was
contrary to law and evidence, filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The
appellate court, though, in its Decision, dated 30 July 2001, affirmed the
appealed Judgment of the RTC, finding no reversible error therein. It even offered
additional ratiocination for declaring the marriage between respondent Crasus
and Fely null and void, to wit
Defendant secured a divorce from plaintiff-appellee abroad, has
remarried, and is now permanently residing in the United States.
Plaintiff-appellee categorically stated this as one of his reasons
for seeking the declaration of nullity of their marriage
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 43 of 57

Article 26 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the
Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and
valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles
35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
WHERE A MARRIAGE BETWEEN A FILIPINO
CITIZEN AND A FOREIGNER IS VALIDLY
CELEBRATED AND A DIVORCE IS THEREAFTER
VALIDLY OBTAINED ABROAD BY THE ALIEN
SPOUSE CAPACITATING HIM OR HER TO
REMARRY, THE FILIPINO SPOUSE SHALL LIKEWISE
HAVE CAPACITY TO REMARRY UNDER PHILIPPINE
LAW.
The rationale behind the second paragraph of the above-quoted
provision is to avoid the absurd and unjust situation of a Filipino
citizen still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he or
she has obtained a divorce abroad. In the case at bench, the
defendant has undoubtedly acquired her American husbands
citizenship and thus has become an alien as well. This Court
cannot see why the benefits of Art. 26 aforequoted can not be
extended to a Filipino citizen whose spouse eventually embraces
another citizenship and thus becomes herself an alien.
It would be the height of unfairness if, under these
circumstances, plaintiff would still be considered as married to
defendant, given her total incapacity to honor her marital
covenants to the former. To condemn plaintiff to remain shackled
in a marriage that in truth and in fact does not exist and to
remain married to a spouse who is incapacitated to discharge
essential marital covenants, is verily to condemn him to a
perpetual disadvantage which this Court finds abhorrent and will
not countenance. Justice dictates that plaintiff be given relief by
affirming the trial courts declaration of the nullity of the marriage
of the parties.[16]
After the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution, dated 08 March 2002,
[17] denied its Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner Republic filed the instant
Petition before this Court, based on the following arguments/grounds
I. Abandonment by and sexual infidelity of respondents
wife do not per se constitute psychological incapacity.
II. The Court of Appeals has decided questions of
substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence considering
that the Court of Appeals committed serious errors of law in
ruling that Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code is
inapplicable to the case at bar.[18]
In his Comment[19] to the Petition, respondent Crasus maintained that Felys
psychological incapacity was clearly established after a full-blown trial, and that
paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines was indeed
applicable to the marriage of respondent Crasus and Fely, because the latter had
already become an American citizen. He further questioned the personality of
petitioner Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, to institute
the instant Petition, because Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines
authorizes the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the trial court, not the
Solicitor General, to intervene on behalf of the State, in proceedings for
annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages.
After having reviewed the records of this case and the applicable laws and
jurisprudence, this Court finds the instant Petition to be meritorious.
I
The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to
support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
Article 36, concededly one of the more controversial provisions of the
Family Code of the Philippines, reads
ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the
time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization.
Issues most commonly arise as to what constitutes psychological incapacity. In a
series of cases, this Court laid down guidelines for determining its existence.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[20] the term psychological incapacity was defined,
thus
. . . [P]sychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
cognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 44 of 57
 which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated[21]
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only
after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.[22]
More definitive guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of
the Family Code of the Philippines were handed down by this Court in Republic v.
Court of Appeals and Molina,[23] which, although quite lengthy, by its
significance, deserves to be reproduced below
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire
Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation of the
nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby
protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be protected by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and
the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence
must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could
not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although
no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to
limit the application of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. The evidence must show that
the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their I do's.
The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment,
or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption
of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a
job
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity
or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in
the person, an adverse integral element in the personality
structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really
accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential
to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by
Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code
in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven
by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 45 of 57
 a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[24]
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[25] further clarified that there is no requirement
that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally examined by a
physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Such psychological
incapacity, however, must be established by the totality of the evidence
presented during the trial.
Using the guidelines established by the afore-mentioned jurisprudence,
this Court finds that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus
failed miserably to establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely;
therefore, there is no basis for declaring their marriage null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
The only substantial evidence presented by respondent Crasus before
the RTC was his testimony, which can be easily put into question for being self-
serving, in the absence of any other corroborating evidence. He submitted only
two other pieces of evidence: (1) the Certification on the recording with the
Register of Deeds of the Marriage Contract between respondent Crasus and Fely,
such marriage being celebrated on 16 December 1961; and (2) the invitation to
the wedding of Crasus, Jr., their eldest son, in which Fely used her American
husbands surname. Even considering the admissions made by Fely herself in her
Answer to respondent Crasuss Complaint filed with the RTC, the evidence is not
enough to convince this Court that Fely had such a grave mental illness that
prevented her from assuming the essential obligations of marriage.
It is worthy to emphasize that Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty,
much less, ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.[26] Irreconcilable differences,
conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical
abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the
said Article.[27]
As has already been stressed by this Court in previous cases, Article 36 is not to
be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the causes
therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness
afflicting a party even before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave
and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.[28]
The evidence may have proven that Fely committed acts that hurt and
embarrassed respondent Crasus and the rest of the family. Her hot-temper,
nagging, and extravagance; her abandonment of respondent Crasus; her
marriage to an American; and even her flaunting of her American family and her
American surname, may indeed be manifestations of her alleged incapacity to
comply with her marital obligations; nonetheless, the root cause for such was not
identified. If the root cause of the incapacity was not identified, then it cannot be
satisfactorily established as a psychological or mental defect that is serious or
grave; neither could it be proven to be in existence at the time of celebration of
the marriage; nor that it is incurable. While the personal examination of Fely by a
psychiatrist or psychologist is no longer mandatory for the declaration of nullity
of their marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines, by virtue
of this Courts ruling in Marcos v. Marcos,[29] respondent Crasus must still have
complied with the requirement laid down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina[30] that the root cause of the incapacity be identified as a psychological
illness and that its incapacitating nature be fully explained.
In any case, any doubt shall be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
[31] No less than the Constitution of 1987 sets the policy to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic social institution and marriage as the
foundation of the family.[32]
II
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is
not applicable to the case at bar.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation
wherein one of the couple getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a
foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated. By its plain and literal
interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of
respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained
her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen. Although the exact date was not
established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC that she
obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the
United States in 1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985.
In the same Answer, she alleged that she had been an American citizen since
1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties,
status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she was already living abroad.
Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 46 of 57
between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce
from respondent Crasus.
III
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity
of marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent
Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to the RTC
may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for annulment or declaration
of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of the Solicitor General had no
personality to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State. Article 48 provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf
of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the
parties and to take care that the evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General does not bar
him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for annulment or declaration of
nullity of marriages. Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987, appoints the Solicitor General as the principal law
officer and legal defender of the Government.[33] His Office is tasked to
represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter
requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor General shall
constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge duties
requiring the services of lawyers.[34]
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to ensure that the
interest of the State is represented and protected in proceedings for annulment
and declaration of nullity of marriages by preventing collusion between the
parties, or the fabrication or suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that
the Solicitor General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land,
then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and contribute to the
realization of such intent, rather than thwart it.
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is authorized to
bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the Republic of the Philippines
once the case is brought before this Court or the Court of Appeals.[35] While it is
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the
State, in a proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before
the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case is elevated
to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be eventually responsible for
taking the case to the appellate courts when circumstances demand, then it is
only reasonable and practical that even while the proceeding is still being held
before the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise
supervision and control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
therein to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the Solicitor
General in several cases for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages
that were appealed before it, summarized as follows in the case of Ancheta v.
Ancheta[36]
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198
(1997)], this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation
and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which
concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the
Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will
be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein
his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as
the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within
fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor
vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id., at
213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA
285 (2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State[37]
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,[38] which became
effective on 15 March 2003, should dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus
as to the authority of the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of
the State. The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to intervene
and take part in the proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages before the RTC and on appeal to higher courts. The pertinent
provisions of the said Rule are reproduced below
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 47 of 57

Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall
serve a copy of the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General
and the Office of the City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five
days from the date of its filing and submit to the court proof of
such service within the same period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties
and the public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the
Solicitor General, to file their respective memoranda in support
of their claims within fifteen days from the date the trial is
terminated. It may require the Office of the Solicitor General to
file its own memorandum if the case is of significant interest to
the State. No other pleadings or papers may be submitted
without leave of court. After the lapse of the period herein
provided, the case will be considered submitted for decision, with
or without the memoranda.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to those of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity and existence of the
marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely. At most, Felys abandonment,
sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal
separation under Article 55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for
declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this
Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously shackled to
what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is one of those situations
where neither law nor society can provide the specific answer to every individual
problem.[39]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July 2001, affirming the Judgment of
the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October
1998, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains valid
and subsisting.
SO ORDERED.

Sec. 19. Decision.

(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the

public prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision
personally or by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by
publication failed to appear in the action, the dispositive part of
the decision shall be published once in a newspaper of general
circulation.

(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of

fifteen days from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be
made if no motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is
filed by any of the parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor
General.

Sec. 20. Appeal.

(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor

General may appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of
Appeal within fifteen days from notice of denial of the motion for
reconsideration or new trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of
the notice of appeal on the adverse parties.

Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 48 of 57

 obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is
given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

FIRST DIVISION
On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the
United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 154380 was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and
Petitioner, Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

Present: In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son
Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
Davide, Jr., C.J., naturalized as an American citizen.
- versus - (Chairman),
Quisumbing,
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a
Ynares-Santiago,
divorce decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her
Carpio, and
child by him currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel,
Azcuna, JJ.
California.
CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III,
Respondent. Promulgated:
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry
invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed.
October 5, 2005
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein
petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
x--------------------------------------------------x
reconsideration but it was denied.
DECISION
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE
QUISUMBING, J.: 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating
him or her to remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine
law?
Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite
ruling on this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
applicable to the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage;
that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper
remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs
respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not
of judicial determination.[6]

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1] dated
May 15, 2002, of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch
23 and its Resolution[2] dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for
reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano
Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph
of Art. 26 of the Family Code and by reason of the divorce decree
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his
case but insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree
which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law
pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.[7]
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the
trial court actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection,
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:

Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 49 of 57

 RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a
deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or whose rights
are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach
or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity
arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a
justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose
interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in
the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination.[8]
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage
between two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained
a divorce decree, and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties
are also adverse, as petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect
the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on a
declaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal
interest in the controversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination
inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation ensues and puts into question
the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how
this provision had come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the
legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order
No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3,
1988. Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance
with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive
Order No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of
the Family Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it
now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,
the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation
presented by the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time
of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was
naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while
residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the
Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following
objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates
against those whose spouses are Filipinos who divorce
them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not
be able to re-marry, while the spouses of foreigners who
validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of
the validity of divorce even for Filipino citizens. For those
whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will
also be considered to be validly divorced here and can
re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into
law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the
intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 50 of 57
validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently,
the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains
a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when
they got married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and
obtained a divorce in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter
dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer
married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of
reason, we hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were
Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a foreign
citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be
allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the
solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity
and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and
literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose
of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,
disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be
extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they
come within its spirit or intent.[12]
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant
case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there
was still a valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As
fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid
divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus
Cipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the
Filipino spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal
separation. Annulment would be a long and tedious process, and in this
particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of the parties
appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation
would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence,
the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the naturalized
alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly
submitted by respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of
respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.[13]
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation
that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must
prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law
allowing it.[14] Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts cannot take
judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged and
proved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree
allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise,
there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter
into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be
interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted
and on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations
that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce
decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated to
remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondents
submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the
Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET
ASIDE.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 51 of 57
SO ORDERED. Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce
on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January
8, 2006.[5]

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another
Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the Philippines,
Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite the registration
of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed
Republic of the Philippines Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under
Supreme Court Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
Manila judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular
No. 4, series of 1982.[6]
THIRD DIVISION Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the
RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, G.R. No. 186571 submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered
Petitioner, no opposition to Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar
Present: case herself but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She,
thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar
CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson, prayer to Gerberts.
BRION,
- versus - BERSAMIN, In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The
*ABAD, and RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ. judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian
citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,[8] in order for him or her to
Promulgated: be able to remarry under Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The August 11, 2010
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
Respondents. -- - accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
DECISION 36, 37 and 38.
BRION, J.: Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is
validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to
Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review remarry under Philippine law.
on certiorari[2]under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.[3] On January 18, determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;[10] the provision was
2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. enacted to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married
[4] Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in Filipino spouse.[11]
April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was
having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned THE PETITION
to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of

Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 52 of 57

From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory
relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination
of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking
into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the
alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine
in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the Filipino spouse
an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper
party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a
possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina
fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be
on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and
Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a
court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse can claim
no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the
substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the
Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages void[15] and
voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the
marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful
union for cause arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize
absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.[18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a
Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her
legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order
No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as
follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and
(6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227
effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.
[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign courts
divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized
that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond between the
spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino
spouse] has to be considered still married to [the alien
spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x
cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.[22]
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law to avoid the
absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.
[23] The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his
or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce
decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him
or her to remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a
proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another
proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do
not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;[25] Article 17 of
the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception
to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court
finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can
declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another
marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration
for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose
status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national law.[26]
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 53 of 57
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in
limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In
other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a
right that clothes the party
with legal interest to petition
for its recognition in this
jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary
statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition
before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The
foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens
national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as
a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a
judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country,
having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as
follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific
thing, the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a
person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence
of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is
sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before
our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we
have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the
acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments
and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give
effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another
country.[28] This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be
proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
[29] The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the
purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of
the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be
official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official publications or
(2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the
copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce
decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,[30] but failed
to include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.[31] Under this situation, we
can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to
determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce
law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article
26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious
conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other
interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to
a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court.[33]
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of
reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res
judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for
extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino
spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code provides.
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 54 of 57
Considerations beyond the
recognition of the foreign
divorce decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the
decree.[34] We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need
to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register. The
law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal
consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e., those
affecting all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in
nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or
illegitimate, or his being married or not.[35]
A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a
persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or
the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce
decrees in the civil registry:
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is established for recording
the civil status of persons, in which shall be entered:
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the
law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize
the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be
given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as
yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it
annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a
court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,[36] and
Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 1982[37] both of which required
a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign judgment,
dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless,
allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration
of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is patently
void and cannot produce any legal effect.
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC
may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize
the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a
foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of
Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

(a) births; Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil register shall be
(b) deaths; changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules of Court supplements
(c) marriages; Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial
(d) annulments of marriages; proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or
(e) divorces; corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and
(f) legitimations; procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,
(g) adoptions; authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil
(h) acknowledgment of natural children; registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed
(i) naturalization; and with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;
(j) changes of name. [38] that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must
be made parties to the proceedings;[39] and that the time and place for hearing
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars shall keep and must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.[40] As these basic
preserve in their offices the following books, in which they shall, jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we cannot
respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the
persons: Rules of Court.

(1) Birth and death register; We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as
requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the foreign decree and another
marriages solemnized but also divorces and dissolved specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The
marriages. recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding
itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
naturalization register. fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the appropriate
adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability of the foreign judgment

Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 55 of 57

can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice
to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,
and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17,
2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329. March 8, 2001]
HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner, vs. JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ,
MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.
RESOLUTION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were
both bound by a prior existing marriage is the bone of contention of the instant
complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial Court,
Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges
respondent Judge with gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit
filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12 May 1999.
Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano,
having been married to him on 21 May 1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish,
Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.[1] Four children were born out of that marriage.
[2] On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with
one Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge.[3] When respondent Judge
solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the same was void and
bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties
were separated.
Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he
officiated the marriage between Manzano and Payao he did not know that
Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been living
together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of
marriage, as manifested in their joint affidavit.[4] According to him, had he
known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the latter not
to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then
prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed
merely to harass him.
After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court
Administrator recommended that respondent Judge be found guilty of gross
ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that
a repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.
On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether
they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings
thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.
For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for
the dismissal of the complaint and setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein
invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits[5] of the late
Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff
upon his instruction. In those affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda
Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja and Domingo
Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked
by constant quarrels, they had both left their families and had never cohabited
or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent Judge alleges that on
the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in
accordance with Article 34 of the Family Code.
We find merit in the complaint.
Article 34 of the Family Code provides:
No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have
lived together as husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal
impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer
oaths. The solemnizing officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to the
marriage.
For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the
following requisites must concur:
1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband
and wife for at least five years before the marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;
Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 56 of 57
 3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must and basic legal principles.[9] And when the law transgressed is simple and
be present at the time of marriage; elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.[10]

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby
together for at least five years [and are without legal impediment to ADOPTED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon
marry each other]; and respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to P20,000.

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had SO ORDERED.
ascertained the qualifications of the parties and that he had found
no legal impediment to their marriage.[6]

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant
to note that in their separate affidavits executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to
before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage
contract, it was indicated that both were separated.

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous

marriage is a diriment impediment, which would make the subsequent marriage
null and void.[7] In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the
late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting
another marriage. And respondent Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos
and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly stated in their
separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their
respective spouses for a long time already is immaterial. Article 63(1) of the
Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to
live separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are
not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation does not dissolve the marriage
tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when
the separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David
Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating that they had been cohabiting as
husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of
a subsisting previous marriage. Marital cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each other is
merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a
justification for respondent Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by
the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he

solemnized a void and bigamous marriage. The maxim ignorance of the law
excuses no one has special application to judges,[8] who, under Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity,
and independence. It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law

Marriage Preliminaries (Assignment Number 2) Page 57 of 57