doi:10.1017/hgl.2017.

1 Hegel Bulletin, 38/2, 266–292

© The Hegel Society of Great Britain, 2017

Comprehending Sociality: Hegel Beyond his

Appropriation in Contemporary Philosophy
of Recognition
Christian Krijnen

Abstract

Contemporary philosophy of recognition represents probably the most prominent

direction that presently claims to introduce an updated version of classical German
idealism into ongoing debates, including the debate on the nature of sociality.
In particular, studies of Axel Honneth offer triggering contributions in Frankfurt
School fashion while at the same time rejuvenating Hegel’s philosophy in terms of
a philosophy of recognition. According to Honneth, this attempt at a rejuvenation
also involves substantial modification of Hegelian doctrines. It is shown that
Honneth underestimates the implications of Hegel’s thoughts about the theme, method
and systematic form of philosophy. As a consequence, Honneth’s social philosophy is,
on the one hand, in need of a plausible foundation. This leads, on the other hand, to a
different construction of the social within philosophy than Honneth offers.

I. The dawn of a new paradigm

Contemporary philosophy of recognition represents probably the most prominent

direction that presently claims to introduce an updated version of classical German
idealism into ongoing debates, including the debate on the nature of sociality or
social ontology.1 In particular studies by Axel Honneth, for instance Suffering from
Indeterminacy: An Attempt at a Reactualization of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (2000) and
Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life (2014), offer triggering
contributions in Frankfurt School fashion, while at the same time rejuvenating
Hegel’s philosophy in terms of a philosophy of recognition. Philosophy profiled as a
philosophy of recognition seems to come up with innovative and far-reaching
opportunities for comprehending the human world.
Although it appears somewhat excessive to characterize the theory of
recognition as a ‘well-established and mature research paradigm in philosophy’
(Zurn 2010: 1), it cannot be denied that for the past couple of decades, there has
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been intense debate about recognition which has commanded ever greater
attention. This debate began with topics in practical philosophy, especially
political and social philosophy. As it has developed, however, recognition has
achieved such broad significance thematically and historically that a new
philosophical paradigm does indeed seem to be in the making. Recognition
appears to be a fundamental concept, relevant not only for understanding
political issues but for our human world as a whole. As a result, the concept of
recognition now includes such notions as subjectivity, objectivity, rationality,
knowledge, personality, sociality, identity, otherness, nature, logic, etc. The
protagonists in this debate seek to make German idealism fruitful for
contemporary problems. Whereas neo-Kantians a century ago sought to
update German idealism by focusing on ‘Kant as the philosopher of modern
culture’,2 contemporary theorists of recognition intend to rejuvenate Hegel’s
philosophy (see, e.g., Honneth 2001, Siep 2010a and Cobben 2009b).
This attempt to return to Hegel exhibits rather divergent interpretations of
his philosophy, and a remarkable turning away from Hegel’s mature system, as
outlined in the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences of 1830.3 Hegel’s
philosophical project of developing self-knowledge of the idea through the
three elements of pure thought, nature and spirit appears to his critics just as
unconvincing as, for example, his non-dialogical, monological, concept of
rationality and normativity. In contrast, I shall argue that Hegel as a systematic
philosopher confronts the contemporary paradigm of recognition with difficult
and far-reaching questions concerning its own foundation, both methodologically
and thematically. Consider first the following background considerations.

II. Contested essentials of Hegel’s philosophy

According to the protagonists of recognition (e.g., Siep 1979), the principle of

recognition is central to Hegel’s practical philosophy in his Jena period, especially
in his unpublished “Geistphilosophie” (1805/6) and Phenomenology of Spirit (1807).
However, it can hardly be said that in these texts Hegel develops a
comprehensive theory of recognition. Therefore, it is little surprise to find
detailed, though independent, attempts to interpret, for example, the
Phenomenology as the core of Hegel’s theory of recognition.4 Hegel’s later
philosophy, as published in his Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830) and
the Philosophy of Right (1821), does not seem to pay much attention to the principle
of recognition (let alone the principle of mutual recognition). This is
subordinated to other, more embracing principles. Hegel’s later works are
characterized by a relation to logic very different to his early works. This reflects a
further important contrast. In his early works, Hegel, inspired by Kant,
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elaborated on something like ‘practical philosophy’.5 However, in the course of

his intellectual development, Hegel criticized Kant’s moral philosophy and
philosophy of religion ever more radically. Hegel’s mature views present a
philosophy of spirit which seeks to overcome the opposition between theoretical
and practical philosophy, or, more precisely, from the start it has already overcome
that opposition. Unlike Hegel, however, the protagonists of recognition conceive
Hegel’s philosophy of spirit as ‘practical’ philosophy; and ‘Hegel’s practical
philosophy’ indeed functions, in various permutations, as a popular book title;
see, e.g., Siep (2010a), Pippin (2008) and Rózsa (2005). In contrast, Hegel’s
Encyclopaedia conceives philosophy as philosophy of the idea, and conceives of
spirit in its objective dimension not as practical but as free spirit, embedding the
distinction between theoretical and practical in a new, more fundamental
constellation of philosophy of spirit. It is essential to Hegel’s mature philosophy
(both in the Logic and in his philosophy of spirit) to overcome the traditional,
pervasive and influential distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy,
and between the theoretical and the practical.
Hence, it is unsurprising that many theorists of recognition favour Hegel’s
early philosophy. They regard his mature philosophy either as insufficient for a
philosophy of recognition, which must instead be developed, for example, from
the Phenomenology,6 or as requiring considerable modification to become relevant
to contemporary philosophy. The first strategy can at best conclude that, from a
systematic point of view, there is a continuity concerning the theme of
recognition in Hegel’s development. In order to determine this continuity,
however, certain perspectives of the younger Hegel must guide the interpretation
of Hegel’s mature philosophy. This results in the view that Hegel’s later
philosophy is retrograde with respect to the Phenomenology (see, e.g., Cobben
2009b).7 On the second strategy, Hegel’s view that philosophy and its disciplines
should be determined within the framework of a ‘system’ of philosophy, granting
the Logic a foundational and guiding role for a contemporary philosophy of
recognition, is dismissed as ‘metaphysical’ (see, e.g., Honneth 1994, 2001).8 Hegel
is said to hold implausibly speculative, metaphysical premises, together with a
corresponding teleological concept of history and a Euro- and Christocentrism
that simply fail in the face of today’s multicultural society (see Siep 1979, 2010c).
To get a grip on dealing with the problem of social ontology within
a Hegelian setting, it seems opportune to specify these general considerations
further in two respects. The first is Hegel’s concept of philosophy as a science
of the absolute idea and its non-metaphysical character (III). This concerns the
programmatic profile of Hegel’s philosophy. It provides the basis for the
second respect: showing that Hegel’s philosophy is not practical philosophy (IV).
Consequently, an alternative, more Hegelian approach to dealing with sociality
needs to be introduced ( V ).
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III. Metaphysics, logic and the system of philosophy

Let me now consider critically from a Hegelian perspective one very important
presupposition of the present recognition debate. This presupposition concerns
the relation between metaphysics, logic and the system of philosophy. Another
influential presupposition, which I will only touch on, concerns the place of the
Phenomenology in Hegel’s philosophical system.
Metaphysics can be conceived of as fundamental knowledge transcending
nature, or our experience of nature, insofar as metaphysics is about the
basic, systematic structure of our concepts and their interconnections, which we
presuppose in thinking about objects, and the ontology implicit in our conceptual
scheme, which makes possible our thought of objects. This influential
conception of metaphysics, however, is insufficient for understanding metaphy-
sics within German idealism: German idealism is guided by a more determinate
concept of metaphysics, based upon the distinction between a metaphysica
generalis and a metaphysica specialis. Moreover, for Kant as for Hegel, metaphysics
has both a thematic9 and a methodical determination,10 according to which
metaphysics is dogmatic insofar as it fails to reflect critically upon its own
foundations. Due to Kant’s critical analysis of metaphysics, and from the
perspective of the history of philosophy, Hegel brands metaphysics
‘former metaphysics’ (E §27). Although Hegel seeks to surpass Kant’s
transcendental philosophy through his speculative idealism, he does not restore
metaphysics against Kant’s intentions.11
Instead of reviving pre-Kantian metaphysics, in Hegel’s speculative idealism
the science of logic supersedes pre-Kantian but now superfluous metaphysics
(I 46 with E §24). By conceiving of logic as the ‘genuine’ metaphysics (I 5), Hegel
gives metaphysics a thematic and methodical significance very different to its
pre-Kantian predecessors.12 At the same time, Hegel deviates from Kant’s
transcendental concepts of general and special metaphysics. For Hegel,
metaphysics should not take its determinations as determinations of ‘substrates’,
gathered from ‘representation’; instead, it considers the ‘nature’ of the
determinations of thought and their ‘value’ as such (an und für sich) (I 46f.).
In this context, Hegel states what is methodologically essential: that in
philosophical knowledge the ‘nature of the content’ itself ‘moves’. Hence, the
content itself ‘posits’ and ‘generates’ its determination (I 6).13 Such a logic in no
way constitutes a pre-Kantian metaphysics but rather a logic of the (absolute)
idea, namely a logic that evolves itself through an immanent process of
determination, beginning with thought as the indeterminate immediate (‘being’,
Sein) and completing this evolution by comprehending its own evolution
(‘absolute idea’). This self-movement of the ‘concept’, and with that the
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development of the relations between the determinations of thought

(Gedankenbestimmungen), must of course be a justified movement: the self-
movement occurs in the ‘form of necessity’ (E §9). This already suggests
that, according to Hegel, philosophy has only one content and object: the
idea, more precisely, the absolute idea (II 484), i.e., the ‘concept which
comprehends itself ’ (sich begreifende Begriff ) (II 504), the ‘absolute truth and
all truth’ (E §236; see also II 484). Therefore, the idea is not a being
(Seiendes). Instead, the absolute idea proves itself to be the method, i.e., the
processuality proper to the determinations of pure thought, treated in the
Logic, together with the system of these determinations of thought. So
conceived, philosophy does not plague itself with substrates of representations,
or any other ‘pre-given’; the absolute idea contains all determinacy within
itself (II 484).
Containing all determinacy in itself, the idea is not exhausted merely
as a logical idea. Taking the whole of philosophy into account, the absolute
idea is addressed by Hegel in three perspectives of determination: within pure
thought, within nature, and within spirit.14 Hence, Hegel’s philosophical program
includes nature and spirit, i.e., the realms of reality; his philosophy includes them
in the way of an immanent development of the idea which acknowledges
‘experience’.15 Here, the logic functions as the ‘foundation’ of any natural or
spiritual determination (II 224; TWA 8: §24A1).16 Because of its radical
foundational role, Hegel qualified the logic as both the ‘first’ and the ‘last’
science of the system of philosophy (II 437). This implies, inter alia, that each and
every determination—whether empirical determinations or philosophical
determinations of nature and spirit constituting the foundations of the
empirical—has its basis in logic, while at the same time the logic is retained in
the other realms of the philosophical system as their foundation. Finally, at the
end of the system, the logic becomes a logic that comprehends itself as a logic that is
the unity of nature and spirit, and, therefore, is the grounding principle of reality.
By reaching this insight, philosophy—a figure (Gestalt) of the absolute
spirit—comprehends itself as truly a science of foundations, or conversely, as
truly a science of totality.17
Such a comprehension apparently can only be accomplished within a
system of philosophy. For Hegel, philosophy without a system cannot be
scientific knowledge. Actually, the truth is the whole, ‘concrete’ only as internally
developing itself while at the same time functioning as the principle of unity:
philosophy is ‘essentially’ a system (E §§14ff.; PhG 19f.; TWA 4: 411). This holds
for the whole of philosophy as well as for its parts: we are always dealing with
‘circles rounded and complete in themselves’. The whole of philosophy, then,
forms a ‘circle of circles’ in which each circle functions as a ‘necessary moment’
(E §15; II 504).
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Although Hegel is time and again criticized for neglecting ‘experience’,

a closer look shows that the opposite is the case: Hegel integrates experience.
He acknowledges what in terms of neo-Kantianism could be called the ‘fact of
culture’, namely a set of actualized validity claims, as a starting point for
philosophical reflection. Hegel’s conceptual arsenal not only results from an
intense struggle with the history of philosophy. The recourse to something
available is necessary from a genetic-methodological point of view too. Hegel’s
Logic can be understood as a philosophical ‘reconstruction’ of principles or
meanings that have been brought to light in the history of philosophy: it
preserves ‘former logic and metaphysics’ and transforms them (E §9), hence
bearing upon the history of philosophy as its material.18 The philosophy of
nature has nature as its topic and therefore the idea in ‘the form of otherness’
(E §§247; see also §18). The development of its concept follows the procedure
determined within the logic: its fashion is posing the presupposed, making
the implicit explicit, hence, determining what is initially indeterminate. Whereas
the logic underlies the condition of, so to speak, utter presuppositionlessness, the
philosophy of reality needs to start with presuppositions of contents that have to
be made explicit in the course of the process of conceptual determination.
Hegel’s philosophy of reality makes up a complex of logical development and
‘outward presentation’ (Darstellung).19
The presuppositions of content that play a role at the beginning(s) of the
philosophy of reality concern the initial (opening) concept, namely the concept
with which a philosophy of a particular sphere has to start. The initial concept of
the philosophy of nature itself is supplied in a scientifically justified way by the
logic. Similarly, the initial concept of the philosophy of spirit itself is supplied in a
scientifically justified way by the philosophy of nature. Both philosophies of
reality start with a given concept (given, of course, within a systematic setting,
hence not ‘merely’ given) that ‘realizes’ itself in a methodologically regulated way:
the ‘logical’ and the ‘existing’ dimension of the concept merge in the idea (as the
concept that corresponds with itself in its objectivity). The presuppositions of
content at the beginning of the philosophy of nature and of spirit are to be
understood as an ‘exposition’: as a preliminary determination respectively of
nature and spirit as such. This preliminary determination characterizes the
particular sphere of objectivity to be dealt with in the philosophy of reality
(nature, spirit).
What does this inclusion of material mean for determining reality
philosophically? The initial concept of a sphere of reality includes on the one
hand the logical dimension. In this respect, nature is determined as ‘the idea in the
form of otherness’ (E §247); spirit again has nature ‘as its presupposition’
(E §381). On the other hand, the dimension of existence (Dasein) of the concept is
included in the speculative consideration of philosophy (the way in which the
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idea gives itself existence). As a consequence, the specific content of the

philosophy of reality comes into the conceptual contemplation of philosophy,
that is the ‘point of view of the concept’ (Betrachtungsweise des Begriffs) (E §245) or
the ‘comprehending consideration’ (begreifende Betrachtung) (E §246).
At the beginning of the philosophy of nature, Hegel accordingly addresses
not only humans’ ‘practical’ and ‘theoretical’ behaviour regarding nature but also
states explicitly that empirical physics is presupposed for the emergence and
development of philosophy. It is, however, presupposed only from a genetic-
methodological perspective, as the foundation of philosophy cannot consist in
‘appealing to experience’: it consists in the ‘necessity of the concept’ (E §§245f.,
esp. §246R). Philosophy does not leave the empirical content (and our empirical
knowledge of it) aside but acknowledges and uses it (E §9R). The ‘emergence of
philosophy’ has ‘experience’ as a ‘starting point’; thought lifts itself above the
‘natural, sensuous, and clever argumentative consciousness’ into the ‘sheer
element of itself ’. Likewise the ‘empirical sciences’ are in need of a philosophical
foundation, picking up their content, yet elevating it into ‘necessity’ (E §12); and
metaphysics too is included by Hegel (E §§246, 378). They all supply material for
a philosophical construction.20
In conclusion, regarding Hegel’s programmatic conception of philosophy,
I see no reason to side with theorists of recognition who, in making Hegel’s
philosophy of right relevant today, argue that for ‘methodological’ reasons,
Hegel’s argumentation fails because it rests on his logic, which purportedly is fully
unintelligible to us due to its ‘ontological’ concept of spirit (Honneth 2001: 12ff.).
However, a vague reference to the ‘theoretical and normative conditions of the
present age’ (Honneth 2001: 13f.) hardly suffices to support such a far-reaching
estimation of Hegel’s logic. On the contrary, any interpretation of Hegel’s concept
of objective spirit that neglects its relation to Hegel’s system of philosophy,
neglects essential determinations of Hegel’s concept of philosophy. Hegel himself
understands his Philosophy of Right as an elaboration of his philosophy of objective
spirit (E §487R, and see §§483–552). Accordingly, he also notes that the
Philosophy of Right borrows its method from the Logic (PR §§2R with §31).21 The
Logic plays a fundamental role for the Philosophy of Right, both as such and
concerning its specific content. The elaboration of the Philosophy of Right follows
the developmental process of self-knowledge of the absolute idea as absolute
spirit.22 In accordance with the logic of a speculative development of concepts,
the beginning of the philosophy of objective spirit must concern a concept of
spirit that is maximally extrinsic to the concept attained by subjective spirit: ‘right’
(Recht, ius, justice).23 Hegel overcomes the outwardness of the idea within
objective spirit by realizing (realisieren) this concept of right: by making explicit
the abstract generality of that concept as the beginning of a series of meanings
(cf. II 488ff. with 241).24
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The philosophical system outlined by the mature Hegel, oriented towards

self-knowledge of the idea, also entails the demotion of the Phenomenology of Spirit
as a paradigm of philosophy. This demotion not only concerns the introductory
function of the Phenomenology,25 but also the (partial) integration of this work into
the Encyclopaedia. This is a relevant issue, as in contemporary recognition
discourse the Phenomenology plays a dominating role in rejuvenating Hegel’s
thought.
When the Phenomenology appeared, for Hegel it had the function of an
introduction within the system of science, especially in its foundational discipline,
the logic (I 7f .). Whereas Hegel first conceived of the Phenomenology as the first
part of the system, later the Phenomenology no longer functioned as an introduction
to, or the first part of, the system.26 Hegel even excludes the Phenomenology from
the order of the system, insofar he integrates essential parts of the Phenomenology
into the philosophy of subjective spirit in the Encyclopaedia. In addition, the
Encyclopaedia obtains a new introduction (E §§1–18), and the logic of the
Encyclopaedia even obtains an introduction of its own (E §§19–83). The
‘Phenomenology’ within the system outlined by the Encyclopaedia certainly does
not have the task of introducing us into philosophy. Hegel sometimes writes of
the Phenomenology as a superfluous introduction into his logic,27 though he never
fully gave up the introductory role of the Phenomenology of Spirit (he retains it even
in the second edition of his Logic of Being of 1832).28 Non-philosophical
consciousness (natürliches Bewußtsein), undoubtedly, retains its right to be led to the
standpoint of speculative philosophy.
Furthermore, the Logic is capable of justifying itself: the ‘concept of science’
results from the Logic itself (I 29). On top of that, the determination of the method
of philosophy is part of the Logic, whereas the Phenomenology transpires only to be
an ‘example’ of this method (I 35). Although the Phenomenology might serve as a
possible route to the Logic, it is not constitutive for the Logic in the sense of being
a necessary condition for its standpoint. The section ‘With What Must Science
Begin?’ (I 51–65) makes it clear that the Phenomenology cannot serve as the
beginning of the Logic. The opposition between consciousness and object—as
well as that between thematized (‘for it’) and thematizing (‘for us’) consciousness
—which is constitutive for the Phenomenology as an introduction, contains too
many presuppositions. Science must begin with (pure) ‘being’ (Sein), regardless of
whether one reaches the Logic by the Phenomenology or by what Hegel calls a
‘decision’ or ‘resolution’ (Entschluß ) (I 52–54).
A closer look at the ‘Phenomenology’ within the Encyclopaedia (E §§413–39)
would show significant differences from the Phenomenology of 1807, substantiating
the thesis that Hegel has downgraded the Phenomenology. For my argument,
however, it is sufficient to reveal the different embedding and focus of the
development.
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The Phenomenology of 1807 aims to examine appearances of true knowledge

in order that subsequent forms of its appearance introduce natural consciousness
into a scientific philosophy as pure, comprehending knowledge.29 This
introduction departs from the basic opposition of Hegel’s time: the opposition
between subjectivity on the one hand and that which restricts this subjectivity on
the other, the subject–object dualism. The paradigmatic figure of this opposition,
both for common sense and for philosophy, is consciousness.30 At the end of the
history of its education or cultivation (Bildung), in ‘absolute knowledge’ (PhG
422–33), consciousness has overcome subject–object dualism. Appearing
knowledge becomes actual, that is to say, it becomes philosophical knowledge.
This knowledge, then, is developed in the system of philosophy; the Phenomenology
concludes with only an immediate knowledge of the absolute. In the system of
philosophy, this absolute proves itself to be the absolute idea. For Hegel, the
absolute idea is the only theme of philosophy. Hence, philosophy is ‘presentation
of the idea’ (E §18). The Phenomenology, however, only concerns consciousness,
that is, a specific aspect of the idea, as a case of application of the philosophical
method. In his Encyclopaedia, Hegel treats consciousness in this narrow sense.
Consciousness is part of the philosophy of the idea and obtains its specific profile
within that philosophy. Not in the Encyclopaedia phenomenology but in
psychology, hence, in the philosophy of the properly subjective dimension of
spirit,31 we comprehend what knowledge is: an endeavour of the free spirit, both
theoretical and practical (E §§440ff.).

IV. Hegel’s philosophy of spirit is not practical philosophy

For Kant (1983: B 860), the concepts of science and of system are closely related.
Architectural unity constitutes the scientific character of our knowledge, within
philosophy too. Kant develops his philosophy accordingly, following Aristotle’s
influential division of philosophy into theoretical and practical philosophy or into
the realms of nature and of freedom. The original unity of these two branches,
however, was a major challenge to German idealists, not least to Hegel.
Nevertheless, theoreticians of recognition, such as Siep or Honneth, according to
their own self-understanding, elaborate a practical philosophy,32 purportedly
Hegel’s practical philosophy.
This practical impetus of contemporary theory of recognition is
unsurprising, as the discourse about recognition was (and is) largely motivated
by politics, human rights, democracy, globalization, economization and multi-
culturalism, hence, by socio-political matters. In that connection, though, one
rather would have expected, at least programmatically, a turn to Kant’s presently
much debated, and highly vaunted, practical philosophy, especially his Critique of
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Practical Reason and his Metaphysics of Morals. Yet, to many theorists of recognition,
Kant’s views appear inferior to Hegel’s. They raise the standard arguments
against Kant’s practical philosophy. Hence, the individualistic and contractual
account of his theory of justice seems inadequate for understanding social
relations. Furthermore, Kant’s empty ethical formalism should be overcome by a
Hegelian idea of substantial ethical life (Sittlichkeit), just as Kant’s atomistic and
monological concept of reason is said to lead to a deficient concept of
subjectivity because the subject is essentially social.
This farewell to Kant would require a study of its own, far beyond the scope
of the present article.33 Hegel, without doubt, engaged seriously with Kant’s
architecture of reason. To develop his concept of philosophy as a speculative
doctrine of the absolute idea, Hegel needed not only to sublate the restrictions
both of theoretical knowledge within the idea of the truth and of practical
knowledge within the idea of the good (II 429ff.); he also had to sublate the
opposition between the theoretical and the practical operations of the spirit into a
doctrine of free spirit (E §§445ff.). The terminus of Hegel’s philosophy of
subjective spirit, and starting point of his philosophy of objective spirit, is indeed
free spirit as a unity of theoretical and practical spirit. Whoever treats Hegel’s
philosophy of objective spirit as a practical philosophy, should explain what then
Hegel’s theoretical philosophy is: Is it the logic, the philosophy of absolute spirit,
the philosophy of subjective theoretical spirit? Is it parts of these or a
combination?34 Should not, in contrast, the philosophy of objective spirit be
primarily understood from Hegel’s concept of spirit, hence, considering the
concept of the practical as determined within the context of the concept of spirit?
Whoever seeks to understand it in another way, or who reads, for example, the
philosophy of spirit as ‘ethics’, should make explicit his or her own understanding
of what ‘practical’ and ‘ethical’ mean—most likely taken from the history of
philosophy—and justify this understanding in the context of Hegel’s philosophy,
before characterizing Hegel’s philosophy by such concepts. Hegel’s philosophy of
spirit certainly offers formal and substantive points of contact for practical
philosophy and for ethics beyond Hegel’s own views, but Hegel’s philosophy of
spirit is neither of these.
A closer examination of the idea, widespread in the recognition discourse,
that Hegel has a ‘practical’ philosophy would make clear that and why Hegel does
not have one, and indeed that it would be a real challenge for the protagonists of
recognition to show how a genuine practical philosophy is possible within the
framework of Hegel’s speculative system (see Krijnen 2014b: 109ff.). Instead of
pursuing practical philosophy, Hegel intends to overcome the opposition
between theoretical and practical philosophy from within and to sublate it in a
higher, more original unity.35 For Hegel, ‘practical’ philosophy is a deficient form
of knowledge, inadequate to his concept of philosophy. Consequently, it is not a
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basis of any of the disciplines of his philosophy of reality (Realphilosophie). On the

contrary, Hegel replaces it with a structure that, as absolute idea, is the truly
scientific perspective of knowledge and, as free spirit, provides a conception of
the subject that is able to actualize its purpose—freedom—within an externally
found objectivity. Hegel’s philosophy of reality is developed on the level of the
absolute idea. Accordingly, the idea of knowledge in the philosophy of spirit is
from the start construed in terms of the absolute idea. To grant parts of the
philosophy of spirit an independent status, for instance (self-)consciousness,
practical spirit, or objective spirit, neglects the idea that within Hegel’s philosophy
of spirit—unlike in his philosophy of nature—the stages of conceptual
development do not exist for themselves: spirit’s determinations and stages are
‘essentially only moments, conditions, determinations of the higher stages of the
development’ (E §380),which are organized according to the absolute idea.
Consequently, the claims of the theoretical and the practical as such, and
hence also those of this influential traditional division itself, lead to more
fundamental, more encompassing concepts such as those of the absolute idea
and the free spirit. As early as in his early writings, Hegel sought to overcome the
opposition between freedom, subjectively understood, and nature, understood as
an instrument of or obstacle to freedom, through a concept of freedom designed
to reconcile what is divided. Nature too must be conceived of as a manifestation
of the idea. Thus, nature is conceived of as something determined by principles
that subsume and subordinate the theoretical and practical conceptions of nature,
by conceptualizing nature itself as freedom in Hegel’s sense: as being with oneself
in one’s other. Furthermore, freedom is the basis of theoretical and practical
spirit and of their relation, whereas they remain conceived dualistically within the
contexts of the ideas of truth and of the good. Their dualism is superseded by
Hegel through the transition from the logical idea of knowledge to the absolute
idea, and it does not recur in the development of subjective spirit. Hegel’s system
of philosophy (strictly speaking, his Phenomenology of Spirit too, in which stages of
consciousness as appearing knowledge lead to the Logic) addresses theoretical and
practical knowledge, including their objects, though not from their own
perspectives. Correspondingly, Hegel’s system of philosophy provides neither
practical knowledge nor theoretical knowledge; instead, it comprehends these
types of knowledge speculatively within his system of philosophy.
It would be a real challenge to the contemporary paradigm of recognition to
figure out what, then, practical philosophy can be within the framework of
Hegel’s mature philosophy. Kant’s project of practical philosophy—namely a
philosophy from the perspective of the practical, not from the absolute idea—is,
in view of the practical-societal concerns of contemporary recognition theory,
too important to dismiss, even if one is dissatisfied with Kant’s execution.
Is such a practical philosophy possible within Hegel’s mature philosophical
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system? If so, where, and how would it look? Would it be able to develop its
genuine practical impetus within speculative philosophy? What roles would
Hegel’s doctrines of the logical idea and of subjective spirit play? Truly intriguing
questions!

V. Updating idealism: methodological considerations for approaching

social ontology

Instead of elaborating on future philosophies of recognition—it would certainly

be fascinating to develop a tenable one—another idealist approach for updating
German idealism regarding social ontology needs to be introduced. Recognition,
though in a different version, should keep playing an important role too, as one
of the historical movements social ontology needs to deal with consists of South-
West Neo-Kantianism. This branch of philosophy, together with the Marburg
School dominating the academic philosophical discourse in the last decades of
the nineteenth and the first of the twentieth century, is famous for, among others,
transforming the concept of recognition into a paradigm of philosophy, while
also reshaping the idea of a system of philosophy against the backdrop of
criticisms of Hegel, current until today (see also Krijnen 2001, 2008, 2014a,
2014b). Concerning the problem of social ontology, South-West Neo-Kantianism
and its aftermath are relevant if we want to understand sociality in Hegel. Why is
this so?
To answer this question in general,36 several aspects should be taken
into consideration. In the first instance, these aspects circle around the
original determinacy or objectivity of the social and its philosophy, social
philosophy, itself—at least, if we take German idealism as a standard for the
foundational effort that a truly scientific philosophy has to undertake. Honneth,
who claims to actualize Hegel’s philosophy of right, may serve as a typical
case again.
Drawing on the tradition of social philosophy, Honneth comes to the
conclusion that social philosophy is essentially about determining and discussing
negative developments and dysfunctions in society, that is to say, ‘social
pathologies’ (Honneth 1994, 2001, 2008). However, constructing the task of
social philosophy in conformity with the idea of social pathologies apparently
presupposes the concept of the social in its original determinacy and validity.
Moreover, the history of social philosophy itself can only be addressed as a
history of addressing social pathologies if the idea that social philosophy is a
philosophy of social pathologies is itself a well-founded idea. A sufficient
foundation of sociality and social philosophy, however, can only be established on
the basis of the concept of philosophy itself.
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Nevertheless, Honneth, among many others, abandons the idea of a radical

foundation based on the ‘concept’. He is one of many who criticize the idea of a
radical foundation (Letztbegründung). It seems, however, that, notwithstanding this
ubiquitous criticism, the idea of a radical philosophical foundation contains
contents that are insufficiently taken into consideration by its antagonists.
Particularly significant for a radical foundation is that science organizes itself
‘only through the proper life of the concept’ (PhG 38). And it is likewise
significant that thought in its determinacy as a principle is comprehended as the
basis for thought in its concrete shape—hence, that thought is in itself the
principle of any objectivity, making objective meaning possible.37 Philosophy is
the science par excellence of foundations: the science that gets to the bottom of
any claim to objectivity, including its own claim: philosophy is universal and
radical self-reflection.
An accompanying effect of abandoning the idea of a radical foundation is
the abandonment of the idea of a philosophical system: of the thought that human
self-understanding and human understanding of the world that humans live in
can only be developed scientifically within a system of philosophy, hence, within a
whole of determinations that is organized by grounds and consequences. Like the
idea of a radical foundation, the idea of a philosophical system also dominated
modern philosophy for a long time, especially, and in a sublimated form, the
tradition of German idealism. Hegel’s philosophy may count as the most extreme
model of the idea of a philosophical system, both regarding its form and its
content. It says much that Honneth—expressly trying to re-actualize Hegel’s
social philosophy and convinced that the contemporary relevance of Hegel’s
philosophy of right is under-estimated—sticks to a ‘methodological’ objection
against Hegel’s philosophy of right: Honneth, as indicated, dislikes Hegel’s
argumentation being tied to his Logic. For this reason, Honneth writes,
Hegel’s argumentation fails ‘methodologically’: Hegel’s Logic purportedly is fully
unintelligible to us due to its ‘ontological’ concept of spirit (Honneth
2001: 12). However, the underdetermined reference to something as vague as
the ‘theoretical and normative conditions of the present age’ (Honneth 2001:
13f.) is certainly not sufficient to substantiate Honneth’s far-reaching estimation
of Hegel’s Logic. Nevertheless, Honneth (2001: 12ff.) is convinced that for
productively appropriating Hegel’s philosophy of right for contemporary issues,
Hegel’s methodological orientation towards the Logic and its ontological concept
of spirit should be abandoned. Concerning the ‘proper substance’ of Hegel’s
philosophy of right, it is extremely important to Honneth that Hegel’s concept of
objective spirit can be interpreted without relating it to his system of philosophy
(Honneth 2001: 14f.).
The foregoing eventually encumbers us with a task: to take the idea of a
philosophical foundation itself as the standard for determining the foundations of sociality.
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Fulfilling this task indeed requires a re-orientation towards the tradition of

German idealism: German idealism offers the topical, methodical and systematic
paradigm for determining the social.38
Without doubt, in some respects the commitment to German idealism for
establishing the social seems plausible, especially when we take into account, for
instance, Kant’s practical philosophy or Hegel’s philosophy of right. A closer
look, however, shows that linking German idealism and sociality is highly
problematic—the concept of the social, as we know it as the subject–matter of
the social sciences, is a phantom here. That is to say, the concept of the social
traditionally belongs to the domain of ‘practical philosophy’, particularly political
philosophy, including philosophy of law and the state, and moral (ethical)
philosophy.39 Socialitas is a basic concept in the rationalist tradition of natural law;
the social also has a practical connotation in social contract theory (for instance
Rousseau’s contrat social ) and in the context of moral philosophy (for example
‘social virtues’ in British empiricism). The social as a genuine, independent,
specific realm of meaning only became a concept for theoretical determination in
the course of the nineteenth century. The traditional link between the social and
the practical became detached. Along with the development of the social
sciences, the following question arose: What is the specific objectivity of the
social, that is, of the subject matter of the social sciences? At the end of the
nineteenth century, debate about the concept of the social was in full swing.
Stammler, Lehmann, Dilthey, Spranger, Scheler, Durkheim and Weber were
some of its important contributors, coming up with important theoretical
determinations of the social. These determinations were, however, highly
contested and marked by a significant degree of heterogeneity. Nevertheless, this
historical constellation indicates that the concept of the social, as the basic social-
ontological concept of the social sciences, cannot just be picked up from the
philosophies of German idealism. On the contrary, it must be constructed on the
basis of German idealist conceptions of philosophy.
This is also true for the more general notion of a social philosophy,
irrespective of whether the beginnings of social philosophy are located in the
German reception of French socialism, or whether the decisive moment of its
early history is positioned at the end of the nineteenth century with Stammler,
Simmel and Stein. Both variants also result in highly contested determinations
and, again, are marked by a significant degree of heterogeneity. Recent work has
not succeeded in overcoming this confusion. There are numerous conceptions of
what social philosophy is or should be. Hence, it is not only social reality that has
been neglected in the history of philosophy, being treated at best within the
context of studies of politics, law, or morality; social philosophy also comes into
being in the course of the nineteenth century. Regarding German philosophy,
social philosophy more and more received the role of a ‘residual discipline’
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(Honneth), sometimes operating as a parent organization of practical philosophy,

sometimes profiled as a normative addition to empirical sociology, then again as a
diagnosis of present times. Anglo-Saxon philosophy, influenced by utilitarianism,
comes to an understanding of social philosophy that is approximately equal to
what is called in German philosophy ‘political philosophy’; it shrinks here to one
of its subdivisions, which focuses in particular on normative questions
concerning the role of the state for the maintenance of a civil society (property,
punishment, medical care, etc.).40 In French philosophy, by contrast, it is unusual
to name a subdivision, or even a whole discipline of philosophy, philosophie
sociale: in French philosophy the issues dealt with in Germany under the cloaking
title Sozialphilosophie are mostly addressed under philosophie morale or philosophie
politique.
In conclusion, what social philosophy is, its subject matter, its method,
remain obscure. Given the diversity of the meaning and the fact that its use is
taken for granted, we cannot but undertake the effort to give the mere name
‘social’ (or ‘social philosophy’) a real, objective validity. This involves considering
how concepts should be introduced at all in philosophy.
Seen from the perspective of a history of the problems of philosophy
(Problemgeschichte), the social—and social philosophy—is younger than the
philosophy of German idealism. This is why the concept of the social needs
to be constructed, hence, justified in its basic meaning. For us, the problem arises
of how to construct the social from the philosophy of German idealism. Thus,
the linkage between the pursued project of establishing sociality philosophically
and German idealism can only have a methodological character.
The appeal to German idealism becomes even more complicated because in
this philosophy socio-philosophical topics are discussed within the context of
what is called practical philosophy. In this respect too, the social is not addressed as
an independent realm of meaning. Kant, for instance, models his philosophy
following the old distinction between theoretical and practical reason. He
consistently divides philosophy into theoretical and practical parts, and divides
their respective domains into those of nature and freedom. Fichte problematizes
this architectonic of the system of transcendental philosophy, and it is Hegel who
sees very clearly that the division ‘theoretical–practical’ is deficient: it is based on
more original constellations. Accordingly, Hegel divides the system of philosophy
into logic and philosophy of reality (nature, spirit), conceiving of practical
phenomena as phenomena of the spirit. Social reality is a reality of the spirit.
Hence, unlike in Kant’s philosophy, Hegel determines social phenomena not
primarily in the context of relationships of law and virtue. Nevertheless, Hegel
too conceptualizes the realm of spirit that most scholars take to be central for
Hegel’s ‘social philosophy’—the realm of objective spirit—as a realm of right,
although right in an all-embracing sense. The concept of the will is a fundamental
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concept here. Hegel addresses self-determination primarily in terms of the will

and discusses the objectification of the free will in terms of right qua existence
(Dasein) of freedom.
At first sight, Hegel’s focus on the will might feed the impression that Hegel
too is ethicizing the philosophy of spirit. After all, he determines free intelligence,
which is the point of departure of the philosophy of objective spirit, not only as
(free) ‘will’ but also as ‘right’ (E §§483ff.)—a figure which typically belongs to
‘practical’ philosophy and which Hegel even bases on a concept, the will, that
since Kant has been the basic concept of moral philosophy. Hence, the objective
reality of reason seems to have a ‘mere’ practical profile, instead of making up an
encompassing concept of reason in its objective existence, an encompassing
concept that, as for instance in neo-Kantianism and the like, might even be
specified in terms of a plurality of ‘cultural realms’. Hegel’s philosophy of
objective spirit is certainly conceptualized as ‘philosophy of right’, the existence
of the free will generally determined as ‘right’ (E §486). Even at the start of this
philosophy, Hegel notes that a rational (vernünftig) will is given in the subjective
will as mores (Sitte) (E §485), and he soon starts talking about ‘rights’ and ‘duties’
(E §486), and discusses ‘property’, as well as other themes that traditionally
belong to the philosophy of right and of the state, though on a modified and
radically new kind of foundation. In short, at first sight we are dealing with a
specific dimension of human self-formation, even identifying the objectification
of freedom with relations of right.
On a second view, however, a different, more complex picture arises, as the
relations within Hegel’s system of philosophy have to be taken into account, in
particular the role that the logic plays. This concerns the logic of the
advancement of a speculative development of concepts as well as its relevance
for the philosophy of reality. This constellation also concerns the concept of right
as an encompassing concept for actualizing freedom, hence, the determinacy of
right as a functional moment of the self-knowledge of the idea. Instead of dealing
with these issues here, it suffices to acknowledge that Hegel’s philosophy of spirit,
especially his philosophy of objective spirit, destroys the common division
‘theoretical–practical’ and offers a new structure for comprehending reality
philosophically. Kant, despite a number of initial approaches, does not develop
an encompassing concept of freedom that is able to function as the unity, hence
as the basis, of theoretical and practical reason (respectively nature and freedom)
—freedom continuously prevails as practical freedom. Hegel, by contrast,
develops a concept of freedom that establishes a pervasive concept of freedom
which underlies any of its specifications, regardless of whether it is the freedom
of the will, freedom of action, logical freedom, esthetical freedom, etc. In Hegel,
we find a broad concept of freedom as self-determination. In addition, Hegel
extensively criticizes the distinction (opposition) between theoretical and practical
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reason and supplies us with an innovative alternative doctrine of the realization

of spirit in its objectivity. Hegel’s philosophy of spirit encompasses the realms of
theoretical and practical philosophy, and hence, relativizes Kant’s architectonic of
philosophy. Freedom even encompasses all of Hegel’s system of philosophy: it
belongs to Hegel’s conception of the speculative concept. Here we are dealing
with a truly all-embracing and fundamental concept of freedom.
Such an all-embracing concept of freedom indeed looks promising if we
want to comprehend the foundations of social reality. Therefore, it is not
surprising that Hegel scholars have tried to elaborate on Hegel’s Social Philosophy
(Hardimon 1994), Foundations of Hegel’s Social Theory (Neuhouser 2000), or have
undertaken an Attempt at a Reactualization of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Honneth
2001) as a social philosophy.41
Nevertheless, for several reasons such efforts are more problematic than
they initially seem. The need to render a conceptual account of the social emerges
in the course of the nineteenth century. As the social sciences come into being
and develop, the problem of determining the specific objectivity of these sciences
becomes urgent. Before then, what was later called ‘social philosophy’ was
primarily treated within the context of practical philosophy. Whoever refers to
Hegel’s social philosophy or theory is obliged to justify philosophically the concept
of the social. Notwithstanding this, the protagonists of Hegel’s social philosophy
or theory take the concept of the social for granted. Nevertheless, despite the fact
that Hegel inspired several social ontological investigations,42 the fact, no less
important, that not even the word ‘social’ occurs in Hegel’s work, should give rise
to caution and suspicion.43
This caution and suspicion boil down to the task of constructing the social
(and its philosophy) from the principles of Hegel’s philosophy. Although Hegel,
for good reasons, does not declare his project of the logic and the philosophy of
reality to be an ‘ontology’, the contemporary debate on the foundations of the
social takes place under the title ‘social ontology’. Hence, in contemporary terms,
the intended construction of the social is to be understood as a contribution to
social ontology: that is to say, to an ontology of the social sphere, a philosophical
theory of the objectivity of the social (Sachlehre, Gegenstandslehre). The idealist social
ontology to be developed concerns a construction of the meaning of the social
from thought as the principle of objectivity. Accomplishing this effort implies
that fundamental questions have to be posed. These questions concern
philosophy itself and its thematic, methodical and systematic profile. It is
indispensable for getting a grip on the social in Hegel’s philosophy to answer
them adequately.
Honneth’s famous attempt at a re-actualization of Hegel’s philosophy of
right, for instance, unfortunately suffers from surpassing instead of mastering
such questions. The intrinsic methodological relation between logic and the
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philosophy of reality, as well as the embeddedness of the philosophy of reality in

the system of philosophy, are of particular far-reaching relevance. What Honneth
calls the ‘proper substance’ of Hegel’s philosophy of right certainly cannot be
grasped without reference to the system.44
Therefore, the legitimatory status of ‘social pathologies’ in Honneth’s
conception become highly problematic (2001: 16f., 49ff.; 1994) The idea of a
philosophical foundation which they express does not fit into Hegel’s conception
of founding phenomena of reality. Seen methodologically, Hegel does not show
the specific legitimacy of a certain sphere of the objective spirit by demonstrating
its ‘social damages’, its ‘pathological effects’ for the validity for the self-relation of
subjects if such a sphere is made absolute while it only contains an incomplete
concept of freedom—for Honneth an ‘empirical’ indicator for transcending the
legitimate area of validity of a specific sphere (2001: 41). On the contrary, Hegel’s
claim to justify any determination ‘from the concept’ thwarts Honneth’s ‘indirect,
time diagnostic scheme of justification’ (Honneth 2001: 41f., 51f.),45 as the
systematic relations, from ‘being’ in the logic up to the ‘absolute spirit’ in the
philosophy of reality, show. Although Hegel’s justificatory claim too contains a
specific ‘empirical relation to experience’, under the title ‘suffering from
indeterminacy’ Honneth lifts the empirical constellation of social pathologies to
the rank of an empeirem: social pathologies function as a basis for validity, while
suffering, here, ‘indicates’ a violation of the borders of a legitimate sphere. For
Honneth (2001: 142, also 15, 51ff.), Hegel is only able to proceed in this way
because this first ‘background conviction’ of empirical knowledge is joined by an
even more important second background conviction: social reality is not
‘indifferent’ regarding the application of insufficient determinations of human
existence—a ‘practical breach’ of reason leads to social dislocations. With this
view, Honneth (2001: 13) restitutes, despite himself, the ‘ontological concept of
spirit’ he criticized so harshly and aimed to abandon. Despite Honneth’s
philosophical pretentions, the knowledge that incorrect interpretations eventuate
in damages of social reality, that a one-sided self-understanding practically leads to a
‘suffering from indeterminacy’, is empirical knowledge. Hence, Honneth offers a
kind of ontic. To put it drastically, Honneth comes up with ‘former’ metaphysics—with
Hegel criticism, no reactualization of Hegel’s philosophy of right.46
What do the foregoing elaborations on the programmatic setting of Hegel’s
philosophy mean for the construction of the social within this philosophy? In the
first instance, they mean that the social does not have its determinacy beyond the
process of self-determination of the idea as the one and only object and content
of philosophy. The social only has its determinacy as a moment in this process. It
is therefore not just any determination taken from elsewhere, and hence, merely
presupposed as the social, but determined in terms of the place it has in the
system of philosophy, and, by implication, accounted for in the mode of
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necessity. With this said, the question arises: What is the place of the social in
Hegel’s system of philosophy—and why? This question cannot be answered
without taking into account the fact that the social sciences emerged in the course
of the nineteenth century. Social philosophy’s primary task is to determine the
specific objectivity of the social. Hence, we are referred to post-Hegelian history:
it supplies the material for us when we aim to construct the social in Hegel’s
philosophy. The construction, then, consists in ‘translating’ this material (more
precisely, all relevant meanings of sociality in philosophy, the sciences and
ordinary life) into the ‘concept’.

Christian Krijnen
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Netherlands
c.h.krijnen@vu.nl

Notes

1
For an overview, see Schmidt am Busch and Zurn (eds.) (2010); concerning philosophy of
recognition and social ontology, see Ikäheimo and Laitinen (2011); on its appropriation of
German idealism, see Krijnen (ed.) (2014). The following paragraphs draw on Krijnen (2014b)
and Krijnen (2011).
2
Heinrich Rickert (1924) published a book with this telling title. The title, of course,
suppresses how much of Hegel is effective in neo-Kantianism. See Krijnen (2008) on Hegel
and neo-Kantianism.
3
Abbreviations of Hegel’s works:
I = Wissenschaft der Logik: Erster Teil (Leipzig: Meiner, 1951).
II = Wissenschaft der Logik: Zweiter Teil (Leipzig: Meiner, 1951).
E = Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse (1830), 8th edn. (Hamburg:
Meiner, 1991).
PhG = Phenomenology des Geistes, in Gesammelte Werke (Hamburg: Meiner, 1968ff.).
PR = Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts (Hamburg: Meiner, 1955).
TWA = Werke in zwanzig Bänden (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1971), cited by volume.
V = Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte (Hamburg: Meiner, 1993), cited
by volume.
GW = Gesammelte Werke (Hamburg: Meiner, 1968ff.).
All translations from foreign (especially German) texts into English are mine, although I have
benefited from consulting current translations.
4
See for instance Cobben (2009b), who, to hold his thesis, is forced to press the Phenomenology
into a different programmatic corset and to ascribe to this work a different place in Hegel’s
system.

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5
See, on the Kantianism of the young Hegel, for instance, Bondeli (1997), Fulda (2003:
part I), Henrich (1971: 41–72), Siep (2010a: 24–62).
6
Halbig et al. (2004: 10) too concur that in the contemporary debate about Hegel’s heritage,
the Phenomenology is particularly central to efforts to revitalize Hegel’s views for contemporary
philosophy.
7
Brandom is also fascinated by Hegel’s Phenomenology. Most notably he appreciates the tight
connection between normativity and sociality, which according to him Hegel conceives in terms of
mutual recognition; Brandom gives Hegel’s philosophy a neo-pragmatist coating (see, e.g.,
Brandom 1999, 2002, 2005, 2006). Accordingly, he reads Hegel’s text through (social-) subjectivist
glasses, which do not seem to fit Hegel’s objectivist orientation. Brandom too must restrict the role
of the Logic in the system of philosophy and modify Hegel’s method of philosophical knowledge.
8
In addition, Quante (2011: ch. 3) is very critical of Hegel’s system.
9
For instance that metaphysics is about ‘supersensible’ (übersinnliche) objects, capturing
conceptually objects ‘in themselves’ (an sich), the ‘essence’ (Wesen) of things.
10
This is so irrespective of whether metaphysics is described as a type of knowledge, lacking
‘critique’ (Kritik), as Kant puts it (see the prefaces and introduction to his Critique of Pure
Reason), or, as Hegel puts it, as an ‘attitude of thought towards objectivity’ that merely consists
in the ‘perspective of understanding towards objects of reason’ (Verstandes-Ansicht der Vernunft-
Gegenstände: E §27), which in a ‘naïve way’ (E §26) supposedly obtains knowledge of its objects
but, in fact, only sells ‘the determinations of thought as the fundamental determinations of
things’ (E §28; I 46f.).
11
Fulda (1988, 1999, 2003, 2004) has shown this in detail.
12
For Stekeler-Weithofer (2005: 155), Hegel makes an ‘ontological turn,’ leading from the
‘critique of knowledge’ (i.e., Kant) to a ‘critical ontology of meaning’ (Stekeler-Weithofer 2005:
153). Such ontological readings of Hegel pave the way for ontological misinterpretations of
Hegel: as a critical ontology of meaning, ontology is no longer what it used to be as an
ontology. Quante (2011: 23f., 29, 31f., 84) too reads Hegel’s theory of rationality, including the
logic, as an ontology. Honneth (2001) certainly considers Hegel’s Logic to represent a fine
example of bad metaphysics.
13
This also entails a different conception of critique from Kant’s conception of critique as a
foundation of (a transcendentalized) metaphysics. See Krijnen (2015a).
14
See, for this and what follows, Krijnen (2008: ch. 4.2.1.2.).
15
Immanent development is meant here as a methodological qualification. As far as the content
is concerned, speculative idealism, according to its self-understanding, is committed to the
‘fruitful bathos of experience’ (Kant). Hegel leaves neither the empirical dimension nor the
history of philosophy aside: he acknowledges empirical and philosophical knowledge as material,
but he (trans)forms this material to conform with the knowledge claim of his speculative
philosophy and the methodology belonging to it. See Krijnen (2008: 190ff.).
16
Hegel also denotes the logic the ‘pure figure’ (reine Gestalt) of the ‘intellectual view of the
universe’ (I 31) as well as ‘inner figurator’ (inneren Bildner) and ‘pre-figurator’ (Vorbildner: II 231)
of his philosophy of reality (Realphilosophie).

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17
See, for the logic as the last science, Krijnen (2008: ch. 4.2.3, esp. 228ff.). The absolute spirit is,
however, not just ‘the spirit which knows that it has to appear in the finite life that Hegel conceives
of as world history’ (Kok 2013: ch. 6.8.3). This type of ‘transcendental openness’ does not cover
Hegel’s mature concept of absolute spirit. Absolute spirit entails a specific closure of spirit too;
Hegel thinks openness and closure together in such a way that this unity is not only a ‘unity of
spirit and nature’ but a unity of the idea, nature and spirit. From the perspective of the history of
philosophy, philosophy is a particular ( jeweilige) knowledge of totality (Krijnen 2008: chap. 4; 2010).
18
See also Hegel’s conception of the history of philosophy (Krijnen 2008: 252ff.).
19
By contrast, the ‘realization’ of the logic as consideration ‘in-and-for-itself ’ of thought takes
place in the ‘same’, i.e., the logical, sphere (II 505).
20
This reveals another problem of Honneth’s approach: How does his idea of an indirect
re–actualization of Hegel fit to Hegel’s philosophy of the history of philosophy? After all,
Hegel (V 6: 43–53) is very critical of attempts to re–actualize former philosophies. However,
as Honneth eschews Hegel’s idea of foundation as well as of a system of philosophy, at
least according to Hegel’s standards, Honneth’s re–actualization can hardly be labelled a
re–actualization of Hegel’s philosophy.
21
Generally, Hegel’s two philosophies of reality regard their object as necessarily conforming
to the ‘self-determination of the concept’ (E §246).
22
Hence, as a spirit that has not been reached within the philosophy of objective spirit.
Objective spirit is a finite spirit, that is to say, not a cognitive self-relation. Only in absolute spirit
is a figure of knowledge reached ‘in which knowing reason [is] free for itself ’ (E §552). The
concept of spirit, and hence, also the concept of the absolute idea, is actualized only with
the concept of absolute spirit.
23
More precisely, abstract right as the existence (Dasein) of freedom in the form of possession.
According to Hegel’s concept of right, the concept of right, as existence of the free will that
has freedom as its ‘inner determination and goal’, must be actualized in an ‘external
pre-given objectivity’ so that the concept is perfected as ‘idea’ (E §§483f.). At the beginning
of this process, the subjectivity of free spirit does not manifest itself in a free spirit but
in an external matter (äußerlichen Sache) in which ‘I’ put my ‘will’ (E §§488f.). See Krijnen
(2012).
24
Against this background of Hegel’s conception of philosophical justification, the justificatory
status of ‘social pathologies’, extremely important to Honneth (2001: 16f., 49ff.; 2008), is just as
problematic as Honneth’s conception of the philosophical foundations of reality.
25
On which, see Krijnen (2008: 59ff. with 90ff.; 2014b: 106ff.).
26
See, e.g., Bonsiepen (1988: Lff.) and Jaeschke (2003: 180) on the place of the Phenomenology
in Hegel’s intellectual development. Cobben (2009b: 137, cf. 143) is surprised that regarding
absolute spirit there is considerable difference between Hegel’s Phenomenology and his Philosophy
of Right: in the latter, absolute spirit plays no role on the level of social institutions. This absence
of the absolute spirit, however, fits well with Hegel’s program of philosophy as self-knowledge
of the absolute idea as absolute spirit: it results from the function that absolute spirit has within
Hegel’s system of philosophy.

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27
According to Hegel (E §78R), an introduction via the route of a self-completing scepticism—the
route of the Phenomenology—is ‘unpleasant’ and ‘superfluous’.
28
See also GW 21: 9R, I 29ff. and 53, and the note to the second edition of the Phenomenology
(PhG 448).
29
Hegel presents the program of the Phenomenology mainly in the Introduction (PhG 53–62).
For recent literature, see, e.g., Fulda (2003, 2008).
30
Hegel’s Phenomenology, therefore, is shaped as a ‘science of consciousness’ (PhG 61) that is a
science of ‘knowing as it appears’ (PhG 434).
31
Hegel occasionally characterized his psychology as the ‘genuine doctrine of the spirit’ (II 437).
32
As indicated, Honneth (2001: 17f., 41, 44) characterizes Hegel’s philosophy of objective spirit as
practical philosophy, understands the philosophy of objective spirit as ethics, moral philosophy,
philosophy of right or ethical theory of legal right (Honneth 2001: 20f., 31f., 53), and takes the free
will to be a moral principle. Siep (2010a) dealt in many studies with Hegel’s ‘practical philosophy’;
recently, he tried to sound out its ‘limits and actuality’. In the terminology of Hegel’s mature works, he
means by practical philosophy Hegel’s philosophy of ‘objective spirit’ (Siep 2010b: 14). Quante (2011)
too interprets Hegel’s philosophy of objective spirit in terms of practical philosophy. Also, beyond the
discourse of recognition, it is common to talk about Hegel’s practical philosophy or ethics: compare,
for example, Peperzak (1991), Stederoth (2001: 387), Düsing (1984, 2002), and Schnädelbach (2000:
289ff., 1999: 120ff.). Recently, Buchwalter (2010) and Vieweg (2012) have published on Hegel’s
‘practical philosophy’. And, unfortunately, the standard translation of Hegel’s Sittlichkeit is ‘ethical life’.
33
Loose (2014) addresses some elements concerning Honneth.
34
Halbig et al. (2004: 14f.) use the opposition ‘theoretical—practical’ without hesitation to assess
Hegel’s relevance. Accordingly, they do not consider what Hegel’s theoretical philosophy would be.
35
See on Hegel’s Frankfurt period, for instance, Siep (2000: 29f.) and on the Phenomenology
Cobben (2009a).
36
For detailed analysis see Krijnen (2015b: chs. 2–3).
37
See Flach (1994) for a contemporary version of the idea of a radical foundation as well as
for criticism of that idea.
38
See Krijnen (2015b) for elaboration of this thesis in discussion with Kantian transcendental
philosophy and Hegel.
39
See, for instance, Röttgers (2002: 25ff.) for a history of ‘social’ and ‘social philosophy’.
40
See Honneth (2008: 1234) and Horster (2005).
41
Because of its focus on theory of action, Honneth (2001: 55, cf. 66) reads Hegel’s
philosophy of right as the outline of a social ontology. An updated version is Honneth (2010).
42
Mayer-Moreau (1910) gave an early impulse for interpreting Hegel as a social philosopher.
Hegel does indeed distinguish in his philosophy of right between the state and the civil
society. With this distinction, he offers conceptual means to think something like social
philosophy. However, this view identifies civil society with sociality, and on top of that
detaches the so-called social philosophy from its functional position within Hegel’s philosophy
of right. Although Röttgers (2002: 34f.) sees this, he too does not justify the concept of the
social in Hegel’s philosophy; actually, he only stipulates that the social is teleologically oriented

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towards the political (state) and civil society absorbed by the economic—therewith, Röttgers
presupposes a determinate concept of the social beyond Hegel’s philosophy. Hegel’s
philosophy of spirit has also inspired early social ontological studies such as Freyer (1923)
and Hartmann (1933).
43
The word only pops up when Hegel is citing Rousseau’s Du Contrat social. Hardimon (1994:
16, incl. remark 16) notes that the phrase ‘social world’ cannot be found in Hegel’s work.
He uses the phrase for Hegel’s sphere of mores (‘ethical world,’ in the common, yet
misleading, English translation of Sittlichkeit), hence, the figures (Gestalten) of family, civil
society, state; he also uses the term ‘society’ as distinct from all kinds of social/societal
subspheres. In general, the social world for Hardimon means ‘society’. Neuhouser (2000: 5)
too knows that ‘social freedom’ is not a Hegelian term. He means the type of freedom relevant
for Hegel’s sphere of mores (‘ethical life’). For him, Hegel’s social theory turns out to be
Hegel’s social philosophy, which essentially concerns the doctrine of Sittlichkeit. A philosophical
justification, in particular a defence within Hegel’s philosophy of right, of why and how
sociality has to be introduced into philosophy, is lacking both in Hardimon and Neuhouser.
Honneth (2001: 17ff.) too speaks without any hesitation about Hegel’s realm of mores as of
the social realm: more precisely, he addresses the whole realm of objective spirit as a social
sphere because this realm makes up the social conditions of actualizing individual freedom
(2001: 20, 22, 29, 31ff.).
44
Why, for instance, should the realm of Sittlichkeit be the ‘proper core’ of the philosophy of
right? (Honneth 2001: 39) Should we not conceive of this core, if that makes sense at all, as the
processuality that characterizes the development, instead as of a stage within that development?
Cores as stages do not seem to express the conceptual structure of Hegel’s system of philosophy.
Not even the absolute idea is, taken as a stage, its core; it would only be that core as the ‘only
object of philosophy’, yet, in this case, ‘core’ would be an inadequate metaphor.
45
Honneth’s dealing with Hegel stems from the tradition of neo-Marxism as advanced by
Adorno and Habermas. Habermas’s idea that ‘critical theory’ should be conducted as
addressing social pathologies especially guides Honneth’s approach.
46
For Hegel (E §163A2), the concept is the ‘genuine first, and things are what they are
through the activity of the concept, immanent in them, and revealing itself in them’; ‘thought
and (more exactly) the concept’ functions as the ‘infinite form, or the free creative activity,
which can realize itself without the help of a matter that exists outside it’. And all of this in the
mode of necessity (E §9).

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