SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME G.R. No. 163609 AND ROSARIO 5. Fifty Thousand (P50,000.
Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for the death of Marvin Jayme;
JAYME, Petitioners, - versus - RODRIGO APOSTOL,
MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts
of the driver assigned to him, which resulted in the death of a minor
pedestrian?
Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals (CA) which reversed and set aside the decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Polomolok, Cotabato City, Branch
39, insofar as defendant Mayor Fernando Q. Miguel is concerned. The
CA absolved Mayor Miguel from any liability since it was not he, but
the Municipality of Koronadal, that was the employer of the negligent
driver.
The Facts: On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South
Cotabato was on board the Isuzu pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano,
an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal.[2] The pick-up truck was
registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the
possession of Ernesto Simbulan.[3] Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck
from Simbulan to bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City
to catch his Manila flight.[4]
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was
then crossing the National Highway in Poblacion, Polomolok, South
Cotabato.[5] The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some fifty (50)
meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano
was driving at a very high speed at the time of the accident.[6]
Marvin sustained severe head injuries with subdural hematoma and
diffused cerebral contusion.[7] He was initially treated at the Howard
Hubbard Memorial Hospital.[8] Due to the seriousness of his injuries,
he was airlifted to the Ricardo Limso Medical Center in Davao City for
more intensive treatment.[9] Despite medical attention, Marvin expired
six (6) days after the accident.[10]
Petitioners spouses Buenaventura and Rosario Jayme, the parents of
Marvin, filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against
respondents.[11] In their complaint, they prayed that all respondents
be held solidarily liable for their loss. They pointed out that that
proximate cause of Marvins death was Lozanos negligent and reckless
operation of the vehicle. They prayed for actual, moral, and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees, and litigation expenses.
In their respective Answers, all respondents denied liability for Marvins
death. Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pick-up
truck without their consent. Likewise, Miguel and Lozano pointed out
that Marvins sudden sprint across the highway made it impossible to
avoid the accident. Yet, Miguel denied being on board the vehicle when
it hit Marvin. The Municipality of Koronadal adopted the answer of
Lozano and Miguel. As for First Integrated Bonding and Insurance
Company, Inc., the vehicle insurer, it insisted that its liability is
contributory and is only conditioned on the right of the insured. Since
the insured did not file a claim within the prescribed period, any cause
of action against it had prescribed.
RTC Disposition
On January 25, 1999, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of spouses
Jayme, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendant Municipality of
Koronadal cannot be held liable for the damages incurred by other
defendant (sic) being an agency of the State performing a (sic)
governmental functions. The same with defendant Hermogenes
Simbulan, not being the owner of the subject vehicle, he is absolved of
any liability.
The complaint against defendant First Integrated Bonding Insurance
Company, Inc. is hereby ordered dismissed there being no cause of
action against said insurance company.
However, defendants Fidel Lozano, Rodrigo Apostol, and Mayor
Fernando Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato, are hereby ordered
jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff (sic) the following sums:
1. One Hundred Seventy Three Thousand One Hundred One and
Forty Centavos (P173,101.40) Pesos as actual damages with legal
interest of 12% per annum computed from February 11, 1989 until fully
paid;
2. Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos as moral damages;
3. Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as exemplary damages;
4. Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos as Attorneys fees;
6. Three Thousand (P3,000.00) as litigation expenses; and
7. To pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Dissatisfied with the RTC ruling, Mayor Miguel interposed an appeal to
the CA.
CA Disposition
In his appeal, Mayor Miguel contended that the RTC erred in ruling that
he was Lozanos employer and, hence, solidarily liable for the latters
negligent act. Records showed that the Municipality of Koronadal was
the drivers true and lawful employer. Mayor Miguel also denied that he
did not exercise due care and diligence in the supervision of Lozano.
The incident, although unfortunate, was unexpected and cannot be
attributed to him.
On October 22, 2003, the CA granted the appeal, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, insofar as defendant-appellant Mayor Fernando Q. Miguel is
concerned, and the complaint against him is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[13]
The CA held that Mayor Miguel should not be held liable for damages
for the death of Marvin Jayme. Said the appellate court:
Moreover, plaintiffs-appellees admitted that Mayor Miguel was not the
employer of Lozano. Thus, paragraph 9 of the complaint alleged that
the Municipality of Koronadal was the employer of both Mayor Miguel
and Lozano. Not being the employer of Lozano, Mayor Miguel could
not thus be held liable for the damages caused by the former. Mayor
Miguel was a mere passenger in the Isuzu pick-up at the time of the
accident.[14] (Emphasis supplied)
The CA also reiterated the settled rule that it is the registered owner of
a vehicle who is jointly and severally liable with the driver for damages
incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of injuries
or death sustained in the operation of the vehicle.
Issues
The spouses Jayme have resorted to the present recourse and assign
to the CA the following errors:
I.the HONORABLE Court of Appeals erred IN holding that MAYOR
FERNANDO MIGUEL cannot be held liable for the death of marvin
jayme which conclusion is contrary to law and the settled
pronouncements of this honorable tribunal;
II.THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL
COURT AND ARE CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD; MOREOVER, THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ARE ALL BASED ON
CONJECTURES AND SURMISES AND AGAINST ACCEPTED
COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHICH URGENTLY CALL
FOR AN EXERCISE OF THIS HONORABLE COURTS
SUPERVISION.[15]
Our Ruling
The doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed liability finds no application
in the present case.
Spouses Jayme contend, inter alia, that vicarious liability attaches to
Mayor Miguel. He was not a mere passenger, but instead one who had
direct control and supervision over Lozano during the time of the
accident. According to petitioners, the element of direct control is not
negated by the fact that Lozanos employer was the Municipality of
Koronadal. Mayor Miguel, being Lozanos superior, still had control over
the manner the vehicle was operated.
Article 2180[16] of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only
liable for ones own quasi-delictual acts, but also for those persons for
whom one is responsible for. This liability is popularly known as
vicarious or imputed liability. To sustain claims against employers for
the acts of their employees, the following requisites must be
established: (1) That the employee was chosen by the employer
personally or through another; (2) That the service to be rendered in
accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give at
all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion
or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.[17]
Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of
Article 2180, it must be established that the injurious or tortuous act
was committed at the time the employee was performing his
functions.[18]
Furthermore, the employer-employee relationship cannot be
assumed. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the relationship by
preponderant evidence. In Belen v. Belen,[19] this Court ruled that it
was enough for defendant to deny an alleged employment relationship.
The defendant is under no obligation to prove the negative averment.
This Court said:
It is an old and well-settled rule of the courts that the burden of proving
the action is upon the plaintiff, and that if he fails satisfactorily to show
the facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no
obligation to prove his exceptions. This rue is in harmony with the
provisions of Section 297 of the Code of Civil Procedure holding that
each party must prove his own affirmative allegations, etc.[20]
In resolving the present controversy, it is imperative to find out if Mayor
Miguel is, indeed, the employer of Lozano and therefore liable for the
negligent acts of the latter. To determine the existence of an
employment relationship, We rely on the four-fold test. This involves:
(1) the employers power of selection; (2) payment of wages or other
remuneration; (3) the employers right to control the method of doing
the work; and (4) the employers right of suspension or dismissal.[21]
Applying the foregoing test, the CA correctly held that it was the
Municipality of Koronadal which was the lawful employer of Lozano at
the time of the accident. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed
as a driver by the municipality. That he was subsequently assigned to
Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no moment. This
Court has, on several occasions, held that an employer-employee
relationship still exists even if the employee was loaned by the
employer to another person or entity because control over the
employee subsists.[22] In the case under review, the Municipality of
Koronadal remains to be Lozanos employer notwithstanding Lozanos
assignment to Mayor Miguel.
Spouses Jayme argued that Mayor Miguel had at least supervision and
control over Lozano and how the latter operated or drove the Isuzu
pick-up during the time of the accident. They, however, failed to
buttress this claim.
Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had authority to give
instructions or directions to Lozano, he still can not be held liable. In
Benson v. Sorrell,[23] the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere
giving of directions to the driver does not establish that the passenger
has control over the vehicle. Neither does it render one the employer
of the driver. This Court, in Soliman, Jr. v. Tuazon,[24] ruled in a similar
vein, to wit:
x x x The fact that a client company may give instructions or directions
to the security guards assigned to it, does not, by itself, render the client
responsible as an employer of the security guards concerned and liable
for their wrongful acts and omissions. Those instructions or directions
are ordinarily no more than requests commonly envisaged in the
contract for services entered into with the security agency. x x x[25]
(Emphasis supplied)
Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee
although the person may have the right to control the manner of the
vehicles operation.[26] In the absence of an employer-employee
relationship establishing vicarious liability, the drivers negligence
should not be attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to be
an occupant of the vehicle.[27] Whatever right of control the occupant
may have over the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an
application of the doctrine of vicarious liability. Handley v. Lombardi[28]
is instructive on this exception to the rule on vicarious liability:
Plaintiff was not the master or principal of the driver of the truck, but
only an intermediate and superior employee or agent. This being so,
the doctrine of respondeat superior or qui facit per alium is not properly
applicable to him. His power to direct and control the driver was not as
master, but only by virtue of the fact that they were both employed by
Kruse, and the further fact that as Kruses agent he was delegated
Kruses authority over the driver. x x x
In the case of actionable negligence, the rule is well settled both in this
state and elsewhere that the negligence of a subordinate employee or
subagent is not to be imputed to a superior employee or agent, but only
to the master or principal. (Hilton v. Oliver, 204 Cal. 535 [61 A. L. R.
297, 269 Pac. 425]; Guild v. Brown, 115 Cal. App. 374 [1 Pac. (2d)
528]; Ellis v. Southern Ry. Co., 72 S. C. 464 [2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 378, 52
S. E. 228]; Thurman v. Pittsburg & M. Copper Co., 41 Mont. 141 [108
Pac. 588]; 2 Cor. Jur., p. 829; and see the elaborate note in 61 A. L. R.
277, and particularly that part commencing at p. 290.) We can see no
logical reason for drawing any distinction in this regard between
actionable negligence and contributory negligence. x x x[29]
The rule was reiterated in Bryant v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co.[30] and again
in Sichterman v. Hollingshead Co.[31]
In Swanson v. McQuown,[32] a case involving a military officer who
happened to be riding in a car driven by a subordinate later involved in
an accident, the Colorado Supreme Court adhered to the general rule
that a public official is not liable for the wrongful acts of his subordinates
on a vicarious basis since the relationship is not a true master-servant
situation.[33] The court went on to rule that the only exception is when
they cooperate in the act complained of, or direct or encourage it.[34]
In the case at bar, Mayor Miguel was neither Lozanos employer nor
the vehicles registered owner. There existed no causal relationship
between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make him
accountable for Marvins death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger
at the time of the accident.
Parenthetically, it has been held that the failure of a passenger to assist
the driver, by providing him warnings or by serving as lookout does not
make the passenger liable for the latters negligent acts.[35] The drivers
duty is not one that may be delegated to others.[36]
As correctly held by the trial court, the true and lawful employer of
Lozano is the Municipality of Koronadal. Unfortunately for Spouses
Jayme, the municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of
the State engaged in governmental functions and, hence, immune from
suit. This immunity is illustrated in Municipality of San Fernando, La
Union v. Firme,[37] where this Court held:
It has already been remarked that municipal corporations are suable
because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.
Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them
in the discharge of governmental functions and can only be held
answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in proprietary
capacity. In permitting such entities to be sued, the State merely gives
the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not acting in
governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case
comes under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the
claimant cannot recover.[38]
Verily, liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver
and his direct employer. The CA observation along this line are worth
restating:
Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and
severally liable with the driver for damages incurred by passengers and
third persons as a consequence of injuries or death sustained in the
operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual owner of the
vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the
vehicle as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly
and primarily responsible for the consequences incident (sic) to its
operation x x x.[39]
The accidental death of Marvin Jayme is a tragic loss for his parents.
However, justice demands that only those liable under our laws be held
accountable for Marvins demise. Justice can not sway in favor of
petitioners simply to assuage their pain and loss. The law on the matter
is clear: only the negligent driver, the drivers employer, and the
registered owner of the vehicle are liable for the death of a third person
resulting from the negligent operation of the vehicle.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision
AFFIRMED.
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA
TAMARGO, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of
age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo,
Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia
Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor
and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living
at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages,
a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was
filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto,
however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the
ground that he bad acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and
Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto
Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was grunted on,
18 November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption,
claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the
action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from
the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was
then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a
petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint,
ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not
indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December
1987. Within the 15-day reglementary period, or on 14 December
1987, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration followed by a
supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It
appearing, however, that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court — that notice of the
motion shall be given to all parties concerned at least three (3) days
before the hearing of said motion; and that said notice shall state the
time and place of hearing — both motions were denied by the trial court
in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners filed a
notice of appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court
dismissed the notice at appeal, this time ruling that the notice had been
filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending 22 December
1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for mandamus
and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision dated 3 December
1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June 1988, The Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners had lost their
right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that
respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action
for damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc.
Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether
or not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still
file the instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still take
cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed
out of time; and (2) whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as
parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as
to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage
case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter,
when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental motion)
for reconsideration filed before the trial court, not having complied with
the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 4, Rule 15, of the
Revised Rules of Court, were considered pro forma and hence did not
interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to appeal: the trial court
held that the motions, not having contained a notice of time and place
of hearing, had become useless pieces of paper which did not interrupt
the reglementary period. 1 As in fact repeatedly held by this Court, what
is mandatory is the service of the motion on the opposing counsel
indicating the time and place of hearing. 2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant.
Petition, and in order that substantial justice may be served, the Court,
invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules to prevent
manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as having been
seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion (and
supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the trial
court as having interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. As the
Court held in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals: 3
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon
where the policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on
their merits. The rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid
technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to help secure not
override, substantial justice. if d technical and rigid enforcement of the
rules is made their aim would be defeated. 4
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on
quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being
fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and,
in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that
may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of
the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom
one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently
designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed negligence"
under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only liable for
torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by others with
whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is responsible.
Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical consequence of the
duties and responsibilities of parents — their parental authority —
which includes the instructing, controlling and disciplining of the child.
5 The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability was explained by the
Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. 6 in the following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence,
whether of act or omission, it is competent for the legislature to elect
— and our Legislature has so elected — to limit such liability to cases
in which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is
morally culpable or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy. to
extend that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so
as to include responsibility for the negligence of those persons whose
acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in
a position to exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The
legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-
contractual liability — with certain well-defined exceptions — to cases
in which moral culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to be
charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to
exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due
care in the selection and control of one's agent or servants, or in the
control of persons who, by reasons of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct. 7
(Emphasis Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their minor
children living with them, may be seen to be based upon the parental
authority vested by the Civil Code upon such parents. The civil law
assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortious acts, the parents were negligent in the performance
of their legal and natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in
their custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words, anchored
upon parental authority coupled with presumed parental dereliction in
the discharge of the duties accompanying such authority. The parental
dereliction is, of course, only presumed and the presumption can be
overtuned under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents
had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air
rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent
Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would
thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the
minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that
because a decree of adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor
of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in the latter as
adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the petition for adoption
that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle. The
Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any parental
responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the report of the
Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency
and the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the
petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that
the trial custody period has been completed, and that the best interests
of the child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall
be entered, which shall be effective he date the original petition was
filed. The decree shall state the name by which the child is thenceforth
to be known. (Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be
read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where
the adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been
dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the
basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship
existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and
over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and
control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this
rule:
Article 58 Torts — Parents and guardians are responsible for the
damage caused by the child under their parental authority in
accordance with the civil Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted
upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have
beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for the
ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall
be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or
omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and
under their parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as having
been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting parents,
the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting happened. We
do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to the decree of
adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing
at a time when adopting parents had no actual or physically custody
over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may perhaps be given to the
granting of the petition for adoption where such is essential to permit
the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.
In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which
they could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United
States and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be
unfair and unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be
inconsistent with the philosophical and policy basis underlying the
doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little differently, no presumption of
parental dereliction on the part of the adopting parents, the Rapisura
spouses, could have arisen since Adelberto was not in fact subject to
their control at the time the tort was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion
reached above. Article 35 provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. — No petition for adoption shall be finally
granted unless and until the adopting parents are given by the courts
a supervised trial custody period of at least six months to assess their
adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal union. During the
period of trial custody, parental authority shall be vested in the adopting
parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in
the adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the
issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting
parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In
the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or
bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any
case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents,
not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses,
Adelberto's natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for
damages brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court
of petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already
before the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby
GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before the
trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that
court for further proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs
against respondent Bundoc spouses. This Decision is immediately
executory.
CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. VICENTE
VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ
The pivotal issue in this petition is whether an employer may be held
vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent operation by
a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle.
The antecedents, as succinctly summarized by the Court of Appeals,
are as follows:
On 28 August 1988, at around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So
Vasquez, was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmea
Rotunda. He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic
in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He was also
only carrying a Students Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the other
hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of Appellant Castilex Industrial
Corporation, registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate
no. GBW-794. On the same date and time, Abad drove the said
company car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmea
rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the traffic in
proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad
collided with each other causing severe injuries to the former. Abad
stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez to the Southern Islands
Hospital and later to the Cebu Doctors Hospital.
On September 5, 1988, Vasquez died at the Cebu Doctors Hospital. It
was there that Abad signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party
(Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever hospital bills,
professional fees and other incidental charges Vasquez may incur.
After the police authorities had conducted the investigation of the
accident, a Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which was
subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute. So, the present action
for damages was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and Luisa So
Vasquez, parents of the deceased Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose
Benjamin Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the same action,
Cebu Doctors Hospital intervened to collect unpaid balance for the
medical expense given to Romeo So Vasquez.[1]
The trial court ruled in favor of private respondents Vicente and Luisa
Vasquez and ordered Jose Benjamin Abad (hereafter ABAD) and
petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation (hereafter CASTILEX) to pay
jointly and solidarily (1) Spouses Vasquez, the amounts of P8,000.00
for burial expenses; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees; and P778,752.00 for loss of earning capacity; and (2)
Cebu Doctors Hospital, the sum of P50,927.83 for unpaid medical and
hospital bills at 3% monthly interest from 27 July 1989 until fully paid,
plus the costs of litigation.[2]
CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.
In its decision[3] of 21 May 1997, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and CASTILEX liable but held that
the liability of the latter is only vicarious and not solidary with the former.
It reduced the award of damages representing loss of earning capacity
from P778,752.00 to P214,156.80; and the interest on the hospital and
medical bills, from 3% per month to 12% per annum from 5 September
1988 until fully paid.
Upon CASTILEXs motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals
modified its decision by (1) reducing the award of moral damages from
P50,000 to P30,000 in view of the deceaseds contributory negligence;
(b) deleting the award of attorneys fees for lack of evidence; and (c)
reducing the interest on hospital and medical bills to 6% per annum
from 5 September 1988 until fully paid.[4]
Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition contending that the Court
of Appeals erred in (1) applying to the case the fifth paragraph of Article
2180 of the Civil Code, instead of the fourth paragraph thereof; (2) that
as a managerial employee, ABAD was deemed to have been always
acting within the scope of his assigned task even outside office hours
because he was using a vehicle issued to him by petitioner; and (3)
ruling that petitioner had the burden to prove that the employee was
not acting within the scope of his assigned task.
Jose Benjamin ABAD merely adopted the statement of facts of
petitioner which holds fast on the theory of negligence on the part of
the deceased.
On the other hand, respondents Spouses Vasquez argue that their
sons death was caused by the negligence of petitioners employee who
was driving a vehicle issued by petitioner and who was on his way
home from overtime work for petitioner; and that petitioner is thus liable
for the resulting injury and subsequent death of their son on the basis
of the fifth paragraph of Article 2180. Even if the fourth paragraph of
Article 2180 were applied, petitioner cannot escape liability therefor.
They moreover argue that the Court of Appeals erred in reducing the
amount of compensatory damages when the award made by the trial
court was borne both by evidence adduced during the trial regarding
deceaseds wages and by jurisprudence on life expectancy. Moreover,
they point out that the petition is procedurally not acceptable on the
following grounds: (1) lack of an explanation for serving the petition
upon the Court of Appeals by registered mail, as required under
Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2) lack of a
statement of the dates of the expiration of the original reglementary
period and of the filing of the motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review.
For its part, respondent Cebu Doctors Hospital maintains that petitioner
CASTILEX is indeed vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent
death of Romeo Vasquez caused by ABAD, who was on his way home
from taking snacks after doing overtime work for petitioner. Although
the incident occurred when ABAD was not working anymore the
inescapable fact remains that said employee would not have been
situated at such time and place had he not been required by petitioner
to do overtime work. Moreover, since petitioner adopted the evidence
adduced by ABAD, it cannot, as the latters employer, inveigle itself
from the ambit of liability, and is thus estopped by the records of the
case, which it failed to refute.
We shall first address the issue raised by the private respondents
regarding some alleged procedural lapses in the petition.
Private respondents contention of petitioners violation of Section 11 of
Rule 13 and Section 4 of Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
holds no water.
Section 11 of Rule 13 provides:
SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of service and filing. -- Whenever
practicable, the service and filing of pleadings and other papers shall
be done personally. Except with respect to papers emanating from the
court, a resort to other modes must be accompanied by a written
explanation why the service or filing was not done personally. A
violation of this Rule may be cause to consider the paper as not filed.
The explanation why service of a copy of the petition upon the Court of
Appeals was done by registered mail is found on Page 28 of the
petition. Thus, there has been compliance with the aforequoted
provision.
As regards the allegation of violation of the material data rule under
Section 4 of Rule 45, the same is unfounded. The material dates
required to be stated in the petition are the following: (1) the date of
receipt of the judgment or final order or resolution subject of the
petition; (2) the date of filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration,
if any; and (3) the date of receipt of the notice of the denial of the
motion. Contrary to private respondents claim, the petition need not
indicate the dates of the expiration of the original reglementary period
and the filing of a motion for extension of time to file the petition. At any
rate, aside from the material dates required under Section 4 of Rule
45, petitioner CASTILEX also stated in the first page of the petition the
date it filed the motion for extension of time to file the petition.
Now on the merits of the case.
The negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this instance. Petitioner
CASTILEX presumes said negligence but claims that it is not
vicariously liable for the injuries and subsequent death caused by
ABAD.
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code should only apply to instances where the employer is not
engaged in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of
manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered by said
provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply.
Petitioners interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The
phrase even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry found in the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that
it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or
industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting
within the scope of his assigned task.[5]
A distinction must be made between the two provisions to determine
what is applicable. Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth
paragraph, to owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise;
and the fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not
engaged in any business or industry. The fourth paragraph covers
negligent acts of employees committed either in the service of the
branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth paragraph
encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope of
their assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the former in both
employer coverage and acts included. Negligent acts of employees,
whether or not the employer is engaged in a business or industry, are
covered so long as they were acting within the scope of their assigned
task, even though committed neither in the service of the branches nor
on the occasion of their functions. For, admittedly, employees
oftentimes wear different hats. They perform functions which are
beyond their office, title or designation but which, nevertheless, are still
within the call of duty.
This court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases where the employer
was engaged in a business or industry such as truck operators[6] and
banks.[7] The Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be faulted in
applying the said paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code to this
case.
Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in
any business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed
by employees within the scope of his assigned tasks. But it is
necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this
is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the
employee was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the
tort complained of was committed. It is only then that the employer may
find it necessary to interpose the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee.[8]
It is undisputed that ABAD was a Production Manager of petitioner
CASTILEX at the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he was
acting within the scope of his assigned task is a question of fact, which
the court a quo and the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even finality
at times. This rule is, however, subject to exceptions such as when the
conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises, or conjectures.[9]
Such exception obtain in the present case to warrant review by this
Court of the finding of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was driving
petitioners vehicle he was acting within the scope of his duties as a
manager.
Before we pass upon the issue of whether ABAD was performing acts
within the range of his employment, we shall first take up the other
reason invoked by the Court of Appeals in holding petitioner CASTILEX
vicariously liable for ABADs negligence, i.e., that the petitioner did not
present evidence that ABAD was not acting within the scope of his
assigned tasks at the time of the motor vehicle mishap. Contrary to the
ruling of the Court of Appeals, it was not incumbent upon the petitioner
to prove the same. It was enough for petitioner CASTILEX to deny that
ABAD was acting within the scope of his duties; petitioner was not
under obligation to prove this negative averment. Ei incumbit probatio
qui dicit, non qui negat (He who asserts, not he who denies, must
prove). The Court has consistently applied the ancient rule that if the
plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action,
fails to show in a satisfactory manner facts which he bases his claim,
the defendant is under no obligation to prove his exception or
defense.[10]
Now on the issue of whether the private respondents have sufficiently
established that ABAD was acting within the scope of his assigned
tasks.
ABAD, who was presented as a hostile witness, testified that at the
time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle,
registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the
restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends
after having done overtime work for the petitioner.
No absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which will furnish the
complete answer to the problem of whether at a given moment, an
employee is engaged in his employers business in the operation of a
motor vehicle, so as to fix liability upon the employer because of the
employees action or inaction; but rather, the result varies with each
state of facts.[11]
In Filamer Christian Institute v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[12] this
Court had the occasion to hold that acts done within the scope of the
employees assigned tasks includes any act done by an employee in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for the account of the
employer at the time of the infliction of the injury or damages.
The court a quo and the Court of Appeals were one in holding that the
driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the scope
of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.
We do not agree. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle
at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge
petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless
it appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope
of his employment.
The following are principles in American Jurisprudence on the
employers liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence of an
employee in the use of an employers motor vehicle:
I. Operation of Employers Motor Vehicle in Going to or from Meals
It has been held that an employee who uses his employers vehicle in
going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning
to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his
employment in the absence of evidence of some special business
benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using the employers vehicle
to go to and from meals, an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off
and so devote more time to the performance of his duties supports the
finding that an employee is acting within the scope of his employment
while so driving the vehicle.[13]
II. Operation of Employers Vehicle in Going to or from Work
In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a
personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his
services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special
benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the
services available at the place where he is needed, the employee is
not acting within the scope of his employment even though he uses his
employers motor vehicle.[14]
The employer may, however, be liable where he derives some special
benefit from having the employee drive home in the employers vehicle
as when the employer benefits from having the employee at work
earlier and, presumably, spending more time at his actual duties.
Where the employees duties require him to circulate in a general area
with no fixed place or hours of work, or to go to and from his home to
various outside places of work, and his employer furnishes him with a
vehicle to use in his work, the courts have frequently applied what has
been called the special errand or roving commission rule, under which
it can be found that the employee continues in the service of his
employer until he actually reaches home. However, even if the
employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his employment
in going to or from work in his employers vehicle, the employer is not
liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident, the employee
has left the direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a
personal errand of his own.
III. Use of Employers Vehicle Outside Regular Working Hours
An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latters
personal use outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for
the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the period of
permissive use, even where the employer contemplates that a
regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by the employee for
personal as well as business purposes and there is some incidental
benefit to the employer. Even where the employees personal purpose
in using the vehicle has been accomplished and he has started the
return trip to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been
held that he has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not
liable for the employees negligent operation of the vehicle during the
return trip.[15]
The foregoing principles and jurisprudence are applicable in our
jurisdiction albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat superior, not on
the principle of bonus pater familias as in ours. Whether the fault or
negligence of the employee is conclusive on his employer as in
American law or jurisprudence, or merely gives rise to the presumption
juris tantum of negligence on the part of the employer as in ours, it is
indispensable that the employee was acting in his employers business
or within the scope of his assigned task.[16]
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work
at the petitioners office, which was located in Cabangcalan, Mandaue
City. Thereafter, he went to Goldies Restaurant in Fuente Osmea,
Cebu City, which is about seven kilometers away from petitioners place
of business.[17] A witness for the private respondents, a sidewalk
vendor, testified that Fuente Osmea is a lively place even at dawn
because Goldies Restaurant and Back Street were still open and
people were drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes, pimps, and drug
addicts littered the place.[18]
At the Goldies Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat
with friends. It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the
incident in question occurred. That same witness for the private
respondents testified that at the time of the vehicular accident, ABAD
was with a woman in his car, who then shouted: Daddy, Daddy![19]
This woman could not have been ABADs daughter, for ABAD was only
29 years old at the time.
To the mind of this Court, ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or
was carrying out a personal purpose not in line with his duties at the
time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of
28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABADs
working day had ended; his overtime work had already been
completed. His being at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known
as a haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug pushers and addicts, had
no connection to petitioners business; neither had it any relation to his
duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even for
personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks
attached to his position.
Since there is paucity of evidence that ABAD was acting within the
scope of the functions entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no
duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, justice and equity
require that petitioner be relieved of vicarious liability for the
consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.[20]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the appealed decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
modification that petitioner Castilex Industrial Corporation be absolved
of any liability for the damages caused by its employee, Jose Benjamin
Abad.
G.R. No. L-5002 March 18, 1909 MARTIN BELEN, ET AL vs.
ALEJO BELEN,
On October 4, 1907, Martin Belen and Honoria Belen, the latter
assisted by her husband Segundo Capuno, filed an amended
complaint against Alejo Belen stating: That the plaintiffs were both
under age, wherefore they requested the court to appoint a guardian
ad litem, who might be Gerardo Belen, to represent them at this trial;
that, several years prior to 1888, Getulio Belen, during his marriage
with Juliana Fanoy, both residents of San Pablo, had two children
named Marciana and Feliciano Belen, the said spouses having
acquired a great portion of the property hereinafter described with
money belonging to the conjugal partnership; that Getulio Belen had
inherited only a small portion of the property from his father, which
property consists of a tract of land planted with 600 cocoanut trees,
situated in the barrio of Santa Maria Magdalena in the municipality of
San Pablo, and is bounded on the north by land of Cornelio Belen; on
the east and south, by land of Venancio Alimon, and on the north (west)
by the lands of Venancio Alimon, Geronimo Sahagun, and Faustina
Belen; another parcel of land also planted with 600 cocoanut trees,
situated in the said barrio, is bounded on the north by the cocoanut
groves of Lucas Baldovino and Alejo Belen, on the east by the latter's
land, on the south by lands belonging to the said Alejo Belen and Maria
Belen, and on the west by those belonging to Pedro and Francisco
Pandino; that on October 19 of that year, Getulio Belen died intestate,
and on September 17, 1890, Juliana Fanoy contracted another
marriage with Gerardo Belen, from which marriage the plaintiffs
Honoria Belen and Martin Belen were born on November 20, 1890, and
November 10, 1892 respectively; that on July 15, 1895, Juliana Fanoy
died intestate, leaving as her heirs her four children born from two
marriages, Marciana, Feliciano, Honoria, and Martin, all of the surname
Belen; that Marciana Belen died on August 23, 1900, as did Feliciano
Belen on May 2, 1902, without any succession, their two half-brothers,
the plaintiffs, surviving them, and as the said Marciana and Feliciano
died without any debt or obligation pending, leaving only the above-
described lands, the plaintiffs did not petition for a letter of
administration on the death of the latter, Feliciano Belen, but in 1902,
in which year he died, the defendant Alejo Belen took possession of
the two said lands without any title or right thereto, and since that time
he has retained and refused to return or deliver them to the plaintiffs in
spite of the repeated demands made by the latter; furthermore, that he
has failed to give them any portion of the fruits and profits of the said
lands, the value of which has amounted to P4,000 from that year up to
the date of the complaint, and has applied them to his own benefit;
wherefore they prayed that the court, after the corresponding
proceedings and trial, declare the plaintiffs to be the exclusive owners
of the said lands, and sentence the defendant to return the same and
to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P4,000 and the costs of the trial.
The demurrer filed by the defendant was overruled, and Gerardo Belen
having been appointed guardian ad litem for the plaintiffs, the
defendant in his answer denied each and all of the facts alleged in the
complaint in each and every one of its paragraphs, and alleged as a
special defense: That he was the owner of two parcels of land situated
in the sitio of Santa Maria Magdalena, of the pueblo of San Pablo, La
Laguna, and that he did not know whether they were the same as those
described in the complaint; that in case that they were the same as
those claimed by the plaintiffs, then he alleged that said lands were his
exclusive property, the first having been acquired by him by inheritance
from his mother Valeria Alcantara, who in her turn had acquired it by
purchase from Ramon Biglete in 1885, and the second by inheritance
from his father Facundo Belen, as the share of the estate falling to him
upon the division of the property of his father among his sons and
legitimate descendants; and that the plaintiffs had no right or interest
over the above-mentioned lands, and therefore he asked the court to
render judgment in his favor absolving him from the complaint with the
costs against the plaintiffs.
After hearing the evidence adduced by both parties, and the exhibits
introduced at the trial having been made of record, the lower court, on
March 10, 1908, entered judgment absolving the defendant from the
complaint with the costs against the plaintiffs, whose counsel, upon
being notified of the decision, duly excepted thereto and moved for a
new trial on the ground that the judgment was contrary to the weight of
the evidence and that the evidence did not support the judgment; his
motion was overruled, the plaintiffs excepted and the corresponding bill
of exceptions having been presented was duly approved and
forwarded to this court.
By a well-stated rule of the courts, a person who brings an action to
recover possession, like the one at bar, is under the obligation fully to
prove, not only his ownership, but also the identity of the thing claimed.
As counsel for the plaintiffs has failed to comply with these requisites,
they are not entitled to a final judgment in their favor, declaring them to
be the exclusive owners of the two parcels of land claimed in the
complaint, and against the defendant by sentencing him to return them
said land together with its products or the value thereof.
They not only failed to prove that they were in possession of said
parcels of land under title of ownership prior to 1902, but also the fact
that they actually lost their possession in the unlikely and incredible
manner they claim, in other words, that Gerardo Belen, upon the
request of the defendant, agreed to deliver to the latter the aforesaid
parcels of land for the purpose of building thereon a camarin
(warehouse) for the manufacture of oil, though later Alejo Belen, in
spite of his repeated demands refused to return the said lands to him.
This was a cession as peculiar as inexplicable, which prompts the
inference that at least a part of the cocoanut trees was destroyed,
without any benefit to the persons claiming to be the owners.
The mere possession of a thing is sufficient to insure respect to the
possessor while no other person appears to show and prove better
right, according to the doctrine of the courts. (Art. 446, Civil Code.) The
defendant has proved that he has been for many years in possession
of the lands in question under title of ownership, and therefore, whether
the proof of his right of ownership be or be not sufficient, so long as no
other person appears with a better right, he is entitled thereto. Article
448 of the same code provides:
The possessor by virtue of ownership has in his favor the legal
presumption that he holds possession by reason of a sufficient title
and he can not be forced to show it.
In case No. 3819, entitled Sanchez Mellado vs. The Municipality of
Tacloban (9 Phil. Rep., 92), this court held that —
In an action to recover possession of real estate under an alleged
titled of ownership, the plaintiff must rely upon the strength of his
own title and not upon the weakness of that of the defendant, and
must establish his allegations by a preponderance of evidence.
Counsel for the plaintiffs did not satisfactorily prove his allegations, so
that the judge, after considering the evidence adduced by both parties,
found that the preponderance of the same was in favor of the
defendant, and this clearly appears from the case.
It is an old and well-settled rule of the courts that the burden of proving
the action is upon the plaintiff, and that if he fails satisfactorily to show
the facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is under no
obligation to prove his exceptions. This rule is in harmony with the
provisions of section 297 of the Code of Civil Procedure holding that
each party must prove his own affirmative allegations, etc.
In view of the foregoing considerations and accepting those contained
in the judgment appealed from, with the rectification, however, that it
shall be understood that the first parcel of land was sold by Roman
Rigleto to Valeria Alcantara, widow of Facundo Belen, instead of to
Juliana Fanoy, which is a material error noted in the first paragraph at
page 10 of the bill of exceptions, we are of opinion, and so hold, that
said judgment should be and is hereby affirmed, with the costs against
the appellants.
METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION vs. CA 141089
On appeal is the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
August 25, 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45002, which affirmed in toto the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 62, in Civil Case
No. 16062. The trial court found herein petitioners liable for the death
of Florentina Sabalburo in a vehicular accident involving a passenger
bus owned by petitioner Metro Manila Transit Corporation (MMTC) and
driven by petitioner Apolinario Ajoc, and ordered them to pay damages
to private respondents.
The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, is
as follows:
The eyewitness account of plaintiffs witness, Maria Zenaida Baylon,
tends to show that in the afternoon of December 24, 1986, she, her
daughter Maria Zenia and the victim, Florentina Sabalburo, were on
their way to Baclaran to buy foodstuffs for their Noche Buena. For some
time, they stood on the island at the intersection of St. Andrews
Street[2] and Domestic Road, [Pasay City] waiting for the traffic light to
change so they could cross to the other side of St. Andrews Street
where they intended to take a ride for Baclaran. When the traffic light
turned red and the vehicles along St. Andrews Street had stopped, the
three of them stepped off the island. Just as they started to cross the
street, she (Baylon) saw an MMTC bus coming from their right (Tramo)
which was moving at a fast speed. The next moment, the left front
portion of the bus hit the victim on the right side of her head. The impact
was of such force that the victims right ear was slashed off and she
thereupon fell on the cement and became unconscious. The victim was
brought by the bus driver, Apolinario Ajoc and the bus conductress to
the San Juan de Dios Hospital where she was given medical attention.
Florentina Sabalburo never regained consciousness and it was on
January 3, 1987 that she succumbed to her injuries.[3]
On February 16, 1987, private respondents filed a complaint[4] for
damages against MMTC and its driver, Ajoc, with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati. Docketed as Civil Case No. 16062, the complaint
essentially alleged that Ajoc drove the MMTC bus in a wanton and
reckless manner, in gross violation of traffic rules and regulations,
without due regard for the safety of others, thus causing the untimely
death of the victim.
Petitioners denied the material allegations of the complaint, disclaimed
any liability for the incident, and insisted that the accident was solely
due to the victims own negligence. The appellate court summed up
their version of the incident as follows:
xxx
That at the time material to this case, bus no. 033, with defendant Ajoc
driving, then bound towards the direction of Baclaran proper, was
slowly accelerating speed on the outer right lane of the road, in
response to the go signal of the traffic light situated in the intersection
of Domestic Road [and Andrew Avenue], while the vehicles on the
inner right lane which were going to turn left towards Domestic Road
were at a stop position, the deceased FLORENTINA G. SABALBURO,
whose stationary position was then covered from Ajocs peripheral
vision by a big truck then bound to MIA Road [that] was at a stop
position, suddenly, without regard to her own safety and in total
defiance of traffic signs designed to protect pedestrian[s], suddenly
darted across the road; Ajoc, thus caught by surprise, tried to prevent
impact by releasing his accelerator pedal and applying his brakes but
the time lag between the deceaseds negligent act and Ajocs prudent
and diligent reaction to the former made the impact a certainty.[5]
As special and affirmative defenses, petitioners also claimed that:
(1) MMTC hires its drivers, conductors and other employees only after
they have successfully passed rigid and extensive theoretical and
practical examinations designed to determine their skills and
competenceand imposes upon its drivers the duty to undergo regular
seminars in defensive driving techniques and road safety habits;[6]
(2) MMTC had taken every human care and foresight possible in
carrying their passengers safely to their respective place (sic) of
destination as well as in avoiding harm to the life and limbs or risk
against pedestrians so that they not be held liable;[7] and
(3) [T]he buses of the defendant corporation, including its bus no. 033
were all properly maintainedbefore the buses left the garage for their
respective routes on that particular day, as in all other days, they were
rigidly inspected and examined and properly certified as roadworthy.[8]
The trial court found private respondents version more credible and on
August 12, 1993, decided the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against defendants as follows:
1. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiff Martin
Sabalburo actual damages in the sum of P63,943.88 representing the
unpaid expenses of plaintiff in connection with the death of Florentina
Sabalburo;
2. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs the sum of
P180,000.00 for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased for a
period of ten (10) years;
3. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiff Martin
Sabalburo the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages;
4. Ordering defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiff Martin
Sabalburo the sum of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5. Ordering defendants [to] jointly and severally pay plaintiff Martin
Sabalburo the sum of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees;
6. Ordering defendants jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs the costs
of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Petitioners seasonably appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
docketed their appeal as CA-G.R. CV No. 45002. Before the appellate
court, petitioners insisted that the accident was solely the fault of the
victim since she suddenly crossed a very busy street with complete
disregard for her safety and in violation of traffic rules and regulations
designed to protect pedestrians.
As earlier stated, the appellate court, in CA-G.R. CV No. 45002,
affirmed the trial courts decision, thus:
IN JUDGMENT, we hold that the appeal interposed by appellants is not
meritorious and the judgment of the lower court which we find to be in
accordance with law and the evidence is therefore AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.[10]
Petitioners then moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court
denied their motion in its resolution of December 10, 1999.[11]
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioners submit as sole issue for our resolution the following:
WHETHER OR NOT ARTICLE 2179[12] AS AN EXCEPTION TO
ARTICLE 2176[13] OF THE CIVIL CODE IS APPLICABLE IN THE
INSTANT CASE.
Petitioners insist that a closer look at the facts established by the trial
court would show that the incident happened at around 3:30 in the
afternoon of December 24, 1986 or barely eight (8) hours before
Christmas Eve. Thus, the victims thoughts were naturally directed
towards the Noche Buena. The victim then crossed busy Andrew
Avenue for the purpose of getting a ride to Baclaran to buy food for the
Christmas Eve celebration. Since her thoughts were on the Christmas
Eve feast, she crossed where there was no pedestrian lane and while
the green light for vehicular traffic was on. Petitioner MMTC submits
that petitioner Ajoc cannot be charged with negligence considering that
he cannot see what is in the mind of a pedestrian. Considering that the
victims own negligence was the direct and proximate cause of her
injuries and untimely demise, it was error for the Court of Appeals not
to have applied Article 2179 of the Civil Code to the instant case.
Petitioners claim that at the time of the incident, the victims mind was
preoccupied with the preparations for the Noche Buena, is naught but
pure conjecture and speculation, with nary a scintilla of proof to support
it, according to respondents. Both the trial and appellate courts
established that the immediate and proximate cause of the victims
death was the negligent and careless driving by petitioner Ajoc.
Therefore, the full force of Article 2176 of the Civil Code applies,
concluded respondents.
In asking us to apply Article 2179 of the Civil Code, we note that
petitioners are asking us to make a finding that the victims own
negligence was the direct and proximate cause of her death. This we
cannot do. The issue of whether a person is negligent or not is a
question of fact.[14] The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts,[15]
although it has the power and authority to review and reverse the
factual findings of lower courts where these do not conform to the
evidence[16] or where the courts below came up with contradictory
factual findings.[17]
We have thoroughly perused the records of this case, and nowhere do
we find evidence to support petitioners claim that the victim was so
engrossed in thinking about Noche Buena while crossing a busy street.
Petitioners stance regarding the victims alleged negligence is non
sequitur. It simply does not follow that one who is run over by a vehicle
on Christmas Eve (or any other holiday for that matter) is negligent
because his thoughts were on the holiday festivities.
Instead, the records support private respondents claim that the MMTC
bus was being driven carelessly. As found by the trial court and
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, the victim and her companions were
standing on the island of Andrew Avenue, waiting for the traffic light to
change so they could cross. Upon seeing the red light, the victim and
her companions started to cross. It was then when petitioner Ajoc, who
was trying to beat the red light, hit the victim. As the court a quo noted,
Ajocs claim that he failed to see the victim and her companions proves
his recklessness and lack of caution in driving his vehicle.[18] Findings
of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.[19] More
so, as in this case, where petitioners have not adequately shown that
the courts below overlooked or disregarded certain facts or
circumstances of such import as would have altered the outcome of the
case. Contrary to petitioners insistence, the applicable law in this case
is Article 2176 of the Civil Code and not Article 2179.
Petitioner MMTC next contends that the Court of Appeals erred in
finding it solidarily liable for damages with its driver/employee, Ajoc,
pursuant to the relevant paragraphs of Article 2180[20] of the Civil
Code. It argues that the act of Ajoc in bringing the victim to a hospital
reflects MMTCs diligence in the selection and supervision of its drivers,
particularly with regard to safety measures. Hence, having exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of its employees to prevent damage, MMTC should not be
held vicariously liable.
It should be stressed, however, that whenever an employees
negligence causes damage or injury to another, there instantly arises
a presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on the part of the
employer, either in the selection of the employee (culpa in eligiendo)
or the supervision over him after the selection (culpa in vigilando).[21]
Hence, to escape solidary liability for a quasi-delict committed by his
employee, an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting
convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his employee,
he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family.[22]
In the present case, petitioner MMTC failed to rebut the presumption
of negligence on its part.
The claim that Ajocs act of bringing the victim to the nearest medical
facility shows adequate supervision by MMTC over its employees
deserves but scant consideration. For one, the act was after the fact of
negligence on Ajocs part. For another, the evidence on record shows
that Ajocs act was neither voluntary nor spontaneous; he had to be
prevailed upon by the victims companions to render assistance to his
victim.[23] Moreover, the evidence to show that MMTC had exercised
due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees
consisted merely of the pertinent guidelines for the screening and
selection of its drivers, as well as periodic seminars on road safety. As
found by the trial court, and affirmed by the appellate court, petitioner
MMTC failed to show that its driver, Ajoc, had actually undergone such
screening or had attended said seminars. As previously held, [t]he
mere formulation of various company policies on safety without
showing that they were being complied with is not sufficient to exempt
(an employer) from liability arising from negligence of its employees. It
is incumbent upon petitioner to show that in recruiting and employing
the erring driver the recruitment procedures and company policies on
efficiency and safety were followed.[24] In this case, MMTC has made
no satisfactory showing that it had paid more than lip service to its
guidelines and policies in hiring and supervision. Its failure to do so
cannot but warrant the proper sanctions from this Court, considering
that MMTC is a government-owned public utility organized for the
public welfare. Having failed to rebut the presumption of negligence on
its part, MMTC is primarily and directly liable for the damages caused
by its employee, the erring driver, Ajoc, pursuant to Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, which provides as follows:
ART. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for ones own acts or omissions-, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in
their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their
company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks,
even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special
agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided
in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be
liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices,
so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
The owners of public utilities fall within the scope of this article.[25] As
earlier stated, MMTC is a public utility, organized and owned by the
government for public transport service. Hence, its liability to private
respondents, for the negligent and reckless acts of its driver, Ajoc,
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is both manifest and clear.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45002 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.