EN BANC bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt.
bladed dagger and with it he stabbed Lt. Masana several times, on the chest and stomach causing his death
G.R. No. L-35156 November 20, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FLORO RODIL defendant-appellant.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of murder by the Circuit
Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine Constabulary.
Accordingly, he was sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00,
to pay the amount of P10,000.00 as moral damages and another P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to
pay the costs.
The information alleges:
That on or about April 24, 1971, in the Municipality of Indang, Province of Cavite,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a double-bladed dagger, with evident premeditation and
treachery, and with intent to kill, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, attack and stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the
performance of his official duties, inflicting upon him stab wounds on the different
parts of his body which directly caused his death.
Contrary to law
From the evidence adduced by the prosecution, We glean the following facts:
At about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the deceased, PC Lt. Guillermo Masana together with
PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, Philippine Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa and Patrolman Felix Mojica of
Indang, Cavite, was having lunch inside a restaurant in front of the Indang market (pp. 2,3, t.s.n., Oct. 30,
1971; pp. 10, 19, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; p. 21, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). While they were eating, they saw, through
the glass panel of the restaurant, appellant outside the restaurant blowing his whistle. Their attention having
been drawn to what appellant was doing, Lt. Masana then in civilian clothing, accompanied by PC soldier
Virgilio Fidel, went out of the restaurant, approached appellant and asked the latter, after Identifying himself
as a PC officer, whether the gun that was tucked in his waist had a license. Instead of answering the question
of Lt. Masana appellant moved one step backward and attempted to draw his gun. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel
immediately grabbed appellant's gun from appellant's waist and gave it to Lt. Masana After that, Lt. Masana
told the appellant to go inside the restaurant. PC soldier Virgilio Fidel followed. Lt. Masana and the appellant
occupied a separate table about one and one-half (1 1/2) meters from the table of Lt. Masana's three
companions — Fidel, Ligsa and Mojica (p. 10, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). After the two were already seated, Lt.
Masana placed appellant's gun on the table. After that Lt. Masana pulled out a piece of coupon bond paper
from his pocket and wrote thereon the receipt for the gun, and after signing it, he asked appellant to
countersign the same, but appellant refused to do so. Instead, he asked Lt. Masana to return the gun to him.
Lt. Masana rejected appellant's plea, telling, the latter that they would talk the matter over in the municipal
building of Indang, Cavite. When Lt. Masana was about to stand up, appellant suddenly pulled out a double-
several hours thereafter (pp. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, t.s.n., Oct. 30, 1971; pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971).
While the stabbing incident was taking place, the three companions of Lt. Masana — PC soldier Virgilio Fidel,
Coast Guard Ricardo Ligsa and policeman Felix Mojica — who were all seated at a separate table about one
and one-half (1 1/2) meters away from that occupied by the accused and Lt. Masana stood up to assist Lt.
Masana but Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang, Cavite, who happened to be taking his lunch in the
same restaurant, was quicker than any of them in going near the combatants and embraced and/or grabbed
the accused from behind, and thereafter wrested the dagger from the accused-appellant. Immediately
thereafter, the Chief of Police brought the accused to the municipal building of Indang, Cavite (p. 8, t.s.n., Oct.
30, 1971; pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971; pp. 26, 28, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972), while the companions of Lt.
Masana brought the latter to the V. Luna Hospital in Quezon City where he expired several hours later as a
result of the stab wounds inflicted by the accused (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971). Dr. Felicisimo del Rosario,
Medico-Legal Officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, conducted an autopsy of the cadaver of Lt.
Masana and made the following findings, which are embodied in his Report, Exhibits "D" and "D-1 " (pp. 88-
89, rec.), and which reads as follows:
Postmortem findings.
General:
Fairly developed and nourished male subject in rigor mortis with postmortem lividity
over the dependent portions of the body. Pupils are dilated. Finger and toe tips are
pale. There is an exploratory laparotomy incision at the abdomen, measuring 21 cm.
long, 3 cm. left of the anterior midline, with eighteen (18) stitches applied. There are
surgical incisions at the left and right abdomen, measuring 2 cm. long, 9 cm. from the
anterior midline and 2 cm. long, 6.5 cm. from the anterior midline with two (2) stitches
applied and a rubber drain sticking out of each, respectively.
TRUNK:
(1) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 0.9 by 0.4 cm., 5 cm. from the anterior midline,
128 cm. above the heel, 1 cm. deep, directed posterior wards and slightly upwards,
passing superficially between muscles and tissues.
(2) Stab wound, left chest, measuring 1.2 by 0.4 cm., 9 cm. from the anterior midline,
121 cm. above the heel, 5.5. cm. deep, directed posterior wards, downwards and to the
left, lacerating the muscles at the 4th intercostal space.
(3) Stab wound, abdomen, measuring 0.9 by 0.2 cm. just left of the anterior midline, 96
cm. above the heel 11 cm. deep, directed posterior wards, upwards and to the left,
perforating the greater curvature of the stomach and the gastric vessels, grazing the
liver, perforating the diaphragm and infero-medial border of the lower lobe of the right
lung.
(4) Impact abrasion, right scapular region, measuring 2 by 0.2 cm., 12 cm. from the
posterior midline, 127 cm. above the heel.
UPPER EXTREMITIES:
1
 (5) Incised wound, anterior aspect of the distal third of the left arm, measuring 3 by 0.5
cm., just medial to its anterior midline.
(6) Incised wound, posterior aspect of the proximal phalange of the right index finger,
measuring 1 by 0.2 cm., just medial to its posterior midline.
Five hundred (500) cc. blood and blood clots accumulated in the thoracic cavity.
There are four (4) sutures applied at a lacerated wound at the greater curvature of the
stomach.
There is nothing remarkable in the unaffected organs internally.
REMARKS:
Cause of death is cardio-respiratory arrest due to severe shock and intrathoracic
hemorrhage as a result of multiple stab wounds of the body, perforating the stomach,
gastric vessels, liver, diaphragm and lower lobe of the right lung.
Claiming self-defense, the accused, on the other hand, maintains and relies on the following facts:
At about 1: 00 o'clock in the afternoon of April 24, 1971, the accused and his wife were in a restaurant near
the market place of Indang, Cavite, in order to take their lunch. They had just come from Mandaluyong, Rizal
where they reside (pp. 21, 22, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). Inside the restaurant, the accused saw three persons to
his right, eating, while to his left he saw a person whom he later learned to be Lt. Guillermo Masana drinking
beer alone. While the accused and his wife were waiting for the food to be served, Lt. Masana approached
him and asked him whether he was Floro Rodil and whether he was a member of the Anti- Smuggling Unit.
After receiving an affirmative answer, Lt. Masana invited the accused to join him in his table. The accused
accepted the invitation so the two moved over to the officer's table where the deceased offered beer to the
accused who, however, refused saying he was still hungry. In the course of their conversation, Lt. Masana told
the accused not to report any matter about smuggling to the PC. The accused informed the officer that he
had not reported any smuggling activity to the authorities. Lt. Masana then asked the accused for his
identification card as a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit, which the latter did by showing his ID card,
Exhibit " 1 ", bearing his picture and indicating that he was an officer of the Anti-Communist League of the
Philippines (pp. 62-68, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971).
Thereupon, Lt. Masana told the accused that the latter's ID was fake, and after the accused insisted that it
was genuine, Lt. Masana tried to take it away from the accused when the latter was about to put it back in his
pocket. Because of his refusal to give his Id card to Lt. Masana the latter got mad and, in an angry tone of
voice, demanded: "Will you give it to me or not?" (P. 7 1, Ibid). Still the accused refused to surrender his ID to
Lt. Masana Thereupon, the latter pulled a gun from his waist and hit the accused on the head with its handle
two (2) time Immediately, blood gushed from his head and face. When Lt. Masana was about to hit the
accused for the third time, the latter parried the right hand of the officer, pulled his "pangsaksak" and
stabbed the officer two or three times and then pushed him away from him and ran out of the restaurant (pp.
74,75,79, Ibid).
The accused went in the direction of the municipal building of Indang, Cavite, where he intended to surrender
to the authorities. But on his way, he met Primo Panaligan, the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite. The Chief of
Police asked him why his head and face were bloody and he answered that he was hit by Lt. Masana on the
head with a gun (pp. 86, 89, t.s.n., Ibid). If here upon, the Chief of Police asked somebody to accompany the
accused to the municipal building. Arriving there, one Victor, a policeman of Indang, Cavite, accompanied him
to Dr. Ruben Ochoa, whose clinic was just across the street where the municipal building is located (p. 9,
t.s.n., Ibid; p. 4, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971). After he was given first aid treatment, he was brought back by the
Indang policeman to the municipal, building where he was detained for two days before he was picked up by
the Philippine Constabulary operatives and transferred to the 121th PC Headquarters in Tagaytay City (pp. 90-
91, t.s.n., Ibid; pp. 4, 39, 40, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971; p. 6, t.s.n., Dec. 15, 1971; p. 5, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972).
After due trial, the court a quo rendered a decision sentencing the accused as heretofore stated.
I
Self-defense is an affirmative allegation that must be proven by clear, sufficient, satisfactory and convincing
evidence (People vs. Libed 14 SCRA 410, 413; People vs. Mendoza, 13 SCRA 11, 17; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA
60, 65-66; People vs. Davis, 1 SCRA 473; 477; People vs. Paras, 80 Phil. 149; 152; People vs. Berio 59 Phil. 533;
536; People vs. Gimena, 59 Phil. 509, 514). Moreover, to prove justification, the accused must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if it were weak, it
could not be disbelieved after the accused had admitted the killing (People vs. Llamera, 51 SCRA 48, 57;
People vs. Talaboc, 30 SCRA 87; People vs. Navarro, 25 SCRA 491; 496; People vs. Solaña, 6 SCRA 60, 65-66;
People vs. Espenilla, 62 Phil. 264, 270; People vs. Apolinario, 58 Phil 586-588; People vs. Ansoyon, 65 Phil. 7 7
2). The rationale for this jurisprudence is that, having admitted the wounding or killing of the victim, the
accused must be held criminally liable for the crime unless he establishes to the satisfaction of the court the
fact of legitimate self-defense.
In the case at bar, the accused contends that it was the deceased, Lt. Guillermo Masana who committed
unlawful aggression when the latter hit him on his head with the handle of his gun after he refused to
surrender his (accused's) ID to him.
This claim does not merit belief.
The accused claims that after he refused to give his ID to the deceased because the same was his and he also
spent money for it, the latter hit him with the handle of his (deceased's) gun. WE cannot perceive how this
refusal of the accused could have provoked or enraged the deceased to the extent of initiating the aggression
by drawing his pistol and hitting the accused with its butt, knowing that the accused was no longer armed
after the latter's gun had earlier been taken away from him. Besides, an agent of authority, like the deceased,
ordinarily is not authorized to use force, except in an extreme case when he is attacked, or subject to active
resistance, and finds no other way to comply with his duty or cause himself to be obeyed by the offender.
Furthermore, the records reveal an unrebutted fact to the effect that the deceased was unarmed when the
incident happened, he being then on leave. As a matter of fact, he was then in civilian clothing (pp. 29-30,
t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972). WE are, therefore, inclined to believe that it was the accused who had every reason to
be resentful of the deceased and to be enraged after the deceased refused to heed his plea that his gun be
returned him; because he might be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms. Accordingly, We are
constrained to draw the inescapable conclusion that it was the accused, not the deceased, who initiated the
aggression which ended in the fatal wounding of the deceased resulting in his death.
The accused further claims that he was hit twice by the deceased before he parried the third blow. This claim
is belied by the record. During the trial, the court a quo asked the accused to show the scar produced by the
injuries inflicted by the deceased when he refused to give his ID thus —
Court
Q Where is that scar?
2
 (Witness showing his right side of the head to the Court)"
[pp. 86,88, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971].
Dr. Ruben Ochoa who treated the injuries of the accused corroborated the foregoing testimony in his medical
findings, Exhibit "3", which reads:
Injuries:
(1) lacerated wound 1/2 inch, parietal region.
(2) lacerated wound, 1 1/2 inches, rt ear lobe
(3) contusion, right mastoid area [Exh. "3"; p. 116, rec] .
The record reveals that the deceased was a right-handed person (pp. 76-77, t.s.n., Dec. 7, 1971). It also shows
that before the stabbing incident took place, the deceased and the accused were facing each other. If that
was the case, and considering that the deceased was, according to the accused, holding the gun with his right
hand, why was the accused hit on the right side of his head and and on his right ear lobe WE find that this
particular claim of the accused that it was the deceased who first hit him twice with the handle of his gun
before parrying the third blow and then stabbing the latter is definitely belied not only by the location of the
scar but also by the medical finding of Dr. Ochoa aforequoted. Indeed, if the protagonists were facing each
other, and it appearing that they were both right- handed (p. 13, t.s.n., Nov. 22, 1971), the blow given by one,
if not parried by the other, would perforce land on the left, and not on the right, side of the body of the
recipient of the blow. WE, therefore, reject such claim for being improbable, the same being contrary to the
natural course of human behavior.
The fact of the matter, however, as testified to by state witness PC soldier Virgilio Fidel, is that the victim
parried with both hands the thrust of the appellant with such force that appellant bumped his head on the
edge of the table causing blood to ooze from the resulting injury on his head.
When the accused allegedly met the Chief of Police of Indang, Cavite, on his way to the municipal building
from the scene of the stabbing incident purportedly to surrender to the authorities, he claims that he told the
Chief of Police that Lt. Masana hit him on his head with the handle of his (Masana's) gun. On his return from
the clinic of Dr. Ochoa where his injuries were treated, he was detained in the municipal building of Indang,
Cavite for two days before he was transferred to the Tagaytay PC Headquarters. During all this time, he did
not give any written statement, much less inform any PC or other police agency that he stabbed Lt. Masana in
self-defense. It was only on July 8, 1971. after the lapse of more than two and one-half (2 1/2) months that he
claimed self-defense during the preliminary investigation of the case before the municipal judge of Indang,
Cavite (pp. 44, t.s.n., Dec. 10, 1971). If the accused had really acted in self-defense, he would surely have so
informed the Chief of Police at the first opportunity. He only allegedly told the Chief of Police, who allegedly
asked him why his head and face were bloody, that Lt. Masana hit him with a gun. He did not tell the Police
Chief that he was surrendering for stabbing the deceased in self-defense. This claim of the accused made
before the municipal judge of Indang, Cavite, on July 8, 1971 aforesaid constitutes an exculpatory statement
made so long after the crime was committed on April 24, 1971. Such claim does not deserve credence since
the same is obviously an afterthought, which cannot overthrow the straightforward testimony of prosecution
witnesses PC soldier Virgilio Fidel and Coast Guard serviceman Ricardo Ligsa both disinterested and unbiased
witnesses, whose testimony as peace officers, in the absence of any showing as to any motive that would
impel them to distort the truth, must be afforded full faith and credit as a whole.
The fact that the chief of police detained the accused that same day after he was treated by Dr. Ochoa,
confirms the testimony of the state witnesses that the police was present during the incident between the
appellant and the victim and that the police chief embraced appellant and grabbed the knife from appellant,
whom he thereafter brought to the municipal building.
II
Was the crime committed murder or homicide merely or murder or homicide complexed with assault upon
an agent of authority?
According to the Solicitor General, the crime committed was murder because "it was established by the
prosecution that during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the victim a chance to
defend himself, stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting upon mortal wounds on the chest
and stomach. ...Needless to say, such a sudden and unexpected attack with a deadly weapon on an unarmed
and unsuspecting victim, which made it impossible for the latter to flee or defend himself before the fatal
blow is delivered, is alevosia or treachery" (p. 14, Appellee's brief).
In support of his contention, the Solicitor General cited the cases of U.S. vs. Cornejo (28 Phil. 475); People vs.
Palomo (43 O.G. No. 10, 4190).
WE do not agree with the Solicitor General. Alevosia or treachery is belied by the following testimony of
Virgilio Fidel, star witness for the prosecution:
COURT
Q What is the truth?
A The truth is that when I saw that Floro Rodil stabbed Lt.
Guillermo Masana, Masana parried him and his head (Rodil's
head) bumped on the edge of a table; that is why he sustained an
injury and blood oozed from his head (pp. 8-9, t.s.n., Jan. 20,
1972; emphasis supplied).
Then, on cross-examination, the same witness testified:
ATTY. MUÑOZ
Q You said that Floro Rodil's head was bumped on the edge of a
table and you saw blood oozing from his head, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Who bumped the head of Rodil on the table?
A When Masana parried his stab with his hands he accidentally
bumped his head on the table.
Q Is it not a fact that Floro Rodil is much bigger than Lt. Masana
3
 A Yes, sir.
Q You mean, by simple parrying, Floro Rodil was pushed to the
extent that he bumped his head on the table?
A The force of Lt. Masana might have been strong in parrying.
xxx xxx xxx
Q When the head of Rodil bumped on the table, was Lt. Masana
already stabbed?
A It could be that he was already stabbed or he was not yet
stabbed.
pp 30-31, 33, t.s.n., Jan. 20, 1972; emphasis supplied].
After a thorough analysis of the aforequoted portions of the testimony of Virgilio Fidel, one of the
prosecution witnesses, WE can only conclude that the assailant and the victim were indeed face to face when
the stabbing took place. As such the attack was not treacherous because the victim was able to ward off the
same with his hand. As a matter of fact, the force he used in warding off the attack was so strong that the
accused bumped his head on a table nearby, causing injuries to him which necessitated medical treatment. In
short, the attack on the victim was made on the spur of the moment. The suddenness of the attack does not
by itself suffice to support a finding of treachery (People vs. Torejas, et al., 43 SCRA 158, 167). Besides, the
record failed to show that the accused made any preparation to kill his victim so as to insure the commission
of the crime, making it at the same time possible or hard for the victim to defend himself or retaliate (People
vs. Saez, 1 11 Phil. 546, 553, citing the case of People vs. Tumaob, 83 Phil. 738). Neither does it show that the
accused employed means directly and specially tending to insure the killing without risk to himself. On the
contrary, it shows that the accused was easily within striking distance of his three companions, two of whom
were police officers. Furthermore, there was an altercation between the accused and the victim about the
confiscation by the latter of the gun belonging to the former, and at the moment when the victim was about
to stand up, the accused drew a knife from his pocket and with it stabbed the victim in the chest. Clearly,
therefore, the impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his victim was the latter's performance of
official duty, which the former resented. This kind of evidence does not clearly show the presence of
treachery in the commission of the crime. Alevosia is not to be presumed, but must be proved as conclusively
as the act which it qualifies (People vs. Abril, 51 Phil. 670, 675). This is so because in the explicit language of
the Revised Penal Code, alevosia or treachery exists when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make
[Art. 14, par. 16, Revised Penal Code].
While the evidence definitely demonstrated that appellant knew because the victim, who was in civilian
clothing, told him that he was an agent of a person in authority; he cannot be convicted of the complex crime
of homicide with assault upon an agent of a person in authority, for the simple reason that the information
does not allege the fact that the accused then knew that, before or at the time of the assault, the victim was
an agent of a person in authority. The information simply alleges that appellant did attack and stab PC Lt.
Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of his official duties, ..." Such an allegation cannot
be an adequate substitute for the essential averment to justify a conviction of the complex crime, which
necessarily requires the imposition of the maximum period of the penalty prescribed for the graver offense.
Like a qualifying circumstance, such knowledge must be expressly and specifically averred in the information;
otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the required knowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, although
proven, would only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance. Applying this principle, the attack
on the victim, who was known to the appellant as a peace officer, could be considered only as aggravating,
being "in contempt or with insult to the public authorities" (Par. 1, Art. XIV of the Revised Penal Code), or as
an "insult or in disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of his rank, ..." (par. 3, Art. XIV,
Revised Penal Code).
It is essential that the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was a person in authority or his
agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused must have the intention to offend, injure, or assault
the offended party as a person in authority or agent of a person in authority (People vs. Villaseñor 35 SCRA
460 [19701, People vs. Rellin 72 Phil. 1038 [1947]; US vs. Alvear et al., 35 Phil. 626 [1916]).
In the case of People vs. Balbar (21 SCRA 1119, Nov. 29, 1967), it was held that failure to expressly alleged in
the information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person in authority does not
render the information defective so long as there are facts alleged therein from which it can be implied that
the accused knew that the person attacked was a person in authority. Thus, the information for Direct Assault
upon a person in authority reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Tiburcio Balbar of the crime of
Assault upon a Person in Authority, committed as follows:
That on or about the 29th day of August, 1960, in Barrio Cumba, Municipality of Lian,
Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovenamed accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault
Miss Ester Gonzales, a public school teacher in the school bonding of Lian, duly
qualified and appointed as such and while in the performance of her official duties or
on the occasion therefor, by then and there pulling his dagger, embraced and kissed.
and repeatedly trying to embrace and kiss the said teacher, Miss Ester Gonzales. That
the crime was committed with the aggravating circumstances of having committed it
inside the school building and during school classes.
Contrary to law.
And the ruling of the Court was:
Direct assault is committed 'by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, ...
shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or
any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of
such performance' (See Art. 148, Revised Penal Code).
By express provision of law (Com. Act No. 578, now part of Article 152 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978), "teachers, professors, and persons
charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and
universities shall be deemed persons in authority, in applying the provisions of article
148." This special classification is obviously intended to give teachers protection,
dignity, and respect while in the performance of their official duties. The lower court,
however, dismissed the information on the ground that there is no express allegation in
the information that the accused had knowledge that the person attacked was a person
in authority. This is clearly erroneous.
Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges that the accused knew
that fact, since she was in her classroom and engaged in the performance of her duties.
He therefore knew that she was a person in authority, as she was so by specific
4
 provision of law. It matters not that such knowledge on his part is not expressly alleged,
complainant's status as a person in authority being a matter of law and not of fact,
ignorance thereof could not excuse non- compliance on his part (Article 3, Civil Code).
This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws, whether civil or penal (De Luna vs.
Linatoc, 74 Phil 15) and whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil.
254) for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.
But, in the case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, Branch V (68 SCRA 305, Nov. 28, 1975), the information for Direct
Assault reads:
That on or about the 17th day of January, 1974, at Barrio Languyin, Municipality of
Potillo, Province of Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, Ernesto Busto, Paulo Coralde, Dony Grande and Jose
Astjada each of whom was armed with a piece of wood, except Paulo Coraide
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, box and strike with said pieces
of wood one Rufino Camonias a councilman of barrio Languyin of said municipality,
duly elected and qualified as such while said councilman was engaged in the actual
performance of his duties.
The trial court dismissed the same on the ground that:
Of importance in this case is the lack of allegation in the complaint or in the information
that the offended party was an agent of a person in authority and that such fact was
known to the accused. The absence of such allegation is fatal in this case."
The People appealed to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
This Court held that the fiscal's proper course of action is not a petition for review on certiorari but the
refiling of a valid information against the accused, for the following considerations:
The Solicitor General in his comment of November 4, 1975 duly observed that '(I)t is
patent that the acquittal of the accused herein is not on the merits. There is want of
factual finding upon which their conviction or acquittal could have been based.'
It need only be observed that contrary to the fiscal's contention, the information was
deficient in that it did not allege an essential element of the crime of direct assault that
the accused had knowledge of or knew the position of authority held by the person
attacked, viz. that of a barrio councilman (and hence the agent of a person in authority
under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 1978) [See
U.S. vs. Alvear 35 Phil. 626; People vs. Rellin 77 Phil. 1038; Vol. 11, Padilla's Revised
Penal Code, 10th Ed., p. 225].
What was held in People vs. Balbar 21 SCRA, 119,1123, cited by the fiscal is that it is
sufficient that the information alleged that the accused knew the position of authority,
held by the offended party, in that case a public school teacher, then engaged in the
performance of her official duties, and that it is not necessary to allege further that the
accused also knew that such position was that of a person in authority, since 'this is a
matter of law' thus:
Complainant was a teacher. The information sufficiently alleges
that the accused knew that fact, since she was in her classroom
and engaged in the performance of her duties. He therefore
knew that she was a person in authority, as she was so by specific
provision of law. It matters not that such knowledge on `his part
is not expressly alleged, complainant's status as a person in
authority being a matter of law and not of fact, ignorance
whereof could not excuse non-compliance on his part (Article 3,
Civil Code). This article applies to all kinds of domestic laws,
whether civil or penal (De Luna vs. Linatoc, 74 Phil. 15) and
whether substantive or remedial (Zulueta vs. Zulueta, 1 Phil, 254)
for reasons of expediency, policy and necessity.
Since the 'decision' of acquittal was really a mere dismissal of the information for
failure to charge an offense and was not a decision on the merits with factual findings
as per the trial judge's own disavowal it is patent that the fiscal's proper course is not
the present petition but the refiling of a valid information against respondents-accused,
as herein indicated.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is dismissed without prejudice to the refiling of a valid
information against respondents-accused as hereinabove indicated (emphasis
supplied).
The ruling in the aforementioned case of People vs. CFI of Quezon, etc., supra, applies to the instant case;
because the information in the former is strikingly similar to the information in the latter and does not allege
facts from which inference can be deduced that the accused knew that the person assaulted is a person, or an
agent of a person, in authority.
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that the victim,
PC. Lt. Masana Identified himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a member of the Anti-
Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in rank and social status to the victim.
The term "rank" should be given its plain, ordinary meaning, and as such, refers to a high social position or
standing as a grade in the armed forces (Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English
Language Unabridged, p. 1881); or to a graded official standing or social position or station (75 CJS 458); or to
the order or place in which said officers are placed in the army and navy in relation to others (Encyclopedic
Law Dictionary, Third Edition, Walter A. Shumaker and George Foster Longsdorf, p. 90); or to the designation
or title of distinction conferred upon an officer in order to fix his relative position in reference to other
officers in matters of privileges, precedence, and sometimes of command or by which to determine his pay
and emoluments as in the case of army staff officers (Bouvier's Law Dictionary, Third Edition, p. 2804); or to a
grade or official standing, relative position in civil or social life, or in any scale of comparison, status, grade,
including its grade, status or scale of comparison within a position (Vol. 36, Words and Phrases, Permanent
Edition, p. 100).
Thus, rank aggravated the killing of a staff sergeant by his corporal (People vs. Mil 92 SCRA 89, 105-106, July
30, 1979), the killing of the Assistant Chief of Personnel Transaction of the Civil Service Commission by a clerk
therein (People vs. Benito, 62 SCRA 351, 357-358, Feb. 13, 1975), the murder by a pupil of his teacher (U.S. vs.
Cabling, 7 Phil. 469. 474; People vs. Aragon & Lopez, 107 Phil. 706, 709), the murder of a municipal mayor
(People vs. Lopez de Leon, et al., 69 Phil. 298), the murder -of a city chief of police by the chief of the secret
service division (People vs. Hollero 88 Phil. 167), assault upon a 66-year old District Judge of the Court of First
Instance by a justice of the peace (People vs. Torrecarreori CA 52 OG 7644), the killing of a Spanish consul by
his subordinate — a mere chancellor (People vs. Godinez, 106 Phil. 597, 606607), and the killing of an army
general (People vs. Torres, et al., L-4642, May 29, 1953).
5
As explained by Mr. Justice Mariano Albert, then of the Court of Appeals, those "generally considered of high
station in life, on account of their rank (as well as age or sex), deserve to be respected. Therefore, whenever
there is a difference in social condition between the offender and the offended party, this aggravating
circumstance sometimes is present" (Albert M.A. — The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1946 Ed., p. 109).
The difference in official or social status between a P.C. lieutenant and a mere member of an anti-smuggling
unit, is patent.
If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of murder with assault against an agent of a
person in authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank or
contempt of or insult to public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because either circumstance is
inherent in the charge of assault against a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority. But in the
case at bar, the appellant is accused of murder only. Consequently, either aggravating circumstance should be
considered in the imposition of the penalty.
Thus, in the following cases where the charge was merely murder or frustrated murder, the aggravating
circumstance of disregard of rank was appreciated:
(1) People vs. Benito, supra — the appellant, a clerk in the Civil Service Commission, was charged with and
convicted of the murder of the assistant chief of the personnel transaction of the said Commission;
(2) People vs. Torres, et al., supra — the appellants were charged with and convicted of murder for the death
of Army Col. Valentin Salgado and attempted murder for the injuries inflicted on Army Gen. Mariano
Castaneda;
(3) People vs. Valeriano, et al. — appellants were accused and convicted of robbery with homicide for the
killing of District Judge Bautista of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga [90 Phil. 15, 34-35]; and
(4) People vs. Hollero supra — where the accused chief of the Secret Division of the Bacolod City Police
Department was convicted of murder for the killing of the chief of police.
The aggravating circumstance of contempt of, or insult to, public authority under paragraph 2 of Article 14 of
the Revised Penal Code can likewise be appreciated in the case at bar.
The evidence of the prosecution clearly established that Chief of Police Primo Panaligan of Indang was
present as he was taking his lunch in the same restaurant when the incident occurred.
As a matter of fact, the said chief of police was the one who embraced or grabbed the accused from behind,
wrested the dagger from him and thereafter brought him to the municipal building of Indang. And appellant
admittedly knew him even then as the town chief of police, although he now claims that he went to the
municipal building to surrender to the chief of police who was not allegedly in the restaurant during the
incident.
While it is true that in the cases of U.S. vs. Rodriguez, et al. (19 Phil. 150, 157-158), People vs. Siojo (61 Phil.
307, 317), and People vs. Verzo (21 SCRA 1403), this Court ruled that the term public authority refers to a
person in authority and that a PC lieutenant or town chief of police is not a public authority but merely an
agent of a person in authority; there is need of re-examining such a ruling since it is not justified by the
employment of the term public authority in aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 instead of the term person in
authority which is specifically used in Articles 148 and 152 of the Revised Penal Code. There is no extended
reasoning of the doctrine enunciated in the aforesaid three (3) cases why the phrase public authority should
comprehend only persons in authority. The lawmaker could have easily utilized the term "persons in
authority" in the aforesaid paragraph 2 of Article 14 in much the same way that it employed the said phrase
in Articles 148 and 1452. The lawmaker must have intended a different meaning for the term public
authority, which may however include, but not limited to persons in authority.
Under the decided cases, a municipal mayor, barrio captain, barrio lieutenant or barangay captain is a person
in authority or a public authority. Even a public school teacher is now considered a person in authority under
CA 578 amending Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code (Sarcepudes vs. People, 90 Phil 228). So is the town
municipal health officer (People vs. Quebral et al., 73 Phil 640), as well as a nurse, a municipal councilor or an
agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (People vs. Yosoya, CA-GR No. 8522-R, May 26, 1955; People vs.
Reyes, et al O.G.S. 11 p. 24).
The chief of police should therefore be considered a public authority or a person in authority; for he is vested
with jurisdiction or authority to maintain peace and order and is specifically duty bound to prosecute and to
apprehend violators of the laws and municipal ordinances, more than the aforementioned officials who
cannot prosecute and who are not even enjoined to arrest malefactors although specifically mentioned as
persons in authority by the decided cases and by Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A.
1978 of June 22, 1957. The town chief of police heads and supervises the entire police force in the
municipality as well as exercises his authority over the entire territory of the municipality, which is patently
greater than and includes the school premises or the town clinic or barrio, to which small area the authority
or jurisdiction of the teacher, nurse, or barrio lieutenant, respectively, is limited.
With two aggravating circumstances and no mitigating circumstance, the appellant should therefore be
condemned to suffer the maximum period of reclusion temporal the penalty prescribed for homicide.
WHEREFORE, HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY
CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED
PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK, APPELLANT FLORO RODIL IS HEREBY SENTENCED TO SUFFER AN
INDETERMINATE TERM OF IMPRISONMENT RANGING FROM 12 YEARS OF RECLUSION TEMPORAL AS
MAXIMUM.
THUS MODIFIED, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED IN ALL OTHER RESPECTS.
Aquino, Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., concur in the result.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-40330 November 20, 1978
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMADO DANIEL alias "AMADO ATO", accused-appellant.
Eraulio D. Yaranon for appellant.
Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Rosalio A. de
Leon for appellee.
6

MUÑOZ PALMA, J:
This case originated from the Court of First Instance of Baguio City by virtue of a complaint filed by 13-year
old Margarita Paleng accusing Amado Daniel alias "Amado Ato" of rape alleged to have been committed as
follows:
That on or about the 20th day of September, 1965, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, armed with a
sharp instrument and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersignedcomplaint, against
her will, and in her own room situated at No. 25 Interior, Pinsao, Guisad, Baguio City.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstance that it was
committed in the dwelling of the offended party, the latter not having
givenprovocation for it, is present. (p. 1, CFI record)
The trial court, presided then by Hon. Feliciano Belmonte, after due trial rendered its decision on May 30,
1966, finding the accused guilty and sentencing him to suffer "not more than TWELVE (12) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY of reclusion temporal and not less than SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, and to pay the
costs." 1
His motion for reconsideration and new trial having been denied, accused filed a notice of appeal; forthwith
the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals.
On September 23, 1974, the Court of Appeals through its Tenth Division rendered a decision the dispositive
portion of which follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, We find that the guilt of the accused Amado Daniel has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt, and he should accordingly suffer the penalty for the
crime herein charged.
We find, however, that the sentence imposed the accused in the judgment appealed
from is not in accordance with law.
Republic Act No. 4111, which took effect on June 20, 1964, amended Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, providing that —
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
Under Section 17 of Chapter 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 (Republic Act No. 296, as
amended) —
The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or
affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees
of inferior courts as herein provided, in —
(1) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life
imprisonment; ...
WHEREFORE, We hereby certify this case to the Supreme Court for appropriate further
proceedings pursuant to law. 2
By virtue of the foregoing decision of the Court of Appeals the case was certified to this Court and in a
Resolution of March 6, 1975, the same was ordered docketed. 3
Preliminary question —
The certification of the case to Us poses a preliminary question which strikes at the very root of a long
standing practice and procedure evoked for the last forty years or so since the creation of the Court of
Appeals. 4
Is the Supreme Court with jurisdiction to act on an appeal in a criminal case where the offense is punishable
by reclusion perpetua or death certified to it by the Court of Appeals with findings of facts and of the guilt of
the accused, but without imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death on the appellant pursuant to
Rule 124, Section 12, paragraph 2, of the Rules of Court?5
Mr. Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, joined by other ,Justices, expresses the view that for this Court to acquire
jurisdiction over the appeal, the decision before Us must have imposed on the appellant the penalty either
of reclusion perpetua or death as the facts warranted.
The rest of the Justices together with the writer of this Opinion, believe otherwise and hold the view that the
dispositive portion of the decision as written and rendered is in accordance with the Constitution and the law,
and vests jurisdiction on the Court to act on the appeal.
A. In People v. Ramos, decided on November 28, 1947, 6 a case was certified to this Court by the Court of
Appeals without findings of facts and simply on the ground that it was "on the opinion that the penalty that
should be imposed ill this case is reclusion perpetua, as recommended by the Solicitor-General, and
not reclusion temporal, as imposed by tile lower court." The question arose as to the proper procedure to be
followed by the appellate court in certifying cases to this Court under Section 145-K of the Revised
Administrative Code as amended by Republic Act No. 52 which read:
Whenever in any criminal cases submitted to a division the said division should be of
the opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed, the said
Court shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case
to the Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had been brought before it
on appeal.
In disposing of the issue several matters came up which evoked different, and We may say, strong reactions
from the Justices then composing the Court, but for brevity we shall not dwell on them. Simply stated, it is
was ruled that the Court of Appeals was duty bound to make its findings of facts to support its opinion that
the penalty to the imposed upon the appellant was either life imprisonment or death so as to bring the case
within the jurisdiction of this Court.
7
From the Resolution written for the Court by then Mr. Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran, We quoted the
following pertinent portions:
The jurisdiction of this Court predicated upon the opinion of the Court of Appeals, as
provided in the above-quoted provisions of the law, must of necessity defend upon the
correctness of that opi nion There is nothing in the law precluding this Court from
exercising ing its authority to pass upon such question which concerns its own
jurisdiction. And in order that this Court may exercise its power of review the Court of
appeals is bound to make in its order f certification such findings of facts as are
necessary to support its conclusion that either life imprisonment or death is the penalty
to be imposed. This is indeed covered by Rule 52, section 3, which provides th where a
court to which an appeal has been taken has no appellate jurisdiction over lic case and
it certifies the same to the proper court, it must do so "with a specific and clear
statement of grounds therefor." the requirement of with and specific grounds is
precisely a device to prevent erroneous transmissions of jurisdiction from a lower to a
superior court.
Furthermore, the words "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon" appearing in
the provision above quoted, are sufficient indication that the Court of Appeals, at the
time of certifying the case to this Court, had already examined the evidence and was
ready to render judgment on the merits, but having found from the facts established by
proof that the penalty to be imposed is either death or life imprisonment, instead of
entering judgment thereon , it certifies the case to the Supreme Court for final
determination. Since the Certification is the only ground for determining our
jurisdiction, it must contain not only conclusions of law but also findings of fact, the
latter being more important than the former for they supply the real basis for
determining jurisdiction ...
The instant case cannot be compared with cases coming directly from a Court of First
Instance wherein either life imprisonment or death penalty is imposed, for in such
cases, if we assume jurisdiction even where the judgment appears to be erroneous on
its face, it is because the Court of First Instance has already exhausted its jurisdiction by
rendering judgment on the merits containing both findings of fact and conclusions of
law, and under such circumstance it is more practical for the administration of the law
that this Court should exercise its appellate jurisdiction by examining the evidence and
correcting all errors both of fact and of law that might have been committed by the trial
court. But here, the Court of Appeals is refraining from rendering judgment on the
merits and is refusing to complete the exercise of appellate jurisdiction because it
believes that such jurisdiction belongs to the Supreme Court and thus, it proceeds to
transfer the case to this Court. lt is in that transfer that we believe we may intervene in
order to prevent an erroneous transfer,
xxx xxx xxx
Section 145-K of the Administrative Code is merely a method designed to make
effective the appellate jurisdiction of both the Court of Appeals and this Court, as
defined by law. According to the law of jurisdiction (section 138, Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Commonwealth Acts Nos. 3 and 259), offenses, for which the
penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment, including offenses arising from the same
occurrence or committed on the same occasion, come within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court, and the remaining offenses fall within the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Appeals ...
We are of the opinion and so hold, therefore, that in a case like this, the Court of
Appeals, in certifying it to this Court, must state its findings of fact necessary to support
its conclusion that the penalty to be imposed is either life imprisonment or death.
While this Court will not review the findings of fact, it will pass upon the correctness of
the legal conclusions derived therefrom. And if this Court finds the conclusions to be
correct, it will assume jurisdiction. If it finds them to be wrong, the case will be
returned to the Court of Appeals. (pp. 613-616, supra, emphasis supplied)
In Ramos, the case was accepted because the Court considered that there was substantial compliance with
the law as the order of certification made reference to the opinion and recommendation of the Solicitor
General whose brief contained sufficient findings of fact to warrant the conclusion that life imprisonment
should be imposed upon the appellant. Justices Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado and Briones concurred in the
Resolution.
Justice Gregorio Perfecto in a separate opinion concurred with the principle that the Court of Appeals is
bound to make its findings of fact and study the evidence so as to determine whether the appellant is guilty
or not, but dissented from that portion of the Resolution which accepted the case as he was of the opinion
that the case should have been remanded to the Court of Appeals.7
Justice Pedro Tuason wrote a separate opinion and dissented from the majority insofar as it held that it was
necessary for the Court of Appeals or a division thereof to state the reasons for its opinion that death penalty
or life imprisonment should be imposed. He particularly dissented from statements that if this Court found
the conclusions of the Court of Appeals to be wrong, the case should be returned to the Court of Appeals for
further proceedings. According to Justice Tuason when a case is certified to this Court it is placed, by force of
the Court of Appeals' opinion, within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the latter to decide the appeal
on the merits; findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are neither essential nor necessary. Justice Tuason was
joined in his dissent by Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief Justice of this Court and Justice Sabino
Padilla.8
B. The theory is now advanced that We go one step further than that ruled in Ramos — that is, for the Court
of Appeals not only to make its findings of fact and finding of guilt, but also to impose the penalty either
of reclusion perpetua or death as the facts warrant in order that We may exercise Our appellate jurisdiction.
We believe that such a judicial ruling will be violence to the letter and spirit of the law which confers on the
Supreme Court the exclusive prerogative to review on appeal and impose the corresponding penalty in
criminal cases where the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or death.
Both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions vest upon the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, in "(A)ll
criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment."9 This jurisdiction is constitutional:
the Supreme Court ma not be deprived thereof by, Congress then, now the National Assembly. 10
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act 1948 as amended in turn provides that the foregoing appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court is exclusive.
Basically therefore, the objection to this new theory is one of jurisdiction - the lack of jurisdiction of the Court
of Appeals to impose the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death.
The present controversy springs from the construction given to the second paragraph of Sec. 12, Rule 124,
Rules of Court 11 more particularly to the use of the phrases "should be imposed" and "shall refrain from
entering judgment", viz:
8
xxx xxx xxx
Whenever in any criminal case submitted to a division the said division should be of the
opinion that the penalty of death or life imprisonment should be imposed, the said court
shall refrain from entering judgment thereon and shall forthwith certify the case to the
Supreme Court for final determination, as if the case had been brought before it on
appeal. (Emphasis supplied)
As we construe it, the Rule cited does not charge the appellate court with the duty of
imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua or death. All that the Rule requires is
that should the Court of Appeals be of the opinion that death or life
imprisonment should be imposed, it "shall refrain from entering judgment thereon ...
The clause "entering judgment" means "rendering judgment". Thus, the Court of Appeals shall refrain from
rendering judgment if and when it is of the opinion that reclusion perpetua or death is the proper penalty for
the crime committed. This can be the only logical interpretation considering that the Court of Appeals is
without jurisdiction to impose the penalties concerned. The phrase "entering judgment" is not to be equated
with an "entry of judgment" as the latter is understood in Rule 36 in relation to Section 8, Rule 121 and
Section 16, Rule 124, Rules of Court. "Entry of judgment" presupposes a final judgment — final in the sense
that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial or appellate court within the reglementary period. A
judgment in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the
sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his
right to appeal.12 It is only then that there is a judgment which is to be entered or recorded in the book of
entries of judgments. 13
It would be incongruous or absurd to state that Section 12, second paragraph, Rule 124 enjoins the Court of
Appeals from entering judgment" when there is no judgment to be entered .
But then the argument is advanced — what is there to be reviewed by the Supreme Court when the decision
being certified contains no penalty or sentence, as distinguished from appeals from the Court of First Instance
where there is a complete judgment to be passed upon. The answer is simple. Section 12 itself states that the
case is for final determination by the Supreme Court as if the case had been brought before it on appeal.
Hence, based on the findings of facts of the appellate court which as a rule are conclusive and binding on Us,
this Court "will pass upon the correctness of the legal conclusions derived therefrom" (People v.
Ramos, supra) and impose the correct penalty for the offense committed.
We realize that had Section 12, Rule 124 used the phrase shall refrain from rendering judgment " there would
be no cause for any ambiguity. We can only assume that the intent of the Rule was so clear to the Court when
it drafted the Revised Rules of Court that it did not envision a possible contrary or adverse interpretation or
ambiguity in its implementation under the phraseology used. It is incumbent upon Us to construe the Rule in
the spirit and intent it was conceived and in harmony with pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
On the merits of the appeal —
1. Generally in a case of this nature, the evidence of the prosecution consists solely of the testimony of the
offended party. Here We have the declaration of the victim, who at the time of the incident was a little less
than 13 years of age, on the basis of which the trial court found the charge of rape duly established. The
happenings are briefly summarized in the People's brief as follows:
The offended party in this case is Margarita Paleng who was born on November 20,
1952 (p. 3, t.s.n., Manipon). She is a native of Balangabang Tublay, Mountain Province
(pp. 3, 12, Id.) At the time of the incident in question on September 20, 1965,
complainant was temporarily boarding at a house located at Pinsao Guisad Baguio City,
as she was then a first year high school student at the Baguio Eastern High School (pp.
3, 12, 20, Id.; p. 36, Estigoy).
On September 20, 1965, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, she had just arrived in
the City from Tublay in a Dangwa bus (p. 3, Manipon). Because it was then raining and
the bus was parked several meters away from the bus station, she waited inside the
bus (pp. 3, 22, Id.). After about three minutes of waiting, the accused came and started
molesting her by inquiring her name and getting hold of her bag (pp. 4, 22-24, Id.). But
she did not allow him to hold her bag (p. 24, Id.). She called the attention of the bus
driver and the conductor about the actuation of the accused, but it seemed that the
former were also afraid of him (pp. 24-25, Id.).
Despite the rain, she left the bus and went to ride in a jeep parked some 100 meters
away (pp. 4, 25, Id.). The accused closely followed her (p. 4, Id.). When the jeep started
to go, the accused also rode and sat beside her (p. 5, Id.).
When the jeep reached Guisad, she alighted on the road but she still had to negotiate a
distance of ten meters (p. 5, Id.). The accused also alighted and again he tried to carry
her bag (p. 5, Id.). Although he was not allowed to carry her bag, her was adamant in
following her (p. 5, Id.).
Reaching her boarding house, she opened the door and was about to close it when the
accused dashed in and closed the door behind him (pp. 31-32, Id.). When she entered
her room, the accused went in (p. 7, Id.). He pulled a dagger eight inches long and
threatened her: "If you will talk, 1 will kill you". (p. 7, Id.). Margarita was stunned into
silence because of her fear (p. i Id.). Thereupon, the accused held her hair with his left
hand and forced her Lo lie down in bed (p. 7, Id.) He also placed his left hand with a
handkerchief in Margarita's mouth, at the same time holding the dagger and her neck
with his right hand (pp. 7-8, Id.). She was forcibly made to the down and, at this
moment, the accused removed the buttons of his pants (p. 8, Id.). He then put down
the dagger on tile bed (p. 8, Id.). Her attempts to extricate herself from the accused was
to no avail assile was only 4 ft. and 8 inches tall and weighed about 95 to 100 pounds
(p. 35, Id.) while the accused was 5 ft. and 7 inches tall and weighed about 126 pounds
(pp. 8, 59, Id.). He then held his penis (pp. 8. 36, Id.), used his thigh to separate the legs
of Margarita (p. 38, Id.). tried, but failed. to remove her panty (p. 36, Id.). He
nonetheless guided his penis and inserted it inside the vagina of the complainant after
prying open the part of her panty covering her private parts (pp. 9, 36, Id.). Then he
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the offended party (p. 9, Id.). Margarita lost
consciousness. When she recovered, he was already gone (p. 9, Id.).
The following morning, her father came to visit her. She confided to him the terrible
misfortune which befell her (pp. 9-10, Id.). She was immediately brought to the Baguio
General Hospital where she was examined (p. 10, Id.). Then they proceeded to the
Police Department. The Chief of Police accompanied them to the Health Center where
she was again examined by Dr. Perfecto O. Micu who thereafter submitted his medical
report (Exh. C; p. 3, rec.; pp. 11, 14-16, Id.). Margarita and her father gave their
respective statements before the police authorities (Exh. B, pp, 5-6, rec.; p. 11, t.s.n.).
She signed her criminal complaint prepared by the Fiscal's Office of Baguio (Exh. A; p. 1,
rec.; p. 11, t.s.n. (pp. 2-4, Brief at p. 83, rollo
9
The City Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Perfecto Micu was called to the witness stand and he testified on the
physical examination conducted on the person of Margarita Paleng on September 23, 1965 and his findings as
contained in the report were as follows:
1. Hymen-circular-stellate type with healing lacerations at 6:00, 8:00, 9:00 and 11:00
o'clock positions in the face of a clock.
2. Contusions at the base of the hymen at 3:00 & 9:00 o'clock regions.
3. Vaginal Orifice - tight and hardly admits 2 fingers.
4. Vaginal wall — tight and vaginal folds are prominent.
5. Vaginal smear — negative for spermatozoa and for gram negative intra or extra-
cellular diplococci. (Exh. "C", p. 3, CFI record)
Dr. Micu concluded that "defloration was recent". He further declared that the condition of the hymen
revealed that Margarita Paleng was a virgin before the incident complained of, and that the number of
lacerations and contusions at the base of the hymen indicated the degree of force exerted to effect the sexual
act. 14
For his defense, appellant claimed that he and Margarita were acquainted with each other since 1963, and
there were occasions when they rode together in a bus; that the incident of September 20, 1965 inside the
room of Margarita was with the latter's consent, and in fact it was the second time he had carnal knowledge
with her, the first time having occurred inside a shack; that he promised Margarita that he would marry her,
but to his surprise, she filed the instant complaint against him. 15
2. The issue being one of credibility, We find no cogent reasons for discarding the findings of facts of the trial
court which were sustained by the Court of Appeals after the latter had examined the evidence as a result of
which it certified the case to this Court.
Appellant assails the veracity of the testimony of the complainant. But what possible motive could a thirteen-
year old girl barely in her teens have in fabricating a story that could only bring down on her and her family
shame and humiliation and make her an object of gossip and curiosity among her classmates and the people
of her hometown. It cannot be denied that a public trial involving a crime of this nature subjects the victim to
what can be a harrowing experience of submitting to a physical examination of her body, an investigation by
police authorities, appearance in court for the hearing where she has to unravel lewd and hideous details of a
painful event which she would prefer to forget and leave it unknown to others. If Margarita did forego all
these and preferred to face the cruel realities of the situation it was due to her simple and natural instincts of
speaking out the truth.
The insinuation that this complaint was filed because appellant had not married the girl although he promised
to marry her, is preposterous. On September 20, 1965, Margarita was only twelve years and ten months old
and was not of marriageable age, hence, marriage was a legal impossibility. And as regards appellant's
testimony that the complaint was instigated by the Chief of Police of Tublay who was Margarita's uncle, the
trial court did not give credit to such a declaration.
Counsel for appellant stresses that notwithstanding that Margarita had the opportunity to ask for help or
attract the attention of other people before she reached her boarding house, she failed to do so. According to
counsel there were people at the Dangwa station, in the busy streets, in the market place, in the jeepney
parking place where the girl took a jeep to proceed to the boarding house, and in the neighboring houses the
closest of which was about 5 meters away, but no attempt was ever made by complainant to seek help so as
to prevent appellant from molesting her. 16
Appellant's contention presupposes that Margarita was well aware all the time from the moment she saw the
appellate inside the bus that the latter had intentions of abusing or raping her. All that the appellant did
inside the bus was to hold her bag and she caged the attention of the driver and the conductor to the
impertinence of appellant but the two did not do anything about it. 17 And when Margarita walked from the
bus to the jeepney station, although she saw appellant walking behind her she did not suspect that he was
following her. To a question propounded by His Honor whether she suspected that appellant was following
her, Margarita answered: "No sir, I did not suspect." 18 All along Margarita could not call the attention of the
people in the street or shout for help inasmuch as at that particular moment the appellant was not doing
anything against her. And when Margarita reached the boarding house there were no persons around 19 and
in fact she went straight to her room and it was at that particular moment when appellant barged into the
room before she could close the door. In short, the Poor girl was simply taken by surprise by the forced
entrance of appellant who immediately took out an 8-inch long dagger and said "If you will talk I will kill you."
Persons can have different reactions to a situation like that — some may manifest an aggressive or violent
attitude of confronting a molesting or impertinent fellow while others, like 12-year old Margarita, may
assume a silent. fearful attitude.
Appellant's counsel also claims that Margarita did not offer any resistance to the acts of the accused at the
time the latter was allegedly forcing himself on her as shown by the medical findings that there were no signs
of extra-genital injuries on the girl's body, and no blood stains on her dress and underwear.
The foregoing arguments are inadequate to weaken and destroy the veracity of Margarita's straightforward
and positive declaration as to how appellant, a 22-year old farmer in the prime of his manhood, weighing 126
lbs and five feet 21 and six inches tall,20 overpowered her and succeeded in accomplishing the sexual act
despite her resistance. Margarita was less than 13 years of age, was 4' 8 " in height, and weighed around 95
lbs.21
In a crime of rape, force need not be irresistible; "it need but be present, and so long as it brings about the
desired result, all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible, is beside the point. 22
All that is necessary is that the force used by the accused is sufficient for him to consummate his evil purpose.
In U.S. v. Villarosa, 1905, there was a similar situation. A 12 year old girl was sexually abused in the woods by
a man of superior physical strength. In holding the accused Villarosa guilty of rape the Court held:
It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to consider the existence of
the crime of rape it is not necessary that the force employed in accomplishing it be so
great or of such character as could not be resisted; it is only necessary that the force
used by the guilty party be sufficient to consummate the purpose which he had in view.
(4 Phil. 434, 437 citing Judgment May 14, 1878, Supreme Court of Spain. The Villarosa
doctrine has been followed in numerous cases involving the crime of rape and one of
the latest is People v. Equec, 1977, per Justice Enrique Fernando, 70 SCRA 665.)
And as stated in People v. Savellano, per Justice Ramon Aquino, the force or violence necessary in rape is
naturally a relative term, depending on the age, size, and strength of the parties and their relation to each
other. 23
10
Rape is likewise committed when intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits herself against her PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
will because of fear for her life and personal safety. In this case of Margarita Paleng, appellant was armed vs.
with a dagger and with it threatened to kill the girl if she would talk or scream for help. Her fear naturally RUFINO MIRANDILLA BERMAS, accused-appellant.
weakened whatever resistance Margarita could muster at the time and as a result appellant was able to
consummate his coitus on the victim. 24

One last point raised by the able counsel of appellant, Atty. Braulio D. Yaranon, who at the time of the trial in
VITUG, J.:
1965 was the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City, was that appellant voluntarily submitted to a lie detector test with
the National Bureau of Investigation and the report of the lie detector examiner is in appellant's favor, that is,
the latter was telling the truth on the questions propounded to him one of which was whether he forced In convicting an accused, it is not enough that proof beyond reasonable doubt has been adduced, it is also
Margarita Paleng into having sexual intercourse with him and the reply was "No". 25 essential that the accused has been duly afforded his fundamental nights.

On this matter We find the trial Judge's observations and conclusions meritorious and We quote from his Rufino Mirandilla Bermas pleaded not guilty before the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274, Metro
decision the following: Manila, to the crime of rape under a criminal complaint, which read:

As to the N.B.I. lie detector test report, the Court does not put much faith and credit on
it. It is well known that the same is not conclusive. Its efficacy depends upon the time,
place and circumstances when taken and the nature of the subject. If subject is hard
and the circumstances, as in this instant, were not conducive to affect the subject
emotionally, the test will fail. The subject had nothing more to fear because the trial
was over. He was not confronted by the victim or other persons whom he had a reason
to fear. Naturally, his reaction to the questions propounded was normal and unaffected
and the apparatus could not detect it. (pp. 172-173, CFI record)
To conclude, the crime committed by the appellant is rape with the use of a deadly weapon with the
aggravating circumstance of having been committed in the dwelling of the offended party. Although
Margarita was merely renting a bedspace in a boarding house, her room constituted for all intents and
purposes a "dwelling" as the term is used in Article 14(3), Revised Penal Code. It is not necessary, under the
law, that the victim owns the place where he lives or dwells. Be he a lessee, a boarder, or a bed-spacer, the
place is his home the sanctity of which the law seeks to protect and uphold.
COMPLAINT
The undersigned complainant as assisted by her mother accuses Rufino Mirandilla
Bermas, of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
That on or about the 3rd day of August 1994, in the Municipality
of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused,
while armed with a knife and by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her
will.1âwphi1.nêt
CONTRARY TO LAW

Hence, the correct penalty for the crime committed is death pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Parañaque, Metro Manila
Code as amended. However, for lack of the necessary number of votes, the penalty next lower in degree is to
be applied. August 8, 1994

PREMISES CONSIDERED, We affirm the judgment of conviction of Amado Daniel for the crime of rape as
charged, and We sentence him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and order him to indemnify
Margarita Paleng by way of moral damages in the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00) and pay
the costs.

Decision Modified.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 120420 April 21, 1999

BERMAS

11
 resentment by Cthe latter. The trial court gave a summary of the testimony given by the accused and his
daughter Luzviminda;
o viz:
m
p
The accused vehemently denied that he has ever committed the crime of rape on her
l
daughter, the complainant. He told the Court that he could not do such a thing because
a
he loves so much his daughter and his other children. In fact, he said that he even
i
performed the dual role of a father and a mother to his children since the time of his
n
separation from his wife. The accused further told the Court that in charging him of the
a
crime of rape, the complainant might have been motivated by ill-will or revenge in view
n
of the numerous scoldings that she has received from him on account of her frequent
t
coming home late at night. The accused stressed that he knew of no other reason as to
why his daughter, the complainant, would ever charge him of the crime of rape except
Assisted probably in retaliation for being admonished by him whenever she comes home late in
by the night.

(SGD) ROSITA BERMAS
Mother 1
Evidence was adduced during trial by the parties at the conclusion of which the lower court,
presided over by Hon. Amelita G. Tolentino, rendered its decision, dated 02 May 1995, finding the
accused guilty of the offense charged and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
The death penalty having been imposed, the case has reached this Court by way of automatic review
pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 22 of Republic Act No. 7659
(otherwise known as An Act To Impose Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes, Amending For That Purpose
The Revised Penal Code, as amended, Other Special Penal Laws, and For Other Purposes, which took effect on
31 December 1993).
The married daughter of the accused, who testified in his behalf, denied that the
complainant was raped by the accused. She said that the complainant did not come
home in the night of August 3, 1994, and that, she is a liar. She told the Court that the
concoction by the complainant of the rape story is probably due to the resentment by
the latter of the frequent scoldings that she has been receiving from the accused. She
further added that she was told by the previous household employer of the
complainant that the latter is a liar. She went on to testify further that she does not
believe that the accused, who is her father, raped the complainant, who is her younger
sister. 3
The trial court, in its decision of 02 May 1995, found the case of the prosecution against the accused as having
been duly established and so ruled out the defense theory of denial and supposed ill-will on the part of
private complainant that allegedly had motivated the filing of the complaint against her father. The court
adjudged:

The prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, gave an account, rather briefly, of the evidence WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
submitted by the prosecution. of rape and hereby sentences him to suffer the DEATH PENALTY, to indemnify the
complainant in the amount of P75,000.00, Philippine Currency, and to pay the costs.
On August 3, 1994, complainant Manuela Bermas, 15 years old, was raped by her own
father, appellant Rufino Bermas, while she was lying down on a wooden bed inside SO ORDERED. 4
their house at Creek Drive II, San Antonio Valley 8, Parañaque, Metro Manila (pp. 6-7,
TSN, Oct. 19, 1994). Armed with a knife, appellant removed the victim's shorts and
In their 61-page brief, defense counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva (in collaboration with the Anti-Death
panty, placed himself above her, inserted his penis in her vagina and conducted coital
Penalty Task Force), detailed several errors allegedly committed by the court a quo; thus:
movements (pp. 7-8, ibid.). After the appellant satisfied his lustful desire, he threatened
the victim with death if she reports the incident to anyone. (p. 9, ibid.)
I. THE ACCUSED WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS.
On August 9, 1994, complainant was medically examined at the NBI, which yielded the
following findings: A. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE
AND VIGILANT COUNSEL.
The findings concluded: 1. No evident sign of extragenital physical injuries noted on the
body of the subject at the time of examination; 2. Hymen, intact but distensible and its
office wide (2.7 cm. In diameter) as to allow complete penetration by an average sized, 1. The trial court did
adult, Filipino male organ in full erection without producing any hymenal laceration. 2 not observe the
correct selection
process in appointing
The defense proffered the testimony of the accused, who denied the charge, and that of his married
the accused's
daughter, Luzviminda Mendez, who attributed the accusation made by her younger sister to a mere
counsel de officio;

12
2. The Public n
Attorney could not
give justice to the o
accused; n

t
a
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13
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14
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15
 e a
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N H
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f. Negligent in her conduct at the initial
;
trial.

b
3. The Vanishing Second Counsel de Officio.
.

16
 H FACTS AND THEREFORE ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY
i OF RAPE BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 5
s
The Court, after a painstaking review of the records, finds merit in the appeal enough to warrant a remand of
w
the case for new trial.
o
r
k It would appear that on 08 August 1994 Manuela P. Bermas, then 15 years of age, assisted by her mother
Rosita Bermas, executed a sworn statement before SPO1 Dominador Nipas, Jr., of the Parañaque Police
w Station, stating, in sum, that she had been raped by accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas, her own father in
a 1991 and 1993, as well as on 03 August 1994, particularly the subject matter of the complaint, hereinbefore
s quoted, duly signed and filed conformably with Section 7, Rule 112, of the Rules of Court. The Second
Assistant Prosecutor, issued a certification to the effect that the accused had waived his right to a preliminary
s investigation.
h
o On the day scheduled for his arraignment on 03 October 1994, the accused was brought before the trial court
d without counsel. The court thereupon assigned Atty. Rosa Elmira C Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office to
d be the counsel de officio. Accused forthwith pleaded not guilty. The pre-trial was waived.
y
;
The initial reception of evidence was held on 19 October 1994. The prosecution placed complainant Manuela
Bermas at the witness stand. She testified on direct examination with hardly any participation by defense
4. The Reluctant counsel who, inexplicably, later waived the cross-examination and then asked the court to be relieved of her
Third Counsel de duty as counsel de officio.
Officio

ATTY. VILLARIN:
5. The performance
of all three
counsels de And I am requesting if this Honorable Court would allow me and
officio was my pañero besides me, would accede to my request that I be
ineffective and relieved as counsel de officio because I could not also give justice
prejudicial to the to the accused because as a lady lawyer, if my pañero here and if
accused. this Honorable Court will accede to my request.

B. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS COURT:

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE TRIED BY
AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE AND TO BE It is your sworn duty to defend the helpless and the defenseless.
PRESUMED INNOCENT. That is your sworn duty, Mrs. Counsel de Officio. Are you
retracting?
C. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE HEARD ATTY. VILLARIN.
AND FOR WITNESSES TO TESTIFY IN HIS
BEHALF.
That is why I am asking this Honorable Court. 6

D. THE ARRAIGNMENT OF THE ACCUSED

WAS INVALID.
E. THE ACCUSED WAS DENIED THE EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT "SCRUTINIZE WITH EXTREME
CAUTION" THE PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE, MISAPPRECIATED THE
Counsel's request was granted, and Atty. Roberto Gomez was appointed the new counsel de
officio. While Atty. Gomez was ultimately allowed to cross-examine the complainant, it should be
quite evident, however, that he barely had time, to prepare therefor. On this score, defense
counsel Fernandez & Kasilag-Villanueva in the instant appeal would later point out:
To substitute for her, the Public Attorney recommended Atty. Roberto Gomez to be
appointed as defense counsel de officio. And so the trial court appointed him.

17
 Atty. Gomez asked for a ten minute recess before he began his cross examination,
presumably to prepare. But a ten minute preparation to cross examine the complainant
upon whose testimony largely rests the verdict on the accused who stands to be meted
the death penalty if found guilty, is far too inadequate. He could not possibly have
familiarized himself with the records and surrounding circumstances of the case, read
the complaint, the statement of the complainant, the medico-legal report, memos of
the police, transcripts and other relevant documents and confer with the accused and
his witnesses, all in ten minutes. 4
The prosecution abruptly rested its case after the medico-legal officer had testified.
The reception of the defense evidence was scheduled for 12 December 1994, it was later reset to 09 January
1995. When the case was called on 09 January 1995, the following transpired:
COURT.
Where is the counsel for the accused?
COURT.
Did he file his withdrawal in this case? It is supposed to be the
turn of the defense to present its evidence.
PROSECUTOR GARCIA.
Yes, Your Honor. The prosecution had already rested its case.
COURT:
Last time he asked for the continuance of this case and
considering that the accused is under detention . . . it seems he
cannot comply with his obligation.
COURT:
(To the accused) Nasaan ang abogado mo?
ACCUSED R. BERMAS.
Wala po.
COURT:
It is already the turn of the defense to present its evidence in this
case. In view of the fact that the defense counsel is not
interested anymore in defending the accused because last time
he moved for the continuance of the hearing of this case and
since this time he did not appear, he is unduly delaying the
proceedings of this case and considering the accused here is
under detention, I think it would be better if the Court appoints
another lawyer. He should file his withdrawal if he is not
interested anymore.
In view of the fact that the counsel de officio has repeatedly
failed to appear in this Court to defend his client-accused, the
Court is hereby constrained to appoint another counsel de
officio to handle the defense of the accused. For this purpose,
Atty. Nicanor Lonzame is hereby appointed as the counsel de
officio for accused Rufino Mirandilla Bermas. 8
The hearing scheduled for that day was reset to 16 January 1995 upon the request of Atty.
Lonzame. On even date, Atty. Lonzame himself asked to be relieved as counsel de officio but later,
albeit reluctantly, retracted, thus:
COURT:
Where is the accused? Where is the counsel de officio?
ATTY. NICANOR LONZAME:
As counsel de officio, Your Honor. The lawyer from the PAO is
here, may I be allowed to give her my responsibility as counsel de
officio considering that the lawyer from the PAO.
COURT:
What about?
ATTY. LONZAME.
I was appointed because the PAO lawyer was not around. If the
Court will allow us to be relieved from our responsibility as
appointed counsel de officio of the accused.
COURT.
You want to be relieved of your responsibility as appointed
counsel de officio? As an officer of the Court you don't want to
handle the defense of the accused in this case?
ATTY. LONZAME.
I will be withdrawing my previous manifestation that I be relieved
of my responsibility as counsel de officio.
COURT.
18
 So, therefore, counsel, are you now ready?
ATTY. LONZAME.
Yes, Your Honor. 9
Trial proceeded with the accused being the first to be put at the witness stand. He denied the
accusation against him. The next witness to be presented was his married daughter who
corroborated her father's claim of innocence.
The defense counsel in the instant appeal took over from Atty. Lonzame who himself, for one reason or
another, had ceased to appear for and in behalf of accused-appellant.
This Court finds and must hold, most regrettably, that accused-appellant has not properly and effectively
been accorded the right to counsel. So important is the right to counsel that it has been enshrined in our
fundamental law and its precursor laws. Indeed, even prior to the advent of the 1935 Constitution, the right
to counsel of an accused has already been recognized under General Order No. 58, dated 23 April 1900,
stating that a defendant in all criminal prosecutions is entitled to counsel at every stage of the
proceedings, 10 and that if he is unable to employ counsel, the court must assign one to defend him. 11 The
1935 Constitution has no less been expressive in declaring, in Article III, Section 17, thereof, that —
(17) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed to be innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and
public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf.
Except for a proviso allowing trial in absentia, the right to counsel under the 1973 Constitution,
essentially, has remained unchanged. Under the 1987 Constitution, a worthwhile innovation that
has been introduced is the provision from which prevailing jurisprudence on the availability of the
right to counsel as early as the stage of custodial interrogation can be deemed to be predicated.
The rule, found in Sections 12 and 14, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution, states —
Sec 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 14 xxx xxx xxx
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy,
impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his
behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of
the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
The constitutional mandate is reflected in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedures which declares in Section 1,
Rule 115, thereof, that it is a right of the accused at the trial to be present in person and by counsel at every
stage of the proceedings from the arraignment to the promulgation of the judgment.
The presence and participation of counsel in the defense of an accused in criminal proceedings should never
be taken lightly. 12 Chief Justice Moran in People vs. Holgado, 13 explained:
In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it
does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure,
and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to
persons who are ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be
assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it has become a constitutional right
and it so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the Court
to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him
whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign
one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a reasonable time to
procure an attorney of his own. 14
In William vs. Kaiser; 15 the United States Supreme Court, through the late Justice Douglas, has rightly
observed that the accused "needs the aid of counsel lest he be the victim of overzealous prosecutors, of the
law's complexity or of his own ignorance or bewilderment." An accused must be given the right to be
represented by counsel for, unless so represented, there is great danger that any defense presented in his
behalf will be as inadequate considering the legal perquisites and skills needed in the court
proceedings. 16 The right to counsel proceeds from the fundamental principle of due process which basically
means that a person must be heard before being condemned. The due process requirement is a part of a
person's basic rights; it is not a mere formality that may be dispensed with or performed perfunctorily.
The right to counsel must be more than lust the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the mere
propounding of standard questions and objections. The right to counsel means that the accused is amply
accorded legal assistance extended by a counsel who commits himself to the cause for the defense and acts
accordingly. The right assumes an active involvement by the lawyer in the proceedings, particularly at the trial
of the case, his bearing constantly in mind of the basic rights of the accused, his being well-versed on the
case, and his knowing the fundamental procedures, essential laws and existing jurisprudence. The right of an
accused to counsel finds substance in the performance by the lawyer of his sworn duty of fidelity to his client.
Tersely put, it means an efficient and truly decisive legal assistance and not a simple perfunctory
representation. 17
It is never enough that accused be simply informed of his right to counsel; he should also be asked whether
he wants to avail himself of one and should be told that he can hire a counsel of his own choice if he so
desires or that one can be provided to him at his request. 18 Section 7, Rule 116, of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
Sec. 7. Appointment of counsel de oficio. — The court, considering the gravity of the
offense and the difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de
oficio only such members of the bar in good standing who, by reason of their
experience and ability may adequately defend the accused. But in localities where such
19
 members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person, resident of
the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused.
A counsel de oficio is expected to do his utmost. 19 A mere pro-forma appointment of de
oficiocounsel who fails to genuinely protect the interests of the accused merits
disapprobation. 20 The exacting demands expected of a lawyer should be no less than stringent
when one is a counsel de officio. He must take the case not as a burden but as an opportunity to
assist in the proper dispensation of justice. No lawyer is to be excused from this responsibility
except only for the most compelling and cogent reasons. 21
Just weeks ago, in People vs. Sevilleno, G.R. No. 129058, promulgated on 29 March 1999, this Court has said:
We cannot right finis to this discussion without making known our displeasure over the
manner by which the PAO lawyers dispensed with their duties. All three (3) of them
displayed manifest disinterest on the plight of their client.
xxx xxx xxx
Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires every lawyer to serve his
client with utmost dedication, competence and diligence. He must not neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in this regard renders him administratively
liable. Obviously, in the instant case, the aforenamed defense lawyers did not protect,
much less uphold, the fundamental rights of the accused. Instead, they haphazardly
performed their function as counsel de oficio to the detriment and prejudice of the
accused Sevilleno, however guilty he might have been found to be after trial. Inevitably,
this Court must advise Attys. Agravante, Pabalinas and Saldavia to adhere closely and
faithfully to the tenets espoused in the Code of Professional Responsibility, otherwise,
commission of any similar act in the future will be severely sanctioned.
The Court sees no other choice than to direct the remand of the case to the court a quo for new trial.
WHEREFORE, let this case be REMANDED to the court a quo for trial on the basis of the complaint,
aforequoted, under which he was arraigned Atty. Ricardo A Fernandez, Jr. of the Anti-Death Penalty Task
Force is hereby appointed counsel de officio for the appellant.
Attys. Rosa Elmina Villamin of the Public Attorney's Office, Parañaque, Roberto Gomez and Nicanor Lonzame
are hereby ADMONISHED for having fallen much too short of their responsibility as officers of the court and
as members of the Bar and are warned that any similar infraction shall be dealt with most
severely.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. L-No. 5292 August 28, 1909
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff,
vs.
THE MORO MANALINDE, defendant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey for plaintiff.
Ramon Diokno for defendant.
TORRES, J.:
Between 2 and 3 o'clock on the afternoon of the 19th of January, 1909, while Juan Igual, a Spaniard, was
seated on a chair in the doorway of Sousa's store in Cotabato, Moro Province, he suddenly received a wound
on the head delivered from behind and inflicted with a kris. Ricardo Doroteo, a clerk in the said store, who
was standing behind the counter, upon hearing the noise and the cry of the wounded man, ran to his
assistance and found him lying on the ground. Meanwhile the aggressor, the Moro Manalinde, approached a
Chinaman named Choa, who was passing along the street, and just as the latter was putting down his load in
front of the door of a store and was about to enter, attacked him with the same weapon, inflicting a severe
wound in the left shoulder, on account of which he fell to the ground. The Moro, who came from the
rancheria of Dupit and had entered the town carrying his weapon wrapped up in banana leaves, in the
meantime escaped by running away from the town. Both wounded men, the Chinaman and the Spaniard,
were taken to the hospital, where the former died within an hour, the record not stating the result of the
wound inflicted on the Spaniard Juan Igual.
In view of the above a complaint was filed by the provincial fiscal with the district court charging Manalinde
with the crime of murder, and proceedings having been instituted, the trial judge, in view of the evidence
adduced, rendered judgment on the 5th of February of said year, sentencing the accused to the penalty of
death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The case has been
submitted to this court for review.
From the above facts fully substantiated in this case, it appears beyond doubt that the crime of murder,
defined and punished by article 403 of the Penal Code, was committed on the person of the Chinaman Choa,
in that the deceased was unexpectedly and suddenly attacked, receiving a deep cut on the left shoulder at
the moment when he had just put down the load that he was carrying and was about to start for the door of
the store in front of which he stopped for the purpose of entering therein. As a result of the tremendous
wound inflicted upon him by the heavy and unexpected blow, he was unable, not only to defend himself,
apart from the fact that he was unarmed, but even to flee from the danger, and falling to the ground, died in
an hour's time. It is unquestionable that by the means and form employed in the attack the violent death of
the said Chinaman was consummated with deceit and treachery (alevosia), one of the five qualifying
circumstances enumerated in the aforesaid article as calling for the greatest punishment.
When Manalinde was arrested he pleaded guilty and confessed that he had perpetrated the crime herein
mentioned, stating that his wife had died about one hundred days before and that he had come from his
home in Catumaldu by order of the Datto Rajamudah Mupuck, who had directed him to go juramentado in
Cotabato in order to kill somebody, because the said Mupuck had certain grievances to avenge against a
lieutenant and a sergeant, the said datto further stating that if he, Manalinde, was successful in the matter,
he would give him a pretty woman on his return, but that in case he was captured he was to say that he
performed the killing by order of Maticayo, Datto Piang, Tambal and Inug. In order to carry out his intention
to kill two persons in the town of Cotabato he provided himself with a kris, which he concealed in banana
leaves, and, traveling for a day and a night from his home, upon reaching the town, attacked from behind a
Spaniard who was seated in front of a store and, wounding him, immediately after attacked a Chinaman, who
was close by, just as the latter was placing a tin that he was carrying on the ground and he was about to enter
a store near by, cutting him on the left shoulder and fleeing at once; he further stated that he had no quarrel
with the assaulted persons.
From the statements made by the accused his culpability as the sole-confessed and self-convicted author of
the crime in question has been unquestionably established, nor can his allegation that he acted by order of
Datto Mupuck and that therefore he was not responsible exculpate him, because it was not a matter of
proper obedience. The excuse that he went juramentado by order of the said datto and on that account killed
20
only two persons, whereas if he had taken the oath of his own volition he would have killed many more,
because it is the barbarous and savage custom of a juramentado to kill anyone without any motive or reason
whatever, can not under any consideration be accepted or considered under the laws of civilized nations;
such exhibitions of ferocity and savagery must be restrained, especially as the very people who up to the
present time have been practicing such acts are well aware that the established authorities in this country can
never allow them to go unpunished, and as has happened a number of times in towns
where juramentados are in the habit of appearing, the punishment of the author has followed every crime so
committed.
In the commission of the crime of murder the presence of aggravating circumstances 3 and 7 of article 10 of
the Penal Code should be taken into consideration in that promise of reward and premeditation are present,
which in the present case are held to be generic, since the crime has already been qualified as committed
with the treachery, because the accused confessed that he voluntarily obeyed the order given him by Datto
Mupuck to go juramentadoand kill some one in the town of Cotabato, with the promise that if he escaped
punishment he would be rewarded with a pretty woman. Upon complying with the order the accused
undoubtedly acted of his own volition and with the knowledge that he would inflict irreparable injury on
some of his fellow-beings, depriving them of life without any reason whatever, well knowing that he was
about to commit a most serious deed which the laws in force in this country and the constituted authorities
could by no means permit. Datto Mupuck, who ordered and induced him to commit the crimes, as well as the
accused knew perfectly well that he might be caught and punished in the act of committing them.
As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused, upon accepting the order and
undertaking the journey in order to comply therewith, deliberately considered and carefully and thoughtfully
meditated over the nature and the consequences of the acts which, under orders received from the said
datto, he was about to carry out, and to that end provided himself with a weapon, concealing it by wrapping
it up, and started on a journey of a day and a night for the sole purpose of taking the life of two unfortunate
persons whom he did not know, and with whom he had never had any trouble; nor did there exist any reason
which, to a certain extent, might warrant his perverse deed. The fact that the arrangement between the
instigator and the tool considered the killing of unknown persons, the first encountered, does not bar the
consideration of the circumstance of premeditation. The nature and the circumstances which characterize the
crime, the perversity of the culprit, and the material and moral injury are the same, and the fact that the
victim was not predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the crime. The person having been
deprived of his life by deeds executed with deliberate intent, the crime is considered a premeditated one as
the firm and persistent intention of the accused from the moment, before said death, when he received the
order until the crime was committed in manifestly evident. Even though in a crime committed upon offer of
money, reward or promise, premeditation is sometimes present, the latter not being inherent in the former,
and there existing no incompatibility between the two, premeditation can not necessarily be considered as
included merely because an offer of money, reward or promise was made, for the latter might have existed
without the former, the one being independent of the other. In the present case there can be no doubt that
after the crime was agreed upon by means of a promise of reward, the criminal by his subsequent conduct
showed a persistency and firm intent in his plan to carry out the crime which he intentionally agreed to
execute, it being immaterial whether Datto Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime, once Manalinde
obeyed the inducement and voluntarily executed it.
The facts in this case are quite different from those in the proceedings instituted by the United States vs.
Caranto et al., wherein the decision on page 256 of Volume IV of the Philippine Reports was rendered, as may
be seen from the mere perusal of the statement of facts. It is also different from the case where a criminal
who has made up his mind to kill a certain individual kills a person other than the object of his criminal intent.
On going to Cotabato the Moro Manalinde intended to and did kill the first two persons he encountered, and
the fact that the victim was not predetermined does not alter the nature, conditions, or circumstances of the
crime, for the reason that to cause the violent death of a human being without any reasonable motive is
always punishable with a more or less grave penalty according to the nature of the concurrent circumstances.
For the above reasons and in view of the fact that no mitigating circumstance is present to neutralize the
effects of the aggravating ones, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with
costs provided however, that the penalty imposed on the culprit shall be executed in accordance with the
provisions of Acts. Nos. 451 and 1577, and that in the event of a pardon being granted he shall likewise be
sentenced to suffer the accessory penalties imposed by article 53 of the Penal Code. So ordered.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32914 August 30, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LAUREANO SANGALANG, accused-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Solicitor Ma.
Rosario Quetulio Losa for plaintiff-appellee.
Narciso V. Cruz, Jr. for accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:p
This is a murder case. The testimonies of the two prosecution eyewitnesses disclose that at around six o'clock
in the morning of June 9, 1968 Ricardo Cortez left his nipa hut located at Sitio Adlas, Barrio Biluso, Silang,
Cavite to gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby. Flora Sarno, his wife, was left inside the hut. While he was
on top of the tree gathering tuba, he was struck by a volley of shots. He fell to the ground at the base of the
coconut tree.
His wife Flora heard three successive shot coming south of the hut. She went outside the hut. From a distance
of about twenty-five meters, she saw five men, each armed with a long firearm, firing at her husband. He was
already wounded and was lying on the ground at the foot of the coconut tree. His assailants were about five
meters away from him.
She recognized Laureano Sangalang as one of the five armed men who were firing at her husband. She and
her brother Ricardo had known Sangalang since their childhood. She also recognized Conrado Gonzales,
Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the other malefactors.
Flora ran towards the place where her husband had fallen. She shouted, "Bakit ninyo pinagbabaril ang aking
asawa". The five persons fired at her. She was then about twenty meters away from them. She retreated to
the hut for cover. She heard some more shots. After the lapse of about five minutes, Laureano Sangalang and
his companions left the place. When Flora returned to the spot where her husband was prostrate, he was
already dead.
On the occasion already described, Ricardo Sarno, twenty-seven years old, a brother of Flora, was inside his
own nipa hut which was about ten meters away from Flora's hut. He was drinking coffee. His wife and
children were eating breakfast. He heard several shots. He came out of his hut. He saw his brother-in-law
being shot by Laureano Sangalang, Eleuterio Cuyom, Perino Canuel, Irineo Canuel and Conrado Gonzales. He
saw Sangalang using a Garand carbine in shooting his brother-in-law. The latter fell from the top of the
coconut tree after he was shot (10 tsn). His sister Flora was trying to approach her husband but she had to
21
flee to her hut when Sangalang and his companions fired at her. He wanted to join her but he was likewise
fired upon by the five men. So, he retired and took refuge in his own hut.
Later, Sarno saw his sister Flora, sitting inside her hut. He followed her after she left the hut and went to see
her dead husband, who was lying on the ground, face up, at the base of the coconut tree. When he noticed
that his brother-in-law was already dead, he gathered his children and brought them to Sitio Biga, which was
more or less thirty meters away from his hut in Sitio Adlas. Ricardo reported the killing to the chief of police
who went to the scene of the crime with some policemen and Constabularymen.
The necropsy report shows that the twenty-five-year-old Cortez sustained twenty-three gunshot wounds on
the different parts of the body, fourteen of which were entrance-wounds, and nine were exit-wounds (Exh. A
and B). He died due to the multiple gunshot wounds (Exh. C).
On June 10, 1968 or on the day following the killing, Flora and Ricardo were interrogated by the Silang police.
They executed sworn statements before the Municipal Judge pointing to Laureano Sangalang, Conrado
Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the assassins of Ricardo Cortez. Flora said in
her statement that she knew those persons because from time to time they used to pass by her place. They
resided at Barrio Capitula, Dasmariñas, which is near Barrio Adlas. On the basis of those statements, the
police filed on June 10 in the Municipal Court a complaint for murder against the five aforenamed persons.
Sangalang was arrested. He posted bail in the sum of P50,000 on June 13. He waived the second stage of the
preliminary investigation. The other accused have not been apprehended. On August 8, 1968 the Provincial
Fiscal filed an information for murder against Sangalang.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Tagaytay City Branch, rendered a judgment convicting
Sangalang of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of Ricardo
Cortez an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos and to pay his widow moral damages in the sum of ten
thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. TG-162). Sangalang appealed.
Sangalang points to certain discrepancies in the declarations of Mrs. Cortez and her brother Ricardo Sarno.
Those inconsistencies, which are not glaring, strengthen their credibility and show that their testimonies were
not coached nor rehearsed. The discrepancies may be attributed to deficiencies in observation and
recollection, or misapprehension of the misleading and confusing questions during cross-examination, or to
the defective translation of the questions and answers but they do not necessarily indicate a wilful attempt to
commit falsehood (People vs. Selfaison, 110 Phil. 839; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1973, 54
SCRA 350).
The controlling fact is that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno clearly and consistently testified that they saw Sangalang, a
person already well-known to them, among the five armed persons who shot Ricardo Cortez. That
unwavering identification negates appellant's alibi.
The prosecution did not prove the motive for the killing. On the other hand, Sangalang did not show that Mrs.
Cortez and Sarno were impelled by a malicious desire to falsely incriminate him. .
Counsel de oficio meticulously examined the contradictions and deficiencies in the evidence for the
prosecution. He made a spirited defense of the appellant. However, his efforts failed to cast any reasonable
doubt on Sangalang's complicity in the killing.
The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree. He was unarmed and defenseless.
He was not expecting to be assaulted. He did not give any immediate provocation. The deliberate, surprise
attack shows that Sangalang and his companions employed a mode of execution which insured the killing
without any risk to them arising from any defense which the victim could have made. The qualifying
circumstance of treachery (alevosia), which was alleged in the information, was duly established (See art.
14[16], Revised Penal Code). Hence, the killing can be categorized as murder (See People vs. Sedenio, 94 Phil.
1046). Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of band(U. S. vs. Abelinde, 1 Phil. 568). Evident
premeditation, which was alleged in the information, was not proven.

The appellant, a fifty-six-year old farmer, admitted that he knew Cortez and that he knows his wife, Flora
Sarno. He pleaded an alibi. He declared that in the afternoon of June 8, 1968 he and Crispulo Mendoza went
to the house of Julian Gatdula at Dapitan Street, Sampaloc, Manila. He arrived at Gatdula's place at six
o'clock. He wanted to borrow money from Gatdula to defray the matriculation fees of his children.
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on Sangalang (Arts. 64[1] and 248, Revised
Penal Code).
Finding no error in its judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the appellant.

As Gatdula had no money at that time, he advised Sangalang to wait until morning. He would try to raise the
SO ORDERED.
sum of two hundred pesos which Sangalang desired to borrow. Sangalang and Mendoza agreed. They
allegedly slept in Gatdula's house on the night of June 8th. The next morning, they breakfasted in that house.
At about ten o'clock on June 9, Gatdula delivered the two hundred pesos to Sangalang. He and Mendoza then
went to the Central Market in Manila and then to Quiapo. They returned to Cavite and arrived at seven
o'clock in the evening of June 9 in Barrio Capdula. Gatdula and Mendoza corroborated Sangalang's alibi. [G.R. No. 115431. April 18, 1996]

In this appeal Sangalang insists on his alibi and impugns the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses, Mrs.
Cortez and the victim's brother-in-law, Ricardo Sarno. The basic issue is whether their eyewitness-testimony
that they saw appellant Sangalang as one of the five armed persons, who riddled Cortez with fourteen THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSE TORREFIEL, accused-appellant.
gunshot wounds of entry, is sufficient to overcome his alibi. In essence, the case projects the ever recurring
conflict in criminal jurisprudence between positive identification and alibi. SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; ALIBI; CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE ACCUSED
The trial court rejected appellant's alibi. It noted that although his witnesses, Mendoza and Gatdula, learned AND ABSENT PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY TO BE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME. - It is well-settled that the
of his arrest, and Mendoza even visited him in the municipal jail, Sangalang and his witnesses did not
defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the accused. Furthermore, for alibi to
interpose the defense of alibi when he was investigated by the police and when he was summoned at the prosper, the accused must establish not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was
preliminary investigation.
committed but that it was also physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission.

22
2. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS; UPHELD ABSENT IMPROPER MOTIVE. - It is significant to note that no
improper motive can be imputed to Realidad Mangilog as would make her testify falsely against
accused-appellant, hence her testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
3. ID.; ID.; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS CONCLUSIVE AND OUGHT NOT TO BE
DISTURBED; EXCEPTION. - The Court of Appeals appreciated abuse of superior strength, aid of armed
men and evident premeditation as aggravating circumstances. These findings are factual and the rule is
that findings of the Court of Appeals upon factual questions are conclusive and ought not to be
disturbed unless shown to be contrary to the evidence on record, and, in this case, there is no such
showing.
4. CRIMINAL LAW; CONSPIRACY; MAY BE INFERRED FROM THE ACTS OF THE ACCUSED WHICH INDICATE
THEIR COMMON INTENTION TO COMMIT THE CRIME. This contention we also find untenable,
conspiracy being clearly manifest in this case as was correctly found by the Court of Appeals. For
collective responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that conspiracy be proved by direct
evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime as only rarely would such an agreement be
demonstrable since in the nature of things criminal undertakings are rarely documented by agreement
in writing. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused immediately prior to, during and
right after the shooting of the victim which indicate their common intention to commit the crime. The
record shows that: (1) all the accused which include accused-appellant arrived together at the scene of
the killings; (2) they were all fully armed; (3) three of them simultaneously shot to death Leopoldo
Mangilog, while an undetermined number shot and stabbed to death Reynaldo Mangilog; (4) the
attack on the two victims was executed simultaneously; and (5) the accuseds statement to the effect
that the victims were responsible for the fact that the military men were running after them. This tends
to establish a motive on their part to kill the victims. All these indubitably indicate a concerted effort
on the part of the accused on a common design to kill the victims.
5. ID.; ID.; THE ACT OF ONE CONSPIRATOR IS THE ACT OF ALL. - Conspiracy having been adequately shown,
all the accused are answerable as co-principals regardless of the degree of their participation. In fact, it
is not necessary to ascertain the individual participation in the final liquidation of the victims or to
ascertain the precise modality or extent of participation of each individual conspirator as the applicable
rule is that the act of one conspirator is the act of all of them. It hardly matters, therefore, that
accused-appellant did not actually participate in the killing of Reynaldo Mangilog or of Leopoldo
Mangilog.
6. ID.; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY; PRESENT WHEN VICTIMS WERE CLEARLY NOT IN ANY
POSITION TO DEFEND THEMSELVES; CASE AT BAR. - As alleged in the informations and as correctly
observed by the Solicitor General, the killing of the victims was qualified by treachery. Leopoldo
Mangilog was shot while he was serving the accused coffee or shortly thereafter. Reynaldo Mangilog,
on the other hand, was shot and stabbed to death while he was taking a bath. It may be added that the
victims were naturally unarmed at that time and their execution was done so early in the morning, that
is, when they had practically just awakened. Under the circumstances, the victims were clearly not in
any position to defend themselves from the sudden and unexpected attack of the accused. These
circumstances are manifestly indicative of the presence of the conditions under which treachery may
be appreciated, i.e., the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and that said means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ABSORBS THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND AID OF ARMED
MEN. - However, we believe, and so hold, that treachery absorbs the circumstances of abuse of
superior strength and aid of armed men, as it appears that the accused saw to it that they were armed
and far outnumbered the victims precisely to ensure the accomplishment of their criminal objective.
8. ID.; MURDER; PROPER IMPOSABLE PENALTY. - Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed
penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Since we find accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by treachery in Criminal
Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 and that the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation was
also attendant, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed in each case, applying Article 63 of
the Revised Penal Code and considering the proscription against the imposition of the death penalty at
the time the crimes were committed.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Cyril A. Tangle for accused-appellants.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel; Hilario Masgong alias Mark; Casiano Masgong alias Manny; Saturnino
Suyod alias Ka Eddie; Jerry Delicano alias Ka Cocoy; Luciano Solanoy, Jr., alias Ka Balot; Noel Semira alias Ka
Nido; Ricky David alias Ka Macky; and Alex Francisco alias Ka Jing, were charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909
and 2910 for Murder and in Criminal Case No. 2911 for Robbery before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8,
Kalibo, Alklan. These cases were, upon agreement of the parties, jointly tried, since they arose from the same
incident and involved the same parties. The trial proceeded as against the accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel
only, the rest of the accused having remained at large.
After trial, the court a quo convicted accused-appellant1 in each of the cases, the dispositive portions of
which are quoted hereinbelow:
In Criminal Case No. 2909 for Murder:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Jose Torrefiel, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and hereby sentences the accused to a penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen (17) years, Four (4)
months and One (1) day to Eighteen (18) years and Eight (8) months.
The accused is hereby ordered also to indemnify the family of the victim the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) by way of damages. x x x2
In Criminal Case No. 2910 for Murder:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused, Jose Torrefiel, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder and hereby sentences the accused to a penalty of imprisonment of Seventeen (17) years, Four (4)
months and One (1) day to Eighteen (18) years and Eight (8) months.
The accused is hereby ordered also to indemnify the family of the victim the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) by way of damages. x x x3
In Criminal Case No. 2911 for Robbery:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Jose Torrefiel guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery and sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of Twelve (12) years and One (1) day to Fourteen
(14) years and Eight (8) months. x x x.4
Accused-appellant Jose Torrefiel, appealed to the Court of Appeals. After considering the evidence and
the law involved, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction in all the cases but refrained from
entering judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 for murder, having ascertained that the proper
23
imposable penalty for each of said crimes is reclusion perpetua, and instead, certified these two (2) cases to
us for final determination pursuant to Section 13 of Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
The facts as correctly summarized by the prosecution in its Brief are as follows:5
On May 26, 1989 at about 5:00 oclock in the morning at Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan, Realidad Mangilog
woke up early to prepare their breakfast. Her husband Leopoldo Mangilog and her son Reynaldo were about
to join her downstairs, when someone knocked at the kitchen backdoor (TSN, March 21, 1990, pp. 3-4).
It was Leonardo who opened the door. When the door was opened appellant Jose Torrefiel armed with a bolo
and a hand gun entered the house first followed by Masiano Masgong, Hilario Masgong, Alex Francisco,
Saturnino Suyod and Noel alias Nido in that order, who were all armed with long firearms. (TSN, Ibid., p. 5)
The group greeted Leopoldo as How are you Tay? to which the latter answered as usual. Leopoldo even
served the newcomers with coffee, but because the coffee was not sufficient for them, Realidad asked
Hermogenes Calizo, who was then the errand boy of the Mangilog (sic), to buy coffee from the store.
(TSN, Id., pp. 5-6).
The group of appellant Torrefiel did not even touch or taste the coffee served them by Leopoldo. Instead,
appellant, Casiano Masgong and Satur Suyod aimed their guns at Leopoldo and started shooting him to death
(TSN, Id., p. 6).6 Simultaneous to the shooting of Leopoldo inside the house by the group of appellant was the
shooting and stabbing of Reynaldo who was then taking a bath inside the bathroom located outside of the
house by the other members of the group who did not enter the house. (TSN. id., p. 7)
After the killing of Leopoldo and Reynaldo, the accused ransacked the house and took P500.00 cash, wrist
watch, kitchen wares, grocery items, chickens and guitar. (TSN, Id., p. 10)
Before the accused left the house of the victims, they even fired their guns at random. They were blaming the
victims to be responsible to the incident why the military was running after them. They were also telling the
people along the road that the fish is okey and could be ready to be butchered (Id., p. 11).
Accused-appellant invoked the defense of alibi, claiming that at about 7:00 oclock in the morning of
May 26, 1989, he was at the house of Barangay Captain Benedicto Puod in Barangay Agbalogo, Makato,
Aklan, which can be reached in an hour and a half( 1 1/2) from Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan, the scene of
the incident. He had gone on vacation to Barangay Agbalogo on May 22, 1989 and attended the fiesta
on May 25, 1989. He had remained in the said barangay since then upon the advice of his wife not to return
to Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan, appellants place of residence, as the situation there was somewhat
hot.7 Benedicto Puod confirmed appellants claim as to his whereabouts in the morning of May 26, 1989,
recounting that he and appellant were, indeed, together drinking alcoholic drinks from 7:00 to 11:00 oclock in
the morning on the occasion of the birthday of his child.8 In addition, Pedro Tosio as a witness testified as to
the presence of appellant at his house in Barangay Agbalogo in the morning until about 5:00 oclock in the
afternoon of May 25, 1989, the day of the fiesta, declaring further that he also saw appellant pass by his
house on May 26, 1989.9
In his appeal, accused-appellant interposed the following assignment of errors:
I Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan.14 He could not be mistaken as to appellants identity since he had on several
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2909.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2910.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY IN
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2911.10
On the first and third assignment of errors, accused-appellant maintains his defense of alibi, stressing
that, not being around at the time and place of the incident as he was at Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan,
he could not have murdered Leopoldo Mangilog and robbed the Mangillogs of their personal belongings.
We are not persuaded.
It is well-settled that the defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the
accused.11 Furthermore, for alibi to prosper, the accused must establish not only that he was somewhere else
when the crime was committed but that it was also physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission.12
That accused-appellant had been positively identified as one of the culprits by prosecution witness
Realidad Mangilog cannot be doubted. The Mangilogs and the accused-appellant had known each other for
years as neighbors. Accused-appellant whose parents reside in Barangay Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan,
established residence in Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan when he got married to a resident there. Since his
house is only about one hundred and fifty (150) meters away from that of the Mangilogs, there were
occasions when accused-appellant would visit the Mangilogs, usually for coffee, and that Leopoldo Mangilog
would also go to the accused-appellants house. Indeed, eyewitness Realidad Mangilog knows the accused-
appellant so well that she could not have been mistaken in identifying appellant as one of those armed men
responsible for the death of her husband and son on that fateful morning of May 26, 1989. She testified thus:
Q. When your husband open (sic) the door, was there somebody who got inside?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where were you at that time?
A. I am (sic) at that time at the door dividing the sala and the dining room.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Were you able to recognized (sic) those persons who entered your house?
A. I can recognized (sic) Jose Torrefiel leading the group and Masiano Masgong alias Manny, Alex
Francisco followed by Satur or Saturnino Suyod and the other one was Noel Semira alias
Nido.13
Moreover, the two other prosecution witnesses, Coreto Maguirang and Hermogenes Calizo, confirmed
the presence of accused-appellant in Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan at the time of the incident in question.
Maquirang testified that while he watched over his carabao which was grazing on May 26, 1989 at
around 5:00 oclock in the morning, he saw the appellant and his group as they passed by him from a distance
of about ten (10) meters heading towards the direction of the house of Leopoldo Mangilog in Barangay
occasions seen appellant together with the same group of armed men.15 Calizo, on the other hand, claimed
that he had seen appellant face to face in the house of the Mangilogs that same morning of May 26,
1989 shortly before the subject incident occurred since at that time he was living in said house. He only
happened to be sent out by Realidad Mangilog to buy coffee so he did not get to see the actual killing of
Leopoldo and Reynaldo Mangilog.16
24
 It is significant to note that no improper motive can be imputed to Realidad Mangilog as would make
her testify falsely against accused-appellant; hence her testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.17
Evidently complementing the positive identification of accused-appellant as one of the perpetrators of
the crimes charged is his failure to prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at Barangay
Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan at the time of the incident, assuming that his claim that he went to the house of
Barangay Captain Puod at 7:00 oclock in the morning of May 26, 1989 was true. As testified to by appellant
himself, it would take just one and a half (1 ) hours to reach Barangay Naligusan, Ibajay, Aklan from Barangay
Agbalogo, Makato, Aklan. Needless to state, it would not at all be impossible for appellant to be at Barangay
Agbalogo at 7:00 oclock in the morning or some two hours after the crimes were committed at Barangay
Naligusan.
In his second assignment of error, accused-appellant contends that he had nothing to do with the
killing of the victim Reynaldo Mangilog, obviously relying on the testimony of Realidad Mangilog to the effect
that Reynaldo Mangilog was shot and stabbed to death by the members of appellants group who stationed
themselves outside the house.
This contention we also find untenable, conspiracy being clearly manifest in this case as was correctly
found by the Court of Appeals. For collective responsibility to be established, it is not necessary that
conspiracy be proved by direct evidence of a prior agreement to commit the crime18 as only rarely would such
an agreement be demonstrable since in the nature of things criminal undertakings are rarely documented by
agreement in writing.19 Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused immediately prior to, during
and right after the shooting of the victim which indicate their common intention to commit the crime.20
The record shows that: (1) all the accused which include accused-appellant arrived together at the
scene of the killings; (2) they were all fully armed; (3) three of them simultaneously shot to death Leopoldo
Mangilog, while an undetermined number shot and stabbed to death Reynaldo Mangilog; (4) the attack on
the two victims was executed simultaneously; and (5) the accuseds statement to the effect that the victims
were responsible for the fact that the military men were running after them. This tends to establish a motive
on their part to kill the victims. All these indubitably indicate a concerted effort on the part of the accused on
a common design to kill the victims.
Conspiracy having been adequately shown, all the accused are answerable as co-principals regardless
of the degree of their participation.21 In fact, it is not necessary to ascertain the individual participation in the
final liquidation of the victims22 or to ascertain the precise modality or extent of participation of each
individual conspirator as the applicable rule is that the act of one conspirator is the act of all of them. 23 It
hardly matters, therefore, that accused-appellant did not actually participate in the killing of Reynaldo
Mangilog or of Leopoldo Mangilog.
As alleged in the informations and as correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the killing of the
victims was qualified by treachery. Leopoldo Mangilog was shot while he was serving the accused coffee or
shortly thereafter. Reynaldo Mangilog, on the other hand, was shot and stabbed to death while he was taking
a bath. It may be added that the victims were naturally unarmed at that time and their execution was done so
early in the morning, that is, when they had practically just awakened. Under the circumstances, the victims
were clearly not in any position to defend themselves from the sudden and unexpected attack of the
accused.24 These circumstances are
manifestly indicative of the presence of the conditions under which treachery may be appreciated, i.e.,
the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate, and that said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted.25
The Court of Appeals appreciated abuse of superior strength, aid of armed men and evident
premeditation as aggravating circumstances. These findings are factual and the rule is that findings of the
Court of Appeals upon factual questions are conclusive and ought not to be disturbed unless shown to be
contrary to the evidence on record,26 and, in this case, there is no such showing. However, we believe, and so
hold, that treachery absorbs the circumstances of abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men, as it
appears that the accused saw to it that they were armed and far outnumbered the victims precisely to ensure
the accomplishment of their criminal objective.27
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in
its maximum period to death. Since we find accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder qualified by treachery in Criminal Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910 and that the generic aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation was also attendant, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be
imposed in each case, applying Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code and considering the proscription against
the imposition of the death penalty at the time the crimes were committed.
WHEREFORE, the decisions of the trial court are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
accused-appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each case of murder (Criminal
Cases Nos. 2909 and 2910).
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125633. December 9, 1999]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLANDO ALFANTA y ALO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
Before this Court, by way of automatic review, is the decision, dated 29 July 1996, of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 82, convicting[1] accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta y Alo of rape with two
aggravating circumstances and sentencing him to suffer the extreme penalty of death.
Rolando Alfanta was charged with the crime of rape in an information that simply read:
That on or about the 26th day of August, 1995, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge upon the person of one NITA FERNANDEZ y
JOSEFA against her will and consent.[2]
When arraigned on 27 September 1995, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the crime
charged. Trial thereupon ensued.
The evidence of the parties has been recited in good detail by the trial court in its decision under
review, thus:
The first prosecution witness was Dr. Noel Minay, Medico Legal Officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation who testified that on August 27, 1995 at around 5:45 in the afternoon, he performed a physical
examination and medico genital examination on one Nita Fernandez for alleged rape. Upon physical
examination he found mark swelling on the left lower jaw or on the mandibular area left portion; and, upon
examination of the hymen, he found that the labia majora and minora gaping, similar to the appearance of a
25
woman who had just given birth; or a normal appearance as a result of several sexual intercourses that had
been performed. He submitted a report on his findings (Exhibit A).
The next witness was Nita Fernandez, the offended party alleged in the information who testified that on
August 26, 1995 at around 12:00 o'clock midnight, while asleep in the residence of a friend at AFOVAI Fort
Bonifacio, Makati city, a man whom she had not seen before suddenly entered the house where she was
sleeping, pulled her, boxed her jaw and put his hand on her mouth, and told her that if she will not obey him,
he will kill her. She resisted, but could not do anything. Thereafter, she was forced to climb a fence. Because
of fear, as the man was holding a bolo, she followed. After climbing the fence, the man instructed her to go to
a vacant house. She followed, as instructed. While at the vacant house, she was told to undress, she did
because of fear, as the man was holding a bolo. Thereafter, the man embraced and kissed her. Then she was
told to lie down and told to separate her legs. The man inserted his penis into her vagina. After inserting the
mans penis to her vagina, she was told to lie face down. She complied, thereafter, the man inserted his penis
into her anus. After inserting the mans penis into her anus, she was told to turn around face up. All these acts
of the man hurt her. After turning around face up, the man inserted his fingers in and out into her private
part. After the man had finished inserting his fingers in and out of her private part, she was told to go near
him and lie beside him, and not to dress up as he was going to take a rest and at the same time telling her not
to tell what happened to others saying that lahat ng nirape ko ay pinatay ko dahil sa ayokong may
magsumbong. All the time the man was inserting his penis and fingers into her private part and into her anus,
she was shouting: tulungan po ninyo ako,' but nobody responded. Noticing that the man was already
sleeping, she suddenly got the knife at waist of the man and stab the man on his chest. The knife broke. She
suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack the man several times. Thereafter, she put on her dress, got hold of the
bolo and ran to the signal office of soldiers. When she arrived at the signal office of soldiers, she told the
persons she met that she killed a man. The bolo was taken from her by the soldiers. With, soldiers, they went
to the place where she was raped. They found the man lying down still alive. The man was brought to the
hospital. The man turned out to be accused Rolando Alfanta y Alo. Thereafter, she executed an affidavit (Exh.
C), narrating what happened to her to the police; and was brought to the NBI Medico-Legal Officer for
examination.
On cross examination she testified that, from Valle Verde, Pasig City, where she worked as housemaid, she
went to her friends house named Patrick because she brought mongo and because she and Patricks wife
Inday, are friends, arriving in the house of Patrick at 6:30 in the evening of August 26, 1995. She was not able
to go back to her place of work at Valle Verde, Pasig because it was already late at night and was told to sleep
at Patricks house. Earlier that evening, at 9:00, she saw accused passed by in front of the house. Aside from
her two (2) other persons slept in the house of Patrick, Inday and son. She slept in the sala, while Inday and
her son in a room. The door of the house was closed, but was not locked. In entering the house were she
slept, one has to reach the sala first. When awakened, she shouted, but nobody heard her because they were
sleeping and at the same time the accused placed his hand on her mouth. She was really afraid because she
was boxed on her chest and accused was holding a bolo. While outside the house she was boxed. At the
garage, which was not lighted, she was told to undress. She followed, because of fear. Accused also
undressed himself. While accused was on top of her, holding a bolo, she cried. Accused is not her
sweetheart. She even said, why will I hack him if he is my sweetheart.
The last witness for prosecution was Lilia Hogar of the Womens Desk Unit, Makati Police Station who testified
that she came into the possession of the bolo, Exh. D, because Nita Fernandez was brought to Sub-Station
A. The bolo, which was brought by Nita Fernandez to the Military Signal Village, was in turn given to the
Central Police Desk wherein she is the Investigator. After the bolo was handed to her by the soldiers of the
Signal Village, she conducted an investigation. Based on her investigation, she learned from Nita Fernandez
that when Nita Fernandez woke up at 12:00 midnight on August 26, 1995, Nita Fernandez saw a man standing
beside her. Nita was punched on the left portion of the face and ordered her to go outside, instructed to
climb over a fence on the other side of the house. After climbing the fence, Nita Fernandez was told to
undress, was boxed on her breast and was told to lie down in a vacant house owned by Captain Pascua,
where suspect raped Nita Fernandez. On their way to the hospital on board the Makati Police car, she asked
accused why he rape Nita Fernandez. Accused answered that Fernandez was not telling the truth because
they were sweethearts.
Defense presented the accused. Accused testified that on August 26, 1995, while at AFOVAI Village,
Municipality of Makati, fixing the fence of the house of General Renato Icarma together with many other
laborers, somebody told him that his wife was waiting for him in the house of Captain Pascua. At 10:00 oclock
that evening, he went to the house of Captain Pascua; and upon reaching the house, he knocked, and called
Patrick Augusto Ablon, the caretaker of Captain Pascua. Belinda Ablon, the cousin of Patrick Augusto Ablon,
opened the door. After opening the door, Nita Fernandez, his live-in partner for almost a year came out, in an
angry mood, because she has been waiting for him for long, and asked him why he was late. He explained
that he did not expect her to come, as his understanding with Nita Fernandez was, he will call her by phone or
write her before she comes. Then Nita Fernandez told him that they talk outside as she was ashamed with the
neighbor, and they will disturb the child who was sleeping. After half hour talking, he invited Nita to sleep. He
and Nita went to a vacant house, owned by a Colonel passing a fence. When they arrived in the vacant house,
it was closed, so they slept in the terrace. He denied doing what Nita Fernandez claimed he did. He claimed
that, he was surprised why Fernandez hacked him, for he knows of no reason why Nita Fernandez will hack
him. He believes that Nita Fernandez concocted the story of rape because of fear that he will file a case
against Nita Fernandez for hacking him.
On cross-examination, accused testified that, he has been staying in the house of General Romeo Icarma (the
house where he and 15 other workers were constructing a fence), since 1990. His livelihood was, as a Mason,
since 1993. In February 1995, the daughter of Nita Fernandez named, Lucia who is married to Lito introduced
him to Nita. He and Nita became sweethearts in February 1995. They have not live together because Nita was
working at Valle Verde. They only meet during Nitas day off. He has been at Nitas place of work, but he used
to call then at her telephone numbers which are 6326062 and 6356060.They used to see each other at Gen.
Icarmas place where he lived. On August 26, 1995, when the incident in questioned happened, Lucia and Lito
were no longer residing at Gen. Icarmas place because they were told to leave in April 1993. On August 26,
1995, while in the squatters area, just 100 meters away from the house of Gen. Icarma, Nita came, looking for
him. Because Nita does not know the workers in Gen. Icarmas house, Nita left and went to the house of
Captain Pascua, just at the back of the house of Gen. Icarma. While at the squatters area, Melchor Rudy
Abella told him that Nita was looking for him.He went to the house of Captain Pascua. At Captain Pascuas
place, he met Nita. Present in the house of Captain Pascua were Augusto Ablon, his wife Rubylin, Belinda, a
cousin and a small child who were all awake, except the child. Although Ablon was very much willing to
accommodate him in Ablons house, he brought Nita to the house of the Air Force Colonel because if it rains,
there is a roof to protect them and ashamed to stay at Ablons house. Even Nita does not like to sleep in
Ablons place, saying that instead of sleeping at Ablons place, she prefers to go back at Valle Verde. He did not
allow Nita to go back at Valle Verde because it was already late at night and if anything happens to her, her
daughter who knows his relationship with Nita will blame him. He did not bring Nita to Gen. Icarmas house
because it is crowded and the Colonels house is just 20 meters from Captain Pascuas house. They went to the
Colonels house, climbing the fence. When they climbed the wall, he was carrying banig, pillow and blanket,
and did not notice that Nita was carrying a knife. Nobody live in the Colonels house and was closed. They
slept in the terrace of the house on a cement flooring. While he was sleeping Nita hacked him with a kitchen
knife. When hacked, he just said aray. The bolo was not used in hacking him. After stabbing him, Nita left and
went to the Military Police leaving the kitchen knife. When the Military Police arrived, he was no longer at the
Colonels house because he went to another house, where he slept. After he was stabbed, he asked the
assistance of Ablon. Ablon was the one who called for the Military Police. He did not leave the colonels
house. He just stayed in the premises. Despite his wounds, he was able to sleep and woke up at 5:00 in the
morning. When asked why Nita stabbed him, he said that it was because he hurt Nita by holding Nita's hand
and pushing her on her chest when Nita insisted in leaving for Valle Verde; and because he hurt Nita, he did
not file a complaint against Nita for hacking him.[3]
In the decretal portion of the decision, the court a quo has pronounced judgment, thus:
26
WHEREFORE, this court finds accused Rolando Alfanta y Alo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Pros. Manola:
rape, penalized by Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, with aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and ignominy, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death, and indemnify Q Now, while you were there on that date and time at the house of your friend in AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio
complainant Nita Fernandez the sum of P50,000.00, plus the costs of the suit.[4] Makati City do you recall of any unusual incident that happened?

A There was sir.

Now before the Court, accused-appellant seeks the reversal of the conviction and the imposition of the
death penalty decreed by the trial court; he contends that - Q Will you kindly tell what that incident was?

A During that time while I was sleeping in the residence of my friend suddenly there was a man who
I. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN FINDING AND CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME OF entered the house where I was sleeping.
RAPE.
Q So when you saw that man entered the house what did he do if any?
II. THE TRIAL COURT [HAS] ERRED IN TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF A I stood up because he was pulling me and then he put his hand in my mouth sir.
NIGHTTIME AND IGNOMINY.[5]
Q What else happened after that?
The case can be described as not really being too far from the typical rape cases that have been A When I was resisting he boxed me and at that time he was holding a bolo and he said if I will not obey
previously reviewed by the Court. It is a case, like the instances before it, of two people, each testifying on the him he will be going to kill me sir.
same incident but making a clearly discordant testimony. Since only the participants could directly testify on
the sexual congress, here conceded to have taken place, extreme care is observed in evaluating the Q After that what transpired next Mr. Witness?
respective declarations of the complainant and the accused. The doctrinally accepted rule is to accord great
respect over the assessment of the trial court on the credibility of the witnesses and, in the usual words of A He forced me to climb the fence and then I saw he was holding a bolo.
similar import employed by the Court, it would be best not to disturb the findings of the court which has Q Did you climb over the fence?
heard the evidence except only when a material or substantial fact has truly been overlooked or
misappreciated which if properly taken into account can alter the outcome of the case.[6] Regrettably for A I climb sir because he forced me to climb the fence.
accused-appellant, no such exceptive instances of possible oversight are perceived or evident in this case.
Q Were you able to go over the fence?
Complainant gave a thorough narrative account, so found to be credible by the trial court and by this
Court as well, of what had transpired during the late hour of the night in question. A When I was over the fence already he told me to go to a vacant house.

Prosecutor Manola: Q How about the accused where was he when he ordered you to climb over the fence?

Q Mrs. Witness will you kindly tell the Honorable Court where you were on August 26, 1995 at around A He was at my back and he told me to go first and then he followed.
12:00 oclock midnight?
Q So after you went or cross over the fence what happened next Madam witness?
A At Fort Bonifacio.
A He told me to go to the vacant house and there he himself told me to undress and I took off my clothes
Q What city or municipality? he embraced me and kissed me sir.

A I do not know but it must be here sir. Q Now when this man told you to go to the vacant house did you obey him?

Q Meaning Makati City? A I was told to go to the vacant house there he told me to undress.

A Yes sir. Q Did you obey him?

Q Why were you there on that date and time Mrs. Witness? A He told me to undress and he was holding a bolo.

A I was sleeping in my friends residence. Court:

Court: Q The question of the prosecutor to you was did you obey the instruction of the accused for you to
undress?
Q What is the address of that friends residence at Fort Bonifacio?
A Yes sir.
A At AFOVAI Fort Bonifacio Makati sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q Why were you there at that time?
Q Tell the Honorable Court why you do followed the instruction of that Man to go to that vacant house
A Because I always go there and my sons residence is beside the house of my friend sir. and to undress why did you follow this instruction?
Court: Proceed fiscal: A I was afraid that he might kill me sir.

27
Q Why do you say that he might kill you?
A He like to rape me sir.
Court:
Q You did not answer the question of the prosecutor why were you afraid?
A Because he was holding a bolo and he was at the same time boxing me sir.
Prosecutor Manola:
Q So what happened after according to you you were instructed to undress?
A He embraced me and kissed me and told me to lie down.
Q And did you lie down as instructed by this Man?
A He forced me to lie down and then he forced me to separate my legs sir.
Q And what happened when you were forced to open your legs?
A He told me not to shout because if I will shout he will kill me and the he inserted his penis to my vagina
sir.
Q After this Man inserted his penis in your vagina or private part what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A He told me to lie front my face down and he inserted his penis to my anus sir.
Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A Then he told me again to lie down and at the same time he inserted his fingers to my private parts
going it and out sir.
Q After that what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A He lie down because he was already tired of molesting.
Q How about you what were you doing at that time when the accused this person according to you lie
down after he put his fingers inside your private part?
Q Now after this person whom you just pointed to who answered by the name of Rolando Alfanta
uttered the words lahat nang ni rape ko ay pinapatay ko dahil sa ayokong may magsumbong what
happened next Mrs. Witness?
A I pleaded to him and he said not to put on my dress because he is going to take a rest.
Q After that what happened next if any Mrs. Witness?
A I saw him that he was sleeping already and then I suddenly got the knife and stab him in the chest sir.
Q After you stabbed him on his chest what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A The knife broke and then I suddenly grabbed the bolo and hack and hack him sir.
Q After you hacked this person who raped you what happened next Mrs. Witness?
A I immediately put on my shirt and I got hold of the bolo and I run to the signal where the soldiers were.
Q Did you reach this place signal where there are soldiers according to you?
A Yes sir.
Q And what did you do when then when you arrived there?
A I told him that I killed a person therein and give them the bolo.
Q What happened after that when you informed the solders at signal that according to you you have
killed a person what happened next?
A We went to the person who raped me sir.
Q And did you see him there?
A Yes sir.
Q Who were with you when you went back to the place where you were allegedly raped?
A The soldiers sir.
Q Did you find this person who raped you?

A He asked me to go near him and lie down beside him. A Yes sir.

Q Did you follow his instruction for you to lie near him? Q What was he doing?

A Yes sir because he was holding a bolo sir. A He was lying down sir.

Q So what happened after you lie down beside this person? Q What happened after that?

A He told me to put on my dress and at the same time he also told me that he does not want me to tell it A When we arrived there he was still alive and he was brought to the hospital.
to anybody because he have raped many.
Q Who brought him to the hospital?
Q Now if this person whom according to you raped you inside the court room would you be able to
recognize him? A The ambulance of the soldier.

A Yes sir I could recognize him.
Q Will you kindly look around the court room if you could recognize this person if he is inside?
Note: Witness pointed to a man who was pointed as the man who raped him and when asked his name
answered as Rolando Alfanta.
Q Now do you remember having given a statement to the Makati Police in connection with what you
have just narrated or told or testified to this afternoon?
A I could remember.
Q If that statement is shown to you would you be able to recognize it?

A Yes sir.

28
 Q Now showing you a statement attached to the records of the prosecutors office consisting of two Q In short he is a complete stranger to you when he entered the room?
pages kindly go over it and tell us if you recognize this statement?
A I saw him around 7:00 oclock in the evening that he was passing thru the front of the house of my
A Yes sir I could recognize this. friends where I was sleeping.

Q Is that your statement Q At that time that you were awaken by the accused with whom were you sleeping?

A Yes sir. A Only me sir.

xxx xxx xxx. Prosecutor Manola:

Q Now this bolo which according to you surrendered to the soldier at the signal if you see this bolo again Q Now you said that while you and the accused were lying down first you stab him with the knife how
would you be able to recognize it again? many times have you stabbed him with the knife?

A Yes sir. A I was not able to count because I was afraid of him.

Prosecutor Manola: Q You said that after stabbing him with the knife which you broke you got hold of the bolo you hacked
him how many times have you hacked him?
We would like to make reservation for this witness to identify this bolo when this bolo is presented by
the policeman who is in custody of this bolo. A I failed to count how many times. I hacked him because I was afraid of him he might kill me.

Court: Prosecutor Manola: That will be all for the witness.

Q How about the knife which according to you was seen by you at the waist line of the accused did you Court: Cross-examination.
bring it also?
Atty. Manalo: With the permission of the Honorable Court.
A I did not bring it sir because it was broken sir it was only the bolo that I brought.
Court: Proceed.
Q Now while you were being raped did you shout for help?
Atty. Manalo:
A Yes sir.
Q Now who were with you at the time when you were sleeping at the house of your friend at AFOVAI
Q How did you ask for help? Fort Bonifacio?

A I asked for help but they were sleeping they did not hear me sir. A One of their children so there were three and I was one.

Q The question to you was how did you ask for help? Q Were you sleeping in one room?

A I cried and I said tulungan po ninyo ako. A I was sleeping in the sala sir.

Q Did anybody respond to your cries for help? Q Now before you sleep in that house at the sala did you close the door of that house?

A None sir. A It was closed but it was not locked.

Q Now how did you feel while the accused was inserting his private part to your private part? xxx xxx xxx.

A It hurt sir my vagina and my anus, my mouth that he boxed me sir. Q Now when why were you interested in sleeping in the house of your friend when you could already at
the house of your employer?
Q Now why did you say that the accused was able to insert his penis into your vagina?
A Because I was bringing mongo to my friend because I am indebted to them sir.
A He forced that to insert it.
Q Now why did you not return to your employer after giving or handing that mongo to your friend?
Q Forced it to where?
A They told me to sleep there because it was already late at night.
A He forced it to enter my vagina sir.
Q By the way what time did you go there?
Q Did you feel when the private part of the accused entered to your vagina?
A Around 6:00 to 6:30 in the evening.
A Yes sir I feel it sir.
Q And what time did you reach your friend at AFOVAI?
Q By the way do you know the accused prior to the date that you were awakened?
A 6:30 sir.
A I do not know him.

29
Q And Valle Verde is just in Pasig isnt? Q Where?

A Yes sir. A I fell on the ground down.

Q It is near where you are employed and it will take you one ride only to reach that place isnt? Q Where were you boxed by the accused?

A Three rides sir. A Outside sir of the house.

Q Now which is first to be reached from the front door of the house where you were sleeping at the time Q Now you said that you were ordered to undress and to lie down on the ground is that correct?
the place where you were sleeping or the place of the room where the owner of the house were
sleeping? A Yes sir.

A First it is the sala where he passed. Q And you followed him?

Q Now you said that the door was not locked was there any other improvised locked placed in that door A He told me to undress in the garage and he also undressed himself and because I was afraid because he
like a wood? was holding a bolo sir.

A They did not lock the door because they are in confident. Q When he undressed himself was he still holding a bolo?

Q Now what is the name of the owner of the house where you slept at that time? A Yes sir one hand was holding the bolo the other one hand he was undressing himself.

A Patrick sir. Q Was it lighted the place?

Q And how are you related to Patrick? A None sir.

A His wife is my friend sir. Q How far were you when the accused was undressing himself?

Q What is the name of his wife? A Near sir.

A Inday sir. Q Did you see his private part when he undressed himself?

Q Now when you were awaken while you were sleeping in the sala of the house of your friend Inday did A Yes sir.
you not shout when you saw a person pulling you holding a bolo?
Q How big?
A I shouted but they did not hear me because they were sleeping and at the same time he placed his
Prosecutor Manola: Immaterial your honor.
hands on my mouth sir.
Atty. Manalo: To test the credibility, your honor.
Q Now you said that you were boxed on the chest by the accused how many times were you boxed by
the accused on the chest? Court: Answer
A I do not know how many times I was boxed sir because I was really afraid of him. A It was dark and I was able to see and I do not know because I was afraid.
Q But you were sure that you were boxed at the chest? Atty. Manalo:
A Yes sir. Q And then you lie down?
Note: Witness demonstrating with her hands first pointing on her chest and also on her mouth. A He told me to lie down and he placed himself on top of me.
Q Was it strong? Q Was he still holding the bolo?
A Yes sir it was strong because the following day it has marked. A Yes sir he was holding the bolo on his one hand.
Note: Witness holding on his left chin. Q How did you see him?
Q How about on the chest? A When he was holding the bolo with his one hand while I he was on top of me I cried and he was holding
the bolo.
Note: Witness demonstrating it was pointed on her chest.
Note: Witness demonstrating the accused holding the bolo upward.
A It was not too strong sir.
A When I cried he was on top of me sir.
Q Did you fall down on your knee when you were hit by the blow?
Q What was he doing when he was on top of you?
A Yes sir.

30
 A He was molesting me sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now what time did you see him passed by the house of your friend according to you?
A 9:00 oclock in the evening sir.
Q Why were you sure that he was the one who passed by the house of your friend?
A I saw him that he was passing.
Q Where were you at the time?
A I was seating by the window sir.[7]
The testimony of the complainant about the incident is straightforward categorical, and relatively free
from any serious flaw. No compelling reason is advanced to sufficiently persuade the Court to conclude that
the trial court has erred in giving due weight and credence to the testimony of the complainant. Neither is
evidence adduced to show that the complainant has had any ulterior motive to prevaricate and enmesh
accused-appellant in a fabricated charge. The Court repeats the familiar doctrine that when a woman claims
that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show such a fact so long as her testimony
can meet the test of credibility,[8] for it is said that no woman in her right mind will cry rape, allow
examination of her private parts, or subject herself and her family to the humiliation concomitant to the
prosecution of the case, unless the story were true.[9]
Testifying in his defense, accused-appellant claimed that he and the complainant had been lived-in
partner for almost a year, and that while they did sleep together on 26 August 1995 at the porch of the house
of a certain Air Force officer, accused-appellant denied any carnal knowledge of the victim that evening. In his
appeal brief, accused-appellant sought to negate any possible or likely use of violence or intimidation,
considering that: (a) in the house where the victim was sleeping on the night of 26 August 1995, there were at
least three persons (the caretaker of the house Patrick Augusto Ablon, his wife Rubylin and the couples son)
who could have responded to any shout for help from the victim; (b) the door of the house was purposely left
unlocked in order to enable accused-appellant to come into the house, and (c) when the victim was made to
climb a fence followed by the accused, she could have escaped but did not.
The sweetheart theory of accused-appellant would appear to be another worn out strategy, often
resorted to as a last ditch effort, to exculpate oneself from criminal liability. No documentary evidence of any
sort, like a letter or a photograph or any piece of memento, was presented to confirm a romantic liaison
between accused-appellant and the complainant. The latter testified:
Q Is it not a fact that you and the accused were sweethearts?
A No sir.
Q And that you went to that place AFOVAI just to meet him in that place?
A No sir he is not my sweetheart. Why will I hack him if he is my sweetheart?
Q You hacked him with the bolo because of you are too much jealousy is concerned because your
sweetheart was then womanizing?
Prosecutor Manola: Misleading your honor.
Atty. Manalo: I am on cross-examination your Honor.
Court: Answer.
A Why will I get jealous I have nothing to do with him. I do not know him sir.
Atty. Manalo:
Q Really?
A I do not know him. I really do not know him sir.[10]
It would be rather strange an occurrence for a love-partner, if true, to stab her beloved for petty
reasons. The trial court was not out of line when it made this evaluation; viz:
This Court cannot accept the claim of accused that he and complainant Nita Fernandez were sweethearts, for
such a claim defies rationality, let alone common sense, because if they were sweethearts, she will not hack
him. Not only that, the manner on which she stabbed and hacked him, first with a knife, then with a bolo,
shows a complete anger to vindicate the outrage on her. If they were sweethearts, she would not have acted
in the manner she did in stabbing and hacking him. At least, if they have some relationship, she would not
show anger the way she did.[11]
Neither would the presence of at least three persons on the night of 26 August 1995 in the house
where victim was sleeping necessarily disprove the sexual assault. It was already close to midnight when the
incident occurred, and the other occupants of the house were by then apparently all sound asleep. The
evidence is to the effect that accused-appellant immediately after getting into the house hit her on the jaw,
put his hand on her mouth and threatened to kill her if she dared refuse to yield to his
demands. Understandably, the victim was shocked, gripped by fear and then cowed into
submission. Intimidation should be viewed in the light of the perception and judgment of the victim at the
time of the commission of the offense and not by any kind of hard and fast rule. It would be unreasonable to
expect the victim to act with equanimity of disposition and to have the courage and intelligence to disregard
the threat made by accused-appellant.[12]
The claim that the unlocked door of the house was a sign that the complainant wanted accused-
appellant to have a chance to see her during the late evening indeed should deserve scant consideration. The
so-called love angle was properly ruled out by the trial court for lack of concrete evidence to establish any
such relationship.
Anent the failure of the complainant to escape when accused-appellant ordered her to climb a fence, it
should be enough to state she did not appear to have had any real opportunity to flee from the clutches of
the intruder who was, in fact, just behind her. After scaling the fence and while inside the abandoned and
enclosed house, she could not have done any much better since she was all the time within striking distance
of the bolo-wielding malefactor.
And now on the propriety of an appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
ignominy.
Nighttime is said to be that period of darkness beginning at the end of dusk and ending at dawn.[13] The
law defines nights as being from sunset to sunrise.[14] By and of itself, nighttime would not be an aggravating
circumstance unless it is specially sought by the offender, or it is specially taken advantage of by him, or it
facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the offenders immunity from capture.[15] As an ordinary
aggravating circumstance, nighttime can be so considered provided it is duly proved although not alleged in
the information.[16] The Court entertains no doubt that appellant has specially taken advantage of the cover of
darkness to facilitate the commission of the crime without being recognized. Accused-appellant has abducted
his victim, brought her to an abandoned and unlit house and then unleashed his carnal desire on her, assured
of the stillness of a sleeping world.[17] The Court has long held that this aggravating circumstance can be
considered when an accused takes advantage of the silence and darkness of the night to ensure impunity
from his illegal act.[18]
With respect to ignominy, the victim testified that after appellant had inserted his penis into her
vagina, appellant ordered her to lie face down and while in that position had his penis into her
anus.Thereafter, he ordered her to lie down again and this time he inserted his finger inside her. The Solicitor
General correctly invoked the case of People vs. Saylan,[19] where this Court said:
31
The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e.
male superior, female inferior, but also the same position as dogs do i.e., entry from behind. The appellant
claims there was no ignominy because The studies of many experts in the matter have shown that this
position is not novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation. (Brief,
p. 24.) This may well be if the sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise.[20]
Article 14, paragraph 17, of the Revised Penal Code considers to be an aggravating circumstance any
means employed or circumstance brought about which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act.The
circumstance, it is said,[21] "pertains to the moral order [and] adds disagree and obloquy to the material injury
caused by the crime.
The crime of rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.[22]
In the case at bar, it remained uncontroverted that accused-appellant was armed with a bolo to realize
his criminal objective. Nonetheless, the use of a deadly weapon could not be considered as a qualifying
circumstance in the crime of rape[23] for not having been correspondingly alleged in the information as to
make the offense fall under the jurisprudentially referred qualified rape punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. In People vs. Garcia,[24] the Court declared:
One further observation. Article 335 originally provided only for simple rape punishable by reclusion
perpetua, but Republic Act No. 4111 introduced amendments thereto by providing for qualified forms of
rape carrying the death penalty, that is, when committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or
more persons, when by reason or on the occasion of the rape the victim becomes insane, or, under the same
circumstances, a homicide is committed. The homicide in the last two instances in effect created a special
complex crime of rape with homicide. The first two attendant circumstances are considered as equivalent to
qualifying circumstances since they increase the penalties by degrees, and not merely as aggravating
circumstances which affect only the period of the penalty but do not increase it to a higher degree. The
original provisions of Article 335 and the amendments of Republic Act No. 4111 are still maintained.
xxx xxx xxx.
Now, it has long been the rule that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the indictment. If
the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as aggravating circumstances,
(People vs. Collado, 60 Phil. 610 [1934]; People vs. Jovellano, et al., L-32421, March 27, 1974, 56 SCRA 156;
People vs. Fuertes, G.R. No. 104067, January 17, 1994, 229 SCRA 289; People vs. Rodico, et al., G.R. No.
107101, October 16, 1995, 249 SCRA 309.) since the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. (U.S. vs.
Campo, 23 Phil. 368 [1912]; People vs. Domondon, 60 Phil. 729 [1934]; People vs. De Guzman, G.R. No.
73464, August 1988, 164 SCRA 215.) Indeed, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of
the charges against him and, consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with simple rape and be
convicted of its qualified form punishable with death, although the attendant circumstance qualifying the
offense and resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was arraigned.[25]
Simple rape is punishable by a single indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. Thus, even if there were
aggravating circumstances of nighttime and ignominy in attendance the appropriate penalty would still
be reclusion perpetua under the law. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that in all cases in which
the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION by hereby lowering the penalty
therein imposed from death to reclusion perpetua. An award of P50,000.00 for moral damages is likewise
ordered to be paid by accused-appellant Rolando Alfanta to the victim Nita Hernandez in addition to the sum
of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity ex delictu granted by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 105961. October 22, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. PACIFICO SUMAOY, JOHN DOE, PETER DOE and RICHARD
DOE, accused. PACIFICO SUMAOY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum, Davao in Criminal
Case No. 7245, finding accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Zandro Vargas, in the sum
of P30,000.00 and to pay the costs.
Accused-appellant was convicted for the killing on July 9, 1988 of Zandro Vargas, a boy 16 years of age,
in Tagum, Davao. Wilbert Vargas, the victims brother, and Patricio Jacobe, Jr. identified accused-appellant
Pacifico Sumaoy as the assailant, together with three others who have remained unidentified and at large.
The prosecution presented four witnesses: Wilbert Vargas, Patricio Jacobe, Jr., Enriqueta Vargas and
Dr. Jose Lopez.
Patricio Jacobe, Jr. testified that he worked as a pin boy in a billiard hall on Roxas Street,
Tagum, Davao. At 5:45 p.m. of July 9, 1988, he left the billiard hall to have some beer at the Pacings
Carinderia on Sobrecary Street. Afterward, he went back to the billiard hall, passing by the J Spot Carinderia at
the corner of Roxas and Sobrecary Streets, where he saw the deceased Zandro Vargas talking to accused-
appellant Pacifico Sumaoy. Three other men were with them but Jacobe did not recognize the three.
Upon reaching the billiard hall, Patricio Jacobe, Jr. piled some billiard balls, then went out and stood on
the sidewalk. He was startled by the sound of a gunshot. When he turned to find out where the sound came
from, he saw Zandro Vargas running towards Roxas Street with his right arm bleeding. Zandro Vargas tried to
seek refuge at the Try Me beauty parlor, but he was overtaken by accused-appellant who dragged him
towards a waiting tricycle. Accused-appellant had a gun. The accused-appellant and three other men then
32
boarded the tricycle taking Zandro Vargas with them. Jacobe allegedly heard one of accused-appellants
companion say that they were taking Zandro to the hospital. Later that evening Jacobe learned that Zandro
was found dead in a kangkong field near the Davao Visayan Village.
The other prosecution witness, Wilbert Vargas, is the brother of the deceased. Wilbert testified that
at 6:00 p.m., on July 9, 1988, while he was talking to a friend on Roxas Street near the public market, he was
told that his brother Zandro was being beaten up in a carinderia at the corner of Roxas and Sobrecary
Streets. Wilbert immediately proceeded to the J Spot Carinderia. He saw accused-appellant aiming his gun at
Zandro as the latter was running away. Accused-appellant shot Zandro Vargas, hitting the latter in the
forearm, and causing him to fall on his knees. Zandro Vargas was then dragged by accused-appellant and
three unidentified men towards a tricycle. Wilbert Vargas saw his brother loaded onto the tricycle like a pig,
with Zandros feet hanging out. Wilbert tried to come to the aid of his brother but accused-appellant pointed
his gun at him, causing him to run home in fear.
Wilbert Vargas told his parents what had happened to his brother. They searched for Zandro. They
went to Mangga, Davao and there learned from Jose Montilla, the driver of the tricycle which accused-
appellant Sumaoy and his companions hailed, that Zandro had been killed and that his body had been
dumped in a kangkong field in Visayan Village, Tagum, Davao. Wilbert and his parents proceeded to the place
indicated and there found Zandros dead body.
Wilbert Vargas identified Pacifico Sumaoy as one of the assailants. Wilbert testified that he recognized
Sumaoy because the latter was assigned to the military detachment in the Diwalwal mining area where
Wilbert used to work. Dr. Jose Lopez, Municipal Health Officer of Tagum, who examined the body of Zandro
Vargas, issued a death certificate. Under questioning by the prosecutor, Dr. Lopez testified as follows:
Q You said you placed your findings in the certificate of death, please read the findings, Doctor.
A (Reading) I hereby certify that I have this 10th day of July 1988 performed an autopsy upon the
body of the deceased Zandro Rinia Vargas and that the cause of death was as
follows: Shock, irreversible, due to gunshot wounds located at (1) right frontal into cranial
cavity exiting at right upper occipital; (2) right eyebrow exiting at left lower occipital; (3)
left temporal (no exit); (4) right arm lateral going out at medical and going into right
axillary into thoracic cavity (no exit).
Q: Will you explain your findings to us, Doctor?
A: There were four (4) gunshot wounds found on the body of the victim No. 1 was at the right
frontal (witness pointing at his middle forehead) going into the cranial cavity going
outside (witness pointing at the back of his head); No. 2, at the right eyebrow (witness
pointing at the middle of the right eyebrow) going out to the left lower occipital ( witness
pointing at the back of his head, left side near the ear); No. 3 wound is found at the
temporal without exit (witness pointing at the left side of his head, a little above the left
ear); and the No. 4 wound is found at the right arm lateral (witness pointing at his right-
upper arm, outside) going at medial aspect then same bullet passed into the axillary
region into the thoracic cavity, no more exit, the right-upper arm as entrance and exit
inside of the right-upper arm and then going into the right chest (witness pointing at the
right side of his body just about 3 inches below the armpit).[2]
Accused-appellant denies participation in the killing of Zandro Vargas. He claims that the whole day
of July 9, 1988 he was on duty as an enlisted personnel of the 1103rd Criminal Investigation Services (CIS) in
Tagum, Davao. Accused-appellant identified a document signed by Technical Sergeant Ricardo Go called Duty
Detail showing that accused-appellant was on duty from 8:00 a.m. of July 9, 1988 to 8:00 a.m. of July 10,
1988. Ricardo Go, Technical Sergeant, Philippine Constabulary and Team Leader of the Criminal Investigation
service Command, Tagum, Davao, and Patrolman Narciso Vismanos, corroborated the accused-appellants
alibi.
On June 6, 1991, the Regional Trial Court of Tagum, Davao rendered a decision finding accused-
appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery. The trial court noted that accused-appellant Sumaoy shot
Zandro while the latter was running away and held that the three bullet wounds sustained by Zandro in the
head showed that he was shot while in a helpless and defenseless condition. The trial court appreciated the
ordinary aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of public position against accused-appellant Sumaoy.
Accused-appellant Sumaoy has appealed from this decision of the trial court. He contends that the
prosecution evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty necessary to support a judgment of
conviction. He points out that no proof was presented as to the type of weapon used in the shooting of
Zandro Vargas, and he challenges the testimony and credibility of witnesses Wilbert Vargas and Patricio
Jacobe, Jr.
On the other hand, the Solicitor General, in representation of the prosecution, argues that the
circumstances established by the prosecution, when taken together, constitute an unbroken chain leading to
the inevitable conclusion that accused-appellant shot and killed Zandro Vargas. While there is no direct
evidence showing that it was indeed accused-appellant who shot Zandro in the head, the Solicitor General
claims that the testimonies of Wilbert Vargas and Patricio Jacobe that Zandro was last seen alive with
accused-appellant and three other men clearly prove that no other person could have shot and killed Zandro
Vargas than accused-appellant Pacifico Sumaoy.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the circumstantial evidence in this case establishes beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellant shot and killed Zandro Vargas. These circumstances, as pointed out
by the Solicitor General, are the following:
(a) Zandro was being mauled by appellant and his companions (p. 5, TSN, June 28, 1990);
(b) As Zandro was attempting to run, appellant drew his pistol and shot Zandro (pp. 5-6, Ibid);
(c) Zandro was hit on the arm (p. 6, TSN, Ibid and p. 8 TSN, July 13, 1990);
(d) Zandro fell on his knees (p. 6, TSN, June 28, 1990);
(e) Zandro was dragged towards a motorized pedicab by appellant (p. 6, TSN, June 28, 1990 and
p. 8, TSN, July 13, 1990);
(f) Zandro was loaded on the motorized pedicab and appellant and his companions boarded the
same pedicab (pp. 6-7, TSN, June 28, 1990 and pp. 8-10, TSN, July 13, 1990);
(g) Zandro was found dead (p. 11, TSN, June 28, 1990).[3]
Together these circumstances constitute an unbroken chain which leads to only one fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused is guilty of the killing of Zandro Vargas.
It was established by positive testimony that accused-appellant Sumaoy shot the deceased in the arm
and thereafter took the victim with him to an undisclosed location with the help of three other men. Only the
accused-appellant was seen with a firearm. Less than 24 hours later, the victim was found dead. Not only was
accused-appellant identified as the person with whom Zandro Vargas was last seen alive, he was also
positively identified as the person who shot Zandro Vargas in the arm. There is thus proof of aggression on
the part of the accused which, taken with the other circumstances, shows he had the intent to inflict injury
upon the victim.
In the case of People v. Fulinara,[4] the accused were convicted of kidnapping with murder based upon
positive testimony that the victim was last seen alive when he was forcibly abducted by two armed men in
army fatigues who were later identified as the accused. After the victim was abducted by the accused he was
later found dead. As in the case before us, there was no eyewitness at the precise moment the victim was
killed.
Accused-appellant contends that he cannot be convicted without the presentation of the gun in
evidence. He alleges that the prosecutions failure to match the slugs recovered from the body of Zandro
Vargas with accused-appellants own firearm precludes his conviction. This contention has no merit. The
presentation and identification of the weapon used are not indispensable to prove the guilt of the
33
accused.[5] The time which elapsed from the moment the victim was last seen alive and the moment his body Guillermo B. Guevara for appellant.
was found narrows the possibility that another agent caused his death,[6] especially where an aggression was Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
established against the victim before he disappeared with the accused.

The accused-appellant tries to discredit the testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses. He
points out that Patricio Jacobe, Jr. testified that Zandro was shot in the right arm, while Wilbert Vargas said
Zandro was shot in the left. This is, however, an inconsistency concerning a minor matter which does not
impair credibility of the witnesses. The inconsistency negates any suspicion that the testimonies were MALCOLM, J.:
perjured or rehearsed.[7] Moreover, findings of fact of trial courts, particularly with respect to the credibility of
witnesses who personally appeared and testified before them, must be respected on appeal.[8]
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Moran presiding, denying
Accused-appellants defense of alibi is of no moment. Not only was accused-appellant positively appellant's motion to declare null and void a search warrant issued on December 26, 1930, and to have
identified as the person who had shot and taken Zandro Vargas to an undisclosed placed. It is also settled that returned to him the books of account, invoices, and records which were seized by virtue of the warrant. The
for alibi to prosper, it is not enough that accused-appellant prove that he was somewhere else when the case was originally assigned to a Division of Five and was there decided, but subsequently, on representations
crime was committed. He must demonstrate that he could not have been physically present at the place of being made that the interpretation of an Act of Congress was involved, the Division ordered its decision set
the crime or in its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission. The testimony of accused-appellant. aside and the transfer of the case to the court in banc.
T/Sgt. Go and Pat. Narciso Vismanos failed to show that it was impossible for the accused to be at the scene
of the crime. The CIS office was only one kilometer away from the scene of the crime. In addition, Vismanos The Administrative Code, section 1434, grants police power to internal revenue agents. Acting pursuant to
admitted that he was so absorbed in his work that he did not really know whether accused-appellant was in this authority, the chief secret service agent and a supervising agent of the Bureau of Internal Revenue gave
the office premises the entire day of the latters duty.[9] testimony under oath before Judge Revilla, in which they specified the premises situated at No. 129 Calle Juan
Luna, District of Binondo, City of Manila, occupied by Jose Rubio, manager of the Simplex Trading
While the evidence in this case sufficiently establishes the guilt of the accused-appellant for the killing
Corporation, which it was desired to search. The witnesses, among other things, stated:
of victim Zandro Vargas, we think he cannot be held liable for murder because of the absence of evidence as
to the manner of the actual killing. Where no particulars are known as to the manner in which the aggression
was made or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim began and developed, it cannot be It has been reported to me by a person whom I considered reliable that in said premises there are
established from mere suppositions that the accused perpetrated the killing with treachery.[10] The evidence fraudulent books, invoices and records.
shows that the aggression against the victim began when he was still at the J Spot Carinderia. As a matter of
fact, according to Patricio Jacobe, Jr., the deceased was trying to flee from the accused-appellant when the I have watched personally the foregoing house for several times in company of the complainant
latter shot him, thus indicating that the victim had been forewarned of a greater aggression against him. The and I can assert positively and with a probable case that the prohibited fraudulent books, invoices
assault on the victim cannot be said to have been made in a sudden or unexpected manner so as to justify a and records, exist and being conducted in the said house, and the occupant of the same keeps in
finding of treachery.[11] his possession effects and devices to wit: Fraudulent books of the Simplex Trading Corporation &
The trial court also erred in finding the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of official position to subsidiary companies Paramount Trading Corporation & New York Trading Corp.
in the commission of the offense. This circumstance requires that the accused, as a public officer, used the
influence or reputation of his position for the purpose of committing the crime. If the accused could have Upon probable cause thus being shown, a search warrant was issued in the usual from, reading as follows:
perpetrated the crime without occupying his position, then there is no abuse of public position. In the case
before us, no evidence was adduced to show that the killing of Zandro vargas was in any way facilitated by
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
the accused-appellants public position. It was not even shown whether the accused-appellant wore his
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
uniform or used his service firearm when he committed the crime.[12]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is MODIFIED, finding accused-appellant Pacifico IN THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF THE CITY OF MANILA
Sumaoy guilty of homicide, and SENTENCING him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 17 years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased
Zandro Vargas in the increased sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff, }

SO ORDERED. VERSUS

EN BANC JOSE RUBIO, Manager of the Simplex Trading

Corporation, Paramount Corporation and
G.R. No. L-35500 October 27, 1932 New York Trading Corporation, defendant. }

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, The People of the Philippine Islands, to the Internal
vs. Revenue Agents of the City of Manila.
JOSE RUBIO, defendant-appellant.
GREETING:

34
 Proof by affidavit having this day been made before me, E. P. Revilla, Judge of the Court
of First Instance of the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, by the complainant on oath of
Juan Evaristo and Augusto Piccio of the City of Manila, P. I., that the defendant Jose
Rubio keeps illegally and feloniously fraudulent books, invoices and records, and that
he verily believes upon probable cause that the said books, invoices and records, at No.
129, Calle Juan Luna in the City of Manila, P. I., and the said (personal) property is now
being used in the commission of felony.
You are therefore commanded to take with you the necessary and proper assistance
and to enter, in the day time or in the night time, into the said dwelling house and
there diligently search for fraudulent books, invoices and records, and that you seize
and bring them before this court, to be disposed of according to law.
Given under my hand this 26th day of December, 1930.
(Sgd.) E. P. REVILLA
Judge, Court of First Instance
On the same day, internal revenue agents proceeded to the place indicated in the warrant, searched the
premises, and took therefrom books, invoices, and documents belonging to the Simplex Trading Corporation
of which Jose Rubio was the manager. Thereafter, as indicated, a motion was presented on behalf of Rubio to
secure a pronouncement of nullity of the search warrant, which motion, after receiving memoranda in
support and in opposition but without taking evidence, was denied.
The particular portions of the Act of Congress which are relied upon are found in the Philippine Bill of Rights,
being paragraphs 3 and 11 of section 3 of the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, commonly referred to as
the Philippine Autonomy Act. These portions of the Organic Act Provide: "That the right to be secure against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated" (sec. 3, par. 11); and "That no person shall . . . be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" (sec. 3, par. 3). The applicable statutory
provisions are sections 95, 96, 97, 98, and 99 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reading as follows:
SEC. 95. A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine
Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding
him to search for personal property and bring it before the court.
SEC. 96. It may be issued upon either of the following grounds:
1. When the property was stolen or embezzled.
2. When it was used or when the intent exists to use it as the means of committing a
felony.
SEC. 97. A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application
supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized.
SEC. 98. The judge or justice must, before issuing the warrant, examine on oath the complaint and
any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing.
SEC. 99. If the judge or justice is thereupon satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the
application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the
warrant, which must be substantially in the following form:
The errors assigned on appeal, connecting up with the order of the trial court, the statement of the case, and
the law as herein set forth, are the following:
1. The lower court erred in not holding that the search warrant was illegal and void for failure to
observe the constitutional and statutory provisions providing for its issue.
2. The lower court erred in holding that even if the warrant were illegal and void appellant's books
and papers might be retained because they were proper subjects for seizure under a search
warrant.
3. The lower court erred in not holding that the seizure of appellant's books and papers was made
solely for the purpose of using them as evidence against him in a criminal prosecution and was,
therefore, unlawful.
The point made in the first error was not originally passed upon the trial court, and is plainly without merit.
The requirements of the law were substantially, and even literally, complied with in this case. Appellant's
contention that the search warrant was issued without the complainants or any witnesses having been
examined, is untenable. The depositions speak for themselves. It is also contended that the application and
the warrant did not particularly describe the things to be seized. The verified statements of the two internal
revenue agents and the warrant issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila all describe the property
sought to be seized as "fraudulent books, invoices and records". While it is true that the property to be seized
under a warrant must be particularly described therein and no other property can be taken thereunder, yet
the description is required to be specific only in so far as the circumstances will ordinarily allow. It has been
held that, where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not
required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue. Appellant has
not shown that the internal revenue agents exceeded their powers under the warranty by seizing property
other than that described in the warrant question. The list of books, invoices, and records seized by said
officers is the best evidence to show that they strictly obeyed the command of their warrant by seizing those
things, and only those described in the search warrant.
Under the second error, it is claimed that "the books, invoices, and records seized are property which one
may lawfully possess; they were searched and seized solely for the purpose of using them as evidence to
prove an offense supposed to have been committed by appellant against the internal revenue customs laws,
which search and seizure for the purpose intended is prohibited by law." Reliance is placed on the Philippine
cases of Regidor vs. Araullo ([1904], 5 Off. Gaz., 955); Uy Kheytin vs. Villa-Real ([1920], 42 Phil., 886); and
United States vs. De los Reyes and Esguerra ([1911], 20 Phil., 467). An examination of the first two cited cases
reveals that the seizures made under the warrants issued therein were irregular and manifestly in violation of
law. In the first case, for instance, the court observed:
A causal examination of the property mentioned in the affidavit and the list of books, papers, and
documents actually seized by the said officers, as represented by their signed statement, above
quoted, will show that the officers, in executing the said search warrant, did not limit themselves,
in seizing property, to that which was described in the affidavit or search warrant.
(Regidor vs. Araullo, supra.)
In the second case, the court said:
35
 The important question that remains to be decided is whether, under a search warrant for opium,
the officers of the law were authorized to seize books, personal letters, and other property having
a remote or no connection with opium. (Uy Kheytin vs. Villa-Real, supra.)
Under these circumstances, it is evident that the seizures made were in excess of the authority given to the
seizing officers. In the case at bar, however, it has been shown that the internal revenue agents strictly
obeyed the command of their warrant by seizing no other property than that described therein.
In the third case cited by the appellant, that of United States vs. De los Reyes and Esguerra, supra, the holding
was that no public officer has the right to enter the premises of another for the purpose of search or seizure
against the will of the occupant and without the proper search warrant. This case is entirely foreign to the
point under discussion, inasmuch as in the instant case a search warrant was issued. From the above, it will
be seen that the three Philippine cases relied upon by the appellant rest upon different facts from those in
the case at bar.
After the decision in Division had been promulgated, the opinion of the United States Supreme Court of April
11, 1932, delivered in the case of United States of America vs. Daniel M. Lefkowitz and Pauline Paris was
received, and it is now urged that this opinion is controlling. Of course, if the opinion, on examination, be
found to support the views of the appellant, it would become our duty, even as against any pride which one
might have in maintaining a position previously taken, to change front to conform to the pronouncements of
the higher court. Turning to the opinion just mentioned, we find it said: "All the searches and seizures were
made without a search warrant" — in contrast, the searches and seizures in the case at bar were made with a
search warrant. Further, it was said: "The only question presented is whether the searchers of the desks,
cabinet and baskets and the seizures of the things taken from them were reasonable as an incident of the
arrests" — an entirely different state of facts from those before us. Again, it was said: "The Fourth
Amendment forbids every search that is unreasonable and is construed liberally to safeguard the right of
privacy" — an admonition which should be respected in this jurisdiction where constitutional rights are as
sacred as in the United States proper. Finally, a contrast was suggested between the search of one's house or
place of business made contemporaneously with his lawful arrest therein upon a valid warrant of arrest and a
search warrant, and it was said:
Respondents' papers were wanted by the officers solely for use as evidence of crime of which
respondents were accused or suspected. They could not lawfully be searched for and taken even
under a search warrant issued upon ample evidence and precisely describing such things and
disclosing exactly where they were. (Gouled vs. United States, 255 U. S., 298, 310.)
xxx xxx xxx
Here, the searches were exploratory and general and made solely to find evidence of respondents'
guilt of the alleged conspiracy or some other crime. Though intended to be used to solicit orders
for liquor in violation of the Act, the papers and other articles found and taken were in themselves
unoffending. The decisions of this court distinguish searchers of one's house, office, papers or
effects merely to get evidence to convict him of crime from searches as such as those made to find
stolen goods for return to the owner, to take property that has been forfeited to the Government,
to discover property concealed to avoid payment of the duties for which it is liable, and from
searches such as those made for the seizure of counterfeit coins, burglars' tools, gambling
paraphernalia and illicit liquor in order to prevent the commission of crime.
We note that the opinion in the Lefkowitz case relies on previous decisions of the United States Supreme
Court in Gouled vs. United States ([1920], 255 U. S., 298), and Go-Bart Importing Co. vs. United States ([1930],
282 U. S., 344). In the first case, it was said:
. . . search warrants . . . may not be used as a means of gaining access to a man's house or office
and papers solely for the purpose of making search to secure evidence to be used against him in a
criminal or penal proceeding, but . . . they may be resorted to only when a primary right to such
search and seizure may be found in the interest which the public or the complaint may have in the
property to be seized, or in the right to the possession of it, or when a valid exercise of the police
power renders possession of the property by the accused unlawful and provides that it may be
taken. (Boyd Case, 116, U. S., 623, 624, L. ed., 748; 6 Sup. Ct. Rep., 524.)
There is no special sanctity in papers, as distinguished from other forms of property, to render
them immune from search and seizure, if only they fall within the scope of the principles of the
cases in which other property may be seized, and if they be adequately described in the affidavit
and warrant. . . . we cannot doubt that contracts may be so used as instruments or agencies for
perpetrating frauds upon the Government as to give the public an interest in them which would
justify the search for and seizure of them, under a properly issued search warrant, for the purpose
of preventing further frauds.
xxx xxx xxx
As to the contract with Steinthal, also a stranger to the indictment. It is not difficult, as we have
said, to imagine how an executed written contract might be an important agency or
instrumentality in the bribing of a public servant and perpetrating frauds upon the Government so
that it would have a legitimate and important interest in seizing such a paper in order prevent
further frauds, . . . .
As to the second case, it rested on the proposition that a general exploratory search of premises, the seizure
of papers therefrom, and their retention for use as evidence in a criminal proceeding cannot be sustained
where made at a time when no crime was being committed and under a false claim of possession of a search
warrant, by one making of an arrest of persons on the premises under color of an invalid warrant, who
required one of them, by pretention of right and threat or force, to open a desk and safe. It was further ruled
that, there is no formula for the determination of the reasonableness of a search and seizure, but each case is
to be decided on its own facts and circumstances.
This brings us in logical order to the third error and the point often made that the seizure of appellant's
books, invoices, and records was made solely for the purpose of using them as evidence against him in a
criminal prosecution. The question, in its final analysis, is, were appellant's books, invoices, and records seized
solely for use as evidence of a crime of which the appellant was accused or suspected? — or were the books,
invoices, and records seized in order to prevent the further perpetration of fraud? In the first place, it is to be
observed that the public has an interest in the proper regulation of appellant's books. (Act No. 3292, section
4.) In the second place, the books belonged to a corporation of which the appellant was simply the manager.
And in the third place, the search warrant only issued on a showing of probable cause — to adopt the
language alike of section 96 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the search warrant — that "fraudulent
books, invoices, and records" were "now being used in the commission of a felony."
Finally, while the assertion is oft-repeated that the books, invoices, and records were taken solely for the
purpose of being used as evidence against Rubio, we find no support for this contention in the record. In the
trial court, the assistant city fiscal said: "As we have stated above, the search and seizure in this case were
made under the provisions of the internal-revenue laws and the authority of a search warrant, and not for the
purpose of obtaining evidence, but with a view to seize the instruments used in the violation of said laws
committed by the defendant." On appeal, the prosecution persistently maintains its position that the seizure
was made with the object of preventing the use of the books of account, documents, and papers in the
commission of further offenses or fraud or against the Government. Not a scintilla of evidence is to be found
in the record to prove that the Government has used the books of account, documents, and papers as
evidence against the appellant, or that the Government ever had the intention of so doing. All we know is,
36
that an information was filed against Rubio, charging him with a violation of the Customs Law, and that he
compromised another case with the Bureau of Internal Revenue on the payment of the sum of P100,000. On
this showing, we perforce cannot deduce that the books of account, documents, and papers were wanted
solely for use as evidence of a crime.
A thorough reexamination of the case, in the light of the arguments presented and the authorities cited, leads
us to the same conclusion as before, namely, that no constitutional right of the appellant was violated; that
the letter of the law was followed, and that the order of the trial judge was correct in all particulars.
Wherefore, the judgment will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the appellant.
N BANC
G.R. No. L-36278 October 26, 1932
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CRISANTO EVANGELISTA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Vicente Sotto for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
Crisanto Evangelista, Jacinto G. Manahan, Guillermo Capadocia, Mariano P. Balgos, Enrique Torrente, Urbano
Arcega, Catalino Monroy, Francisco Rafael, Sotero Senson, Remigio Tolentino, Dominador B. Reyes, Emilio S.
Juan, Alberto Santos, Juan Lagman, Andres Santiago, Angel Mesina, Felipe Cruz, Maximo M. Gutierrez,
Dominador J. Ambrosio, Cenon Lacanienta, Mateo del Castillo, Norberto Nabong, Sixto Estrada, Augusto
David, Doroteo Cahumban, Jose Ilagan, and Liboro Natividad were accused in the Court of First Instance of
the City of Manila of a crime against the fundamental laws of the State, it being alleged in the information as
follows:
That on or about the 30th day of May, 1931, and for some time prior thereto, the above named accused,
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously affiliate to, compose and become members of, the so-called Communist Party of the Philippines
(Partido Komunista sa Pilipinas), an illegal association, whose principal purposes and objects are to bring
about, by the use of force, the downfall of the present form of government and establish in place thereof
another patterned after the Soviet Government of Russia and run by those affiliated to and in sympathy with
said association; to incite a revolt of the laboring class, advocating and urging struggle between said laboring
class and the so-called capitalists, and other similar objects tending to combat the fundamental basis of the
present social order and alter the regularity of its functions and to the commission of violations of the existing
laws, which above-mentioned association was formed and organized without the local authorities having
been informed of its aforesaid objects and purposes as well as of the by-laws thereof; and that at the time
and place hereinabove mentioned, in the furtherance of their conspiracy and in utter disregard of the notice
or warning given by the authorities that they could not hold any meeting anywhere, the said accused
assembled, gathered and congregated under the name and auspices of the Katipunan ng mga Anak pawis sa
Pilipinas (Association of the Sons of the Sweat of the Philippine Islands), another association having the same
illegal aims and purposes as the said Communist Party of the Philippines, at El Retono Building, in said City of
Manila."
After trial the court below convicted the said accused, with the exception of Norberto Nabong, Sixto Estrada,
Augusto David, Doroteo Cahumban, Jose Ilagan, Liboro Natividad, and Mateo del Castillo, who were
acquitted.
Thereafter the convicted accused appealed to this court.
The accused were charged with the crime of illegal association in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila in that on or about the 30th day of May, 1931, and for some time prior thereto, the said accused
affiliated to, and became members of, the so-called Communist Party of the Philippines whose principal
purposes and object were to bring about by force the downfall of the present form of government and
establish in its place another patterned after the Soviet Government of Russia, and to incite a revolt of the
laboring class.
After the trial the court below convicted the said accused, with the exception of Norberto Nabong, Sixto
Estrada, Augusto David, Doroteo Cahumban, Jose Ilagan, Liboro Natividad, and Mateo del Castillo, who were
acquitted.
It appears that the appellants, Evangelista, Manahan, Capadocia, Torrente, Arcega, Monroy, Rafael, Senson,
Tolentino, Reyes, San Juan, Santos, Lagman, Santiago, Mesina, Cruz, Gutierrez, and Ambrosio, presented
themselves as candidates of the Communist Party for different offices — insular, provincial and municipal —
in the last elections; that the accused Mariano P. Balgos, Cenon Lacanienta and some of those who
campaigned for their candidacies as members of the Communist Party, delivered speeches at several
meetings of the Communist Party, advocating the ideas and principles of the said Communist Party and urging
the laborers to join it.
It also appears that the appellant Enrique Torrente appears in the newspaper known as Titis, an organ of the
Communist Party, as the editor thereof.
The appellants have not denied being members of the Communist Party of the Philippines; on the contrary,
Crisanto Evangelista admitted expressly at the trial that he was affiliated to the said party. As witness for the
defense, he testified that the objects and purposes of the Communist Party of the Philippines are set out in its
constitution and by-laws which purposes and objects, according to said constitution and by-laws, are to
overthrow the present form of government by any means necessary, especially armed revolution.1awphil.net
The appellant, Catalino Monroy, admitted having gone to Russia as delegate of the Kapisanan nang mga Anak
pawis to the Red International Labor Union Congress.
From the foregoing it is clear that the twenty appellants herein are or were members of the Communist Party
of the Philippines, for all of them, with the exception of Balgos and Lacanienta, presented themselves as
candidates in the last general elections as communists, and said Balgos and Lacanienta, as well as many of
those mentioned, delivered speeches at several meetings held under the auspices of the said Communist
Party, advocating communism and urging the laborers to affiliate to the said party. If any one of these
appellants were not a member of the Communist Party, it would have been very easy for him to deny it, but
no one has so done.
The principal defense set up by the appellants is that the Communist Party of the Philippines is not an illegal
association in that it preaches only a social but not an armed revolution, but a mere reading of the
constitution of the Communist Party will show that such a pretense is obviously useless. Neither is there any
merit in the appellant's argument that communism is not prohibited in any part of the civilized world. And as
to the validity of the law prohibiting communism, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the law of
37
California prohibiting the display of the communist red flag as a sign inciting sedition and disorderly
opposition to the government.
Under the law of the Philippine Islands, the association formed by the appellants is clearly illegal. Article 188
of the Penal Code, as substituted by article 24 of the Royal Decree of September 12, 1897
(Alcubilla, Diccionario de Administracion, Apendice de 1897, p. 454), says that illegal associations are those
the object of which is against public morals, to commit some crime, or to attack the fundamental basis of the
social order or alter the regularity of its functions. Now, according to appellant Crisanto Evangelista and the
constitution and by-laws of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the purpose of the party is to incite class
struggle and to overthrow the present government by peaceful means or by armed revolution; therefore the
purpose of the party is to alter the social order and to commit the crimes of rebellion and sedition. An
association having such an object must necessarily be illegal (decision of Oct. 8, 1884, of the Supreme Court
of Spain, 7 Hidalgo, Cod. Pen., 531-532.) The report submitted by Secretary Hughes to the Senate of the
United States, as well as that made by Hamilton Fish, after an investigation of communism, leads to the same
conclusion, namely, that force and violence are inseparable from communist programs.
The last point made by the appellants is relative to the penalty imposed. The trial court imposed the penalty
of confinamiento for the period of eight years and one day, as provided by paragraph 5, article 190 of the old
Penal Code, as substituted by article 26 of the Royal Decree of September 12, 1897, in connection with
articles 28 and 114 of the same Code. The appellants contend that this is erroneous because the Revised
Penal Code has eliminated this kind of penalty. But there is no merit in this argument, because the act took
place under the sanction of the old Code, and the penalty of confinamiento, therein provided for, is lighter
than that provided by the new Code in its article 147, which is prision correccional and arresto mayor and
fine.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the twenty defendants. So ordered.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 77284 July 19, 1990
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BONIFACIO BALANSI alias "BAN-OS", defendant-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Balgos & Perez for defendant-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The accused-appellant stands charged with the murder of Elpidio Dalsen on January 30, 1982 at Balinciagao,
Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao. The Information alleged that he, armed with a Garand rifle, went inside the house of
the victim, then allegedly fast asleep, where he shot him twice and killed him. Treachery was held to be
present, and so were evident premeditation and employment of means to weaken the defense of the
victim. 1
The accused-appellant was then the Barangay Captain of Balinciagao Norte, Pasil, Kalinga-Apayao, and a
member of the Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF), while the victim was the Provincial Development Officer
of Kalinga-Apayao. 2 The incident took place during a wedding celebration at Balinciagao Sur, Pasil, at or
about 5:30 or 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon. The prosecution presented eight witnesses. The defense placed
two on the stand.
The trial court found the accused guilty as charged and sentenced him to die and to pay a total of
P590,000.00 in actual (P540,000.00 for loss of the victim's earning capacity) and moral damages, plus costs. 3
It appears that the victim, a nephew of the appellant, was then sleeping at the house of his parents located
opposite the house where the wedding celebration was being held. At or about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon,
Beatrice Canao, a Balinciagao resident, saw the accused, her uncle, standing at the door of the house of the
victim's parents, also her relatives, armed with a gun. She inquired what he was doing there and he allegedly
replied that he was waiting for the victim. She then entered the premises to locate an old newspaper with
which to wrap food, a rice cake, when she saw the victim asleep. When she left, she saw the accused at the
doorway. After disposing of her rice cake (which she gave to a certain Fr. Medina), she heard two gunshots,
fired at an interval of two or three seconds, emanating apparently from the house, to which she shortly
rushed. She allegedly met the accused at the steps leading to the second floor, brandishing his rifle. 4
She allegedly shouted "putok, putok!" 5 She then reported the matter to the police.
Yulo Asbok a fellow CHDF member of the accused and likewise a Balinciagao resident, also heard two
gunshots ring that afternoon. He said that he was three meters from the house where the gunshot sounds
seemed to have originated. He allegedly proceeded there but was met by the accused at the steps. They
allegedly grappled for possession of the rifle, which, he alleged, was still warm and reeked of gunpowder. He
was able to wrest possession, after which, the accused allegedly ran away and fled to Pogon, also in
Balinciagao. He later learned that the victim had been shot and that he died at Lubuagan Hospital. 6
Rosalina Dalsen, the victim's wife was enjoying the wedding celebration when she heard two gunshots. She
made inquiries subsequently and was informed that the victim was her husband. She claimed that she saw
the accused standing at the entrance of her parents- in-law's house prior thereto. 7
Dr. Nicolas Balais, a dentist by profession, was also at that celebration when he heard the shots. He then went
to the victim's parent's house where they, the shots, rang out from. He did not allegedly have in mind that
somebody had actually been fired upon but thought that may be there had been a burglary. He ascended the
steps of the house where the accused earlier met Beatrice Candao and Yulo Asbok, and entered the second
floor. He saw the victim lying in his room, whom he initially believed to be merely sleeping, but who was, in
fact, dead. 8
The prosecution also presented Simeon Valera, principal of Pasil Central School, and Artemio Dalsen the
victim's brother, who sought to establish a motive for the killing of the victim, a motive they imputed to the
accused. Valera testified that revenge was supposedly a tradition among Kalingas (of which both the accused
and victim were members), which, however, could be prevented by the dusa, meaning, apparently,
intervention and mediation by community elders. 9 Meanwhile, Dalsen claimed that the accused had nursed
along- standing grudge against the victim, whom he accused of delaying on alleged award for the
construction of a bridge in Balinciagao in 1979. 10
After the prosecution rested, the defense presented its evidence. It presented two witnesses, the accused
himself and Masadao Jose, who lived in Samangana, Balinciagao.
38
The accused claimed that he was also at the wedding celebration on that fateful afternoon when he too
heard two gunshots break in the air. As a member of the CHDF, he allegedly took it upon himself to
investigate the matter. He said that he went to the direction where the shots came from and was on his way
to the entrance of the house when Yulo Asbok allegedly prevented him from doing so, who grabbed the
firearm he was carrying. He did not allegedly know at that time that the victim had been shot and allegedly
learned of it only on the following day. He admitted having ran away but allegedly because he had been
implicated. Four days later, he voluntarily turned himself in to the police. Masadao Jose corroborated his
statement. 11
In returning a verdict of guilty, the trial judge observed: "While there is no eye witness who testified to having
seen the accused Bonifacio Balansi shoot the victim, yet all the circumstances pointed to him as the
perpetrator of the crime." 12
The circumstantial evidence referred to came primarily from the lips of Yulo Asbok and Beatrice Candao as
well as the accused himself, who admitted having been at the scene of the crime. Obviously, the judge did not
lend credence to the accused's defense.
The accused-appellant now contends that the judge erred, first, in appreciating circumstantial evidence,
second, in appreciating treachery, and third, in rejecting his defense of alibi.
We affirm, with modification, the decision appealed from.
While there was no eyewitness account, the web of circumstantial evidence points to no other conclusion
than that the accused was guilty of shooting the victim, Elpidio Dalsen to death in the afternoon of January
30, 1982. These circumstances are as follows: (1) He was seen standing by the entrance of the house where
the victim had sojourned, armed with a long rifle, minutes before gunshots were heard. Three witnesses saw
him: Beatrice Canao, Yulo Asbok, and Rosalina Dalsen. (2) Moments later, two shots rang out, one after the
other. Four witnesses heard them: Canao, Asbok, Dalsen and Nicolas Balais. (3) Thereafter, Canao saw him
descending from the steps of the house. Asbok also saw him there, whom he wrestled for the possession of
the rifle. (4) He fled and hid for four days.
Under Rule 133, Section 5, of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient
for conviction if.
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt. 13
As we glean from the evidence, there is no one, other than the accused-appellant, who could have
perpetrated the offense.
The accused-appellant, as we said, disagrees. He insists that he was there, precisely, to investigate the matter,
and armed himself for the purpose, but was stopped by Yulo Asbok. His protests notwithstanding, we too
must reject this defense. Two reasons persuade us. First, he has not ascribed any motive to Yulo Asbok as to
why he, Asbok should testify falsely against him. Second, he admits having fled immediately thereafter. If he
were truly innocent, he would not have done so. We have held time and again that flight is a silent admission
of guilt. 14 As aptly put "The righteous is brave as a lion, but the wicked man fleeth." 15
If he were moreover truly innocent, and that it was Yulo Asbok who had something to do with the killing and
who had meanwhile tried to stop him from conducting an inquiry, it would have been he, the accused, to be
the first to make a report to the authorities so that Asbok could be brought to the bar of justice. If the latter
did try to prevent him from performing his duties, as he claimed, 16 he should have gone to lengths to
implicate Asbok because that too was his duty.
We also reject his claims of inconsistency on the part of the prosecution's witnesses, notably Asbok who
stated that he was the first to be in the victim's house after the shooting (aside from the accused), in the face
of Canao's testimony that she also had been there. The Court is not convinced that an inconsistency exists.
For obviously, Asbok had been mistaken. Canao had earlier been there.
The Court sees no need to make an inquiry on the admissibility of testimonies attributing motive to the
accused-appellant. We are sufficiently persuaded that even without any successful showing of a motive, the
circumstantial evidence on hand nevertheless suffices to warrant a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court, however, is not convinced that the accused-appellant had committed murder arising from
treachery, evident premeditation, and means employed to weaken the defense of the victim. As to treachery,
jurisprudence is ample that the manner of attack must be shown. While there are testimonies to the effect
that the victim was "fast asleep", we can not safely presume that he was still in that condition when the
accused sprung his attack. And since nobody saw the actual shooting, we can not justifiably say that the
victim was still actually still asleep at that time. 17
Neither is evident premeditation a qualifying circumstance. In appreciating evident premeditation, it is
necessary to show: (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the offense; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient interval of time between the
determination and execution. 18 The prior determination of the accused to do away with the victim has not
been sufficiently demonstrated by the prosecution.
That the accused also employed means to weaken the victim's defenses is likewise missing in this case. As we
said, there was no actual eyewitness to the killing and hence, we can not say for sure, based on the evidence
before us, that the appellant did employ means to weaken the defense of the victim.
We, however, affirm the trial court insofar as it appreciated dwelling. Although the victim was not shot in his
house (his parents owned it) it has been held that the dwelling place need not be owned by the victim. 19 In
that case, it was held:
La circunstancia agravante de morada, aunque no fuese la casa propia de los occisos,
debe estimarse porque — segun el Tribunal Supremo de España — " no solo por el
respeto que el domicilio ajeno merece, como especie de complements de la
personalidad, y por el que es debido al hogar de la familia, sino por el no menor de que
es digna la residencia privada de cualquier ciudadano, y por el mayor grado de malicia
que revela quien busca a su victima alli en donde se encuentra con la confianza y
abandono propios del lugar elegido para el descanso y las intimidades de la vida: razon
por la cual habla el Codigo penal en el art. 10, no de domicillo en sentido legal, sino de
morada en su acepcion real, que no es otra que la del paraje en donde una persona
hace estancia de asiento. ... a titulo de nuesped, o por otro cualquiera.i•t•c-aüsl (S. de
25 de Junio de 1886, 2 Viada., 5 ed., 329.) 20
39
In the Basa case, the victims were killed while sleeping as guests in the house of another. Dwelling there was
held to be aggravating.
21
According to earlier cases, including U.S. v. Bredejo, our ruling was that the dwelling place must be owned
by the offended party. In another decision, People v. Celespara, 22 dwelling was not appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance in the absence of proof that the victim owned the dwelling place where he was
killed. In People v. Guhiting, 23 morada was not likewise considered for the same reasons.
However, more recent cases have since followed the lead of Basa, notably People v. Galapia 24 and People v.
Sto. Tomas. 25
"Dwelling" is considered an aggravating circumstance because primarily of the sanctity of privacy the law
accords to human abode. According to one commentator, one's dwelling place is a "sanctuary worthy of
respect" 26 and that one who slanders another in the latter's house is more guilty than if he who offends him
elsewhere. However, one does not lose his right of privacy where he is offended in the house of another
because as his invited guest, he, the stranger, is sheltered by the same roof and protected by the same
intimacy of life it affords. It may not be his house, but it is, even for a brief moment, "home" to him. He is
entitled to respect even for that short moment.
It is with more reason in this case. The late Elpidio Dalsen died in the house of his very parents. who raised
him until he could be on his own.
Under the circumstances, we affirm the lower court, but only insofar as it held the accused-appellant
responsible for taking the life of Elpidio Dalsen. We hold him liable for simple homicide aggravated by
dwelling. Under the Revised Penal Code, he must suffer reclusion temporal in its maximum period, there
being no mitigating circumstances and one aggravating circumstance. 27
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal. The grant of damages is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202122, January 15, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. BERNABE PAREJA Y CRUZ, Accused–Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO–DE CASTRO, J.:
The accused–appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz (Pareja) is appealing the January 19, 2012 Decision1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR.–H.C. No. 03794, which affirmed in toto the conviction for Rape and Acts of
Lasciviousness meted out by Branch 113, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 04–
1556–CFM and 04–1557–CFM.2
On May 5, 2004, Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one Attempted Rape. The Informations for
the three charges read as follows:
I. For the two counts of Rape:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Criminal Case No. 04–1556–CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of February, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above–named accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the
common law spouse of the minor victim’s mother, through force, threats and intimidation, did then and there
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual assault upon the person of [AAA3 ], a minor 13
years of age, by then and there mashing her breast and inserting his finger inside her vagina against her will. 4
Criminal Case No. 04–1557–CFM
That on or about and sometime in the month of December, 2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above–named accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz, being the
stepfather of [AAA], a minor 13 years of age, through force, threats and intimidation, did then and there
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said minor against her will.5
II. For the charge of Attempted Rape:
Criminal Case No. 04–1558–CFM
That on or about the 27th day of March, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above–named accused, BERNABE PAREJA Y CRUZ, being the common
law spouse of minor victim’s mother by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape against the person of minor,
[AAA], a 13 years old minor by then and there crawling towards her direction where she was sleeping, putting
off her skirt, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have produce[d] the crime of rape for
the reason other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is the timely arrival of minor victim’s mother who
confronted the accused, and which acts of child abuse debased, degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth
and dignity of said minor complainant as a human being.6
On June 17, 2004, Pareja, during his arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against him. 7 After
the completion of the pre–trial conference on September 16, 2004,8 trial on the merits ensued.
The antecedents of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse took place on
three (3) different dates, particularly [in December 2003], February 2004, and March 27, 2004.
AAA’s parents separated when she was [only eight years old 9 ]. At the time of the commission of the
aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with herein accused–appellant Bernabe Pareja
who, by then, was cohabiting with her mother, together with three (3) of their children, aged twelve (12),
eleven (11) and nine (9), in x x x, Pasay City.
The first incident took place [i]n December 2003 [the December 2003 incident]. AAA’s mother was not in the
house and was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking advantage of the situation, [Pareja], while AAA was
asleep, placed himself on top of [her]. Then, [Pareja], who was already naked, begun to undress
AAA. [Pareja] then started to suck the breasts of [AAA]. Not satisfied, [Pareja] likewise inserted his penis into
AAA’s anus. Because of the excruciating pain that she felt, AAA immediately stood up and rushed outside of
their house.
Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the [December 2003] incident for fear that
[Pareja] might kill her. [Pareja] threatened to kill AAA in the event that she would expose the incident to
anyone.
AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident had happened more than once. According to AAA,
[i]n February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had again been molested by [Pareja]. Under the same
40
circumstances as the [December 2003 incident], with her mother not around while she and her half–siblings of reclusion perpetua.
were asleep, [Pareja] again laid on top of her and started to suck her breasts. But this time, [Pareja] caressed
[her] and held her vagina and inserted his finger [i]n it. The accused shall be credited in full for the period of his preventive imprisonment.

With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident], it was AAA’s mother who saw The accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party [AAA], the sum of P50,000.00, without subsidiary
[Pareja] in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while the latter was asleep. Outraged, AAA’s mother imprisonment, in case of insolvency.12
immediately brought AAA to the barangay officers to report the said incident. AAA then narrated to the
barangay officials that she had been sexually abused by [Pareja] x x x many times x x x. The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, gave more weight to the
prosecution’s evidence as against Pareja’s baseless denial and imputation of ill motive. However, due to the
Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine failure of the prosecution to present AAA’s mother to testify about what she had witnessed in March 2004,
General Hospital for a medical and genital examination. On March 29, 2004, Dr. Tan issued Provisional the RTC had to acquit Pareja of the crime of Attempted Rape in the March 2004 incident for lack of
Medico–Legal Report Number 2004–03–0091. Her medico–legal report stated the following evidence. The RTC could not convict Pareja on the basis of AAA’s testimony for being hearsay evidence as she
conclusion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary had no personal knowledge of what happened on March 27, 2004 because she was sleeping at that time.
Hymen: Tanner Stage 3, hymenal remnant from 5–7 o’clock area, Type of hymen: Crescentic
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
x x x
Wanting to reverse his two convictions, Pareja appealed13 to the Court of Appeals, which on January 19, 2012,
Genital findings show Clear Evidence of Blunt Force or Penetrating Trauma. affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 04–1556 and 04–1557, to wit:
After the results of the medico–legal report confirmed that AAA was indeed raped, AAA’s mother then filed a
complaint for rape before the Pasay City Police Station.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and,
consequently, DISMISSED. The appealed Decisions rendered by Branch 113 of the Regional Trial Court of the
To exculpate himself from liability, [Pareja] offered both denial and ill motive of AAA against him as his
National Capital Judicial Region in Pasay City on January 16, 2009 in Criminal Cases Nos. 04–1556 to 04–1557
defense. He denied raping [AAA] but admitted that he knew her as she is the daughter of his live–in partner
are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.14ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
and that they all stay in the same house.
Issues
Contrary to AAA’s allegations, [Pareja] averred that it would have been impossible that the alleged incidents
Aggrieved, Pareja elevated his case to this Court15 and posited before us the following errors as he did before
happened. To justify the same, [Pareja] described the layout of their house and argued that there was no
the Court of Appeals:
way that the alleged sexual abuses could have happened.

According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood, only about four (4) meters wide by ten (10) meters, and I
was so small that they all have to sit to be able to fit inside the house. Further, the vicinity where their house
is located was thickly populated with houses constructed side by side. Allegedly, AAA also had no choice but THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] OF THE CRIMES CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING
to sleep beside her siblings. THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was hard to imagine how he could possibly still go about II
with his plan without AAA’s siblings nor their neighbors noticing the same.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] BASED SOLELY ON THE PROSECUTION WITNESS’
Verily, [Pareja] was adamant and claimed innocence as to the imputations hurled against him by AAA. He TESTIMONY.16
contended that AAA filed these charges against him only as an act of revenge because AAA was mad at [him]
for being the reason behind her parents’ separation.10 In his Supplemental Brief17 Pareja added the following argument:

Ruling of the RTC The private complainant’s actuations after the incident negate the possibility that she was raped.18

On January 16, 2009, the RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape but convicted him of the Pareja’s main bone of contention is the reliance of the lower courts on the testimony of AAA in convicting him
crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness in the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents, for rape and acts of lasciviousness. Simply put, Pareja is attacking the credibility of AAA for being
respectively. The dispositive portion of the Decision11 reads as follows: inconsistent. Moreover, he claimed, AAA acted as if nothing happened after the alleged sexual abuse.

WHEREFORE, the herein accused Bernabe Pareja y Cruz is hereby acquitted from the charge of attempted Ruling of this Court
rape in Crim. Case No. 04–1558, for want of evidence.
This Court finds no reason to reverse Pareja’s conviction.
In Crim. Case No. 04–1556, the said accused is CONVICTED with Acts of Lasciviousness and he is meted out
the penalty of imprisonment, ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day as minimum to 4 years and 2 months Core Issue: Credibility of AAA
of prision [correccional] as maximum.
Pareja claims that AAA’s testimony cannot be the lone basis of his conviction as it was riddled with
In Crim. Case No. 04–1557, the said accused is CONVICTED as charged with rape, and he is meted the penalty inconsistencies.19

41
 alleged to have been committed.
We find such argument untenable.
The phrase “on or about the year 1992” encompasses not only the twelve (12 ) months of 1992 but includes
When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow certain guidelines that the years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993, for which accused–appellant has to virtually
have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez,20 we enumerated them as follows: account for his whereabouts. Hence, the failure of the prosecution to allege with particularity the date of the
commission of the offense and, worse, its failure to prove during the trial the date of the commission of the
First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTC’s evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses, offense as alleged in the Information, deprived accused–appellant of his right to intelligently prepare for his
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its defense and convincingly refute the charges against him. At most, accused–appellant could only establish his
vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses. place of residence in the year indicated in the Information and not for the particular time he supposedly
committed the rape.
Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTC’s assessments and
conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower court’s findings, particularly when no x x x
significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked or
disregarded. Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its allegation in the Information that accused–appellant raped
complainant in 1992 manifestly shows that the date of the commission of the offense as alleged was based
And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC. (Citations omitted.) merely on speculation and conjecture, and a conviction anchored mainly thereon cannot satisfy the quantum
of evidence required for a pronouncement of guilt, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt that the crime was
The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the “assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best committed on the date and place indicated in the Information.29 (Citation omitted.)
left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on
the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts–and when his findings have been affirmed by the In this case, although the dates of the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents were not specified, the
Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.”21 While there are recognized period of time Pareja had to account for was fairly short, unlike “on or about the year 1992.” Moreover,
exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no substantial reason to overturn the identical conclusions of the Ladrillo was able to prove that he had only moved in the house where the rape supposedly happened, in
trial and appellate courts on the matter of AAA’s credibility. 1993, therefore negating the allegation that he raped the victim in that house in 1992. 30

Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victim’s testimony are generally expected.22 As this Court While it may be true that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim in Ladrillo contributed to his
stated in People v. Saludo23 : eventual acquittal, this Court said that they alone were not enough to reverse Ladrillo’s conviction, viz:

Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such an offense is not Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining witness’ testimony that militates heavily against
analogous to a person’s achievement or accomplishment as to be worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is its being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered independently, the defects might
something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her psyche not suffice to overturn the trial court’s judgment of conviction, but assessed and weighed in its totality, and
for life and which her conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim cannot be in relation to the testimonies of other witnesses, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a powerful
expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and horrifying experience compulsion towards reversal of the assailed judgment.31 (Emphasis supplied.)
she had undergone. (Citation omitted.)chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
It is worthy to note that Ladrillo also offered more than just a mere denial of the crime charged against him to
Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account has exculpate him from liability. He also had an alibi, which, together with the other evidence, produced
never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a witness.24 The inconsistencies mentioned by reasonable doubt that he committed the crime as charged. In contrast, Pareja merely denied the accusations
Pareja are trivial and non–consequential matters that merely caused AAA confusion when she was being against him and even imputed ill motive on AAA.
questioned. The inconsistency regarding the year of the December incident is not even a matter pertaining to
AAA’s ordeal.25 The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape becomes important only when it As regards Pareja’s concern about AAA’s lone testimony being the basis of his conviction, this Court has held:
creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape itself or the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of
conviction. In other words, the “date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when the Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to produce a
accuracy and truthfulness of the complainant’s narration practically hinge on the date of the commission of conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone would
the crime.”26 Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime.27 be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the corroboration of the testimony of a single
witness in a rape case.32 (Citations omitted.)
In this connection, Pareja repeatedly invokes our ruling in People v. Ladrillo,28 implying that our rulings therein
are applicable to his case. However, the factual circumstances in Ladrillo are prominently missing in Pareja’s Improbability of sexual abuse
case. In particular, the main factor for Ladrillo’s acquittal in that case was because his constitutional right to in their small house and in the
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated when the Information against presence of AAA’s sleeping siblings
him only stated that the crime was committed “on or about the year 1992.” We said:
Pareja argues that it was improbable for him to have sexually abused AAA, considering that their house was
The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11, Rule 110, of the Rules Court which so small that they had to sleep beside each other, that in fact, when the alleged incidents happened, AAA was
requires that the time of the commission of the offense must be alleged as near to the actual date as the sleeping beside her younger siblings, who would have noticed if anything unusual was happening.33
information or complaint will permit. More importantly, it runs afoul of the constitutionally protected right
of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Information is not This Court is not convinced. Pareja’s living conditions could have prevented him from acting out on his
sufficiently explicit and certain as to time to inform accused–appellant of the date on which the criminal act is beastly desires, but they did not. This Court has observed that many of the rape cases appealed to us were

42
not always committed in seclusion. Lust is no respecter of time or place,34 and rape defies constraints of time charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the
and space. In People v. Sangil, Sr.,35 we expounded on such occurrence in this wise: world or risk the offenders’ making good their threats to kill or hurt their victims. (Citation omitted.)

In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor couples with big families Medical examination
living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a problem despite the presence of other persons not indispensable
around them. Considering the cramped space and meager room for privacy, couples perhaps have gotten
used to quick and less disturbing modes of sexual congresses which elude the attention of family members; Pareja avers that the Medico–Legal Report indicating that there is evidence of blunt force or penetrating
otherwise, under the circumstances, it would be almost impossible to copulate with them around even when trauma upon examination of AAA’s hymen, “cannot be given any significance, as it failed to indicate how and
asleep. It is also not impossible nor incredible for the family members to be in deep slumber and not be when the said signs of physical trauma were inflicted.” Furthermore, Pareja said, the findings that AAA’s
awakened while the sexual assault is being committed. One may also suppose that growing children sleep hymen sustained trauma cannot be utilized as evidence against him as the alleged sexual abuse that occurred
more soundly than grown–ups and are not easily awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in the in December, was not by penetration of the vagina.41
night. There is no merit in appellant’s contention that there can be no rape in a room where other people are
present. There is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that This Court has time and again held that an accused can be convicted of rape on the basis of the sole
“lust is no respecter of time and place,” and rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest of testimony of the victim. In People v. Colorado,42 we said:
places. (Citations omitted.)
[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical examination of the
Demeanor of AAA victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in character
as a rape victim and not essential to conviction. x x x.

Pareja asseverates that AAA’s demeanor and conduct belie her claim that she was raped. He said that “the
ordinary Filipina [would have summoned] every ounce of her strength and courage to thwart any attempt to
besmirch her honor and blemish her purity.” Pareja pointed out that they lived in a thickly populated area
such that any commotion inside their house would have been easily heard by the neighbors, thus, giving AAA
the perfect opportunity to seek their help.36 Moreover, Pareja said, AAA’s delay in reporting the incidents to
her mother or the authorities negates the possibility that he indeed committed the crimes. AAA’s belated
confession, he claimed, “cannot be dismissed as trivial as it puts into serious doubt her credibility.”37
Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAA’s anus at the time she was
examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the medical examination actually bolsters AAA’s claim of
being raped by Pareja on more than one occasion, and not just by anal penetration. However, as the
prosecution failed to capitalize on such evidence and prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja cannot
be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266–A of the Revised Penal Code.
In People v. Perez,43 this Court aptly held:

A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape liability by shifting the blame on the This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full
victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual abuse. However, this Court has recognized the fact that no credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration,
clear–cut behavior can be expected of a person being raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule that failure allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a public trial, if
of the victim to shout or seek help do not negate rape. Even lack of resistance will not imply that the victim she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed against her. Youth and
has consented to the sexual act, especially when that person was intimidated into submission by the immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of tender years, one not yet
accused. In cases where the rape is committed by a relative such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as rape if what she claims is
law spouse, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence.38 In this case, AAA’s lack of resistance not true. (Citations omitted.)
was brought about by her fear that Pareja would make good on his threat to kill her if she ever spoke of the
incident. Criminal Case No. 04–1557–CFM:
The December 2003 Incident
AAA’s conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by Pareja is also not enough to
discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act within reason or in accordance In Criminal Case No. 04–1557–CFM or the December 2003 incident, Pareja was charged and convicted of the
with society’s expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard rational reaction to an irrational crime of rape by sexual assault. The enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti–Rape Law of 1997,
experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected to act as usual in an unfamiliar situation revolutionized the concept of rape with the recognition of sexual violence on “sex–related” orifices other
as it is impossible to predict the workings of a human mind placed under emotional stress. Moreover, it is than a woman’s organ is included in the crime of rape; and the crime’s expansion to cover gender–free
wrong to say that there is a standard reaction or behavior among victims of the crime of rape since each of rape. “The transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime against persons and the
them had to cope with different circumstances. 39 introduction of rape by ‘sexual assault’ as differentiated from the traditional ‘rape through carnal knowledge’
or ‘rape through sexual intercourse.’”44 Republic Act No. 8353 amended Article 335, the provision on rape in
Likewise, AAA’s delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the proper authorities is insignificant and the Revised Penal Code and incorporated therein Article 266–A which reads:
does not affect the veracity of her charges. It should be remembered that Pareja threatened to kill her if she
told anyone of the incidents. In People v. Ogarte,40 we explained why a rape victim’s deferral in reporting the
Article 266–A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
crime does not equate to falsification of the accusation, to wit:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons close to her or to report
the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not sexually molested a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
and that her charges against the accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated. Delay in prosecuting the b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,
offense is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of

43
 the circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an
act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument
or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense
proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

Thus, under the new provision, rape can be committed in two ways: Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

1. Article 266–A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse, also known as “organ rape” or Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. — Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other persons
“penile rape.” 45 The central element in rape through sexual intercourse is carnal knowledge, which must be of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be punished by prisión
proven beyond reasonable doubt.46 correccional.

2. Article 266–A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called “instrument or object rape,” or
The elements of the above crime are as follows:
“gender–free rape.”47 It must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to
(d) of paragraph 1.48
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;
In People v. Abulon,49 this Court differentiated the two modes of committing rape as follows:
(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender may be a man or a
a. By using force or intimidation; or
woman;
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the offended party may be
a man or a woman;
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the second is
(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex.53 (Citation omitted.)
committed by inserting the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and
Clearly, the above–mentioned elements are present in the December 2003 incident, and were sufficiently
established during trial. Thus, even though the crime charged against Pareja was for rape through carnal
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.
knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating any of his
constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape. 54
Under Article 266–A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape by sexual assault is “[b]y any
person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual
Nonetheless, the Court takes this case as an opportunity to remind the State, the People of the Philippines, as
assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the
represented by the public prosecutor, to exert more diligence in crafting the Information, which contains the
genital or anal orifice of another person.”
charge against an accused. The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is to see that justice is done55 –
to the State, that its penal laws are not broken and order maintained; to the victim, that his or her rights are
AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003, inserted his penis into her anus. While
vindicated; and to the offender, that he is justly punished for his crime. A faulty and defective Information,
she may not have been certain about the details of the February 2004 incident, she was positive that Pareja
such as that in Criminal Case No. 04–1556–CFM, does not render full justice to the State, the offended party,
had anal sex with her in December 2003, thus, clearly establishing the occurrence of rape by sexual
and even the offender. Thus, the public prosecutor should always see to it that the Information is accurate
assault. In other words, her testimony on this account was, as the Court of Appeals found, clear, positive, and
and appropriate.
probable.50
Criminal Case No. 04–1556–CFM:
However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003 incident is rape through carnal
The February 2004 Incident
knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault even though it was proven during
trial. This is due to the material differences and substantial distinctions between the two modes of rape;
It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the evidence presented by the prosecution against Pareja,
thus, the first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and vice–versa. Consequently, to convict Pareja
especially AAA’s testimony. In its scrutiny, the RTC found AAA’s declaration on the rape in the December
of rape by sexual assault when what he was charged with was rape through carnal knowledge, would be to
2003 incident credible enough to result in a conviction, albeit this Court had to modify it as explained
violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 51
above. However, it did not find that the same level of proof, i.e., beyond reasonable doubt, was fully satisfied
by the prosecution in its charge of attempted rape and a second count of rape against Pareja. In Criminal
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under the variance
Case No. 04–1556–CFM, or the February 2004 incident, the RTC considered AAA’s confusion as to whether or
doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,52 to wit:
not she was actually penetrated by Pareja, and eventually resolved the matter in Pareja’s favor.

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a variance between the This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay,56 stated that aside from sucking her
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or breasts, Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. However, she was not able to give a clear and convincing
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is account of such insertion during her testimony. Despite being repeatedly asked by the prosecutor as to what
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved. followed after her breasts were sucked, AAA failed to testify, in open court, that Pareja also inserted his finger

44
in her vagina. Moreover, later on, she added that Pareja inserted his penis in her vagina during that
incident. Thus, because of the material omissions and inconsistencies, Pareja cannot be convicted of rape in
the February 2004 incident. Nonetheless, Pareja’s acts of placing himself on top of AAA and sucking her
breasts, fall under the crime of acts of lasciviousness, which, as we have discussed above, is included in the
crime of rape.
Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her account of how Pareja sucked both her breasts in the
February 2004 incident. Thus, Pareja was correctly convicted by the courts a quo of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness.
Defense of Denial
and Improper Motive
Pareja sought to escape liability by denying the charges against him, coupled with the attribution of ill motive
against AAA. He claims that AAA filed these cases against him because she was angry that he caused her
parents’ separation. Pareja added that these cases were initiated by AAA’s father, as revenge against him.57
Such contention is untenable. “AAA’s credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by such imputation of ill
motives. It is highly unthinkable for the victim to falsely accuse her father solely by reason of ill motives or
grudge.”58 Furthermore, motives such as resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from
giving full credence to the testimony of a minor rape victim.59 In People v. Manuel,60 we held:
Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of her
private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and
impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her being. It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of child–
victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl–child says that she has been raped, she
says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.
Liability for Acts of Lasciviousness
The penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code is prisión correccional in its
full range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,61 the minimum of the indeterminate penalty shall be
taken from the full range of the penalty next lower in degree, 62 i.e., arresto mayor, which ranges from 1
month and 1 day to 6 months.63 The maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall come from the proper
penalty64 that could be imposed under the Revised Penal Code for Acts of Lasciviousness,65 which, in this case,
absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, is the medium period of prisión correccional, ranging from
2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.66
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court modifies the award of damages as follows: P20,000.00 as civil
indemnity;67 P30,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,68 for each count of acts of
lasciviousness. All amounts shall bear legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this judgment.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR.–H.C. No. 03794 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We find accused–appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz GUILTY of two
counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. He is sentenced to two (2) indeterminate prison terms of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum,
to 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional, as maximum; and is ORDERED to pay the victim, AAA,
P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each
count of acts of lasciviousness, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-26170 December 6, 1926
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. TEODORO LUCHICO, Defendant-Appellant.
M. H. de Joya for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Teodoro Luchico appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, convicting him
of the crime of rape, and sentencing him, without taking into consideration any circumstance modifying his
criminal liability, to suffer fourteen years, eight months and one day reclusion temporal, with the accessories
of the law, and to pay the costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In support of his appeal the appellant assigns the following supposed errors as committed by the trial court in
its judgment, to wit: (1) The trial court erred in giving more weight to the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution than that given by the accused and appellant and the other witnesses for the defense; (2) the
lower court erred in finding the herein accused and appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime
of rape.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The prosecution attempted to prove the following facts:chanrobles virtual law library
That at about 6 o'clock in the evening of March 3, 1923, the offended party, Inocencia Salva, a girl of 13 years
of age, being in the kitchen of the house of the herein accused, Teodoro Luchicho, as a servant of the latter,
preparing a decoction of senna leaves, her master approached her and said: "Inocencia, do not make an
outcry when I am in the place where you are lying down;" "Why?" asked the girl, and the accused replied:
"Because I love you very much." "That cannot be," answered Inocencia, "because I look upon you as my
father while I am here." The accused then caught her by her face and imprinted a kiss upon her left cheek.
Inocencia Salva ran to the parlor, secured a pen knife and opened it. Upon seeing the knife in her hand, the
accused snatched it and went into the room where his wife, Catalina de Jesus, was. The offended party went
downstairs pursued by the accused. Upon reaching the municipal president's pharmacy, she saw Benito
Bugnay seated at the gate of a house and addressing him, inquired: "Listen, will you permit me to step in here
for a moment?" "Why, are you tired? " asked the man. "Because Teodoro Luchico has pursued me," replied
the girl. The man further asked her: "And now what do you want?" and the girl replied: "I want to go to the
municipal building to make a complaint against Teodoro Luchico for what he did to me." "You need not do
anything more," answered the man, "the president is over there on the opposite side and you can go over
there and present your complaint." She then went to the pharmacy, which was on the opposite side, and
there she met the accused Teodoro Luchico who called her: "Come here I want to treat your wounded hand."
She replied: "I don't want you to treat it; first of all I want to complain of what you did to me." While she was
telling the president what had occurred, the accused interrupted and said: "do not believe that, my friend,
because she is every young and had been ill with typhoid fever." The municipal president paid no attention to
her and after having applied some medicine to her wound, said to her: "You can go home." The accused told
the girl to come along with him and upon relying that she would not, he said to her: "If you don't go with me I
will break your feet," and taking hold of her right arm, led her towards his house. Upon passing by a place
where the houses are somewhat distant and upon reaching a "camachile" tree, he threw her to the ground,
caught hold of her knees, covered her mouth and mounted her, and taking out his genital organ, wet it with
saliva and introduced it, with difficulty and great suffering of the girl, into her private parts, and although, on
account of the pain, she attempted to call for help, she could not do so because her mouth was covered by
the accused. After consummating the carnal act the accused picked the girl up in his arms and carried her to
Placida Javier's house, which was close by. This happened at about 7 o'clock at night, and although it was
moonlight the place was dark as there was a pathway shaded by many trees. Upon arriving at Placida Javier's
house, the accused sent her niece Maria to his house to get a chemise for Inocencia because the one she was
45
wearing was soiled with blood which oozed from the girl's genital organ as a result of rape. After the accused
had changed her dress, he took the stained one. Upon orders from the accused the girl went from Placida
Javier's house to the house of Isidro Luchico, the accused brother, where she spent the night. At dawn on the
following day Inocencia Salva made an effort to reach the accused's house under the pretext that she was
going to mass. Instead of going to mass she went to the house of the ex-municipal president, Mr. Arsenio
Roldan, to present her complaint as the present municipal president would not listen to her. After hearing her
story, Mr. Arsenio Roldan sent her to the house of Lieutenant Selga of the Constabulary in Caloocan. When
Lieutenant Selga arrived at the barracks in the afternoon of the same day, which was Sunday, he
accompanied her to the accused's house where she secured her blood-stained dress and torn chemise from
underneath an aparador.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On the morning of March 5, 1923, Dr. Emiliano Panis of the Constabulary made a physical examination of the
girl and found an inflammation or congestion of the small and large lips of the genital organ, an irritation of
the vaginal canal with small hemorrhages under the mucose membrane and inflammation, pus and a bloody
excretion of a foul odor, and a disappearance of the hymen. The inflammation or congestion was due to the
introduction of a hard body out of proportion with the girl's vaginal cavity, which produced a traumatism in
the vaginal canal. Dr. Emiliano Panis also found a small wound about 2 or 3 inches long on the thumb of her
left hand and another superficial wound on the left leg.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The defense attempted to prove that the offended party, Inocencia Salva, had been ill with typhoid fever
before she entered the service of Teodoro Luchico in January, 1923, being brought by Natalia de Jesus for
whom she had been working before; and as a result of said illness the girl's hair was short and she at times
would cry without any cause and would wonder about; that in February of the same year, the girl had some
difficulty in micturating; that Dr. Lucio Santos was consulted and he advised the use of a catheter the nurse,
who was attending the accused's wife, to look after her, and who applied a rubber catheter once, and at
another time a metal catheter; that on March 3, 1923, Inocencia Salva spoke to the herein accused and his
wife Catalina de Jesus asking permission to work in a candy factory in the same municipality in company with
some other women; that as she was not permitted to leave, she became angry and said she would go to
another house so that she might go with her companion; that Catalina de Jesus then told her to wait until the
following day inasmuch as she wanted to communicate with Natalia de Jesus in Manila to find out who would
be responsible for her debt; hat on the afternoon of the same day Inocencia Salva said that she had found
another employer and that she wanted to go to the latter's house and requested that they say nothing to
Natalia de Jesus; that Catalina de Jesus replied that she had to inform the said Natalia de Jesus; that from
then on the girl was angry and asked for her penknife which was in the possession of her employers; that the
accused handed her the penknife; that while talking with some people who were visiting him, Teodoro
Luchico heard some children, who were in the yard, say that Inocencia Salva's hand was bleeding; that he
asked her how she had wounded her hand and she replied: "If you advise Manila before I leave, I prefer to
die;" that after saying this the girl ran downstairs with the open penknife in her hand; that while Teodor
Luchico was holding his little baby in his arms he requested some of his visitors to pursue, the girl; that not
having over taken her, his wife told him to leave the baby, go to the municipal president and ask the police to
catch her; that it was then between 5 and 6 o'clock in the afternoon, and at the moment when the accused
was leaving the president's pharmacy with a policeman, he saw Inocencia Salva running and pointed her out
to the president, saying: "There is the girl whom I intended to ask the police to catch." The municipal
president said to him: "You had better call her; let us see if the girl will come; " that the accused did so and
when the girl approached they saw that the front of her dress was stained with blood; that the accused
ordered the persons who were there to search her in order to see if she still carried the penknife; the girl
replied that wasn't necessary because she had lost it while running; that when the girl said she had a wound
in her thumb, the accused asked the municipal president, who was a physician, to treat it; that she did not
want to let him treat it saying that she wanted to die; as the municipal president was very busy, he told the
accused that he might take the girl, who was disposed, to go with him; that while on the road to his house,
she asked permission of the accused to look for her penknife and handkerchief which contained some money;
that upon arriving near Placida Javier's house she complained of pain in her wound and the accuse took her to
said house where they bathed it in sublimate and water; that between 6 and 7 o'clock in the evening the
accused and the offended party left Placida Javier's house and returned to the said accused's house, passing
through a vegetable garden; that when they arrived at the accused's house the mother of the latter told her
that she should eat supper and sleep in the house of her other son named Isidro Luchico, for fear that the
accused's wife might suffer a relapse; that at midnight Isidro Luchico went to the accused's house to tell him
that the girl had disappeared; that the girl returned to the house very early the following morning to change
her dress and said that she would go to mass; that she afterwards appeared accompanied by Lieut. Selga and
a sergeant of the Constabulary that after the investigation of the accused the Constabulary officers left taking
the girl with them, and in a few days presented a complaint against him for rape; that on April 6, 1923, while
the accused was going on board a banca to return to his house he saw the girl, who called to him; that he
then brought the banca to the river bank and asked her what she wanted; that she replied that she tried to
find him the day before in order to ask him to accompany her to the house of the justice of the peace, as she
wished to withdraw her complaint; that the accused asked her why and she answered that the complaint did
not state the truth and that one Bartolome Sianjo had induced her to present it; that Bartolome Sianjo was
angry with the accused because the latter, with other associates, had filed a complaint with a petition for an
attachment against him; that Attorney Roldan was angry with the accused on account of politics; that when
they reached the house of the justice of the peace the girl said that she wanted to be at peace with her
master and for that reason she wished to withdraw her complaint; that the girl was later operated upon in
the General Hospital for bladder trouble; that when she had already been discharged, they transferred her to
San Lazaro Hospital, because she was suffering from constitutional hysteria, making her very impressionable
and forgetful and in a mental state bordering on insanity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The accused, testifying as a witness in his own behalf, denied everything that the offended party had testified
to against him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The offended party, upon cross-examination by the attorney for the defense, testified that she had not been
induced by anyone to present the complaint against the accused; that on April 6, 1923, the accused arrived in
a banca at Jose Dimla's house where she lived, and said: "Inocencia, the judge orders me to take you to him,
because he wishes to know if you are agreeable to the arrangement," that she replied: "I cannot go with you
because my master Jose is not here:" that the accused then took hold of her hand and pushed her and she fell
on the floor near the wall; that she wept and intended to scream, but the accused said to her: "Don't scream,
because if you do I will kill you; If you attempt to scream, this will be your last day;" that he afterwards took
hold of her hand and carried her by force to his banca where he made her lie down, covering her with a
basket which he carried; that when they reached the house of the justice of the peace, Teodoro Luchico said
to him; "Your Honor, Inocencia is agreeable to the withdrawal of the complaint;" that the justice of the peace
asked her; "What do you say Inocencia, are you agreeable to the withdrawal of the complaint?" that she
answered in the negative.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The result of the physical examination to which the offended party submitted two days after the outrage,
which gave rise to the complaint presented to Lieutenant Selga of the Constabulary against the herein
accused, leaves no room for doubt that she has been raped.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
As will be seen, the evidence of the defense tends to establish the theory that Inocencia Salva being
impressionable due to suffering from constitutional hysteria, his enemies took advantage of the trouble she
had with her former masters and used her as an instrument for their revenge, and to that end induced her to
file a complaint against the herein accused in order that she might be able to leave their services without
having to pay her debt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
While the evidence of the prosecution leaves much to be desired and certain testimony of the witnesses for
the defense has not been contradicted, yet with all the evidence of the defense it has not been able to
destroy the probatory value of the testimony of the offended party, corroborated by her physical
examination. Admitting for the moment - although it was denied by the offended party - that Bartolome
46
Sianjo and Attorney Arsenio Roldan did induce her to present the complaint against the accused, it is not
possible to believe that they would go to the extreme of advising her to irritate her genital organ until it bled
to give her the appearance of having been raped. It has not been proven that at the time of presenting her
complaint to Lieutenant Selga of the Constabulary which was the day after the outrage, any abnormal mental
symptoms were noticed. While eminent medical criminologists have verified from experience that some
hysterics, tormented by the genital instinct, have filed a false accusations for crimes against chastity, yet, not
a single case has been found in which the hysteric accuser has gone to the extreme of causing herself
traumatism and injuries in the sexual organ in order to lend the appearance of truth to her false
accusation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the above, we think that the evidence of the prosecution has established beyond a reasonable
doubt the guilt of the accused.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The Attorney-General is of the opinion that in imposing the penalty the aggravating circumstances of
nocturnity and abuse of confidence should be taken into consideration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The crime of the rape committed by the accused upon the offended party was the result of a succession of
acts which took place within the period of two hours, commencing at 5 o'clock in the afternoon and ending at
7 o'clock in the evening, without a moment's interruption in which it can be said that nighttime, being the
most favorable occasion for committing the crime, occurred to the accused. In order that the aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity may be taken into consideration, it is necessary that the same be sought and that
it be taken advantage of, which does not appear to be clearly proven in the present
case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In order to take into consideration the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, it is essential that
the confidence be a means of facilitating the commission of a crime, the culprit taking advantage of the
offended party's belief that the former would not abuse said confidence. When the accused raped the
offended party she had already lost confidence in him from the moment that he took the liberty of making an
indecent proposal to her and of offending her with a kiss, which compelled her to arm herself with a
penknife; and in the present case it cannot be said that the fact of the accused being the offended party's
master facilitated the attainment of his lustful purpose.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
The crime of rape committed by the accused carries with it the obligations to indemnify the offended party
when the latter is a widow or single, to acknowledge the offspring if the character of its origin does not
prevent it and to support the same. In the present case, it is only necessary to sentence the accused, by way
of indemnity to endow the offended party she being single. He cannot be ordered to support and
acknowledge the offspring which she might have, because it has been proven that she did not conceive, and
even though she might have conceived, the character of its origin would have prevented it on account of the
accused being married.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In view of the foregoing and with the sole modification that the accused is further sentenced to endow the
offended party in the sum of P500, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the
appellant. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-45266 November 24, 1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LEOPOLDO PARDILLA, RUDY MANZANO and REYNALDO PARDILLA, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. L-48450 November 24, 1988
LEOPOLDO PARDILLA, RUDY MANZANO and REYNALDO MANZANO, petitioners,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF PRISONS, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ramon A. Gonzales for accused-appellants.
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch II, in Criminal Case No.
4079 * dated August 20, 1976, finding all the accused: Leopoldo Pardilla, Rudy Manzano and Reynaldo
Pardilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder although the information filed charged
them with the crime of homicide, and sentencing Rudy Manzano and Reynaldo Pardilla to death while
imposing life imprisonment on Leopoldo Pardilla in view of his old age. This decision includes the case of
Leopoldo Pardilla, not as appellant, but as one of the petitioners in G.R. No. L-48450, a petition for Habeas
Corpus filed by all the abovementioned accused which by resolution of the Court dated March 22, 1984 was
consolidated together with this case (L-45266).
The dispositive portion of the appealed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, all accused, namely: Rudy Manzano, Reynaldo
Pardilla and Leopoldo Pardilla are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder which was erroneously denominated as homicide. Rudy
Manzano and Reynaldo Pardilla are hereby sentenced to death while Leopoldo
Pardilla is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment in view of his old age. We are
imposing this maximum penalty in view of the presence of three aggravating
circumstances, namely: conspiracy which we concluded as equal or synonymous with
evident premeditation and therefore, qualified the killing as murder and the
aggravating circumstances of superior strength and means to weaken the defense.
On account of the penalty imposed, the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply.
All accused are jointly and severally condemned to indemnify the heirs of the late
Alfredo Solinap, Sr. the sum of Twelve Thousand (Pl2,000.00) Pesos by way of death
compensation plus funeral and burial expenses of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos,
and to pay the costs.
The effects of crime are confiscated in favor of the State.
The convicts shall suffer no subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in view of
the penalty imposed.
47
 The bail bonds for the provisional liberty of all the accused are hereby cancelled and
all convicts are ordered committed to jail. No bail bond is fixed in case they should
appeal.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 22)
The accused were charged with homicide in an information dated May 12, 1975 which alleges:
The undersigned Provincial Fiscal accuses LEOPOLDO PARDILLA, RUDY MANZANO and
REYNALDO PARDILLA of the crime of HOMICIDE, committed as follows:
That on or about February 28, 1975, in the Municipality of Pototan, Province of Iloilo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the above-named accused
conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping each other, armed with a
sharp-pointed knife known as pinote and canes, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, beat and stab ALFREDO SOLINAP, SR. with
the weapons they were then provided, inflicting upon him stab wound at the breast
and a lacerated wound on the head which caused the death of said ALFREDO
SOLINAP, SR.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Rollo, p. 2)
The evidence of the prosecution consisted principally of the testimonies of two alleged eyewitnesses: Cesar
Polistico, a tricycle driver and Norberto Barrios, a 16-year old student; Blas Provido, the police officer to
whom Leopoldo Pardilla surrendered the butcher's knife and its scabbard and Dr. Gracia Buenvenida who
examined the deceased.
The testimony of Cesar Polistico who narrated the incident from its initial stage up to its conclusion is
summarized by the trial court as follows:
According to prosecution witness Polistico, in the afternoon of February 28, 1975, he
was in the store of Sgt. Pepito Pari-an at Barrio Lumbo, Pototan, Iloilo, to buy
cigarettes, when the incident took place. There were some people thereat, among
whom was the deceased, Alfredo Solinap, Sr. Shortly upon Polistico's arrival, the
accused Reynaldo Pardilla and Rudy Manzano arrived. Reynaldo Pardilla stood by the
roadside while Rudy Manzano sat on a bench. When Alfredo Solinap, Sr. noticed their
presence, he stood up. At this point, Reynaldo Pardilla shouted "Bert." Hearing what
Reynaldo uttered, Solinap approached Reynaldo and asked him, "What do you intend
to do? Are you going to surround me?" When Reynaldo made no reply, Solinap
confronted Rudy Manzano who was seated on the bench, and asked him the same
questions he asked Reynaldo. Rudy answered, "Brother, I have nothing to do with it."
Not contented with Rudy Manzano's reply, Solinap approached Reynaldo again. This
time their bad blood was intensifying and Polistico had to separate them, telling
Reynaldo to go home. Reynaldo agreed to go home but he shouted to Solinap, "'Wait
for me there." He (Polistico), also asked Solinap to go home, but his house was far
and before he could go home, the three accused arrived and the fight that caused
Solinap's death began.
Rudy Manzano returned running with a butcher's knife and a chako (two shortpieces
of wooden batons joined together loosely by a chain and used in Chinese martial art),
and upon reaching Solinap, he gave Solinap a kick in the back and the deceased fell.
As soon as Solinap stood up, the other two accused, Leopoldo Pardilla and his son
Reynaldo Pardilla arrived, coming from behind Solinap. Leopoldo was armed with a
knife and a cane, while his son Reynaldo has a bayonet. As Leopoldo and Reynaldo
were from behind, upon catching up with Solinap, Leopoldo hit his head (Solinap)
with his cane and again Solinap fell for the second time. Upon falling, all three
accused ganged upon him. In the melee that ensued after Solinap fell, the latter was
never able to rise for, he was wounded on his left chest. He died right where he fell.
(Rollo, pp. 7-9).
The testimony of Norberto Barrios is as follow:
Norberto Barrios, 16 years of age, single, and a student testified that at about 6:00
P.M. of February 28, 1975 he was walking on the road in Brgy. Lumbo, Pototan, Iloilo,
in front of the store of Sgt. Pepito Pari-an (Tsn. Nov. 28, 1975, p.5); that he met Rudy
Manzano going towards the store of Sgt. Pari-an holding a butcher's knife and a chaco
(Ibid, p. 6); that Rudy was running towards Alfredo Solinap whom he kicked upon
meeting the latter and Solinap fell with his face on the ground (Ibid, p. 7); that after
Solinap fell, Rudy stabbed with a butcher's knife 3 times but he was not hit as Alfredo
moved backward (Ibid, p. 8), that Rudy followed Alfredo who bumped against the
wall of a store (Ibid, p. 9); that Leopoldo and Reynaldo at that time were running
towards Alfredo, Reynaldo carrying a butcher's knife and Leopoldo also carrying a
butcher's knife (Ibid, p. 10); that Alfredo was able to stand up when Reynaldo
stabbed him once on the chest (Ibid, pp. 10-11); that after Reynaldo stabbed Alfredo,
Leopoldo hit Alfredo with his cane on the head more than 5 times (Ibid, pp. 11-12);
that Cesar Polistico was about meters away when Alfredo was stabbed by Reynaldo
and beaten by Leopoldo (Ibid, p. 13). (Rollo, p. 179; Appellants' Brief, p. 179).
Police officer Blas Provido testified that accused Leopoldo Pardilla surrendered to him a butcher's knife and
the scabbard, after which he brought the latter to the town hall where Leopoldo was detained. He reported
the matter to his immediate superior and it was entered in the police blotter (ibid, p. 180). Dr. Gracia
Buenvenida testified that when she examined the deceased Alfredo Solinap, she found that he has one
stab wound on the chest and a lacerated wound on the head and that she issued a medical certificate,
Exhibit "B". (Ibid).
On the other hand, the evidence for the defense consisted of the testimonies of Patrolman Elias Piamonte,
and of the accused themselves.
Finding the testimony of Piamonte of no substantial evidentiary value, the trial court limited the discussion
to the testimonies of the three accused.
As presented by the defense, the testimonies are as follows:
According to Rudy Manzano, at about 5:30 to 6:30 of February 28, 1975, he was
strolling near the dike when he met Reynaldo Pardilla at the side of a road, 20 to 30
meters from the store of Sgt. Pepito Parian (tsn, June 15, 1976, p. 62); that while
walking with Reynaldo, the latter called for his nephew "Bert" in their house (Ibid, pp.
67-68); that suddenly Alfredo came out of the store of Parian and asked them saying:
"Are you plotting against me? and Reynaldo answered:" "I cannot understand what
you are talking about Tay Pidong" (Ibid, p. 70); that he (Rudy) sat on a bench on the
store while Reynaldo and Alfredo were talking (Ibid, pp. 70-71); that he noticed that
Alfredo tried to box Reynaldo who ran away towards his house (Ibid, p. 71); that
when Reynaldo left, Alfredo went towards him and said: "You also?"(Ibid, p. 72); that
48
 he answered "I have nothing to do", and Alfredo slapped him on the left cheek and
he (Alfredo) stepped back and pulled out a butcher's knife (Ibid, p. 73); that since he
has nowhere to run he raised his body and with both legs kicked Alfredo who fell, and
immediately he jumped out of the place and ran away (Ibid, pp. 75-76); that upon
reaching the house he stayed there the whole evening (Ibid, p. 77).
Reynaldo Pardilla testified that on February 28, 1975 at about 5:30 to 6:00 P.M. he
and Rudy Manzano were at the end of the dike where they used to pass in Brgy.
Lumbo (sic) about to go to his (Rudy) house (Tsn, June 15, 1976, p. 5); that while they
were approaching the store of Parian he looked back and shouted "Bert" 3 times,
referring to his nephew Gilbert Pardilla for the purpose of telling the latter to take the
carabao out of the sugar plantation (Ibid, p. 6); that after shouting "Bert" for the
second time, Alfredo came out from the store of Parian and said: "Are you plotting
against me?" and he (Reynaldo) answered: "Tay Pidong I don't understand you"; that
Alfredo continued to approach him, so he moved backward and then Alfredo boxed
him, but he was not hit, and so he moved backward and ran away (Ibid, p. 8); that he
went home, which is about 100 meters away and did not return to the store
anymore, and learned that Alfredo died when his father arrived that evening (Ibid, p.
9); that his father told him that he killed Alfredo because if he did not kill him, he
would have been killed by Alfredo (Ibid, p. 10); that he told them that he is going to
the municipal building to surrender (Ibid, p. 11).
Leopoldo Pardilla testified that on February 28, 1975, at about 6:00 P.M. while going
home, he dropped at the store of Parian (Tsn, June 16, 1976, pp. 46-47); that he saw
Alfredo Solinap standing at the side of the road (Ibid, p. 47)-. that upon seeing him,
Alfredo approached him and said: "You filed a case" and at the same time he thrust
his butcher's knife towards him (Leopoldo), but the latter parried the blow and
returned the thrust, hitting him (Alfredo) on the left chest (Ibid, pp. 49-50); that
Alfredo reeled towards the back part of the store of Parian on bamboo stump (pusog)
and fell to the ground while he (Leopoldo) continued on his way home (Ibid, p. 51);
that Norberto Barrios and Cesar Polistico were not there at that time (Ibid, 51-52);
that when he arrived home he told his wife, his son and his grandson that he killed
Alfredo because had he not done so, Alfredo would have killed him (Ibid, p. 52); ...
(Rollo, pp. 180-182; Appellants' Brief).
To recapitulate the theory of the defense is to the effect that Leopoldo Pardilla killed Alfredo Solinap, Sr. in
self defense. Rudy Manzano and Reynaldo Pardilla did not have any participation in the killing because at
the time of the encounter, both of them were already at home.
Finding the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses more credible, the trial court, as above-stated,
convicted the accused of Murder and sentenced them to death with the exception of Leopoldo Pardilla
who because of old age was sentenced to life imprisonment.
On September 1, 1976, the accused filed their notice of appeal from the decision of the trial court.
However, on September 10, 1976, the said accused filed a motion to withdraw their notice of appeal and
on September 12, 1976, filed instead a motion for the reconsideration of said decision, contending that
since they were charged with homicide, they cannot be convicted of murder; that while the decision finds
that there was superior strength or means employed to weaken the defense, the same was not alleged in
the information and can only be considered, if ever, as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of
homicide, but not a circumstance that would qualify the offense as murder; that the allegation of
conspiracy is not equivalent to an allegation that the offense was committed with evident premeditation;
and that since the information charges homicide, and conviction cannot be more than the penalty
prescribed for said crime, the accused should be released on their bail bonds, pending appeal, at the
discretion of the court. The trial court, however, denied the motion on November 11, 1976.
On December 3, 1976, the accused filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and mandamus with
preliminary injunction, G.R. L-45149 (Pardilla v. Adil), to annul and set aside the same decision, upon the
ground that conspiracy, which the trial court found to be synonymous with evident premeditation, could
not qualify the crime as Murder, but may be appreciated only, if ever, as an aggravating circumstance of
Homicide.
The records of Criminal Case No. 4079 were elevated to the Court on December 21, 1976 for the automatic
review of the decision, docketed as G.R. No. L-45266. On February 9, 1977, this Court gave notice to the
counsel of appellant to file the Brief of Appellants within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice, but on
February 16, 1977, the appellants filed a motion to suspend the proceeding in L-45266 until this Court shall
have resolved G.R. No. 45149 (Rollo, p. 36). Consequently, this Court dismissed G.R. No.
L-45149 in its Resolution of March 30, 1978 for the reason that the issue raised therein is involved in the
decision under automatic review (Resolution of this Court En Banc, August 6, 1979, Rollo, p. 50).
On June 28, 1978, the accused filed their petition for Habeas Corpus, G.R. No.
L-48450, praying for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, ordering the Bureau of Prisons, respondent
therein, to produce the bodies of petitioners before the Court, to show cause of their Imprisonment and
after hearing, that judgment be rendered setting aside the decision of the Court of First Instance in Criminal
Case No. 4079 and ordering petitioners to be released on their original bonds in said case, pending
resolution of a new decision by the said court for the offense of homicide. The Court issued the Writ of
Habeas Corpus on July 12, 1978 returnable to this Court on July 19, 1978. On July 19, 1978, the Solicitor
General submitted a return of the writ and answer to petition praying for the dismissal of the petition on
the ground that petitioners therein are lawfully detained in the National Penitentiary by virtue of a
decision rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, finding them guilty of the crime of murder.
Taking note of the fact that the gravest offense by which accused-petitioner therein may be found guilty is
only homicide, this Court considered the petition for Habeas Corpus as a petition for bail and an incident in
case G.R. No. L-45266, and ruled in its Resolution dated August 6, 1979 that it is consistent with equity and
justice that they should be released on bail pending determination of the criminal case against them on the
merits. The Court ordered the release from custody of accused Rudy Manzano and Reynaldo Pardilla upon
their filing of bond in the amount of P20,000.00 each, but declared the judgment of the lower court insofar
as accused Leopoldo Pardilla is concerned to have already become final and executory since the latter did
not file a notice of his intention to appeal the decision (Rollo, L-45266, p. 57). The Court approved the
bailbond of Reynaldo Pardilla and ordered his release on September 18, 1981 (Rollo, p. 157). Rudy
Manzano was similarly released on September 20, 1983 (Rollo, p. 117).
On October 12, 1979, the accused filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court dated
August 6, 1979 on the ground that it would be unjust to grant bail to Reynaldo Pardilla and Rudy Manzano
who were sentenced to death, while denying the same right to Leopoldo Pardilla whose sentence is life
imprisonment and praying that the petition in L-48450 be treated as it is intended to be, a petition for
habeas corpus, and not a mere motion for bail in L-45266, and thereafter, said petition be granted. On
October 31, 1979, they filed a motion to suspend filing of appellants' brief in L-45266 until their motion for
reconsideration shall have been resolved, which motion was granted by the Court in its Resolution dated
November 20, 1979.
On January 1, 1980, the Solicitor General filed for the People of the Philippines (G.R. No. L-45266) and the
Director of Prisons (G.R. No. L-48450) a comment on the accused's motion for reconsideration of the
Resolution dated August 6, 1979 with the proposition that in order for accused-petitioner's objection to the
Resolution in question be obviated, the Resolution be modified by allowing Leopoldo Pardilla to proceed
with the petition for habeas corpus while maintaining the Resolution with respect to Rudy Manzano and
49
Reynaldo Pardilla by treating the same petition as a motion for bail and as an incident in case G.R. No. L-
45266.
In their reply to comment filed on February 2, 1980, the accused objected to the recommendation of the
Solicitor General, contending that if Leopoldo Pardilla is entitled to a decision on his petition for habeas
corpus on the ground that the decision below is not merely erroneous but void, then, there is no basis for a
different treatment to Rudy Manzano and Reynaldo Pardilla who are questioning the lower Court's
decision on the same ground.
On March 22, 1984, the Court resolved: (1) to hold in abeyance the resolution of the accused-petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of the resolution of August 6, 1979, praying that the petition in L-48450 be
treated as it is intended to be, a petition for habeas corpus, and not a mere motion for bail in L-45266; (2)
to set aside the resolution of November 20, 1979 which granted the accused-appellants' motion praying
that the period for the filing of the appellants' brief in G.R. No. L-45266 be suspended pending the
resolution of their motion for reconsideration in G.R. No. L-48450; and (3) to require the accusedappellants
to file the appellant's brief which should also discuss the case of Leopoldo Pardilla who did not appeal,
within thirty (30) days from notice of the resolution.
After several extensions granted by the Court, the brief for the accused-appellants was filed with the court
on July 23, 1984 and the brief for the plaintiff-appellee, on November 15, 1984. Appellant's reply brief was
filed on April 2, 1985.
Accused-appellants assign the following errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED OF MURDER WHEN THEY
WERE ONLY CHARGED OF HOMICIDE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ALL THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF MURDER
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (Appellants Brief pp. 182-183).
In the petition for Habeas Corpus filed by the accused in L-48450, this Court had the occasion to rule on the
question of whether or not the lower court erred in convicting the accused of murder when they were only
charged with homicide. In the Resolution of August 6, 1979, the Court stated:
We take note of the fact that the information filed against the accused does not
allege any qualifying circumstance. The gravest offense therefore, for which they may
be found guilty is only homicide. For this reason, the instant petition shall be
considered as a petition for bail and an incident in Case G.R. No. L-45266. It is
consistent with equity and justice that the accused should be released on bail
pending determination of the criminal case against them on the merits ... (Rollo, p.
56)
By and large, the above ruling of this Court is but a reiteration of a well-settled doctrine that where the
charge is homicide, the accused cannot be convicted of murder (People v. Simon, 10 SCRA 280 [1964];
People v. Bautista, 28 SCRA 184 [1969]; and People v. San Miguel, 124 SCRA 733 [1983]). More importantly,
it was established that the words "conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one
another" contained in the information, simply convey the allegation of conspiracy, and does not necessary
result in a charge of murder. (People v. San Miguel, supra).
There is no dispute that the deceased sustained only one stab wound on the chest and a lacerated wound
on the head. Leopoldo Pardilla admitted having stabbed the deceased although in self-defense. The trial
court did not give credence to his plea and convicted all three accused of murder. Leopoldo Pardilla did not
appeal so that the decision of the trial court has become final and executory insofar as he is concerned.
And when a sentence has already become final because the accused has already begun serving the same,
the case can no longer be reopened with a view to its modification (De Leon vs. Hon. Rodriguez, et al., 107
Phil. 759; Bustamante vs. Maceren, 48 SCRA 155; Sec. 7,
Rule 120).<äre||anº•1àw>
However, as regards the two other accused in order to implicate and/or hold them liable for the crime
committed by Leopoldo Pardilla, conspiracy must be proven.
It is a well settled rule that conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It cannot
be based on mere conjectures but must be established as a fact. The same degree of proof required to
establish the crime is necessary to support a finding of the presence of conspiracy; that is, it must be shown
to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself (People v. Palon, 127 SCRA 529,
537 [1984] citing: People v. Custodia 47 SCRA 289 [1972] People v. Drilon, Jr. 123 SCRA 79 [1983]).
It is likewise settled that conspiracy while inferable from the circumstances must still be proved clearly and
convincingly, according to jurisprudence as the commission of the crime itself (People v. Benavides, 127
SCRA 189 [1984], citing: People v. Cerdena, 51 Phil. 393 [1928]; People v. Dorico, 54 SCRA 172 [1973]).
Equally beyond dispute is the rule that Appellate Courts will not generally disturb the factual findings of the
trial court, considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial but this does not apply
where the lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that if considered, would affect the
result of the case (People v. Royeras, 130 SCRA 265 [1984]).
A careful review of the records shows that the trial court did not only fail to consider certain circumstances
which negate the presence of conspiracy but also overlooked certain contradictions and inconsistencies in
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses which do not refer to minor and collateral matters but on the
contrary, render their version highly improbable and contrary to human experience.
As shown by the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Cesar Polistico, there was no sign of aggression on
the part of the two accused Reynaldo Pardilla and Rudy Manzano, when they arrived at the scene of the
incident on that fatal day. In fact, it was the deceased who belligerently taunted and confronted them with
the query as to what they intend to do. Reynaldo did not reply while Rudy answered in a gentle manner:
"Brother, I have nothing to do with it." Not contented with Rudy's answer, the deceased again approached
Reynaldo. It was then that Polistico tried to separate them and told Reynaldo to go home and the latter
did. (Decision, Crim. Case No. 4079, p. 6). Clearly, therefore, aggression originated from the deceased
Alfredo Solinap, Sr. and the existence of conspiracy is belied by the surrounding circumstances.
The trial court then assumed that when the three accused returned and went after the deceased, they have
already planned for about 30 minutes in the house of Reynaldo on how they would attack the deceased
(Ibid, p.13).
Apart from the fact that the time estimated to have elapsed was pure calculation, such speed in planning
and conspiracy is indeed beyond belief. More than that, the testimonies of both prosecution witnesses
50
show that they did not even arrive together and that although all three accused were allegedly armed with
knives, chaco, canes or batons, which they repeatedly used in hitting the accused, the latter sustained only
one stab wound on the chest which Leopoldo admitted to have inflicted on the accused in self-defense
while the lacerated wound on the head was caused by the fall of the deceased on the ground (Rollo, L-
45266, p. 191).
In fact there is no longer any reason or purpose for the accused to plot and conspire against the deceased.
The records show that earlier, Leopoldo, President of the Samahang Nayon in Barangay Lumbo was
maltreated by the deceased who was reputedly troublesome by nature, in a jeepney before the incident.
But far from resorting to violence, Leopoldo opted to avail of legal remedies by filing a complaint of less
serious physical injuries (Ibid).
It is therefore evident, that it was the deceased who had an axe to grind against accused Leopoldo, and
coupled with the fact that the deceased was drunk at the time, the theory of the defense that it was the
deceased who accosted Leopoldo and stated "You filed a case" and at the same time thrusting a butcher's
knife toward Leopoldo who parried it and returned the thrust against him with his own butcher's knife,
appears to be more credible and more in accord with the physical evidence. Thus, the absence of multiple
injuries that should have resulted from the alleged simultaneous attack on the deceased by three (3)
alleged assailants, one of whom is an arnis enthusiast while the other two were young and agile opponents
who were supposed to have given the deceased flying kicks, not to mention wrestling and stabbing, is an
indication that such violence and attack as described by the prosecution witnesses were not used on the
deceased. Implied conspiracy was based on non-existent factual premises. As ruled by this Court, physical
evidence is of the highest order and speaks more eloquently than all witnesses put together (People v.
Bardaje, 99 SCRA 388 [1980]).
In resume, the totality of the foregoing circumstances, shows without question the improbability and
reasonable doubt of the allegations of the prosecution witnesses. The prosecution has not discharged its
burden of proving its accusation beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is Reversed insofar as appellants are concerned and accused
Reynaldo Pardilla and Rudy Manzano are Acquitted, but as ruled by this Court in the resolution of August 6,
1979, the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on Leopoldo Pardilla has already become final and
executory insofar as he is concerned because he did not file a notice of his intention to appeal.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 109776 May 26, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff appellee,
vs.
ROQUE CABRESOS, accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Roque Cabresos was charged with the crime of rape before the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Branch 26 of
Medina, Misamis Oriental, in an information which alleged:
That on or about 29th day of June 1988 at about 2:00 early dawn, more or less, at Sitio
Upper Anoling, Barangay Kabulakan, Municipality of Balingoan, Province of Misamis
Oriental, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by
means of force and intimidation and with the use of a knife, have sexual intercourse
with the offended party, Editha Pesidas, against her will and without her consent.
The crime was committed with the attendance of aggravating circumstance of abuse of
confidence and obvious ungratefulness as accused was accommodated to live with the
complainant's family.
Contrary to and in violation of Article 335, paragraph 1, in relation to Article 14,
paragraph 4, all of the Revised Penal Code. 1
At arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, he was found guilty and sentenced in a decision
rendered in November 19, 1992. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds Roque Cabresos guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with the use of deadly weapon as defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code with aggravating circumstances
of abuse of confidence, obvious ungratefulness, blood relationship and with the use of
deadly weapon; and, thereby sentences him to suffer an imprisonment under reclusion
perpetua or thirty (30) years imprisonment, with full credit of the entire period of his
detention from February 17, 1989 to the present or finality of this judgment. Accused
Roque C. Cabresos is hereby declared as the father of the child Anthea Q. Pesidas and
he is ordered to recognize and support said child in accordance with the provisions of
the Family Code.
Accused Roque Cabresos is likewise ordered to pay Editha Pesidas the sum of
P30,000.00 by way of moral damages and P20,000.00 by way of exemplary damages
and to pay the costs. 2
Roque Cabresos appeals from his conviction assigning the following as errors allegedly committed by the trial
court:
The trial court gravely erred in giving full credence to the testimony of the prosecution
witness which is highly incredible, inconsistent and unreliable.
II
The trial court gravely erred in not giving credence to the defense interposed by
accused-appellant.
III
51
 The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite failure of the Balingoan, Misamis Oriental. In the said store, they again drank one pocket size of
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.3 Tanduay rhum. From the store of Beboy Pebular, at about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon
of the same day, they went to the house of Alding Itom. At Alding Itom's house, they
butchered a dog, cooked the meat and ate the same as their sumsuman. After eating,
The trial court found that the evidence of the prosecution showed the relevant facts to be the following:
at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day they proceeded to the house of
his uncle Anastacio Cabresos. When they were already at the house of his uncle, they
Complainant Editha Pesidas testified that she is 18 years old (at the time she testified), once more drank another one pocket size of Tanduay rhum. The accused went to sleep
but she was 16 years old when she was raped by accused. She is single, housekeeper at around 11:30 o'clock in the evening of the same date at the latter's house and woke
and a resident of Kabulakan, Balingoan, Misamis Oriental and has studied up to second up at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning of the following day. That was June 29, 1988. 5
year high school. She personally knows the accused Roque Cabresos whom she
considers as her uncle because he is a cousin of her mother. She identified the accused
We are once again faced with the task of deciding who as between two (2) persons is worthy of belief and
in the courtroom by touching his shoulder.
who is not. Private complainant Editha Pesidas claims that she was raped by the accused. The accused denies
the accusation and interposes the defense of alibi contending that he could not have committed the rape
Editha Pesidas declared that last June 28, and June 29, 1988, her mother and father because he was somewhere else at the time the alleged rape occurred. In support of his claim, Cabresos
were in Talisayan District Hospital. She was left in the house together with her brother presented witnesses who vouched that he was with them on the night and hour in question, carousing on
and sister, who are 12 and 10 years old respectively. She slept alone in her room, while cheap rum and on dog-meat with great abandon.
her brother and sister slept in the adjoining room. Roque Cabresos lived with them and
in that particular night of June 29, 1988, Roque Cabresos slept in the sala. Then, at
After much consideration and upon careful examination of the record, we find no reason to overturn the
dawn, which was 2:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, already June 29, 1988, she
findings of the trial court.
was awakened by accused Roque Cabresos who pointed a sharp pointed knife to her
neck, squeezed her mouth and boxed her abdomen that she lost her strength.
The issue to be resolved is, of course, whether or not the prosecution was able to establish from the
testimony of the complainant the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
There and then, Roque Cabresos took off her panty by tearing it. Then, accused placed
himself on top of her and made a push and pull movement (kiyo-kiyo). Accused
inserted his penis to her vagina that she felt severe pain which lasted about half an We answer in the affirmative.
hour. The left hand of accused was holding the knife and was always pointing to her
neck. She struggled, but accused is bigger and stronger that she lost her strength.
The question is essentially one of credibility and it is a well-settled rule reiterated in a long and still growing
Ultimately, accused succeeded in raping her. Something sticky came out from his penis;
line of cases, that appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court since the
thereafter, Roque Cabresos threatened her; that, she would be killed if she would tell
latter are in a better position to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and
her parents. He uttered this threat about five (5) times. Then, Roque Cabresos left her
observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless it is convincingly shown that the trial court had
room and returned to sleep in the sala.
plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case.6

After three days from the commission of the crime, her parents returned home from
In his appeal, appellant highlights certain points in complainant's testimony which he contends constitute
the hospital. She did not tell them about what happened because Roque Cabresos
inconsistencies or improbabilities which weaken the force of her accusation. However, going over those same
threatened to kill her.
points we come to a different conclusion.

Complainant testified that at the time accused raped her, she was fertile. In the
On the night of the rape, the victim's parents were not at home. They were at a hospital in Talisayan where
succeeding months, she did not have monthly menstruation. When her pregnancy was
the victim's mother had to be brought7 and they returned from the hospital only three (3) days
noticeable, her parents inquired about it, and she told them the truth. She told also her
later.8 Complainant positively identified the accused as her assailant. There was a kerosene vigil lamp in the
grandfather Eufrocino Quejada some time last February 1989. She was accompanied to
altar which illuminated her bedroom.9 Moreover, as found by the trial court, she was familiar (with) the
the house of a midwife for examination. Thereafter, accompanied by her parents and
persona of the accused being a relative who resided in their house.10
grandfather, they went to the police station of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, and there,
her affidavit was taken on February 14, 1989 which she subscribed on the following day
before the prosecutor. 4 Complainant was only able to cry out for help once because the accused threatened her with a knife which he
pointed at her neck;11 he also squeezed her mouth and boxed her stomach, as a result of which her strength
and vitality fled her.12
Appellant Cabresos' version of the facts was summarized by the trial court as follows:

The fact that her young brother (12 years of age) and sister (10 years old) who were sleeping in an adjoining
On June 28, 1988 at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused appellant was at the house
room did not hear her outcry does not necessarily mean that the rape never occurred.
of Mr. Trapal in Upper Lapinig, Balingoan, Misamis Oriental together with his
companions, namely: Anastacio Cabresos alias "Baloloy", Eddie Aragon, Rene Magallon,
Dobby Magallon and Oloy Cabresos drinking one pocket size of Tanduay rhum. While Appellant stresses the fact that after the alleged rape, the complainant testified that she continued going to
they were drinking, they were conversing about their works, especially the gathering of school and not once did she report the incident to her parents or the police although she passed by the police
coconuts. After staying there for an hour, they proceeded to the municipal building of

52
station everyday on her way to school.13 Furthermore, the complainant did not report the outrage on her A: I was still afraid of him.
person to a relative of hers who is a policewoman.14
xxx xxx xxx
We have previously held in earlier cases that delay in prosecuting the rape is not an indication of fabricated
charges. 15 In at least one case, we observed that "if the complainant did not become pregnant, she probably
A: I was still afraid for he might come back. 19
would never have revealed that she was raped by her uncle. Many victims of rape never complain or file
criminal charges against their rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain rather than reveal their
shame to the world or risk the rapists' making good their threats to kill or hurt their victims."16 This in fact was xxx xxx xxx
what happened here where the victim reported the incident to her parents only eight (8) months after she
had been raped when her pregnancy became noticeable. Similarly, in the case of People v. Soterol,17 where Q: Did it not occur to your mind to tell your parents that you were
the appellant had contended that complainant's 6-month delay in filing the complaint and her silence after already pregnant?
the alleged rape render her charge incredible, we ruled that the complainant's failure to report the rape
incident earlier had been fully and satisfactorily explained. There, the complainant testified that she did not
report the incident immediately because she believed her uncle's threat to kill her. A: No, because of fear and shame.

Editha's inaction for eight (8) months was sufficiently explained by her in open court. Thus: Q: Did it not occur to your mind that your parents would
eventually discover you were pregnant and it was better to tell
them earlier so that if there is a person answerable for that they
(Direct Examination of Editha Pesidas) would run after him?

Q: And when your father arrived in your house, did he know A: No, because of my fear.
about the incident?

Q: Did it not occur to your mind that your fear of being

A: No, sir. discovered will be useless because eventually your parents will
discover it?
Q: Why?
A: No, because of my fear and shame.
A: I did not say anything because I was afraid of the warning of
Roque Cabresos. Q: Did it not occur to your mind your shame will be useless
because eventually your parents will know of your pregnancy?
xxx xxx xxx
A: No.
Q: What was the warning or threat of the accused during the
incident? Q: Why?

A: He said that if I tell my parents he would kill me. A: Because of my fear. 20

Q: How many times did he utter these words? xxx xxx xxx

A: Five times. 18 (Emphasis supplied)

xxx xxx xxx While a mature woman would probably have acted differently, we are unable to conclude that Editha's
continued fear of her violator and her failure to inform her parents of the rape meant that it had not occurred
(Cross-examination of Editha Pesidas) at all.

Q: When Roque Cabresos left your house, and your parents
(were) already there, of course, your fear no longer existed
because your parents were already there?
Appellant Cabresos also assails the findings of the trial court concerning the delayed delivery of the child as
not supported by evidence. The trial court found that the complainant Editha Pesidas "gave birth within 300
days or 10 months allowable in medical science from conception or fertilization, implantation, gestation and
to birth of the child," 21 as a result of the sexual assault inflicted upon her by appellant. The trial court said on
this point:

53
 . . . this court has taken note of the testimony of Editha Pesidas; that the onset of her Q: And this place of Balodoy to Kabulakan, Balingoan, Misamis
monthly menstruation was June 9, 1988 and ended after five days. So, it must be June Oriental is how many kilometers, according to your own
14, 1988. Medical science has shown that from the first day of menstruation, the first estimate?
ten days thereafter is considered a safe period, meaning the woman is not fertile. This
corresponds to June 10 to 19, 1988. Then, the period from the 11th day to 20th day
A: Three kilometers.
from the first day of menstruation is fertility period where the ovum in matured and
any time may be fertilized by a sperm. In the case of Editha Pesidas, [the] fertility
period corresponds from June 20 to June 29, 1988, that is why, Editha Pesidas said that Q: And ordinarily hiking we can negotiate three kilometers in less
from the day she was raped, she did not have any monthly menstruation thereafter, than one hour?
except a little blood spotting on July 20, 1988.
A: Yes, sir. 29
Medical science has taught us the basics of fertilization, conception, gestation and
delivery of a child. First, the basics: a baby is formed when the sperm cell from the man xxx xxx xxx
meets (or fertilizes) the woman's egg or ovum. An ovum, which is released by the
woman's ovary only once in about 28 days, has a maximum life of 24 to 72 hours (3
days only). The sperm cell, on the other hand, may live for up to 6 days under very (Cross-examination of Anastacio Cabresos)
hospitable conditions, but usually lives for only about 24 hours. When the ovum is not
fertilized, it dies, and the absence of fertilization is normally indicated by the arrival of Q: A healthy person like the accused can reach Barangay
menstruation. On the other hand when the ovum is fertilized, it attaches itself on the Kabulakan which is three kilometers only one hour because he is
inner wall of the womb. This is sometimes known as implantation of fertilized ovum. healthy?
The inner wall does not shed off, so menstruation does not occur during the entire
period of pregnancy.
A: Of course, if he is healthy.

Somewhere in July 20, 1988 is the attachment of the fertilized ovum in the womb of
Editha Pesidas. It is the date of the implantation of said fertilized ovum. That is why on Q: Or maybe less than an hour?
said date, she had little blood spotting which is not considered as
menstruation. Counting therefrom, the birth of Anthea Q. Pesidas on May 1, 1988, the A: Depending upon his speed in walking.30
child's coming to this world was within the 300 days or ten months, allowable in
medical science from conception or fertilization, plantation, gestation, and to birth of
xxx xxx xxx
the child. 22

(Cross-examination of accused Roque Cabresos)

In computing the duration of pregnancy, "we should note that time is computed from the date of three
different occurrences in the life of the mother: one is the first day of the last menstrual period, one is the
time of intercourse, and one is the time of the fertilization of the ovum . . . . . " 23 We find that the trial judge's Q: Anastacio Cabresos alias Baludo is living in what place?
computation in this case of the duration of complainant's pregnancy counted from the time of the
fertilization of the ovum, is medically accepted and recognized. A: At Upper Lapinig.

Moreover, from complainant's testimony, the uncontroverted fact is that the complainant gave birth to a Q: What is the distance from Upper Lapinig to Kabulakan,
baby girl 307 days or 10 months after the date of her alleged rape. While the ordinary period of gestation is particularly the place of Pesidas?
approximately 9 calendar months or 280 days, calculated from the first day of the last menstrual
period, 24 there is nevertheless an abundance of medical authorities recording exceptions to this general
rule.25 In fact, it has been held that length of pregnancy varies from 220 to 330 days from date of fruitful A: Three kilometer, more or less.
coitus.26 Thus, the 280-day rule is not a hard and fast one.27
Q: By ordinary hiking you can negotiate three kilometers with an
On the other hand, as against the complainant's positive identification, the accused-appellant offers the hour hike?
defense of alibi. However, we have many times held that alibi is a weak defense and cannot prevail over the
complainant's positive and clear identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. 28 Moreover, A: It depends how you walk.
the defense of alibi in this case must be rejected because aside from a clear and positive identification made
by the complainant, the possibility of the accused having gone to the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission was not at all remote. Note the following statements of defense witnesses: Q: But natural walking?

(Cross-examination of Rene Magallon) A: More than an hour, more or less.31

54
 xxx xxx xxx A: He slept in another room.

Q: You mean, by ordinary hike, you can negotiate one kilometer Q: So that you cannot determine if Roque Cabresos was still in his
by one hour? room because you could not see him?

A: Less than (an) hour. A: My house has three rooms and the room where they were
sleeping I could pass by it.
Q: Even in thirty minutes?
Q: But you had no time to pass by the room where they were
sleeping because you were sleeping at that time?
A: Yes sir. 32

A: I woke up at 4:30.
xxx xxx xxx

Q: It was only at 4:30 when you passed by the room where the
The settled rule is that, for alibi to be given credence, "an accused must not only prove satisfactorily that he
accused (was) sleeping?
was at another place at the time the crime happened; but more importantly, that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission."33
A: Yes, sir.
Of equal significance is the fact that the accused had the opportunity to commit the crime considering
that none of his witnesses actually saw him at the hour in question because they were all already asleep at Q: At 12:00 midnight you did not wake up?
that time.
A: No, sir
(Direct Examination of Rene Magallon)
Q: You did not wake up at 1:00 o'clock?
Q: What time did Roque Cabresos go to sleep on June 29, 1988?
A: I woke up to urinate in my bedpan.
A: 1:20 in the morning
Q: At 2:00 o'clock did you wake up?
Q: About you, what time did you go to sleep?
A: No, sir.
A: 2:00 o'clock. 34
Q: It was only 4:30 when you woke up again?
xxx xxx xxx
A: Yes, sir.35
(Cross-examination of Anastacio Cabresos)
xxx xxx xxx
Q: So that at 9:00 o'clock you were already lying down and at
10:00 o'clock you were already sound asleep?
(Emphasis supplied)

A: About that hour.

Q: And you woke up the next morning at about 4:40?
A: 4:30 dawn.
Q: And the accused who was sleeping in your house was not
sleeping with you in the same room that night?
Although we affirm the findings of the lower court with regard to the guilt of the accused and its appreciation
of the aggravating circumstances of use of a deadly weapon, 36 abuse of confidence and obvious
ungratefulness,37 we must take exception to its appreciation of blood relationship as an aggravating
circumstance in this case. We have held in earlier cases38 that the relationship between uncle and niece is not
covered by any of the relationships mentioned in Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code. Nevertheless, the
penalty imposed by the trial court need not be disturbed considering the presence of other aggravating
circumstances.

55
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding appellant Roque Cabresos guilty of rape and sentencing
him to reclusion perpetua and declaring him as the father of the child Anthea Q. Pesidas, ordering him to
recognize and support said child, is hereby AFFIRMED. The award to the complainant of civil indemnity in the
total amount of P50,000.00 (P30,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages) is likewise
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
the defendant, Geronima told no one what had happened until the next day, when she hinted to her father
and a neighbor that they might look for the deceased on that hill. .
The body was found, and the authorities of Bacarra notified; and on the night of the 30th of that month, April,
the justice of the peace, the chief of police, and the president of the sanitary division including said
municipality of Bacarra went to the place. The last named official, Dr. Mauricio Paz, made an autopsy and
mentioned the following wounds in the certificate he issued:

EN BANC (a) One on the back of the right wrist, four inches long, cutting all the muscles, bones, and vessels
of that region, and leaving only the flesh of the palm unsevered from the body.
G.R. No. L-33843 February 11, 1931
(b) Two wounds in the chest for inches long parallel to each other and to the sternum (bone),
situated on the borders of said bone, and taking in the flesh, muscles, ribs, vessels, and both lungs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN AGUINALDO, defendant-appellee. (c) One wound on the right side of the neck, ten inches long, from the right border of the sternum
near the nape of the neck; four inches deep and three inches wide, raking in all the muscles,
vessels, and nerves of that region and a part of the occiput.
Manuel N. Aguilar for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
(d) Another wound on the right cheek from the chin back behind the right ear, taking in the
muscles, vessels, and bones of the region; the right ear has not been found, for it was severed
VILLAMOR, J.:
from the head.

The accused was tried for the crime of murder by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte on the following
(e) Another wound on the head eight inches long from the forehead to the nape of the neck,
information:
dividing the cranium in two, taking in the scalp, the cranial bones, and the brain.

That on or about the 29th of April, 1930, in the municipality of Bacarra, Province of Ilocos Norte,
( f ) Another wound underneath the right eye, two and a half inches long, taking in the soft parts
Philippine Islands, the above-named accused did wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously kill one
and bones of the region.
named Anselmo Oao, with a bolo, the crime being committed in an uninhabited place, with
evident premeditation, treachery, and cruelty.
(g) The forehead shows a surface wound, round and about two and a half inches in diameter, only
skin-deep; the frontal bone is exposed.
Contrary to law.

At the preliminary investigation the defendant pleaded guilty before the justice of the peace of Bacarra, but
in the Court First Instance he pleaded not guilty.
After both parties had submitted their evidence, the court found the defendant guilty of murder with the
qualifying circumstance of cruelty and uninhabited place, and sentenced him to life imprisonment, with the
accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to pay the costs.
The defendant has appealed to this court, and his counsel contends that the trial court erred in convicting
him of murder, when the evidence of record only supports a conviction of homicide.
The record shows that the deceased Anselmo Oao and his wife, Geronima Lacar, lived at the place called
Rango, in the municipality of Bacarra; that on the morning of April 29, 1930, husband and wife went to a hill
in Rango to dig up some roots to be used as medicine for Geronima's toothache. While the deceased was in a
sort of gully at the hillside, stooping down and digging up the roots, the defendant appeared and suddenly
rushed at him, stabbing him in the neck with his bolo from behind. When he felt the blow, the victim tried to
raise his head saying, "Apo, what are you going to do to me?" Geronima, in turn, demanded of the defendant:
"What have you done to my husband?" But the defendant continued attacking the deceased, who was
unarmed, and threatened to kill Geronima if she reported him. She fled terrified to her house. Still in fear of
4. The wounds designated by letters (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e) are necessarily mortal.
5. These wounds were produced by a sharp instrument.
6. Death was due to the excitement and hemorrhage caused by these wounds.
The defendant voluntarily made the sworn statement, Exhibit B, before the justice of the peace of Bacarra
and in the presence of the municipal president and the chief of police, declaring in substance that he had
illicit relating with Geronima Lacar, the wife of the deceased, for a month before the incident; that the day
before the 29th of April, Geronima urged him to kill Anselmo Oao; that he therefore killed Anselmo on that
morning, while the latter was stooping, digging up roots in Rango; that on receiving the first slash, Anselmo
confronted him, but fell upon being stabbed again; that no one witnessed the act except Geronima, who,
after seeing her husband stabbed twice, ran away to her house. The defendant further admitted that the bolo
Exhibit C was the weapon he had used upon the deceased, and that the shirt Exhibit D and the drawers,
Exhibit D-1, were the dead man's clothing on the occasion in question.
The justice of the peace testified in the case, identifying Exhibit B, which is the sworn statement made by the
defendant before him, as already stated, and in the presence of the municipal president and the chief of
police. The municipal president fully corroborates the testimony of the justice of the peace.

56
The trial court, by an order dated May 5, 1930, delegated the justice of the peace of Laoag, capital of the
Province of Ilocos Norte, to conduct the preliminary investigation in each of the two informations against
Geronima Lacar and against Juan Aguinaldo, respectively. And this justice of the peace testified, identifying
Exhibit E, where defendant Juan Aguinaldo also pleads guilty.
In testifying, Dr. Mauricio Paz, president of the second sanitary division, after describing the wounds he found
upon Anselmo Oao's body, said that they found the body o n the hillside, in a hole about 1 meter deep. The
body was placed face downward, with the head a little inclined to the left. The left hand was under the head,
and the right hand on the abdomen. It was dressed in a shirt and short drawers, and was beginning to
decompose.
The defendant testified in his own behalf that he came upon the deceased that morning as he was looking for
the cattle he pastured. Without even knowing him, the deceased said to him: "You come here to look for
something to rob." The accused answered that he was only looking for his cattle, but the deceased ran after
him with a drawn bolo. In view of the deceased's aggressive attitude, he was compelled to fight, for he had
reached an impassable place and could not flee. He then stabbed the deceased, who was more robust than
he, wounding him in the neck. Without realizing what he was doing, he continued to stab the deceased, who
fought back until he sank down seriously wounded. He denies that he has threatened the dead man's wife,
saying that she was not present on that occasion.
The defendant also testifies that the constabulary men arrested him in his house, tied his hands, and bound
him because he refused to confess; that during the investigation which they conducted he only admitted that
he had caused the deceased's death; that this admission of his was reported by the constabulary men to the
justice of the peace of Bacarra, who reduced it to writing, later on making him sign Exhibit B in the presence
of the constabulary men; and that some time later he was also taken by the constabulary men before the
justice of the peace of Laoag, who drew up a document and made him sign it, without giving him an
opportunity to secure counsel. But the defendant admitted on cross-examination, that the justice of the
peace of Bacarra investigated him and reduced to writing what he had testified, and he signed it, declaring at
the same time that it was true; that later on, when already in the provincial jail, the provincial fiscal read out
to him in Ilocano the sworn statement he had made before the justice of the peace of Bacarra, and he again
affirmed under oath that it was true; and that he did not tell the fiscal that he had been maltreated by the
constabulary men, because the latter were then present.
After examining the record, we are fully convinced that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It
will be noted that the accused, in testifying before the trial court, makes no mention of the alleged instigation
of the deceased's wife to commit the crime; but even supposing that such instigation existed, there is
absolutely no reason why the defendant should be exempted from criminal liability for the treacherous killing
of Anselmo Oao. The dead man's position when he received the first blow, with his back to the defendant and
bent down, because he was digging up medical roots in a gully, entirely unprepared and unable to defend
himself from his assailant, clearly shows the defendant's treachery in attacking his victim, thereby qualifying
the crime as murder, defined and penalized in article 403 of the Penal Code.
The defendant's allegation that he was pursued by the deceased and being unable to flee, he turned to bay
bolo in hand, is, to our way of thinking, an invention pure and simple on the part of the defendant, which the
trial court did not believe, and neither do we. .
The trial court accepted as aggravating circumstances, cruelty and uninhabited place. The Attorney-General
holds that the number of wounds found upon the corpse does not, by itself alone, justify the acceptance of
the circumstance of cruelty, it being necessary to show that he deliberately and inhumanly increased the
sufferings of the victim, and this has not been proved in the present case. The Attorney-General also alleges
that the circumstance of uninhabited place cannot properly be accepted, for lack of evidence to show that
the appellant sought the solitude of the place where the crime was committed in order the better to attain
his purpose. We agree with the Attorney-General. The evidence does not clearly show that the place was
about 1 kilometer away form the nearest house. .
Considering all the circumstances of the present case, we are of opinion that the judgment appealed from,
imposing the penalty of life imprisonment on the defendant, which penalty is the medium degree of that
fixed in article 403 of the Penal Code for the crime of murder, is in accordance with law. It must therefore be
affirmed, as we do hereby affirm it, with costs against the appellant. So ordered. .
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35775 June 29, 1984
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DIOSDADO EGOT, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Salvador B. Britanico for accused-appellant.
ABAD SANTOS, J:
Automatic review of the decision rendered by the defunct Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur in
Criminal Case No. 72 because of the imposition of the death penalty.
In an information dated July 15, 1970, DIOSDADO EGOT was accused of rape said to have been committed as
follows:
That on February 4, 1970, at about 5700 o'clock in the afternoon, in the cemetery of
barrio Pangi, municipality of Ipil, province of Zamboanga del Sur, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused with lewd designs, in order to facilitate the commission of the crime, did, then
and there wilfully and feloniously bring one Liberty Siodora, an eleven year old girl to
the cemetery an isolated place, with the pretext that they will look for his lost horse,
upon reaching the cemetery, with his bolo intimidated the young girl and by force have
carnal knowledge with her against her will. (Expediente, p. 1.)
EGOT pleaded "not guilty" when he was arraigned and after trial the court rendered the following sentence:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds the accused DIOSDADO EGOT guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE penalized under Article 333 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and pursuant to said article, sentences him to suffer the supreme
penalty of DEATH, and to pay to the offended party Liberty Siodora the SUM OF EIGHT
THOUSAND (P8,000.00) PESOS as moral damages, All Costs against the accused. (Id., pp.
62-63.)
In imposing the death penalty the trial court said:
57
 Under Article 33 of the Revised Penal Code the crime of rape committed either by force
or intimidation or even without such force or intimidation, where the woman raped is
below 12 years old, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment) and
where the rape was committed with the use of deadly weapon, as in this case, since
there is evidence that the accused Egot used a sharp-pointed bolo in the commission of
the offense, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Considering that the
offense was attended with the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place as it was
committed in a cemetery which is uninhabited and isolated and far from the road and
grassy, the penalty imposable on the accused is the supreme penalty of death. (Id., p.
62.)
The People's version of the facts is as follows:
At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of February 4, 1970, at barrio of Pangi,
Municipality of Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur, Pelagia Siodora left her house and went to her
neighbor's farm (p. 28, tsn., February 22, 1972), leaving her daughter Liberty who was
eleven years old (Exhibits C, C-1 and C-3; p. 79, tsn., March 28, 1972) and her other
younger children (p. 28, tsn., February 22, 1972). Before she left her house that
afternoon, she saw appellant Diosdado Egot riding on horseback and alighting at the
house of his aunt (Candida Ramos), whose house is about ten meters from her house
(pp. 28-30, tsn., February 22, 1972).
At about 5:00 o'clock of the same afternoon appellant went to the house of Pelagia
Siodora who was no longer there at that time. He talked to complainant Liberty asking
her to "accompany me look for my horse, if we find it I will give you biscuit" (p. 75, tsn.,
March 23, 1972). Liberty unsuspectingly agreed to accompany appellant ostensibly to
look for his horse. Upon reaching the cemetery, which was about one hundred fathoms
from Liberty's house (p. 31, tsn., February 22, 1972), appellant pointed a bolo at her (p.
72, tsn., March 23, 1972) and told her to lie down (p. 71, tsn., March 23,
1972).lwphl@itç Appellant then remove her panty and after opening the front part of
his pants let his penis come out (p. 72, tsn., March 23, 1972). Then appellant went on
top of her and inserted his penis into Liberty's vagina and had sexual intercourse (p. 74,
tsn., March 23, 1972).
After the incident Liberty wen home and reported the matter to her mother (p. 67, tsn.,
March 23, 1972). The following day the mother reported the incident to the police (p.
33, tsn., February 22, 1972). She could not report the incident on the same date to the
police as it was already nighttime and barrio Pangi is about three kilometers from the
town proper (p. 73, tsn., February 22, 1972). The police told her to secure a medical
certificate (p. 32, tsn., February 22, 1972). She submitted her daughter for physical
examination to Dr. Henry de Villa, Rural Health Officer of Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur (p. 34,
tsn., February 22, 1972), who issued a medical certificate (Exhibit A) which reads:
I. General data: Liberty Siodora, 11 years old, female child,
residing at Pangi, Zamboanga del Sur;
II. Time and place of commission of offense: About 5:00 P.M.,
February 4, 1970, at Pangi, Ipil, Zbga. Sur;
III. Time and place of examination: About 11:00 A.M. Feb. 7, 1970
at Ipil, Zamboanga Sur;
IV. Findings:
1. Laceration, one cm., fourchette
posterior;
2. Hymen — lacerated at 10:00, 2:00, and
6:00 o'clock; admits one finger; Urethral
opening irritated, Abrasion deltoid area,
left.
V. Conclusion —
The findings are compatible with history of the victim. (Brief, pp.
1-4.)
EGOT denied the rape. He interposed the defense of alibi. He said that he could not have raped Liberty as
alleged because at that time he was in the cornfield of Pelagia Siodora, Liberty's mother, together with his
aunt Candida Ramos; they were there to retrieve his horse which strayed after it got freed from its tether
In this review, the appellant is represented by counsel de oficio, Atty. Salvador B. Britanico, who made the
following assignment of errors:
A. THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF RAPE; and,
B. THAT, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE EVIDENCE ARE ADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE
CONVICT PETITION OF THE HEREIN ACCUSED, THE TRIAL COURT ER RED IN IMPOSING
THE DEATH PENALTY. THE APPROPRIATE PENALTY SHOULD HAVE BEEN RECLUSION
PERPETUA. (Brief, p. 1.)
According to the trial court, "At the time of the sexual intercourse Liberty was only 11 years and 7 months
old, having been born on July 4, 1958." (Expediente, p. 53.) The trial court relied on the testimony of Pelagia
Siodora that Liberty was born on July 4, 1958. (TSN, Feb. 22, 1972, p. 27.) It also relied on Exhibit C, the
supposed birth certificate of Liberty where her date of birth is given as July 4, 1958. (Expediente, p. 33.)
The appellant questions the authenticity of Exhibit C; it "is being disputed by the defense on the ground that
she could not have been born on that date considering that the Birth Certificate (Exhibit "C") was filed and
registered on April 14, 1958 (Exhibit I or three (3) months before the alleged birth." (Brief, p. 3.)
Indeed, Exhibit C is of doubtful authenticity. For aside from the circumstance cited by the appellant, Exhibit C
does not have the Signature of the Local Civil Registrar. But the testimony of Pelagia Siodora in respect of the
date when her daughter Liberty was born has not been substantially impugned. Liberty must be deemed to
have been below 12 years old on February 4, 1970. Moreover, Liberty's age becomes unimportant in the light,
of the allegation in the information that the appellant used a bolo to intimidate her to submit to his carnal
desire.
The first assignment of error questions the appreciation of the evidence by the trial court. To be sure this
raises a problem albeit no insurmountable. "The difficulty, recognized and acknowledged, in the decision-
making process where the prosecution is for rape, arises from the fact that usually only the participants can
testify as to the alleged sexual abuse. The accused may deny such an occurrence, put up the defense that he
was somewhere else, or allege the consent on the part of the complainant. The court then is left with no
58
choice but to exert the utmost effort to determine the likelihood that a sexual act did take place and under house or other inhabited place (People vs. Aguinaldo, 55 Phil. 610; People vs. Mendoza,
what circumstances. Such choice is not always easy." (People vs. Imbo G.R. No. L-36759, Aug. 31,1982,116 et al., 100 Phil. 818).lwphl@itç The cemetery of Barrio Pangi, Ipil, Zamboanga del Sur
SCRA 355,357.) was therefore not an uninhabited place. (Brief, pp. 13-14.)

The appellant questions the credibility of Liberty Siodora. He claims that she was not a reliable witness Pelagia did not say that her house is only 100 meters from the cemetery. What she said was that the
"because of her proven retarded mentality." (Brief, p. 8.) He quotes from the decision which states: "The cemetery is about "100 fathoms more or less from our house." (TSN, Feb. 22, 1972, p. 31.) A fathom is equal
Court which had the opportunity to observe the offended party Liberty Siodora, had noticed her stunted to 6 feet so that 100 fathoms is equal to 600 feet which is equal to 200 yards or 180 meters. A distance of 200
growth and somewhat retarded personality and mentality. " (Expediente, pp. 56-57.) But the appellant yards to the nearest house is sufficient to make the scene of the crime uninhabited. (See People vs. Pulido, 85
ignores completely the other statements of the trial court that: "According to the prosecution's evidence, as a Phil. 695 [1905]).
consequence of the rape committed by accused Egot on the person of Liberty, she became somewhat
mentally deranged and from the time of the incident up to the present, she silvers and gets scared whenever
The appellant likewise claims despoblado "is not present even if the crime was committed in an uninhabited
she sees the accused Egot or a male person. ... But at the trial, she positively demonstrated in open court how
place, if the offended party was casually encountered by the accused and the latter did not take advantage of
the accused Egot raped her on that unfortunate afternoon of February 4, 1970, stating that he (Egot) told her
the place or it can not be shown that it facilitated the commission of the crime (People vs. Luneta, et al., 79
to he down t in armed with a sharp-pointed bolo, went on top of her and forced his penis into her vagina and
Phil. 815, cited in Reyes, Ibid, page 320)." (Brief, pp. 14-15). He forgets that he did not meet Liberty at the
had sexual intercourse with her. She positively Identified accused Egot in open court as the man who ravished
cemetery; he purposely brought her there to facilitate the commission of the crime.
her." (Id, pp. 56-57.)

There is no evidence that the appellant surrendered voluntarily. In fact, according to his own testimony, the
Liberty's tender age lends credibility to her testimony. For as this Court' said: "Moreover, if there is anything
police went to his house and they brought him to the municipal jail. Neither can it be conceded that he
apparent from our past decisions on rape cases, with the offended parties being young and immature girls
should be accorded the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender because "while the case was already
from the ages of twelve to sixteen, it is that there is considerable receptivity on the part of this Tribunal to
pending in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Sur, notwithstanding that he had all the opportunity
lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the
to do so while in the house of provincial guard Minsay." (Brief, p. 17.) Suffice it to say that such a claim has no
shame and embarrassment to which such a gruelling experience as a court trial, where they are called upon
legal or jurisprudential basis.
to bare what perhaps should be shrouded in secrecy did expose them to. This is not to say that an uncritical
acceptance should be the rule. It is only to emphasize that skepticism should be kept under control." (People
vs. Molina, G.R. No. L30191, Oct. 27, 1973, 53 SCRA 495, 500-501.) WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby modified in the sense that for lack of the necessary
number of votes DIOSDADO EGOT is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead of death
and moral damages to paid to Liberty Siodora shall be in the amount of P20,000.00. Cost against the
There is circumstantial evidence to support the testimony of Liberty that she was raped by the appellant:
appellant.
when Liberty rename home and was asked by her mother why she was crying she replied that she had been
raped by Egot at the cemetery; and then there was the physical examination conducted by Dr. Henry de Villa
which showed that Liberty's sexual organ had lacerations, irritation and abrasion. SO ORDERED.

The appellant's alibi must fail because of the positive Identification made by Liberty that he was life culprit THIRD DIVISION
and also because it was not physically impossible for him to be at the cemetery when the rape was
committed. G.R. No. L-66848 December 20, 1991

The second assignment of error assumes the guilt of the appellant but seeks to mitigate his liability. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
The appellant claims that the use of a bolo had not been legally established; hence the aggravating RUBEN LEE y AMOSO, QUIRINO VIRAY, JR. y COLLADO, and JUAN LAROSA y GONZALES, defendants-
circumstance of use of a deadly weapon cannot be considered. Suffice it to say that Liberty categorically appellants.
stated that E got "used his bolo." (TSN, March 23, 1972, p. 72.)
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
The appellant also claims that the aggravating circumstance of despoblado was not present. He asserts: Blesila O. Quintillan for defendants-appellants.

By the very evidence of the prosecution, the cemetery was merely 100 meters away
from the house of Siodoras, that is, within the hearing distance when one shouts for
assistance. This is therefore not an uninhabited place in the contemplation of law
(People vs. Laoto, et al. 52 Phil. 401). As one authority puts it, "An uninhabited place is
one where there are no houses at all a place at a considerable distance from town, or DAVIDE, JR., J.:
where the houses are scattered at a great distance from each other" (Reyes, Ibid, page
318). In this case, the houses of the Siodoras and the Ramoses are merely 10 meters
apart from one another and only 100 meters away from the cemetery. What the
Supreme Court considered as uninhabited is a place about a kilometer from the nearest

59
 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-49 (81).
In an Information filed with the then Criminal Circuit Court of Manila on 8 July 1981, accused Ruben Lee y
Amoso, Quirino Viray, Jr. y Collado, and Juan Larosa y Gonzales, were charged with the crime of Robbery in
Band with Homicide and Multiple Physical Injuries, committed as follows:

That on or about June 22, 1981, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and Each of the accused entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment on 7 September 1981. 2
confederating together with one GERONIMO GERDAD (deceased) and others whose whereabouts
and identities are still unknown, and helping one another, all armed with unknown caliber firearms
At the trial on the merits, the prosecution presented the following witnesses: Gina Salvador and Rodrigo Conde, two (2) of the jeepney passengers; Pfc. Florentino Bagallon, the
and bladed weapons, by employment of craft, that is, pretending to be bonifide (sic) passengers of
investigating policeman; and Drs. Marcial C. Cenido and Narciso Adraneda, Jr., the examining physicians. The defense presented the three (3) accused. Thereafter, on 26 August
a jeepney, bearing plate No. 632 CS, PUJ, driven by BERNABE POYUAON, and at nighttime
1983, the trial court (now Branch XLVI, Regional Trial Court of Manila) promulgated its decision 3
purposely sought to better accomplish their objectives, with intent of (sic) gain and by means of finding the accused guilty of the crime charged
force, violence and intimidation upon persons, to wit: by then and there simultaneously and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death. The dispositive portion of the decision reads in full as
announcing it was a hold-up and pointing their respective weapons, guns and knives, to the driver follows:
and other passengers of the said jeepney, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, rob, and carry away the following, to wit: WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Ruben Lee y Amoso, Quirino Viray, Jr. y Collado and
Juan Larosa y Gonzales, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery in band with
From: homicide and multiple physical injuries which is aggravated further by craft and nighttime and
hereby sentences them to suffer the Penalty of DEATH; to pay, jointly and severally, the heirs of
the deceased Leopoldo Espellego the sum of P12,000.00 for the death of the latter, and to the
RODRIGO CONDE — One (1) wallet, black, valued
robbery victims, the following sums: Rodrigo Conde, P35.00; Wong Ngaw, P225.00; and Perpetuo
— at P35.00 with 1 -dollar bill;
Aquino, P10.00 all of which were not recovered. They are also ordered to pay their proportionate
BERNABE POYUAON — Cash money of P50.00;
shares of the costs of suit.
ANNABELE JAVIER — Wallet, wristwatch and
necklace valued not less than
P5.00; The .45 caliber paltik, Exhibit W, and the .32 caliber Sentinel revolver, Exhibit W-1, which bears
WONG NGAW Seiko Wallet, valued at Serial No. P 5803, are hereby confiscated in favor of the government and the Clerk of Court is
P25.00; with SSS ID card and hereby directed to cause delivery of the same to the Firearms and Explosives Section, Philippine
other papers and cash money Constabulary, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
of P200.00 and
PERPETUO AQUINO — Cash Money of Pl0.00. Atty. Fernando Mangubat is hereby awarded the sum of P500.00 as attorney's fees.

or all in the total amount of P325.00, more or less, belonging to the aforesaid driver and
passengers of the said jeepney, against their will, to the damage and prejudice of the said owners,
in the aforesaid amount of P325.00, more or less, Philippine Currency; that by reason or on the
occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of enabling the said accused to take, rob, and
carry away the said amount, in pursuance of their conspiracy, the said accused with intent to kill,
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attacked, assaulted and used personal violence upon the
passengers of the said jeepney, by then and there taking possession of the steering wheel and
driving the vehicle away, firing shots at the crew of the mobile patrol car who (sic) gave chase of
the said accused, and hitting, as a consequence, the following hold-up victims, to wit: LEOPOLDO
ESPELLEGO, who sustained mortal gunshot wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
his death thereafter; GINA SALVADOR, who sustained a gunshot wound at the back, thereby
inflicting upon her serious physical injuries which required and will require medical attendance for
a period of more than thirty days and incapacitated and will incapacitate the said Gina Salvador
from performing her customary labor during the said period of time; and WONG NGAW and
PERPETUO AQUINO, both of whom sustained physical injuries which have (sic) required medical
attendance for a period of not less than one day but not more than nine days and incapacitated
the said Wong Ngaw and Perpetuo Aquino from performing their customary labor during the same
period of time.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1 left seated near the entrance of the jeepney and who turned out to be the accused, Ruben Lee,
Pursuant to the governing law then in force, 4 the case was elevated to this Court for automatic review.
The conviction is based on the following findings of fact of the trial court:
June 22, 1981, at about 2:30 o'clock a.m., a passenger jeepney with Plate No. 632 CS, PUJ, driven
by Bernabe Poyuaon, was on its way from Rizal Avenue, Manila to Baclaran, Metro Manila. In the
jeepney as passengers while it was already nearing the Philippine General Hospital along Taft
Avenue were some 13 persons who were seated as follows: On the left seat (which is directly
behind the driver) were a male passenger immediately behind the driver, Leopoldo Espellego,
Annabele Javier, Gina Salvador, and a male passenger who was seated just at the entrance of the
jeepney, in that order. On the right seat beginning from the entrance of the jeepney were a male
passenger, Maria Lourdes Javier, Rodrigo Conde, Perpetuo Aquino and Wong Ngaw, also in that
order. Beside the driver were two male passengers.
xxx xxx xxx
The jeepney was travelling southward along Taft Avenue when the passenger seated last on the
drew out a gun and first poked it at Gina Salvador who was to his left and then waived (sic) said
gun at the other passengers, at the same time announcing a hold-up as follows: "Mga putang ina
ninyo, huag kayong sisigaw, hold-up ito" (Sons of bitches, don't shout. This is a hold-up).
Simultaneously, the passenger seated in front of Ruben Lee who turned out to be Quirino Viray, Jr.

60
 drew out a knife and poked it at Maria Lourdes Javier who was to his right; the passenger seated In their letter to this Court dated 2 May 1988, accused Ruben Lee and Quirino Viray manifested their willingness to accept the sentence of Reclusion Perpetua. 9
Accused
just behind the driver who turned out to be Geronimo Gerdad drew out a gun and pointed it at the Juan Larosa, however, in a letter to this Court dated 29 April 1988, manifested that he wanted to continue
driver; and the passenger seated further from the driver drew out and poked a knife at the driver. with his appeal. 10

The announcement of the hold-up frightened the passengers and Ruben Lee ordered them to
hand over their wallets, watches and other valuables. He ordered Geronimo Gerdad to collect the
things of the passengers near him. Gina Salvador gave the following to Ruben Lee: her Seiko 5 In view of the foregoing, this Court promulgated on 25 May 1988 the following resolution:
Men's watch worth P500.00; her Chinese gold necklace worth P200.00; cash amounting to
P800.00; and her handbag worth P15.00. From Rodrigo Conde was taken a wallet worth P35.00
G.R. No. 66848 (People vs. Ruben Lee, et. al.)—Considering the pleadings filed in this case, the Court Resolved to NOTE: (a) the letter of compliance filed by
and containing one Australian dollar, From the others, including that of the driver, were taken cash
accused-appellants Ruben Lee and Quirino Viray signed in the presence of witnesses, dated May 2, 1 988, stating that they are willing to accept the sentence
which were (sic) handed over to Geronimo Gerdad.
of reclusion perpetua in consonance with the provision of Section 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution; and (b) the letter of compliance filed by accused-
appellant Juan Larosa dated April 29, 1988 stating that he wants to continue his case as an appealed case.
When approaching Pedro Gil Street, Ruben Lee ordered the driver to turn right towards Roxas
Boulevard and upon reaching Mabini Street, the jeepney was noticed by the crew of Police Mobile
Said resolution became final on 17 June 1988 and Entry of Judgment was correspondingly made.
Patrol Car No. 221 as Pedro Gil is a one-way street Patrol Car No. 221 tailed the jeepney and
signalled it to a stop. Upon orders of Ruben Lee, the jeepney driver stepped down to talk nicely to
the policemen (who stopped their car about seven meters behind) by telling the latter that they This review should then be limited to the case of accused Juan Larosa.
entered the street by accident. At the same time, Ruben Lee warned the passengers to keep quiet,
otherwise he will shoot them.

Once the jeepney driver left to talk to the policemen, Ruben Lee also stepped down, placed his
In the Appellant's Brief, accused Juan Larosa assigns the following errors: 11
gun on his seat and ordered Quirino Viray, Jr. to take hold of it, and proceeded to the driver's seat,
started the jeepney and drove off towards Roxas Boulevard, turned left and sped towards
Baclaran. Mobile Patrol Car No. 221 (with the jeepney driver on board) followed suit with its sirens
blowing and at the same time alerting other patrol cars through its radio. The jeepney, with Ruben
Lee on the wheels, turned left towards the airport and on reaching a dark roard, turned back. At I
this juncture, Ruben Lee ordered one of the passengers thrown out in order to distract the
attention of the pursuers. So that the passenger beside him was thrown out. However, said
passenger was not hurt; instead he ran away after hitting (sic) ground. With the mobile patrol car THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED LAROSA IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT WHEN HE WAS NOT

in pursuit, the jeepney sped back to Roxas Boulevard and towards the Luneta with the holduppers PROPERLY AND CREDIBLY IDENTIFIED AS PARTICIPANT (SIC) IN THE CRIME;

taking potshots at the pursuers. And because the passengers heard shots coming from behind,
they were either down on the floor or were stooping from their seats, for fear that the policemen II
might shot (sic) directly at them. The jeepney finally stopped at Marvex Drive in Balintawak,
Quezon City. The hold-uppers jumped out of the jeepney and engaged the pursuing policemen in a
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI OF THE ACCUSED;
shoot out. Ruben Lee pointed a gun at Gina Salvador's back and fired. When the firing subsided,
one of the hold-uppers, Geronimo Gerdad, was found seriously wounded and a .22 caliber revolver
(Exhibit W-1) was found near his body. One of the passenger victims, Leopoldo Espellego, was III
seriously wounded while three others were wounded, namely: Gina Salvador who suffered a
gunshot wound; Wong Ngaw, with lacerations and abrasions (see Exhibit F); and Perpetuo Aquino,
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER BY ACCUSED.
with a lacerated wound (See Exhibit G). One patrol car brought Gerdad and Espellego to the
Chinese Memorial Hospital where both were pronounced dead on arrival. Gina Salvador, Wong
Ngaw and Perpetuo Aquino were brought to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital where they were We shall take them up in the order they are presented.

treated. 5
A. In support of the first assigned error, Larosa claims that the two (2) alleged eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution, namely, Gina Salvador and Rodrigo Conde, were not
Through their counsel de oficio appointed by this Court, accused-appellants filed their Brief 6
on 22 March 1985. able to identify him.

The People, through the Solicitor General, filed the Appellee's Brief 7 on 12 September 1985.

Pursuant to Section 19(l), Article III of the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines which provides Indeed, as correctly pointed out by Larosa, Gina failed to mention him. While she was very specific as to the role and participation of accused Ruben Lee and Quirino Viray, she

that any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua, this Court, in a letter to the
accused dated 20 April 1988, asked them whether they still wished to continue with their case considering
that the death penalty is no longer imposable and their death sentences had been automatically commuted
to reclusion perpetua. 8
candidly admitted that she "could no longer recall the hold-upper who was sitted (sic) in front (sic) of the jeep." 12
However, prosecution witness Conde
positively identified Larosa as the holdupper sitting on the front seat of the jeep. On direct examination, he
testified as follows:

61
Fiscal Belmonte: Q Do you know if there was any passenger of that jeep fell (sic) down?

Q When you boarded the jeep, were there passengers? A Yes, Sir.

A Yes, Sir. Q Where was that passenger sitted (sic) at the time that he was fell (sic) down?

Q When you boarded the jeep, were these three already there? A We were on our way to MIA when that passenger fell down, Sir.

A Yes, Sir. Q Why did he fall down?

A Because he was pushed by one of the holduper (sic), Sir.

Q What happened next?

A When the jeep reached at the PGH, the three drew guns, Sir. Q Do you know who was that holduper?

Q Did thev say anything?

A Yes, Sir, they said, this is a hold-up. A Larosa, Sir. 14

Court:

Q Who among the three drew a gun? On cross-examination, this witness immediately aborted the defense counsel's attempt to show that the light of the jeep was put off, hence, it was impossible for him to see
the holduppers clearly. Thus:

A Ruben Lee, Your Honor.

Q Who else?

Atty. Mangubat:
A The other one sitting near the driver, Sir.

Q By the way when these holduper (sic) announced that it was hold-up, did they order the driver to put out the light?
Fiscal Belmonte:

Q Is that other one in this Courtroom?

A No, Sir. 15
A Yes, Sir.

Court:

xxx xxx xxx

Q Point to him?

A Larosa, Your Honor. 13

Subsequent attempts on the part of the cross-examiner to discredit Conde proved futile. His testimony was given full faith and credit by the trial court and We find no reason to
overturn such a finding. Well-entrenched is the rule that appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court since the latter are in a better position
to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying, unless it is found that the trial courts have
xxx xxx xxx plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if considered, might affect the result of the case. 16

Fiscal Belmonte: Equally settled is the rule that conviction may be based on the lone testimony of an eyewitness, when the testimony is credible. 17

62
B. In respect to his second assigned error, Larosa would have Us believe that at 2:00 a.m. of 22 June 1981, he was at his house sleeping with his family. 18 However,
accused relies merely on his own testimony and his alibi is not corroborated by anybody else.
We have ruled time and again that alibi is a weak defense for it is easy to concoct and fabricate. 19 Alibi
cannot prevail over and is worthless in the face of the positive identification by credible witnesses that the
accused perpetrated the crime. 20 In the case at bar, We find no reason to depart from this doctrine for the
prosecution has sufficiently established the guilt of the accused Larosa.
C. In his last assigned error, Larosa claims that he voluntarily submitted to the custody of the police and
offered no resistance when the police accosted him. We agree with the Appellee that this contention has no
basis. Before Larosa and the other holduppers could even be apprehended, they engaged the pursuing police
authorities in a shootout and only gave up upon realizing that they were already surrounded by residents
and tanod members in the vicinity. 21
For a surrender to be voluntary, it must be spontaneous and should show the intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities, either: (1) because he
acknowledges his guilt, or (2) because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily included for his search and capture. 22
In the absence of these
two (2) reasons, and in the event that the only reason for accused's supposed surrender is to insure his safety,
his arrest being inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and hence, not voluntary. 23
The trial court correctly appreciated against the accused the generic aggravating circumstances of band and craft. Nighttime, however, was erroneously taken against him.
A crime is committed by a band whenever more than three (3) armed malefactors shall have acted together in the commission of an offense. 24
In the case at bar,
commission by a band was properly appreciated as it has been shown that when the holdup was staged,
Ruben Lee, Quirino Viray, Geronimo Gerdad (deceased), and accused Larosa were all armed with guns and
knives.
Craft is likewise present herein since the accused and his cohorts pretended to be bona fide passengers of the
jeep in order not to arouse suspicion. However, once inside the jeep, they robbed the driver and the other
passengers. 25
As to nighttime, there is no showing that it was purposely sought for or taken advantage of to facilitate the
commission of the offense or for the purpose of impunity. 26 There's no proof that they waited for the night to
commit the crime. Besides, as testified to by Rodrigo Conde, the light of the jeep was not put off. Obviously,
they did not seek the darkness of the night and were not afraid of the light.
The robbery and the resulting deaths of Leopoldo Espellego and Geronimo Gerdad (holdupper) and physical
injuries of Gina Salvador, Wong Ngaw, and Perpetuo Aquino are included in one (1) special complex crime of
robbery with homicide and physical injuries, defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal
Code, it being evident that the deaths and injuries occurred by reason of or on occasion of the robbery. 27 The
penalty provided for therein is reclusion perpetua to death. Considering the presence of the aggravating
circumstances of band and craft or disguise, the greater penalty, which is death, shall be applied. 28 However,
in view of the provisions of the 1987 Constitution abolishing the death penalty, 29 accused Larosa is entitled to
the reduced penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Finally, conformably with the new policy of this Court, 30 the civil indemnity of P12,000.00 is increased to
P50,000.00. However, considering that the judgment against Ruben Lee and Quirino Viray, the other
convicted holduppers herein, had become final and executory as of 7 June 1988, they are solidarily liable with
Juan Larosa up to the amount of P12,000.00 only. Anything in excess of said amount is the sole liability of
accused Larosa.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court in Criminal Case No. CCC-VI-49 (81) finding the accused, Juan
Larosa and his co-accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
Physical Injuries, as defined and penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, is hereby AFFIRMED
in all respects, except as above modified. As modified, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA, and the civil indemnity for the death of Leopoldo Espellego is hereby increased to
P50,000.00, the first P12,000.00 of which the accused Juan Larosa shall be jointly and severally liable with his
co-accused, and for the remaining P38,000.00 he shall be solely liable.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 89418-19. November 21, 1990.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RODOLFO ASPILI, ERNESTO MAGBANUA, EDUARDO
MENDOZA, RODOLFO SALES, ROBERT AGUIRRE and PACIFICO REBUTIDO, Accused-Appellants.
The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Enrique A. Javier, Sr. counsel de oficio for Accused-Appellants.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; COMPLEX CRIMES; SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED
WITH RAPE, COMMITTED IN THE CASE AT BAR; PENALTY THEREOF; SAID CRIME NOW DESIGNATED AS PIRACY
IN PHILIPPINE WATERS. — The Court finds, at the outset, that the trial judge erred in designating the offense
committed by the appellants as rape with homicide aggravated by robbery in band. For one, neither in law
nor in jurisprudence is there an aggravating circumstance as robbery in band. More importantly, the evidence
shows that what was committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by rape.
The overwhelming evidence reveals that the original design of the malefactors was to commit robbery in
order to facilitate their escape from the penal colony. Their original intent did not comprehend the
commission of rape. Hence, the crime of rape cannot be regarded as the principal offense. In this case, since
it attended the commission of robbery with homicide, the rape is deemed to aggravate the crime but
damages or indemnification for the victim may be awarded. (See People v. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136 [1958]; People
v. Tapales, 93 SCRA 134 [1979]). Instead of ignominy, it is the rape itself that aggravates the crime (People v.
Mongado, 28 SCRA 642 [1969]). With respect to the deaths of Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque, the
appellants are clearly liable therefor since, as held by this Court in People v. Mangulabnan, (99 Phil. 992
[1956]) it is immaterial that the death of a person supervened by mere accident, provided that the homicide
is produced by reason or on occasion of the robbery. Since rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of
robbery, the offense committed by the appellants is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide,
aggravated by rape, punishable under Paragraph 1 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). It does not
matter if the technical name assigned to the offense is rape with homicide and with robbery in band, for the
real nature of the crime charged is determined not by the title of the complaint, nor by the specification of
the provision of the law alleged to have been violated, but by the facts recited in the complaint or
information. (See People v. Oliviera, 67 Phil. 427 [1939]) As the acts constituting robbery with homicide were
clearly set forth in the complaint and proven during trial, then the appellants may be held liable for such
63
crime, regardless of the erroneous designation of the offense. In passing, it may be mentioned that the crimes
committed by appellants are now denominated as piracy in Philippine waters, punishable under Presidential
Decree No. 532. We find it unnecessary to retroactively apply the provisions thereof in favor of the appellants
because the acts committed by them are likewise punishable therein by reclusion perpetua.
2. ID.; AGGRAVATIG CIRCUMSTANCES; RECIDIVISM, IN BAND AND ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH, ALSO
ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR; NOCTURNITY AND CRAFT, NOT CONSIDERED. — We find no merit in the
appellants’ contention that the lower court erred in considering recidivism as an aggravating circumstance. All
the appellants are recidivists. They were serving sentence at the Sta. Lucia Penal Colony by virtue of a final
judgment of conviction when they committed the above-mentioned offenses. Rodolfo Aspili, Ernesto
Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza and Pacifico Rebutido have previously been convicted of the crimes of
frustrated homicide, serious physical injuries, theft, and murder and trespass to dwelling, respectively. Both
Rodolfo Sales and Roberto Aguirre have previously been convicted of robbery in band. We likewise uphold
the trial court’s finding that the crime was aggravated because it was committed by a band. All the six
appellants were armed when they boarded the vessel and perpetrated their dastardly acts. There is also
abuse of superior strength, since most of the victims were women and children ranging from 2 to 9 years old.
However, the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and craft should not have been considered by the
lower court. There was no showing that the appellants purposely sought the cover of night when they
committed the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Neither did the appellants employ craft,
since they had already boarded the vessel when they pretended to buy Tanduay Rum in exchange for the
dried fish and chicken they were carrying. Even without such pretense, they could nonetheless have carried
out their unlawful scheme.
3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSIONS; REQUIREMETS AND RESTRICTIONS ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL HAVE NO RETROACTIVE EFFECT AND DO NOT APPLY
TO CONFESSIONS TAKEN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973. — The interlocking extrajudicial confessions executed by
the appellants are admissible even if they were not informed of their right to counsel. These confessions were
all taken in January 1970, long before the 1973 Constitution took effect. Article III Section 20 of the 1973
Constitution, for the first time, concretized the present right of persons under custodial investigation to
counsel, how to be informed of such right and the effect of non-compliance. The requirements and
restrictions surrounding this constitutional guarantee, however, have no retroactive effect and do not apply
to confessions taken before January 17, 1973, the date of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. (See Magtoto v.
Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 [1975])
DECISION
and the damaged rudder of the launch (TSN, 2-18-70, pp. 169-176).
While at the aforementioned place, near the site of the Sta. Lucia Penal Colony, in the afternoon between one
and three o’clock, two persons went aboard the M/L Elsa. They were identified by Josie Gonzales as Pacifico
Rebutido and Rodolfo Aspili, and after Pepito Severino handed to them the liquor they left the launch (TSN, 8-
26-70, pp. 437-442).
It was later established that said two accused together with the other four, namely: Ernesto Magbanua,
Rodolfo Sales, Roberto Aguirre and Eduardo Mendoza, all convicts — colonists of Sta. Lucia Penal Colony, had
been drinking liquor (tanduay) since the morning of December 28, 1969 even as they hatched the plan to
escape from the Penal Colony with the use of M/L Elsa. The buying of the tanduay served also the purpose of
acquainting the herein accused that the crew and passengers of M/L Elsa were innocent, peaceful and
unarmed (TSN, 11-26-40, pp. 307-312).
Between 7 and 8 o’clock in the evening of the same day, the six accused carried out their agreed plan to
escape and, fully armed with pistols and boloes, they boarded the launch bringing with them chicken and
dried fish. Upon boarding the launch, they placed themselves in strategic positions. Magbanua talked to the
patron of the launch who ordered the engine operator, Pepito Severino, to fetch four bottles of tanduay.
While in the act of handing the tanduay to Magbanua, the latter suddenly thrust his bolo at Severino’s
abdomen, at the same time pointing a pistol at him shouting ‘walang kikilos’ (nobody moves). This prompted
Severino to jump into the sea, after seeing also the rest of the accused draw their bolos. Witnessing all these
hostile acts and having evaded a stab by Rodolfo Sales who nevertheless chased him, Catalino Nadayao was
constrained to jump overboard. Some passengers and the rest of the crew who were frightened by the
shouting of Magbanua and the ensuing commotion likewise jumped into the sea (TSN 2-20-70, pp. 183-193;
3-17-70, pp. 196-197). Among the passengers who jumped overboard were Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda
Arque.
Only five persons were left in the launch who did not jump overboard. Josie Gonzales tried to jump overboard
but Ernesto Magbanua, one of the accused, prevented her by holding both arms. Magbanua pulled and
dragged her. Josie struggled to free herself but to no avail. Magbanua succeeded in dragging her over the
cargoes where he pinned her down. While in that lying position he forcibly raped her for about five to ten
minutes. At that time, Magbanua was pointing a gun at Josie’s head. After Magbanua was through, Rodolfo
Sales approached her, took off his pants and laid on top of her for about 3 to 5 minutes. At the time Sales was
raping Josie, Magbanua was still holding her and pointing a gun at her. After Sales, Pacifico Rebutido
approached her and likewise raped her. Josie tried to evade but she was already weak and only felt pain (TSN,
8-26-70, pp. 458-463; 8-27-90, pp. 1-23).

On the other hand, Narcisa Batayola likewise attempted to jump but Magbanua also held her at the back
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: portion of her dress and told her to return to the place where she and the other children were originally
hiding. She saw the accused ransacking the cargoes and taking the contents thereof. Moments later, Roberto
Aguirre then with a pistol held Narcisa on the shoulders while Eduardo Mendoza held her legs and wrestled
The appellants seek a reversal of the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Palawan, 4th Judicial Region, her down. Aguirre had sexual intercourse with her followed by Mendoza. Thereafter, Rodolfo Aspili brought
Branch 48, finding them guilty of the crime of rape with homicide, with the aggravating circumstances of her out toward a sawali and right there and then made her lay down in a slanting position. When Aspili was
robbery in band, taking advantage of nighttime, recidivism, abuse of superior strength and craft. having sexual intercourse with her, nobody was holding her but she could no longer resist as she was already
exhausted and weak (TSN, 11-16-70, pp. 147-167).
The facts for the prosecution are summarized by the Solicitor General, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Subsequently, the six accused left the launch and boarded their banca. Thereafter, Josie and Narcisa together
"On December 28, 1969, the M/L Elsa left Puerto Princesa City for Dumaran, Palawan. On board were with the children jumped into the water and swam to the bakawan to hide. They were rescued by the
Catalino Nadayao, the patron of the vessel; Pepito Severino and two other crew members; and thirteen (13) ‘Baracuda Launch.’ In the process, the dead bodies of Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque were found.
passengers among whom were Narcisa Batayola, Daisy Gonzales, Josie Gonzales, Yolanda Arque, Wenifredo
Magallanes, a certain Bunag and several children ranging from two (2) to nine (9) years of age. All in all, 17 Necropsy examination on the cadavers of Daisy and Yolanda showed that both died of suffocation by
persons were on board M/L Elsa with some cargoes consisting of liquor like tanduay, beer, coke, etc. The drowning as blood was coming out from their nose, mouth and opening of both ears due to rapture of
vessel left Puerto Princesa at 3:00 o’clock in the morning, navigating towards the lighthouse but due to big tempanic membrane (TSN, 2-17-70, pp. 109-124).
waves and strong winds, the launch was forced to seek shelter at Balon, Sta. Lucia, Puerto Princesa City,
arriving thereat about 6 to 7:00 o’clock in the morning where they were stranded because of the bad weather Dr. Dueñas, the examining physician, likewise found that Josie Gonzales and Narcisa Batayola both had

64
undergone sexual penetration recently.
Rape with Homicide and with Robbery in Band
Subsequently, both Josie Gonzales and Narcisa Batayola filed separate complaints charging the herein, six
accused with the crimes of Rape with Homicide and Robbery in Band." (Brief for the plaintiff-appellee, pp, 2- COMPLAINT
8, Rollo, p. 334)
"That on or about the 28th day of December, 1969, in Sitio Balon, Sta. Lucia Sub-Colony, Municipality of
On the basis of the above-mentioned alleged acts committed by the accused, the following criminal cases Puerto Princesa, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
were filed:cralawnad above-named accused who are all serving sentence by virtue of a final judgment in the Iwahig Penal Colony,
Puerto Princesa, Palawan, conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, forcibly boarded the
1. Criminal Case No. 3 motor launch named ‘M/L ELSA’ which was then at anchor seeking shelter in the vicinity due to bad weather
and while on board the said vessel, the accused Roberto Aguirre, Eduardo Mendoza and Rodolfo Aspili, did
for then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with deliberate intent and lewd designs and by means
of force, violence and intimidation, using guns and boloes for the purpose had sexual intercourse, one after
Rape with Homicide and with Robbery in Band the other, with herein complainant, Narcisa Batayola, a minor 15 years of age, against her will, she being one
of the 17 passengers aboard the same vessel while the rest of the accused were either having carnal
COMPLAINT knowledge with another victim, Josie Gonzales, likewise a minor 13 years of age, by means of force and
intimidation and against her will; while the others were ransacking the baggages of the passengers and on the
"The undersigned complainants, after having been duly sworn to oath in accordance with law, accuse occasion of such acts of the accused, panic took place aboard the said vessel, thus forcing the other
RODOLFO ASPILI, ERNESTO MAGBANUA, EDUARDO MENDOZA, RODOLFO SALES, ROBERTO AGUIRRE and passengers to jump over board for fear of bodily harm, and as a consequence thereof, Daisy Gonzales age 15
PACIFICO REBUTIDO, of the crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE AND WITH ROBBERY IN BAND, committed as and Yolanda Arque, age 9, both passengers of the said vessel were drowned; and further on the occasion
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph thereof, all the accused took and carried away unlawfully and feloniously and against the will of the owners
thereof, cash amount of money, personal belongings and cargoes of the vessel amounting to no less than
"‘That on or about the 28th day of December, 1969, in Sitio Balon, Sta. Lucia Sub-Colony, Municipality of P2,000.00, Philippine Currency.
Puerto Princesa, Province of Palawan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused who are all serving sentence by virtue of a final judgment in the Iwahig Penal Colony, "Contrary to law and with the aggravating circumstances of night time, by an armed band in an uninhabited
Puerto Princesa, Palawan, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, forcibly boarded place, recidivism and/or reiteration, with evident premeditation, superior strength and with the use of craft,
the motor launch named ‘M/L ELSA’ which was then at anchor seeking shelter in the vicinity due to bad fraud or disguise, and penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 4111 in
weather and while on board the said vessel the accused Ernesto Magbanua, Rodolfo Sales, and Pacifico relation to Art. 160 of the same Code.
Rebutido, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with deliberate intent and lewd designs
and by means of force, violence and intimidations using guns and boloes for the purpose, had sexual Puerto Princesa, Palawan, Philippines, January 7, 1970
intercourse one after the other with the herein complainant JOSIE GONZALES, a minor 13 years of age,
against her will, she being one of the 17 passengers aboard the said vessel while the rest of the accused were (SGD.) CRISTITO ARQUE (SGD.) NARCISA BATAYOLA Y ARQUE Guardian-Uncle-Complainant Complainant"
either having carnal knowledge with another victim NARCISA BATAYOLA, likewise a minor 15 years of age, by
means of force and intimidation and against her will; while the others were ransacking the baggages of the (Rollo, pp. 179-180)
passengers and on the occasion of such acts of the accused, panic took place aboard the said vessel thus
forcing the other passengers to jump overboard for fear of bodily harm, and as a consequence thereof, DAISY The facts for the defense are summarized by their counsel as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
GONZALES age 15, and YOLANDA ARQUE, age 9, both passengers of the said vessel were drowned; and
further on the occasion thereof, all the accused took and carried away, unlawfully and feloniously and against "The true facts of the cases are those testified to by Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza, Roberto Aguirre,
the will of the owners thereof, cash amount of money, personal belongings and cargoes aboard the vessel Rodolfo Sales and Manolo Espino stated briefly hereunder as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
amounting to no less than TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.’"
At about 9:00 o’clock in the morning of December 28, 1969, Ernesto Magbanua and Roberto Aguirre left their
CONTRARY TO LAW and with the aggravating circumstances of nighttime, by an armed band, in an nipa hut at Santa Lucia Penal Colony and went to the Prison Brigade of the said colony to get their dirty
uninhabited place, recidivism and or reiteration, with evident premeditation, superior strength and with the clothes. At the brigade they met three (3) private persons, passengers or crews of Motor Launch ‘Elsa’. They
use of craft, fraud or disguise, and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by were eating ‘Camote Cassava’ with the Capataz of the colony on duty, a certain person called Rudy.
Republic Act No. 4111 in relation to Article 160 of the same Code." chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
From the brigade, Magbanua and Aguirre proceeded to the hut of Pacifico Rebutido. There they saw Pacifico
SGD. PABLO GONZALES SGD. JOSIE GONZALES Rebutido, Rodolfo Aspili, Rodolfo Sales and Eduardo Mendoza drinking tanduay which were brought to
Rebutido’s hut by the three (3) private persons from the Motor Launch ‘Elsa’.
Father-Complainant Complainant
At about 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon of the same date, Ernesto Magbanua and his companions returned to
(Rollo, pp. 15-16) the colony brigade for the usual daily checking and counting of prisoners. After the checking-up, the group
returned to the nipa hut of Pacifico Rebutido and there planned to escape from the Sta. Lucia Penal Colony
2. Criminal Case No. 4 situated in Puerto Princesa, Palawan. They agreed to hire the Motor Launch ‘Elsa’ anchored about ten (10)
arms length from the wharf of Sta. Lucia Penal Colony in Balon, Puerto Princesa, Palawan with money,
for chickens and dried fish.

65
 upon all of them, another separate penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, both penalties to be served successively,
At about 7:00 o’clock in the evening of that date the group, defendants-appellants herein, went to the Motor with all its accessory penalties too in both cases, further, all same six (6) herein accused are sentenced and
Launch ‘Elsa’ using the banca of the colony and bringing with them money, chickens and dried fish. Ernesto ordered to pay actual damages jointly and solidarily as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Magbanua boarded the launch ahead of the rest, talked to the patron of the launch to bring them to liberty
and offered money, chickens and dried fish for their fares. His companions likewise boarded the motor 1. P265.00 — to Josie Gonzales;
launch, Rebutido being the last to board the same at the time when the patron of the launch was still thinking
and considering the offer of Magbanua. But when Rebutido reached the deck of the launch, he stepped on a 2. 24.00 — to Narcisa Batayola;
loose board and fell inside the engine room. The impact of his fall was so loud that the patron jumped
overboard into the sea shouting to his crews and passengers to likewise jump into the sea. Only two women, 3. 36.00 — to Pepito Severino and
a man and small children remained in the launch. Magbanua told the remaining persons on board the launch
not to jump overboard because they did not have bad intentions. 4. P1,675.00 — to Catalino Nadayao, for and the other passengers, named by him to have suffered losses, in
an amount corresponding to each, respectively,
Magbanua and his companions then searched for those who jumped into the sea for anyone who may not
know how to swim in order to save him. And they found a small boy about nine (9) years of age struggling to and furthermore, the same six (6) aforenamed accused are sentenced and ordered to pay, jointly and
swim. They saved him by using a pole and pulling him towards the launch. When asked why he jumped solidarily, moral damages, in the amount of P25,000.00 to each of Josie Gonzales and Narcisa Batayola, their
overboard, the boy said that he jumped because he heard the Captain of the launch shouting to them to jump heirs and assigns respectively, as moral damages, and ultimately to indemnify in the same manner, the
into the sea. parents, their heirs and assigns of deceased Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque, the amount of P30,000.00 for
each and every death of the said two (2) deceased, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency in
When the herein appellants found no more persons on the sea around the launch, Rodolfo Aspili and Eduardo all the aforecited civil liabilities. It is further directed that an alias warrant of arrest be issued against Rodolfo
Mendoza went down to the engine room with one male passenger of the launch and tried to start the engine. Sales and Pacifico Rebutido and not to be returned until they were in the custody of the law." (Rollo, pp. 290-
It was at that moment when Magbanua who remained on the deck saw Josie Gonzales at the prow of the 291)
launch. He asked her to accomodate him for a sexual intercourse, but Josie pointed him instead to Narcisa
Batayola saying that Batayola is the one having experience on the matter. When told that he (Magbanua) did We agree with the trial court that the prosecution correctly presented the facts of the case.
not like Batayola, Josie agreed to a sexual intercourse if Magbanua will not harm her. She undressed herself
when told to undress. Then Magbanua opened the zipper of his pants and let Josie hold his penis. While Josie The appellants raise the following assignments of errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
was holding his penis, Magbanua made her lie down. He inserted his penis inside the vagina of Josie who
complained of pains. It took Magbanua about five (5) minutes to insert only two inches of his penis inside the I
vagina of Josie Gonzales. At that same moment, Rodolfo Sales and Pacifico Rebutido pulled Magbanua up
from Josie Gonzales reminding Magbanua that their agreement was only to escape and what he was doing to
Josie Gonzales was not part of their agreement. "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CRIMES COMMITTED BY THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
HEREIN ARE RAPE WITH HOMICIDE WITH THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF ROBBERY IN BAND,
At about the same time that Magbanua was having sexual intercourse with Josie Gonzales, Roberto Aguirre NIGHTTIME, SUPERIOR STRENGTH, RECIDIVISM, AND CRAFT.
was also having sexual intercourse with Narcisa Batayola. Before the intercourse, Aguirre saw Batayola about
to jump into the sea. He prevented her from jumping overboard by holding her. Then he went around the
II
deck of the launch to see if there were still persons swimming on the water, leaving Batayola at the prow of
the launch. Seeing none, he returned to Batayola and asked her to have sexual intercourse with him. At first
Batayola refused. But later she undressed herself when told to undress. Aguirre made her lie down and he
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS HEREIN CONSPIRED TO COMMIT
inserted his penis inside the vagina of Narcisa Batayola without any difficulty. He made two successive sexual
THE OFFENSES OF RAPE WITH HOMICIDE AND CONVICTING ALL OF THEM OF THE SAID CRIMES." (Rollo, pp.
intercourse with Narcisa Batayola, after which they both dressed up. They were in that situation when
326-327)
Rodolfo Sales and Pacifico Rebotido arrived, pulled Aguirre away and they boarded their banca because they
saw someone flashlighting the premises at the shore. Magbanua also called Aspili and Eduardo Mendoza at
The Court finds, at the outset, that the trial judge erred in designating the offense committed by the
the engine room and they likewise boarded their banca and proceeded to the mangrove swamp to escape.
appellants as rape with homicide aggravated by robbery in band. For one, neither in law nor in jurisprudence
On the way, they noticed that Aspili was left behind." (Appellant’s Brief, pp. 3-6)
is there an aggravating circumstance as robbery in band. More importantly, the evidence shows that what
was committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by rape.
The two cases were consolidated and, after hearing, the lower court rendered judgment finding the accused
guilty of the crime of rape with homicide. The dispositive portion of the decision is set forth
The records disclose that the appellants took control of the vessel M/L Elsa by threatening the crew and
below:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
passengers with their boloes and pistols. (TSN, pp. 452-459, August 26, 1970; pp. 137-148, November 16,
1970) Narcisa Batayola, a prosecution witness, testified that after the commotion that ensued when
"WHEREFORE, haloed by the illuminating light of all aforegoing facts, laws, jurisprudence and arguments, this
appellants wielded their weapons, some of the appellants immediately started ransacking the cargoes and
Court finds all the herein accused, namely: Rodolfo Aspili, Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza, Jr., Rodolfo
taking the contents thereof (TSN, p. 148, November 16, 1970) These acts of the appellants therefore manifest
Sales, Roberto Aguirre and Pacifico Rebutido guilty of the crimes of Rape with Homicide, with the aggravating
an unlawful intent to gain, through violence and intimidation of persons, by taking the vessel and personal
circumstances of Robbery in Band, taking advantage of nighttime, recidivism, abuse of superior strength and
property of the crew and passengers, which comprises the crime of robbery.
craft, in the above-entitled Criminal Case No. 3, beyond reasonable doubt, and sentences all of them to
Reclusion Perpetua, and all, likewise, guilty of the same but separate crime with all the same aforementioned
The overwhelming evidence reveals that the original design of the malefactors was to commit robbery in
aggravating circumstances, in the above-entitled Criminal Case No. 4, beyond reasonable doubt and imposes
order to facilitate their escape from the penal colony. Their original intent did not comprehend the

66
commission of rape. Hence, the crime of rape cannot be regarded as the principal offense. In this case, since
it attended the commission of robbery with homicide, the rape is deemed to aggravate the crime but
damages or indemnification for the victim may be awarded. (See People v. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136 [1958]; People
v. Tapales, 93 SCRA 134 [1979]). Instead of ignominy, it is the rape itself that aggravates the crime (People v.
Mongado, 28 SCRA 642 [1969]).
With respect to the deaths of Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque, the appellants are clearly liable therefor
since, as held by this Court in People v. Mangulabnan, (99 Phil. 992 [1956]) it is immaterial that the death of a
person supervened by mere accident, provided that the homicide is produced by reason or on occasion of the
robbery.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Since rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of robbery, the offense committed by the appellants is
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, aggravated by rape, punishable under Paragraph 1 of
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). It does not matter if the technical name assigned to the offense
is rape with homicide and with robbery in band, for the real nature of the crime charged is determined not by
the title of the complaint, nor by the specification of the provision of the law alleged to have been violated,
but by the facts recited in the complaint or information. (See People v. Oliviera, 67 Phil. 427 [1939]) As the
acts constituting robbery with homicide were clearly set forth in the complaint and proven during trial, then
the appellants may be held liable for such crime, regardless of the erroneous designation of the offense.
With the foregoing pronouncements, the Court no longer deems it necessary to deal with the appellants’
argument in their first assignment of error that assuming arguendo that they are guilty of committing rape,
the crimes of rape and homicide should be viewed as separate and distinct offenses. We have already ruled
that the crime committed is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, the rape being considered
merely as an aggravating circumstance.
We find no merit in the appellants’ contention that the lower court erred in considering recidivism as an
aggravating circumstance. All the appellants are recidivists. They were serving sentence at the Sta. Lucia Penal
Colony by virtue of a final judgment of conviction when they committed the above-mentioned offenses.
Rodolfo Aspili, Ernesto Magbanua, Eduardo Mendoza and Pacifico Rebutido have previously been convicted
of the crimes of frustrated homicide, serious physical injuries, theft, and murder and trespass to dwelling,
respectively. Both Rodolfo Sales and Roberto Aguirre have previously been convicted of robbery in band.
We likewise uphold the trial court’s finding that the crime was aggravated because it was committed by a
band. All the six appellants were armed when they boarded the vessel and perpetrated their dastardly acts.
There is also abuse of superior strength, since most of the victims were women and children ranging from 2
to 9 years old.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
However, the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and craft should not have been considered by the
lower court. There was no showing that the appellants purposely sought the cover of night when they
committed the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Neither did the appellants employ craft,
since they had already boarded the vessel when they pretended to buy Tanduay Rum in exchange for the
dried fish and chicken they were carrying. Even without such pretense, they could nonetheless have carried
out their unlawful scheme.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the appellants’ contention that there was no conspiracy in
the commission of rape becomes immaterial in view of the fact that all of them directly participated in its
commission. Appellants Magbanua, Sales and Rebutido took turns in raping Josie Gonzales, while appellants
Aguirre, Mendoza and Aspili ravished Narcisa Batayola. The Court accords more weight and credence to the
testimonies of complainants Gonzales and Batayola. These two girls, 13 and 15 years old respectively, would
not subject themselves to the rigors of a public trial if they were not motivated by an honest desire to punish
their assailants. Moreover, their narrations were corroborated by the testimony of Dr. Juanito Duenas who
physically examined Gonzales and Batayola and found that both indeed had just undergone sexual
penetration.
The interlocking extrajudicial confessions executed by the appellants are admissible even if they were not
informed of their right to counsel. These confessions were all taken in January 1970, long before the 1973
Constitution took effect. Article III Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, for the first time, concretized the
present right of persons under custodial investigation to counsel, how to be informed of such right and the
effect of non-compliance. The requirements and restrictions surrounding this constitutional guarantee,
however, have no retroactive effect and do not apply to confessions taken before January 17, 1973, the date
of effectivity of the 1973 Constitution. (See Magtoto v. Manguera, 63 SCRA 4 [1975])
At any rate, even without considering these extrajudicial confessions, the Court is convinced that the guilt of
appellants has been incontrovertibly established beyond reasonable doubt by the prosecution.
The Court, however, finds that the trial judge erred in imposing upon the appellants two separate penalties
of reclusion perpetua, both penalties to be served successively. The basis for this imposition by the lower
court is its finding that the appellants are guilty of two crimes of rape with homicide, one for the rape of Josie
Gonzales and the other for the rape of Narcisa Batayola. We have already pronounced, though, that the rape
committed is merely an aggravating circumstance. Since the appellants are found guilty of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by rape, recidivism, in band and abuse of superior
strength, then, applying Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, only one penalty of reclusion
perpetua should have been imposed.cralawnad
In passing, it may be mentioned that the crimes committed by appellants are now denominated as piracy in
Philippine waters, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532. We find it unnecessary to retroactively
apply the provisions thereof in favor of the appellants because the acts committed by them are likewise
punishable therein by reclusion perpetua.
Considering the perversity accompanying the crime, the heinous nature not only of the offense but its
manner of commission, and the refusal of the accused to learn from their earlier convictions, the Court
strongly feels that the sentences herein imposed must be fully served. Any official who goes over any
applications for pardon or parole is urged to read the records of the case before acting on the applications.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 3 and 4 is AFFIRMED but MODIFIED. The
appellants are found guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide with the aggravating
circumstances of rape, recidivism, in band and abuse of superior strength and are hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The award of actual damages is hereby affirmed. The awards representing
indemnity for the deaths are increased to P50,000.00 for each victim while the moral damages for the rapes
are increased to P30,000.00 for each victim.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-34785 July 30, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,
vs.
RENATO BARRIOS Y ALMOGUERA and RICO NAZARIO Y IBAÑ;EZ, accused.
Renato L. Ramos, for accused Renato Barrios.
Cristobal A. Cantor (Counsel de Oficio) for accused Rico Nazario.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco and Solicitor Carlos N.
Orrega for appellee.
67
 C
A
FERNANDEZ, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
S
A
This is an automatic review of the amended decision dated January 13, 1972 of the Circuit Criminal Court of S
Manila in CCC-VI-733 (71) entitled "The People of the Philippines versus Renato Barrios and Rico Nazario"
finding the two accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide and sentencing each one of them to A
death and to jointly and severally pay the heirs of the victim Teodoro Castillo y Molina the sum of P12,000.00 s
for the death of said victim and the sums of P10,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as exemplary damages s
and P7.00 representing the amount taken from the deceased and to pay the costs. 1 i
s
The two accused, Renato Barrios y Almoguera and Rico Nazario v Ibañ;ez were charged in September 1971 t
with the crime of robbery with homicide in the following. têñ.£îhqw⣠a
n
t
INFORMATION
F
The undersigned accuses Renato Barrios y Almoguera and Rico Nazario y Ibañ;ez of the i
crime of robbery with homicide, committed as follows: s
c
a
That on or about August 28, 1971, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, l
conspiring and confederating with one another whose Identity and whereabouts are
still unknown and helping one another. did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, by means of force and violence, and with intent to gain, take away from I hereby certify that an ex-parte investigation in this case has been conducted by me in
Teodoro Castillo y Molina, a taxi driver, the latter's earnings of undetermined amount, accordance with law; that there is reasonable ground to believe that the offense
to the damage and prejudice of the said Teodoro Castillo y Molina in the said charged has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
undetermined amount; that on the occasion of the said robbery and for the purpose of
enabling them to take, steal and carry away the aforesaid earning of Teodoro Castillo y Manila, Sept. 13, 1971. 2
Molina, the herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the said Teodoro Castillo y Molina, by then and there stabbing him with a The facts, as found by the trial court, are:
bladed instrument, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries which were the direct
cause of his death thereafter. A careful study of the evidence presented, shows the fact that victim Teodoro Castillo y
Molina, a taxi driver, was killed and robbed of his earnings has never been disputed.
Contrary to law. têñ.£îhqw⣠The only issue in this case, therefore, is the criminal participation of the accused.

( The corroborating statements of both accused (Exhibit "F", statement of Nazario and
S Exhibit "G", statement of Barrios) indubitably show that said accused, together with
G one Arthur, who is still at large, conspired, confederated with and helped one another
D in killing and robbing the victim. Nazario admitted in his statement (Exhibit "F") that he
. invited Barrios to stage a hold-up in Perlita Street. Thereupon, a taxi passed by and he
) stopped it. They boarded the same and he sat in the front seat while Barrios and Arthur
sat at the back with Arthur immediately behind the driver of the taxi. Thereafter,
R Barrios poked the balisong on the taxi driver. Then they pulled said taxi driver to the
O rear seat in order to frisk him but the driver shouted for help. Fearing that they might
D be heard and the driver would create a scandal, Barrios immediately stabbed the driver
O 3 times. Thereafter, he and his companions filed. Nazario further declared that Barrios
L also stabbed the taxi driver because he fought back.
F
O Barrios likewise admitted in his statement (Exhibit "G") that they actually stopped the taxi at the corner of
Perlita and Estrada Streets and got the money of the driver but the driver fought back and for which reason
C he stabbed him with a kitchen knife. After that, he and his two companions fled. He cannot remember the
. number of times he stabbed the taxi driver because he was then drunk. têñ.£îhqwâ£

68
 The fact that both accused confessed to the truth is strongly .shown by the
corroborating testimony of Generoso Quimpo, Jr., who Testified in a spontaneous,
categorical, logical and straightforward manner with marked fluency and ease that
between 2:00 and 2:30 a.m. of August 28, 1971, while he was still half-awake, he heard
a commotion consisting of a sound of a sound of a car, a radio and the struggle of some
men. He even heard a shout "iwanan mo na iyan" and the slamming of tile door of the
taxi. He looked out of the window and saw a taxi at standstill, around 9 to 10 meters
away, but with the engine on. Inside the taxi, he saw two men at the rear seat
struggling. Then the driver (he said he is the driver because he was the one who
shouted "magnanakaw") came out and started running towards Perlita Street shouting
"magnanakaw, magnanakaw" The man who was inside, at the rear of the taxi, also
went out and ran on the opposite direction towards Estrada. In other words, the
testimony of Quimpo, Jr. that he saw two men struggling in the rear seat of the taxi,
one of whom he believes to be the taxi driver because he was the one shouting
"magnanakaw," corroborates the admission of Nazario that they pulled the taxi driver
from the front to the rear seat in order to frisk him of his money (Exhibit "F", answer to
question No. 6): the testimony of Quimpo, Jr. that the taxi driver went out of his Taxi
and shouted corroborates also a portion of the answer of Nazario to question No. 6
(Exhibit "F") that the taxi driver got out of his taxi and shouted; and the testimony of
Quimpo, Jr. that he saw two men struggling at the back of the taxi also corroborates
the statements of Nazario and Barrios that Barrios stabbed the taxi driver because the
latter fought back. The crediblity of Quimpo, Jr. Cannot be doubted for in the absence
of evidence showing improper motive actuating the principal prosecution witnesses
tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive existed and their
testimonies are worthy of full faith and credit (People versus Amiscua, L-31238,
February 27, 1971). 3
The two accused maintained that they were maltreated into giving their statements admitting their
participation in the commission of the crime charged in the information. This ,contention has no merit.
The statements in question were subscribed and sworn to before Assistant Fiscal Avelino Concepcion of
Manila. There is no showing that the two accused refused or even hesitated to sign and swear to said
statements. They did not complain to his fiscal that they were maltreated by the police officers. these
circumstances, the statements are considered to have been voluntarily given. 4
The assertion of the accused Rico Nazario that he did not to the fiscal before whom he subscribed and swore
to, the statement because he was afraid of the police officers is not Considering the gravity of the offense, it.
is logical to ;assume that the fiscal examined thoroughly the two accused on the voluntariness of their
statements. if the two accuses were really maltreated they should have complained because he probable
penalty of death for the crime charged is more awesome than the feared reprisal of the police. Moreover,
there is no evidence of the alleged maltreatment other than the bare assertion of the accused.
The statements of the two accused contain details of which could only have been furnished by them. The
allegation of Nazario that they drink first beer or liquor in the railroad track in Perlita Street; that he was the
one who sat in front of the taxicab while the other accused sat on the rear seat: that Barrios was the one who
poked a knife at the taxi driver: that the driver was pulled to the rear seat of the taxicab so that he could be
frisked of his money: that the driver shouted "saklolo, tulungan ninyo ako"; and that the driver was stabbed
because he fought back are details that could not have been concocted by the police investigators,
The accused, Renato Barrios, narrated in his statement that the driver fought back when the former took his
money; that q-aid accused stabbed the driver with a kitchen knife; that before the robbery, he and the other
accused first drank liquor by the bridge going to the railroad track; that he knows Col. Quimpo who lives at
the corner of Estrada and Perlita Streets; that it is true that he went to Col. Quimpo three (3) days after the
incident and asked what said accused should do as he is one of those being suspected in the killing and
robbing of the driver as reported in a newspaper; and that he read in the Daily Star that he is a suspect and
Col. Quimpo is a witness. These details could not having been known to the police investigators.
It is a settled rule that where the statement of the accused mentions details which only the declarant could
have furnished and could not have been concocted by the investigator, the confession is considered to have
been voluntarily given. 5
Moreover, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the presumption is that the police officers who
investigated the accused performed their official duties regularly. 6
The defense interposed by the accused that on August 28, 1971 they were narrating stories in the house at
2473 Perlita Street, the residence of Renato Barrios, is not credible, Alibi is a defense that can very easily be
concocted. For this reason, alibi to be sustained as a defense must be supported by strong evidence. The
evidence of the accused in support of their alibi is weak. It is strange that the accused and their companions
should be conversing up to 2:30 o'clock in the morning. This is contrary to the ordinary course of things.
Besides, Virginia Siscon, a witness of the accused, declared that she conversed with the accused and other
persons only up to 10:00 o'clock in the evening of that date. The place where the accused and other persons
allegedly told stories was at 2473 Perlita Street which was near the scene of the crime. The crime was
committed on the same street. There was every possibility for the two accused to have been present at the
scene of the crime although earlier that evening they were conversing with other people in the house at 2473
Perlita Street.
It has been held that for alibi to prosper, the evidence must show that the accused was so far away that he
could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. 7
The evidence of the prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that the two accused committed
the crime charged in the information.
The trial court imposed the death penalty on both accused because of the finding that the commission of the
crime was attended by the aggravating circumstances of craft and abuse of superior strength without any
mitigating circumstance. The evidence of the prosecution has not established the aggravating circumstances
of craft and abuse of superior strength.
Craft is a circumstance characterized by trickery or cunning resorted to by the accused to carry out his design.
The trial court found that craft was present because the two accused stopped the taxicab by pretending to be
passengers. There is no evidence that the two accused pretended to be passengers. In fact, it is not clear how
the taxicab was stopped. The only eyewitness for the prosecution, Generoso M. Quimpo, Jr., declared that
between 2:00 and 2:30 o'clock in the morning of August 28, 1971, he was half-awake when there occurred a
commotion outside his house consisting of a sound of a car, radio and the struggling of some men; that upon
looking out of the window, he saw a taxicab at a standstill about 9 or 10 feet away from the window; that he
was in the second floor of the house; that the engine of the car was running; that before looking outside, the
witness heard a man shouting "Iwanan mo na yan."; that when he heard the slamming of the door of the
taxicab and he peeped out immediately, he saw the taxicab already parked outside; that he saw two men
struggling inside the taxicab at the rear seat; that the taxi driver came out and ran towards Perlita Street
shouting "magnanakaw, magnanakaw.": that a few seconds after the taxi driver had run out, the man inside
the taxicab at the rear also ran towards the opposite direction going to Estrada Street; and that the two
persons struggling at the rear of the taxicab were the taxi driver and a man.
69
It is clear from the foregoing testimony that when Generoso M. Quimpo, Jr. looked out of the window from
his house, the taxicab was already at a standstill and that only two men were struggling at the rear seat of the
taxicab, the driver of the taxicab and one man. This testimony of the prosecution witness also rules out the
existence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Only one man was struggling with
'The taxi driver at the rear seat of the taxicab and the witness saw only one man coming out of the rear of the
taxicab running towards the opposite direction going to Estrada Street.
It is settled that an aggravating circumstance should be proven as fully as the crime itself in order to
aggravate the, penalty. 8
In view of the foregoing, the trial court erred in imposing the penalty of death. The crime was committed
without the presence of any aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
WHEREFORE, the decision under automatic- review is hereby affirmed, with the sole modification that the
penalty imposed on the two accused is reclusion perpetua, with costs against said accused.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 65833 May 6, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EUGENIO LAGARTO y GETALADO, JR., accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Dakila F. Castro & Associates for accused-appellant.
PARAS, J.:
This is an automatic review of the judgment * of the Regional Trial Court, 8th Judicial Region, Branch XXII,
Laoang, Northern Samar, in Criminal Case No. 1566, finding the accused EUGENIO LAGARTO y GETALADO, JR.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER.
The pertinent facts of the case are:
In the early evening of May 25, 1983, Reynaldo Aducal, who was buying fish in the public market, Poblacion
Laoang, Northern Samar, was fatally stabbed. Right after the stabbing, the assailant was apprehended by Pfc.
Wenefredo Laguitan whose commendable act thwarted the assailant's escape.
For the killing of Reynaldo Aducal, accused Eugenio Lagarto y Getalado, Jr. was charged in an amended
information with the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of May, 1983, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening more or less,
inside the public market Bgy. Little Venice, Municipality of Laoang, Province of Northern Samar,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused with
deliberate intent to kill with the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one REYNALDO
ADUCAL y LURA with the use of a Batangas fan knife or Balisong which the above-named accused
had provided himself for the purpose, thereby inflicting upon said victim fatal wounds on his chest,
which wounds caused the instantaneous death of the victim.
Accused is a recidivist, having been previously convicted by final judgment of another came
embraced IN THE SAME TITLE OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, THAT OF MURDER IN CRIMINAL CASE
NO. 1473.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
(Record, "Amended Information", p. 35)
Upon arraignment, appellant entered a plea of guilty.
The records disclose that the trial court had asked appellant whether or not he understood the consequences
of his plea. Following the rulings of this Court, however, the trial court still directed the prosecution to
present its evidence for the purpose of establishing with certainty the guilt and the degree of culpability of
the accused.
Two witnesses were presented by the prosecution: they were Zosimo Aducal, father of the victim, and Pfc.
Wenefredo Laguitan.
1. Zasimo Aducal testified that in the evening of May 25, 1983 while he was attending to his farm,
three (3) kilometers away from the poblacion of Little Venice, Laoang, Northern Samar, his
grandson Artemio Aducal, son of Reynaldo, informed him that Reynaldo Aducal had been stabbed
dead; he was not able to see his deceased son that night because he could not see his way during
night time; it was only in the following morning when he saw his deceased son with two stab
wounds on the right and left breast. (TSN, October 18, 1983, pp. 14-20).
2. Pfc. Wenefredo Laguitan testified that on May 25, 1983, around 6:00 in the evening, while he
and Pat. Manuel Sevillana were passing the market place, his attention was called by a certain
Armando Baluyot to a commotion; he observed that the people were scampering for safety and a
man was escaping; when somebody shouted that the man was the assailant, he immediately
followed the man and apprehended him right then and there; at the police headquarters the man
admitted to him that he had long planned to kill the victim and that, the plotter was Eugenio
Lagarto, Jr., herein appellant. (TSN, October 18, 1983, pp. 22-28,).
The prosecution likewise presented the following evidence:
(a) Case Record of Criminal Case No. 1473 entitled "People vs. Eugenio Lagarto, Jr." showing that
appellant had been convicted by final judgment of homicide. (Exhibit "A" to "A-1 a");
(b) Death Certificate of deceased Reynaldo Aducal (Exhibit "B");
(c) Fan knife (Exhibit "D");
(d) Extra-judicial confession of appellant (Exhibit "C" to "C-4"), which discloses the following:
70
 07. Question: Do you know Reynaldo Aducal personally?
Answer: Not so much, sir, but he was the one who stabbed my brother Pablito last
1980.
08. Question: What was the result when Reynaldo Aducal stabbed your brother
Pablito?
II. THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY AGAINST THE ACCUSED; AND
III. CONSEQUENTLY, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE ACCUSED TO SUFFER THE
EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH."
(Brief for Accused-Appellant, p. 4; Rollo, p. 1 1 8)

Answer: As a result, my brother Pablito was hospitalized. It is a well-established rule that a plea of guilty, besides being a mitigating circumstance, is a
judicial confession of guilt—an admission of all the material facts alleged in the information,
including the aggravating circumstances. (People vs. Ariola, 100 SCRA, 523) To be considered a
09. Question: Why did you stab to death Reynaldo Aducal?
true plea of guilty, it must be made by the accused freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge of
the consequences and meaning of his act. It must be made unconditionally. (People vs.
Answer: I stabbed him to death sir, as a revenge or retaliation for his stabbing of my Comendador, 100 SCRA 155).
brother Pablito.
In the case at bar, the trial court exerted its utmost effort to be extra solicitous in seeing to it that
10. Question: According to what you have said Reynaldo Aducal had stabbed your the accused understood, the meaning and importance of his plea. Thus,
brother Pablito in 1980. Do you mean to say that since 1980 up to May 25, 1983 you
had been planning to avenge your brother by killing Reynaldo?
Q Do you realize the import and consequences of your having entered the plea of
guilty?
Answer: Yes, sir.
A Yes, your Honor.
(p. 2, Exhibit "C")
xxx xxx xxx
Based on the appellant's plea of guilty and the evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Q Now, the Court would repeat to you that you have entered the plea of guilty to a
most grievous offense?
WHEREFORE, the Court accepts his plea and declares accused, Eugenio Lagarto y Getalado guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Murder defined and penalized in Article 248
A Yes, your Honor.
of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, appreciating in his favor the mitigating
circumstance of spontaneous plea of guilty which is offset by the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation, the Court hereby sentences said accused to suffer the extreme penalty of Q For having entered a plea of guilty to the present crime of murder for the killing of
DEATH with all the accessories provided for in Art. 40 of the Revised Penal Code. Reynaldo Aducal you are therefore submitting the case without presenting your own
evidence, do you realize that?
The accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of Reynaldo Aducal in the amount of
P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. A Yes, your Honor.

SO ORDERED. Q And despite this advise and admonition to you by the court, do you still insist on
entering a plea of guilty to the crime as charged?
(Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 20)
A Yes, your Honor.
The imposition of the supreme penalty of death warrants an automatic review by this Court. However, the
penalty of Death had been changed to reclusion perpetua in accordance with the provision of Section 19(l), Q The Court will advise you that in this kind of offense which is a crime of murder there
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. is only one possible penalty and the court has no other recourse but to impose it, that
of death, do you realize that?
The counsel de oficio recommends that the sentence be modified, contending that:
A Yes, your Honor.
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION AGAINST THE ACCUSED. (Translated in the dialect known to the accused)

71
 (TSN, October 11, 1983, pp. 2-4). Evident premeditation requires proof of the following requisites: (a) the time when the offender determined
to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that he had clung to his determination; and (c) a
sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect
The trial court was not remiss in its obligation to warn the accused of the important consequences of his plea.
upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. (People
The possibility that death might be imposed should have warned the accused to protect his interest: even an
vs. Cafe, 166 SCRA 704; People vs. Montejo, 167 SCRA 506).
ordinary unlettered man fears death. And despite the thought of losing his life, the accused pleaded guilty.
We are convinced that the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt in the light of
overwhelming evidence presented by the prosecution, fully corroborated and substantiated by the plea of The statement of the accused, that he had long planned to kill Reynaldo Aducal in retaliation for the act of
guilty of the accused. Reynaldo Aducal in stabbing his brother, does not adequately prove the existence of evident premeditation. It
is necessary to establish that the accused meditated on his intention between the time it was conceived and
the time the crime was actually perpetrated. Defendant's proposition was nothing but an expression of his
The only issue before Us is whether or not the trial court correctly appreciated the existence of recidivism and
own determination to commit the crime which is entirely different from premeditation. (People vs. Carillo 77
the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery.
Phil. 572). In People vs. Alde, 64 SCRA 224, We ruled that there is no evident premeditation where the only
evidence to support it is the statement of the accused that he planned to kill the victim in 1964 when actual
Section 5, Rule 118 of the old Rules of Court provides that "Where the defendant pleads guilty to a complaint stabbing was 1969.
or information, if the trial court accepts the plea and has discretion as to the punishment for the offense, it
may hear witnesses to determine what punishment shall be imposed." (emphasis supplied). The trial court in a
To show premeditation, it is required that the criminal intent be evidenced by notorious acts evincing the
criminal case may sentence a defendant who pleads guilty to the offense charged in the information, without
determination to commit the same. (People vs. Guiyab, 139 SCRA 446). It must be evident and not merely
the necessity of taking testimony. (US vs. Talbanos, 6 Phil. 541). Yet, it is advisable for the trial court to call
suspected (People vs. Iturriaga, 88 Phil. 534) or merely thought of or contemplated mentally, without
witnesses for the purpose of establishing the guilt and the degree of culpability of the defendant. (People vs.
externalized acts. The finding of the trial court, that the accused had clandestinely concealed the knife in his
Comendador, supra) The present Revised Rules of Court, however, decrees that where the accused pleads
body away from the searching eye of the prison guards which showed the deliberate intent of the accused, is
guilty to a capital offense, it is now mandatory for the court to require the prosecution to prove the guilt of
not borne out by the records. Perusal of the records does not show that the accused deliberately planned the
the accused and his precise degree of culpability, with the accused being likewise entitled to present evidence
killing through external acts. The finding of facts by the trial court should not be based on mere assumptions;
to prove, inter alia, mitigating circumstances (See People vs. Camay, 152 SCRA 401; Section 3, Rule 116 of
there must be proof that such facts exist.
Rules of Court).

In order that treachery may be appreciated, it is necessary to prove the manner in which the victim was
In the case at bar, the trial court directed the prosecution to present evidence for the purpose of establishing
attacked.1âwphi1Treachery can in no way be presumed but must be fully proved. Where there are merely
the guilt and degree of culpability of the defendant.
indications that the attack was sudden and unexpected, but there are no precise data on this point, the
circumstance of treachery can not be taken into account. (People vs. Ariola, supra)
We find, as the trial court found, that the accused is a recidivist. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial
for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the same
In the case at bar, there is no evidence to show that the mode of attack was consciously adopted as to insure
title of the Revised Penal Code. Herein accused had been convicted of the crime of homicide in Criminal Case
the perpetration of the crime and safety from the defense that the victim might put up. There is an absence
No. 1473 before the trial of the present Criminal Case No. 1566. The former counsel de oficio of herein
of evidence to show the means employed by assailant and the mode of attack. Treachery may not be simply
accused alleged that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 1473 was rendered on September 15, 1983, hence
deduced from assumptions; it must be as clearly proved as the crime itself in order to qualify the crime into
when the accused was arraigned on October 11, 1983 for Criminal Case No. 1566 he was not a recidivist.
murder.

The former counsel de oficio is of the opinion that "the time of trial" is to be reckoned with the date of the
WHEREFORE, the that court's judgment is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant EUGENIO LAGARTO y GETALADO is
arraignment. The phrase "at the time of his trial" should not be restrictively construed as to mean the date of
hereby CONVICTED of homicide; appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of spontaneous plea of
arraignment.
guilty which is offset by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism, the Court hereby sentences said accused
to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
We declared in People vs. Enriquez, 90 Phil. 428, that the phrase "at the time of his trial for an offense" is (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of Reynaldo Aducal an indemnity of fifty
employed in its general sense, including the rendering of the judgment. In US vs. Karelsen, 3 Phil. 23, We held thousand pesos (P50,000.00). Costs de oficio.
that the phrase "at the trial" is meant to include everything that is done in the course of the trial, from
arraignment until after sentence is announced by the judge in open court. In the case at bar, the accused was
SO ORDERED.
convicted of homicide in Criminal Case No. 1473 on September 15, 1983. There being no appeal, the
judgment therein became final on October 11, 1983. The second conviction was rendered on October 26,
1983 for Murder. Hence, it is crystal clear that the accused is a recidivist: the accused had been convicted by FIRST DIVISION
final judgment at the time of the rendition of the judgment for the second offense.

We find no merit in the finding of the trial court that evident premeditation and treachery existed in the
commission of the crime. It is a rule that a plea of guilty cannot be held to include evident premeditation and
G.R. No. 93436 March 24, 1995
treachery where the evidence adduced does not adequately disclose the existence of these qualifying
circumstances (People vs. Gravino, 122 SCRA 123).

72
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, Moreno de la Rosa, the Municipal Mayor, who happened to be at the public market, tried to pacify them,
vs. saying that they were arguing over trivial matters.
MELCHOR REAL y BARTOLAY, accused-appellant.
The two protagonists momentarily kept their peace but after awhile Corpus raised his voice again and said
something to appellant. The latter, in a soft voice, uttered "SOBRA NA INA NA IMO PAGDAOGDAOG" (You are
being too oppressive).
QUIASON, J.:
When Corpus kept on walking to and fro near the disputed fish table, appellant started to sharpen his bolo
while murmuring to himself. Once Corpus turned around with his back towards appellant, the latter hacked
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Masbate, Masbate, in Criminal Case
him on the nape. The blow caused Corpus to collapse. He was rushed to a medical clinic. When asked by his
No. 1606 finding appellant guilty of murder.
wife as to who hacked him, he answered "Melchor Real."

We affirm with modification, the appealed decision.

A police investigator went to the clinic to take the dying declaration of Corpus, who said that it was appellant
who stabbed him. Corpus died two days later.
I
Appellant admitted hacking Corpus but claimed that he did so out of humiliation and anger when the victim
The information against appellant reads as follows: threw his fish in the presence of so many people.

That on or about March 11, 1978, in the morning thereof, at the Poblacion of the He testified as follows:
Municipality of Aroroy, Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this
Court, the said accused with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, did
Q. When Edgardo Corpus was lambasting you in the presence of
then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and criminally attack, assault and hack
the public, what did you do, how did you feel?
with a sharp bolo one Edgardo Corpus y Rapsing, hitting the latter on the nape, causing
an injury which caused the death of the said Edgardo Corpus y Rapsing several days
thereafter. A. I got angry.

That the accused is a recidivist having been convicted by the Municipal Court of Aroroy, Q. And what did you do?
in the following cases:
A. So I hacked him.
Crime Date of Conviction
Q. Was he hit?
1. Ill treatment by Deed — July 6, 1965
A. Yes, Sir.
2. Grave Threats — November 25, 1968
Q. In what part of his body was he hit?
(Rollo, p. 14).
A. At the right neck.
Upon being arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty.
Q. Did you admit to the authorities that it was you who hacked
After trial, the court convicted appellant and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to Edgardo Corpus?
pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000.00 and costs.
A. Yes, sir.
Hence, this appeal.
On cross-examination, he again admitted his guilt.
II
Q. And when this Edgardo Corpus turn (sic) his back, you
At about 9:00 A.M. on March 17, 1978, in the public market of Aroroy, Masbate, appellant and Edgardo immediately hacked him on his neck?
Corpus, both vendors, engaged in a heated argument over the right to use the market table to display their
fish.

73
 A. Yes, sir ( TSN, July 9, 1986, pp. 6-8; Emphasis supplied).
III
Before us, appellant argues that the crime committed was only homicide and not murder and that he is
entitled to two mitigating circumstances: namely, passion and obfuscation and vindication of a grave offense.
We agree with appellant that the offense committed was homicide. He is entitled to the benefit of the doubt
as to whether he acted with alevosia when he attacked the victim. As a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant,
whether frontally or from behind, is treachery if such mode of attack was cooly and deliberately adopted by
him with the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to either fight or retreat. The rule does not apply,
however, where the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the
sudden infuriation on the part of the accused because of the provocative act of the victim (People v. Aguiluz,
207 SCRA 187 [1992]). This is more so, where the assault upon the victim was preceded by a heated exchange
of words between him and the accused (People v. Rillorta, 180 SCRA 102 [1989]). In the case at bench, the
assault came in the course of an altercation and after appellant had sharpened his bolo in full view of the
victim. Appellant's act of sharpening his bolo can be interpreted as an attempt to frighten the victim so the
latter would leave him alone. It was simply foolhardy for the victim to continue walking to and fro near
appellant in a taunting manner while the latter was sharpening his bolo.
The suddenness of the attack does not, by itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia where the decision to
attack was made peremptorily and the victim's helpless position was accidental (People v. Ardisa, 55 SCRA
245 [1974]).
Appellant also claims that he is entitled to two mitigating circumstances: namely, vindication of a grave
offense and passion and obfuscation. The peculiarity of these two mitigating circumstances is that they
cannot be applied at the same time if they arise from the same facts or motive.
Appellant was previously convicted of ill-treatment by deed (Revised Penal Code, Art. 266, Title Eight) and
grave threats (Revised Penal Code, Art. 282, Title Nine). He was convicted of homicide in the instant criminal
case (Revised Penal Code, Art. 249, Title Eight). Inasmuch as homicide and ill-treatment by deed fall under
Title Eight, the aggravating circumstance to be appreciated against him is recidivism under Article 14[g] rather
than reiteracionunder Article 14(10) of the Revised Penal Code.
There is no reiteracion because that circumstance requires that the previous offenses should not be
embraced in the same title of the Code. While grave threats fall in title (Title Nine) different from homicide
(Title Eight), still reiteracion cannot be appreciated because such aggravating circumstance requires that if
there is only one prior offense, that offense must be punishable by an equal or greater penalty than the one
for which the accused has been convicted. Likewise, the prosecution has to prove that the offender has been
punished for the previous offense. There is no evidence presented by the prosecution to that effect.
Appellant is convicted of homicide, appreciating in his favor the mitigating circumstance of passion and
obfuscation, which is offset by the aggravating circumstance of recidivism.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant is convicted
of the crime of homicide and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of TEN (10) YEARS of prision mayor as
minimum to SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of reclusion temporal as maximum. The
indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the victim is increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-9791 October 3, 1914

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

If appellant attacked his victim in the proximate vindication of a grave offense, he cannot successfully claim in
vs.
the same breath that he was also blinded by passion and obfuscation. At most, only one of two circumstances
VICENTE F. SOTELO, defendant-appellant.
could be considered in favor of appellant (People v. Yaon, Court of Appeals, 43 O.G. 4142 cited in I Reyes,
Revised Penal Code [1981]).
J. C. Hixson for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Corpus for appellee.
The act of the victim in berating and humiliating appellant was enough to produce passion and obfuscation,
considering that the incident happened in a market place within full view and within hearing distance of many
people.

The trial court held, and the Solicitor General agreed, that the attendant aggravating circumstance
was reiteracion and not reincidencia as alleged in the information. The trial court and the Solicitor General are JOHNSON, J.:
in error.
On the 5th day of January, 1914, the prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila presented a complaint against
According to the information charging appellant of murder and the evidence, the accused was previously the said defendant, charging him with the crime of estafa. The complaint alleged: "That on or about January
convicted of ill-treatment by deed on July 6, 1965 and grave threats on November 25, 1968. 2, 1914, in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Vicente F. Sotelo, having received from one Manuel
Araneta for safe-keeping, on commission or for administration, a plain gold ring set with three diamonds,
valued at P250, the property of the said Manuel Araneta, for the purpose of selling it and delivering the
In recidivism or reincidencia, the offender shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another
proceeds thereby derived to the said Manuel Araneta within a period of two hours or of returning the said
crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[g]). In reiteracion,
ring to the latter in case he should be unable to sell it, said accused, Vicente F. Sotelo,did, then and there,
the offender shall have been punished previously for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or greater
willfully, unlawfully, and criminally misapply, misappropriate, and covert the said ring or its value in the sum
penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty (Revised Penal Code, Art. 14[10]).
of P250, Philippine currency, to his own benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said Manuel Araneta in
Unlike in reincidencia, the offender in reiteracion commits a crime different in kind from that for which he
the sum of P250, equivalent to 1,250 pesetas; that the accused is a recidivist; all contrary to law."
was previously tried and convicted (Guevarra, Penal Sciences and Philippine Criminal Law 129 [1974]).

74
Upon said complaint the defendant was duly arrested, arraigned, tried, found guilty, and sentenced, by the
Honorable Richard Campbell, judge, to be imprisoned for a period of four months and one day of arresto
mayor, and to pay the costs. From that sentence the defendant appealed to this court and made the
following assignments of error: "First. The trial court erred in finding that Manuel Araneta or Alejandra
Dormir testified that Manuel Araneta delivered the ring to the defendant, upon an agreement that the
defendant should sell the same for not less than P250. Second. The trial court erred in finding that the
defendant was guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt."
With reference to the first assignment of error, the lower court said: "He [Manuel Araneta] states positively
that he delivered the ring to the defendant, with the distinct understanding that the latter should sell it and
return with the money to him, the agreement being that he should sell it for not less than P250."
An examination of the record, however, shows that Manuel Araneta testified with reference to the price for
which the defendant was to sell the ring, as follows: "On the morning of the 2nd day of January (1914) this
year, I met Mr. Sotelo, the accused in this case. He asked me where I was going and I told him I was going to
sell a diamond ring. I asked him if he could find a purchaser for me, because, I told him, the best offer I had
received was P120. About 12:30 that same day Mr. Sotelo appeared at my house; at that time we were
eating; my brother-in-law, my sister, and the owner of the ring (Alejandra Dormir) were there eating. He
stated he had at last found a purchaser who was willing to pay P180 or P190, I do not remember exactly, for
the ring; that at 1.30 he would return and bring with him the proceeds of the sale of the ring. Then I told the
owner of the ring to turn it over to Mr. Sotelo for its sale, stating at the same time that I knew Mr. Sotelo.
Then, as 2 and 3 o'clock passed without the defendant appearing in the house, and because I assumed the
responsibility for the ring — because I had assured the owner of it of my confidence in Mr. Sotelo — I started
to find Mr. Sotelo."
In answer to the question "Why did you [Manuel Araneta] tell Sotelo to find a purchaser for you?" — he said:
"In order to find out whether there was some one who would offer more than P120 for the ring, because the
owner wanted P180 or more."
The foregoing is all the testimony found in the record concerning the price at which the defendant was to sell
the ring.
Alejandro Dormir, the owner of the ring, testified that she had paid P250 for it, but there is nothing in the
record which justifies the finding of the lower court that the defendant agreed to take the ring and to sell it
for not less than P250. While the finding of the lower court as to the amount for which the defendant agreed
to sell the ring is not in accordance with the evidence, it was not a finding which in any way exculpates the
defendant, provided the record shows that he did receive from the owner the ring in question, under an
agreement to sell it at some price and to return the money which he should receive to the owner.
With reference to the second assignment of error, the lower court said, in his summary of the proof: "The
testimony of Manuel Araneta is to the effect that the ring in question is the property of one Alejandra Dormir,
who delivered it to him (Manuel Araneta) to sell; that he in turn delivered it to the defendant herein, Vicente
Sotelo, after some conversation in which Sotelo said he could find a customer for it, and an agreement was
made whereby Sotelo should return during the day and deliver the proceeds of the sale to the said Manuel
Araneta. This testimony is corroborated by the woman, Alejandra Dormir, the owner of the ring in question.
She testified that being in need of money, she turned the ring in question over to Manuel Araneta, who was a
friend of her family, in order that he might sell it and deliver the proceeds of the sale to her.
The accused does not deny that the ring was delivered to him, nor that he pawned the ring in the
pawnshop of one Guillermo Ruiz, at 1810 Calle Azcarraga. He states, however, that it was pawned
with the knowledge and consent of Manuel Araneta, who told him (the accused) that he was in
need of P20, and asked him if he would not take the ring and pawn it for him and bring the money;
that, later, after he had pawned the ring for P20, and had given the money to Manuel Araneta, the
latter asked him to obtain for him P50 additional on the ring, which the accused did, delivering to
Araneta the second time the sum of P49,40, 60 centavos being deducted by the pawnbroker as
interest; whereupon, says the accused, Manuel Araneta gave him the sum of P4.40 as his
commission on the transaction.
The court is of the opinion that the evidence demonstrates the guilt of the accused, beyond a
reasonable doubt. He has a bad reputation, having been convicted of theft in 1902, and sentenced
to three years six months and twenty-one days. Moreover, it is the opinion of the court that the
declaration of the accused, with respect to the consent of Araneta in the pawning of the ring is
false and, therefore, can not be taken into consideration as a defense in this case.
With reference to the second assignment of error, the guilt or innocence of the accused depends wholly upon
the proof — a question of fact only. The prosecution alleged and tried to prove that the accused was given
the ring for the purpose of selling it a price not less than P180 or P190. and to return the money or purchase
price to the owner within a period of about one hour. The accused admits that he received the ring at the
time and place when and where the owner alleges that he gave it to him. He denies, however, that he
received the rings for the purpose of selling it on commission. He alleges that he received it for the purpose of
pawning it. He admits that he pawned it, at first for P20, but took no pawn ticket at that time, and that the
P20 were delivered to the owner (or Manuel Araneta) and that later he returned to the same pawn-broker
and received the further sum of P50 (P49.40), which was also delivered to the owner (or Manuel Araneta). He
alleges that when he received the P50 (P49.40) he took a pawn broker's ticket for the same.
We have, then, the only difference between the prosecution and the accused a question of fact, whether or
not the ring was delivered to the accused to be sold or to be pawned. If it was delivered to the accused to be
pawned, and he did pawn it, in accordance with his instructions, and did return the money to the owner,
then, in that case, there is no breach of trust and he is not guilty of the crime charged. If, upon the other
hand, the ring was delivered to the accused to be sold, and he neither sold the ring nor returned it to its
owner, then he is guilty as charged in the complaint. The lower court, after a careful analysis of the proof
adduced during the trial of the cause, reached the conclusion that the evidence showed, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the ring was delivered to the accused to be sold and that he neither returned the ring nor its
purchase price to the owner.
There were but four witnesses examined during the trial of the cause, two for the prosecution and two for
the defense. The first witness for the prosecution was Manuel Araneta. He testified that had known the
defendant for about two years; that at the request of Alejandra Dormir he delivered the ring in question to
the defendant to be sold; that he told the defendant that he had received an offer of P120 for the ring; that
the defendant represented that he had a purchaser who was willing to pay P180 or P190 for the ring; that the
ring was given to the accused to be sold at that price (P180 or P190); that the defendant promised to return
with the purchase price within about an hour; that the ring was given to the defendant at about 12.30 noon
p.m.; that he (Manuel Araneta) waited until between 3 and 4 o'clock p.m. for the return of the defendant;
that the defendant did not return up to that time nor at any other time, with the ring; that between 3 and 4
o'clock he (Manuel Araneta) went to the office of the prosecuting attorney of the city of Manila, and made a
complaint against the said defendant.
He further testified that the ring had been pawned several times and that the owner had redeemed it from a
pawnbroker on the morning of the day (January 2, 1914) on which it had been delivered to the defendant.
Alejandra Dormir, the other witness presented for the prosecution, testified that she was the owner of the
ring; that she had paid P250 for it; that the ring had been pawned; that she had redeemed it on the same day
that it was delivered to the defendant, because she wanted to sell it; that she wanted to sell and asked him
whether or not he could sell it; that Mr. Araneta and told he knew a man who wanted to buy a ring; that the
defendant arrived at the house where she was in company with Mr. Araneta and others, while they were
75
eating; that the ring was upon her finger at that time; that the ring was taken off of her finger and delivered
to the defendant; that she did not authorize the defendant to pawn the ring.
The defendant testified in his own behalf and said that at about 8 o'clock or 8.30 on the morning of January 2,
1914, he was driving in a carromata from his house in Rizal avenue; that as he was passing near the house of
Mr. Araneta he saw his and bade him good morning; that Mr. Araneta asked him whether he knew any
person who wanted to buy a ring and he showed him the ring on his finger; that he told Mr. Araneta that he
was not devoting himself to such small things, but that, notwithstanding that fact, he knew a person, one
Vicenta Zialcita, who was engaged in the business of selling and buying jewelry; that Mr. Araneta asked him to
accompany him to this woman's house; that he refused, saying that he was very busy but would come back
about twelve o'clock that same day to accompany him; that he did return to the house of Mr. Araneta at
about 12 o'clock that same day; that when he came to the house of Mr. Araneta he saw that the people of
the house were eating their meal; that Mr. Araneta invited him into the house; that once insides of the house,
I asked him whether he was really to go to the house of Vicenta Zialcita, but he said no; Mr. Araneta then
asked me if I had P20, because he was in need of the money; that Mr. Araneta then asked him if he could not
pawn the ring, and I told him that I would see what I could do and he then gave the ring to me; that he went
to the house of Juan Bebing, who was then appraiser of the pawnshop of Guillermo Ruiz; that he told Juan
Bebing that he wanted to pawn the ring for P20, because a friend of his was in need of that money; that he
was going to redeem it to-morrow because it was going to be sold; that he received the P20; that no pawn
ticket was issued for it; that he returned to Rizal Avenue and left the carromata at the corner and from there
walked to the house of Mr. Araneta asked him if he could not get P50 more on the ring; that he said he was
not sure; that it was then 12 o'clock and that he was hungry; that, notwithstanding that, he told him
(Araneta) that he would come back between 2 and 3 o'clock; that after giving MR. Araneta the P20 he
returned at about 2.30 in pawnshop and saw Mr. Bebing and his (Mr. Bebing's) wife needed P20 for market
purposes, and he (Bebing) had pawned the ring for the same amount; that he told him (Bebing) that the
owner of the ring wanted another P50; that he (Bebing) said that it was all right; that we could fix it up by
putting on the ticket P70, with 3 per cent interest on the P20; that Bebing made out a ticket for P70,
deducting sixty centavos, and that he (Bebing) gave him P49.40; that he also saw in the report which is sent
by the pawnshops to the police where his name appeared as Vicente Sotelo and that he changed the name
with his own hands and made it Vicente F. Sotelo; that later he took Mr. Cruz to the house of Manuel Araneta
and delivered the P49.40 to Manuel Araneta; that Manuel Araneta gave him P4.40 as his
commission.lawphil.net
The said Hipolito Cruz testified in part confirmed the declarations of the accused. His testimony is of little
value, however, upon the particular question presented, for the reason that he was not present at either of
the times the accused alleges that he received the two sums of money from the pawnbroker and neither was
he present at the time the accused alleges he delivered the money to Manuel Araneta.
An examination of the declaration of the accused shows that he admitted that he took the ring and that he
knew a person, Vicenta Zialcita, who was engaged in the business of selling and buying jewelry. He does not,
however, at any time in his declaration, attempt to show that he took the ring to the said Vicenta Zialcita, for
the purpose of attempting to sell it to her. Another peculiar facts also appears in his declaration. It id the fact
that the said Juan Bebing, who was supposed to have been the appraiser of the pawnshop of Guillermo Ruiz,
did not place the ring with Ruiz, but pawned it himself, whether to some other pawnbroker or not, does not
appear. Bebing was not called as a witness. His declaration might have thrown some light upon the conduct
of the defendant. The prosecution alleges that the ring was delivered to the defendant to be sold by him. The
defendant admits, while alleging that it was given to him to pawn, that he told the owner that he knew a
person (Vicenta Zialcita) who wanted to buy a ring. The defendant says that he offered to accompany the
owner to said person (Vicenta Zialcita). If the ring was given to him to pawn, why did he offer to take the
owner to a person who desired to buy it? That fact seems to contradict his statement that he received the
ring only for the purpose of pawning it.
We think the proof shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, not only by the witnesses for the prosecution but also
by the admissions of the defendant, the following facts:
That on the 2nd day of January, 1914, at about 12.30 p.m., the owner of the ring delivered it to the
defendant, to be sold by him, at a practice not less than P180 or P190, under the obligation to return the
same, of the purchase price, within about one hour thereafter; that the defendant did not return either the
ring or the purchase price within said time nor at any other time; that his failure to return either the ring or
the purchase price has resulted in great prejudice and damage to the owner.
This court has held in numerous cases that such facts show clearly that the defendant is guilty of the crime of
estafa and should be punished under paragraph 5 of article 535, in relation with paragraph 2 of article 534 of
the Penal Code. (U. S. De Guzman, 1 Phil. Rep., 138; U. S. vs. Zamora, 2 Phil. Rep., 582 U. S. Anacleto, 3 Phil.,
Rep., 172; U. S. vs. Singuimuto, 3 Phil., 176; U. S. vs. Ner, 4 Phil. Rep., 131; U. S. vs. Ongtengco, 4 Phil. Rep.,
144; U. S. vs. Aquino, 4 Phil., Rep., 402; U. S. vs. Berry, 5 Phil., Rep., 370; U. S. vs. Leaño, 6 Phil. Rep., 368; U.
S. vs. Solis, 7 Phil. Rep., 195; U. S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil. Rep., 117; U. S. vs. Celis, 8 Phil. Rep., 378; U. S. vs.
Rodriquez, 9 Phil., Rep., 153; U. S. vs. Da Silva, 10 Phil. Rep., 39; U.S. vs. Leyva, 10 Phil. Rep., 43; U. S. vs.
Meñez, 11 Phil. Rep., 430; U. S vs. Alabanza, 11 Phil. Rep., 475; U. S. vs. Perello, G. R. No. 5133 1; U. S. vs.
Melad, 27 Phil. Rep., 488.)
In the crime of estafa, as well as that of larceny, the punishment depends upon the amount or the value of
the article misappropriated or stolen. In the present case the owner asserted that she paid P250 for the ring.
There is no proof to the contrary. She offered to sell it, in the present case, for P180 or P190. The ring may
have been worth P250 at the time she purchased it. The value which she placed upon it at the time she gave
it to the defendant, we think should be considered its value at that time, in the absence of other evidence, for
the purpose of fixing the punishment.
The appellant makes an effort to show, inasmuch as Mr. Araneta, who gave the ring to him, was not its
owner, that he was not guilty of the crime of estafa, even though he misappropriated it. The crime of estafa is
committed, although the victim was not the owner of the property, but the holder or broker simply, when it
appears that the real owner was prejudiced by the disappearance of the property. The fact is more
particularly true when the person committing the illegal act knew that the property did not belong to the
holder but to some other person. U. S. vs. Almazan, 20 Phil. Rep., 225.) In the present case the proof shows
that while the ring was delivered to him by Manuel Araneta, he knew that the owner was Alejandra Dormir.
The record does not show whether or not the ring was returned to its owner, in accordance with the
provisions of article 120 of the Penal Code. It is a general principle that no man can be divested of his
property without his own consent or voluntary act. In the case of Varela vs. Finnick (9 Phil. Rep., 482) this
court said, speaking through Mr. Justice Torres: "Whoever may have been deprived of his property in
consequence of a crime, is entitled to the recovery thereof, even if such property is in the possession of a
third party who acquired it by legal means other than those expressly stated in article 464 of the Civil Code."
The only exception made by article 464 of the Civil Code seems to be where the property has been pledged in
a "monte de pieded" established under authority of the government. In such a case the owner cannot recover
the property without previously refunding to said institution the amount of the pledge and the interest due.
(Varela vs. Matute, 9 Phil. Rep., 479; U. S. vs. Meñez, 11 Phil. Rep., 430; U. S. vs. Perello, R. G. No. 5133;
Arenas vs. Raymundo, 19 Phil. Rep., 46; Reyes vs. Ruiz, 27 Phil. Rep., 458.)
Whoever claims to have acquired title to property, real or personal, through some agent or person not the
real owner, must be prepared to show that the person of whom he purchased such property had authority to
transfer the same. (Manning vs. Keenan, 73 N.Y., 45; Meiggs vs. Meiggs, 15 Hun, N.Y., 453; McGoldrick vs.
Willits, 52 N.Y., 612; Succession of Boisblanc, 32 La. Ann., 109; Loomis vs. Barker, 69 Ill., 360; Berthholf vs.
Quinlan, 68 Ill., 297; Thompson vs. Barnum, 49 Iowa, 392; Bercich vs. Marye, 9 Nevada, 312; Voss vs.
Robertson, 46 Ala., 483; Wheeler & Wilson vs. Givan, 65 Mo., 89; Switzer vs. Wilvers, 24 Kansas, 383; 36 Am.
Rep., 259.)
76
To the foregoing general rule, that no man can be divested of his property without his own consent or article 130, paragraph 4, of the code, a pardon only produces the extinction of the penalty, but not of its
voluntary act, there seem to be two owner has entrusted or delivered to an agent, money or negotiable effects."
promissory notes have been delivered or transferred to some third innocent party.
After due consideration of the provisions of article 130, together with the views of Viada, we are inclined to
This exception is apparently based upon the exigencies of commerce and trade. Money bears no earmarks of the view that the pardon does not operate to defeat the consideration of the former conviction as an
peculiar ownership ownership. Its primary purpose is to pass from hand to hand as a medium of exchange, aggravating circumstance.
without other evidence of its title. Negotiable promissory notes, so far as it is possible, are intended to
represent money, and, like it, to be a means of commercial intercourse, unfettered by any qualifications or
The lower court imposed the penalty in the medium degree. Considering the aggravating circumstance of
conditions not appearing on its face. (Banco Español-Filipino vs. Tan-Tangco, 13 Phil. Rep., 628; Daniel on
recidivation, the penalty should be imposed in the maximum degree. Therefore, the sentence of the lower
Negotiable Instruments, sections 769, 862; McMabon vs. Sloan, 12 Pa. St., 229; 51 Am. Dec., 601.)
court is hereby modified, and the defendant is hereby sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of six months
and one day ofprision correccional and to pay the costs.
It is a fundamental principle of our law of personal property that no man can be divested of it without his own
consent; consequently, even an honest purchase, under a defective title, cannot resist the claim of the true
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.
owner. The maxim that "No man can transfer to another a better title than he has himself" obtains in the civil
Carson and Moreland, JJ., dissent.
as well as the common law. (Pothier, Trite du Contrat de Vente, 1 N., 7; Ersk. Inst., 418.) And hence it is now
recognized everywhere in the United States, as well as in civilized Europe, that a sale "ex vi termini" imports
nothing more than that a bona fide purchaser succeeds only to the rights of the vendor. (2 Kent's THIRD DIVISION
Commentaries, 324; Saltus vs. Everett, 20 Wend., N.Y., 267; 32 Am. Dec., 541; Gibson vs. Miller, 29 Mich.,
355; Lancaster National Bank vs. Taylor, 100 Mass., 18; 97 Am. Dec., 70.).1awphil.net

Second. Another exception to the general rule is based upon the doctrine of estoppel. An illustration of this [G.R. No. 89075. October 15, 1996]
second exception would be where an man voluntarily placed property in the possession of one whose
ordinary business it is to sell similar property as an agent for the owners, In such a case it is warrantable
inference, in the absence of anything to indicate a contrary intent, that he intends the property to be sold.
For example, where the owner sends his goods to an auction room, where goods of a like kind are constantly
being sold, he would be estopped from recovering them in case they were actually sold. (Pickering vs. Busk, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO GEROLAGA, EFREN ATIVO and REMEDIOS
15 East., 38.) In all such cases, however, under this exception, there must be some act or conduct on the part RUADO, accused-appellants.
of the real owner, whereby the party selling is clothed with the apparent ownership or authority to sell, which
the real owner will not be heard to deny or question, to the prejudice of an innocent third party, dealing on DECISION
the faith of such appearance. If the rule were otherwise, people would not be secure in sending their watches
or jewelry to a jewelry establishment to be repaired, or clothing to a clothing establishment to be made into PANGANIBAN, J.:
garments. (Wilkinson vs. King, 2 Campbell, 335; Pickering vs. Busk, 15 East., 38; Levi vs. Booth, 58 Md., 305; 42
Am. Rep., 332.)
In this Decision, this Court emphasizes the need to review the facts and details of appealed cases with
meticulous, laser-like precision. While, as a rule, the findings of fact of trial courts are accorded great respect
During the trial proof was presented to show that the defendant, in the year 1902, had been sentenced to be by appellate tribunals, still, the latter must wade through the mass of evidence in order to ensure that the
imprisoned for a period of three years six months and twenty-one days, for the crime of larceny, and that he trial court did not overlook or misapprehend little details that could spell the innocence of the accused, or at
had been conditionally pardoned by the then Governor-General, Mr. Taft, on the 27th day of July, 1903. That least mitigate their guilt. This is but consistent with the doctrine that all doubts must be resolved in their
proof was presented for the purpose of fixing the penalty to be imposed upon the defendant. In view of the favor. Indeed, it is far better to set free a thousand guilty persons than to unjustly punish an innocent one.
pardon, may the fact that the defendant was sentenced be considered as a circumstance, for the purpose of
increasing the penalty, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 17 of article 10, of the Penal Code? Realizing that this direct appeal did not have the benefit of the usual filtering layer of the Court of
Article 130 of the Penal Code provides that criminal liability is extinguished in several different ways: "(a) By Appeals and noting that the assailed judgment of conviction for murder was based purely on circumstantial
the death of the offender; (b) by service of the sentence; (c) by amnesty; (d) by pardon; (e) by pardon of the evidence as well as on an uncounselled confession of guilt, we pored over the evidence, particularly the
offended party (repealed by section 2 of Act No. 1773); (f) by prescription of the crime; (g) by prescription of voluminous transcripts of stenographic notes, and came to the ineludible conclusion that indeed the court a
the penalty." quo over-looked and/or misapprehended some crucial bits of evidence and circumstances which when
properly considered led to the acquittal of two of the appellants, and the conviction of the third for the less
damning crime of homicide instead of murder.
In reading said article 130, we find in paragraph 3 that the liability which is extinguished by
amnesty, completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects, while extinguishment by pardon, during the
period which the sentence would have lasted, except for the pardon, does not altogether extinguish the
penalty. There is a condition imposed by law, to the effect that the pardoned person shall not live in the place The Antecedents
of residence of the offended party, without the latter's consent, and that a violation of that provision would
work a revocation of the pardon. While we have been unable to find any decisions of the supreme court of
Spain upon the question which we are discussing, we find that Viada (vol. 1, p. 315) says: "A pardon should
The twists and turns of this case are absorbing enough to be mistaken as the plot of a storybook thriller
not be an impediment to the consideration of recidivation as an aggravating circumstance, for, according to
or a movie script. They are not. Rather, they are the flesh and blood drama of real life.

77
 For the bizarre fatal stabbing of Antonio Sy on March 21, 1987, appellant Remedios Ruado-Sy, the
deceaseds sister-in-law, along with her former employee, Roberto Gerolaga and her houseboy, Efren Ativo
were charged with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information[1] lodged with the
Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate on June 15, 1987 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 5247 reads as
follows:
That on or about March 21, 1987, in the morning thereof, at the poblacion of the municipality of Aroroy,
Province of Masbate, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused conspiring
and helping one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation, treachery and in consideration of a price
or reward, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one Antonio Sy y
Tan with a double bladed dagger, hitting the latter on the chest, abdomen and other parts of the body,
thereby inflicting wounds which directly caused his instantaneous death.
Contrary to law.
All the accused pleaded not guilty during the arraignment on August 4, 1987. The prosecution
presented seven (7) witnesses:
(1) Dr. Emilio Quemi -- who testified and submitted a post-mortem examination (Exh. A) and
certificate of death (Exh. C), which showed that the victim sustained seven (7) wounds, five
(5) of them fatal, to wit:[2]
1. Stab wound penetrating, measuring about 3 inches wide located at the epigastric region.
2. Stab wound, penetrating the abdominal cavity, measuring about 1 1/2 inches, located at the
left abdominal wall, a little above and lateral to the navel.
3. Stab wound, measuring about 2 inches wide, penetrating located at level of left costal arch, at
its lateral side.
4. Stab wound, measuring about two inches, penetrating the thoracic cavity, located just below
the right clavicle.
5. Stab wound, about one inch wide, penetrating, located a little anterior to the right axillary
fossa.
6. Incised wound, measuring about 1/3 inch wide located at the left side of thoracic vertebrae at
the level of the 6th.
7. Incised wounds, located at the palmar surface of the fingers of the right and left hand.
(2) Pfc. Estercacias (sometimes spelled Estercasio) Pimentel, Jr., who was the first police officer
to arrive at the scene of the crime
(3) Police Sgt. Felix Alonzo
(4) Pat. Tagumpay Mendoza
(5) Mrs. Conchita Sy Chua; younger sister of the victim
(6) Mrs. Benedicta Castillo Sy, and
(7) P/Sgt. Edgardo Tugbo.
On the other hand, testimonial evidence for the defense was given by six (6) persons:
(1) Pfc. Pimentel who was called back to the stand
(2) Accused Roberto Gerolaga
(3) Co-accused Efren Ativo
(4) Co-accused Remedios Ruado-Sy
(5) M/Sgt. Noli Cabug, and
(6) Emilio Sy, the victims brother and husband of the accused Remedios R. Sy.
On December 28, 1988, the trial court[3] rendered a Decision finding the three defendants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and imposing on each of them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and the payment in solidum of an indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 to the heirs of Antonio Sy
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The Facts
Thirty-one-year-old Antonio Sy was the youngest brother of Emilio, Arturo, Jose, Teddy, Anita, Teresita,
Norma, Lourdes and Conchita Sy.[4] Antonio was married to Benedicta Castillo.Childless, the couple lived apart
from each other. Benedicta stayed in Cabangcalan, Aroroy, Masbate where she was assigned as a teacher
while Antonio lived with his eldest brother, Emilio and the latters wife, Remedios Ruado, who was also called
Remy. While Benedicta claimed that Antonio was a businessman engaged in buying and selling mens and
ladies wear for which he earned a net income of around P3,000 a month,[5] his brother Emilio and the latters
wife Remy swore that Antonio was jobless and that he was dependent on them and given an allowance
of P25.00 a day. Antonio had an insatiable hunger for vices -- gambling, illegal drugs, women. Hence, his
allowance was always insufficient for his needs.[6]
At around 6:00 oclock in the morning of March 4, 1987, as Remy was arranging her merchandise in her
store on the ground floor of her residence in Aroroy, Masbate, a boy around fifteen years of age approached
her, handled her a letter and then hurriedly left. As translated by the court stenographer, the letter in
Masbateno reads:[7]
March 4, 1987
COMMANDER
NPA HELEN LIPANTO
REMY:
(MEL)
WE WILL ASK HELP FROM YOU WORTH P3,000 PESOS WE WILL EXPECT IN TWO DAYS.
I AM ONLY ASKING YOU NO ONE MUST KNOW OR INFORM ANYBODY FOR IF IT HAPPENS MANY LIVES WILL BE
LOST? ESPECIALLY THE MILITARY. THEY WILL BE PITIFUL?AND WE WILL GET YOU IF YOU FAIL? THEN YOU
PLACE THE MONEY IN ENVELOPE IN YOUR GARBAGE CAN AT 9:00 AT NIGHT ON SATURDAY
THANKS
78
GOD BLESS YOU = ALL
DONT BE AFRAID (YOU) WILL NOT BE HURT IF YOU FOLLOW THE ORDER?"[8]
After reading the letter, Remy gave it to her husband. Emilio decided that (a) it should be presented
secretly to the authorities for entry in the police blotter, (b) their house should be guarded, and (c) the
amount of P3,000 should be given to anyone who could apprehend Helen Lepanto.[9]
Accordingly, the couple called the police. When Pfc. Estercasio Pimentel, Jr. arrived he was shown the
letter. In the presence of Emilio, Remy asked Pfc. Pimentel's help in having their house and placing their
premises under surveillance. She also asked him to apprehend and identify Helen Lepanto and to bring the
letter to the municipal building in order that it could be officially recorded in the blotter.
Fear gripped the couple. Emilio asked Remy to tell their houseboy, Efren Ativo, to be vigilant especially
at night and to arm himself with a 2 x 2 piece of wood as a club or weapon. The couple closed their store at
6:00 p.m. instead of the usual 8:00 p.m. Upon her husbands prodding, Remy set aside P3,000 in one-hundred
peso bills.[10]
Following the instructions in the aforesaid letter, Emilio instructed Remy to place the P3,000, which
was in an envelope, inside the garbage can at about 6:30 p.m. on March 6, 1987.Emilio told one of their sales-
girls to inform Pfc. Pimentel that the money had been placed in the garbage can and that he should guard
it. However, the following day, Pfc. Pimentel returned the money to them with the information that nobody
went near the garbage can that night. Emilio then told Remy to verify this information with the station
commander. The latter confirmed that their surveillance yielded negative results. When Emilio was informed
of this, he asked Remy to go back to the station commander and to retrieve the letter in order that it could be
machine-copied in Masbate.
Thus, Remy got back the letter on March 9, 1987, and proceeded to Masbate to have the letter
machine-copied. She returned to Aroroy at around 11:00 p.m. The following day, she met Sgt. Noly Cabug, a
member of the 270th Philippine Constabulary Command in Aroroy,[11] who assured her that he would uncover
the identity of Helen Lepanto. However, in spite of two days sleuthing, the intelligence personnel could not
produce any result from their surveillance.[12]
While the Sy couple was officially informed that the police had no leads, the latter in fact harbored
some suspicions. In the evening of March 6, 1987, Pfc. Pimentel and Pat. Cadiz kept watch in the house across
from the Sy residence while Patrolmen Maglente and Tugbo secretly stationed themselves at a street corner
near the Sy residence. At around 9:00 oclock that evening, Pfc. Pimentel saw Antonio Sy coming from the
house of Benny Tuason. Just before entering the Sy residence, Antonio approached the garbage can and
looked at it for about five to ten seconds. He peered at the garbage can for two more times -- at 9:30 p.m.
and then at around 10:00 p.m. when the electric light was switched off. The police stopped their surveillance
at 2:00 a.m. but Antonio Sy did not return to the garbage can for the fourth time.[13]
When Pfc. Pimentel reported this to his chief on March 7, 1987, the latter concluded that Antonio Sy
must have been Commander Helen Lepanto. But Pfc. Pimentel himself did not share the same belief
otherwise he would have apprehended Antonio Sy the moment he went near the trash can. That same day,
when Pfc. Pimentel returned the P3,000.00 to Remy, he did not reveal to her the conversation he had with his
chief.[14]
At 8:00 oclock in the morning of March 15, 1987, another boy approached Remy in her store. The child
conveyed the message that she was to prepare the amount of P3,000 which they had not taken on the 6th of
March, and to drop the money on the 20th. The boy hastily left after warning Remy not to inform the
authorities about this new arrangement. As before, Remy related to her husband what had transpired. Emilio
asked her to follow the new orders, but he insisted that, instead of placing the money in the garbage can, she
should give it to their houseboy, accused Efren Ativo, because he slept in the kitchen. Emilio added that
anyone who could identify or apprehend Helen Lepanto should be given the money as a reward.[15]
At around 4:00 oclock in the afternoon of that same day, accused Roberto Gerolaga entered the store
to buy a t-shirt and some spare parts. Having been Gerolagas former employer, Remy felt free to tell him that
she had received a threat. She begged him to help apprehend or identify Helen Lepanto.
Gerolaga told Remy that she was asking something dangerous because Lepanto might be a member of
the NPA Sparrow Unit. However, she managed to convince Gerolaga to help watch over their house. She
intimated to him that whoever could apprehend or identify Helen Lepanto, be he a PC soldier, a policeman or
a civilian, would be given a P3,000 reward. Remy further informed Gerolaga that the money would be placed
in the garbage can on the 20th of March and hence, whoever would pick up the envelope in the said container
could be Helen Lepanto or his/her companions.[16]
Gerolaga, a 25-year-old minibus conductor who was also known as Edgar,[17] testified that at around
7:00 oclock in the evening of March 20, 1987, he went for a walk at the pier, drank beer for about an hour at
a little store and then went to a street corner near the Sy residence. Because he saw no one approach the
garbage can, Gerolaga went back to the pier where there was a dance. He left the dance at midnight and
went back to the bus terminal. Thence, he returned to the corner to watch the Sy house.
It was then that he saw someone approach the garbage can. The man had a flashlight which he
beamed at the container. Then, as the stranger entered the gate of the Sy residence, Gerolaga followed
silently. The person went to the well, fetched water and washed his feet. From a distance of about three (3)
meters, Gerolaga greeted him, Good evening, Commander Helen Lepanto. Surprised, the man turned his
head and exclaimed, Why do you know me? Gerolaga retorted that he knew him very well -- that he was
Antonio Sy. Immediately, Antonio pulled out a double-bladed knife and tried to stab Gerolaga but the latter
evaded the thrust. He caught Antonios hand and held him in a bear hug. Antonio kept on shouting, I will really
kill you, I will really kill you. Sensing that Antonio was strong, Gerolaga shouted for help. He twisted Antonios
hands and pushed the one holding the weapon upon Antonios chest several times. When Gerolaga felt
Antonio weakening, he released him, and the latter fell on the ground face down.
Gerolaga pulled out the bladed weapon and walked towards the gate. It was there that he met Efren
Ativo. The latter angrily demanded to know what he was doing inside the premises.Gerolaga told him that he
had already identified Helen Lepanto. Gerolaga asked Ativo for the P3,000, but Ativo was incredulous. So
Gerolaga led Ativo to the well near which Antonio lay dead. It was only then that Ativo went inside the house,
took the money and handed it to Gerolaga.
Gerolaga went to the bus terminal where he took off his bloodied shirt and pants and placed them
together with the weapon in a plasticbag. At 2:00 a.m., he boarded the San Agustin minibus which promptly
departed. Arriving in Luy-a, Gerolaga entrusted the plastic bag to a co-worker, Rafael Francisco, who alighted
there, with instructions that the clothing in the bag should be washed by Franciscos mother.[18]
After Gerolaga left, Ativo, still trembling, closed the gate. At 5:00 oclock that morning, he knocked at
the stairs near the door of Remys room. He informed her, her husband and his sister Norma, that Antonio Sy
was dead. Emilio instructed everyone not to touch the body until the authorities arrived. Ativo summoned
Pfc. Pimentel but did not tell him about Gerolagas participation.[19]
The police officer found the body of Antonio sprawled on the floor. The victim, lying about a meter
away from the well, was still holding a flashlight in one hand. Pfc. Pimentel examined the body to determine
the number of wounds it sustained. Ten (10) meters from the body, he found a scabbard.
The body of the victim was in a state of rigor mortis and inside a coffin when Dr. Emilio Quemi, medical
specialist at the provincial health office, arrived to conduct the post-mortem examination.[20] In his
report,[21] Dr. Quemi indicated that Antonio Sy sustained five (5) stab wounds in the epigastric region, above
the navel, at the lateral side of the costal arch, below the right clavicle and the right axillary fossa, and incised
wounds at the left side of the thoracic vertebrae and at the palmar surface of the fingers of the right and left
hand(s). He established the cause of death as shock due to massive external hemorrhage, caused by multiple
wounds.
On March 23, 1987, the Aroroy police received information that Gerolaga had been looking for Antonio
Sy at around 11:00 oclock on the night of March 21 (sic).[22] The police searched for Gerolaga and learned that
79
he had hide off to Barangay Luy-a. Upon reaching that place at 4:00 oclock in the afternoon, the police were
told that Gerolaga had proceeded to Crossing, Mandaon, where he was finally apprehended by Pat.
Maglente.
At the police station, the authorities learned from Gerolaga that the double-bladed weapon used in the
assault was in the possession of Juanita Amaro, mother of Rafael Francisco.Juanita Amaro subsequently
turned over the 8-inch long weapon as well as the pants and shirt of Gerolaga to Pat. Edgardo Tugbo and Pat.
Mendoza.[23]
Gerolaga was investigated by Sgt. Felix Alonzo. He readily admitted killing Antonio Sy, and also
implicated Mrs. Remedios Ruado-Sy, saying that she gave him through Efren Ativo the P3,000 after he killed
Antonio Sy. However, Gerolaga surrendered only P600[24] to Sgt. Alonzo as the rest of the money had been
spent.[25]
Before taking Gerolagas statement,[26] Sgt. Alonzo informed him of his constitutional rights to counsel
and against self-incrimination. However, Gerolaga told him that he did not as yet need a lawyer. The
statement he made was signed in the presence of his mother Encarnacion Letada Gerolaga and his cousin
Ermila Gerolaga Manlangit, who affixed their thumbmark and signature, respectively, on the certification
appended to the statement.[27]
Also on March 23, 1987, at around 8:00 oclock in the morning, a fifteen-year-old boy approached Remy
in her store. The boy told her that their head had ordered that Remy should write a letter to her in-laws
admitting the killing of Antonio Sy. Remy protested, telling the boy that it was her husbands idea that
the P3,000 be given to whoever could apprehend and identify Helen Lepanto, but the boy left
immediately. Distraught, Remy told her husband about the boys message. Enraged, Emilio asked whether she
caused the killing of his brother. Remy denied the accusation and reminded Emilio of their agreement to find
ways to identify Helen Lepanto and to give the P3,000 to whoever could identify him.
Emilio ordered her to prepare the letter and to follow the instructions of the NPA as it was the only
way by which their entire family could be spared. Remy went upstairs, prepared the letter and showed it to
her husband. The boy came for the latter at 4:00 p.m. of the same day.
At 5:30 p.m., the boy was back. He told Remy that their head was not convinced by her short letter and
that she should make it longer. She should also include the letter of Helen Lepanto and state what had
happened in our family. The boy warned her once again that she should not report to the authorities and
that, should she refuse to follow their instructions, they would get her and her family.
Again Remy relayed the instructions to her husband. Emilio, expressing pity for her, told her to follow
the NPA instructions, reiterating that this was the only way to save the family. She went upstairs and
prepared the letter on three sheets of yellow pad paper written back-to-back.[28] As translated by the court
interpreter, it reads:
M
a
r
c
h
2
4
,
1
9
8 Understand me. Im writing you this so that you will know.
7
Dear Teresing, Tuaches, Ting, Long,
I write you this letter, because I want you to know the truth of Tonys death. You know, on March 4, Tony sent
me a letter. Here you may read, because he planned to kill me. Good, he was able to tell that my Comadre
that during the Juniors Ball of Chong (daughter of Remy) he would stab me. If luck was against me I should
have been the object of your vigil instead of him. I have been asking help from Sto. Nio to save me because I
have still many obligations yet to my children. I prayed to God that if I am wrong, He should punish me, but if
he is wrong, he should be punished instead.
You know this fellow was used to Barkadas, gambling, disco and he had also a girlfriend in Joans. He was
always worried on how to acquire a large amount of money because of his vices, such was the reason why I
prepared myself to kill or be killed, I told him that if my life was what he was after, it was up to him to find out
who would reach the base first(.) I told your Manoy to settle this case before we repent it.Well in the
afternoon of that day Tony and baby had an altercation in connection with the construction of his house
because he did not agree to give 1 meter allowance to his elder brothers piece of lot. But I told them, Its up to
you. Then Baby said, Mama, get Tony because this is again a big problem. Manoy, I have prayed to all the
Gods in order that Tony should reform, but there was no good result.' I told Norma, you have given
him P50.00. He would go to the disco house, he might be stabbed there thus all his problems will be
finished. The thorns in your heart will also be pulled. So, God heard our prayer. He met an adversary.
The truth is that last March 4, Tony wrote me a letter, that a person who was working under me before,
would come here to buy spare parts. I did not know why I was able to tell Edgar that I had a problem because
I received a letter from the NPA Commander, Helen Lepanto. I let him read the letter. Sus, Manay Remy, this
letter is asking for the amount of P3,000.00, Im going to put that person down. Yes, I answered, because
anyway I am going to be killed is a matter of who will be the first (sic). My bayaw was the one who sent this to
me, said I. Sus, its difficult, because he is like a snake, a dangerous one.What do you say? Aba, Manay Remy,
what a pity on you! You are like a cock who is induced to fight but has no chance to win. So, he sided with me
and killed Tony. When he came from the disco house, I handed to him the reward of P3,000.00 in order that
he would not be angry with me. So, it appears that I am the mastermind, but it was only a matter of who got
ahead if it was a game.
T
h
a
n
k
s
You know, Tony had many plans. He wanted to kill Baby. He wanted to kill Doctor, because according to him,
he is the one keeping the papers. Baby, he said, is tight handed when it comes to money. He got angry with
me, because when I gave him his P20.00 allowance, he wanted P50.00 and later on P100.00. I told him, Tony,
Baby might be angry with me, because you are given the amount more than you are allowed, The following
morning, I gave him P300.00 and I said, This is the last time that I will give you. You ask from my other in-laws
(brother and sisters of Tony). As for me, I dont like to give you anymore. Aba, by March 4, there was a letter
that I would be kidnapped and somebody was told that I would be killed before the end of March. I was
determined then to kill or be killed for your own good, for my childrens good, and mine. I have many
problems yet for my children, that is why I choose to finish him for he had no problems yet but make trouble
to me and to all of us. It is said that Teresings worries may last until her death. So, all of us have threats. We
are all in a pityful situation.
80
 T y
h o
a u
n
k a
s l
l
.
Rem
y T.
Rua Dont be afraid. You will not be hurt if you follow my order.
do
This is the letter that was sent in duplicate.
Even if your younger brother was like a snake in your family, I did not do anything because he is your blood, I
am a different person. Ruado, you know. But when it come to service I did my best. I sent for Teresing in
I have no ill-feeling if you want me to be imprisoned (sic). Just okey. If you accuse me, just okey also. Ill face
order to explain to each an(d) every one of you, but you did not like because you are only thinking of what I
you in the government in whatever action you may take against me. Im alone, but I think God will not forsake
have done. You know, what Tony said, that he would kill me before the end of March.We competed only as to
me. But I tell you that I am like this, because I have given you too much pity. In truth, Tony has brothers and
who would reach the base first.
sisters, but you did not do anything to correct his mistake, grave or not. Like when he held up your elder
brother. You kept that in secret for he is your blood your surname and you will be put in shame. Now, its too
Here is his letter on March 4. late to repent, because he was able to meet somebody to stop his wrong deeds.

N I enclosed you in my two arms. Even if you ill not be asked, something is loosen in your hearts, beginning
P now. I know that you have an ill-feeling against me, but if it were in your place, you would find out a remedy.
A
Com
God will judge us all and God knows how much I loved Tony. Even when Pa had a letter and telegram not to
mand
allow him in the house, I still admitted him, because I took pity on him. But at the end, I was still bad. Well,
er
my brothers and sisters I hope you understood me already. We just played chess and I won. To all of you,
Helen
forgive me. Okey, if you dont want to see me, God is responsible to all of you.
Lepan
to
T
h
Remy:
a
Mil:
n
k
We are asking from you as a help for us the amount of P3,000.00. You send it within two days. s

I want you not to reveal this to anybody or else many lives will be lost especially the military. It would be a Siste
pity to them and we will get you if you can not produce this. Then you put the money inside an envelope and r-in-
place it in a trash container, at 9:00 oclock on Saturday night. law[2
9]

Salamat,
After reading the letter, Emilio asked Remy to give it to his younger sisters. Remy prepared an
enveloped and was about to deliver it to her sisters-in-law when, at 9:00 a.m., another unnamed boy came
G
back, asking for the letter. He returned it to Remy at 10:00 a.m. with the information that his chief considered
o
the letter to be alright. Emilio then ordered their daughter Haydee to deliver the letter to his sisters.[30]
d
In the afternoon of March 24, 1987, as Remy and others were going over the personal belongings of
b Antonio Sy which, in accordance with Chinese traditions and belief, should be burned during his burial, they
l found a wallet. Inside it was a letter to a Miss Mecenario which was written in the same handwritting as the
e letter sent to Remy by Helen Lepanto. From Gerolaga's revelation and this letter, Remy concluded that Helen
s Lepanto was none other than Antonio Sy.[31]
s

81
 As earlier stated, the trial court convicted the defendants-appellants of murder. It discredited
Gerolagas claim of self-defense, holding that Antonio Sy was found dead by the police authorities sprawled
face upward a meter from the well holding a flashlight in his right hand.[32] To the trial court, such fact belied
Gerolagas claim of self-defense because Antonio Sy could not have pulled the dagger from its scabbard with
his right hand holding the flashlight. The scabbard was found ten (10) meters away from the body of the
victim and not tucked into his waist or near his body, which would have been the case if the weapon indeed
belonged to the victim. Moreover, the court opined that Antonio Sy, a Chinese businessman, could not have
kept a locally made dagger and scabbard.
The trial court also faulted Gerolaga for not surrendering to the authorities immediately. Furthermore,
his plea of self-defense does not square with the commission of the crime induced by reward or price.[33]
In holding that the three defendants conspired in the killing of Antonio Sy, the trial court indicted Remy
for providing the monetary reward which Ativo delivered to Gerolaga, the actual assailant. The trial court was
convinced of Remys culpability by the tenor of the letter she wrote admitting participation in the crime. As to
Ativo, the court a quo emphasized his failure to report the incident immediately to his employers and to the
police authorities.
The defendants filed a motion for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence.[34] They
wanted to present on the witness stand one Frankie Escarlan, Jr. who allegedly witnessed the killing of
Antonio Sy. On May 19, 1989, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that the claimed newly
discovered evidence would be merely corroborative of Gerolagas self-defense.[35] Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issues
In their well-presented and convincing brief consisting of 166 pages, appellants specified the following
alleged errors of the trial court:[36]
(1) The trial court erred by, in, and for, rejecting the valid and clearly tenable claim of self-
defense, and thus, and with patent partiality, it erroneously rendered its judgment
convicting all of the accused in this case, despite the insufficiency of the evidence for
the purpose;
(2) The trial court erred by, in, and for, finding and ruling that conspiracy obtains in this case,
without clear and sufficient factual and legal basis, and thus, with manifest bias and in
grave error, it held all of the accused criminally liable as co-principals; on the contrary,
upon the entire and purely admissible evidence, the applicable laws and jurisprudence
on the matter, conspiracy does not lie in the case at bar;
(3) The trial court erred by, in, and for, not finding and ruling that each, and all of the accused
acted without freedom, then being under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an
equal or greater injury, in their case, respectively, or probable death;
(4) The trial court erred by, in, and for, not finding and ruling that accused Efren Ativo, more so,
Remedios Ruado-Sy, acted in obedience to lawful orders for some lawful purpose in
this case at bar;
(5) The trial court erred, consequently, in its decision by, in, and for, having convicted all of the
accused for murder through conspiracy, or by, in, and for, not having acquitted all of
the accused herein, upon the ground of reasonable doubt, it having failed or refused to
consider exclusively, only the purely admissible factual and more credible
circumstantial evidence obtaining in this case, and to observe with liberality, consistent
with the proper dispensation of criminal or penal justice, the law, jurisprudence, and
the fundamental precepts, as are applicable to, or in the case at bar.
In fine, the issues could be condensed into three:
(1) Is Gerolagas theory of self-defense sufficient, credible and valid?
(2) If not, was the crime committed murder or homicide? More specifically, were evident
premeditation, treachery and/or price and reward amply proven by the prosecution?
(3) Are appellants Remedios Ruado-Sy and Efren Ativo, who were unquestionably absent from the
crime scene, equally as guilty as appellant Roberto Gerolaga who while admitting the killing of the victim
proffers self-defense as a justifying circumstance?
The Courts Ruling
First Issue: Gerolagas Theory of Self-Defense
At the outset, it should be pointed out that the prosecution did not (could not?) present any
eyewitness to the crime. The circumstances prior to and those obtaining during the actual commission of the
felony were established mostly by the defense. This happened because of appellants theory that the killing
was justified by self-defense. As such, the resolution of this case hinges to a large extent on the credibility of
the appellants witnesses. However, while the determination of the issue of credibility has always depended
on trial courts and appellate courts are, as a rule, bound by such findings, we realize that in the present case,
the conviction of the accused was based on pure circumstantial evidence and on an uncounselled confession
of guilt. On account thereof, we were constrained to pore over the evidence, and arrived at the conclusion
that the trial court misapprehended critical bits of evidence and circumstances which when considered
correctly leads to a modification of the judgment of conviction. We thus emphasize the need for all courts to
scrutinize every bit of evidence with meticulous care and analyze each case with deliberate precision and
thoroughness to spare the innocent and/or mitigate the penalty of the guilty.
With the foregoing caveat, we shall first pass upon appellant Gerolagas theory of self-defense. When
such defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused. He must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions. Even if the latter were weak, it could not be
disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the killing.[37]
In the present case, it was duly proven that Gerolaga was unarmed when he entered the Sy residence
to confront the victim.[38] It was also clearly established, through Emilio Sy, that Antonio owned the double-
bladed knife, its scabbard and the flashlight found at the crime scene.[39] Because Gerolaga surprised Antonio
by disclosing the latters sobriquet as he was washing his feet, and because such disclosure came from an
intruder in the Sy residence, it is indeed not improbable that Antonio initially attacked Gerolaga.
However, to appreciate self-defense in favor of an accused, the following requisites must be
concurrently and clearly proven: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of
the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.[40] In this case, even if the first and third requisites were to be appreciated in favor of
appellant Gerolaga, the second requisite had not been met. There was no reasonable necessity to inflict upon
Antonio Sy numerous wounds, five of them fatal.[41] Because Gerolaga himself was unscathed, the wound
sustained by Antonio Sy certainly negates the formers claim of self-defense.[42] Moreover, the justifying
circumstance of self-defense may not survive in the face of Gerolagas flight from the crime scene, his
concealment of the weapon and his failure to inform the authorities of the incident.[43]
82
Second Issue: Murder or Homicide?
The sole key to appellant Gerolagas exoneration having been disposed off, appellants exact criminal
responsibility must now be determined.
As defined by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is the crime committed by a person who kills
another in consideration of a price, reward, or promise. Said qualifying circumstance of price or reward
equally affects both the offeror and offeree[44]-- the former becomes a principal by inducement and the latter,
a principal by direct participation.
In this case, the prosecution attempted to establish that Gerolaga killed Antonio Sy for the reward. In
his brief, the Solicitor General even quoted the following portion of Gerolagas testimony to support the
theory:
Q. And when you said that you are going to help, the help that you are going to do is to kill Helen
Lepanto?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And it was also your desire to kill Commander Helen Lepanto because you will received (sic)
the Three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos, is it not?
A. Yes, sir.[45]
However, that portion of Gerolagas testimony should have been considered in the context of his entire
testimony as well as all the pieces of evidence presented at the trial, in the same manner that it should have
been considered under the basic principle in criminal law that all doubts shall be resolved in favor of the
accused. Gerolaga knew the purpose for which Remy and her husband offered the P3,000.00 reward. Thus,
after testifying that he expressed to Remy his fears about looking for and identifying NPA Commander Helen
Lepanto as the latter might be a member of the dreaded Sparrow Unit, Gerolaga said:
Q. So what did Remedios Ruado say if she said anything?
A. Mrs. Ruado answered that she must be helped because this amount asked by NPA will be
given to whoever who (sic) can apprehend that Helen Lepanto. (Underscoring
supplied.)[46]
Pressed by the prosecution to admit that he desired to kill Commander Helen Lepanto for the reward
of P3,000, appellant Gerolaga demurred as follows:
Q. When you entered the gate following that person, you were thinking that the person you
were following was Commander Helen Lepanto? Is that what you want the Court to
understand?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And in following him with the intention of killing, you want to tell us that you do not have any
weapon?
A. I have no intention to kill him. What I have in mind is to recognize him and identify him and to
report to the policemen.
ATTY. BRAVO continuing)
Q. You mean you were not afraid to follow up (sic) Commander Helen Lepanto whom you
believe to be a member of the NPA when your intention is to kill him and that Helen
Lepanto is armed?
A. What I wanted during that night is that to identify and recognize him because had I knew (sic)
him I will (sic) not do harm to him because we were friends.[47] (Underscoring supplied.)
Appellant Gerolaga then proceeded to narrate that it was only when Commander Helen Lepanto spoke
that, by his voice, he recognized the stranger to be Antonio Sy, his friend. But because Antonio Sy
immediately lunged at him with a knife, appellant Gerolaga responded accordingly.
We are thus faced with a situation where self-defense is discredited because of the number of wounds
inflicted upon the victim. However, there are several circumstances, proven by the defense and unrebutted
by the prosecution, indicating that Gerolaga intended only to identify and recognize, and not to kill, the
victim. These circumstances include appellant Gerolagas entering the Sy residence unarmed and the reflex
action of Antonio Sy in lunging at the appellant on account of his unexpected detection and identification. In
such a situation, the law tilts the scales of justice in favor of the perpetrator of the offense. [48] Consequently,
because appellant Gerolaga had been impelled by the prospect of a monetary reward merely
for identifyingthe source of the Sy couples woes, he may not, in the same breath, be deemed as having
intended to kill Antonio Sy for a price. He killed Antonio Sy in reaction -- albeit extreme -- to the violent attack
launched by the deceased. The qualifying circumstance of price or reward in regard appellant Gerolaga may
not, therefore, be counted against him.
In view of the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt showing the evident premeditation and
treachery alleged in the Information but considering his owning up to the killing of the victim, appellant
Gerolaga may be held liable only for the crime of homicide, not for murder as charged.
The qualifying circumstance of price or reward may not likewise be appreciated against appellants
Ruado-Sy and Ativo. Both testified that the money was meant to encourage people to identify and apprehend
Commander Helen Lepanto. Even Emilio Sy, who was allowed to testify after his defendant wife had granted
permission,[49] swore that his wife did not entertain any idea of killing Commander Helen Lepanto. She asked
only for the latters identification and apprehension.[50] Such fact was buttressed by Pfc. Pimentel who, after
the police had formed the surveillance team, returned to Remy to ask what police services she needed. He
testified as to the conversation that transpired:
Q. What did Mrs. Ruado answer to that?
A. Mrs. Ruado said that she will cooperate and she told us that whoever among us could
apprehend Lepanto that Three Thousand (P3,000.00) pesos she (sic) asked will be given to
us as a consideration for our services.[51]
Money offered or paid by anyone as a sort of an expression of x x x appreciation of sympathy or aid
(gratification), may not be considered as a recompense for participation in a crime.[52] In the face of the
prosecutions relentless effort to discredit her testimony during the trial, appellant Ruado-Sy tenaciously stuck
to her repeated statement that, in line with her husbands idea, she intended the P3,000.00 to be a reward for
whoever could identify and apprehend Commander Helen Lepanto. That no criminal intent may be ascribed
to her in setting aside the P3,000.00 as reward is supported by the fact that appellant Ruado-Sy immediately
referred the letter of Commander Helen Lepanto to the police authorities and even offered them the same
amount as a recompense for the identification and apprehension of the author of the letter.
Third Issue: Culpability of Ruado-Sy and Ativo
Neither may appellants Ruado-Sy and Ativo be held criminally liable on the basis of appellant Gerolagas
sworn statement implicating his co-accused in the crime, as it was executed without the assistance of
counsel. The right to counsel has been consitutionalized to curb duress and other undue influence in
extracting confessions from a suspect in a crime.[53] In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 12(1) of the
1987 Constitution, a waiver of the right to counsel must be in writing and executed in the presence of
counsel.[54] Indeed, any waiver of the right to counsel without the assistance of counsel has no evidentiary
83
value.[55] Hence, appellant Gerolagas waiver of the same right, even if executed in the presence of his mother
and cousin, is void and has no legal effect.
The trial courts reliance on appellant Ruado-Sys letter on March 24 1987 as a basis for her conviction is
misplaced. A reading of the letter bespeaks of no more than the rambling thoughts of a clearly apprehensive
wife. That she admitted she was ready to kill and be killed may not be considered as an accurate gauge of the
existence of any criminal intent on her part. The letter was written under understandably overpowering
anxiety and apprehension on account of her possible liability for the death of Antonio Sy, her in-laws anger at
her and her fear of reprisal from them, and her failure to neutralize the NPA threat. Also, as correctly pointed
out by the Solicitor General,[56] it was written three days after the crime had been committed when appellant
Ruado-Sy already had more than an inkling as to the true identity of Commander Helen Lepanto.
Furthermore, her claim that it was returned to her in order that she could lengthen the letter is buttressed by
its format. Appellant Ruado-Sys signature appears in the middle of the letter and, in accordance with the
directive given her through the boy-messenger, she incorporated the contents of the March 4, 1987 letter of
Commander Helen Lepanto.
It is immaterial that the order to write the letter was coursed through a boy in his mid-teens. Under the
circumstances, appellant Ruado-Sy could not be expected to (and would have been foolhardy to) subdue the
boy or to cause his apprehension. We take judicial notice of the fact that in rural areas, gullible young people
are conscripted in the commission of crimes by lawless elements who, taking advantage of the fear generated
by the swift justice allegedly rendered by members of the New Peoples Army upon those who refuse to do its
bidding, use the name of said organization to attain their malevolent purposes, even if they may not really be
members thereof. While it has not been clearly established that Antonio Sy was indeed a member of the NPA,
or that he was merely out to collect more money from his own relatives, appellant Ruado-Sys actions
subsequent to her receipt of the letter from Commander Helen Lepanto showed that she was in fact in the
grip of fear and a sense of helplessness throughout that time, and therefore, we can only conclude that in all
probability, she was psychologically and mentally unbalanced, and not in complete control of her free will,
when she wrote the letter of March 24, 1987.
Anent appellant Ativo, it is not uncommon for houseboys like him to follow their masters orders
unquestioningly and quite literally. No criminal intent was proven or could be attributed to him for his act of
delivering the reward to appellant Gerolaga. His failure to report immediately the death of Antonio Sy to his
own employers and to the police is explained by the fact that after he discovered that Antonio Sy was killed
and Gerolaga demanded the amount of P3,000 from him, he, too, was consumed by fear that Gerolaga might
kill him.[57]
If at all, appellants Ruado-Sy and Ativo may be held criminally liable only under the conspiracy theory
where the act of one may be imputed to all the conspirators.[58] Conspiracy, considering the secrecy by which
it is usually hatched, may be established by a chain of circumstances only.[59] However, like the physical acts
constituting the crime itself, it must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.[60]
In the present case, the prosecution attempted to establish conspiracy by showing that the reward
of P3,000 was financed by appellant Ruado-Sy and that appellant Ativo delivered the amount to the
killer. However, considering the unrebutted testimony of appellant Ruado-Sy that, with the approval of her
husband, she set aside the P3,000 as a reward for the identification and apprehension of Commander
Lepanto and the fact that Ativo merely obeyed the order of his employers to deliver the amount to whoever
could identify and apprehend said NPA commander, no criminal intent to kill Antonio Sy could be attributed
to him. Moreover, as earlier discussed, it was not indubitably proven that appellant Gerolaga intended to kill
Commander Lepanto and/or Antonio Sy for a price. Hence, no community of criminal design may be
attributed to them. As there is no other evidence to prove conspiracy except the affidavit of confession
(which is inadmissible in evidence), even the Solicitor General admitted that the lower court erred in finding
the existence of conspiracy.
In view of the foregoing, appellant Gerolagas criminal liability is individual and separate. He shall be
liable only for homicide, not murder, as no qualifying circumstances have been proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Because no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attended the killing, he shall be meted the
medium period of the penalty of reclusion temporal.[61] By the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
he shall suffer ten (10) years of prision mayor medium as minimum penalty to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal medium as maximum penalty. Pursuant to current jurisprudence, he shall
indemnify the heirs of Antonio Sy in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000).
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partially GRANTED. Appellants Remedios Ruado-Sy and Efren Ativo are
hereby ACQUITTED and are hereby ordered RELEASED immediately, unless they are being detained for some
other legal cause. Appellant Roberto Gerolaga is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide for which he is hereby IMPOSED the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal and ORDERED to indemnify the heirs of the
victim, Antonio Sy, in the amount of P50,000.00. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 113793 August 11, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JUAN GANZAGAN, JR. Y MADAYAG, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
In order for conviction to lie, all the elements of the crime must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. In
the case of murder, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to muster the evidence required by the Constitution
to show not only that the unlawful killing was perpetrated by the accused, but also that any of the attendant
circumstances that qualify it to murder exists. If it cannot be proven with moral certainty that at least one of
the qualifying circumstances enumerated in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is present, the prosecution
fails in its task, and the accused must be freed from liability for murder.
The case at bench commenced upon the filing on June 13, 1988 of an Information before the Regional Trial
Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan,1 charging appellant JUAN MADAYAG GANZAGAN, JR.2 of murdering
SERVILLANO VILLANUEVA MANUEL, JR., as follows:
That on or about the 1st day of April 1988, in the evening, at Barangay Bayaoas, Municipality of
Urdaneta, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being then armed with a single bladed bolo, called "Panabas",
measuring about 26 inches including its handle, with deliberate intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
hack one Servillano Manuel, Jr. y Villanueva, inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:
Significant External Findings:
— Abrasion, both knees; abrasion, right shoulder, lateral aspect; abrasion,
right forefinger and middle finger; abrasion, chin, right half; abrasion with
ecchysmosis, right temple near right eye;
84
 — Gaping wound, neck, left half, middle half, with exposed and severed
muscles, veins and arteries, measuring 11 cms. x 4 cms.;
— Incised wound, forehead, right half, above right eyebrow with exposed
bone, measuring 6 cms. x 2 cms.;
After waiting in vain at the corner for about an hour, Elino headed home. On his way, he caught sight of
appellant hacking Servillano with a bolo about fifteen (15) meters from where he was. Servillano was then
stooped forward and away from appellant, with his head down and backside pointed upward.11 Immobilized
by shock, Elino witnessed appellant strike Servillano four times, and then throw aside the bloodied bolo he
used. Appellant escaped on-board a tricycle, together with his brother-in-law, Ernesto Adame.12

— Incised wound, forehead, middle, measuring 5 cms. x 1 cm., with exposed
wound;
— Incised wound, forehead, left half, with exposed bone, measuring 5 cms.
x 1 cm.;
— Gaping wounds (5) nape and back of skull, beginning from back of head
going down to nape;
Servillano's body was autopsied on the morning of April 2, 1988, by rural health unit physician DR. RAMON
GONZALES, JR.,13 who found the cause of death to be "irreversible shock due to arterial hemorrhage caused
by the hacking wound, neck."14 His findings were reduced to a written report,15 the contents of which are
quoted in and incorporated into the Information filed against appellant.
The defense did not challenge the result of the autopsy conducted on Servillano's body, and did not question
the medical findings as to the cause of death. Appellant, in fact, admitted that he inflicted the fatal hacked
wounds on Servillano. However, appellant sought shelter behind the doctrine of self-defense. He and his wife,
MARILOU GANZAGAN,16 related a completely different version of what transpired on the day Servillano died.

Wound no. 1: measures 6 1/2 cms. x 1 cm.; The Ganzagans testified that at around five o'clock in the afternoon (5:00 p.m.) of April 1, 1988, they were at
no. 2: measures 7 1/2 cms. x 1 1/2 cms.; home. Marilou was then downstairs, preparing some bilo-bilo, while appellant was on the upper level of the
no. 3: measures 3 cms. x 1 1/2 cms.; house, watching over their two-month-old infant daughter.17 Suddenly, Servillano Manuel, Jr., who was visibly
no. 4: 12 cms. x 1 1/2 cms.; upset, barged into their house, looking for
no. 5: 6 cms. x 1 1/12 cms. appellant.18 He left hurriedly without waiting for appellant to come down.19

Significant Internal Findings:
— Neck, left half, lateral aspect; severed jugular vein and carotid artery;
— Fracture, linear, right frontal bone, 6 cms. long;
— Fracture, linear, middle half of frontal bone, 2 cms. long;
Not long after, Servillano returned to the Ganzagan residence.20 This time, he was armed with a bolo, with
which he stuck the house near the kitchen.21 Appellant confronted Servillano who cursed22 and abruptly
assaulted the former with the bolo. He delivered an overhead hacking blow23 to appellant, who stepped back
and parried the same with his right arm. The tip of the bolo hit the appendage and produced a three-
centimeter nick on it.24 Marilou rushed out of their house onto the street, screaming for help. None came to
her aid, as everyone was attending a procession along the Urdaneta-Asingan provincial road.25 When she
returned to their house, neither appellant nor Servillano was there.26 She did not think to look for the two,
and merely remained inside their house.27

— Fracture, linear, left half of frontal bone, 5 cms. long;
which caused the death of Servillano Manuel, Jr., y Villanueva as a consequence, to the damage
and prejudice of his heirs.
Appellant was arraigned. He pleaded not guilty to the charge leveled against him. Trial ensued.
Meanwhile, after a brief tussle with Servillano, appellant was able to wrest the bolo away from him. With
bolo in hand, appellant ran to the middle of the street.28 He stopped when he remembered his baby, who was
left alone
in their house.29 For the next five minutes, appellant stood transfixed on the road.30 The impasse was broken
by Servillano who renewed his attack.31 In trying to grab the bolo back from appellant, Servillano stumbled
and fell forward, face down and with his backside pointing up.32 It was then that appellant hacked Servillano
several times.33

The records show that appellant and Servillano Manuel, Jr. lived in the same neighborhood in Sitio Las Vegas,
Barangay Bayaoas, Urdaneta, Pangasinan.3 During his lifetime, Servillano worked as a kristo, or cockpit bet
caller, and as a collector in carnival shows.4 Before his arrest, appellant was working part-time as a laborer.5
The prosecution produced an eyewitness in the person of ELINO MANUEL,6 Servillano's younger brother. Elino
narrated that sometime after five o'clock in the afternoon (5:00 p.m.) of April 1, 1988, appellant came to their
house looking for Servillano.7 Failing to find him there, appellant boxed the door of the Manuel residence
twice and left in a huff. "Hutdon mong tanan, patyon mong tanan," he uttered in Visayan as he left.8 Chills ran
down Elino's spine. In his mind, he translated appellant's threat: "I will kill you all!"9
Fearing for his brother's life, Elino rustled to the corner of Las Vegas Road and Sison Street, where he
expected Servillano to pass on his way home from the poblacion. Unfortunately, he was wrong, for Servillano
opted to take an alternate route back to their house.10
Appellant fled from the scene of the crime. He went into hiding,34 and a week passed after the incident before
his wife saw him again.35 Much later, during the pendency of the trial against him, appellant jumped bail.36
In rebuttal, the prosecution submitted in evidence a certification of the death of the Ganzagan's four-month-
old son, Michael, on January 15, 1988, barely two-and-a-half (21/2) months before Servillano's killing.
At the close of trial, the court a quo decided against appellant. It held:
The killing was qualified by evident premeditation and treachery because when (appellant) went
to the house of the victim armed with a bolo looking for the latter who was not around, he had
already the intention to kill him and said intention to kill was never abandoned as he waited for
the arrival of the victim whom he saw along the road. There was treachery as the accused hacked

85
 the victim by the neck several times and the sudden and frontal attack on the forehead, thus hundred (100) meters from their house, but it took her thirty (30) minutes to return
causing his bones on the forehead to be exposed as shown in the medical certificate . . . The home (TSN of November 22, 1993, pp. 5, 9, 10);
exposure of the bones would only show that the hacking was therefore so strong enough as to
insure his premeditated intention to kill the victim.
3. None heeded Marilou's call for help because everyone else in their entire
neighborhood was attending a procession on the main road (Ibid., at p. 5);
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing discussion, this Court believes that the prosecution was
able to prove the guilt of the (appellant) beyond reasonable doubt. Pursuant to Art. 248 of the
4. When Marilou returned home and found neither her husband (appellant) nor
Revised Penal Code, the court hereby finds the (appellant) Juan Ganzagan, Jr., guilty of the crime
Servillano there, she did not — either out of worry or curiosity — even try to find out
of Murder and sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, considering the
what had happened to them (Id., at pp. 5, 12);
provisions of the 1987 Constitution (Art. III, Section 19[1]), and with all the accessory penalties
provided by law; and to pay the civil liability of P50,000.00 to the heirs of the deceased and moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00, with costs. 5. After he succeeded in taking the bolo away from Servillano, appellant ran out of their
house to the middle of the road, where he stopped and stood doing nothing for five
minutes. On cross-examination, he claimed that he stopped because he remembered
SO ORDERED. (Citations omitted)37
that their infant daughter was left alone in their house. But, he did not attempt to
return to their home anyway;
Appellant now sets forth the following assigned errors:
6. It took Servillano five minutes to reach appellant, who was standing fifteen (15)
I meters from where they had previously been wrestling, because he (Servillano) was
drunk (TSN of November 23, 1983, p. 20); and
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT UPHOLDING SELF-DEFENSE AS A GROUND FOR
ACQUITTAL OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT. 7. When Servillano finally caught up with appellant, he did not attack the former
immediately although he thought that Servillano was again armed with a weapon.
Instead, he waited until Servillano stumbled face down while trying to wrest the bolo
II
away from him (appellant).

ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS AT ALL GUILTY, THE TRIAL COURT

Furthermore, appellant's self-contradictions and vacillations in his testimony are patent and
NEVERTHELESS ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM FOR MURDER INSTEAD OF ONLY HOMICIDE
numerous. These were exposed in his cross-examination, where he was confronted and asked to
CONSIDERING THAT NEITHER THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY NOR
explain several of his contradictory statements, viz.:
PREMEDITATION WAS DULY ESTABLISHED.38

FISCAL VENIEGAS:
The appeal is partly meritorious. Appellant is not guilty of murder.

Q On April 1, 1988 at about 5:00 o'clock, Servillano Manuel was

Appellant reiterates his reliance on the doctrine of self-defense to justify the killing of Servillano.
drunk and he came to you in your house and extorted money
He argues that he was able to prove all the elements of defense of self, namely: (1) unlawful
from you, is that correct?
aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
WITNESS:
We are not persuaded.
A Yes, sir.
There are strong reasons to doubt the defense version of the facts that led to the killing of
Servillano. The account of the Ganzagan spouses is inconsistent with the common experience and Q As he used to do in the past every time he is drunk?
observation of mankind.39Especially difficult to accept are the following assertions:
A Yes, sir.
1. On the fateful afternoon of April 1, 1988, appellant was preparing bilo-bilo on the
second floor of their house because he was looking after their two-month-old infant
Q And he was asking money from you?
daughter. This is highly peculiar, since according to the records of their parish church
(Exh. "F", Original Records, p. 227), their four-month-oldinfant son, Michael died
barely two-and-a-half-months prior to Servillano's killing; A Yes, sir.

2. While appellant and Servillano were grappling for possession of the latter's bolo, Q How did he try to ask you for liquor money? Will you quote
Marilou ran out to seek help. She said that she only ran to a distance of fifty (50) to one what he said?

86
A He told me, "Will you give me money because I got short in the Q And in your earlier testimony, there is no point in time when
other side and I need some more money." you talked to him and (when he) asked you for wine money. Is
that correct?
Q Is that (during) the first time that he came or on the second
time when he returned to your house? A Yes, sir.

A The first time, sir. xxx xxx xxx

Q The first time, when you were upstairs making bilo-bilo? Q When Servillano Manuel returned to your house as you said,
did he also ask where you were from your wife?
A Yes, sir.
A Not anymore because he immediately hacked the post in the
doorway.
Q And he was talking to you?

Q And at that time, you got irked and you went downstairs?
A He talked with my wife, sir.

A I went down. He was the one who got mad. I just went down
Q So, it was not you from whom he was asking money, but it was
the stairs.
your wife?

Q What did he tell you when he came back if any?

A Yes, sir.

A He said, "vulva of your mother!"

Q But you said the first time that he came, you testified that he
was asking for your name and later he was asking for you from
your wife. Q Because you asked him why he was looking for you, correct?

A Yes, sir. A Yes, sir.

Q Then he left. and later on, after about 30 minutes, he came Q And he answered, "Okinnam!" (vulva of your mother)?
back?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q In direct examination, you said that when Servillano returned
Q And you went down because as you were upstairs, you went after half an hour after the first time that he came to your house,
down and asked him why he was asking you. Correct? you went down your house, asking him why he hacked the post
and you said he did not answer and immediately hacked with a
bolo on your right hand. Do you remember having said that?
A Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir.
Q And Servillano Manuel without saying a word hacked you
immediately. Is that correct, according to your testimony?
Q Why did you say that he answered you "vulva of your mother"?
Are you changing your previous testimony?
A Yes, sir.

A Immediately before he hacked me, he said "vulva of your

Q Then you wrestled and wrested the bolo from him and you ran
mother!"
to the street. Is that correct?

Q In other words, your previous testimony that he did not say

A Yes, sir.
anything before he hacked you is not correct?

87
 A That is true.
Q But you did not tell the Court that he said "vulva of your
mother!"
A He said that.
Q But you did not mention to the Court in the first time.
A Because I am nervous.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, in your direct testimony, you said that after wresting the
bolo from Servillano, you ran towards the road and you stood
there for five (5) minutes after which Servillano Manuel came to
you and attacked you. Do you remember having stated that?
A That is why I paused for five (5) minutes in the road, because I
thought of my baby in the house whom I wanted to protect
because he might harm the baby instead.
Q But you also left your wife in the kitchen with your baby
upstairs, correct?
A She was not there anymore because as soon as we fought with
Servillano Manuel, my wife became hysterical and she ran away.
Q When you were on the road, you thought of your baby as you
said. That is why you stayed there for five (5) minutes?
A Yes, sir.
Q And then it was at that time that Servillano Manuel appeared
and tried to kill you as the intention as you said was to kill you.
A Yes, sir.
Q But he was already unarmed because you had already wrested
the bolo from him?
A Yes sir, because during that time, I thought that he still had
some arms with him because it was quite dark already.
COURT:
Q When you were standing there at the road, Servillano
approached you?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q When he approached you, why did you say that Servillano has
intention to kill you?
A When Servillano Manuel came and approached me, he was so
mad. I thought he was armed and it was quite dark then, so I
decided to hack him.
Q When you decided to hack him, what did you use? The bolo
you wrested from him?
A Yes, Ma'am.
Q Did he grapple for the possession of the bolo from you in the
road?
A He tried to wrest the bolo from me while we were in the road.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Will you demonstrate how he grappled the bolo again?
A While I was holding the bolo downward and I was standing by
the road, Servillano Manuel came and lunged forward to get the
bolo from my hand, and in that instance, he stumbled to the
ground.
Q Will you demonstrate how Servillano stumbled?
A As he lunged forward to get the bolo from my hand, I moved
my hand which held the bolo away from him. So, he fell to the
ground, face down.
Q With the buttocks up?
A (The witness demonstrated how Servillano Manuel fell to the
ground, face down with his buttocks up.)
FISCAL VENIEGAS:
Q And Servillano Manuel was in that position when you hacked
him?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you tell the Court in the first blow when you hacked him,
where did you hack him? What part of his body?
88
 A His face and his arm.
Q You mean that in that position with face on the ground, you
hacked his face and his hand?
A When Servillano came towards me he tried to wrestle the bolo
away from me. That is why I lunged the bolo to his face. That is
why his face and arm were hit.
Q At the same time, the face was hit?
A I cannot recall.
Q So, it is not true that when he came at you after you were
standing there for five (5) minutes and you concluded his
intention to kill you when he wrested the bolo, that he fell to the
ground as you said?
A The first time he tried to wrestle the bolo from me, I
immediately hacked him on the back and the second time, he
tried to wrestle (was when he fell down).
Q But in the demonstration, you demonstrated only one attempt
on his part to wrestle the bolo from you. Is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx40
In any event, even granting the defense's factual assertions, we are still unimpressed by
appellant's theory of self-defense.
It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal law that the burden of proving the guilt of the accused
lies squarely on the shoulders of the prosecution. Conviction must rest, not on the weakness of the
defense, but on the strength of the prosecution.41 In cases, however, where the accused admits
committing the crime but invokes self-defense to escape liability, the rule is reversed and the
burden of proof shifted to the accused to prove the elements of his defense. As held in the case
of People v. Boniao, 217 SCRA 653 (1993):
By invoking self-defense, the appellant admitted killing the four (4) victims. The burden
is, therefore, upon him to prove the existence, by clear and convincing evidence, of its
essential requisites . . .; otherwise stated, the onus probandi was thus shifted to him . . .
. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of
the prosecution . . . for even if the latter were weak, it could not be disbelieved after he
himself admitted the killing . . . (Citations omitted)
Thus, in claiming self-defense, appellant needs to convincingly establish that: (1) Servillano acted
with unlawful aggression towards him; (2) the means he employed to repel such aggression was
reasonable; and (3) he did not sufficiently provoke Servillano towards aggression. If appellant fails
to discharge this burden of proof, his conviction shall of necessity follow, on the basis of his
admission to the killing.
Unlawful aggression, which is an indispensable element of self-defense,42 is an assault or attack, or
a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate manner, which places the accused's life in actual
peril.43 It is an offensive act positively strong and determinative of the aggressor's intent to cause
harm or injury.44 It presupposes a material attack which is impending or at the point of happening,
and not merely an intimidating attitude or stance.
In the case at bench, appellant testified that after the initial bolo attack on him, he was able to
take possession of the weapon and run away from Servillano. At that point, the unlawful
aggression against him effectively ceased. When hostilities resumed five minutes later, appellant
was the armed protagonist, and Servillano's act of trying to wrest the bolo back from him cannot
be considered as unlawful aggression. Appellant no longer faced any imminent or immediate
danger to his life and limb from his opponent.
There was no unlawful aggression by Servillano. Appellant had nothing to repel. Therefore, he
cannot successfully posit the view that he was merely defending himself when he killed Servillano.
Parenthetically, appellant's claim of self-defense is further belied by the physical evidence in the
case, specifically the number, location and severity of the hacked wounds found on Servillano. Dr.
Gonzales found five (5) gaping wounds on Servillano's neck, running from the back of the head to
the nape which exposed and severed the muscles, veins and arteries in the neck area. These
indicate clearly that appellant's act was no longer one of self-preservation, "but a determined
effort to kill his victim."45
Appellant next postulates that even if self-defense were unavailable to him, he should only have
been found guilty of committing homicide, and not murder. He claims that neither treachery nor
evident premeditation, which are alleged in the Information, are present in the case at bench.
We are convinced.
The circumstances that qualify murder must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself. The
presence of treachery46 and evident premeditation47 must not be deduced from mere presumption
or sheer speculation. Unfortunately in the case at bench, that is exactly what the trial court did in
concluding that both qualifying circumstances are present.
Article 14 (16) of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery thus:
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend
directly and specifically to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. (Emphasis ours.)
Its essence lies in the adoption of ways that minimize or neutralize any resistance which may be
put up by the offended party.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to present any witness to testify as to the manner by
which Servillano was attacked by appellant. Their sole eyewitness, Elino Manuel, only saw the
actual hacking of the victim by appellant, and not the events that led to it. The records provide no
89
 basis for the trial court's finding of treachery. As we held in the case of People v. Bachar, 170 SCRA
700 (1989)48:
. . . Not a single eyewitness to the stabbing incident had been presented by the
prosecution. Thus, the record is totally bereft of any evidence as to the means or
method resorted to by appellant in attacking the victim. It is needless to add that
treachery cannot be deduced from mere presumption, much less from sheer
speculation. The same degree of proof to dispel reasonable doubt is required before
any conclusion may be reached respecting the attendance of aleviosa.
Evident premeditation suggests the deliberate hatching of a plan to execute a crime. Its elements
are: (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) an overt act/acts manifestly
indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the
decision to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow the accused to reflect
upon the consequences of his acts.
Time and again, we have held that evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify a killing
to murder in the absence of direct evidence of the planning and preparation to kill when the plan
was conceived.49 In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to prove with any certainty that
appellant had planned and prepared to kill Servillano previous to the fatal hacking. The records are
bereft of any indication of such a plot. Furthermore, the findings of the court a quo that appellant
was already armed with a bolo when he went to the Manuel residence looking for Servillano and
that he waited in ambush for the latter, are totally unfounded. These were never mentioned in the
testimony of prosecution eyewitness Elino Manuel.
Absent the qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, the crime committed
by appellant is not murder, but homicide, as defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the conviction of appellant JUAN MADAYAG GANZAGAN, JR. by the Regional
Trial Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, Branch 48 in Criminal Case No. U-4850 is AFFIRMED, but he is
found GUILTY of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE. The appealed Decision, dated December 6, 1993, is
MODIFIED so that appellant shall instead suffer the penalty of from twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 84714 October 5, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JANUARIO DELA CRUZ y HURADO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reynaldo C. Tarongoy for accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
The accused contests the decision of the Regional Trial Court, 1 finding him guilty of murder and sentencing
him to suffer reclusion perpetua plus actual damages.
The evidence for the prosecution reveals the following:
On August 3, 1987 at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Reynaldo Pascasio, a tricycle
driver, was on his motorized tricycle parked infront of the "Big Foot" Bar located at East
Dirita, San Antonio, Zambales, near the crossroad of the National Highway and the road
leading to the U.S. Naval Communication Station at San Miguel, San Antonio, Zambales.
While there, accused Januario dela Cruz, who crossed the road, approached him and
told him "Maykadtoy ta adda ibelleng" which in English is "Come here, we shall throw
something". Responding, he went with the accused Januario dela Cruz infront of the
gate of the Guerrero Compound where the latter's companions were. From where
Reynaldo Pascasio was parked infront of the "Big Foot" Bar, the accused companions
were about eight (8) meters away across the street. Then, three (3) male persons, as
well as accused Januario dela Cruz boarded the tricycle. The three (3) companion's of
Januario dela Cruz rode inside the sidecar of the tricycle, while accused Januario dela
Cruz rode in tandem with Reynaldo Pascasio on the motorcycle of the tricycle. Of his
four (4) passengers only accused Januario dela Cruz was known to Reynaldo Pascasio,
having known him for the past three (3) years. After boarding the tricycle the persons
inside the sidecar told Reynaldo Pascasio to bring them to the terminal at Olongapo
City. However he was later told to proceed to San Narciso Zambales (p. 21, t.s.n.,
November 17, 1987). While on the way to San Narciso, Zambales, near the Elementary
School of Barangay Beddeng, San Narciso Zambales, Reynaldo Pascasio heard the shout
in the vernacular "Array" and blood spurted from the sidecar and landed on his
forearm, as well as on the steering bar of his motorcycle (p.30, Ibid). Upon hearing this,
Reynaldo Pascasio stopped his tricycle and one of the passengers in the sidecar, who
was bloodied, was brought out from the tricycle by the other two (2) passengers in the
sidecar. Once on the ground, the two(2) passengers mauled the bloodied passenger.
Later, they threw him by the roadside. While this was going on, accused Januario dela
Cruz was standing behind Reynaldo Pascasio. Afterwards, the accused Januario dela
Cruz and the two (2) unidentified persons boarded the tricycle and Januario dela Cruz
directed Reynaldo Pascasio to bring them to his (Januario dela Cruz') place (p. 26, Ibid),
leaving behind the bloodied person, whom the two (2) unidentified companions of
Januario dela Cruz threw away by the roadside, infront of the Beddeng Elementary
School.
In going to the house of accused Januario dela Cruz, accused Januario dela Cruz
directed Reynaldo Pascasio to pass through the alley behind the Mini Mart, instead of
passing through the checkpoint at the road leading to the U.S. Naval Communication
Station, and exited into the road going to the Base (p. 28, t.s.n., November 17, 1987).
Upon arrival at the house of accused Januario dela Cruz, the two (2) unidentified
passengers alighted from the tricycle and accused Januario dela Cruz washed away the
blood from the steering bar and inside the sidecar with water in a pail, using a rag,
which be got from his neighbor (p. 30, Ibid). And while accused Januario dela Cruz was
washing the tricycle, the two (2) persons went behind the house of accused Januario
dela Cruz where the wound of one of them was treated by them (p. 33, t.s.n., supra).
90
Later, after washing the tricycle, accused Januario dela Cruz gave Reynaldo Pascasio the
amount of P7.00 and the latter went home. Because he was afraid, he did not report
the incident to the police. However, five (5) days later, he was arrested by the police
and was investigated. He gave his statement to the police narrating the incident that
occurred in the evening of August 3, 1987 (Exhibit "C"). And it was after his arrest that
he learned from the father of the slain man that the latter's name was Jerry Pamoleras.
The following morning at 6:00 o'clock on August 4, 1987, Barangay Captain Ricardo
Abinsay of Barangay Beddeng, San Narciso, Zambales reported to the Station
Commander of the police station of San Narciso, Zambales his discovery of the dead
body. In turn, the Station Commander, P/Lt. Manuel Tejada, dispatched Pat. Arsenio
Agawin and Pat. Salvador Wagma to the place where the body was found. Taking the
mini-bus, the two (2) peace officers arrived at the scene infront of the Beddeng-
Mabangcal Elementary School at Barangay Beddeng, San Narciso, Zambales at about
6:30 a.m. where they came upon P/Lt. Amado Fariñas viewing the dead body of a
person, who was wearing a red undershirt (sando and a white pant bloodied, and lying
flat on his stomach on the ground. Lt. Fariñas then gave the wallet, which he took from
the pocket of the dead person's pants, to Pat. Agawin, which contained an I.D. with a
name "Jerry Reyes" (p. 7, t.s.n., January 12, 1988). Thereafter, the body was
transported to the police station of San Narciso, Zambales. On the same date in the
morning, Dr. Jaime Braga, the Rural Health Physician of the San Narciso Rural Health
Unit performed a post-mortem examination of the cadaver found infront of Beddeng-
Mabangcal Elementary School and found the following:
lacerated wound proximal 3rd arm posterior aspect (L)
— Incised wound palmar surface (L)
— Stab wound 2 cm length neck lateral (R)
— Stab wound 2 cm length medical scapular (R)
— Stab wound 2 cm length vertebral area posterior
— Lacerated wound 3 cm knee (L)
which injuries caused the cardiorespiratory arrest, and consequently, caused the death
of said person, identified through his wallet as "Jerry Reyes" (Exhibit "B"). Dr. Braga
issued a death certificate (Exhibit "A").
In the meantime, Rodolfo Pamoleras, who last saw his son at his house in Olongapo City
on August 3, 1987 was informed by his wife that his father who lives at Iba, Zambales,
has told her that their son had been missing for three (3) days already. But, somehow,
on August 6, 1987, by a stroke of Fate, Rodolfo Pamoleras' brother-in-law, a tricycle
driver, was told by a woman traveller from San Narciso, Zambales that a dead body was
found in San Narciso (p. 20, Ibid). Reacting to this information, he and his wife went to
San Narciso at about 7:00 p.m. on August 6, 1987 (p. 20, Ibid) and talked to the Chief of
Police (Station Commander) of the San Narciso INP. Because the cadaver of their son
was already buried, they and the police chief were able to identify the deceased as
their son, through the latter's picture they brought (Exhibit "E-1") and the wallet, which
contained an ID card showing the name "Jerry Reyes". The deceased was using the
family name of his mother, "Reyes", because Pamoleras is long and cannot be
contained in the identification card.
Upon learning that their son was already buried, Rodolfo Pamoleras, Sr. talked to his
wife and they agreed that the body of their son should be exhumed to determine if it
was really their son's body that was buried by the police. So, on August 7, 1987,
witnessed by the policemen of San Narciso, Zambales, the security men of the Martin
Funeral Parlor, Rodolfo Pamoleras, Sr. exhumed the body of his son, Rodolfo Pamoleras
Jr. alias "Jerry R. Reyes". When the coffin was opened, he identified the body as that of
his son through the growth at the tip of the ear, the rotten front teeth, the Red T-shirt
his son was wearing when he saw him for the last time and the shoes his son was
wearing, which belonged to him. He also identified the body in the coffin because of
the similarity of his and that of his son's facial features. Then, a photograph of the dead
body of his son inside the coffin was taken (Exhibit "E").
Because the sister of Rodolfo Pamoleras' wife was buried at Subic, Zambales, and his
wife wanted their son buried there, the remains of his son was re-buried at Subic,
Zambales. For the burial services, he spent P3,000.00 (Exhibit "C") and P3,000.00 for
expenses in the exhumation and for the nine (9) days prayer which are not supported
by receipts. 2
The version of the accused, on the other hand, is as follows:
On the other hand, as claimed by accused Januario dela Cruz, he knows prosecution
witness Reynaldo Pascasio and are friends (p. 8, t.s.n., April 5, 1988) and Reynaldo
Pascasio drives a tricycle whose route is from the town proper of San Antonio,
Zambales to the gate of the U.S. Naval Communications Facility at San Miguel, San
Antonio, Zambales; that at about 10:00 o'clock in the evening on August 3, 1987, he
was standing infront of his cousin's store located at the intersection of the National
Highway and the road leading to the U.S. Naval Communication Facility, known locally
as "crossing". He was there because he paid his indebtedness.
While standing infront of his cousin's store at West Dirita a man, who came from the
direction of the Holiday Inn (p. 14, Ibid) approached him and offered him a bottle of
beer, he was holding, but, he refused. He then asked for his name and the man gave his
name as Doming Lachingco. Thereafter, Doming Lachingco asked him if he knew
somebody who could bring someone to San Narciso. And he replied he knew a driver
named Reynaldo Pascasio, whose tricycle was parked across the street infront of the
"Big Foot" Bar and he called Reynaldo Pascasio, telling him he had a passenger (pp. 10-
11, t.s.n., April 5, 1988). After calling Reynaldo Pascasio, the latter and Doming
Lachingco talked to each other. Afterwards, Reynaldo Pascasio asked him to accompany
him in bringing his passengers to San Narciso and he acceded. When Doming Lachingco
talked to him, he was alone and did not know he had companions. But, when Doming
Lachingco boarded the tricycle, two (2) others also boarded the tricycle (p. 24, Ibid). Of
the three (3) passengers, two were tall. Doming Lachingco was the tallest, while the
third passenger was the smallest. The latter wore short pants and a red T-shirt.
On the way to San Narciso, Zambales, a commotion among passengers ensued inside
the sidecar of the tricycle. Reynaldo Pascasio, the driver, then stopped his tricycle and
the three (3) passengers, including Doming Lachingco inside the sidecar alighted. Then,
the three (3) passengers had a free-for-all fight on the ground. He noticed that Doming
Lachingco was already bloodied but the deceased was not yet bloodied. Then, all of a
sudden, he saw Doming Lachingco holding a glittering object, swinging it towards the
91
 shortest man in the group and the latter fell on the right side of the road just infront of
the Beddeng-Mabangcal Elementary School about four (4) meters from the tricycle. He
then told the tricycle driver, Reynaldo Pascasio, to leave the passengers. And, the
tricycle driver maneuvered his tricycle in order to leave his passengers in the sidecar,
but Doming Lachingco and his companion held the baggage rack (parilla) of the tricycle
and boarded the tricycle.
After coming from San Narciso, Reynaldo Pascasio drove the tricycle to his (Januario
dela Cruz) house at West Dirita, which is about one (1) kilometer from the National
Highway, because Reynaldo Pascasio told him, after coming from San Narciso, that he
would bring him home. And, instead of passing through the access road leading to the
U.S. Naval Communication Facility and the checkpoint, they passed behind the Mini-
Mart and exited into the road going to the Base. Upon arrival infront of the house of
accused Januario dela Cruz, Doming Lachingco asked Januario dela Cruz if he could
wash his hands at his gate. And after Doming Lachingco and his companion had finished
washing the tricycle of Reynaldo Pascasio, they left (p. 21, t.s.n., April 5, 1988). Then, he
went inside his house; that he did not voluntarily wash the blood from the sidecar of
the tricycle of Reynaldo Pascasio and he was threatened with death by Doming
Lachingco if he would report the incident. That was why he did not report the incident
(p. 12, t.s.n., April 5, 1988).
To corroborate the claim of Januario dela Cruz that he did not wash the tricycle of
Reynaldo Pascasio, Mercy de Guzman, a neighbor of accused Januario dela Cruz at
Purok 5, West Dirita San Antonio, Zambales, declared that between 10:00 and 11:00
o'clock in the evening on August 3, 1987, she was then at the balcony of her house
having some fresh air when accused Januario dela Cruz alighted from a tricycle. After
alighting therefrom, she saw him go inside his house. 3
In returning its verdict, the lower court relied on the testimony of Reynaldo Pascasio, who drove the tricycle
in which the stabbing occurred, who narrated in detail the tragic trip from East Dirita San Antonio, Zambales
to San Narciso, Zambales, and who implicated dela Cruz as one of the men who went on that journey.
Dela Cruz assigns a lone error committed supposedly by the trial court, that is, that it was mistaken in holding
him liable as a co-conspirator in the killing of Rodolfo Pamoleras, Jr.
As the trial court noted, there is no dispute as to the corpus delicti. Neither is it questioned that Januario dela
Cruz did not personally inflict any injury on the deceased, other than the fact that at the time the latter died,
he was in the scene of the crime. What is apparent is that it was either Doming Lachingco 4 (who has since
remained at large and hence, beyond judicial jurisdiction), or the "Doe" accused, who actually knifed the
victim. The issue then is whether or not dela Cruz may be held responsible on the theory of conspiracy.
The issue hangs on credibility of witnesses, and in this connection, this Court has time and time again held
that "credibility" is the sole province of the trial court. 5
Apart from that, the records themselves amply show that Januario dela Cruz was indeed, a co-conspirator in
the murder of Rodolfo Pamolares.
Reynaldo Pascasio's testimony was candid and straightforward, and more importantly, dela Cruz has shown
no improper motive on Pascasio's part that may have led him (Pascasio) to lie on the stand.
Dela Cruz's version that he had all along been but a chance passenger in Pascasio's tricycle and that he had
merely accompanied Lachingco, et al., and that on their way, a free-for-all had broken out leading to the fatal
stabbing, is hardly believable. First, according to him, Lachingco was a total stranger who had merely asked
him a favor (to look for a ride to San Narciso). If this were so, there was no need to go with him on that ride.
As common experience suggests, one does not simply hang around with perfect strangers. Second, he did
nothing after Lachingco had disposed of the victim's remains (laid by the roadside), and subsequently, after
they had all gone home. His own evidence does not indicate that he had indeed, thereafter sought to alert
the authorities about the murder he had witnessed, or at the very least, have Pascasio come forward to
acquit him. His behavior certainly does not speak his innocence.
On the testimony alone of Reynaldo Pascasio, this Court is convinced that Januario dela Cruz was a co-
conspirator in the murder of Rodolfo Pamoleras, Jr., and must be held as a co-principal along with the actual
killers. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it. 6 While proof of the agreement need not rest on direct evidence, the
agreement itself may be inferred from the conduct of the parties, disclosing a common understanding among
them with respect to the commission of the offense. 7 Pascasio's recital that dela Cruz was one of Lachingco's
gang, one of whom thrust a fatal stab wound on the deceased and threw his cadaver by the roadside, after
which dela Cruz instructed him, Pascasio, to take another route, and that he, dela Cruz, later washed the
dead's blood off the vehicle, are an eloquent testimony of a conspiracy in the murder of Rodolfo Pamolares,
Jr. It is also proof of treachery, in which the malefactors, without warning and with no risk to themselves, did
away with Pamolares. On this score, however, this Court can not appreciate evident premeditation as a
qualifying circumstance, because in evident premeditation, the time intervening between the plan to slay the
victim and the actual slaying must be shown. 8 As to "use of motor vehicle," the evidence indeed shows that
dela Cruz, et al. had deliberately availed themselves of a tricycle in order to consummate their dastardly act
and to use it as cover to facilitate it. 9
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G. R. L-37400 April 15,1988
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee.
vs.
SABANGAN CABATO, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Reubin L. Maraon for accused-appellant.
CORTES, J.:
Accused-appellant Sabangan Cabato appeals from the judgment of the Court of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Court) of Zamboanga del Norte finding him guilty of the crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE in Criminal
Case No. 307.
92
The facts of the case are as follows: struck d that they do not have P3,000.00; that one of the bandits struck him with a
pistol while the other boxed him that one of the bandits struck the back of his head
with a stone and his teeth fell out that the accused and his companions left the house;
In an INFORMATION dated February 12,1971, the Provincial Fiscal of Zamboanga del Norte accused Sabangan
that he noticed that wife was already dead; that he gave the stones to the police (Exh.
Cabato of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE committed as follows:
C, C-1, C-2); that after the bandits left, he untied himself, that he called for held but
nobody came; that he went to his two married sons who were living uphill; that the
That in the evening on or about the 25th day of January, 1971, ... the said accused land owned by them is two hectares; that the two bandits wore masks. [CFI Decision,
SABANGAN CABATO, conspiring, confederating and working together with two (2) pp. 5-6,] (Emphasis supplied.)
other DOES who are stin at large, all armed with firearms and stones and with intent of
illicit gain by means of force, violence and intimidation against persons, did then and
xxx xxx xxx
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter the dwelling house of one VICTOR
GUINIT and once inside attack, hold tight and squeeze the mouth of Id Victor Guinit,
and hug his wife Herminia Ames Guinit, and then rob them of cash money (coins) in the On the other hand, the accused vehemently denied his alleged participation in the gruesome crime and
amount of P300.00; ... that in pursuance to (sic) their evil motives, during and on the testified to the effect that:
occasion of said robbery, the above-named accused taking advantage of their superior
strength and of the darkness of the night to better accomplish their purpose and with
xxx xxx xxx
intent to kill by means of treachery and evident premeditation, did there and then
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, strike with stones for several times said
HERMINIA AM-ES GUINIT thereby inflicting upon her several abrasions and ...he [Cabato] knew offended party Victor Guinit and his wife since he was young; that
contusions... which caused her death on the spot;. . the home of the Guinit is one kilometer away from his house; that he visited them
before as a neighbor; that the Guinit has (sic) children named Felix and Isco who are
living at tambalang ; that he never committed the crime of robbery with homicide
xxx xxx xxx
attributed to him; that on January 25, 1971, he was gathering corn in their farm in the
interior at Balatan, Salug together with his father-in-law; that he left Tambalang bound
CONTRARY TO LAW with the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident for Balatan at 6:00 A.M., the same day; that he gathered corn and returned to
premeditation, dwelling, superior strength, and without respect due to ages of the Tambalang at 5:00 P.M. and then pastured his carabao and stayed in his house the
victims (spouses) and due to the sex of Herminia Ames Guinit [Rollo, pp. 9-101. whole night; that on January 25, 1971, in the evening, he did not know of any robbery;
that on January 26, 1971, he was informed by their neighbors of the robbery; that he
was Hold that the victims were the Guinits; that as a moslem he did not go to the Guinit
Upon arraignment, the accused, assisted by counsel, pleaded NOT GUILTY.
to give alms as they are prohibited; that be met the son of Guinit named Felix Guinit in
the house of Isco; that he went Isco Guinit to find out if the report of the robbery of the
During the hearings in the Trial Court, the prosecution, relying heavily on the eyewitness account of Victor parents of Isco is true; that Isco Guinit told him that the robbers were not Identified;
Guinit, established that: that the amount taken was P80.00; that on January 29th, he was arested at the market
of Tambalang;...[CFI Decision, pp. 12-13].
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
Offended party Victor Guinit, 69 years old, widower, testified that he knows accused
Sabangan Cabato personally; that witness pointed to accused in open court, that on Faced with the issue of whether or not the accused was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime-barged,
January 25, 1971, his wife was his only companion in their house; that at around 7:30 the Trial Court had to first settle the question concerning the positive Identification of Sabangan Cabato as
p.m., three persons came to their house while they were taking supper; that his wife one of the robbers who killed the deceased Herminia Ames Guinit.
brought food to their dog; that they have two lamps in the house, one lamp near the
bed, and another lamp brought by his wife; that the two persons [who] hugged him
Weighing and evaluating the evidence on record, the Trial Court rendered the following decision:
covered his mouth; that the robber hit his mouth with a stone causing s tooth to fell
out (sic); that one of the robbers grappled with his wife, and the mask covering the face
fell out (sic) and his wife recognized accused Sabangan Cabato; that his wife shouted. xxx xxx xxx
'Sabangan, do not kill us, we will give you the money,- that the accused was at a
distance of three meters from him; that accused Sabangan Cabato said: "Get your
There exists no doubt that accused Sabangan Cabato was clearly Identified as one of the participants in the
money; that she (deceased) said: "Victor, we will give the money in the piggy bank";
gruesome crime that took place in the residence of Victor Guinit on January 25, 1971. By his own admission,
that his wife went down; that later the deceased said: "Victor I do not know where you
accused Sabangan Cabato is well-known to the Guinit family for their houses are only one kilometer apart.
put the money; that the robbers untied him and he went downstairs; that he got the
Accused Cabato visited the house of the deceased at least two times. Besides, during the incident in question,
money and gave the same to one of the bandits; that one of the bandits said, let us go
there were two kerosene lamps in the house of Victor Guinit which illuminated their home such that the
upstairs, and got (sic) the paper bills, we want P3,000.00; that the money given to the
solicitors were clearly seen. Another factor that clinched the Identification of the accused, Sabangan Cabato,
bandits were their saving (sic) for five years consisting of coins which were proceeds
is the fact that when the deceased, Herminia Guinit grappled with the accused Cabato, the mask woman by
from the sale of the bananas; that the deceased and accused Cabato went to the
kitchen; that they told the bandits that we do not have paper bills an of the bandits

93
the accused Cabato fell so much so that the deceased exclaimed, "Sabangan do not kill us, we will give you
the money.
According to the evidence, accused Sabangan Cabato brought the deceased to the kitchen in order to compel
her to divulge the whereabouts of the P3,000.00 paper bills. But the deceased denied they had any other
money except the coins inside the bamboo tube in the approximate sum of P300.00, which led the accused,
Cabato, to strike the deceased with the stone in the head which caused cerebral hemorrhage (Exh. A) leading
to her death.
From the findings of the Sanitary Inspector who examined the injury suffered by deceased Herminia Guinit,
the cerebral hemorrhage was caused by hitting the head with a hard object presumably a stone (Exh. C, C-1,
C-2) which were (sic) found in the kitchen near the dead body.
The contention of the defense that Victor Guinit was unable to Identify any of the perpetrators for the police
blotter (Exh. 1) is devoid of merit.
According to Patrolman Mananguil and Llenes, they were informed by Victor Guinit on January 28,1971, that
accused Cabato was one of the robbers who perpetrated the crime. The investigation was conducted in the
Office of the Chief of Police and on the 29th day of January, 1971, accused Cabato was brought for
Identification in the Municipal Building of Salug. Although accused Cabato was together with-any persons,
Victor Guinit pinpointed him as one of the robbers.
The accused defense is alibi, claiming that he was in Barrio Balakan, in the house of his in-laws gathering corn.
But his testimony must be rejected for lack of sufficient corroboration. Outside of his lone testimony, no
other witness was presented to substantiate his alibi. [CFI Decision, pp. 15-17.] (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
Maintaining his innocence, accused appeals the decision assetting that his guilt has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt. His Identification by the prosecution witness Victor Guinit allegedly lacked definiteness and
concreteness not to mention that it was tainted with serious inconsistencies [Brief for the Accused, p. 1].
These alleged. inconsistencies painstakingly narated by accused.-appellant cannot overturn the finding of
guilt by the Trial Court.
Accused-appellant alleged that Victor Guinit, in his cross-examination, declared that he recognized the
accused when the place of cloth which covered the latter's mouth fell down as a result of the grappling by the
deceased [TSN, June 8, 1972, p. 2]1. But in his examination in chief, he testified that he recognized the,
accused as early as when the robbers were still at the recognized the accused as early as when the robbers
were still at the door [TSN, Jure 8, 1972, p, 14]. This is allegedly incredible because when the robbers were at
the door, they still had their marks on Brief for Accused, p, 4].
A close perusal of the direct examination of Victor Guinit would show that the Identification of Cabato was
indeed made when the latter's mask fell down.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, what did you do when you noticed that after your wife
opened the door, Sabangan Cabato bumped your wife with two
(2) other persons?
A The two (2) other persons passed towards me and hugged me;
one of them covered my mouth with his palm and I was hit by a
piece[of stone] on my nape and one of my teeth fell down.
Q Now what about this Sabangan Cabato, what did he do?
A He grappled with my wife.
Q And what happened while [he was.] grappling with your -wife?
A During the course of the grappling, my wife happened to
scratch Sabangan Cabato's face and the piece of cloth used as
mask fell
Q Now, how far were you from your wife and Sabangan Cabato,
while the two (2) were grappling each other?
A About three (3) meters.
Q Now, from that distance, were you able to recognize and
Identify the person grappling with your wife?
A Yes.
Q How were you able to recognize him?
A Because his mask fell down. [TSN, June 8, 1971, pp. 14-15.]
xxx xxx xxx
Accused-appellant further pointed out that Guinit, in his cross-examination, testified that he was unconscious
for 20 minutes after he was struck with a stone by one of the robbers [TSN, June 8, 1972, P. 24). Accused
alleged that if Guinit was unconscious, it was physically impossible for him to see what happened in the
kitchen between the deceased and the accused nor to see the falling down of the mask.
However, the Identification of the accused was made by Victor Guinit even before the former proceeded to
the kitchen with the deceased. The sequence of events as culled from the records would reveal that when the
deceased was opening the door to feed the dog, three masked men bumped her on their way into the house.
Once inside, two of the masked men hugged Victor Guinit while the third grappled with Herminia. During the
course of the grappling, the wife happened to scratch the face of the masked man as a result of which the
mask fen down. This was when the Identity of the accused was revealed to the couple with the wife
exclaiming, "Sabangan, do not kill us. We will give you the money." [TSN, June 8,1972, p. 15.] At that precise
time, Guinit was only three meters away from his wife. Afterwards, Guinit proceeded to where the money
was hidden then he went back into the house to hand over the money. Not being satisfied, the robbers
demanded for paper bills which the couple denied possessing. This was when the two robbers whose
Identities were not revealed, beat Guinit while Cabato went to the kitchen with Herminia.
The other inconsistencies alleged by the accused to buttress his appeal centered on minor details.
94
Conceding that there may have been inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution, these far from
being badges of fraud and fabrication, can justifiably be considered as a manifestation of good faith and a
confirmation of the fact that the witness was not a rehearsed witness. It is a truism that the most candid
witness oftentimes makes mistakes but such honest lapses do not necesssarily impair his intrinsic credibility.
[People v. Alcantara, L-26967, 33 SCRA 812; People v. Canada, G. R. No. 63728, Sept. 15, 1986, 144 SCRA 121].
Inconsistencies in the testimony of witnesses due only to inaccurate expressions or honest mistake or
observations are not fatal. [People v. Demalate, L-38960, March 30, 1982, 113 SCRA 353; People vs. Delavin,
G.R. Nos. 73762-63, Feb. 27, 1987, 148 SCRA 257]. When they lie.
Further, there was not even an iota of evidence presented by the accused-appellant ascribing to prosecution
witness Guinit any motive or intent to implicate the former as the person who killed his wife. The testimonies
of both the prosecution and the defense, in fact would picture the Guinits and the Cabatos as neighbors on
good terms. As the accused himself narrated, the Guinits were neighbors whom he used to visit since he was
young. In this light, Guinit's testimony becomes more credible. As was held in one recent case:
xxx xxx xxx
We have no doubt about the credibility of Rolando Blanco [the witness"). ... The
recorda do not show any improper motive on his part to falsely implicate the appellants
in this diabolic crime. In fact, Antonio Guilbao is his first cousin. They were, all positively
identified by Blanco. [People v. Ladrera, G.R. 55339, May 21, 1987, 150 SCRA 113, 123-
124.]
Accused's admissions would negate any improper motive for Guinit to testify falsely against him. In this
Summing up, the alleged inconsistencies brought forth by the accused boil down to the question of the
eyewitness' credibility.
Time and again, it has been held that the Supreme Court respects the trial court's findings on credibility of
witnesses [People v. Palon, L-33271, Feb. 20,1984,120 SCRA 529; People v. Dava Nos. L-41642-41645, May 15,
1987, 149 SCRA 582]. The appellate court will not disturb the factual findings of the lower court for the latter
is in a better position to gauge the credibility of eyewitnesses. [People v. Mercado, G.R. No. 65152, Aug.
30,1984,131 SCRA 501] "The matter of assigning value to declarations at the witness stand is best and most
completely performed by a trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates can weigh such testimony in the light
of the defendant's demeanor, conduct and attitude at the time and is thereby placed in a more competent
position to discriminate between the true and the false" [People v. Bermudez, L-30931, June 28, 1974, 57
SCRA 629, People v. Laganzon, L-47118, May 21, 1974, 129 SCRA 333, 347].
In this case, the decision of the trial court clearly outlined the evidence for both prosecution and defense. The
trial judge had observed the demeanor of both prosecution and defense witnesses on the witness stand and
found nothing amiss with the credibility of the prosecution witness.
Accused interposed alibi as his defense claiming that he was in Balakan gathering corn with his wife and in-
law [TSN, Dec. 13,1972, PP. 10-11].
Considering however that the Identification of the accused was positively established, accused's defense of
alibi becomes weak.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses by an accused especially if there is direct testimony of an eyewitness
Identifying the accused as the culprit. [U.S. v. Garcia, 9 Phil. 434 (1907); People v. Coronado, G.R. No. 68932,
Oct. 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 250; People v. Inot, 36790, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 322]. It is rarely given credence
because it is easily fabricated [People v. Millarpe G.R. No. 69281, Feb. 25,1985,134 SCRA 555; People v. Petil,
G.R. No. 70223, Mar. 31, 1987,149 SCRA 92]. Uncorroborated alibi, as in this case, is not credible against
positive Identification (People v. Jones, G.R. No. 61165, June 24,1985, 134 SCRA 166; People v. Canturia, G.R.
No. 67598, Oct. 11, 1985,139 SCRA 280]. Alibi does not deserve much credit as it was established only by the
accused himself without any corroboration from his wife or in-law.
xxx xxx xxx
Absence of such corroboration, in the light of the categorical statement of one of the
victims, . . . , that he saw [accused] stab Luisita Apostol because there was a lighted
post at the place of the incident ... is fatal to the defense. [People v. dela Cruz, G.R. Nos.
71044-45, Mar. 16,1987, 148 SCRA 582, 589].
xxx xxx xxx
The Court now addresses itself to the aggravating circumstances alleged by the plaintiff-appellee to have
attended the commission of the crime.
The prosecution argues that since "the attack was by a robust man of 29 years with a huge stone against an
ageing defenseless woman" (Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 15], abuse of supe prior strength should aggravate
the crime.
The records of the case are bereft of any information with respect to the physical conditions of both the
accused and the victims. Thus, abuse of superior strength cannot be considered. This aggravating
circumstance depends on the age, size and strength of the parties. It is considered whenever there is a
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the aggressor, assessing a situation of superiority of
strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor which is selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out
of proportion to the means of the defense available to the person attacked [People v. Cabiling, L-38091 Dec.
17, 1976, 74 SCRA 285, 303].
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that there was indeed a notorious inequality between the ages,
sizes and strength of the antagonists and that these notorious advantages were purposely souhgt for or used
by the accused to achieve his ends.
However, the Court considers dwelling as an aggravating circumstance since it has been proven that, indeed
robbery with homicide was committed inside the house of the offended parties. Dwelling is aggravating in
robbery with violence or intimidation because this class of robbery can be committed without the necessity of
trespassing the sanctity of the offended party's house [People v. Mercado, L-39511, April 28,1980, 97 SCRA
232; People v. Dajaresco, L-32701, June 19, 1984, 129 SCRA 576; People's vs. Gapasin, G.R. No. 52017, Oct.
27, 1986, 145 SCRA 178].
Likewise, the Court considers disguise as another aggravating circumstance. The accused, together with two
others, wore masks to cover their faces. There could have been no other purpose for this but to conceal their
Identities particularly for Cabato who was very much known to the offended parties. The fact that the mask
subsequently fell down thus paving the way for Cabato's Identification will not render this aggravating
circumstance inapplicable. In a recent case, the Court held 'that Darwin Veloso and his five (5) companions
wore masks [which eventually fell down] to conceal their Identities during the commission of the crime
constitutes disguise" [People v. Veloso, L-32900, Feb. 25, 1982, 112 SCRA 173, 182].
95
Robbery with homicide under Art. 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code is punishable with reclusion perpetua to
death. However, in view of Sec. 19 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution the supreme penalty of death can no
longer be imposed.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED insofar as the judgment sentenced the accused to
suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA but is MODIFIED insofar as the civil indemnity is concerned which
is hereby increased to P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 112015 May 26, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RENATO DAEN, JR., a.k.a. "NONOY DAING," accused-appellant.
FELICIANO, J.:
Renato Daen, Jr., Raul Henson, Roland Henson, Francisco Suyat, Noning Suyat and Nonoy Onse were charged
with the murder of Mario Ponce, Jr. in an Information which read as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of September, 1990 in Quezon City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with
treachery, abuse of superior strength and evident premeditation, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon
the person of MARIO PONCE, JR y LAZO, by then and there, stabbing the latter on the
different parts of his body with the use of bladed weapons, thereby inflicting upon said
MARIO PONCE JR y LAZO, serious and mortal wounds which were the direct and
immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the
said victim, in such amount as maybe awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil
Code.1
Only Renato Daen, Jr. and Raul Henson were tried, as the rest of the group charged remained at large. After
the prosecution had rested its case, counsel for accused Raul Henson filed a Demurrer to Evidence, which the
trial court granted in an order dated 8 February 1993 dismissing the Information as against Raul Henson, In
due time, the trial court found the remaining accused Renato Daen Jr. guilty of the crime charged, sentenced
him to reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000.00 as actual
damages plus P100,000.00 as moral damages.2
From the evidence submitted to it, the trial court found that in the afternoon of 9 September 1990, the victim
Mario Ponce, Jr. complained to Virgilio Yap, Barangay Captain of Escopa I, Project 4, Quezon City, that his
(Mario's) rooster had been stolen. Ponce pointed to "Nonoy Daing," Nonoy Onse, Francisco Suyat and Noning
Suyat as the persons who had probably taken his rooster. These four (4) persons were then attending a
birthday party.
The four (4) pointed out by Pence were called by Barangay Captain Yap for a conference. At this meeting,
which was held near Ponce's residence, Ponce was unable to pinpoint who among the group of four (4) had
actually taken his rooster. No one in the group admitted having taken the bird. The meeting ended at around
5:00 p.m.
The group of Renato Daen returned to the place where the party (basically a drinking session) was going on, a
place about ten (l0) houses away from the residence of Mario Ponce. The trial court summarized the
succeeding events in the following manner.
At around 9:00 in the evening, Nonoy and Noning Suyat left the party uttering: "Bakit
sa akin ibinibintang ang nawawalang manok?" "Nakakainis yung taong yon." This was
the version of accused Nonoy Daing whose real name is Renato Daing [should be Daen].
According, however, to Lamberto Vergara, not an accused here but also in the
aforementioned group of male persons, the accused Noning Suyat and Nonoy Onse
were the ones who left the drinking session at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening.
As the two [did not return] for quite a while, their friends, namely, accused Renato
[Daen] and Ronald Henson followed them to the house of Mario Ponce. They were in
turn followed by Lamberto Vergara and Roberto Nabual to the same place, that is, in
front of the 2-storey residence where Mario Ponce lives.
There an altercation ensued and someone in the group of those who went to the Ponce
house from their drinking session at the birthday party stabbed Mario Pence. Mario
sustained two frontal stab wounds at the right costal region. The neighbors helped in
bringing Mario to the hospital in a tricycle but he expired early next morning.3
According to the Medico Legal Report submitted by the prosecution, the victim, Mario Ponce, Jr., sustained
two (2) frontal stab wounds at the right costal region..4
The trial court was thus presented with the problem of determining who, among the several persons
temporarily congregated in front of the house of Mario Ponce, Jr., had in fact stabbed Ponce to death.
The prosecution presented Remily Ponce, sister of the deceased victim, and she testified that she was at the
balcony of their house with her cousin Bernardino Lazo when she saw the group of Renato Daen having a
heated argument with her brother right in front of their house and just below the balcony. The argument
erupted into a commotion, but she did not see who had stabbed her brother.
Prosecution witness Bernardino Lazo, a cousin of the victim, was more specific. Lazo testified that he was at
the balcony of the second floor of their house and saw the whole incident. He declared that he saw Noning
Suyat and Mario Ponce talking and drinking with each other just outside the Ponce house, when Ronald
Henson soon followed by other members of Renato Daen's group, arrived. A commotion ensued soon after
the group's arrival. Renato Daen and five (5) other persons surrounded the victim and someone held the
latter's hands. Renato Daen then stabbed Mario Ponce twice with his left hand. Witness Lazo also testified
that among the group, he saw two (2) persons armed with knives, to wit: Renato Daen and Nonoy Onse.
96
Renato Daen denied that he had stabbed the victim. Daen claimed that Noning Suyat, and not he (Renato
Daen) had knifed the victim in the stomach. The testimony of the defense witnesses was summed up by the
trial court in its decision:
According to herein accused Renato "Nonoy" Daing [should be Daen], he, Nonoy Onse
and Ronald Henson followed Nonoy [should be Noning] Suyat to the house of Mario
Ponce. There they saw Suyat and Mario arguing. Mario then pushed Suyat so violently
that Suyat fell to the ground. Suyat drew his knife and lunged at Mario's stomach, After
that, Suyat told the three (Daing, Henson and Onse) not to tell anyone and threatened
them if they do not follow his advice.
Mr. Lamberto Vergara, another defense witness, testified that [Noning] Suyat together
with Nonoy Onse left the party that night. When they did not return, Renato [Daen]
and Ronald Henson were asked by the celebrant to follow the two. Vergara followed
suit.
Mr. Vergara saw Suyat and Mario talking while Henson was standing nearby and [Daen]
and Onse were conversing with each other. Then at a certain point of their
conversation Mario said to Ronald Henson: "Putang ina mo." Ronald went towards
Mario but Suyat stopped Ronald Henson. It was then that Mario pushed Suyat who fell
down and hit a wall. When Suyat stood up he pulled out a knife and stabbed Mario.
According to Mr. Vergara, the victim was stabbed only once but Suyat only. He saw this
when he turned his head as he was then leaving the place when Mario said: "Putang
ina mo."
A third defense witness Robert Nabual, testified that it was Suyat, Ronald Henson and
Nonoy Daing who returned to the house of Mario Ponce from where the birthday party
was being held. He followed the trio. When Mr. Nabual arrived at Mario Ponce's house
he saw [Noning] Suyat and Mario Ponce having an argument. Then Mario pushed
[Noning] Suyat who fell on the ground. [Noning] then stood up and stabbed Mario.
Nonoy Daing was there during that whole time at a store buying cigarette.
After [Noning] Suyat has stabbed Mario, Rodel Henson also stabbed Mario who fell
down. Thereafter, according to Mr. Nabual, Suyat and Henson ran away. These two
accused like their co-accused, with the exception of Raul Henson (a brother of Rodel)
and Renato [Daen] having remained at-large to date.
According to Mr. Nabual, accused Renato [Daen] was also shocked by the incident so he
had to help [Daen] home after the body of Mario was taken by a tricycle to the
hospital.5
Renato Daen, Jr. is now before this Court appealing his conviction, claiming that the court a quo had erred:
(1) in convicting [him] of the crime of
murder on the sole basis of the biased
testimony of prosecution witness
Bernardino Lazo, cousin of the deceased
Mario Ponce, Jr.; and
(2) in convicting [him] of the crime of
murder because neither treachery nor
evident premeditation had attended the
killing, contrary to the conclusion of the
trial court.
In respect of the first supposed error, we note that the trial court had explicitly appraised the conflicting
testimony of the prosecution and defense witnesses and had carefully concluded that prosecution witness
Mr. Bernardino Lazo was more credible than the defense witnesses:
After a considerable thought and reflection on the conflicting evidence the court is of
the opinion that the testimony of Mr. Bernardino Lazo is more credible than that of
Renato [Daen], Lamberto Vergara, and Renato Nabual.
First. The testimonies of the three defense witnesses are contradictory to each other on
the vital fact of who returned to the house of Mario Ponce to confront him. Accused
[Daen] said that it was Suyat alone who left the party. It was only much later when he,
Ronald Henson and Onse followed Suyat.
But according to Mr. Vergara, it was Suyat and Onse who left the party and it was only
much later, on request of the celebrant, that [Daen] and Henson followed suit.
But then, according to Mr. Nabual, it was Suyat, Henson, and [Daen] who left the party
and then Mr. Nabual followed them to the Ponce house.
Second. According to [Daen], Suyat stabbed Mario only once. He saw no one else who
stabbed Mario. This was also the testimony of Vergara.
Yet, the medical findings show that Mario was stabbed twice.
Mr. Nabual testified that it was Suyat and Ronald Henson who stabbed Mario once
each and then the duo ran away.
There is here again a contradiction about a vital portion of the incident at bar among
the defense witnesses.
Third. According to Mr. Nabual, there were two persons who stabbed Mario, namely,
Suyat followed by Ronald Henson. But according to Mr. Vergara and accused [Daen] it
was only Suyat who stabbed Mario. This is once more a major contradiction.
From the foregoing major inconsistencies of the defense witnesses thus easily gleans a
great motive to move [Daen] away from the case.
Yet, it is quite clear that [Daen] was one of those who, after drinking a good amount of
wine had returned to the house of Mario with several others evidently to confront
Mario for suspecting their group of stealing his rooster. The excuse offered that [Daen]
merely wanted to fetch Suyat back to the party is a limp one. For, admittedly [Daen]
never even bothered to bring Suyat back to the party as, according to [Daen], he merely
watched from a store while Mario and Suyat were arguing. And this excuse is even
97
 unbelievable because [Daen] admitted on cross that he was just right beside Mario's
side.
The testimony of Lazo, although a cousin of the victim is the more credible one. It was
delivered frankly and naturally. Mr. Lazo's lack of ulterior motive is disclosed quite
clearly by the fact that he frankly relieved accused Raul Henson of any criminal
responsibility although Raul is a brother of accused Ronald Henson who according to
defense witness Nabual stabbed Mario.6
The defense has presented to this Court neither factual circumstance nor argument which would compel it to
overturn the conclusions reached above by the trial court.
This Court has ruled often enough that blood relationship of a witness to the victim does not by itself impair
the credibility of the former.7 The circumstance that Bernardino Lazo was a cousin of the unfortunate Mario
Ponce does not ipso facto make Lazo a biased witness whose testimony must be discarded. To warrant
rejection of the testimony of a relative; it must be clearly shown that, independently of the relationship, the
testimony was inherently improbable or defective or that improper or evil motives had moved the witness
falsely to incriminate the appellant.8Appellant Renato Daen did not do so.
Instead, appellant Renato Daen pointed to certain claimed inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution
witness Bernardino Lazo which, the defense contended, rendered Lazo's testimony of doubtful veracity.
Firstly, Lazo testified that he was alone on the balcony of his home when he witnessed the stabbing of Mario
Ponce, while Remily Ponce had testified that she was also on the same balcony with Lazo at that time.
Secondly, Lazo stated that when he spoke to the victim, the latter was already unable to talk. On cross-
examination, however, Lazo said that the victim was able to say "Nasaksak ako." Further, appellant
contended that Lazo, who had testified that he had witnessed the whole incident, did not know in what
specific part of the body Ponce had sustained the stab wounds.
We have examined the record of this case, and we consider that the inconsistencies alleged by the defense in
respect of the testimony of Bernardino Lazo, are more apparent than real. Further, to the extent that
inconsistencies were in fact shown, they appear to the Court to relate to details of peripheral significance
which do not negate or dissolve the positive identification by Lazo of Renato Daen as the perpetrator of the
crime.
Thus, while witness Lazo had stated that he was alone on the balcony when he observed the commotion and
the stabbing below, and while witness Remily Ponce had declared that she was with her cousin Lazo on the
balcony at that time, neither statement put in question the presence of eyewitness Bernardino Lazo at the
critical time and place. Both witnesses agreed and in fact confirmed that Lazo was indeed on the balcony of
the Ponce house at the time of the stabbing. At most, the presence of Remily Ponce might perhaps have been
questioned by appellant Daen; but this would not offer any real comfort to appellant since Remily could not
and did not testify as to the identity of the attacker who had stabbed her brother.
In respect of the second supposed inconsistency, Bernardino Lazo had testified that immediately after being
stabbed, Mario Ponce went up to the house and told his stunned presence relatives that he had been
stabbed. When, however, Lazo spoke to the victim, Mario was no longer able to respond. 9 Remily Ponce
corroborated Lazo's testimony on this point. Remily stated that after the commotion in front of their house
had erupted, her brother struggled upstairs, told their family that he had been stabbed, and then collapsed
on the floor. 10
The failure of Lazo specifically to state in what particular part of the body Mario Ponce had been stabbed by
appellant Daen, did not render Lazo's testimony either incredible or doubtful. Time and again this Court has
acknowledged that different human minds react differently when confronted with a sudden and shocking
event. A witness may sometimes ignore certain details which at the time appeared to him as insignificant but
which, to another person under the same circumstances, would seem noteworthy.
The stabbing to death of Mario Ponce had occurred on 9 September 1990, about two (2) years before the trial
of the case began in 1992. Considering the lapse of time between the occurrence of the incident and the
hearings on the criminal case, one can hardly fault the witnesses if they are unable to narrate the details of
the occurrence with absolute accuracy and completeness. A witness is not expected to remember an
occurrence with perfect recollection down to insignificant and minute details. 11 In People v. Santito, Jr., 12 the
Court had noted that:
Testimonial discrepancies could be caused by the natural fickleness of memory which
tend to strengthen, rather than weaken, credibility as they erase any suspicion of
rehearsed testimony. It would have been more suspicious if the witness had been able
to pinpoint with clarity or describe with precision the exact sequence of events. The
most candid witness oftentimes makes mistakes but such honest lapses do not
necessarily impair his intrinsic credibility. 13
The Court, however, is unable to accept the trial court's holding that the killing was attended by treachery.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance is properly found when two (2) conditions concur: (1) the employment
of means; methods, or manner of execution which would ensure the offender's safety from defensive or
retaliatory acts on the part of the offended party, that is, that the latter had no opportunity to defend himself
or react against the offender; and (2) that such means, methods, or manner of execution had been
deliberately or consciously chosen. 14 In the case at bar, the prosecution did not, to the mind of the Court,
establish the presence of the second condition. Although the testimony of prosecution witness Lazo tended
to show that the victim had been surrounded by appellant Renato Daen and five (5) others, one of whom had
pinned down the victim's hands, there was no showing that such manner of execution had been deliberately
chosen, designed and brought about. Neither can it be contended that the attack upon Mario Ponce was
sudden and unexpected, without the slightest provocation on his part. The evidence showed that the
stabbing incident had been immediately preceded by confrontation between the victim on the one hand and
the appellant's group on the other, and that the victim had in fact suddenly shoved back one of the group
with such force that the latter fell to the ground. It appears to the Court that, all the circumstances
considered, the stabbing was probably the result more of a sudden impulse of the moment generated by the
altercation during the confrontation, than the outcome of conscious design or choice on the part of appellant
Daen and his group. We believe that the prosecution failed to establish with moral certainty the presence of
treachery in this case. The well-settled rule is that any circumstance which would qualify a killing to murder
must be proved as indubitably as the killing itself. 15
Although the Information had charged evident premeditation on the part of the accused, the trial court did
not find the presence of that circumstance. Indeed, the elements of this modifying circumstance were clearly
wanting in the instant case.
Nevertheless, we find that the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength, as alleged in
the Information, attended the killing of Ponce. Where it is shown that the attack had not been made
with alevosia, the number of appellant's group and the concertedness of their acts vis-a-vis a defenseless
person may constitute abuse of superior force. 16 In the present case, appellant Daen undeniably took
advantage of the presence of members of his group, which presence facilitated the stabbing of Mario Ponce.
Appellant's group numbered more than five (5) male persons, two (2) of whom were armed with bladed
weapons: the victim Mario Ponce was unarmed, surrounded by this group and his hand were held on to by at
least one member of the same group as Daen lunged at him with a knife. The slaying of Mario Ponce must still
be characterized as murder.
98
Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal, 17 murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period
to death. There being no generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance, that penalty in its medium period,
that is, reclusion perpetua is properly imposable.
Turning to the civil aspect of the crime, the indemnity for death to which the heirs of Mario Ponce, Jr. are
entitled, should be raised to P50,000.00 in consonance with recent jurisprudence of the Court. The award by
the trial court of P30,000.00 as actual damages should, upon the other hand, be reduced to P3,500.00 which
is the only amount that was evidenced by a receipt. 18 The award of moral damages is subsumed in the civil
indemnity for death; to the extent, however, that the award exceeds P50,000.00, it is bereft of sufficient
factual basis.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding Renato Daen, Jr. guilty of the crime of murder and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, is hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant is ordered to pay
the heirs of Mario Ponce the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for death; and another amount of
P3,500.00 in concept of actual damages.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135065. August 8, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BENNY CABANGCALA y ABRASIA, RENATO CABANGCALA
y ABRASIA alias RENE, and DANILO CABANGCALA y ABRASIA alias DANNY, accused-appellants.
DECISION
MELO, J.:
Before this Court on automatic review is the judgment rendered by Branch 51 of the Regional Trial
Court of the First Judicial Region stationed in Tayug, Pangasinan, sentencing to death two of herein accused-
appellants, as well as the appeal of the third accused-appellant who was still a minor at the time of the
commission of the crime of murder.
The Information charged as follows:
That on or about the 7th day of February, 1997, in the evening, at Brgy. Pangangaan, municipality of
Umingan, province of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, armed with a bamboo, and with the use of superior strength and evident
premeditation, and taking advantage of nighttime, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, strike, maul, box and hit one DIONISIO PASCUAL, inflicting
upon the latter mortal wound on his head and different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of DIONISIO PASCUAL.
CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Record, p. 1.)
The antecedent facts are summarized as Counterstatement of the Facts in the People's Brief in this
wise:
On February 7, 1997, at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, Rovellano Abrasia, fifteen years old, testified
that he and his first degree cousins, the Cabangcala brothers, Benny, Rene and Danny (appellants herein), had
just finished cutting cogon in the mountains of Barangay Ricos, Umingan, Pangasinan. He [Rovellano]
accompanied Danny to the barber shop of Merced Abrasia in Barangay Pangangaan of the same municipality
(pp. 2-6 & 8, tsn. Aug. 14, 1997; pp. 2-3, tsn., Sept. 5, 1997).
While having his haircut, Danny saw the victim Dionisio "Isio" Pascual drinking gin with Anciong Abrasia and
Quisot Camacho in front of the house of Corazon Morante (pp. 4-6, tsn., Aug. 14, 1997). Thereupon, Danny
pointed to the victim and told Rovellano " that man is Isio Pascual" (pp. 7-8, Ibid.).
Later, Rovellano and Danny went to the latter's house, some 100 meters from Morante's place, where they
drank gin together with Benny and Rene (pp. 13-14, tsn. Sept. 1, 1997; pp. 5 to 5-A; tsn., Sept. 3, 1997). There,
Rovellano overheard the Cabangcala brothers talking about the victim (p. 14, tsn., Sept. 1, 1997). Rovellano
recalled that a week before, Mario Cabangcala, appellant's younger brother, told him that he had a quarrel
with the victim's son (p. 13, tsn., Sept. 2, 1997). At around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, that same day, Benny
announced a plan to kill the victim (p. 20, ibid.) The four continued drinking until 10:00 o'clock in the evening
during which period Danny would occasionally go out to verify if the victim was still at Morante's place (pp. 2,
6 to 8, tsn. Sept. 3, 1997). Danny reported to the group that the victim was still there lying down while his
drinking buddies Anciong and Quisot had already gone home (pp. 5 to 7, ibid.).
The Cabangcala brothers then proceeded to execute their plan and, together with Rovellano, waited for the
victim at a place halfway within the 100 meter distance between the house of Morante and the Cabangcalas,
along a footpath where the expected victim would use in going home (p. 8, id.). When the group spotted the
victim, the latter was bidding goodbye to Morante saying, "Mare, I will go home now" (p. 7, id..) Immediately,
Benny and Danny went downhill to cut a piece of bamboo about one (1) meter long (p. 9, id.).
As the victim was approaching, Rovellano run and hid behind a " buri palm" (p. 14, tsn. Sept. 5, 1997). The
Cabangcala brothers positioned themselves under a bamboo groove around five (5) meters away from
Rovellano (p. 10, tsn. Sept. 3, 1997; p. 14, tsn. Sept. 5, 1997.)
The victim stopped on the rice paddy about four [4] meters from Rovellano (pp. 13 to 14, tsn. Sept. 5, 1997).
Rovellano noticed that the victim had a companion whom he did not recognize but who immediately fled
perhaps sensing danger from the encounter (pp. 9 to 10, & 14, tsn. Sept. 3, 1997). Benny approached the
victim and struck him twice with the bamboo hitting the latter on the left cheek and the neck (p. 15, tsn. Aug.
14, 1997). The victim fell, after which Danny and Rene joined Benny in mauling the victim (pp. 15 to 16, ibid.).
The victim pleaded for his life saying Please have mercy on me. Don't kill me" (p. 17, tsn. Aug. 14, 1997). But
the mauling continued. At one point Danny uttered "Nagado nga ammomon. No saan nga diay anak mo nga
pinangpakpak na kaniak saanak nga agibales"; meaning Nonsense, had not your son clubbed me I would not
avenge" (ibid.).
When the victim was rendered unconscious, Rene carried him towards the field east of Danny's house (pp. 17
& 19, tsn. id.). There, the victim was mauled further with the piece of bamboo carried by Benny (p. 5, tsn.
Sept. 5, 1997). Thereafter, Rovellano accompanied Danny in getting a sled where they loaded the victim and
brought him to the mountain of Barangay Ricos (p. 19, tsn. Aug. 14, 1997). Using shovels, the Cabangcala
99
brothers dug a pit where they dumped the victim and covered it with soil (pp. 20 to 21, ibid.). Thereafter, they
all went home (p. 21, id.).
On March 14, 1997, the victim' s brother, Fulgencio, and daughter Jennifer, went to the Umingan Police
Station and reported to the police that the victim had been missing since February 7, 1997 (p. 3-4, tsn. Oct. 6,
1997). SPO1 Jeremias Fernandez conducted an investigation in Luna Este but failed to obtain favorable results
(p. 5, id.).
However, ten (10) days thereafter, on March 24, 1997, Fulgencio returned to the station with a certain Danilo
Abrasia who disclosed that he saw the victim sometime in February 1997 in Barangay Pangangaan being
mauled by the Cabangcala brothers (id.). Hence, SPO1 Fernandez went to Barangay Pangangaan where a
secret informant told him that a certain Rovellano Abrasia had knowledge about the missing person (p.
6, id.). SPO1 Fernandez found Rovellano that night at a certain bakery in the poblacion of Tayug,
Pangasinan (id.). When confronted by the police, Rovellano admitted that he was with the Cabangcala
brothers when the latter killed the victim in Barangay Pangangaan (pp. 6- 7, id.). The police, thereafter,
invited Rovellano to the police station where he executed his statement at around 4:00 o'clock in the morning
the following day, March 25, 1997 (pp. 7 to 8, id.; Exh. A., pp. 11-12, Record).
On March 25, 1997, upon being told by Rovellano of the exact place where the victim was buried, SPO1
Fernandez proceeded there together with Rovellano, Fulgencio Pascual, some members of the Umingan
Police, and Barangay officials of the mountainous area of Barangay Ricos and reached the place at around
11:00 o'clock in the morning (pp. 8-9, tsn. Oct. 6, 1997). A cadaver was exhumed with the face still complete
which Fulgencio identified as that of his brother Dionisio (p. 9, id., see also pictures in pp. 41, 42 & 43,
Record). The cadaver was thereafter brought to the municipal hall and thereafter to the cemetery for autopsy
(p. 10, id.).
Immediately, SPO1 Fernandez went to the house of Benny Cabangcala with the Barangay Captain of Barangay
Pangangaan (pp. 20 & 21, id.) SPO1 Fernandez saw the three (3) appellants in the house of Benny about to
leave because there were (3) traveling bags and said appellants were selling a carabao to a buyer from
Barangay Prado (p. 22, id.). With the coordination of the said barangay captain, SPO1 Fernandez was able to
invite the Cabangcala brothers to the police station to shed light on the killing of Dionisio Pascual (p. 20, id.).
The next day, on March 26, 1997, SPO1 Fernandez prepared a Special Report on his investigation (Exh. E, p.
14, Record). At around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of that same day, Dr. Thelma Busto, Rural Health
Physician of Umingan, Pangasinan, examined the cadaver and prepared the following post-mortem findings:
Post-Mortem Findings:
1. Head -multiple fracture of the skull
2. Other parts of the body was in state of decomposition.
CAUSE OF DEATH:
Cerebral Hemorrhage sec. to fracture of the skull.
(Exhibit C, p. 16, Record)
Dr. Busto noted that when the cadaver was brought to her the skin was still intact although it was soft,
tearing and moist. However, the face was still recognizable (p. 5, tsn. Oct 1, 1997). She prepared a schematic
diagram showing multiple fractures with skull, 10 at the back, 4 to 5 at the frontal crown, and 2 on each
parietal area (pp. 5-7, id.; Exh. D, p. 15, Record).
The victim's family thereafter took care of his funeral and burial (pp. 3 to 6, tsn. Sept. 26, 1997; p. 26, tsn.
Sept. 16, 1997).
Jennifer Pascual Espiritu, one of the victim's daughters, recalled that the last time she saw her father alive
was on February 7, 1997. The day before it, on February 6, 1997, the victim came to her house in Barangay
Luna Este and went fishing with her neighbor. At night, the victim slept in her house (p. 25, tsn. Sept. 16,
1997). In the morning of February 7, she saw the victim going home to Barangay L Paz taking the route of
Barangay Pangangaan (pp. 25 to 26, id.). When she saw her father again was on March 26, 1997, his remains
were already in a coffin (p. 26, id).
Dinisio Pascual, Jr. never saw his father again after he left their place on January 8, 1997 (p. 12 to 13, tsn. Oct.
10, 1997). He had to leave for Manila and stay there for about four (4) months because he knew that the
Cabangcala brothers planned to kill him (p. 12, id.) on account of his violent encounters with them on
December 25, 1996 during the wedding party of a certain Josephine Cabanting in Barangay Luna Este where
Dionisio, Jr. had boxed Mario Cabangcala, appellants' younger brother because the latter tried to hit him with
a bottle of " beer grande" when he refused to buy beer for them (pp. 4 to 6, id.).Dionisio, Jr. felt very strongly
that the he was the reason why the Cabangcala brothers killed his father.
(Rollo, pp. 149-157.)
On the basis of the foregoing facts, the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction, disposing
thusly:
WHEREFORE, guilt having been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the Court hereby convicts the herein
accused of the crime of evidently premeditated MURDER defined and penalized under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No.7659, .with the circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and nighttime aggravating the offense.
Accordingly, and pursuant to Article 63 of the same code, the Court hereby sentences the accused BENNY
CABANGCALA and RENATO CABANGCALA to suffer the penalty of DEATH.
In regard to the accused DANILO CABANGCALA alias "Danny," the Court applies section 22 of Republic Act
7659 and Article 68, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of from 12 years of prision mayor maximum as MINIMUM to
17 years and one day of reclusion temporal maximum as MAXIMUM.
The subject accused are further hereby ordered to SOLIDARILY indemnify the heirs of deceased DIONISIO
PASCUAL for damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for his death, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
(Record, pp. 225.)
In the automatic review of this case, appellants assign the following errors:
THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PERSON EXHUMED ON MARCH 26, 1997
(sic), IS THAT OF DIONISIO PASCUAL.
100
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDIT TO THE BELATED TESTIMONY OF DANILO ABRASIA THAT
WITNESS SAW THE INCIDENT.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDIT TO THE TESTIMONY OF ROVELLANO ABRASIA.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT ACCEPTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI ADVANCED BY THE ACCUSED.
The Court affirms the conviction of all three accused-appellants.
Firstly, accused-appellants heavily bank on the possibility that the body exhumed by the police
authorities upon information disclosed by Rovellano Abrasia on March 25, 1997, is not that of Dionisio
Pascual, whereby in the absence of the corpus delicti they cannot be convicted of the crime charged. To cast
reasonable doubt, accused-appellants quote prosecution witness Dr, Busto's statement that "when a person
was buried on February 7 and exhumed on March 25, the body would be so decomposed that it would be
hard to identify the person" (Appellants' Brief, p. 1; Rollo, p. 91).
We are not persuaded for the foregoing statement was obviously taken out of context. Dr. Busto was
stating a general proposition that if a cadaver had been buried for 45 days, it would normally be in such a
state of decomposition making identification difficult. More so, according to Dr. Busto, if the ground on which
the cadaver is buried is wet. The specific finding for this particular cadaver, however, is that although the
cadaver when brought to her was in an advanced state of decomposition, its face was still "recognizable"
because the "skin was still intact" (p. 5, tsn. Oct, 1, 1997), One day before Dr, Bustosaw the cadaver, right at
the site where the remains of Dionisio Pascual were exhumed, Fulgencio Pascual (brother of Dionisio), and
Victoria Abrasia (a cousin of Dionisio) positively identified it to be that of Dionisio Pascual.
TESTIMONY OF FULGENCIO PASCUAL:
Q. And then after digging what was discovered, if there was any?
A. I saw the cadaver of my brother first the face, sir.
Q. How do you know that was the cadaver of your brother?
A. I know him sir because the face was not yet to decomposed. I could still recognize his face.
Q. What were the physical features you observed wherein you are now concluding that he was your
brother?
A. We have a resemblance with my brother the only difference is he was taller and thinner than me, sir.
xxx
Q. Aside from you who else, if any, identified the body right at the place of the exhumation?
A. My cousin, sir.
Q. Who?
A. Victoria Abrasia, sir.
Q. He (sic) was with you?
A. Yes, sir, were only two at that time.
(pp. 11 & 12, tsn. Sept. 23, 1997)
Moreover, the body exhumed on March 25, 1997 was given due funeral services. As Dionisio's
daughter, Jennifer, averred, she saw her father already in a coffin on March 26, 1997. We agree with the trial
court's observation that "nobody mourns the death of a stranger." It is hard for this Court to conceive of the
possibility that the family of Dionisio would grieve before the remains of a stranger, much less spend money
for funeral services and burial of somebody other than their own deceased. This, coupled with the fact that
the location of the exhumation site was pointed to by no less than an eyewitness to the crime and the burial,
the Court is convinced that the body recovered on March 25, 1997 is truly that of Dionisio Pascual.
Secondly, accused-appellants find fault in witness Danilo Abrasia's delay in reporting the incident to the
authorities. This, according to them, should have been enough basis for the court to disregard his
testimony. Besides, they claim, Danilo did not actually witness the commission of the crime but only learned
about it through Rovellano Abrasia.
We find this contention lacking in merit, as well.
Delay of a witness in revealing to the authorities what he knows about a crime does not render his
testimony false, for the delay may be explained by the natural reticence of most people and their abhorrence
to get involved in a criminal case. But more than this, there is always the inherent fear of reprisal (People vs.
Basilan, 174 SCRA 115 [1989]). We have ruled on several occasions that "the delay of several months in
reporting the incident to the police does not affect the witness' credibility, the reluctance of witnesses to
volunteer information in a criminal case being of common knowledge (People vs. Sampaga, 202 SCRA 157
[1991]).
Accused-appellants also imply there is no basis for Danilo to be fearful of reprisal because accused-
appellants allegedly did not see him during the commission of the crime. In People vs. Dulay (217 SCRA 103
[1993]) we ruled:
We cannot sustain this contention because whether or not the witnesses feared him only the witnesses can
tell. Fear arises in the subject not in the object of the fear. It is defined as an unpleasant emotional state
characterized by anticipation of pain or great distress. It is a reaction to an external danger, which is
perceived to cause him harm.
(p. 117.)
We cannot discount the possibility that fear develops in the mind of the witness despite the absence of
threat from the accused. Besides, reprisal from the accused may come about not only before the witness
reports the crime, but it may also develop after the crime is reported. This is the reason for enactment of the
law on witness protection. In this light therefore, the fact that accused-appellants did not see Danilo Abrasia
witness the crime has no real significance insofar as the said eyewitness' fear is concerned.
Thirdly, accused-appellants contend that the testimony of Rovellano Abrasia is contrary to natural
experience because even as he appeared to be a participant in the crime, having been present from the
planning stage up to the consummation of the crime, although his cooperation and assistance were not
required by the three accused-appellants who were all brothers. They also cite the fact that Rovellano left
Barangay Pangangaan immediately after the alleged commission of the crime, an indication, according to
them, that he was himself guilty.
We find these circumstances insufficient to discredit Rovellano's testimony. These were all aptly
explained by the fact that Rovellano was himself related to the Cabangcala brothers, accused-appellants in
this case. We do not find it odd that he could have actually tagged along with them during all that time that
accused-appellants were plotting the crime up to the time of the actual commission of the murder. It is also in
accord with natural experience for Rovellano to distance himself from his cousins right after the commission
of the crime for fear of being implicated. This will not be taken as flight similar to that of an accused avoiding
appropriate charges and possibly, a conviction.
101
 It must likewise be noted that his testimony is not the sole basis for the conviction of the three Nighttime could not be appreciated where, as in this case, no evidence was presented showing that
accused-appellants. The major points in his narration were corroborated by other evidence tending to bolster nocturnity was specially sought by accused or taken advantage of by him to facilitate the commission of the
his credibility. crime or to ensure his immunity from capture.

Besides -
(p.221.)

As to the credibility of witnesses it is well established that the findings of fact of the trial court thereon should
not be disturbed on appeal said court being in a better position to decide the question, from having itself
heard and observed the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts
of substance and value which, if considered, could affect the result of the case.
There is no evidence in the present case that accused-appellants intentionally sought the advantage of
nocturnity to facilitate the commission of the crime or to ensure immunity from capture. They simply waited
for the victim to finish his drinking spree with his companions, which happened to be at around 10 o'clock in
the evening, and it was when the victim was on his way home, that the accused-appellants attacked him.

(People vs. Perez, 265 SCRA 506, 516 [1996])
In the present case, we find no cogent reason to depart from this settled rule.
Finally, we find unpersuasive accused-appellants' insistence that the trial court erred in not giving
credence to their defense of alibi.
Two eyewitnesses have positively identified the three accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the
crime. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by the prosecution
witnesses.(People vs. Gabatin, 203 SCRA 225 [1991]; People vs. Tinampay, 207 SCRA 425 [1992]). No
jurisprudence in criminal cases is more settled than that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, for which reason
it should be rejected when the accused is sufficiently and positively identified by credible eyewitnesses to the
crime (People vs. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464 [1998]). As we have already ruled, no circumstances are present
in the case at hand, which would render Danilo's and Rovellano Abrasia's eyewitness accounts incredible.
Additionally, the distance between accused-appellants' houses where they claim to have stayed when
the crime was being perpetrated, does not preclude the possibility that they could also have been at the
scene of the crime. They were actually only within fifty meters from the scene of the crime. It is equally
settled that:
The requisite elements for alibi to be appreciated are: (a) to prove his presence in another place at the time
of the perpetration of the offense; and (b) to demonstrate that it would thus be physically impossible for him
to be at the scene of the crime (People vs. Magpantay, 284 SCRA 96 [1998]).
There being no aggravating circumstances to be appreciated against accused-appellants, the death
penalty imposed by the trial court upon accused-appellants Benny and Renato Cabangcala for the crime of
murder cannot be affirmed. Accused-appellants Benny and Renato Cabangcala are, therefore, sentenced to
the prison term of reclusion perpetua.
As for Danilo Cabangcala, who was a minor when the crime was committed, the correct penalty should
be one degree lower which is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period
(10 years and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months). Applying the indeterminate sentence law, :the imposable
penalty for the crime of murder in his case where there is neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance,
should be 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor in its minimum period, as minimum up to 14 years and 8 months
of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum.
With regard to civil damages, Dionisio Pascual's heirs should be awarded P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity (People vs. Basco, 318 SCRA 615 [1999]). Moral damages, which include physical suffering and
mental anguish may be recovered in criminal cases resulting in physical injuries or victim's death, as in this
case (People vs. Bromo, 318 SCRA 760 [1999]), which, under prevailing jurisprudence is fixed at
P50,000.00 (People vs. Panida, 310 SCRA 66 [1999]).
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused-appellants' conviction of the crime of murder is AFFIRMED
but with MODIFICATION as to the imposable penalty, as above indicated. Accused-appellants are further
ordered to solidarily pay the heirs of Dionisio Pascual the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages, with costs in all instances.
SO ORDERED.

We, however, cannot affirm the trial court's appreciation of the aggravating circumstances of abuse of SECOND DIVISION
superior strength and nighttime.

Regarding abuse of superior strength as aggravating circumstance, what should be considered is not
that there were three, four or more assailants as against one victim, but whether the aggressors took
advantage of their combined strength in order to consummate the offense (People vs. Platilla, 304 SCRA 339 G.R. No. 95262 January 4, 1994
[1999]). In the present case, accused-appellants were priorly unarmed, and it was only when they were about
to commit the crime, while waiting for the victim to pass by the bamboo groove that they thought of getting
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
some implement, a crude bamboo pole which they cut right there and then. We further note that only Benny
vs.
approached the victim, striking him with the said piece of bamboo. Only after the victim fell, having been
EMMANUEL DESALISA, accused-appellant.
struck twice by Benny, did the two brothers joined in mauling the victim to death. Obviously, the three
accused-appellants did not purposely take advantage of their superior strength.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Now, as regards the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, it may also be noted that indeed, the plan
to kill the victim was hatched as early as 5 o'clock in the afternoon, but accused-appellants did not execute
Roberto R. Barrales for accused-appellant.
the plan until 10 o'clock that evening. It may be stressed, however, that for nighttime to be appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance, the court must be convinced that the cover of darkness was purposely sought for
the purpose of ensuring the consummation of the crime. In People vs. Bitoon (309 SCRA 209 [1999]), we
ruled:

102
NOCON, J.:
Circumstantial evidence has adequately established the identity of the killer in this case, destroyed the
presumption of innocence in his favor and fulfilled the test of moral certainty sufficient to convict. Hanged by
means of a rope, the victim, accused-appellant's legal wife, and the approximately five month old fetus in her
womb died as a consequence. Unfounded infidelity of the victim moved accused-appellant to perpetrate the
highly condemnable deed. As one proverb goes, "A tranquil mind gives life to the body but jealousy rots the
bones."
Accused-appellant Emmanuel Desalisa, a twenty four year old farmer, was charged with the complex crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion in Criminal Case No. 1017 before the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon,
Fifth Judicial Region, Branch 52. The information filed in said case reads, as follows:
That on or about the 9th day of October, 1983, in the (sic) sitio Pinaductan, barangay
San Juan, municipality of Bacon, province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused moved by hatred and jealousy
with evident premeditation, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
with intent to kill armed with a sharp pointed instrument, assault, attack, and inflict
physical injuries on the vagina of one Norma Desalisa y Dioneda with whom he was
united in lawful wedlock and who was pregnant for about five (5) months, and
thereafter with the use of rope hang her to a jackfruit tree causing her death and that
of her fetus, to the damage and prejudice of her legal heirs.
That in the commission of the offense there exist the aggravating circumstances of
nighttime and uninhabited place which facilitated the commission of the offense, and
evident premeditation.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant entered the plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
On July 10, 1990, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, with the circumstancial (sic) evidence pointing to the guilt of the accused,
the Court finds accused Emmanuel Desalisa guilty beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the
crime of Parricide, and sentences him to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT (sic)
and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Norma Desalisa y Dioneda, the amount of
Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos, as burial expenses and Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00)
Pesos as damages.
SO ORDERED.2
Hence, the present appeal.
The antecedent facts of this case, as culled from the records are, as follows:
Accused-appellant lived with his eighteen year old legal wife, Norma Desalisa, and two year old daughter in a
small nipa house on a hill at Pinaductan, San Juan, Bacon, Sorsogon. There are two other houses in the
neighborhood which are 150 meters away: the house of his parents-in-law and the house of Carlito Dichoso.
These cannot, however, be seen from the couple's house because of the many fruit trees and shrubs
prevalent in the area.
According to Paulina Dioneda, mother of Norma, on October 9, 1983, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning,
she was informed by the mother of accused-appellant that accused-appellant and Norma had an altercation.
He slapped and boxed her on the stomach. At about 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Norma
complained to her that accused-appellant manhandled her by slapping and boxing her on the stomach when
she told him not to go out of the house and get drunk because during that time their child was sick; also,
accused-appellant was jealous of a man. Even before October 9, 1983, Norma used to tell her that she was
being manhandled by accused-appellant.3
Vicente Dioneda, father of Norma, testified that on October 9, 1983, at around 6:00 or 7:00 o'clock in the
evening, accused-appellant went to their house and left his child. On the following morning, between 6:00
and 7:00 o'clock, he went to the house of accused-appellant and Norma. When he arrived there, he noticed
that the plates were scattered on the floor; the kettle with rice that was not eaten was also on the floor; and
the rope which was used to tie the other end of their hammock was missing. He went out of the house. He
saw the couple's pig and observed that it was hungry. He thought of feeding it with coconut meat so he
climbed a coconut tree which was nearby. While on the third step of the trunk, he saw the back of the body
of Norma. He went down the tree and called her. Inasmuch as she did not answer him, he approached her
and touched her back. However, her body swayed. It was only then when he realized that she was hanging
from a branch of the jackfruit tree. Her neck was tied with the missing rope of their hammock. Her bloody
feet were approximately four inches above the ground. Her dress was wet. He informed his wife immediately
about the matter. He and his wife proceeded to the house of Carlito Dichoso and requested the latter to fetch
the authorities. Accused-appellant often manhandled his daughter because he suspected her of having a
paramour and that the baby in her womb was not his. The last time he saw Norma alive was on October 9,
1983, at around 4:00 to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon when she went to their house. He corroborated the
previous narration of Paulina Dioneda on this aspect. He saw accused-appellant at the municipal building of
Bacon on October 10, 1983. He asked accused-appellant why he killed Norma. Accused-appellant did not
answer him but just stooped down. 4
Carlito Dichoso, neighbor of accused-appellant, testified that at about 6:00 or 7:00 o'clock in the evening of
October 9, 1983, accused-appellant went to his house. It was raining during that time. Accused-appellant
borrowed a flashlight because he will be looking for his wife. After two and a half hours, accused-appellant
returned to Carlito's house. He sat on a bench. Carlito asked him whether or not he found his wife but he did
not answer. Carlito told him to look for his wife in the house of his in-laws because she might be there. Again,
he did not answer. Carlito also told him to look for his wife in the nearby hut because perhaps the heavy
downpour prevented her from proceeding home. Accused-appellant remained sitting on the bench, leaning
on the post. He uttered the following words: "My wife is continuously possessed by devils." Carlito's wife then
advised accused-appellant: "You must be patient with your wife because she is pregnant." Accused-appellant
did not answer her. She then prepared a mat and a pillow for accused-appellant but the latter preferred to
remain sitting on the bench. During the time that it was raining hard, or about 3:30 o'clock in the morning of
the following day, accused-appellant was frightened because he fell down from the bench. He sat again on
the bench and Carlito noticed that he did not sleep anymore. At around 5:00 o'clock of the same morning,
accused-appellant opened the door and said: "If there is something that happened, Manoy Carlito, what
would I do?" Carlito was not able to ask him where he was going because he already went down. At around
7:30 o'clock of the same morning, Carlito was informed by Vicente and Paulina Dioneda that Norma is dead.
Accused-appellant and his wife used to quarrel because of jealousy. 5
Corporal Crisonogo Gillego, chief investigator and government prosecutor of the Bacon Integrated National
Police, testified that he was ordered by their station commander to investigate the case of a woman who was
hanged at San Juan, Bacon, Sorsogon. He was accompanied by two members of the Bacon INP and some
barangay officials of San Juan. He saw the woman hanging from a jackfruit tree branch, whom he later came
to know as Norma Desalisa. A rope was tied around her neck. Her feet were twelve inches above the ground.
There were blood stains on the back of her dress and on her panty. He suspected that it was not a suicide
case because he noticed that the hair of Norma was entangled with the knot of the rope. He opined that if a
person is about to commit suicide, he has to prepare the knot first in order to place it around his neck and
then jump. Before Norma was untied, pictures were taken of her. He also investigated the house of the
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couple and found that the rope that was used in hanging Norma was the same as the rope tied to one end of
their hammock. Some things inside the house were not in proper places. He saw accused-appellant at the
house of the barangay captain. He asked him how the incident happened but he did not answer. He asked
him if he suspected somebody as the paramour of his wife. Accused-appellant answered that a person whose
surname is Ariate is courting his wife. He asked accused-appellant whether or not they always quarrel.
Accused-appellant answered that they quarrel sometimes. He noticed that accused-appellant was trembling
while he was asking those questions. He asked him why he was not in his house. He answered that he was
afraid the relatives of his wife might retaliate. Accused-appellant was informed by his mother about the death
of his wife. 6
Dr. Amelia Escarcha, resident physician of the Sorsogon Provincial Hospital, conducted an autopsy on the
body of Norma and submitted the following report:
PHYSICAL FINDINGS:
External Findings:
Head & Neck: —
1. Rope embedded around the neck with
knot directing to the right lateral of the
neck;
2. Contusion, 3 cm., post-auricular area; right;
3. Ligature mark on the anterior neck
extending to the submandibular area &
infra-auricular area;
4. Tongue bitten right.
Abdomen:
5. Abdomen enlarged, at about 5 months
size with fetal parts on abdominal
palpation.
Genitalia:
6. Scanty pubic hair
7. Parous vagina
8. Hematoma with contusion both labia
9. Punctured wound 1 cm. long & 2 cm.
depth, perineum with slight blood clot,
non-perforating.
Internal Examination: —
1. Cervix soft, closed, no vaginal discharge
2. Uterus — pregnant to about 4-5 months
in size.
Internal findings:
1. Lung — both lungs collapsed colored
grayish.
2. Heart —- normal in size.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxation secondary to hanging.7
On the other hand, accused-appellant professes his innocence of the crime charged against him. He
speculates that his parents-in-law are harboring ill-feelings against him since his wife died. His relationship
with his wife has deteriorated as early as June 24, 1983, when she told him upon coming home: "You nearly
came upon the man." From that time on, they had no peace at home and often quarrelled. He did not
consider her anymore as his wife. But he suspects nobody of having killed his wife, for he was of the
impression that she probably committed suicide by hanging herself as previously, she wanted to hang herself
but was stopped by her uncle, "Tio Awe." His version of the incident is, as follows: In the afternoon of October
9, 1983, his wife was in their house. When he arrived in the evening of that day, he and his wife had an
altercation because she suspected him of having an affair with the daughter of Manoy Carlito. She told him to
leave otherwise, she will leave. So, he left and visited his farm. Upon returning at around 6:00 o'clock in the
evening he found his wife gone and their daughter crying alone. He carried her and proceeded to the house
of his parents-in-law to inquire whether or not his wife is there. Not finding her, he left the child in their care
and proceeded to the house of Carlito. He likewise did not find her there. He then borrowed Carlito's
flashlight to look for her. At that time, he was armed with a sharp bladed instrument. He looked for her in the
huts near their farm but she was not there. When it started to rain, he returned to the house of Carlito to
check whether or not his wife is already there, only to find out that it was not so. Since it was raining hard, he
stayed in the house of Carlito up to around 5:30 o'clock in the morning of the following day, when he went
home hoping to find his wife there. Still, there was no trace of his wife. Searching around the premises, he
saw his wife hanging from a branch of the jackfruit tree. He was shocked and taken aback because he did not
think that his wife would do such a thing. He knew that she was dead because she was not moving. But the
first thing he did was to go to the house of his parents and informed them about the incident instead of
running to her and cutting her down. His mother went immediately to the police station, while he went to
Dominador Baluyot, one of the peace and order officers to inform him about the incident.8
Juan Don, a councilor, and Dominador Baluyot, a laborer, testified that there was no eyewitness to the
incident, They opined, however, that accused-appellant did not kill Norma.
In this appeal, accused-appellant imputes error on the part of the trial court for finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt despite evidence to the contrary.
Accused-appellant asseverates that the trial court erred in arriving at the conclusion that he was motivated by
jealousy in killing his wife. Not only is this not true but on the contrary, it was the victim who was jealous. She
previously tried to commit suicide but was fortunately prevented from doing so by the timely intervention of
her "Tio Awe". In fact, he spent the night in the house of Carlito Dichoso which he would not have done if he
were guilty. His first impulse, if he had killed his wife, is to go into hiding to avoid arrest.
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The Office of the Solicitor General supports the conviction of accused-appellant. The injuries sustained by his
wife belie his assertion that she committed suicide by hanging herself. His defense of denial is one of the
weakest defenses. The presence of motive and the attendant circumstances, correctly led the trial court to
believe that he killed his wife.
We uphold the conviction of accused-appellant.
The quantum of proof necessary to establish accused-appellant's guilt, albeit based on circumstantial
evidence, is sufficient. There is more than one circumstance. The facts from which the inference are derived
are proven. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.9 Thus, we quote as our own the ratiocination of the trial court:
MOTIVE:
There is not (sic) question (that) there was a serious quarrel between accused
Emmanuel Desalisa and his young wife deceased Norma Desalisa. The accused
admitted the existence of the quarrel to P/Cpl. Gillego, as was testified to by the
mother-in-law of the accused Paulina Dioneda and admitted by the accused when he
testified for and in his own behalf. . . . Likewise, accused admitted (that) one Aryate was
courting Norma and that when the matter was brought out to him, the accused was
trembling and very pale.
Paulina Dioneda testified, which was unrebutted nor denied by the accused, that on
October 9, 1983, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, her daughter (deceased) Norma
accompanied by her mother-in-law (mother of the accused) told her she had an
altercation with her husband accused Emmanuel. Norma was, according to her,
slapped, boxed and manhandled by the accused. . . .
When the accused testified for and in his own behalf, he admitted that on October 9,
1983, or immediately prior to Norma's hideous hanging, Norma refused to allow him to
enter the house or she will be the one to leave the house. A statement coming from a
wife when told to a husband cannot be mistaken to anything less than a very serious
quarrel.
The quarrel between accused Emmanuel and deceased Norma prior to and
immediately before the fatal hanging when considered with the kind of quarrel the
couple were having, an affair with another man, culminating to his doubt having
fathered the child Norma was carrying at the time was doubtful (sic). Jealousy (sic) is a
motive as old as time.
OPPORTUNITY TO COMMIT THE CRIME:
The accused has the opportunity to commit the crime. The house where accused
Emmanuel and Norma live as pictured by both the witnesses for the prosecution and
the defense is up a hill and isolated. The whole neighborhood consists of only three (3)
houses. While it is true (that) from any of the three (3) houses, one cannot see the
other because of the fruit trees and shrubs that abound, their distance from each other
is only 150 meters. No one, definitely no one can go up the hill to visit or whatever
without being known to the neighbor. With such an arrangement, no one can go up the
hill to the house of the accused Emmanuel and Norma without their neighbors, who are
related to them, being aware of. Nowhere in the whole evidence, where neither
Norma's family nor accused Emmanuel Desalisa's family, directly or indirectly, even
suspected any stranger for having committed the crime. The accused himself blamed
that (sic) his wife Norma for having taken her own life. He never pointed his accusing
finger to anybody.
As early as 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of October 9, 1983, accused Emmanuel was
with Norma and their child in their house up the hill at Pinaductan, San Juan, Bacon.
They were all alone in that isolated house when he was not allowed, with threatening
voice, entry in his own house, or his wife will leave the house. What can be more
humiliating to a man aside from a wife being unfaithful to be refused entry to one's
very home? A man maybe able to swallow defeat to a woman's affection, even lose the
love of a wife, but to be scorned and refused entry to one's house by the very woman
who was unfaithful to his love, is something a man cannot take sitting down, as the
accused did take with his own hand the life of his young wife Norma.
The intensity of the hatred of the man who committed the dastardly act of hanging
Norma by the neck tied to the branch of a jackfruit tree is shown by the injury suffered
by the deceased. The injury on the head, the entangled hair of the deceased to the
noose of the rope, the proximity (six inches) of the noose that holds and encircles the
neck of the deceased to that of the branch of the jackfruit tree, the contusion in the
labia minora and punctured wound suffered by the deceased in her genital area, could
have only be done by a man whose manhood was trampled upon, as accused
Emmanuel Desalisa in his jealousy was prone to believe, and in his blind jealousy not
only snuffed the life of his wife by hanging but also tortured and humiliated the
deceased by abusing and inflicting injury to her private parts as a last act of insult to
humiliate her womanhood, as he was insulted and humiliated to (sic) what he believe
(sic) his unfaithful wife has committed against his honor.
Another point that is pointed, is, when the accused was at the house of his neighbor,
his Manoy Carlito Dichoso, after having left said house to look for his wife, he was
asked by Carlito if he found his wife. The accused did not answer the query. He just sat
on the bench and said, "his wife Norma is possessed by devils." When Carlito's wife
who was then present told him to be patient with his wife because she is pregnant,
again, the accused, did not answer. When the accused was at the police headquarters
of Bacon, and in the presence of many, was accused (sic) by his father-in-law Vicente
Dioneda, why he killed his daughter Norma. Again, the accused did not answer. That
when P/Cpl. Gillego was able to extract from him the information that one Ariate was
courting Norma, the accused was trembling and very pale. These are actuations and
circumstances pointing to a man bothered by a guilty conscience. 10
The uncorroborated assertions of accused-appellant that it was the victim who was jealous of him and that
she has tried to commit suicide previously are nothing but self-serving statements which cannot outweigh the
prosecution's overwhelming evidence to the contrary. 11
There is ample evidence to support the finding that the hanging of the victim was homicidal 12 and not
suicidal, as claimed by accused-appellant. A day after the incident, Vicente Dioneda found scattered plates
and kettle with untouched rice on the floor of the house of accused-appellant 13 while Cpl. Gillego found that
some things in the house were not in proper places. 14 These are indicia or previous struggle. There were
blood stains on the victim's dress, 15 panty, 16 and feet. 17 On her genitalia, the doctor found a punctured
wound, 1 cm. long and 2 cm. deep, with slight blood clot which could have been caused by any pointed
object, sharp bolo or sharp pointed instrument. 18Accused-appellant admitted during the cross-examination
that he was armed with a sharp bladed instrument while he was looking for his wife. 19 The doctor also found
105
hematoma with contusion on both labia of her genitalia, which could have been caused by a fist
blow. 20 According to the doctor, these injuries could not have been self-inflicted. 21
Although accused-appellant spent the night in the house of Carlito Dichoso and did not flee, this circumstance
standing alone is no brief on his innocence. There is no case law holding that non-flight is conclusive proof of
innocence. 22
What strikes the attention of this Court further is the testimony of accused-appellant that when he saw his
wife hanging from a branch of the jackfruit tree, he went to the house of his parents and informed them
about the incident, 23 instead of bringing her down and determining if she was still alive, and if so, to rush her
to any doctor, clinic or hospital. He didn't even bother to let his parents-in-law know of what happened to
their daughter because according to him, he was confused. 24
We find it hard to believe in his excuse, considering that the house of his parents-in-law, is only 150 meters
away from his house. 25 Furthermore, it goes without saying that his parents-in-law are the more concerned
persons than his parents with respect to the misfortune that befell their daughter. Or, he could have
proceeded to the house of Carlito Dichoso, which is likewise only 150 meters away from his house. We view
the course of action that he took as akin to seeking sanctuary in the protective arms of his parents.
The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation can not be appreciated against accused-appellant
absent any proof as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time elapsed before it was carried
out. 26 Neither may be the aggravating circumstance of nighttime be appreciated against him because there is
no proof that it was purposely sought or taken advantage of, or that it facilitated the commission of the
crime. 27
However, the aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place is present. The uninhabitedness of a place is
determined not by the distance of the nearest house to the scene of the crime but whether or not in the
place of commission, there was reasonable possibility of the victim receiving some help. Considering that the
killing was done during nighttime and many fruit trees and shrubs obstruct the view of neighbors and
passersby, there was no reasonable possibility for the victim to receive any assistance. 28 At any rate, in the
imposition of the proper penalty we shall disregard the presence of this aggravating circumstance, which we
shall explain later.
We note that the trial court convicted accused-appellant of the crime of parricide only. This is an error. The
evidence on record has shown beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant has committed the complex
crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. The abortion was caused by the same violence that caused the
death of the victim. It is unintentional because accused-appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim
but not necessarily to cause an abortion. 29
In case of complex crimes, the penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum period shall be
imposed. 30 The maximum period of the penalty for parricide, the more serious crime, is death. 31 However, by
reason of Sec. 19 (1), Article III of the 1987 Constitution which proscribes the imposition of the death penalty,
the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. 32 Being a single indivisible penalty, reclusion perpetua is imposed
regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances. 33
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified. Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua. The civil indemnity for the death of the victim is increased to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6344 March 21, 1911
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
W.L. Wright for appellants.
Acting Attorney Harvey for appellee.
MORELAND, J.:
This is an appeal by Manuel Rodriguez, Cipriano Galvez, Raymundo Revilla, Dorotea Rojas, Feliciano
Pantanilla, Roman Villaister, Pedro Villanueva, Nicomedes Abella Sabino Raymundo, Geronimo Guijon, Martin
Sauler, Eusebio Bustamante, Victoriano Calipusan and Valentin Multialto from a judgment o the Court of First
Instance of the Moro Province, Hon Herbert D. Gale presiding, convicting them of the crime of murder and
sentencing them each to death.
From the proofs presented by the Government, it appears that the appellants, with nine other, being
members of the second company of the Constabulary stationed at Davao, mutinied on the 6th day of June,
1909, attempting, during the course of such mutiny, to kill one of their superior officers, Lieutenant Goicuria;
that immediately after such revolt the mutinees, having taken arms and ammunition from the depositary, left
the vicinity of Davao and marched toward the mountains of Lipada; that on the 8th day of June, 1909, said
mutineers returned to Davao for the purpose of attacking the town; that the inhabitants thereof, having
received previous notice of the proposed attack, prepared themselves to meet it; that J. L. Burchfield, P. C.
Libby, A. M. Templeton, and Roy Libby, armed with rifles, having been detailed by those commanding the
defense of the town, on the afternoon of the day referred to, advanced to the cemetery within the limits of
the town, forming an outpost for the purpose of awaiting the coming of the mutineers; that about 4.15
o'clock they sighted the mutineers; that immediately thereafter they heard a shot, followed by others, which
came from near the cemetery, where the mutineers had halted and dismounted; that after a few shots had
been exchanged Roy Libby was struck with a ball and killed; that the outpost retreated to the convent and
took refuge therein; that the mutineers advanced against the town, attacking it at various points and
especially the convent, where a portion of the residents of the town had gathered, including the women and
children, or the purpose of defending themselves; that no other person except Roy Libby was killed, although
several others were more or less severely wounded.
What with the confession of some of the accused, the testimony of others, and the evidence presented by
the witnesses for the prosecution, there remains so little a question of fact in this case that it is substantially
unworthy of discussion. That the appellants with others revolted against their superior officers on the 6th of
June; that they returned to Davao on the 8th and attacked it viciously and persistently, killing one of its
defenders and wounding several others; and that they all took a direct and active part therein, is not only
absolutely undoubted from the testimony of the prosecution but is substantially admitted by all of the
defendants in the case. Some of the appellants sought to defend themselves upon the ground that they had
been forced, by threats and intimidation, to take part in the mutiny and the attack upon Davao by other
members o the mutineer band. The evidence in no way justifies this defense and it is utterly impossible under
any construction of the evidence to sustain it. All of the appellants, however, agree in presenting the defense
that they entered the town of Davao on the 8th of June, not for the purpose of attacking it for the purpose of
surrendering to their superior officers and the governor of the district. Not only it is impossible from the
testimony of the prosecution to arrive at such a conclusion o fact, but it is almost as nearly impossible to
arrive at such a conclusion from the evidence presented by the appellants themselves. No defense upon the
facts worthy of the name has been presented.
106
As to whether or not there was present premeditacion conocida, qualifying the crime as murder, a simple
reading of the proofs presented by the Government is sufficient to demonstrate that beyond question or
doubt. It appears that all of the appellants, on or about the 8th day of June, at about 11 o'clock in the
forenoon, went to the house of Cenon Rasay, some distance from Davao, in order to obtain information as to
whether or not reinforcements had been landed at Davao. On being informed that, to the knowledge of the
persons questioned, none had been landed, they asked the elder Rasay to permit them to leave at his house
the three woman that accompanied them, as they were going to march on Davao and attack it. The appellant
Rodriguez also requested that, in case he should be killed in the attack, he, Rasay, should treat one of the
women, who was the wife of Rodriguez, as his servant. Having left the women in the house of Cenon, they
took up the march to Davao. On arriving near the river Bagoo, they were overtaken by Ignacio Rasay, a
kinsman of Cenon Rasay, and suspecting that he was going to Davao for the purpose of warning the town
against the meditated attack, they halted him and told him that, if he should give any warning of their
approach, they would cause damage to his family. He having assured them that such was not his purpose,
they permitted him to proceed. The appellants continued on their way and arriving at the cemetery near
Davao heard a shot, which they claim came from those who had seen sent out to watch for their approach.
On seeing this advance guard, the accused dismounted from their horses and began to fire forming in a
skirmish line and advancing steadily. Overwhelmed by the number of the attacking party, the outpost
retreated toward the village, pursued by the appellant. There followed an attack upon the town, more or less
general, of the kind and character generally to be expected from such a body of men. The attacks was, in a
large measure, unsuccessful and the mutineers withdrew when they saw the futility of further fighting.
The learned trial court found premeditacion conocida as the element qualifying the crime as murder. The
learned counsel for the appellants excepts to this finding and asserts that, inasmuch as the appellants did not
know even of the existence of the deceased, Roy Libby, at the time of his death, much less that he was at the
time in the village they attacked and one of the outpost of four, his death could not possibly have been
premeditated. He argues that, in order that the killing be premeditated, the accused must have resolved to
kill the premeditated person. We do not stop to discuss this question at length for the reason that it has
already been determined by this court adversely to the learned counsel's contention. In the case of the
United States vs. The Moro Manalinde, "the accused made up his mind to kill two undetermined persons, the
first whom he should meet on the way, in compliance with the inducement of a third person." In its decision
the court said:
As to the other circumstance it is also unquestionable that the accused upon accepting the order
and undertaking the journey in order to comply therewith, deliberately considered and carefully
and thoughtfully meditated over the nature and the consequences of the acts which, under orders
received from the said Datto, he was about to carry out, and to that end provided himself with a
weapon, concealing it by wrapping it up, and started on a journey of a day and a night for the sole
purpose of taking the life of two unfortunate persons whom he did not know, and with whom he
had never had any trouble; nor did there exist any reason which, to a certain extent, might
warrant his perverse deed. The fact that the arrangement between the instigator and the tool
considered the killing of unknown persons, the first encountered, does not bar the consideration
of the circumstance of premeditation. The nature of the circumstances which characterize the
crime, the perversity of the culprit, and the material and moral injury are the same, and the fact
that the victim was not predetermined does not affect nor alter the nature of the crime. The
person having been deprived of his life by deeds executed with deliberate intent, the crime is
considered a premeditated one, as the firm and persistent intention of the accused from the
moment, before said death, when he received the order until the crime was committed upon the
offer of money, reward or promise, premeditation is sometimes present, the latter not being
inherent in the former, and there existing no incompatibility between the two, premeditation can
not necessarily be considered as included merely because an offer money, reward or promise was
made, for the latter might have existed without the former, the one being independent of the
other. In the present case there can be no doubt that after the crime was agreed upon by means
of a promise of reward, the criminal by his subsequent conduct showed a persistently and firm
intent in his plan to carry out the crime which he intentionally agreed to execute, it being
immaterial whether Datto Mupuck did or did not conceive the crime, once Manalinde obeyed the
inducement and voluntarily executed it. (U.S. vs The Moro Manalinde, 14 Phil. Rep., 77.)
The trial court found that the crime charged was committed with the aggravating circumstances following:
8. When craft, fraud or disguise is employed.
9. When advantage is taken of superior strength or means are employed to weaken the defense.
10. When the act is committed with abuse of confidence.
11. When advantage is taken is taken by the culprit of his public position.
13. When the crime is committed on the occasion of a fire, shipwreck or other calamity or misfortune.
15. When it is committed at night, or in an uninhabited place, or by a gang.
16. When the crime is committed in contempt with insult to the public authorities.
As to number 8:
We do not believe that this circumstance was present.
This circumstance is characterized by the intellectual or mental rather than the physical means to which the
criminal resorts to carry out his design. This paragraph was intended to cover, for example, the case where a
thief falsely represents that he is the lover of the servant of a house in order to gain entrance and rob the
owner (astucia); or where (fraude) A simulates the handwriting of B, who is a friend of C, inviting the latter,
without the knowledge of B, by means of a note written in such simulated hand, to meet B at a designated
place, in order to give A, who lies in wait at the place appointed, an opportunity to kill C; or where (disfraz)
one uses a disguise to prevent being recognized; and cases of that class and nature.
We are unable to find from the facts proved any element which warrants the conclusions of the learned trial
court as to the presence of this circumstance in the commission of the crime of which the appellants were
found guilty. They boldly marched from the mountains of Lipada to Davao, partly, at least, in the daytime,
with the purpose of attacking the town, which purpose they communicated to at least three person, one of
whom was permitted to precede them to the town. they advanced against the town at about 4.15 in the
afternoon without any effort at concealment. They were in no way disguised, but, on the contrary, each wore
the greater portion of the Constabulary uniform in which he was clad at the time of the mutiny. While it
appears that some of them had cloths wrapped about their heads, it does not appear that this was done as a
disguise, but was following rather the custom of the country in which they had been reared. We find in all the
case nothing of craft, fraud or disguise.
As to number 9:
The circumstance depends upon the relative strength of the one attacking and the one attacked. It can hardly
be said that advantage is taken of superior strength or means are employed to weaken the defense when
twenty-three men, in the daytime, openly and without stratagem of any kind, attack a town of the size of
Davao. the results of the attack clearly show that the strength of the attacking party was not sufficient to
accomplish the purpose in view. They demonstrate, under the circumstance, that no means were employed
107
to weaken the defense, outside of such as are inherent in the situation when one body of men attacks
another with deadly weapons.
As to number 10:
For the existence of this circumstance it is necessary that there exist a relation of trust or confidence between
the person committing the crime and the one against whom it is committed and that the former make use of
such relation to commit the crime. For example, where one commits a robbery in a house in which, as a
friend of the owner, he is at the time a guest. No relation of this nature existed between the appellants and
the citizens of Davao or the deceased. The evidence fails to disclose a single fact upon which the existence of
this relation can be based.
As to number 11:
In the case at bar, if the crime was committed with contempt of and insult to the public authorities, those
authorities must have been the public authorities of Davao. But the persons exercising that authority were
the very persons against whom, among others, the crime charged in this action was being committed.
After diligent investigation and extended consideration, we have been unable to find that any aggravating
circumstances attended the commission of this crime.
There being present no aggravating circumstances and there existing no extenuating circumstances, the
penalty imposed must be in its medium degree.
The judgment of the court below is hereby modified and the appellants are each sentenced to cadena
perpetua, to the accessories provided by law, to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the deceased Roy
Libby the sun of P1,000 and to pay the costs of the trial.

In order that this aggravating circumstance exist it is necessary that the person committing the crime be a So modified, the judgment is affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
public official and that he use the influence, prestige or ascendency which such office gives him as the means
by which he realizes his purpose. The essence of the matter is presented in the inquiry, "Did the
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Carson, and Trent, JJ., concur.
accused abuse his office in order to commit the crime?" We do not believe that the facts of this case warrant
the finding of the trial court in this particular. (Supreme court of Spain, decisions of 4th March, 1872; 18th
December, 1871.) THIRD DIVISION

As to number 13: G.R. No. 93021 May 8, 1991

The reason for the existence of this circumstance is found in the debased form of criminality met in one who, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
in the midst of a great calamity, instead of lending aid to the afflicted, adds to their suffering by taking vs.
advantage of their misfortune to despoil them. MARIANO UMBRERO, ALFREDO COSTALES alias PIDO, JIMMY AGLUBA and LEON CERIA, accused. MARIANO
UMBRERO, ALFREDO COSTALES @ Pido, and JIMMY AGLUBA, accused-appellants.
As is readily seen from the facts, no such condition as is described in this paragraph existed in Davao on the
occasion of the attack. The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Alfredo J. Donato for accused-appellants.
As to number 15:

The second paragraph of this subdivision reads:

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The court shall take this circumstance into consideration according to the nature and
characteristics of the crime.
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Aparri, Branch 8, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
In this case, under all the circumstances, including those presented in the discussion relating to paragraph 9,
the fact that there were more than three armed persons in the attacking party is not sufficient to call for the
application of the provisions of this paragraph. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused Mariano
Umbrero, Jaime (Jimmy) Agluba and Alfredo Costales alias Pido, guilty of the crime of MURDER as
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and therefore sentences each
As to number 16:
of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to pay jointly and severally an indemnity of
THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS to the heirs of Alfonso Urbi; and each of them to pay 1/7
The supreme court of Spain has held "that the circumstance of contempt of or insult to public authority, of the costs. (Rollo, p. 31)
provided for in paragraph 16 of the Penal Code, can exist only when such authority is engaged in the exercise
of its functions and he who is thus engaged in the exercise of said functions is not the person against whom
The information filed against the accused reads:
the crime is committed in which that circumstance appears;" the court further saying that such aggravating
circumstance was not present in the case before it "because D. Jose Torres, although he was municipal judge,
was the object of the murder involved in that case." That on or about November 29, 1980, in the Municipality of Lallo, province of Cagayan, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, Mariano Umbrero, Alfredo

108
 Costales alias Pido, Jimmy Agluba and Leon Ceria, together with Eugenio Rigon alias Inyong,
Bartolome Tangonan and Danny Costales who are still at-large and not yet arrested, armed with
guns, conspiring together and helping one another, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation
and with treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and
shoot one, Alfonso Urbi, inflicting upon the latter wounds on his body which caused his death.
That the offense was committed with the following aggravating circumstances, to wit: (a) that it
was committed with abuse of superior strength, and (b) that it was committed by a band.
(Records, p. 33)
The accused Mariano Umbrero, Alfredo Costales, Jimmy Agluba and Leon Ceria pleaded not guilty on
arraignment. The other accused, Eugenio Rigon, Bartolome Tangonan, and Danny Costales were not arraigned
as they were still at large.
The prosecution evidence upon which the trial court based its finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Angelina Urbi Ragsac, daughter of the victim Alfonso Urbi testified: She was at home in Sta.
Teresa at about 2:00 in the afternoon of November 29, 1980 when several armed men came, two
(2) of whom shot her father under the house, accused Alfredo Costales and Danny Costales. She
was not able to recognize the other armed men. She was two (2) meters from her father when he
was shot. Of the two accused mentioned, she only identified in Court accused Alfredo Costales.
Danny Costales was not present. He was the one who shot her father. He followed her father
when he ran outside the house but the companions of Alfredo Costales followed and killed him.
Alfredo Costales and Danny Costales shot her father with short firearms. Their companions had
long firearms. All the accused ran after killing her father. She and her mother did not do anything
because they were afraid; however, they went to get the body of her father later on. He sustained
five (5) gunshot wounds on his breast and stomach. She reported the killing of her father to
barangay captain Felix Villamin. Thereafter she executed an affidavit marked as Exhibits "E" and
"E-1" which were admitted by the defense as part of the record. Mariano Umbrero was among the
armed men who came to their house in the afternoon of November 29, 1980. She knows him
personally.
On cross-examination defense counsel Atty. Alfredo J. Donato made reference to question No. 5
and the corresponding answer, in the affidavit of the witness (Exhibits "E" & "E-1 ") to be marked
as Exhibit "I " for the defense. She admitted that the first one to shoot her father was Danny
Costales of Jurisdiccion, Camalaniugan known and called Dominador who executed an affidavit.
She knew that Alfredo Costales was apprehended. As to Danny Costales, she does not know
whether or not he was apprehended. In 1980 their place was infested with NPA and she believed
that Danny Costales and his companions were members of the NPA. She does not know of any
motive of the armed men in killing her father. She, her father and mother and her children were
then eating on the ground floor of their house when the armed men arrived. Her father stood up
when Danny Costales asked for water to drink. Her father went to the door to see him and his
companions. It was there where Danny Costales shot him.
On August 5, 1985 the prosecution presented Eugenia Urbi, surviving spouse of the victim Alfonso
Urbi. Her testimony is hereby reproduced substantially: In the afternoon of November 29, 1980, at
about 2:00 o'clock, she and her deceased husband were in the house of their daughter Angelina
Urbi Ragsac in Sta. Teresa, Lallo. To their surprise, armed men came to ask for water. When her
husband went to them to give water he was shot by Johnny Costales. Mariano Umbrero, Jimmy
Agluba and Pido Costales were his companions. She identified in Court Pido Costales who gave his
name as Alfredo Costales, Mariano Umbrero and Jaime Agluba. Johnny Costales was not in Court.
She knows Leon Ceria he being her barriomate. She saw him the following day after the killing of
her husband when he passed by their house. She did not see Leon Ceria with the group of armed
men who went to their house. She was about a meter from her husband when he was shot by
Johnny Costales in the presence of his companions. Johnny and Danny Costales was admitted as
one and the same person. At the time Danny Costales shot her husband, some of his companions
were near him and some were a little bit far. Those who were near him were the accused Pido
Costales, Mariano Umbrero and Jimmy Agluba. They were all armed. Danny Costales and his
companions left after shooting her husband. Thereafter the killing of her husband was reported to
barangay captain Felix Villamin who instructed Juan Urbi to get the body of her husband. She
could not be compensated for the killing of her husband. She was investigated, and in connection
therewith she executed an affidavit (Exhibits "F" and "F-1").
On cross-examination, she testified that Danny Costales shot her husband three (3) times. She
clarified that when they were eating, Danny Costales and his companions suddenly arrived. They
asked for water. Her husband stood up and went to see them. That was the time when Danny
Costales shot her husband for the first time. Her husband ran outside, followed by Danny Costales
and shot him again. Danny Costales and his companions then left. She did not go immediately to
the place of her husband because she was afraid. At the time Danny Costales shot her husband,
accused Alfredo Costales, Jaime Agluba and Mariano Umbrero were holding their firearms at their
sides. They drew their guns when her husband ran outside the house; however, they did not
prevent her husband from running outside the house. She could not tell as to whether or not
Mariano Umbrero, Jimmy Agluba and Alfredo Costales fired their guns.
Exhibit "B", sworn statement of Eugenia Urbi, was also adopted as Exhibit "4" for the defense, to
show that the victim sustained five (5) gunshot wounds, the entrance of which were 0.5 cm.
showing that the fatal weapon was fired by one person.
On August 28, 1985 the prosecution presented Martin Pagaduan, also a resident of Sta. Teresa,
Lallo, Cagayan. He was in his ricefield north of the house of Alfonso Urbi on the day he was shot to
death. He saw more than ten (10) armed men passed by going westward. Not long thereafter, he
heard gun reports from the house of Alfonso Urbi which is less than fifty (50) meters from his
ricefield. The armed men returned and proceeded eastward. They took his brother Juan Pagaduan.
He was able to identify Mariano Umbrero, Jimmy Agluba, Pido Costales, Inyong Rigon, Florante
Tabunal and Romy Arellano who were with the group of armed men he saw. When he heard gun
reports he saw the armed men surrounding the house of Alfonso Urbi. The persons in the house
cried loudly. He went to hide because he was afraid. When the armed men were already gone, he
went to the house of Alfonso Urbi. He saw him already dead in his yard. He sustained gunshot
wounds. He identified in Court accused Mariano Umbrero, Jimmy Agluba and Alfredo Costales.
They were all holding firearms when they passed by. He was confronted with his affidavit taken
during the investigation conducted by the Integrated National Police of Lallo which was marked as
Exhibits "G" and "G-1 ".
On cross-examination he admitted that he was examined during the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Municipal Trial Court of Lallo. His signature appearing therein was marked as
Exhibit "2" and the signature of Judge Pascual as Exhibit "2-B". The question of the Court: "How did
you know that there were ten (10) heavily armed men who were present in the house of Alfonso
Urbi on November 29, 1980 at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon when he was gunned down by
these heavily armed persons? Ans. I was around forty (40) meters away from these heavily armed
persons preparing my harrow when I was attracted by the presence of those armed persons when
one of them by the name of Doming Arellano shot the late Alfonso Urbi with an armalite was
marked as Exhibit "2-D". (Rollo, p. 22-24)
109
The case as against Leon Ceria was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
As for Mariano Umbrero, Alfredo Costales and Jimmy Agluba, their version is summarized as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Mariano Umbrero corroborated his witness Alejandrino Umangay, that they they left Sta.
Teresa and Rosario, respectively because the soldiers ordered them to evacuate; they and other
residents of the barangay were suspected as members of the NPA. On November 29, 1980,
Alejandrino Umangay went to collect from Mariano Umbrero an indebtedness of P200.00. To pay
the same Mariano Umbrero sought to mill his palay in Bical, Lallo, a distance of three kilometers in
the ricemill of Gregorio Cabulay. As they were putting in a sack the palay, two men arrived Ka Al
the leader of the NPA and Danny Costales. They invited Mariano Umbrero to the house of Alfonso
Urbi. Mariano Umbrero excused himself for they were going to mill his palay, and they told him to
follow. At 4:00 o'clock their palay was milled and Mariano Umbrero started for his house at 5:00
o'clock. Mariano Umbrero denied having been with Danny Costales, when he shot to death
Alfonso Urbi.
The accused Alfredo Costales corroborated the testimony of his wife Maria Umoso, that on
November 29, 1980 when Alfonso Urbi was killed he was not in Sta. Teresa, Lallo, for he was in
Aparri, Cagayan on the burial of Benilda Espino, their granddaughter who died on November 23,
1980 (Exh. 4, Death Certificate) who was buried on November 28, 1980 in the afternoon, and went
back to Sta. Teresa at 5:00 o'clock and arrived at 9:00 o'clock in the evening. In 1980, the soldiers
ordered them to evacuate Sta. Teresa due to the presence of the NPA. Alfredo Costales denied
having been with Danny Costales (no relation) when he killed Alfonso Urbi on November 29, 1980,
at about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. (pp. 7, 8 Decision)
The accused Jaime Agluba, corroborated the testimony of his wife Laureta Agluba, who testified
that in 1980 soldiers ordered residents of Sta. Teresa to evacuate due to the presence of NPA. On
November 29, 1980, were not in Sta. Teresa but they were in Newagac, Gattaran, a distance of
about 50 kilometers. (should be 15 kilometers, TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 10-11) As is their usual
work the accused Jaime Agluba, during farming time always went to help his sister Estrella
Villamin, married to Rufino Villamin. They left Sta. Teresa on November 23, 1980 and continued
living in Newagac, until their return to Sta. Teresa, Lallo, on December 2, 1980. Jaime Agluba
denied having been with Danny Costales when he killed Alfonso Urbi on November 29,1980."
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 3-4)
xxx xxx xxx
The appellants raise the following assignment of errors, to wit:
I adjudged as innocent. They asserted that mere presence at the scene of the crime does not by itself indicate
THAT THE HON. LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE INFORMATION AS AGAINST THE
ACCUSED MARIANO UMBRERO, THERE BEING NO CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IN THE MUNICIPAL COURT OR WAS THERE A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IN THE
OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR, THUS DENYING HIM THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
DUE PROCESS.
II
THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ALL THE ACCUSED TO RECLUSION
PERPETUA AND THE PAYMENT OF P30,000.00 INDEMNITY. (Rollo, p. 50)
In the first assigned, error, Mariano Umbrero alleges that he was denied his right to due process. He states
that there was no preliminary investigation conducted as his name not included in the criminal complaint
filed with the municipal court which conducted the preliminary investigation.
The allegation is unmeritorious.
We agree with the Solicitor General that:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . [A]lthough appellant Umbrero was not named in the complaint filed by the police with the
municipal trial court for the purpose of conducting a preliminary investigation, the municipal judge
upon being informed that Mariano Umbrero was one of the perpetrators of the killing of Alfonso
Urbi, issued a warrant of arrest and later ordered suspect Umbrero to file his counter-affidavit. The
record shows that appellant Umbrero was given the opportunity to answer the charges against
him during the preliminary investigation. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 6-7)
Moreover, it has been held in Parades v. Sandiganbayan (G.R. No. 89989, January 28, 1991), reiterating this
Court's ruling in People v. Casiano (1 SCRA 478, [1961]), that:
The absence of a preliminary investigation does not affect the court's jurisdiction over the case.
Nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. If there was no
preliminary investigation and the defendant, before entering his plea, calls the attention of the
court to the absence of a preliminary investigation, the court, instead of dismissing the
information, should conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case
to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted. (pp. 7-8)
The appellant never asked for or called the attention of the court before entering his plea, as to the absence
of a preliminary investigation. His right to preliminary investigation, then is deemed waived as he failed to
invoke such right prior to or, at least, at the time of the entry of his plea in the court of first instance. (People
v. Casiano, p. 483, supra) The entry of their plea constituted a waiver of their right to preliminary
investigation and any irregularity that attended it. (See People v. La Caste, 37 SCRA 767, 773 [1971])
Jurisdiction was acquired by the Court over the person of Mariano Umbrero as the accused appeared at the
arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. (See Gimenez v. Nazareno, 160 SCRA 1, 5 [1988])
In the second assigned error, the appellants contend that there was no conspiracy, thus, they should all be
the existence of conspiracy. There must be proof of their participation in the crime.
This contention must fail.
It is well-settled rule that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence but can be inferred from the acts
of the accused. (People v. Alitao, G.R. No. 74736, February 18, 1991) The appellants' actuations immediately
prior to, during, and right after the shooting of Alfonso Urbi indicate their common intention to commit the
crime. The appellants were not merely present at the scene of the crime. The prosecution witnesses
positively identified the appellants as among the armed men who arrived at the scene of the crime, shot
110
Alfonso Urbi, and left together after apparently accomplishing their purpose. (TSN, April 10, 1985, pp. 2, 7; Umbrero's relative is Umangay's niece. (TSN, April 21, 1986, p. 32) It has been ruled that the defense of alibi is
TSN, August 5, 1985, pp. 2, 6; TSN, August 28,1985, pp. 2-3) weak if it is established mainly by the accused themselves and their relatives and not by credible persons
(See People v. Flores, G. R. No. 71980, March 18, 1991).
The trial court stated:
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present in the case
at bar.
xxx xxx xxx

It will be recalled that accused Mariano Umbrero, Jaime Agluba and Alfredo Costales, alias Pido
and others were all armed when they went together to the house of the victim Alfonso Urbi. They
were close to Danny Costales when he (Danny) asked for water which was not their common
purpose. Alfonso Urbi got near to see them. Suddenly he was shot by Danny Costales. He ran
outside the house but was overtaken by Danny Costales who pumped more shots on him all
located on the vital parts of the body, causing his instantaneous death. They all left together upon
accomplishing their purpose. The accused were all holding their firearms on their sides, while
others stood guard and surrounded the house. The acts performed by all the accused before,
during and after the perpetration of the crime are indicative of a previous criminal design and
unity of common purpose. (Rollo, p. 30)
The appellants although not active participants in the killing itself, made no effort to prevent it. In fact, the
appellants even drew the guns that were tucked on their waists when Alfonso Urbi, after being shot for the
first time, tried to run outside of his house. (TSN, August 5,1985, pp. 18-19)
Conspiracy having been established, the appellants as co-conspirators are all guilty on the principle that the
act of one is the act of all. (People v. de Guzman, 162 SCRA 145,153 [1988])
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. (People v. Cempron, G.R. No.
66324, July 6, 1990; People v. Manzanares, 177 SCRA 427, 434, [1989])
The shooting of Alfonso Urbi was sudden and unexpected.1awp++i1 The victim was unarmed, unable to
defend himself. He was an unsuspecting victim as the assailants just asked for a drink of water. (TSN, April 10,
1985, p. 20; TSN, August 5,1985, p. 2) He was totally unprepared to be able to defend himself.
On the other hand, evident premeditation was not clearly established, contrary to the findings of the trial
court. Although conspiracy existed, it was merely inferred from the acts of the accused in the perpetration of
the crime, the requisites necessary to appreciate evident premeditation have not been met in this case.
(See People v. Repe, 175 SCRA 422, 435 [1989]) The prosecution failed to prove all of the following: (a) the
time when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had
clung to their determination to commit the crime; and (c) the lapse of sufficient length of time between the
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. (People v. Iligan, G. R.
No. 75369, November 26, 1990; People v. Montejo, 167 SCRA 506, 513 [1988])

Aid of armed men should also not be appreciated in this case, considering that the assailant as well as the
The defense of alibi of the appellants is without merit. The appellants were positively identified by the
appellants were in conspiracy. (See People v. Candado, 84 SCRA 508, 524 [1978]; People v. Piring, 63 Phil. 546,
prosecution witnesses as the witnesses were only a few meters away from the crime scene. (TSN, April 10,
553 [1936])
1985, p. 3; TSN August 5, 1985, p. 5).

The fact that Judge Tumacder did not preside at the trial of this case in its entirety, having taken over only
The defense of alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the
when the second defense witness was to be presented, did not detract from his appreciation of the
appellants (People v. Kyamko, G.R. No. 95263, December 18, 1990). There is nothing in the records which
prosecution evidence. The full record was available to him. (See People v. Abaya, 185 SCRA 419, 424 [1990])
would show a motive or reason on the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate the accused. Identification,
then, should be given full credit. As there is no showing that the prosecution witnesses were moved by
improper motives, the presumption is that they were not so moved, their testimony therefore, is entitled to In view of the foregoing, the appellants were correctly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, but
full faith and credit. (People v. Doctolero, G.R. No. L-34386, February 7,1991) without the attendant circumstances of evident premeditation and aid of armed men. The penalty to be
imposed is reclusion perpetua. The indemnity to the heirs of the deceased is raised to FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00).
In the instant case, the appellants failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that they were at some
other place and for such a period of time as to negate their presence at the time when and the place where
the crime was committed. (See People v. Solis, G.R. No. 93629, March 18, 1991 citing People v. Riego, G.R. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the aforesaid MODIFICATION.
No. 90256, September 12, 1990)
SO ORDERED.
The persons that the appellants presented to corroborate their alibis were their relatives.
EN BANC
Alfredo Costales and Jaime Agluba could have presented other people, aside from their wives, to corroborate
their testimony that they were at some place other than the scene of the crime. But even the testimony of
G.R. No. L-14476 November 6, 1919
Jaime Agluba's wife did not clearly show that Jaime Agluba was not in Sta. Teresa as she stated that during
their stay in Newagac her husband would go to the field and it was only the wife's belief that her husband
was in the field in the afternoon of November 29, 1980. (TSN, January 17, 1989, pp. 16-17) As regards THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
Mariano Umbrero, he could have presented Gregorio Cabulay (TSN, April 21, 1986, p. 27) aside from vs.
Alejandrino Umangay to support his statement. Umangay's corroboration is not that credible as Umbrero and JOSE I. BALUYOT, defendant-appellant.
Umangay had known each other ever since they were still little boys (TSN, April 21, 1986, p. 31) and

111
Filemon Sotto for appellant.
Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This cause has been brought to the Supreme Court upon an appeal prosecuted by Jose I. Baluyot from a
judgment of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Bataan, convicting him of the crime of murder,
committed August 3, 1918, upon the person of Conrado Lerma, governor of said province, and sentencing
him to undergo the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay
the costs.
At the general election which was held on June 6, 1916, Conrado Lerma was elected governor of the Province
of Bataan. One of his competitors upon this occasion was the accused, Jose I. Baluyot, who came out third in
the race. As a result of this contest a feeling of personal rancor was developed in the mind of Baluyot against
his successful competitor, and during the two years which followed the accused became fully imbued with
the idea that Governor Lerma was persecuting him.
In the year 1918 Baluyot was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the offense
of estafa in connection with a loan of money which had been negotiated at the Philippine National Bank. This
proceeding had been tried and in the early days of August, 1918, was pending decision by the judge who tried
the case.
Upon the organization of the National Guard, Baluyot had been commissioned as captain in that body, and
owing possibly to the pendency of the accusation for estafa and its damaging effects upon his reputation, he
had been asked to resign from the position of captain in the National Guard; and although he had not
resigned when the act which gave occasion to this prosecution occurred, he had apparently been temporarily
relieved from duty with that organization pending investigation.
The misfortunes above mentioned, as well as others of a minor character, were attributed by Baluyot to the
machinations of Governor Lerma, all of which served to foment and increase his feeling of enmity towards
the latter.
On August 2, 1918, the defendant left the city of Manila and went to the town of Orion, in the Province of
Bataan, taking with him a revolver. Early on the following day, August 3, he shipped to Manila from Orion a
piano belonging to his wife, and at 8 a.m., went to Balanga, the capital of the Province, arriving at the
recorder's office in the provincial building at about 9 o'clock a.m., where he inquired for Governor Lerma.
He was told that the governor had not arrived, but was expected later. The accused accordingly determined
to wait in the recorder's office, which served as a sort of anteroom to the office of the governor. At about 11
o'clock a. m. the governor arrived. He and the accused greeted each other in a friendly manner by shaking
hands; and the governor, upon being informed that Baluyot had called to confer with him, invited Baluyot
into his office. Baluyot hesitated, having noted the presence of another caller, and asked if the latter did not
have a prior right to an interview. The governor said that Baluyot should enter first, which the latter
accordingly did. The governor and the accused remained alone in the former's office for 3 or 4 minutes,
whereupon it occurred to Governor Lerma that the interview might be more extended than he had expected,
and he accordingly requested that Baluyot should withdraw long enough for the governor to confer with one
Antonino Aranjuez, the other caller to whom reference has already been made. Baluyot accordingly withdrew
into the recorder's office and told Aranjuez that the governor wanted to see or talk to him. Aranjuez then
went in and had a conference with the governor for a few minutes about the appointment of the former as
chief of police for the municipality of Limay. When Aranjuez came out Baluyot said that it was now his turn
and again entered the governor's office.
The evidence shows that at the time Baluyot reentered the governor's office the latter was sitting behind his
desk in an ordinary office chair. Baluyot approached the desk and upon reaching a position directly in front of
the governor spoke certain words which were heard, though not distinctly, by persons in the recorder's office,
Antonino Aranjuez merely heard the accused call out "governor," while Gregorio de Guzman understood
Baluyot to be asking the governor for his revolver. The accused himself testified that his reference to the
revolver was intended to admonish the governor to prepare for a mortal combat and he says that the words
spoken were these:
BALUYOT. It appears to me that your revolver and mine have the same calibre.
GOVERNOR LERMA. No sir; mine is 32.
BALUYOT. So is mine. Be prepared because one of us must die.
The accused gives a color to this conversation which seems to us somewhat unnatural, and his statement as
to what occurred, especially with reference to the length of time that elapsed after he entered the governor's
office until the first shot was fired, is wholly lacking in verisimilitude. What really occurred, as the lower court
found, and as the testimony of the witnesses in the recorder's office shows, is that the first shot was fired
within a few seconds after Baluyot reentered the governor's office and that the interval which elapsed was
scarcely more than sufficient to allow Baluyot to reach the governor's desk. The inference is conclusive that,
immediately upon asking the governor about his revolver, and discovering that he was unarmed, Baluyot
drew his own revolver and fired.
In the testimony given by Baluyot himself a circumstance is mentioned which appears to us important in this
connection. He says that while he was sitting in the recorder's office, awaiting the arrival of Governor Lerma,
Paulo Venegas, a guard attached to the provincial jail, came up and after speaking in a low voice with the
recorder, entered the office of the governor and presently emerged, bringing a revolver and some cartridges.
Baluyot noticed that the revolver was discharged and remarked to the person having it in hand that an
unloaded revolver is less useful even than a cane. The guard replied that he was not the person charged with
loading it, but was going to take it out to be cleaned, whereupon he disappeared carrying the revolver with
him. This act of carrying away of the revolver from Governor Lerma's office was especially notice by Baluyot
and naturally from this he must have supposed that the revolver seen by him was a weapon commonly kept
in the governor's office. The still further inference was obvious to Baluyot that the governor upon arrival
would be unarmed in his office, unless he should possibly bring a revolver upon his person.
This circumstance shows that the words which Baluyot directed to Governor Lerma immediately before the
fatal attack were intended to discover whether Governor Lerma was in fact unarmed. Upon discovering that
Governor Lerma did not have his revolver at hand, the accused at once drew his own weapon and fired.
Baluyot therefore knew Governor Lerma to be unarmed and practically defenseless, and it is plain that the
attack was not begun until the assailant was fully assured upon this point.
The bullet first fired by Baluyot entered in the frontal region of the right shoulder blade of Governor Lerma
and inflicted a wound of minor importance, passing through the aforesaid part of the body and penetrating
the back of the chair in which the governor was sitting. Passing on from the chair, the ball entered the wall of
the office building, but was so far spent that it did not penetrate deeply. Instead it merely made a circular
hole in the wall of moderate depth and rebounded, falling on the floor. The line of direction followed by the
ball indicates that the accused directed the shot in somewhat downward direction and that Governor Lerma
was in all probability reclining backwards in the chair at the instant the shot struck him.
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The governor immediately arose. His free action was impeded by the table in front, and by the walls of the so the body of Governor Lerma shot forward out of the closet, as if in an attitude to embrace the slayer, who
office behind and on either side, since his table was in a corner of his office. His exit was further obstructed by drew backwards, and the body fell prone on the floor. In this position it remained and was found prostrate a
a small book stand on his immediate right. His only convenient direction of escape was, therefore, in the few minutes later by person who came upon the scene. Death ensued in about two or three hours, without
direction to his left by way of the space between the left corner of his desk and the wall nearby. This direction recovery of consciousness.
the governor accordingly took, directing himself towards a passageway in the wall a few feet from his desk
leading into a corridor. When the governor had cleared the desk so as to leave a free space between himself
Baluyot, immediately after the tragedy, stepped over to a window of the room overlooking the public square
and his assailant, the distance which separated them was only a few feet. Baluyot meanwhile turned
and calling to a squad of Constabulary, who were directing themselves to the provincial building, indicated
somewhat to his right and advanced slightly in the direction taken by Governor Lerma.
that they should come up. At the same time he threw his revolver to the ground, with three empty shells and
others that had not been discharged. Upon the arrival of the Constabulary he surrendered without resistance.
The latter desiring to make good his escape, started to run in the direction aforesaid, and Baluyot, raising his
revolver, again fired. The ball struck Governor Lerma in the region of the right shoulder blade and passed
The offense committed in this case exhibits features markedly similar to those which characterized the crime
through the body an inch or two from the wound made by the first shot. The firing of the second shot was
which was the subject of prosecution in United States vs. Gil (13 Phil. Rep., 530); and the offense here
seen by Antonino Aranjuez, whose attention had been attracted by the noise of the first shot. Being then
committed was properly qualified by the trial judge as murder, in which was present the qualifying
seated at a desk in the recorder's office near the door leading into the governor's office, this witness
circumstance of alevosia. The presence of this element is easily and in our opinion irrefutably indicated in the
immediately arose upon hearing the first shot, and having arrived at a point in the governor's office where
conditions and manner both of the original attack and of the final act by which the offense was
stood a screen, occluding direct vision from the door to the governor's desk, he placed himself at the side of
consummated.
the screen and was thus able to see the scene then being transacted. It was at this instant that Baluyot, with
his arm extended, fired the second shot at his fleeing victim. The governor at this moment had his right hand
raised to his already wounded shoulder and was running in a direction away from his assailant rather than With reference to the manner in which the attack was begun, the proof shows that access was gained by
towards him. Immediately upon seeing this shot fired, Aranjuez, instead of intervening to save the governor, Baluyot, to the governor's office upon the pretext that he desired a friendly interview; and although the
as would have been becoming, turned and fled to obtain succor. strained relations existing between the two, owing to their political antagonisms, was appreciated by both,
there was nothing in the situation to warn the governor of impending trouble. The fact Baluyot had already
been called into the office upon the governor's first arrival and had withdrawn for a few moments to permit
Bonifacio Mencias, the sanitary official, who examined the wounds of Governor Lerma, says that both of the
another person to have an interview was also calculated to put the governor off his guard at the moment
first two wounds were made by bullets which entered from the front. This is obviously true as to the first, but
Baluyot reentered the office. Being seated in a reclining chair, and hemmed in by obstacles which prevented
as to the second there seems to be room for doubt. The inspection made by the doctor may have been
him from reaching his assailant, it is plain that the unarmed governor could make no effectual defense against
superficial, and his opinion may have been partly a matter of mere inference from his information as to the
a person armed with such a deadly weapon as a revolver. It is obvious also that the means and methods thus
general features of the tragedy. At any rate he does not state any particulars from which it could clearly be
deliberately selected by the assailant were intended to insure the execution of the crime without any risk to
discovered that the second shot entered from the front. The witness Aranjuez makes it clear that as the
himself arising from the defense which the offended party could make.
matter presented itself to his eye, the governor was fleeing with his right side, rather than his front, exposed
to Baluyot. This witness says that the governor's face was turned in the direction of his flight, though he
thinks the governor could have seen what Baluyot was doing. In this view the second shot should apparently We need not detain ourselves to analyze the conditions which existed when the second shot was fired, and
have entered from behind. we pass on to the third, with the single observation that the entire assault from the beginning must be
considered continuous and that the second shot was fired while the victim was endeavoring to flee to a place
of safety. The presence of alevosia in the firing of the third shot seems to be too patent to permit of
The point we consider of little importance, inasmuch as it is obvious that Baluyot was the aggressor
controversy. The victim in his effort to escape had been driven to take refuge in the closet, and with the door
throughout and that the second shot was fired at an unarmed man whose only purpose was to effect an
shut, it was impossible for him to see what his assailant was doing or to make any defense whatever against
escape to a place of safety.Whether at the instant this shot was fired Governor Lerma may have had his body
the shot directed through the panel of the door. It was as if the victim had been bound or blindfolded, or had
turned so as momentarily to confront his assailant, moving away sidewise, can have no bearing upon the
been treacherously attacked from behind in a path obscured by the darkness of night.
qualification and character of the crime. The testimony of Baluyot to the effect that as soon as Governor
Lerma emerged from behind the table the two engaged in a hand to hand struggle is preposterous in the
extreme. Even supposing that alevosia had not been present in the beginning of the assault, it would be necessary to
find this element present from the manner in which the crime was consummated. In United States vs. Elicanal
(35 Phil. Rep., 209) Justice Moreland said:
After the second shot was fired, Governor Lerma continued his flight along the corridor and, instead of
attempting to pass out to the right into the recorder's office, which would have exposed him to the danger of
another shot while passing through the open space, he took refuge in a closet at the end of the corridor. Once This court has held repeatedly that, even though the beginning of an attack resulting in the death
within, he shut the door and placed himself in a position to obstruct the entrance of his pursuer, who vainly of the deceased is free from treachery of any sort, nevertheless it will be found present if, at the
attempted to open the door. time the fatal blow is struck, the deceased is helpless and unable to defend himself. While the
writer of this opinion formerly held the view that, where there is no treachery in the attack which
results in the death of the deceased, there can be no treachery which will qualify the crime as
The governor then began to call aloud for help, and Baluyot, judging the position of the governor's head from
murder notwithstanding the fact that, at the time the fatal blow was struck, the deceased was
the direction of the sound thus emitted, fired his revolver in the direction indicated. The bullet passed
unarmed and defenseless, nevertheless, the court having held so frequently the contrary, the
through the panel of the door and struck Governor Lerma in the forward part of the head near and above the
writer accepts the doctrine so well established.
right temple. It passed downwards and came out through the left eye, loosening the eyeball in its socket. This
wound was necessarily fatal, though not instantly so; and the governor evidently lost consciousness at once.
Baluyot, feeling the movement of the body within the closet, opened the door without resistance. As he did

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There was present in the offense in question the generic aggravating circumstance that said offense was
committed in a place where public authority was engaged in the discharge of duty. (Subsec. 19, art. 10, Penal
Code.) There is no discernible difference at this point between the present case and that of United
States vs. Gil (13 Phil. Rep., 530, 533), in which this aggravating circumstance was declared to be present.
The trial court also found that the crime in question was characterized by the further aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation. Certain items of proof which tend strongly to show the presence of
this element may be briefly mentioned. It was testified by one Pedro Magajes, a friend of the accused, that on
July 14, 1918, Baluyot in the course of a conversation with Magajes exhibited ill-feeling against Lerma and
said that Lerma would pay for the misfortunes that were befalling him (Baluyot). Domingo
Lintag, compadre of the accused, testified that on the Friday in the month of August, prior to the commission
of the crime in question, he saw the defendant in Orion; that when he and the defendant shook hands the
latter squeezed his hand tightly and said, "Parece ser que esta es la ultima vez que vamos a dar la mano" [may
be that this will be the last time we will shake hands]. This remark is especially noteworthy, since it shows
that the accused contemplated some occurrence which would have grave consequences to him. On the
morning of August 3, the day on which the crime was committed, the accused asked more than one person if
they thought he was in Bilibid, intimating that a false rumor to this effect had been maliciously circulated by
his arch-enemy, Governor Lerma. This shows clearly that the mind of the accused was fixed upon Lerma as
the supposed author of his wrongs.
No very satisfactory explanation is given by the accused as to the reason for his trip to Orion and especially to
Balanga; and the conclusion is irresistible that he was carried to the latter place by a thirst for vengeance .
Furthermore, the conduct of the accused in the next day or two succeeding the commission of the crime was
that of a person stimulated by a feeling of gratification over the successful accomplishment of a fixed
purpose, not the conduct of one effected by grief over the fatal results of a sudden and unexpected
altercation. At no time did he exhibit any sign of regret for the act committed. The conclusion reasonably to
be drawn from the evidence as a whole is that the accused, for several days prior to the perpetration of this
murder, had determined to seek an interview or encounter with Governor Lerma regardless of
consequences. It is impossible to say at what moment the determination to take life became a fixed
resolution. The design to kill was probably entertained when the accused went in the early morning of August
3 to the governor's office, and the putting of this resolution into effect was at once determined upon when
the accused found that the governor was unarmed. In order to constitute the element of known
premeditation in the crime of murder it is not necessary that the slayer should have prefigured in his mind all
of the details of the crime or determined upon the exact moment when he should carry his purpose into
effect. It is enough that the determination to take life should have been formed for a period sufficiently long
to allow the actor time to reflect coolly upon the character and the consequences of the act, the
accomplishment of the crime being left to some suitable opportunity such as chance or design may present.
It is thus manifest that the conclusion of the trial court that the offense was characterized by known
premeditation is by no means without support in the evidence. Nevertheless, as an express ruling on this
point is unnecessary to the disposition of the case, was concede to the accused the benefit of the possible
doubt, and we accordingly refrain from making any express findings as to the presence of said element.
It is contended in behalf of the accused that the crime in question was qualified by two extenuating
circumstances, namely, first, that it was committed under "an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion and obfuscation" (art. 9, subsec. 7, Penal Code), and, secondly, that "the offender had no
intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed." (Art. 9, subsec. 3, Penal Code). This contention
rests upon certain statements found in the testimony of the accused and which, in our opinion, are
discredited by other evidence. Baluyot states that he began his first interview with Governor Lerma on August
3 by saying that he wished Diputado [delegate] Reyes of Bataan could have been present as there were
certain things which he wanted to say in the presence of them both. Baluyot then stated that there was no
doubt that Governor Lerma had won in the political contest and that it was also undeniable that in all his own
misfortunes the governor had played an important and direct part. The governor, according to Baluyot,
thereupon replied: "viene usted con la misma queja, Sr. Baluyot, pero no somos enemigos? Si fueramos
amigos, menos mal; y usted en nuestro lugar hubiera hecho lo mismo como usted ha hecho con mi compadre
Velez que acaba de ser separado de la Guardia Nacional." [You come with the same complaint, Mr. Baluyot,
but, are we not enemies? If we were friends, not quite so bad. If you were in our place you would have done
the same as you have done with my friend (compadre) Velez who has just been discharged from the National
Guard.] Baluyot says that in reply to this he protested that he had nothing to do with the separation of
Captain Velez from the National Guard. At his juncture the governor suggested that the interview was going
to be somewhat lengthy and requested that Baluyot should yield his turn for a few minutes until the governor
could have a short interview with Aranjuez. Thereupon the interview was interrupted in the manner already
stated, Baluyot withdrawing for a few moments into the recorder's office.
Baluyot says that, when he was readmitted into the presence of the governor, he seated himself in the same
chair in front of the governor's desk where he had been seated before, and the conversation was resumed.
This conversation according to Baluyot was of the following tenor:
GOVERNOR LERMA. Where do you say you are going to, Mr. Baluyot?
BALUYOT. I am thinking of going to Cebu and residing therefor some time with my brother-in-law.
THE GOVERNOR. But you will not be able to do so very soon, perhaps until after several months.
BALUYOT. That is not true. On my return to Manila, I'll prepare for my trip and go to Cebu.
THE GOVERNOR. I believe you will not be able to carry that out, because Judge Concepcion will
detain you.
BALUYOT. Why?
THE GOVERNOR. Well, Judge Concepcion has sentenced you for estafa to four months, and I don't
know how many days; truly that is a good idea, to change location, a location so full of people as
Cebu where nobody knows you perhaps you may be able to cheat better.
Baluyot says that, upon being informed by Governor Lerma that Judge Concepcion had rendered judgment
against him in the estafa case condemning him to prison, he lost his head, as he was in high hopes of being
acquitted in that prosecution. He accordingly, at the close of the foregoing words imputed to Governor
Lerma, rose from his chair and used the words which we have quoted in a former part of this opinion with
reference to the calibre of Governor Lerma's revolver, at the same time unbuttoning his coat and producing
his own weapon.
Even supposing that the conversation between the accused and Governor Lerma was exactly as stated by
Baluyot, the language used by Governor Lerma was not such as could have produced passion and obfuscation
in Baluyot sufficient to constitute the mitigating circumstance defined in subsection 7 of article 9 of the Penal
Code. It is to be noted, however, that no such conversation as that above transcribed could possibly have
taken place in the interval between the reentrance of Baluyot into the governor's office and the time when
the words addressed to the governor about the revolver were heard in the recorder's office. From the
testimony given by the witnesses Pedro Gonzales, Antonino Aranjuez and Gregorio de Guzman, we consider it
to be irrefutably established that the first shot was fired within nine or ten seconds after Baluyot reentered
the governor's office and that the interval which elapsed was scarcely more than sufficient to allow Baluyot to
reach the governor's desk.
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The mind of an unbiased person must also be impressed with the inverisimilitude of imputing to Governor
Lerma knowledge of a judgment rendered by a court in the City of Manila against Baluyot of which Baluyot
was ignorant, for under section 41 of the Code of Criminal Procedure sentence in such a proceeding as that
then pending against this accused must be pronounced in the presence of the condemned person, and if
Baluyot had in fact been convicted he himself would have been among the first to learn of it. It is highly
improbable that governor Lerma would have been guilty of conduct so unbecoming as to have engaged in
bantering a political enemy over a matter so delicate, when judgment had not in fact been pronounced. Our
conclusion is that Baluyot's account of the words which passed between him and Governor Lerma
immediately prior to the firing of the first shot must be rejected as false.
The contention that the accused had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed rests upon
the statement of Baluyot that the third shot was accidentally discharged from his revolver while he was
attempting to push open the door of the closet in which the Governor had taken refuge. This pretension is
hardly deserving of serious notice, as it is refuted not only by the circumstantial evidence bearing upon this
phase of the tragedy but also by an admission made by Baluyot on August 5 in conversation with Eusebio
Reyes, reporter of a Manila newspaper. In this conversation Baluyot stated that he pursued the deceased to
the door of the closet and, having observed from the cries emitted by Governor Lerma that the latter was
seated behind the door, he (Baluyot) discharged his pistol in the direction where he divined the governor to
be. We have no doubt as to the truth of this admission, and it is a complete refutation of the suggestion that
the discharge of the revolver was accidental.
What we have thus far said suffices to demonstrate that in slaying Governor Lerma, the accused was guilty of
murder with at least one aggravating circumstance and that the penalty for murder was properly imposed in
its maximum degree. It is, however, further insisted in the brief of the Attorney-General that in reality two
crimes were committed by the accused in the same act, namely, murder and assault upon a person in
authority. Under this conception of the case also the penalty for murder should be imposed in its maximum
degree under article 89 of the Penal Code.
We agree with the Attorney-General upon the proposition that the same act in fact resulted in this case in the
perpetration of two crimes. That the homicide is to be characterized as murder we have already determined;
and it is undeniable that, an attack was in the same act made upon a person in authority while exercising the
duties of his office, as charged in the complaint, since the deceased was, as a provincial governor, an
authority within the meaning of article 249 of the Penal Code. These considerations in our opinion supply an
additional irrefutable basis for the imposition of the death penalty by the trial judge though his decision did
not discuss this aspect of the case.
What has been said is sufficient to dispose of so much of the appeal as is concerned with the commission of
the offense and its legal qualification under the law. Other questions, however, are raised relative to the
conditions under which the case was called to trial and the manner in which the prosecution was conducted
in the Court of First Instance. In this connection various errors of law are imputed, in a separate assignments,
to the action of the Hon. Carlos Imperial, who acted as judge in the court below.
In the first specification of error the appellant alleges that "he was not given ample opportunity to defend
himself," because the court denied his attorney's last request for a continuance. Upon this ground the
appellant seeks to secure from this court, if not a reversal of the judgment, at least an order for a new trial.
The assignment of error is in our opinion without merit. It appears in evidence that on August 3, 1918, the
provincial fiscal filed an information in the court of the justice of the peace charging the accused with the
crime of murder. On the 5th, he appeared and waived the right to be defended by an attorney and requested
that the "expediente" be sent to the Court of First Instance as soon as possible. On the 9th, an information
was filed in the Court of First Instance, whereupon Manuel Banzon, a regularly admitted member of the bar,
was appointed by the court as attorney de officio for the defendant upon the latter's request, and he was duly
arraigned, entering a plea of not guilty. On that date the attorneys for the Government asked that the trial be
set for the 12th, but the counsel for the accused requested that it be set for the 15th, which petition was
granted . After the case was called for hearing on the 15th, the court received a telegram from Vicente Sotto,
then a member of the bar in Manila, stating that he had been employed by the family of the accused and
asking that the hearing be postponed until the following Monday. The attorneys for the Government objected
to this request but the court, nevertheless, postponed the hearing until the following day, and Sotto was
immediately notified by telegram of that order. Sotto at once departed for Balanga and was present in court
when the case was called for trial the next morning. Banzon was authorized by the court to retire from the
case only with the defendant's consent and after Sotto had made his appearance and taken charge of the
case.
From the foregoing statement it is seen that the accused was at all times represented before the court by a
competent attorney, and no fact is adduced which would enable us to say that he was in any wise
embarrassed in the making of his defense by the action of the court in setting the case for trial on August the
sixteenth and proceeding with it on that day. It cannot be permitted that a trial court should be put in error
for refusing a continuance when there is nothing whatever to show that the accused was in fact prejudiced by
the action taken. Where a continuance is sought on the ground of want of preparation, an affidavit should
ordinarily be filed showing in what respect the applicant is not ready and that he has made reasonable
exertions to prepare for trial without success, or some good reasons for not making such exertions. (13 Cor.
Jur., 183.) Nothing of the kind was done in this case; and when Sotto actually appeared in court and assumed
the duties of attorney for the accused, no application for a continuance of any sort was really made. On the
contrary the attorney was content merely to cause a note to be made in the record to the effect that he
respectfully protested against the telegram which the court had sent to him the day before notifying that the
cause was set for trial on the 16th. No statement whatever was made showing why further delay was
necessary. The action taken by the court was in our opinion in no wise prejudicial and was therefore not
erroneous.
In United States vs. Lao Chueco (37 Phil. Rep., 53), it was held that "when an accused is obliged to come to
trial without having the opportunity to cite his witnesses it cannot be said that he is given the opportunity to
be tried completely, fully and impartially as the law prescribes, and a new trial will be ordered." But in that
case the accused was deprived of the opportunity to subpoena his witnesses, whereas in the case at bar
neither the accused nor his attorney informed the court that there was any witness that they wanted to be
cited. It does not appear even now that there was any essential witness whom he could have presented had
not the case been tried on August 16th. When the accused was arraigned on August 9 the court told him that,
if he had any witness that he wanted the court to subpoena, he should so inform the court as soon as
possible in order that the trial of the case might not be delayed.
The second assignment of error raises a question which is addressed to the personal qualification of his
Honor, Carlos A. Imperial, to preside at the hearing of this case. The exception to the trial judge was based on
the fact that the latter had attended the funeral obsequies of Governor Lerma, which had been characterized
by marked manifestations of public grief and sympathy. This fact was relied upon as showing that Judge
Imperial was biased and could not be relied on to try the accused with rectitude, justice, and impartiality. The
judge, however, did not accede to this suggestion and proceeded with the trial as already stated. There is in
our opinion no merit in the assignment. No prejudice on the part of the judge is in fact shown, and the record
by no means bears out the assumption that the judge was in fact in any wise biased.
Furthermore, the objection raised is not based upon any of the grounds of disqualification stated in section 8
of Act No. 190. This section expressly enumerates without ambiguity the cases in which a judge or justice of
the peace is disqualified from acting as such, and the express enumeration of these cases excludes others.
Such is the tenor of the decisions of this court in the cases of Perfecto vs. Contreras (28 Phil. Rep., 538),
and Joaquin vs. Barretto (25 Phil. Rep., 281). In the case last cited it was held that extreme delicacy was no
ground for disqualifying a judge from trying a case. The decisions just cited are civil cases but in the absence
of express provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure, the analogy is of value.
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In the third assignment it is imputed as error that the court at the hearing denied a motion of the attorney of
the accused to withdraw the plea of not guilty previously entered by him in order to permit a demurrer to be
filed to the information. The attorney did not disclose to the court the ground on which he proposed to base
his demurrer, and as the information appears to be sufficient, it is evident that this motion was merely
dilatory, and the court committed no error in refusing to accede thereto. The action of the trial court in
passing upon an application of this character is largely discretionary and is not subject to review except where
the judicial discretion appears to have been abused.
The fourth specification is addressed to the supposed error of the court in refusing to compel the provincial
fiscal to produce in court at the request of the attorney for the accused certain written statements which had
been made by the witnesses Pedro Gonzales, Gregorio de Guzman, and Antonio Aranjuez in a preliminary
inquiry conducted by the fiscal preparatory to this prosecution. It appears that after the witnesses above
mentioned had been examined in court for the prosecution, they were turned over to the attorney for the
accused and were by him fully cross-examined. Later, when the giving of testimony for the prosecution had
been concluded, the defense proceeded to introduce sundry witnesses who were examined in due course.
After four had thus testified, and immediately before the accused was placed upon the stand in his own
behalf, his attorney made the request that the declarations or statements above referred to should be
produced. The attorney for the prosecution objected on the ground that one party cannot be compelled to
produced evidence in favor of the other. The court was of the opinion that the written declarations the
production of which was sought were of a privileged nature and accordingly overruled the motion.We are of
the opinion that the court was not in error in refusing to compel the production of the documents in
question. They were not original or independent evidence of such a character as to give the accused an
unqualified right to compel their production, and no proper basis was laid in the cross-examination of the
witnesses who had made those statements to justify their production with a view to the impeachment of the
declarants. The request was of course based upon the supposition or expectation that if the statements of
the witnesses before the fiscal were produced, they might be found to contain something different from what
was contained in their testimony given in court.
We know of no rule of practice which sustains the contention of the appellant. The statements in question
were not the sworn declarations of witnesses taken in conformity with the requirements of section 13 of
General Orders, No 58, and which are commonly attached to the "expediente" transmitted by the committing
magistrate to the Court of First Instance. In the case at bar the preliminary examination before the
committing magistrate was waived by the accused, and the declarations of the witnesses for the prosecution
were therefore not taken before the magistrate.The declarations referred to were, on the contrary, taken in
an investigation conducted by the fiscal under the authority of section 1687 of the Administrative Code. This
section authorizes the fiscal, if he deems it wise, to conduct an investigation into the matter of any crime or
misdemeanor for the purpose of instituting or carrying on a criminal prosecution. It is expressly declared that
this section shall not be construed to authorize a provincial fiscal to act as a justice of the peace in any
preliminary investigation. The proceeding here contemplated is of an administrative character, and the
information thereby acquired is intended for the use of the fiscal in the conduct of the prosecution. Such
declarations therefore pertain to the official file in the office of the public prosecutor and are not subject to
production at the mere request of the attorney for the accused where no ground therefor had been laid.
In order that we may not be misunderstood, as well as for the purpose of clarifying the practice in such
matters, a few words may here by properly said in respect to the proper mode of proceeding in a case where
a party wishes to get before the court contradictory statements made by a witness who is testifying for the
adversary party. For instance, if the attorney for the accused had information that a certain witness, say
Pedro Gonzales, had made and signed a sworn statement before the fiscal materially different from that
given in his testimony before the court, it was incumbent upon the attorney when cross-examining said
witness to direct his attention to the discrepancy and to ask him if he did not make such and such statement
before the fiscal or if he did not there make a statement different from that delivered in court. If the witness
admits the making of such contradictory statement, the accused has the benefit of the admission, while the
witness has the opportunity to explain the discrepancy, if he can. On the other hand, if the witness denies
making any such contradictory statement, the accused has the right to prove that the witness did make such
statement; and if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce the document, secondary evidence of
the contents thereof would be admissible. This process of cross-examining a witness upon the point of prior
contradictory statements is called in the practice of the American courts "laying a predicate" for the
introduction of contradictory statements. It is almost universally accepted that unless a ground is thus laid
upon cross-examination, evidence of contradictory statements are not admissible to impeach a witness;
though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in the discretion of the court.
We wish to add that in a case of this kind, if the accused had, by affidavit or otherwise, made it appear to the
satisfaction of the court that the witnesses named had made statements in their declarations before the fiscal
materially at variance with their statements in court and that the production of said declarations was
necessary or even desirable, in the interests of justice, the court would have had ample power to order their
production. No such showing, or intimation, was made in this case; and the attorney who made the motion
was merely angling at random to discover something that might prove to be favorable to his client. To put a
court in error for refusing to entertain such a motion would encourage frivolous delays and tend to embarrass
the speedy and proper administration of justice.
The last assignment directed to supposed error of law in the action of the trial court is to the effect that the
judge made his decision without hearing the assessors who acted at the trial. In this connection it appears
that at the request of the accused two assessors were appointed in accordance with the provisions of
sections 153-161 of Act No. 190, which provisions were extended to criminal causes by Act No. 2369 of the
Philippine Legislature. The record does not show that the assessors in the case before us were in fact
consulted by the judge, and the decision of the court makes no mention of them. We are of the opinion that
the irregularity, if such it be, is immaterial. The functions of the assessor are purely advisory, and the
responsibility for the decision rests exclusively with the judge. The statute does not require that the opinions
of the assessors shall be recorded except where two or more assessors are of the opinion that the court's
findings of fact are wrong. In the silence of the record it is to be presumed not only that the functions of the
assessors were properly performed but that they agreed with the findings of the court. This presumption is
borne out in the case before us by the circumstance that after the records of the case had been sent up to
this court, the clerk of court of Bataan forwarded as part of said records certifications signed by the assessors
who had sat in the case, stating that they had read the decision rendered by the court and that they
concurred in the findings of fact made therein. It is not necessary that the record should affirmatively show
that the judge consulted the assessors before making his decision as in the absence of a showing to the
contrary it is to be presumed that he did so.
From the preceding discussion it is apparent that, in the view sustained by the majority of the members of
this court, no material error was committed by the trial judge either in the mode of conducting the trial or in
the qualification of the crime and fixing the penalty attendant thereupon. However, as one of the Justices of
this court is not in accord with the majority with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death
penalty, the penalty imposed must, in conformity with the requirements of Act No. 2726 of the Philippine
Legislature, be reduced from death to cadena perpetua with the accessory penalties prescribed in article 54
of the Penal Code. As thus modified the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-32914 August 30, 1974
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LAUREANO SANGALANG, accused-appellant.
116
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez and Solicitor Ma.
Rosario Quetulio Losa for plaintiff-appellee.
Narciso V. Cruz, Jr. for accused-appellant.
AQUINO, J.:p
This is a murder case. The testimonies of the two prosecution eyewitnesses disclose that at around six o'clock
in the morning of June 9, 1968 Ricardo Cortez left his nipa hut located at Sitio Adlas, Barrio Biluso, Silang,
Cavite to gather tuba from a coconut tree nearby. Flora Sarno, his wife, was left inside the hut. While he was
on top of the tree gathering tuba, he was struck by a volley of shots. He fell to the ground at the base of the
coconut tree.
His wife Flora heard three successive shot coming south of the hut. She went outside the hut. From a distance
of about twenty-five meters, she saw five men, each armed with a long firearm, firing at her husband. He was
already wounded and was lying on the ground at the foot of the coconut tree. His assailants were about five
meters away from him.
She recognized Laureano Sangalang as one of the five armed men who were firing at her husband. She and
her brother Ricardo had known Sangalang since their childhood. She also recognized Conrado Gonzales,
Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the other malefactors.
Flora ran towards the place where her husband had fallen. She shouted, "Bakit ninyo pinagbabaril ang aking
asawa". The five persons fired at her. She was then about twenty meters away from them. She retreated to
the hut for cover. She heard some more shots. After the lapse of about five minutes, Laureano Sangalang and
his companions left the place. When Flora returned to the spot where her husband was prostrate, he was
already dead.
On the occasion already described, Ricardo Sarno, twenty-seven years old, a brother of Flora, was inside his
own nipa hut which was about ten meters away from Flora's hut. He was drinking coffee. His wife and
children were eating breakfast. He heard several shots. He came out of his hut. He saw his brother-in-law
being shot by Laureano Sangalang, Eleuterio Cuyom, Perino Canuel, Irineo Canuel and Conrado Gonzales. He
saw Sangalang using a Garand carbine in shooting his brother-in-law. The latter fell from the top of the
coconut tree after he was shot (10 tsn). His sister Flora was trying to approach her husband but she had to
flee to her hut when Sangalang and his companions fired at her. He wanted to join her but he was likewise
fired upon by the five men. So, he retired and took refuge in his own hut.
Later, Sarno saw his sister Flora, sitting inside her hut. He followed her after she left the hut and went to see
her dead husband, who was lying on the ground, face up, at the base of the coconut tree. When he noticed
that his brother-in-law was already dead, he gathered his children and brought them to Sitio Biga, which was
more or less thirty meters away from his hut in Sitio Adlas. Ricardo reported the killing to the chief of police
who went to the scene of the crime with some policemen and Constabularymen.
The necropsy report shows that the twenty-five-year-old Cortez sustained twenty-three gunshot wounds on
the different parts of the body, fourteen of which were entrance-wounds, and nine were exit-wounds (Exh. A
and B). He died due to the multiple gunshot wounds (Exh. C).
On June 10, 1968 or on the day following the killing, Flora and Ricardo were interrogated by the Silang police.
They executed sworn statements before the Municipal Judge pointing to Laureano Sangalang, Conrado
Gonzales, Irineo Canuel, Perino Canuel and Eleuterio Cuyom as the assassins of Ricardo Cortez. Flora said in
her statement that she knew those persons because from time to time they used to pass by her place. They
resided at Barrio Capitula, Dasmariñas, which is near Barrio Adlas. On the basis of those statements, the
police filed on June 10 in the Municipal Court a complaint for murder against the five aforenamed persons.
Sangalang was arrested. He posted bail in the sum of P50,000 on June 13. He waived the second stage of the
preliminary investigation. The other accused have not been apprehended. On August 8, 1968 the Provincial
Fiscal filed an information for murder against Sangalang.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Tagaytay City Branch, rendered a judgment convicting
Sangalang of murder, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay the heirs of Ricardo
Cortez an indemnity of twelve thousand pesos and to pay his widow moral damages in the sum of ten
thousand pesos (Criminal Case No. TG-162). Sangalang appealed.
The appellant, a fifty-six-year old farmer, admitted that he knew Cortez and that he knows his wife, Flora
Sarno. He pleaded an alibi. He declared that in the afternoon of June 8, 1968 he and Crispulo Mendoza went
to the house of Julian Gatdula at Dapitan Street, Sampaloc, Manila. He arrived at Gatdula's place at six
o'clock. He wanted to borrow money from Gatdula to defray the matriculation fees of his children.
As Gatdula had no money at that time, he advised Sangalang to wait until morning. He would try to raise the
sum of two hundred pesos which Sangalang desired to borrow. Sangalang and Mendoza agreed. They
allegedly slept in Gatdula's house on the night of June 8th. The next morning, they breakfasted in that house.
At about ten o'clock on June 9, Gatdula delivered the two hundred pesos to Sangalang. He and Mendoza then
went to the Central Market in Manila and then to Quiapo. They returned to Cavite and arrived at seven
o'clock in the evening of June 9 in Barrio Capdula. Gatdula and Mendoza corroborated Sangalang's alibi.
In this appeal Sangalang insists on his alibi and impugns the credibility of the prosecution eyewitnesses, Mrs.
Cortez and the victim's brother-in-law, Ricardo Sarno. The basic issue is whether their eyewitness-testimony
that they saw appellant Sangalang as one of the five armed persons, who riddled Cortez with fourteen
gunshot wounds of entry, is sufficient to overcome his alibi. In essence, the case projects the ever recurring
conflict in criminal jurisprudence between positive identification and alibi.
The trial court rejected appellant's alibi. It noted that although his witnesses, Mendoza and Gatdula, learned
of his arrest, and Mendoza even visited him in the municipal jail, Sangalang and his witnesses did not
interpose the defense of alibi when he was investigated by the police and when he was summoned at the
preliminary investigation.
Sangalang points to certain discrepancies in the declarations of Mrs. Cortez and her brother Ricardo Sarno.
Those inconsistencies, which are not glaring, strengthen their credibility and show that their testimonies were
not coached nor rehearsed. The discrepancies may be attributed to deficiencies in observation and
recollection, or misapprehension of the misleading and confusing questions during cross-examination, or to
the defective translation of the questions and answers but they do not necessarily indicate a wilful attempt to
commit falsehood (People vs. Selfaison, 110 Phil. 839; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1973, 54
SCRA 350).
The controlling fact is that Mrs. Cortez and Sarno clearly and consistently testified that they saw Sangalang, a
person already well-known to them, among the five armed persons who shot Ricardo Cortez. That
unwavering identification negates appellant's alibi.
The prosecution did not prove the motive for the killing. On the other hand, Sangalang did not show that Mrs.
Cortez and Sarno were impelled by a malicious desire to falsely incriminate him. .
117
Counsel de oficio meticulously examined the contradictions and deficiencies in the evidence for the
prosecution. He made a spirited defense of the appellant. However, his efforts failed to cast any reasonable
doubt on Sangalang's complicity in the killing.
The victim was shot while he was gathering tuba on top of a coconut tree. He was unarmed and defenseless.
He was not expecting to be assaulted. He did not give any immediate provocation. The deliberate, surprise
attack shows that Sangalang and his companions employed a mode of execution which insured the killing
without any risk to them arising from any defense which the victim could have made. The qualifying
circumstance of treachery (alevosia), which was alleged in the information, was duly established (See art.
14[16], Revised Penal Code). Hence, the killing can be categorized as murder (See People vs. Sedenio, 94 Phil.
1046). Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstance of band(U. S. vs. Abelinde, 1 Phil. 568). Evident
premeditation, which was alleged in the information, was not proven.
The trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on Sangalang (Arts. 64[1] and 248, Revised
Penal Code).
Finding no error in its judgment, the same is affirmed with costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 109660 July 1, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DANNY ANGELES alias "Danny Fake" and JOHN DOE, accused,
ROMEO NELL alias "Omeng," appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
After an accused has openly admitted the killing, the gravamen of the prosecution's case cannot be
disbelieved anymore. Thus, the accused must prove all the elements of self-defense clearly and convincingly.
He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's.
This is an appeal from the December 11, 1992 Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch 172,
in Criminal Case No. 10341-V-90 convicting Appellant Romeo Nell of murder.
Together with Danny Angeles, alias "Danny Fake," and one John Doe, appellant was charged with murder in
an Information dated June 11, 1990 which reads:
That on or about the 24th day of March 1990, in the municipality of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above
named accused, armed with a bladed instrument and with intent to kill one Reynaldo
Laureano y Nuque, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one
another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with evident
premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery, attack, assault and stab with
the said bladed instrument they were then provided the said Reynaldo Laureano y
Nuque, hitting the latter on his body, thereby causing him serious physical injuries
which directly caused his death.2
Only appellant was arrested while the two other accused remained at large. During his arraignment on May
13, 1992, he pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds the accused guilty of the crime of
Murder as principal, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Reynaldo Laureano in the sum of P50,000.00; and to
pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.3
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution actually presented two versions of the incident: one by Rosini Espejo-Cenon and another by
Benjamin Laureano. Although both versions undoubtedly pointed to appellant as the assailant, they
materially differed as to the participation of the other accused and the events which led to the fatal stabbing
of the deceased.
Prosecution Witness Rosini Cenon's testimony was summarized by the trial court as follows:4
. . . On March 24, 1990 at about 10:00 p.m. she was washing clothes in front of their
house. From across the street, at a distance of 6 meters she saw the accused Romeo
Nell alias Omeng, pointing to him in Court, stabbed (sic) Reynaldo Laureano. Romeo
Nell was with Danilo Angeles alias Danny Fake. The victim when stabbed was just
resting by sitting in front of an already closed store. Romeo made a thrust at Reynaldo
with a "panaksak" but Reynaldo was able to run away. Romeo followed him. Some
liquor drinkers noticed Reynaldo being chased so they threw bottles at Romeo who was
hit at the nape and stumbled. Danny Fake tried to help Romeo. Before Romeo was able
to stand up, Danny Fake was able to pull Reynaldo and immersed him in a canal. Then
Romeo who was already up stabbed Reynaldo upon orders of Danny Fake. Reynaldo
was hit on the chest by Romeo who even repeatedly moved the bladed weapon inside
the body to and fro. After Reynaldo was stabbed and they saw he was no longer
moving, Danny Fake kicked Romeo saying "Putang ina mo ano pa ang hinihintay mo,
sumibat ka na". Romeo then ran together with another man who was half naked from
waist up. Danny Fake then shouted, "bakit hindi tulungan ito ng mga bumato sa kanya"
while holding a viente nueve knife. Then Danny Fake left. Somebody went down and
helped Reynaldo. She (witness) shouted "tulungan ninyo si Rey." He was brought to the
hospital but he died. She saw all the incident because of the light from the stores which
were still open then.
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In contrast, Prosecution Witness Benjamin Laureano, the victim's brother, described the events differently.
His testimony was presented in the appealed Decision as follows:5
. . . On March 24, 1990 . . . (a)t about 10:30 p.m. of said date he was fetching water at
Abalos St., about 20 meters away from their residence. He was told by among (sic)
those fetching water with him that there was trouble going on at the corner of Abalos
St. and Concepcion St. which is about 20 meters away. He went there to look, with
Boyet Manansala. Upon reaching the place he saw his brother Reynaldo and Romeo
quarreling. He pointed to the accused Romeo in Court. He had known Romeo before
the incident because he used to borrow tools from their neighbors. He saw Romeo and
Reynaldo struggle with each other and then Romeo ran out (sic) of the corner towards
the market. After the accused ran away his brother Reynaldo chased him. He asked his
brother Reynaldo to go home because Reynaldo was not able to run far and was not
able to catch the accused. His brother and he (sic) went home. His brother again went
down the house and drunk beer in a store in front of their house. He was with Junior
Cenon. Romeo Nell arrived. He saw Romeo because he (witness) was then lifting the
container of water for their house. Romeo chased his brother with a bladed weapon.
When he caught up with him they struggled with each other first. His brother was hit
and knelt in the canal. Romeo Nell stabbed him and kicked him. His brother was hit on
the chest once. Romeo Nell ran away. He saw all this from a distance of 8 meters. He
went upstairs to ask help from his brothers. When they all went down Romeo Nell was
no longer there. They brought Reynaldo out of the canal to the Santisimo Rosario
Hospital. He was dead on arrival. He gave a statement to the police (Exh. B, B-1).
On cross examination, Benjamin Laureano testified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
When he saw his brother being stabbed he could not go near because Romeo had a
companion and a look out.
xxx xxx xxx
Dr. Prospero Cabanayan conducted the autopsy on the victim. He testified that the victim died of severe
hemorrhage due to an eleven-inch stab wound below the right collarbone, penetrating the big blood vessels
direct to the heart, and two puncture wounds located at the chest almost near the armpit.6 The stab wound
could have been caused by a sharp, single-bladed instrument while the puncture wounds, by a pointed
instrument.7 From the location of the wounds, he opined that it was possible that the victim was lying down,
facing the assailant who was standing.8
The prosecution presented Francisca Sagnip, the sister of the victim, as rebuttal witness. She testified that:9
On March 26, 1990 at about 8:00 A.M., [s]he was at the police station to present the
kitchen knife which she found at the canal at Abalos St., Marulas, Valenzuela. She found
it on March 26, 1990 at about 7:30 A.M. She identified the kitchen knife (Exh. H).
On cross examination she testified that she was not present when her brother was
stabbed. It was after the report was made to the police that the latter went to the
scene and insvestigated. They found no kitchen knife. She was alone when she found
the knife. She believes it was the one used by his (sic) brother.
Evidence for the Defense
Appellant justifies his act by invoking self-defense. His testimony is synthesized in the Appellant's Brief: 10
. . . [O]n March 24, 1990 while plying his tricycle he saw Reynaldo Laureano at about
5:00 to 6:00 p.m. He let his two passengers alight. Reynaldo approached him for beer
money and he told him he will give him later. He just started plying his tricycle.
Reynaldo got angry saying "hindi puede". Reynaldo said he needed to drink and if he
will not give, something bad will happen to him. Reynaldo said "Ako ang may hawak ng
Abalos St." and Reynaldo boxed him as he said these. He fought back. While they were
boxing each other, Reynaldo's brother Benjamin and a certain Junior arrived. He ran
because Benjamin had a knife. The three gave chase. They failed to catch him. He went
home. He left his tricycle on the road. After one hour, he tried to retrieve it but did not
pass Abalos St. He was able to retrieve his tricycle and went home. He rested for 4
hours before plying his tricycle. That was about 10:00 p.m. He met for the second time
Reynaldo Laureano because he passed by Abalos St. He saw Benjamin, Junior, and
Reynaldo Laureano drinking beer, sitted (sic) on a bench on the side of the street near
the house of Reynaldo Laureano. Upon his return trip, the three blocked his way. He
was forced to stop. They were again asking for money particularly Reynaldo while the
two were just standing by. He requested that he be allowed not to give because his trip
was destroyed and that he has his family to feed. Reynaldo approached him to box him.
He jumped towards his tricycle to get his screw driver to defend himself because one of
them already pulled out a knife while Junior was holding a bottle of beer and hit him on
the head. Junior is the brother in law of Rosini Espejo. After he was hit with a bottle of
beer, his vision became dark and he started stabbing Reynaldo. Benjamin and Junior
ran away when they saw Reynaldo was hit. He boarded his tricycle and went home. He
stabbed Reynaldo even if it was Junior who hit him with a bottle of beer because
Reynaldo was poised to box him. When he started stabbing, he hit Reynaldo. He did not
tell this to the police. He was afraid he would be incarcerated. He was thinking of his
children as his wife is abroad. The incident happened on March 24, 1990. He was
arrested on April 27, 1992. He did not hide but just continued plying his tricycle. The
father, brother and sister of Reynaldo were often his passengers. The reason why they
did not cause his arrest is because people there knew that the deceased is a trouble
maker and a "salot" in their place. The testimony of Espejo which gave a different
version that he had a companion is not true. She just testified that way because her
brother in law is involved in the case. He had a screw driver because he uses it as a tool
for adjustment of the contract point of his tricycle. . . . (TSN, November 4, 1992, pp. 3-
19).
Ruling of the Trial Court
In rejecting the claim of self-defense, the trial court held that the evidence of the prosecution was more
credible than that of the appellant. Prosecution Witnesses Benjamin Laureano and Rosini Cenon gave two
versions of the facts, but the trial court accepted Benjamin's testimony rather than Rosini Cenon's because
the former gave his statement to the police immediately after the stabbing incident at ten minutes past one
o'clock early morning of March 25, 1990. Rosini's statement, on the other, hand was executed two days later,
on March 27, 1990, after her brother-in-law Junior Cenon was implicated in the stabbing by appellant.
Unlike Benjamin's story, appellant's version was not only uncorroborated; it was also incredible. The trial
court opined that, even if the victim was a drug user and a troublemaker, appellant's actions were not
justified.
119
The lower court also held that the killing was qualified by evident premeditation. It found that the appellant
and the victim had a quarrel that ended when the former ran away from the latter. Later on, appellant
returned and stabbed the victim.
Assignment of Errors
Appellant claims self-defense. He ascribes the following errors to the trial court: 11
I against his life was posed by the armed Junior, not the unarmed victim.
The trial court erred in categorizing the crime committed as murder instead of
homicide.
II
The trial court erred in not acquitting the accused-appellant on the ground of self-
defense under paragraph 1 of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious. We do not agree with appellant's claim of self-defense, but we find that the
prosecution has not established evident premeditation beyond reasonable doubt. We shall now discuss the
errors assigned by the appellant in inverse order.
Assessment of Appellant's Credibility
by the Trial Court
By interposing self-defense, appellant shifted the burden of proof, thereby obligating himself to show that his
act was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. 12 Consequently, he must establish clearly
and convincingly all the elements of self-defense, relying mainly on the strength of his own evidence and not
on the weakness of the prosecution's; for even if the latter was weak, it could not be disbelieved after his
open admission of the killing.
The trial court, however, did not find appellant's uncorroborated testimony credible. The time-tested
doctrine is that a trial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness 13 is entitled to great weight — even
conclusive and binding on this Court, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence. Credibility is a matter that peculiarly falls within the province of the
trial court as it had the opportunity to watch and observe the demeanor and behavior of the witnesses at the
time of their testimony. 14 Thus, assigning value and weight to each testimony is within its jurisdiction. 15
The trial court's assessment of the credibility — or the lack of it — of appellant and his version of the incident
appears supported by the records. Five crucial points are worth noting.
The first point is the matter of the weapon used. Appellant claimed that he used a six-inch screwdriver to stab
the victim. 16 The medico-legal officer described the two instruments which could have inflicted such wounds
as a single-bladed weapon and an instrument with a sharp point. 17 A screwdriver fits neither of the two
descriptions. Based on appellant's description, it was as an old screwdriver with a blunt end and rounded on
the side. 18 He did not even present in evidence this alleged implement to show that it fitted either of the two
descriptions.
Second, appellant would like us to believe that it was Benjamin who wielded a knife — one of the weapons
that, according to the medico-legal officer, could have caused the wounds of the deceased. He thus wants to
imply that it was Benjamin who fatally stabbed his brother. This allegation is not only illogical; it runs counter
to the established fact that the quarrel was between the victim and the appellant, not Benjamin. Appellant
has not show any plausible reason, argument or evidence why Benjamin should kill his own brother.
Third is appellant's choice of victim. He testified that he was hit on the head with a beer bottle by one Junior
Cenon. Why then did he attack the victim who, according to him, was only poised to box him. Clearly, it was
Junior who had hit him and was probably holding a bottle of beer, broken by then. The more imminent threat
The fourth point is the matter of flight. Although he claimed that he did not go into hiding after the incident,
he also admitted that he fled from the scene of the crime in his tricycle. 19 Flight, in jurisprudence, is a strong
indication of guilt, 20 although its converse does not necessarily imply innocence. 21 That he feared being
imprisoned as he had children to take care of does not exempt him from these legal precepts. He even
intentionally failed to report the incident to the police, negating his claim of self-defense. 22
The fifth point is the failure of the defense to raise the extortion theory and Benjamin's complicity therein
during the latter's testimony. The failure to raise a theory that would have gravely impaired Benjamin's
credibility creates a very serious doubt on the veracity of appellant's present allegations.
Thus, we cannot blame the trial court for not putting much faith in appellant's testimony. Evidence, to be
believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but must be credible in itself. 23
Failure to Prove Requisites of Self-Defense
An accused must also establish by clear and convincing evidence 24 the requisites of self-defense, namely: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 25 These, appellant
failed to prove.
Self-defense, by its very nature, requires the attendance of unlawful aggression initiated by the
victim. 26 Unlawful aggression is an assault or attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate
manner which places the accused's life in actual peril. 27 It must be such that it puts in real danger the life or
personal safety of the person defending himself. 28 It cannot be merely an imagined threat or a threatening or
intimidating attitude. 29
In this case, unlawful aggression was not established by the defense. Appellant merely proved that the victim,
Benjamin and Junior Cenon were extorting beer money from him. The manner of extortion described by
appellant, however, does not show how appellant's life or limb was placed in any peril as to justify his killing
of Reynaldo.
Even if we consider that a threat to his life or limb could have been imminent because Benjamin held a knife,
still appellant did not state that the latter threatened him with the deadly weapon. In fact, Benjamin did not
threaten him at all. Appellant admitted that after his head was hit with a bottle of beer, his vision dimmed
and he started stabbing the victim who was allegedly approaching and about to box him. Based on said
testimony, we fail to see any peril to appellant's life or limb that could have justified his having killed the
victim.
In self-defense, there should also be reasonable necessity for the action taken as well as the means used. The
latter requires a consideration of (1) whether the aggressor was armed, (2) the nature and quality of the
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weapon used, and (3) the physical conditions and sizes of both aggressor and the person defending
himself. 30 Appellant was armed while his three alleged assailants were not competently shown to have been
armed. His claim is that Benjamin had a knife and that Junior Cenon and the victim held a bottle of beer each.
But allegation is not evidence and, in the absence of the latter, we cannot agree with appellant that his
alleged aggressors were similarly armed. Therefore, the reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel the "aggression" from the victim and his companions was not proven in this case.
Clearly, the justifying circumstance of self-defense cannot be sustained. Appellant failed to prove unlawful
aggression by the victim or to demonstrate the reasonable necessity of the means he employed to defend
himself. 31
Evidence of Premeditation, Treachery
and Abuse of Superior Strength
However, the trial court erred in appreciating evident premeditation based solely on the fact that appellant
returned to the crime scene four hours after his first quarrel with the victim. Evident premeditation indicates
a stubborn adherence to a decision to commit a felony. It requires a showing of: (1) a previous decision by the
accused to commit the crime; (2) overt act(s) manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his
determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual execution
sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his acts. 32 Evident premeditation
connotes a deliberate adherence to a plan to commit a crime.
Returning to the scene of an earlier fight about four hours later does not establish these elements. Mere
lapse of time is not equivalent to evident premeditation. 33 Time and again, we have held that evident
premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify a killing to murder in the absence of evidence, not only of
sufficient lapse of time, but also of the planning and preparation to kill when the plan was conceived. 34 The
prosecution evidence simply showed that after the fight was broken up, appellant returned to kill the victim.
From said circumstances, we cannot deduce with certainty that appellant clung to a decision to kill the victim.
Treachery and abuse of superior strength were not discussed in the trial court's Decision. Since they were
alleged in the Information, the Court pored over the records to find any evidentiary support therefor.
However, we are also unable to appreciate treachery from the prosecution's narration of events. Benjamin
was bringing several containers of water into their house when the incident occurred. Thus, because his
attention was focused elsewhere prior to his brother's stabbing, he was not in a position to say that appellant
attacked his brother suddenly and without warning. He did see, however, that appellant chased his brother
with a bladed weapon and that they struggled with each other first before appellant stabbed his brother. In
effect, he admitted that when appellant attacked the victim, the latter was not without a chance to defend
himself. The prosecution failed to establish that the appellant employed means, methods or forms which
tended directly and specially to insure the commission of the killing without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. 35
The record is also bereft of proof that appellant and his companions took advantage of their collective
strength to overwhelm their victim. 36 Superior strength is not appreciated by the mere fact of superiority in
the number of malefactors, but rather by the deliberate employment of excessive force which is out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. 37 Note also must be made of the fact
that the victim was not alone.
In sum, appellant's testimony suffers seriously from want of credibility. Even if we ascribe credibility to
appellant's testimony, however, we still cannot accept his plea of self-defense, for he failed to prove all the
requisites thereof. While the appellant failed to prove self-defense, the prosecution likewise failed to show
any qualifying circumstance. In this light, appellant should be convicted only of homicide under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code without any generic aggravating or mitigating circumstance.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant is CONVICTED of homicide, not murder,
and is SENTENCED to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum and fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The trial court's disposition requiring the
appellant "to indemnify the heirs of Reynaldo Laureano in the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs" is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
N BANC
[G.R. No. 128114. October 25, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROGER CANDO Y PAGDANGANAN, ARNEL VARGAS Y
MAGTANGOB, AND WILBERTO RAPCING Y BROOLA, accused-appellants.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
On automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, in Criminal Case
No. 95-142748, convicting appellants of the crime of robbery with homicide, sentencing them to death,
ordering them solidarily to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00, and to return the
personal belongings taken from the victim and other offended parties. In a related case, Criminal Case No. 95-
142749, appellants were acquitted of the charge of carnapping.
Appellants Cando and Rapcing, aged 40 and 28 respectively, were employed as candlemakers at the
Rosarian Candle Factory located in Paco, Manila. Appellant Vargas, aged 20, was employed as a delivery
boy. The victim, Luis D. Remoriata, was the caretaker (katiwala) in said factory.
The facts based on the records are as follows:
In the afternoon of May 13, 1995, Vargas, Rapcing and one Nonoy Sayson were having a drinking
session at a canteen in front of the factory. At around 9:30 P.M., Cando joined the group. Upon the prompting
of Vargas, Cando went to the factory to get his salary. Cando came back angry because he was unable to get
his salary from the secretary, nor was he able to get a loan of P100.00 from the caretaker. Apparently, Cando
already had previous misunderstandings with the caretaker, so this time, he threatened to kill the caretaker.
The group continued their drinking session.[1]
At around 11:00 P.M., Vargas, Rapcing, and Cando, armed with two knives and carrying a shoulder bag,
climbed the fence of the factory. They walked on the galvanized iron roof towards the other building. One by
one, they slipped through a narrow window at the side of the building. The trio proceeded to the victims
room, which was lighted by a fluorescent lamp. Cando picked a piece of lead pipe and told Vargas to pull open
the door where the victims mosquito net was attached. When Vargas pulled open the door, the mosquito net
snapped and Cando struck the victim on the head with the lead pipe. The victim awakened and Cando
demanded money from him. When the victim replied that he had no money, Cando struck him again with the
lead pipe. Blood oozed from the victims head. Cando asked the victim if he recognized him. The victim weakly
replied Yes, You are Roger (Cando). Thereafter, Cando repeatedly hit him with the lead pipe until he became
unconscious. Cando placed the victims radio cassette in his bag. He went upstairs to get more items and the
keys of the Cimarron van. Thereafter, the trio went downstairs to where the van was parked. Vargas, the only
121
one who knew how to drive, sat on the drivers seat. Cando and Rapcing opened the gate, then pushed the
van outside. Once they were out of hearing range, Vargas gunned the motor and the two clambered into the
van. Cando sat on the passenger side while Rapcing sat at the back. Cando prevailed upon the group to
proceed to Quiapo to visit his girlfriend, but they could not locate her so they just drove around until
daybreak. When they reached Hemady Street in Quezon City, they abandoned the van. The trio boarded a
jeep going to Taft Avenue and went their separate ways.[2] It was then already early morning of May 14, 1995.
At around 6:00 A.M., Mrs. Norma Chu, the factory owner, discovered the dead body of Luis Remoriata.
The factory van was also missing. A hysterical Mrs. Chu called the Barangay Captain, who in turn reported the
incident to the police. Upon investigation, the police found a bakawan firewood stained with blood some ten
meters away from the victims body. The police also called a funeral parlor to get the body of the victim.[3]
In the meantime, the van was discovered by Barangay Kagawad Mejia, who called up the telephone
number posted at the side of the van. The owner, Mrs. Chu, arrived with three NBI Agents who took pictures
of the van and lifted fingerprints from it.[4]
The very next day, May 15, 1995, Mrs. Chu lodged a complaint[5] with the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). Based on her complaint, the NBI dispatched a team of agents to the crime scene. The NBI
recovered a bloodstained steel pipe behind the door of the room. Upon learning from Mrs. Chu that
appellants Cando and Vargas had previous skirmishes with the victim, on May 16, 1995, the NBI agents picked
up Vargas from the factory and brought him to their office for questioning.[6]
Vargas readily admitted his participation and pinpointed appellants Cando and Rapcing as his co-
perpetrators. He likewise executed an extrajudicial admission[7] and waiver of his rights under Articles 124 and
125 of the Revised Penal Code.[8]
Acting on the lead, the NBI agents picked appellant Cando at his house in Libis St., Caloocan City.
Appellant Cando invoked his right to remain silent.[9] He executed a waiver of rights under Articles 124 and
125 of the Revised Penal Code.[10]
Thereafter, appellant Rapcing was also arrested at his house in Cristobal St., Looban, Paco,
Manila.[11] Rapcing admitted complicity in the crime, and executed an extrajudicial admission[12] corroborating
the story of Vargas. He also executed a waiver of his rights under Articles 124 and 125 of the Revised Penal
Code.[13]
During custodial investigation, the three were assisted by Atty. Isidro T. Gamutan, a lawyer who
happened to be at the NBI because he was following up a case.
On May 17, 1995, appellant Vargas executed a second extrajudicial admission[14]
stating that Cando
gave him the bag containing the stolen items for safekeeping and that he brought the bag to his sister-in-laws
house in Kahilum, San Andres Bukid, Manila. He accompanied the NBI agents to the house and gave them the
bag which bore Candos name.[15]
On May 23, 1995, appellants were charged with the crime of Robbery with Homicide under the
following Information:[16]
The undersigned accuses ROGER CANDO y PAGDANGANAN, ARNEL VARGAS y MAGTANGOB and WILFREDO
RAPCING y BROOLA of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, committed as follows;
That on or about May 13, 1995, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and
confederating together and helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent of gain and by means of force, violence and intimidation, to wit: by hitting one LUIS D. REMORIATA
with steel pipe and wood on the head several times and at the same time forcibly taking away from him the
following, to wit:
One (1) Brown wallet valued at P 120.00
containing cash money of . 1,000.00
Cash money in the amount of 10,000.00
Three (3) wrist watches, all valued 1,000.00
One (1) Radio casette (STD) ... 1,200.00
Assorted clothing, not less than 500.00
or in the total amount of P13,820.00 belonging to said Luis D. Remoriata and under his personal care, to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner in the aforesaid amount of P13,820.00, Philippine Currency; that on
the occasion of the said robbery and by reason thereof, the herein accused, in pursuance of their conspiracy,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the said LUIS D. REMORIATA, and as a result thereof, he sustained physical injuries which were
the direct and immediate cause of his death.
Contrary to law.
ALEJANDRO G. BIJASA
Asst. City Prosecutor
On August 29, 1995, upon arraignment, appellants entered their respective pleas of not guilty.[17] Joint
trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Norma C. Chu, the factory owner; (2) NBI
Agents Serafin Gil, Mario Garcia, Gregorio Tomagan; (3) NBI Photographer Cecilio Datinguinoo; (4) NBI
Fingerprint Examiner Elter Yano; (5) Dr. Manuel Lagonera, medico-legal officer; (6) Atty. Isidro Gamutan,
counsel of appellants during custodial investigation; (7) Barangay Kagawad Alejandro Mejia.
Mrs. Norma Chu testified that when she discovered the body of the victim, the quarters was in
disarray, and the victims clothes and radio were missing. Later, her husband and son informed her that their
wallets which they placed on top of the TV in the sala upstairs, and two other wristwatches were missing. She
also identified the van which was recovered from Hemady St. in Quezon City as the one belonging to the
factory.[18]
Serafin Gil testified that he took down the statement of Mrs. Chu and supervised the custodial
investigation of appellants.[19] Mario Garcia took down the statements of Vargas and Rapcing.[20] Gregorio
Tomagan testified that he was present during the taking of the two statements of appellant Vargas dated
May 16 and 17, 1995.[21] Cecilio Datinguinoo testified that he took pictures of the van while the NBI agents
were lifting fingerprints from the van.[22] Elter Yano testified that he managed to lift six (6) fingerprints from
the cimarron van, tagged as Q-1 to Q-6. He testified that Q-1 which was lifted from the air freshener found in
the van was identical to the left index fingerprint of appellant Vargas (Exh. DD). Likewise, Q-2 which was lifted
from the victims stereo cassette was identical to the right ring fingerprint of Cando (Exh. EE). The other prints
were unidentifiable.[23]
Dr. Manuel Lagonera testified that the cause of death was blunt head injuries and that the victim
sustained the following injuries:[24]
1. Triangular lacerated wound, with contussions at the periphery, measuring 3x2.8x2.5 cms, right
forehead.
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 2. Deep lacerated wound, right forehead, above the right eyebrow, measuring 7x1.9 cms.
3. Lacerated wound, right zygomatic region, measuring 4.2x1.5 cms.
4. Deep lacerated wound, left frontal region, measuring 7x2.5cms.
5. Lacerated wound, left fronto-temporal region, measuring 2.5x2 cms.
6. Deep lacerated wound, angle of the mouth, right, measuring 4.5x2 cms.
7. Hematoma, both upper eyelids.
8. Deep lacerated wound, vertex, measuring 9x3 cms.
9. Lacerated wound, left occipital region, measuring 7x3 cms.
10. V-shaped lacerated wound, right external ear, measuring 3x2.5 cms.
11. Abrasion, right anterior shoulder, measuring 4x1.8 cms.
12. Semi-circular contussion, right supra-clavicular region, measuring 3.5x3.2 cms.
INTERNAL FINDINGS:
1. There was extensive sub-aponeurotic hematoma with multiple fractures of the cranial vault. Epidural
hematoma over the left parietal lobe of the brain with massive sub-arachnoid hemorrhage.
2. Right anterior and middle cranial fossae were fractured.
3. The stomach was empty.
Atty. Isidro T. Gamutan testified that he happened to be at the NBI when the three accused were
scheduled for custodial investigation. The Chief of the Anti-Carnapping Unit requested him to give legal
assistance to the three accused. He asked the accused why they were being investigated, and explained to
them their rights. When he was satisfied that the accused understood their rights, he assisted them in
executing their extrajudicial statements.[25]
Alejandro Mejia, Barangay Kagawad at Barangay Kristong Hari, Quezon City testified that he found the
abandoned van with a flat tire. He contacted the owner through the telephone number printed on the side of
the van. The owner arrived with three NBI agents who examined the van.[26]
For the defense, appellants testified. Appellant Cando stated that he finished Grade III, cannot read,
but can write his name. He denied any participation in the killing, but claimed that Vargas and Rapcing knew
about the incident. He said that on May 13, 1995, he reported for work at the factory at 2:00 P.M. until 10:00
P.M. He went home in Libis St. Caloocan City, where he slept until around 11:00 A.M. the following day. He
denied joining the drinking session. On May 14, 1995, he reported for work at around 12:00 NN until 2:00
P.M.. He identified as his the bag containing the stolen items. He further identified the contents of the bags,
the air freshener which was taken from the van, the two wristwatches belonging to the son and daughter of
Mrs. Chu. He admitted that he and the other two appellants offered to pay to the widow of the victim
damages for his death.[27]
Appellant Vargas, for his part, admitted participation in the killing, but claimed that he was forced by
Cando at knife point to participate. He further claimed that it was only Cando who killed the victim by hitting
him with an iron bar. He admitted, however, that he agreed to drive the Cimarron because he wanted to
practice driving.[28]
Appellant Rapcing recanted his extrajudicial admission. He denied any knowledge or participation in
the killing since he was stone drunk (lasing na lasing). He claimed that he just slept inside a Tamaraw pick-up
parked outside the factory. Further, he claimed that the finding of guilt is inconsistent with the fact that he
never went into hiding after the alleged incident.[29]
On December 27, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision[30] convicting the three (3) appellants of
Robbery with Homicide with the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and treachery, and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death. Appellants were acquitted of the charge of carnapping.
Hence, the present automatic review. In their consolidated brief,[31] appellants raise the lone
assignment of error that -
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF EVIDENT
PREMEDITATION AND TREACHERY ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
In praying for the reduction of the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua, appellants contend that
the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation, as there was no time for cool reflection since their
minds were hazy with the influence of liquor. Appellants further dispute the existence of treachery since the
killing of Remoriata was merely on the spur of the moment.
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, contends that evident premeditation clearly attended the
commission of the crime but said aggravating circumstance, being inherent in the crime of robbery with
homicide, should not be appreciated separately.[32] Treachery qualified the killing since the victim was
sleeping at the time he was attacked. In addition, the generic aggravating circumstances of nighttime and
dwelling should be appreciated.
The principal issue for resolution is whether the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation attended the commission of the offense? Secondarily, we must also determine whether all the
elements of robbery with homicide were proved beyond reasonable doubt.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means,
methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.[33] The conditions which must
concur before treachery can be appreciated are: (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) that said means of execution be
deliberately and consciously adopted.[34] The essence of treachery lies in the adoption of ways that minimize
or neutralize any resistance which may be put up by the offended party.[35] The killing of the sleeping victim
herein was attended by treachery since he was in no position to flee or defend himself.[36]
The presence of treachery, though, should not result in qualifying the offense to murder, for the
correct rule is that when it obtains in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, such treachery is to
be regarded as a generic aggravating circumstance, robbery with homicide being a case of a composite crime
with its own definition and special penalty in the Revised Penal Code.[37]
For evident premeditation to exist, the prosecution must prove with clear and convincing evidence the
following elements: (1) the time when the offenders decided to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly
indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time between the
determination and execution to allow them to reflect upon the consequences of their act and allow their
conscience to overcome the resolution of their will.[38] Evident premeditation is inherent in crimes against
property, but it may be considered in robbery with homicide if there is premeditation to kill besides
stealing.[39] The prosecution clearly proved the intention to rob and to disable the victim, but not the
intention to kill him. As Vargas testified, the victim was still alive when they left him rolling on the
floor.[40] Thus, evident premeditation can not be appreciated where the prosecution failed to establish that
the accused killed the victim pursuant to a preconceived plan.[41]
The alternative circumstance of intoxication, however, should be considered as mitigating, it having
been sufficiently shown that (1) at the time of the commission of the criminal act, they have taken such
123
quantity of alcoholic drinks as to blur their reason and deprive them of certain degree of control, and (b) that
such intoxication is not habitual, or subsequent to the plan to commit the felony. [42]
As to the crime committed, the prosecution amply established the following elements of robbery with
homicide: (a) the taking of personal property is perpetrated by means of violence or intimidation against a
person, (b) the property taken belongs to another, (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus
lucrandi, and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, in its generic
sense, is committed.[43] It matters not that the victim was killed prior to the taking of the personal properties
of the victim and the other occupants of the house. What is essential in robbery with homicide is that there
be a direct relation, and intimate connection between robbery and the killing, whether the latter be prior or
subsequent to the former or whether both crimes be committed at the same time.[44] The rule is well-
established that whenever homicide has been committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of the
robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it
clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.[45] While Cando was bashing the head of the
victim, and placing the personal items in his bag, nary a peep could be heard from Vargas and Rapcing. Their
act of simply watching Cando shows their moral assent and complete acquiescence to the commission of the
crime.
Appellant Vargas claims that he was threatened at knife point to join appellant Cando in the
commission of the crime. He is in effect invoking the exempting circumstance of compulsion of an irresistible
force under Article 12, par. 5 of the Revised Penal Code. We have held that the compulsion must be of such a
character as to leave no opportunity to the accused for escape or self-defense.[46] Vargas had several
opportunities to prevent the killing and to escape, but he chose to remain with his co-conspirators, and even
willingly drove the get-away vehicle.
As to appellant Rapcing, the fact that he did not go into hiding after the alleged incident does not make
him an innocent man. We have long ruled that flight is an indicium of guilt, but non-flight is not necessarily an
indicium of innocence.[47]
Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 9 of R.A. No. 7659, the penalty for
robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death. There being one mitigating circumstance of
intoxication, and one aggravating circumstance of treachery, the penalty to be imposed is reclusion
perpetua.[48] The existence of one aggravating circumstance merits the award of exemplary damages under
Art. 2230 of the New Civil Code.
We likewise order that the personal properties which are in custodia legis be returned to the offended
parties.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, in Criminal Case No. 95-
142748 is hereby MODIFIED as follows: appellants ROGER CANDO Y PAGDANGANAN, ARNEL VARGAS Y
MAGTANGOB, and WILBERTO RAPCING Y BROOLA are hereby found guilty of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordered solidarily to pay the heirs of
the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to return to the owners
thereof the cash and the vehicle and other effects taken by the appellants, as well as to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 118079. December 24, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO ESTANISLAO, ROGELIO ESTANISLAO, and
FELINO ESTANISLAO [Deceased], accused-appellants.
DECISION
PADILLA, J.:
On 3 July 1990, the 4th Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged Armando, Rogelio and
Felino all surnamed Estanislao, with the murder of one Sergio Montejo, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about January l9, 1990, in the late afternoon thereof, at Poblacion, Municipality of
Libmanan, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one
another with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab Sergio Montejo with a sharp bladed
instrument, hitting the latter on his left chest that caused his instantaneous death.
That as a consequence of the death of said Sergio Montejo, his heirs sustained damages which
will be proved later in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
When arraigned, all accused pleaded not guilty.[2]
On 22 May 1992, the trial court issued an order dismissing the criminal aspect of the case against
accused Felino Estanislao due to his death on 9 October 1990.[3]
On 21 March 1994, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29 of Libmanan, Camarines Sur rendered a
decision[4] of conviction, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance,
accused Armando Estanislao and Rogelio Estanislao are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua together with the accessory penalties and for them, including the estate of
the deceased accused Felino Estanislao, to pay jointly and severally an indemnity to the heirs of
Sergio Montejo in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) ONLY and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.[5]
A motion for reconsideration of the judgment finding the accused-appellants guilty of murder was
denied on 6 September 1994[6] and a Notice of Appeal was seasonably filed with, and given due course by the
trial court.[7]
The evidence for the prosecution based mainly on the testimony of Fe Pearedondo tends to prove that
on 19 January 1990 at around five oclock in the afternoon while she (Pearedondo) was at the eatery owned
by a certain Jun Badilla and while Badilla, another unnamed person and the victim Sergio Montejo were
drinking beer, the accused Rogelio Estanislao arrived.
When the victim Montejo stood up from the drinking session to relieve himself, accused Rogelio
Estanislao suddenly uttered, Tara Sergio! after which Rogelio suddenly stabbed the victim Sergio Montejo and
thereafter fled. Pearedondo likewise testified that she saw Armando and Felino Estanislao, whom she had
earlier seen within the vicinity of the store, approach the victim immediately after the stabbing, carrying
wooden sticks locally called palomaria. When the two (2) found out that the victim had fallen down with a
stab wound, they then also fled.
Araceli Montejo, the victims wife, testified that the relationship between the Estanislaos and the
Montejos had turned sour since 18 November 1989 when her husband (the victim) had advised the
Estanislaos to vacate the property of the Montejos that they were occupying since the Montejos were going
to use the property. She testified that on 11 January 1990, only a week before the stabbing incident, her
husband and Armando Estanislao had a fist fight where the latter was aided by the two (2) other accused,
Felino and Rogelio Estanislao. The fight was broken up by the timely arrival of police officers which prevented
124
the accused from further attacking the victim Sergio Montejo. The victims widow likewise testified that
Rogelio Estanislao threatened to kill her husband while she was trying to stop the fight.[8]
The defense on the other hand had a completely different version of the incident.
Accused-appellant Rogelio Estanislao while admitting that he was holding the bladed weapon that
killed the victim interposed the defense that the latter was accidentally hit when he (Rogelio) was trying to
parry an attack on himself.
Rogelio testified that at around five oclock in the afternoon of 19 January 1990 at Barangay Poblacion,
Libmanan, Camarines Sur, he passed by an eatery (carinderia) where the owner, a certain Jun Badilla, one
Gerry Balces and the victim Sergio Montejo were having a drinking spree. As he passed by, he heard the
victim say in the native dialect, Here he comes, attack him now!. It was then that Montejo and Balces threw
beer bottles at him and Montejo pulled out a fan knife (balisong) saying I will finish you!. Jun Badilla likewise
attacked him with a bolo.Rogelio then stated that he was able to grab hold of a small wooden table locally
known as papag which he used to parry the attacks of the two (2) assailants. He declared that the victim was
hit by the bolo of Jun Badilla when he parried the latters attack and the bolo accidentally hit the
victim. Defense witness Dionisio Munda corroborated Rogelios version of the incident.
Accused-appellant Armando Estanislao relied on his defense of alibi. He testified that on the date and
time of the incident, he was at the house of a certain Leonor Amores working as a hired laborer.
Amores confirmed Armandos alibi but admitted that the distance from her house to the crime scene
can be negotiated in five (5) minutes on foot or two (2) minutes by trimobile.
Accused-appellants assign the following errors to the trial court:
I
WHEN IT RELIED UPON THE LONE, UNCORROBORATED AND INADEQUATE TESTIMONY OF
PROSECUTION WITNESS FE PEAREDONDO IN CONCLUDING THAT APPELLANT ROGELIO
ESTANISLAO EMPLOYED TREACHERY IN ATTACKING THE VICTIM.
II
WHEN IT RELIED UPON THE DUBIOUS TESTIMONY OF OFFENDED PARTY ARACELI MONTEJO IN
CONCLUDING THAT THERE EXISTED EVIDENT PREMEDITATION THAT QUALIFIED THE OFFENSE
TO MURDER.
III
WHEN IT INFERRED THE EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY AMONG THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FROM
MERE RELATIONSHIP AND SPECULATION.
IV
WHEN IT DISREGARDED APPELLANT ROGELIO ESTANISLAO S CLAIM OF SELF-DEFENSE EVEN
WHEN HIS TESTIMONY WAS NEVER REBUTTED AND THEREFORE TACITLY ADMITTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.
V Montejo although preceded by a warning (Tara Sergio!) was undoubtedly sudden and unexpected and
WHEN IT CONVICTED THE ACCUSED OF THE CRIME OF MURDER AS CHARGED.[9]
Accused-appellants argue that the trial court erroneously relied on the testimony of Fe Pearedondo
which was not only uncorroborated but also based on assumptions and contained accounts of events which
were improbable.
It is argued that the prosecution should have presented the persons allegedly drinking with the victim
at the time of the incident.
Accused-appellants likewise contend that witness Pearedondo only assumed that the reason the victim
stood up was to relieve himself, which assumption lacked any basis.
Appellants also maintain that it is improbable for accused Felino and Armando Estanislao to loiter near
the scene of the incident as early as 4:30 in the afternoon of 19 January 1990 since the former was an infirm
and ailing man who died during the trial of the case while the latter walks with a limp and there would have
been a danger of their being violently accosted by the victim and his drinking companions.
Appellants then assail the finding of the trial court that treachery and evident premeditation
accompanied the killing.
The settled rule is that appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the
issue of credibility of witnesses, considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard
the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during trial.[10]
In the present case, there is no showing that the trial court overlooked certain facts which could have
materially affected its appreciation of the testimony of prosecution witness Fe Pearedondo. Her testimony
was clear, unequivocal and consistent. The issues raised by appellants regarding assumptions and
improbabilities pertain to matters which are extraneous to her straightforward narration of how accused-
appellant Rogelio Estanislao suddenly stabbed the victim Sergio Montejo, after which he immediately fled.
Accused-appellant Rogelio Estanislao for his defense contends that he was holding a wooden table
(papag) and a knife he had grabbed possession of from one of the victims drinking buddies. He maintains that
the victim Montejo was accidentally stabbed when he was parrying the attacks against him.
Appellant Rogelios defense that the victim was accidentally stabbed is defeated and negated by his
own testimony.
On direct examination, Rogelio Estanislao first testified that the victim attacked him with a knife while
Jun Badilla attacked him with a bolo he had pulled from his scabbard. He was then able to get hold of a
wooden table to defend himself. While parrying the attacks against him, the victim (Montejo) was hit by the
bolo of Badilla which he had blocked with the papag.[11]
Later however, Rogelio stated that he was not sure if it was the bolo of Badilla or the knife which the
victim had earlier attacked him with, but which the latter dropped and which he picked up and was then
holding together with the papag, which struck the fatal wound on Sergio Montejo. He also stated that the
victim was attacking him with a lead pipe while Badilla was attacking him with his bolo.[12]
On cross-examination, Rogelio had yet another version of the incident. He stated that Badilla was not
yet holding a bolo when Sergio attacked him with a knife. Rogelio narrated that Sergio first dropped the knife
before Badilla got a bolo from the stall and attacked him.[13]
The differences in the three (3) versions of the incident are irreconcilable and unexplained. Thus,
against the uncontested and consistent testimony of the prosecution witnesses, his defense must fail.
Moreover, if it were indeed true that it was the victims (Montejo) group that first attacked Rogelio
Estanislao, it is not explained why the latter did not file criminal charges against his alleged attackers.
The presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery has been adequately shown. The attack on
prevented the unsuspecting victim, who had just stood up, from defending himself.
Evident premeditation on the other hand was not substantially shown.
The requisites of evident premeditation are: l) the time when the offender determined to commit the
crime must be adequately shown; 2) an act to show that the offender clung to his determination and 3) a
sufficient lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow the offender to reflect upon
the consequences of his act.[14]
125
 Not all of said requisites have been adequately shown in this case.
On the criminal liability of Armando Estanislao, the trial court based his conviction on the inference
that there was conspiracy between the father (Felino), whose criminal liability was extinguished by his death
during trial of the case, and the two (2) sons, Rogelio and Armando.
Conspiracy may be inferred from the joint and simultaneous acts of several accused aimed at a
common purpose.[15]
We are not convinced that conspiracy between Rogelio and the two (2) other accused can be logically
inferred from the acts of the latter.
It is undisputed that Armando and Felino Estanislao did not commit any positive act to show unity of
purpose with Rogelio. Their mere presence in the crime scene, absent other proof to support the allegation of
conspiracy, cannot be considered an indication of their being conspirators.[16] Nor can relationship with
Rogelio and their carrying wooden sticks be considered as badges of conspiracy. The doubt in this case should
be resolved in favor of the accused-appellants.
Finally, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in favor of accused-
appellant Rogelio Estanislao. The trial court correctly held that Rogelios surrender after a warrant of arrest
had been issued and almost two (2) months after the incident was not spontaneous and therefore deserves
no consideration.
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. Accused-appellant Armando Estanislao is hereby ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt;
2. The liability of the estate of Felino Estanislao for the death of the victim is SET ASIDE for being without
basis;
3. Accused-appellant Rogelio Estanislao is declared guilty of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 1255. August 17, 1903.
3. ID., ID.; IGNOMINY. — The fact that the deceased was killed in the presence of his wife does not constitute
the circumstance of ignominy which consists in adding disgrace and ignominy to the material injury caused by
the crime.
4. ID., ID., AID OF ARMED MEN. — The casual presence of armed men near the place where the crime was
committed does not constitute an aggravating circumstance when it appears that the accused did not avail
himself of their aid or rely upon it.
DECISION
MAPA, J. :
The testimony of the witnesses and the confession of the accused himself show unquestionably that the
latter stabbed Constantino Nabaonag to death while he was bound, and therefore unable to defend himself
against the aggression. This circumstance constitutes alevosia, and the offense is therefore properly classified
as murder, defined and punished by article 403 of the Penal Code. It follows, therefore, that the judgment of
the court below now before us in consultation is correct, in so far as it finds the defendant guilty of the crime
of murder.
This judgment condemns the accused to the penalty of death, the court considering that the crime was
committed with the aggravating circumstances of deliberate premeditation, the employment of means
tending to add ignominy to the necessary effects of the act, and the commission of the crime with the
assistance of armed men.
The opinion of the court in this regard does not meet with our approval. There was no premeditation,
because an examination of the record shows that the purpose of killing Constantino arose suddenly in the
mind of the defendant, and was instantaneously carried into effect, upon information that the deceased had
spoken ill of the defendant.
The accused says: "As soon as I heard of this I became furiously enraged; I seized my dagger and killed him at
once." This part of the defendant’s testimony was not disproven in the course of the trial. The determination
to kill was, then, followed immediately by the execution of the crime; and consequently between the
determination to commit the act and its actual commission there was no opportunity for the cold, meditative,
and persistent reflection which constitutes premeditation, which is essentially different from a simple
] determination of the will, which is always presumed in the commission of every offense.

THE UNITED STATES, Complainant-Appellee, v. FELIPE ABAIGAR, Defendant-Appellant. The circumstance of ignominy was not present because no means were employed nor did any circumstances
surround the act tending to make the effects of the crime more humiliating. Ignominy is a circumstance
Fermin Mariano for Appellant. pertaining to the moral order, which adds disagree and obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime.
The fact that the deceased was killed in the presence of his wife certainly could not have such a signification,
Solicitor-General Araneta for Appellee. and this is the circumstance which the court below had in view when declaring that this circumstance had
concurred.
SYLLABUS
Furthermore, the evidence shows that the crime was not committed with the assistance of armed men. The
1. CRIMINAL LAW; MURDER; ALEVOSIA. — When it appears that the deceased was killed while bound, and testimony of the accused, corroborated by that of the witness for the prosecution, Francisco Abadiano, is that
therefore unable to defend himself, the crime is murder because of the concurrence of the qualifying the crime was committed by the defendant alone, without assistance from any one. It is true that in the
circumstance of alevosia. house near the place where the crime was committed there were ten men armed with daggers, according to
the statements of the witness referred to, and five without arms, according to the accused, but as these men
2. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; PREMEDITATION. — Where the determination to kill is followed took no part, directly or indirectly, in the commission of the crime, and it does not appear that they heard the
immediately by the execution of the crime it is error to apply the circumstance of deliberate premeditation in conversation which caused the sudden determination on the part of the accused to will the deceased, and
aggravation of the penalty. still less that they had in any way participated in this determination, we can not, within the law, find that this

126
circumstance concurred in the commission of the crime prosecuted for the purpose of augmenting the WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
criminal responsibility of the accused. The mere casual presence of armed men, more or less numerous, near of rape, penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic
the place of the occurrence does not constitute an aggravating circumstance when it appears that the Act No. 4111, and the commission of the offense having been attended by three
defendant did not avail himself in any way of their aid, and did not knowingly count upon their assistance in aggravating without any mitigating circumstance, hereby sentences him to suffer the
the commission of the crime. supreme penalty of death, to indemnify the offended party in the amount of Six
Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00), and to pay the costs. In view of the fact that the offended
In the present case, there being no circumstance tending to modify the guilt of the defendant, the penalty is party is a married woman, aside from the fact that she has not become pregnant as a
that prescribed by article 403 of the Penal Code in its medium grade, to wit, the penalty of life imprisonment, result of the commission of the rape, the Court makes no pronouncement as to
and not the penalty of death imposed by the court. acknowledgment and support of offspring. (Id., p. 64.)

For the reasons stated we reverse the judgment in so far as it condemns the defendant to death, and impose
The factual version of the prosecution is summarized in the People's brief as follows:
upon the latter the penalty of life imprisonment, and condemn him to the payment of an indemnification of
1,000 Mexican pesos to the heirs of the deceased, together with the costs of this instance.
The complaining witness, Eutropia A. Agno, a married woman and a resident of Barrio
Malinao, Gingoog City, was a classroom teacher of the Malinao Elementary School (pp.
EN BANC
2, 3, tsn., Feb. 22, 1973).

G.R. No. L-36941 June 29, 1984

In the afternoon of January 23, 1971, Eutropia went to the public market in Gingoog
City to buy foodstuffs for her family and thereafter, she proceeded to the store of her
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, mother to fetch her five-year old daughter Nilsonita (p. 4, tsn., Id.). On their way home,
vs. Eutropia and Nilsonita boarded a passenger jeepney and while inside the vehicle she
RAFAEL SAYLAN alias PAEL, accused-appellant. (Eutropia) noticed that the other passengers were Rudy Gonzales, a grade I pupil of the
Malinao Elementary School, the appellant, Rafael Saylan, and a couple whom she did
not know (pp, 5, 6, tsn., Id.). The jeepney went only as far as Malinas citrus farm
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
because the road to Barrio Malinao was not passable by vehicles (p. 5, tsn., Id.). It was
almost 6:30 o'clock in the evening when the jeepney arrived at the Malinas citrus farm
Federico Y. Alikpala, Jr., for accused-appellant. and so all the passengers alighted and had to walk all the way to Barrio Malinao which
was about three and a half kilometers away (p. 5, tsn., Id.). After walking some distance
and upon reaching a junction, the couple separated from the group and took the road
leading to their house while Eutropia's group took the opposite road (p. 9, tsn.,
Id.).lwphl@itç The appellant, however, joined the group of Eutropia and when they
ABAD SANTOS, J.: reached the place where the road was plain, appellant who was then walking side by
side with Eutropia suddenly pulled out a dagger about eight inches long and pointing it
This is an automatic review of the decision of the defunct Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental in at the latter said, "Do not shout, Nang, I will kill you!" (pp. 11, 12, tsn., Id.). At this
Criminal Case No. 52-M which imposed the death penalty. juncture, appellant placed his right arm around the neck of Eutropia with the dagger
pointed at her left breast (p. 12, tsn., Id.), after which he dragged Eutropia at some
distance. When they reached the junction of the trail for men and a trail for carabaos,
RAFAEL SAYLAN was accused of the crime of rape in the sworn complaint of Eutropia Agno said to have been he ordered everybody to stop and told the children (Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales) to
committed as follows: stay behind and threatened to kill them if they persisted in following them (pp. 17, 18,
tsn., Id.). Thereafter, appellant again dragged Eutropia by her hand and brought her
That on or about the 23rd day of January, 1972, at more or less 7:00 o'clock in the towards a creek near a coconut tree which was about five meters away from where
evening, at Sitio Craser, Malinao, Jingo City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales were (pp. 14, 15, 16, tsn., Id.).lwphl@itç The appellant
this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with deliberate intent to have sexual then ordered Eutropia to remove her panty which she refused at first, but appellant
intercourse, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally with the use of a threatened to kill her, so she removed her panty after which appellant ordered her to
dagger, force and intimidate Eutropia Agno y Arcay, to remove her pantie and to lay lie down (pp. 18, 19, tsn., Id.). Subsequently, appellant placed himself on top of the
down on the ground and with the use of a dagger, force and intimidation succeeded in victim and inserted his penis into her vagina and succeeded in having sexual intercourse
having sexual intercourse with Eutropia Agno y Arcay, a woman of good reputation and with her by moving his buttocks up and down (pp. 20,21, tsn., Id.).
against her will. That the commission of the foregoing offense was attended by the
aggravating circumstances of: abuse of superior strength, nighttime, uninhabited place, After the first sexual act, appellant ordered Eutropia to standup which the latter
ignominy and reiteracion. (Expediente, p. 27.) helplessly and grudgingly followed (p. 23, tsn., Id.). Appellant again inserted his penis
into her vagina and then performed a push and puli movement (pp. 23, 24, 25, tsn., Id.).
The accused entered a plea of "not guilty" and after trial the court rendered the following judgment: Not satisfied with the second intercourse, appellant ordered Eutropia to lie down again
preparatory to a third intercourse (p. 26, tsn., Id.). Appellant again performed the
sexual act with her (pp. 26, 27, tsn., Id.).

127
After the third intercourse, appellant ordered Eutropia to stand up and then he bent
her body downwards with her hands and knees resting on the ground (p. 28, tsn., Id.).
When the latter was already in this position, appellant then placed himself behind her,
inserted his penis into her vagina and executed a push and puli movement in the dog's
way of sexual intercourse (pp. 27, 28, tsn., Id.)
After performing this uncommon way of sexual intercourse, appellant ordered Eutropia
to he down again which the latter reluctantly obeyed because appellant's dagger was
always pointed at her and thereafter he had carnal knowledge of her for the fifth time
(pp. 29, 30, tsn., Id.).
After the fifth intercourse, and after satisfying his sexual lust, appellant asked Eutropia
if she will tell her husband what he did to her and the latter answered, "I will not tell"
(p. 31, tsn., Id.). But she only said this so that appellant would let her go home (p. 33,
tsn., Id.).
Afterwards, Eutropia and appellant returned to the place where the children were left
and upon arriving thereat, they found Nilsonita (Eutropia's daughter) asleep with Rudy
seated dozing beside her (pp. 32, 33, tsn., Id.). Nilsonita who was sleeping was carried
by the appellant and then they all proceeded to Malinao (pp. 33, 34, tsn., Id.).
After walking some distance, Eutropia saw the house of her friend "Ben" and upon
approaching the said house, she shouted, "Ben, Ben, please give me hot water" (p. 34,
tsn., Id.). Upon hearing her voice, Ben, who was still awake at the time, opened the
door of his house and allowed Eutropia to come up (p. 34, tsn., Id.). Eutropia
immediately went upstairs and went straight to the room of Ben as she was feeling very
bad (p. 34, tsn., Id.). Appellant, who was then carrying Nilsonita and Rudy Gonzales,
were also allowed to go upstairs (p. 35, tsn., Id.). Meanwhile, Eutropia requested Ben to
fetch her husband (p. 35, tsn., Id.).
When Eutropia woke up between 9:00 and 10:00 o'clock that evening, her husband was
already there (p. 36, tsn., Id.). She then asked him whether the appellant was stin
around, and in reply, he told her that appellant had already left (p. 37, tsn., Id.).
Eutropia then told her husband that she was raped by the appellant (p. 37, tsn., Id.).
Upon learning of the dastardly act committed by the appellant, he advised his wife to
submit herself to a medical examination (p. 37, tsn., Id.).
The following morning, the offended party was brought to the office of the City Health
Department of Gingoog City where she was examined by Dr. Ireneo O. Pascual who
after conducting a thorough physical examination, issued a medical certificate with the
following findings, to wit:
(1) Multiparous.
(2) Presence of viscid whitish secretions at vaginal fornix
(3) Microscopic examination of secretions reveals epithelial cells,
but no spermatozoa Identified.
(pp. 10, 11, 12, t.s.n., Feb. 24, 1973; Exh. "A").
Rudy Gonzales, a grade I pupil of the Malinao Elementary School and one of the
witnesses for the prosecution, testified that he met Mrs. Eutropia Agno in the
afternoon of January 23, 1972 at the public market of Gingoog City buying foodstuffs
for her family (pp. 2, 3, tsn., Feb. 26, 1973). On their way back to Barrio Malinao, they
boarded a passenger jeepney and while he was inside the vehicle, he noticed that the
other passengers aside from Mrs. Agno, her daughter, and himself were the appellant
and a couple whose names he did not know ( p. 4, tsn., Id.). The jeepney, however,
could only travel up to the Marinas Citrus farm and so they had to walk all the way to
Barrio Malinao (p. 4, tsn., Id.) After was some distance and upon reaching a trail for
carabaos, the appellant suddenly pulled a dagger and placed his arms around the neck
of Mrs. Agno and then dragged her towards the carabao trail (pp. 4, 5, tsn., Id.).
Meanwhile, he and Nilsonita were left behind and they fell asleep because it took a
long time for the appellant and Mrs. Agno to come back for them (p. 5, tsn., Id.). When
Mrs. Agno and the appellant returned, he was already awake while Nilsonita was still
asleep and so appellant had to carry her in going home to Man (p. 6,
tsn., Id.).lwphl@itç After was some distance, Mrs. Agno saw the house of Mang Ben and
because she was feeling bad, they all went to the house of Mang Ben where Mrs. Agno
spent the night (p. 7, tsn., Id.). Afterwards, he and the appellant left the house of Mang
Ben and then they proceeded to his house at Malinao where both of them slept (pp. 7,
21, tsn., Id.). (At pp. 2-8.)
The accused did not deny having had sexual intercourse with Mrs. Agno; in fact he admitted that he
copulated with her for three successive times in the early evening of January 23, 1972, but he claimed that it
was with her consent. Accordingly, he now claims that:
I. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SEXUAL INTERCOURSE HAD BEEN
COMMITTED AGAINST THE WILL AND CONSENT OF THE COMPLAINANT.
II. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES HAD
ACCOMPANIED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE. (Brief, p. 5.)
The appeal must fail for the reasons stated hereunder.
This is a typical rape case. Only the participants could directly testify on the alleged sexual abuse and the
accused alleges consent on the part of the complainant. The question of credibility arises and under the
circumstances We have to rely heavily on the determination made by the trial judge who observed the
demeanor of the witnesses while before Us is only the cold transcript of what they said.
We accept the conclusions and findings of fact of the trial court that the complainant was in fact raped by the
appellant. There is no fact or circumstance in the record which will justify a different action.
The claim of the appellant that the sexual intercourse was mutually agreed is utterly incredible. If it were true
that Mrs. Agno consented to have coitus with the appellant, her conduct thereafter defies understanding
because it is contrary to reason and it has not been shown that Mrs. Agno, a school teacher, was bereft of
common sense. For if it was true that the sexual act was indeed mutually desired and performed why did she
complain not only to her husband but also to the authorities? An affair such as that claimed by the appellant
is carried out in a discreet manier. On the other hand, the version of the complainant has indicia of credibility.
For her version bared her shame to a small community and her exposure was necessary only because she had
to reveal the truth. No, We simply cannot believe the appellant's version.
We have said above that the findings and conclusions of the trial court are entitled to great respect. In finding
the appellant guilty, this is what the court a quo said in part:
128
 The testimony of the accused is incredible. When he told his love to the offended party WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is modified in the sense that the appellant shall suffer the penalty
for the first time, they were only two in the latter's house. He had more time with her ofreclusion perpetua instead of death and the indemnity to be paid to the offended party is increased to
then. She refuse him because she is married. He tried for the second time. He was again P20,000.00. Costs against the appellant.
refused because she is married. It is unthinkable and highly improbable that on the
evening of January 23, 1972, after only three minutes, the offended party would rush to
SO ORDERED.
accept his love and go to the extent of thanking him for his considering her daughter as
his own, unless she was coerced, threatened, forced and intimidated.
FIRST DIVISION
It is highly improbable for a school teacher with several children to exchange her
[G.R. No. L-18054. March 18, 1922. ]
husband only 40 years old and with a good means of livelihood for one whom she does
not know and whom she has observed as doing nothing except to play basketball. It is
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ARSENIO SUNGA Y REYES (alias) ARSENIO
subversive of the traits, character and nature of Filipino women to say that the
LOPEZ, Defendant-Appellant.
offended party, a school teacher and a girl scout accepted the love of a man who is
good for nothing and surrendered her whole body and virtue to him after an accidental
Francisco Sevilla for Appellant.
courtship of only three minutes. The offended party is an unsophisticated and
conservative woman, fixing her hair the old fashion way. She does not apply make-up
Attorney-General Villa-Real for Appellee.
on her face, and her dress is up to her knees. This makes the pretensions of the accused
all the more incredible. (Expediente, p. 59.)
SYLLABUS

The complaint alleges the following aggravating circumstances: abuse of superior strength, 1. QUALIFIED THEFT; UNLAWFUL ENTRY. — The act of entering through the window, which is not the proper
nocturnity, despoblado,ignominy, and reiteracion. entrance to the house, for the purpose of taking away certain valuable articles constitutes unlawful entry,
which if alleged in the complaint would make the crime robbery, but when, as in the present case, no such
The trial court disregarded superiority because it "is inherent in the crime of rape or is absorbed in the allegation was made, said circumstance should be taken into account as an aggravating circumstance
element of force." It also did not consider nocturnity "there being no evidence that the accused purposely (circumstance No. 21, article 10 of the Penal Code), with the result that, in the absence of any extenuating
sought it to facilitate the commission of this rape." (Id, p. 63.) circumstance, the penalty must be raised to the maximum degree.

2. SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT. — The penalty of subsidiary imprisonment imposed upon the accused is not
Despoblado was present according to the trial court because: "The accused dragged the offended party, at authorized by the law, as the principal penalty in this case is of an affective, and not correctional, nature. (Art.
the point of a dagger, to the carabao trail, about 10 meters from the junction, but 40 to 50 meters below to 25 and 51 of the Penal Code.)
better attain his purpose without interference, and to better secure himself from detection and punishment
(U.S. vs. Vitug, 17 Phil. 1). Even the junction where the two children were left is already 400 meters from the
nearest house. While there maybe occasional passersby, this does not destroy its being an uninhabited place. DECISION
(People vs. Bangug, 52 Phil. 87)." (Id, p. 62.) We hold that the trial court for the reasons stated correctly held
that the crime was committed in an uninhabited place.
ROMUALDEZ, J. :
The trial court held that there was ignominy because the appellant used not only the missionary position, i.e.
male supenor female inferior, but also "The same position as dogs do" i.e., entry from behind. The appellant
claims there was no ignominy because "The studies of many experts in the matter have shown that this The herein accused is Arsenio Sunga y Reyes (alias) Arsenio Lopez who was prosecuted for, and convicted of,
'position' is not novel and has repeatedly and often been resorted to by couples in the act of copulation. the crime of qualified theft in that with intent of gain he had taken away, without the consent of the owner,
(Brief, p. 24.) This may well be if the sexual act is performed by consenting partners but not otherwise. certain pieces of jewelry and other valuables worth in all P3,277, equivalent to 16,385 pesetas. The penalty
imposed upon the accused was ten years of presidio mayor, with the accessories prescribed by law, to
indemnify the offended party in the sum aforesaid, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
The trial court also held that "there is no reiteracion because one of the offenses, namely Robbery in Band,
pay the costs.
for which the accused has been penal was committed after the commission of this rape case, and the penalty
imposed on the other offense of Frustrated Homicide, is lighter than the penalty for rape." (Id, P. 63.)
The theft was considered as qualified theft on account of the proven and undenied fact that the appellant is
fourteen times a recidivist.
Although not alleged in the complaint, the trial court stated that the offense was aggravated by disregard of
rank because it was a fact knowm to the appellant that Mrs. Agno was a school teacher. The appellant claims Counsel for defense in this instance does not assign any error to the judgment appealed from, which he fields
that this circumstance cannot be assigned to him because there was no deliberate intent to offend or insult in accordance with the facts and the law of the case.
the rank of Mrs. Agno. The Solicitor General agrees with the appellant for the same reason.
However, the prosecution, maintaining that the defendant should be punished in accordance with paragraph
The judgment of the trial court is in accordance with the facts and the law but it cannot be affirmed 1 of article 518 of the Penal Code in relation with paragraph 3 of article 520 of the same Code, recommends
completely because of the lack of the necessary number of votes. that in the absence of any modifying circumstance, the appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty
prescribed in article 520, in the medium degree, that is to say, seven years, four months and one day of

129
presidio mayor. pointing a gun at Chua's head. On orders of Bartulay, Beran got the wallets and watches of the four. Bartulay
asked about the money they were carrying and Chua pointed to its location. Beran got it and gave it to
An examination of the record shows without a shadow of doubt the guilt of the accused. His alibi is absolutely Bartulay. The money amounted to about P100,000.00. Then, again on orders of Bartulay, Beran herded the
worthless as a defense. three companions inside the panel where they were locked. It was while they were still inside the panel that
Beran and the others heard two gunshots. When Beran got off the truck, he saw Chua still lying on the ground
The only matter that under the facts of the case concerns us is the determination of the penalty that should but now bleeding in the head. Thereafter, Beran drove the truck from the scene of the crime while Bartulay
be imposed. We are in accord with the prosecution as to the legal provisions applicable to the case. However, followed in a motorcycle. Somehow, Caca and Morante managed to escape by jumping from the truck
we find that the accused entered the inhabited house through a window, which was not the proper entrance through a secret exit of the panel. They subsequently reported the occurrence to the law-enforcement
to the house, and therefore, there is present in this case the circumstance of scaling a house which, had it authorities who, returning to the scene of the crane the following day, found Chua already dead. 1 Beran was
been alleged in the complaint, would have made the crime robbery (article 508 of the Penal Code, second arrested on September 8, 1979, with the amount of P4,500.00 in his possession and upon questioning
paragraph before the last), but as this circumstance was not alleged, it must be considered as an aggravating pointed to the place where he had hidden the pistol he had used during the hold-up. 2 Further investigation
circumstance (No. 21, article 10, Penal Code), with the result that, in the absence of any extenuating disclosed that the motorcycle and guns by Bartulay and Beran were owned by Rosalio Laguardia, who was
circumstance, as in the present case, the penalty must be raised to the maximum degree. Identified by Beran as the mastermind of the crime. 3 The money stolen was supposed to have been divided in
the house of Raymundo Bartulay Dante's brother. 4
On the other hand the subsidiary imprisonment imposed upon the accused is not permitted by the law
because the principal penalty is not correctional, but affective, in nature. (Arts. 25 and 51 of the Penal Code.)
Dante Bartulay could not be tried at the time because he was at large. Baltazar Beran was found guilty of
robbery with homicide and sentenced to death. Rosalio Laguardia was convicted (presumably as a principal
The judgment appealed from is modified and the appellant is sentenced to undergo ten years of presidio
by inducement) and sentenced to life imprisonment. Raymundo Bartulay was acquitted for insufficient
mayor, to return to the owner the articles stolen, described in the complaint, or their value of P3,277, to the
evidence. 5
accessories prescribed in article 57 of the Penal Code, and to the payment of the costs of both instances. So
ordered.
This case involves Baltazar Beren only as Laguardia later withdraw his appeal.
EN BANC
In finding Beran guilty and sentencing him to death, the trial court made the following conclusion:
G.R. No. L-63243 February 27, 1987
... It is undisputed that the crime committed by the accused was robbery with
homicide, and the killing of the victim was done with the use of a gun. The heinous act
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
was preceded by taking of the wallets, the watches and the money from the victim of
vs.
the robbery. Whenever a homicide has been committed as a consequence, or on the
ROSALIO LAGUARDIA, DANTE BARTULAY, BALTAZAR BERAN, and RAYMUNDO BARTULAY, accused-
occasion, of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery will also be
appellant.
held guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide (Pp. v.
Darwin Veloso y Militante, alias Carlito Villareal, accused-appellant, G.R. No. 32900,
Feb. 25, 1982). In the case at bar, evidence is strong and clear that Baltazar Beran did
not endeavor to prevent the homicide of the killing (sic) of Mike Chua by Dante
Bartulay ... 6
CRUZ, J.:

The accused-appellant now faults the trial court for holding inter alia that Beran should be held guilty of the
In this automatic review of the death sentence imposed upon the lone accused-appellant, we are asked to
homicide committed on the occasion of the robbery notwithstanding that he was not the one who actually
determine if, while concededly guilty of robbery, he should also be held for the killing of the victim
killed Chua; that he should have tried to prevent the killing of Chua but did not; and that the aggravating
notwithstanding that this was actually done by another person. The Solicitor General says the judgment
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, nighttime and use of a motor vehicle should not have
should be affirmed because of the proven conspiracy between the accused-appellant and the actual killer.
been appreciated against him.
The defense, on the other hand, impliedly admits the conspiracy only with respect to the robbery but not as
regards the murder which it claims was not part of the original plan.
The accused-appellant suggests that the case 7 cited by the lower court in convicting him is not applicable
because the crime involved therein was robbery with homicide committed by a band whereas the robbery in
The facts, as derived by the lower court from the evidence adduced at the trial, are briefly narrated as
the instant case was perpetrated only by two persons. The trial judge did err in this respect. Nevertheless, as
follows:
the Solicitor General correctly points out, the offense, while not covered by Article 296 of the Revised Penal
Code, still comes under Article 294(l) which may also impose the death penalty "when by reason or on
On September 6, 1979, at about 10:30 o'clock in the evening, Dante Bartulay and Baltazar Beran, the herein occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been committed" even if cuadrilla is not present.
accused-appellant, signaled to a stop a truck owned by Fortune Tobacco Corporation then being driven by
Miguel Chua on the zigzag road in Kilometer 36 inside the Iwahig Penal Colony at Puerto Princess in Palawan
Under this provision, it is enough to show conspiracy among the participants in the crime of robbery to
City. Beran approached one side of the truck and pretended to borrow a screwdriver and while Chua looked
render each and every one of them liable for any homicide that may be committed by reason or on the
for the tool Bartulay shouted from the other side of the truck, "This is a hold-up!" With guns drawn, the two
occasion of such robbery. And in the instant case, evidence of such conspiracy is not lacking. Indeed, it is not
men ordered Chua and his three companions, Benigno Caca, Frank Morante, and Eduardo Aniar, to alight.
disputed that Bartulay and Beran together went to the scene of the crime and lay in wait for Chua's truck;
Bartulay forced Chua to lie face down on the ground about 3 meters away from his companions. Bartulay was

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that they together pretended to borrow a screwdriver from the victim; that while Bartulay pointed a gun at
Chua and his companions, Beran divested them of their cash and watches; that Beran got the bag containing
P100,000.00 on orders of Bartulay; that also on the latter's orders, Beran locked up Chua's three companions
in the panel; that Beran drove the stolen truck away from the scene of the crime while Bartulay followed in
the motorcycle; and that Beran later got P4,500.00 as his share of the stolen money.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it, whether they act through the physical volition of one or all proceeding severally or
collectively. 8It is also a settled rule that conspiracies need not be established by direct evidence of acts
charged but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions, and circumstances
which vary according to the purpose accomplished. The very existence of a conspiracy is generally a matter of
inference deduced from certain acts of the persons accused, done in pursuance of an apparent criminal or
unlawful purpose in common between them. The existence of the agreement, or joint assent of the minds,
need not be proved directly. 9
Confronted with the established fact of conspiracy to commit the robbery, the accused-appellant cannot
plead that he should not be held responsible for the murder on the ground that he did not conspire to
commit it or that he had no opportunity to prevent its commission.
"The rule is that where the conspiracy to commit robbery was conclusively shown by the concurrent and
coordinate acts of the accused, and homicide was committed as a consequence or on the occasion of the
robbery, all the accused are guilty of robo con homicidio whether or not they actually participated in the
killing." 10
That rule was applied in People v. Puno, 11 where the accused and confederate Tenarife, in pursuance of a
preconceived plan, boarded a jeep and help up its passengers, with Tenarife killing one of them after
divesting him of his wallet and his watch. Puno himself robbed another passenger but did not participate in
the shooting of the deceased victim. Nonetheless he was held guilty of robbery with homicide as the killing
was committed by Tenarife in connection with the robbery which Puno and Tenarife had conspired to
commit.
Generally, when robo con homicidio has been proven, all those who had taken part in
the robbery are guilty of the complex crime unless it appears that they endeavored to
prevent the homicide (U.S. v. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1; Decisions of Supreme Court of Spain
dated Feb. 23 and April 30, 1972 and June 19, 1980; 3 Viada, Codigo Penal 347, 354,
358). 12
It may be observed that, although Puno did not actually take part in the killing of Oyong
by Tenarife, his presence in the jeepney was a crucial factor that emboldened his
confederate in perpetrating that homicidal act with impunity. 13
In People v. Veloso, 14 this Court held:
... Well entrenched is the rule that whenever a homicide has been committed as a
consequence, or on the occasion, of a robbery, all those who took part as principals in
the robbery will also be held guilty as principals of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide, although they did not actually take part in the homicide, unless it clearly
appears that they endeavored to prevent the homicide.
That decision cited the earlier case of People v. Mangulabnan, 15 where it was categorically declared:
... in order to determine the existence of the crime of robbery with homicide it is
enough that a homicide would result by reason or on the occasion of the robbery
(Decision of Supreme Court of Spain of Nov. 26, 1892, and Jan. 7, 1878, quoted in 2
Hidalgo's Penal Code, p. 267, and 259-260, respectively). This High Tribunal speaking of
the accessory character of the circumstances leading to the homicide, has also held
that it is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident (Decision of Sept.
9, 1886, Oct. 22, 1907, April 30, 1910 and July 14, 1917), provided that the homicide be
produced by reason or on the occasion of robbery, inasmuch as it is only
the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes,
modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime, that has to be taken into
consideration (Decision of Jan. 12, 1889 — see Cuello Calon's Codigo, Penal pp. 501-
502; Emphasis supplied).
It is futile therefore for the accused-appellant to argue that he was inside the panel with the companions of
Chua when the latter was killed by Bartulay and could not have stopped the shooting. The undisputed fact is
that the killing was committed on the occasion of the robbery which Beran and Bartulay plotted and were
carrying out together. In the absence of clear evidence that he endeavored to prevent it, Beran is as guilty of
the homicide as Bartulay although it was Bartulay who pulled the trigger.
Concerning the aggravating circumstances which the accused-appellant insists should not have been taken
against him, the Court notes that no specific finding regarding such circumstances was made by the trial
judge, who simply meted out the penalties without explanation. The trial judge, notably, did not say why,
after finding both Beran and Laguardia guilty, the former should be sentenced to death and the latter only to
life imprisonment. If any error has been committed with respect to Laguardia's penalty — and the
circumstances so indicate — it is too late to correct it now as the same has long since become final. By
withdrawing his appeal, Laguardia may have benefited from the trial judge's carelessness.
The trial court also does not clearly impute to Beran any ag gravating circumstance and merely hints at
nighttime and use of motor vehicle almost in passing. This is another censurable flaw in the decision. It is no
wonder that the case itself is perplexed over the accused-appellant's assignment of error that the trial court
had taken the said several aggravating circumstances against him.
In any event, it is clear that, as alleged in the amended information, the crime committed by Beran was
aggravated by despoblado and justified the imposition on him of the death penalty as prescribed by Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code. The evidence shows that the accused lay in wait for the truck being driven by
Chua at an isolated portion of Highway 36, choosing that particular spot where they could commit the crime
they were planning without disturbance or discovery and with easy opportunity for escape. 16 The use of
motor vehicles is also appreciated because the conspirators drove away from the scene of the crime to
facilitate their escape and also to prevent the other passengers of the truck, whom they took with them, from
reporting the offense to the authorities. 17
Nighttime is rejected, however, because it was not especially sought, as Chua's trip schedule and not the
discretion of the culprits determined the time of its commission. Evident premeditation is, of course, inherent
in the crime of robbery and was not proved in the commission of the killing. As for treachery, there is no
evidence of its employment as none of the witnesses actually saw the shooting of Chua, being all inside the
panel when they heard the fatal shots.
Miguel Chua was only 32 years old at the time he was killed and left a wife and three children aged,
respectively, 11, 10 and 8, the youngest a daughter. To provide for his family, he was willing to work even at
night, not unaware perhaps, given the condition of the times, of the dangers that lurked in the desolate
routes he traveled, considering especially the sizeable amounts of money he often carried. If he was
nonetheless undeterred, it was probably because, like the promising young man that he was, he had a dream
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for the future. Tragically, that dream died with him on the lonely stretch of road where greed lay in ambush
with a gun.
The indemnity for the death of Chua is increased to P30,000.00. Funeral expenses amounted to
P16,500.00. 18 As the victim was earning at the time of his death a monthly compensation of
P2,500.00, 19 consisting of salary and commission, or P30,000.00 annually, and could have lived about 24
more years, 20 his total earnings for the period would have amounted to P720,000.00. The heirs are also
entitled to this amount plus P10,000.00 moral damages and P10,000.00 exemplary damages. 21
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED as MODIFIED but in view of the provisions of the new
Constitution, the death penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua. The accused-appellant shall also pay the civil
indemnity specified above, and costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 94308 June 16, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN E. ILAOA and ROGELIO E. ILAOA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff- appellee.
Buen Zamar for accused- appellants.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Pfc. Reynaldo P. Angeles was dispatched in the early morning of 5 November 1987 to Tinio St., Sta. Maria
Phase I, Balibago, Angeles City, where the decapitated body of a man, later identified through his voter’s
identification card as Nestor de Loyola, was found in a grassy portion thereof. Apart from the decapitation,
the deceased bore forty-three (43) stab wounds in the chest as well as slight burns all over the body. The
head was found some two (2) feet away from the corpse.
Five persons, Ruben E. Ilaoa, Rogelio E. Ilaoa, Rodel E. Ilaoa, Julius Eliginio and Edwin Tapang, were charged
for the gruesome murder of Nestor de Loyola. However, only the brothers Ruben and Rogelio stood trial since
the other accused escaped and were never apprehended.
On 15 June 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City found Ruben and Rogelio guilty of murder with the
attendant circumstances of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and cruelty, and imposed upon
them the penalty of "life imprisonment." 1 The conviction was based on the following circumstantial evidence:
One. The deceased Nestor de Loyola was seen at about eleven o’clock in the evening of 4 November 1987, in
a drinking session with his compadre Ruben Ilaoa together with Julius Eliginio, Edwin Tapang and a certain
"Nang Kwang" outside Ruben’s apartment. 2
Two. The drunken voices of Ruben and Nestor engaged in an apparent argument were later on
heard. 3 Nestor was then seen being kicked and mauled by Ruben and his brother Rodel, Julius Eliginio and
Edwin Tapang. 4 Nestor was crying all the while, "Pare, aray, aray!" Afterwards, Nestor, who appeared drunk,
was seen being "dragged" 5into Ruben Ilaoa’s apartment. Nestor was heard saying, "Pare, bakit ninyo ako
ginaganito, hirap na hirap na ako!" 6
Three. Ruben Ilaoa and Julius Eliginio borrowed Alex Villamil’s tricycle at about two o’clock the following
morning allegedly for the purpose of bringing to the hospital a neighbor who was about to give birth. Ruben
was seen driving the tricycle alone, with a sack which looked as though it contained a human body, placed in
the sidecar. The tricycle was returned an hour later to Alex who noticed bloodstains on the floor. The latter
thought that they were those of the pregnant woman.
Four. Blood was found on Ruben’s shirt when he was asked to lift it during the investigation by the
police. 7Moreover, Ruben’s hair near his right forehead was found partly burned and his shoes were
splattered with blood. 8Susan Ocampo, Ruben’s live-in partner, was likewise seen in the early morning of 5
November 1987 sweeping what appeared to be blood at the entrance of their apartment. 9
In this appeal, brothers Ruben and Rogelio Ilaoa argue for their acquittal. They contend that the
circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial court for their conviction failed to establish their guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. Specifically, they assail the finding of evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength
and cruelty as totally unwarranted.
We affirm Ruben Ilaoa’s guilt having been satisfactorily established by the evidence on hand, albeit
circumstantial. However, we reverse the conviction of Rogelio as we find it patently baseless.
In finding Rogelio guilty of murder, the court a quo relied solely on the testimony that he helped his brother
Ruben drag Nestor de Loyola inside Ruben’s apartment where the deceased was last seen alive. Apart from
such testimony, however, there is nothing else to link Rogelio to the killing.
To warrant a conviction on the basis of circumstantial evidence, three requisites must concur: (a) there must
be more than one circumstance; (b) the circumstances from which the inferences are derived are proven;
and, (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. 10 In the case at bench, it does not require much analysis to conclude that the circumstance
relied upon to establish Rogelio Ilaoa’s guilt, i.e., the alleged dragging of the deceased to his brother’s
apartment, is totally inadequate for a conviction, having miserably failed to meet the criteria. This is
especially so where the veracity of such circumstance is even open to question. While Antonio Ramos and
Abdulia Logan testified that Rogelio Ilaoa helped his brother drag the deceased to his apartment, Eustancia
Bie who claimed to have witnessed the same incident positively testified that it was Ruben Ilaoa and Julius
Eliginio who did so. 11 Rogelio Ilaoa was not mentioned. Not having been adequately established, in addition
to being uncorroborated, such circumstance alone cannot be the basis of Rogelio’s conviction.
Ruben’s case, however, is a totally different matter. Unlike that of his brother, Ruben Ilaoa’s fate was most
definitely assured by the unbroken chain of circumstances which culminated in the discovery of Nestor de
Loyola’s decapitated body in the early morning of 5 November 1987.
As found by the trial court, in the late evening of 4 November 1987, appellant Ruben Ilaoa was engaged in a
drinking session with the deceased Nestor de Loyola together with several others. Ruben was heard arguing
132
with Nestor. A few moments later, Ruben mauled and kicked the deceased with the help of their drinking The penalty prescribed for homicide in Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. Applying the
companions just outside Ruben’s apartment. As the deceased cried "Aray! Aray!" and "Pare, bakit n’yo ako Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the
ginaganito? Hirap na hirap na ako!" appellant dragged the deceased with the help of Julius Eliginio to the maximum shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, which is fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
apartment from where a man’s cries were continued to be heard later. To further seal the case against him, months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, while the minimum shall be taken from
Ruben borrowed Alex Villamil’s tricycle at two o’clock in the morning of 5 November 1987 on the pretext that the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor, in any of its periods, the range of which is six (6)
a neighbor was about to give birth and had to be rushed to the hospital. However, he was seen driving the years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.
tricycle alone with a sack placed in the sidecar. The sack looked as if it contained a human body. 12 Then, an
hour later, or at three o’clock in the morning, the tricycle was returned with bloodstains on the floor.
In line with present jurisprudence, the civil indemnity fixed by the court a quo for the death of Nestor de
Loyola is increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
For his defense, appellant Ruben Ilaoa does not dispute the testimony of an eyewitness that he was driving
the tricycle at past two o’clock in the morning with the sack in the sidecar. However, he claims that the sack
WHEREFORE, the judgment finding accused RUBEN E. ILAOA guilty beyond reasonable doubt is AFFIRMED but
contained buntot ng pusa, a local term for marijuana, not a human body, which he delivered to a designated
only for homicide, instead of murder. Consequently, he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of eight
place in Fields Avenue as a favor to his compadre Nestor de Loyola whom he could not refuse. Moreover, it
(8) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of prision mayor medium, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years,
was the vomit discharged by his drinking companions that was being swept clean by his girlfriend at the
four (4) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal medium as maximum. In addition, accused-appellant
entrance of their apartment in the early morning of 5 November 1987, not blood as the witnesses
RUBEN E. ILAOA is ordered to pay the heirs of Nestor de Loyola P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and, as fixed by
asseverated.
the court a quo, P46,765.00 as actual damages, P10,000.00 as reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses of
litigation, and P10,000.00 for moral damages.
We find the version of the prosecution more persuasive than the defense. The fact that appellant quarreled
with the deceased, then mauled and pulled him to the apartment where the latter was last seen alive, in
Accused-appellant ROGELIO E. ILAOA, however, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged for obvious insufficiency
addition to borrowing a tricycle which was found with bloodstains when returned, sufficiently point to Ruben
of evidence.
as the culprit responsible for the crime. The fact that the deceased was his compadre, hence, presumably
would have no motive to kill the latter, is not enough to exculpate appellant. It is a matter of judicial
knowledge that persons have been killed or assaulted for no apparent reason at all, 13 and that friendship or SO ORDERED.
even relationship is no deterrent to the commission of a crime. 14
THIRD DIVISION
If we are to believe appellant Ruben, we will not be able to account for the blood found on the floor of the
tricycle after it was brought back to the owner. Ruben himself could not explain away such testimony for he G.R. No. 76338-39 February 26, 1990
belied the excuse that the tricycle was needed to rush a pregnant woman to the hospital, which was the
explanation he gave to Alex Villamil when he borrowed it. We cannot even consider that the story about the
blood on the tricycle was simply concocted by Alex Villamil to incriminate Ruben because the latter was his PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
friend, as Ruben himself has admitted. 15In fact he could think of no reason for Alex Villamil to testify falsely vs.
against him. 16 RENATO TAC-AN Y HIPOS, accused-appellant.

Despite the foregoing, however, we hold appellant liable only for homicide, not murder, on the ground that The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
the qualifying circumstances alleged in the information, namely, abuse of superior strength, cruelty and
evident premeditation, were not sufficiently proved to be appreciated against appellant. Amadeo D. Seno for accused-appellant.

Abuse of superior strength cannot be considered because there was no evidence whatsoever that appellant
was physically superior to the deceased and that the former took advantage of such superior physical
strength to overcome the latter’s resistance to consummate the offense. 17 The fact that Nestor de Loyola’s
decapitated body bearing forty-three (43) stab wounds, twenty-four (24) of which were fatal, 18 was found FELICIANO, J.:
dumped in the street is not sufficient for a finding of cruelty where there is no showing that appellant Ruben
Ilaoa, for his pleasure and satisfaction, caused Nestor de Loyola to suffer slowly and painfully and inflicted on Accused Renato Tac-an appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, convicting him
him unnecessary physical and moral pain. 19 Number of wounds alone is not the criterion for the appreciation of qualified illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007 and of murder in
of cruelty as an aggravating circumstance. 20 Neither can it be inferred from the mere fact that the victim’s Criminal Case No. 4012 and imposing upon him the penalty of death in both cases.
dead body was dismembered. 21Evident premeditation cannot likewise be considered. There is nothing in the
records to show that appellant, prior to the night in question, resolved to kill Nestor de Loyola, nor is there
On 18 December 1984, appellant was charged with violation of Section 1, paragraph (2), of Presidential
proof to show that such killing was the result of meditation, calculation or resolution on his part. On the
Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
contrary, the evidence tends to show that the series of circumstances which culminated in the killing
constitutes an unbroken chain of events with no interval of time separating them for calculation and
meditation. Absent any qualifying circumstance, Ruben Ilaoa should only be held liable for homicide. That, on or about the 14th day of December 1984, in the City of Tagbilaran Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while
acting under the influence of drugs and without any license or permit from the proper

133
 authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have ill his
possession, custody and control an unlicensed firearm, a SMITH & WESSON Airweight
caliber .38 revolver with Serial Number 359323 with Five (5) spent shells and Five (5)
live ammunitions and without any justifiable cause and with intent to kill, used the said
firearm and ammunitions to shoot one Francis Ernest Escano III hitting and inflicting
upon the latter the following gunshot wounds or injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS — Head & Chest (through and
through);
Head Entrance — 1.4 x 2.2 cm., Left Fronto-Temporal Area; Port
— 1.3 x 0.3 cm.; Right Cheek. 3.5 cm. above the right external
meatus;
Chest Entrance — 0.3 x 1 cm. — Right Infrascapular Area at the
level of the 7th Intercostal Rib (Back); Exist — 0.3 cm. dia; above
the right nipple;
Y-shape laceration, check at the right angle of the mouth, Right
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8
which gunshot wounds or injuries directly caused his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the Republic of the Philippines.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Section 1, paragraph 2 of the Presidential
Decree No. 1866. 1
On 11 January 1985, an amended information 2 for murder was also filed against appellant reading as follows:
That, on or about the 14th day of December, 1984 in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
any justifiable cause and with intent to kill, evident pre-meditation treachery, while
acting under the influence of drugs, with cruelty and deliberately augmenting the
suffering of the victim, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shot one Francis Ernest Escano with the use of an unlicensed SMITH &
WESSON Airweight caliber .38 revolver with Serial Number 359323 hitting and inflicting
upon the latter the following gunshot wounds or injuries, to wit:
MULTIPLE GUNSHOT WOUNDS — Head and Chest (Through &
Through);
Head Entrance — 14 x 2.2 cm., Left Fronto-temporal Area; Port —
l.3 x 0.3 cm., Right Cheek, 3.5 cm., above the right external
meatus;
Chest Entrance — 0.3 x 1 cm. — right Infrascapular Area at the
level of the 7th Inter-Costal Rib (back); exit — 0.3 cm. dia; above
the right nipple
Y-shape laceration, cheek at the angle of the mouth, Right
Dimensions: 3 x 1.2 cm. x 1.8.
which gunshot wounds or injuries directly caused his death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the deceased namely: Judge & Mrs. Francisco Rey H. Escano, in
the amount to be proved during the trial of the case.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in
relation to Section 17 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 179, with the qualifying aggravating
circumstances of evident premeditation, treachery and acting under the influence of
dangerous drugs and cruelty.
Appellant entered a plea of not guilty in both cases. The two (2) criminal cases were consolidated upon
motion of the prosecution and tried jointly. On 31 July 1986, the trial court rendered a decision 3 convicting
appellant under both informations. The dispositive portion of the decision read as follows:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, decision is hereby rendered in
Criminal Case No. 4007 finding the accused Renato Tac-an y Hipos GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions qualified with
Murder under Section 1, paragraphs 1 and 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 and
hereby sentences said Renato Tac-an y Hipos to suffer the penalty of DEATH. Further,
decision is also rendered in Criminal Case No. 4012 finding the same accused Renato
Tac-an y Hipos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder under Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, in relation to Batas Pambansa Blg. 179 and P.D. 1866. Appreciating
the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation (treachery used to qualify the
crime to murder) and the special aggravating circumstances of acting while under the
influence of dangerous drugs and with the use of an unlicensed firearm and with insult
to a person in authority and there being no mitigating circumstance to offset them, and
sentences the said Renato Tac-an y Hipos to suffer the penalty of DEATH. The accused
is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Francis Ernest Escano in the
amount of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00); to pay actual compensatory
damages in the amount of ONE HUNDRED EIGHT THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED TEN
PESOS (P108,310.00); to pay moral damages to Judge Francisco Escano, Jr., the sum of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) and to Mrs. Lydia Escano the sum of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) for the mental anguish and suffering
each experienced because of the death of Francis Ernest. All such amount shall earn
legal interest from the time this decision shall become final and executory until fully
satisfied. The accused shall also pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Immediately after promulgation of the decision, appellant signified his intention to appeal to this Court,
although the same was subject to automatic review by this Court.
In his brief, appellant assigned the following as errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I. The lower court erred in believing the prosecution's version of the case instead of
according full faith and credence to the defendant's version.
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 II. The trial court erred in not holding that Renato Tac-an was justified in shooting the
deceased.
III. The trial court erred in not holding that in (sic) the least the defendant acted in
incomplete self-defense in shooting the deceased.
IV. The trial court erred in not holding that P.D. 1866 is inapplicable to the defendant
inasmuch as said decree was enforceable only during the existence of the Martial Law
Regime.
V. The trial court erred in not holding that the defendant was placed twice in jeopardy
for having been prosecuted for violation of P.D. 1866 despite his being prosecuted for
murder in an information which alleges that the accused used an unlicensed firearm in
killing the deceased.
VI. The trial court erred in not adjudging the defendant innocent of murder.
From the record, the facts may be collated and summarized as follows:
Appellant Renato Tac-an, then eighteen (18) years and seven (7) months of age, and the deceased Francis
Ernest Escano III, fifteen (15) years old, were classmates in the third year of high school of the Divine Word
College in Tagbilaran City. They were close friends, being not only classmates but also members of the same
gang, the Bronx gang. Renato had been to the house where Francis and his parents lived, on one or two
occasions. On those occasions, Francis' mother noticed that Renato had a handgun with him. Francis was then
advised by his mother to distance himself from Renato. 4
Francis withdrew from the Bronx gang. The relationship between Renato and Francis turned sour. Sometime
in September 1984, Renato and Francis quarrelled with each other, on which occasion Francis bodily lifted
Arnold Romelde from the ground. Arnold was friend and companion to Renato. The quarrel resulted in
Renato and Francis being brought to the high school principal's office. The strained relationship between the
two (2) erstwhile friends was aggravated in late November 1984 when Francis teamed that Renato, together
with other members of the Bronx gang, was looking for him, apparently with the intention of beating him up.
Further deterioration of their relationship occurred sometime in the first week of December 1984, when
graffiti appeared on the wall of the third year high school classroom and on the armrest of a chair in that
classroom, deprecating the Bronx gang and describing Renato as "bayot" (homosexual) 5 Renato attributed
the graffiti to Francis.
At about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 December 1984, Renato entered Room 15 of the high school
building to attend his English III class. Renato placed his scrapbook prepared for their Mathematics class on
his chair, and approached the teacher, Mrs. Liliosa Baluma, to raise a question. Upon returning to his chair, he
found Francis sitting there, on the scrapbook. Renato was angered by what he saw and promptly kicked the
chair on which Francis was seated. Francis, however, explained that he had not intentionally sat down on
Renato's scrapbook. A fistfight would have ensued but some classmates and two (2) teachers, Mrs. Baluma
and Mr. Damaso Pasilbas, intervened and prevented them from assaulting each other. After the two (2) had
quieted down and apparently shaken hands at the instance of Mrs. Baluma, the latter resumed her English III
class. Francis sat on the last row to the extreme right of the teacher while Renato was seated on the same last
row at the extreme left of the teacher. While the English III class was still going on, Renato slipped out of the
classroom and went home to get a gun. He was back at the classroom approximately fifteen (15) minutes
later. 6
The Mathematics class under Mr. Damaso Pasilbas scheduled for 3:00 p.m. had just started in Room 15 when
Renato suddenly burst into the room, shut the door and with both hands raised, holding a revolver, shouted
"Where is Francis?" Upon sighting Francis seated behind and to the light of student Ruel Ungab, Renato fired
at Francis, hitting a notebook, a geometry book and the armrest of Ruel's chair. Francis and Ruel jumped up
and with several of their classmates rushed forward towards the teacher's platform to seek protection from
their teacher. Renato fired a second time, this time hitting the blackboard in front of the class. Francis and the
other students rushed back towards the rear of the room. Renato walked towards the center of the classroom
and fired a third time at Francis, hitting the concrete wall of the classroom. Francis and a number of his
classmates rushed towards the door, the only door to and from Room 15. Renato proceeded to the teacher, s
platform nearest the door and for the fourth time fired at Francis as the latter was rushing towards the door.
This time, Francis was hit on the head and he fell on the back of Ruel and both fell to the floor. Ruel was
pulled out of the room by a friend; Francis remained sprawled on the floor bleeding profusely. 7
Renato then went out of Room 15, and paced between Rooms 14 and 15. A teacher, Mr. Pablo Baluma,
apparently unaware that it was Renato who had gunned down Francis, approached Renato and asked him to
help Francis as the latter was still alive inside the room. Renato thereupon re-entered Room 15, closed the
door behind him, saying: "So, he is still alive. Where is his chest?" Standing over Francis sprawled face down
on the classroom floor, Renato aimed at the chest of Francis and fired once more. The bullet entered Francis'
back below the right shoulder, and exited on his front chest just above the right nipple. 8
Renato then left with two (2) remaining students and locked Francis alone inside Room 15. Renato proceeded
to the ground floor and entered the faculty room. There, he found some teachers and students and ordered
them to lock the door and close the windows, in effect holding them as hostages. He also reloaded his gun
with five (5) bullets. After some time, a team of Philippine Constabulary troopers led by Capt. Larino Lazo
arrived and surrounded the faculty room. With a hand-held public address device, Capt. Lazo called upon
Renato to surrender himself Renato did not respond to this call. Renato's brother approached Capt. Lazo and
volunteered to persuade his brother to give up. Renato's father who, by this time had also arrived, pleaded
with Renato to surrender himself Renato then turned over his gun to his brother through an opening in the
balustrade of the faculty room. Capt. Lazo took the gun from Renato's brother, went to the door of the faculty
room, entered and placed Renato under arrest. 9
Meantime, as soon as Renato left Room 15, some teachers and students came to rescue Francis but could not
open the door which Renato had locked behind him. One of the students entered the room by climbing up
the second floor on the outside and through the window and opened the door from the inside. The teachers
and students brought Francis down to the ground floor from whence the PC soldiers rushed him to the
Celestino Gallares Memorial Hospital. 10 Francis died before reaching the hospital.
Capt. Lazo brought Renato to the PC Headquarters at Camp Dagohoy, Tagbilaran City. The officer deposited
the revolver recovered from Renato which was an Airweight Smith and Wesson .38 caliber revolver, with
Serial No. 359323, as well as the five (5) live bullets removed from the said revolver, and the five (5) empty
cartridges which Renato had turned over to him. Ballistic examination conducted by Supervising Ballistician,
Artemio Panganiban, National Bureau of Investigation, Cebu, showed that the empty cartridge cases had
been fired from the revolver recovered from Renato. 11
Appellant at the outset assails the trial court for having believed the prosecution's version of the facts instead
of the version offered by the appellant. The trial court took into account, inter alia, the positive and direct
testimony of:
1. Mrs. Liliosa Baluma who testified as to, among other things, the events which took
place inside her English III classroom immediately before the shooting;
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 2. Ruel Ungab — a fifteen (15) year old classmate of Renato and Francis, who had fallen A: He said, 'So you are brave now you had a (sic) guts to fight
on the floor with Francis when the latter was finally hit by Renato; against me.'

3. Damaso Pasilbas — the Mathematics teacher who was holding his class when Renato Q: And what else did he say?
had burst into Room 15 and started firing at Francis; and
A: He said, 'Go home, get your firearm because I will go home to
4. Napoleon Jumauan — another sixteen (16) year old, classmate of Renato and Francis get a gun.'
who was inside the classroom when Renato had started firing at Francis and who was
only about a foot away from the head of Francis when Renato, having re-entered Room
Q: Was that all that he told you?
15, had fired at Francis as the latter was sprawled on the floor of the classroom.

A: He further said, 'You go home get your firearm, if you won't go

After careful examination of the record, we find no reason to disagree with the conclusion of the trial court
home and get a gun, I will go to your place and kill you including
that Renato had indeed shot and killed Francis under the circumstances and in the manner described by these
your parents, brothers and sisters.'
witnesses.

Q: And after that where did Francis go?

1. The claim of self-defense.

A: Before the bell rang he went ahead. 13

Renato claimed that he was acting in self-defense, or at least in incomplete self-defense, when he shot
Francis. For a claim of self-defense to be sustained, the claimant must show by clear and convincing evidence
that the following requisites existed: (Emphasis supplied)

a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; We note at the outset that there was no evidence before the Court, except Renato's own testimony, that
Francis had uttered the above statements attributed to him by Renato. Although there had been about
twenty-five (25) other students, and the teacher, in the classroom at the time, no corroborating testimony
b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to repel the aggression;
was offered by the defense. In the second place, assuming (arguendo merely) that Francis had indeed made
and
those statements, such utterances cannot be regarded as the unlawful aggression which is the first and most
fundamental requirement of self-defense. Allegedly uttered in a high school classroom by an obviously
c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused. 12 unarmed Francis, such statements could not reasonably inspire the "well grounded and reasonable belief"
claimed by Renato that "he was in imminent danger of death or bodily harm." 14 Unlawful aggression refers to
an attack that has actually broken out or materialized or at the very least is clearly imminent: it cannot consist
Testifying in his own behalf, Renato said that a few minutes before the end of Mrs. Baluma's English III class,
in oral threats or a merely threatening stance or posture. 15Further as pointed out by the Solicitor General,
Francis had approached him:
Francis was obviously without a firearm or other weapon when Renato returned and burst into Room 15
demanding to know where Francis was and forthwith firing at him repeatedly, without the slightest regard for
(Atty. Seno, Defense Counsel) the safety of his other classmates and of the teacher. There being no unlawful aggression, there simply could
not be self-defense whether complete or incomplete, 16 and there is accordingly no need to refer to the other
Q: How did it happened (sic) that you had a conversation with requirements of lawful self-defense.
Francis?
2. The claim that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable.
(Renato)
As pointed out at the outset, appellant was charged with unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm, a
A: While the class was going on, Mrs. Baluma was writing on the Smith and Wesson Airweight.38 caliber revolver with five (5) spent bullets and five (5) live ones and with
blackboard. having used such firearm and ammunition to shoot to death Francis Ernest Escano III, in violation of Section 1
of P.D. No. 1866.

Q: Then what happened?

Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866 provides, in relevant part, that:

A: While our teacher was writing on the blackboard Francis

suddenly got near me. Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of
Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. — The penalty of reclusion temporal in its
Q: And what happened when Francis approached you? maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any person who shall
unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearms, part of

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 firearm, ammunition, or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in
the manufacture of any firearm or ammunition.
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, the penalty of
death shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)
is no law which renders the use of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance in homicide or
murder. Under an information charging homicide or murder, the fact that the death weapon was an
unlicensed firearm cannot be used to increase the penalty for the second offense of homicide or murder to
death (or reclusion perpetua under the 1987 Constitution). The essential point is that the unlicensed
character or condition of the instrument used in destroying human life or committing some other crime, is
not included in the inventory of aggravating circumstances set out in Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. 19

Appellant urges that P.D. No. 1866 is inapplicable to him "considering that the reason for its [P.D. No. 1866]
In contrast, under an information for unlawful possession (or manufacture, dealing in, acquisition or
issuance no longer exists." He argues that P.D. No. 1866 was enforceable only during the existence of martial
disposition) of a firearm or ammunition, P.D. No. 1866 authorizes the increase of the imposable penalty for
law, and that when martial law was "lifted in 1979," the reason for the "existence" of P.D. No. 1866 faded
unlawful possession or manufacture, etc. of the unlicensed firearm where such firearm was used to destroy
away, with the result that the "original law on firearms, that is, Section 2692 of the [Revised] Administrative
human life. Although the circumstance that human life was destroyed with the use of the unlicensed firearm
Code, together with its pre-martial law amendments, came into effect again thereby replacing P.D. No.
is not an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, it may still be taken into
1866." 17
account to increase the penalty to death (reclusion perpetua, under the 1987 Constitution) because of the
explicit provisions of P.D. No. 1866. As noted earlier, the unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm or
There is nothing in P.D. No. 1866 (which was promulgated on 29 June 1983) which suggests that it was ammunition is an offense punished under a special law and not under the Revised Penal Code.
intended to remain in effect only for the duration of the martial law imposed upon the country by former
President Marcos. Neither does the statute contain any provision that so prescribes its lapsing into non-
4. The claim that there was no treachery.
enforceability upon the termination of the state or period of martial law. On the contrary, P.D. No. 1866 by its
own terms purported to "consolidate, codify and integrate" all prior laws and decrees penalizing illegal
possession and manufacture of firearms, ammunition and explosives in order "to harmonize their provisions Appellant contends that there was no treachery present because before any shot was fired, Renato had
as well as to update and revise certain provisions and prior statutes "in order to more effectively deter shouted "where is Francis?" Appellant in effect suggests his opening statement was a warning to Francis and
violators of the law on firearms, ammunitions and explosives." 18 Appellant's contention is thus without basis that the first three (3) shots he had fired at Francis were merely warning shots. Moreover, building upon his
in fact. own testimony about the alleged threat that Francis had uttered before he (Renato) left his English III class to
go home and get a gun, appellant argues that Francis must have anticipated his return and thus had sufficient
time to prepare for the coming of the appellant. 20 Appellant's contention, while ingenious, must be rejected.
3. The claim of double jeopardy.
The trial court made a finding of treachery taking explicit account of the following factors:

It is also contended by appellant that because he had already been charged with illegal possession of a
1. Room 15 of the Divine Word College High School Department Tagbilaran City, is
firearm and ammunition in Criminal Case No. 4007, aggravated by the use of such unlicensed firearm to
situated in the second floor of the building. It is a corner room and it has only one (1)
commit a homicide or murder, he was unconstitutionally placed in jeopardy of punishment for the second
door which is the only means of entry and exit;
time when he was charged in Criminal Case No. 4012 with murder "with the use of an unlicensed [firearm],"
in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179.
2. At the time of the attack, the deceased was seated on his chair inside his classroom
and was writing on the armrest of his chair and also talking to Ruel Ungab and while
It is elementary that the constitutional right against double jeopardy protects one against a second or later
their teacher, Mr. Damaso Pasilbas was checking the attendance. The deceased was not
prosecution for the same offense, and that when the subsequent information charges another and different
aware of any impending assault neither did he have any means to defend himself;
offense, although arising from the same act or set of acts, there is no prohibited double jeopardy. In the case
at bar, it appears to us quite clear that the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 4007 is that of unlawful
possession of an unlicensed firearm penalized under a special statute, while the offense charged in Criminal 3. The accused used an airweight Smith & Wesson .38 caliber revolver in shooting to
Case No. 4012 was that of murder punished under the Revised Penal Code. It would appear self-evident that death the defenseless and helpless Francis Ernest Escaño;
these two (2) offenses in themselves are quite different one from the other, such that in principle, the
subsequent filing of Criminal Case No. 4012 is not to be regarded as having placed appellant in a prohibited
4. The attack was so sudden and so unexpected. the accused consciously conceived
second jeopardy.
that mode of attack;

We note that the information in Criminal Case No. 4007 after charging appellant with unlawful possession of
5. The accused fired at Francis again and again and did not give him a chance to defend
an unlicensed firearm and ammunition, went on to state that said firearm and ammunition had been used to
himself. After the deceased was hit on the head and fell to the floor while he was
shoot to death Francis Ernest Escaño III. We note also that the amended information in Criminal Case No.
already sprawled and completely defenseless the accused fired at him again and the
4012 after charging appellant with the unlawful killing of Francis Ernest Escaño III, stated that the killing had
deceased was hit on the chest;
been done with the use of an unlicensed firearm. We believe these additional allegations in the two (2)
informations did not have the effect of charging appellant with having committed the same offense more
than once. 6. The deceased was not armed. He was totally defenseless. He was absolutely not
aware of any coming attack. 21
However, in sentencing Renato to suffer the penalty of death for the crime of murder, the trial court did take
into account as a "special aggravating circumstance" the fact that the killing of Francis had been done "with The Court also pointed out that Renato must have known that Francis while inside Room 15 had no means of
the use of an unlicensed firearm." In so doing, we believe and so hold, the trial court committed error. There escape there being only one (1) door and Room 15 being on the second floor of the building. Renato in effect

137
blocked the only exit open to Francis as he stood on the teacher's platform closest to the door and fired as
Francis and Ruel sought to dash through the door. Renato's question "where is Francis?" cannot reasonably
be regarded as an effort to warn Francis for he shot at Francis the instant he sighted the latter, seated and
talking to Ruel Ungab. That Renato fired three (3) shots before hitting Francis with the fourth shot, can only
be ascribed to the indifferent markmanship of Renato and to the fact that Francis and the other students
were scurrying from one part of the room to the other in an effort to evade the shots fired by Renato. The
cumulative effect of the circumstances underscored by the trial court was that the attack upon Francis had
been carried out in a manner which disabled Francis from defending himself or retaliating against Renato.
Finally, the circumstance that Renato, having been informed that Francis was still alive, re-entered Room 15
and fired again at Francis who lay on the floor and bathed with his own blood, manifested Renato's conscious
choice of means of execution which directly and especially ensured the death of his victim without risk to
himself. 22 We are compelled to agree with the trial court that treachery was here present and that,
therefore, the killing of Francis Ernest Escaño III was murder.
5. The claim that there was no evident premeditation.
The trial court also found the presence of evident premeditation and appreciated the same as a generic
aggravating circumstance. Here, it is the urging of the appellant that the requisites of evident premeditation
had not been sufficiently shown. In order that evident premeditation may be taken into account, there must
be proof of (a) the time when the offender formed his intent to commit the crime; (b) an action manifestly
indicating that the offender had clung to his determination to commit the crime; and (c) of the passage of a
sufficient interval of time between the determination of the offender to commit the crime and the actual
execution thereof, to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 23 The defense pointed out that
barely fifteen (15) minutes had elapsed from the time Renato left his English III class and the time he returned
with a gun. While there was testimony to the fact that before that fatal day of 14 December 1984, anger and
resentment had welled up between Francis and Renato, there was no evidence adequately showing when
Renato had formed the intention and determination to take the life of Francis. Accordingly, we must discard
evident premeditation as an aggravating circumstance.
6. The claim that the killing was not done under the influence of a dangerous drug.
Section 17 of B.P. Blg. 179 which was promulgated on 2 March 1982 provides as follows:
In the absence of medical evidence, the Court took into account certain detailed factors as circumstantial
evidence supporting the testimony of Orlando Balaba. These circumstances were:
The circumstance of place where the killing was committed, the circumstance of the
manner of the attack, the circumstance of holding hostage some teachers and students
inside the faculty room, the circumstance of terrifying an entire school, the
circumstance that sitting on a scrapbook is too insignificant as to arouse passion strong
enough to motivate a killing, are circumstantial evidences that gave the court no room
for doubt that prosecution witnesses Orlando Balaba, Benjamin Amper and Allan de la
Serna truthfully told the court that they saw the accused smoking marijuana inside the
comfort room at 1:45 in the afternoon of December 14, 1984. ... . 26
The above circumstances pointed to by the trial court may be indicative of passionate anger on the part of
Renato; we do not believe that they necessarily show that Renato had smoked marijuana before entering his
English III class. In the absence of competent medical or other direct evidence of ingestion of a dangerous
drug, courts may be wary and critical of indirect evidence, considering the severe consequences for the
accused of a finding that he had acted while under the influence of a prohibited drug. The Court considers
that the evidence presented on this point was simply inadequate to support the ruling of the trial court that
Renato had shot and killed Francis while under the influence of a prohibited drug.
7. The claim that appellant had voluntarily surrendered.
Appellant contends that he had voluntarily surrendered and that the trial court should have considered that
mitigating circumstance in his favor. The trial court did not, and we consider that it correctly refused to do so.
Firstly, Renato surrendered his gun, not himself, 27 by handing over the weapon through the balustrade of the
faculty room. Secondly, he surrendered the gun to his brother, who was not in any case a person in authority
nor an agent of a person in authority. 28 Thirdly, Renato did not surrender himself he was arrested by Capt.
Lazo. The fact that he did not resist arrest, did not constitute voluntary surrender. 29 Finally, if it be assumed
that Renato had surrendered himself, such surrender cannot be regarded
as voluntary and spontaneous. Renato was holed up in the faculty room, in effect holding some teachers and
students as hostages. The faculty room was surrounded by Philippine Constabulary soldiers and there was no
escape open to him. He was not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

SEC. 17. The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, when a crime is 8. Whether or not the crime was committed in contempt of or with insult to the public
committed by an offender who is under the influence of dangerous drugs, such state authorities.
shall be considered as a qualifying aggravating circumstance in the definition of a crime
and the application of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal Code.
The trial court held that the shooting to death of Francis had been done "in contempt of or with insult to the
public authorities:
The trial court found that Francis was killed by Renato while the later was under the influence of a dangerous
drug, specifically marijuana, and took that into account as a "special aggravating circumstance". No medical
Under Republic Act 1978, as amended, a teacher of a public or private school is
evidence had been submitted by the prosecution to show that Renato had smoked marijuana before gunning
considered a person in authority. The fact that Mr. Damaso Pasilbas, the teacher in
down Francis. Fourteen (14) days had elapsed after December 14, 1984 before Renato was medically
mathematics, was already checking the attendance did not deter the accused from
examined for possible traces of marijuana; the results of the examination were negative. Defense witness Dr.
pursuing his evil act, The accused ignored his teacher's presence and pleas. Not yet
Rogelio Ascona testified that in order to have a medically valid basis for determining the presence of
satisfied with the crime and terror he had done to Francis and the entire school, the
marijuana in the human system, the patient must be examined within twenty-four (24) hours from the time
accused entered the faculty room and held hostage the teachers and students who
he is supposed to have smoked marijuana. 24 The prosecution had presented Orlando Balaba, a student at the
were inside that room. To the court, this act of the accused was an insult to his teachers
Divine Word College, High School Department, who testified that he found Renato and one Jaime Racho
and to the school, an act of callus disregard of other's feelings and safety and
inside the men's room of the High School Department sucking smoke from a hand-rolled thing that look like a
completely reprehensible. 30
cigarette, that he had asked Renato what that was and that Renato had replied damo (marijuana). 25 While
the testimony of Orlando Balaba was corroborated by two (2) other prosecution witnesses, we believe that
Orlando Balaba's testimony was incompetent to show that what Renato and Jaime Racho were smoking We believe the trial court erred in so finding the presence of a generic aggravating circumstance. Article 152
inside the men's room was indeed marijuana. It was pointed out by apellant that Orlando Balaba had never of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 1978 and Presidential Decree No. 299, provides
smoked nor smelled marijuana. as follows:

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 Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. — Who shall be
deemed as such. — In applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this
Code, any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a
member of some court or government corporation, board, or commission, shall be
deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be
deemed a person in authority.

A person who by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent

authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and
security of life and property, such as a barrio councilman, barrio policeman and
barangay leader and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be
deemed an agent of a person in authority.

In applying the provisions of Articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors and
persons charged with the supervision of public or duly recognized private
schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance of their
professional duties or on the occasion of such performance, shall be deemed persons in
authority. (As amended by P.D. No. 299, September 19, 1973 and Batas Pambansa Blg.
873, June 12, 1985).

Careful reading of the last paragraph of Article 152 will show that while a teacher or professor of a public or
recognized private school is deemed to be a "person in authority," such teacher or professor is so deemed
only for purposes of application of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a person in authority), and 151 (resistance
and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person) of the Revised Penal Code. In marked
contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does not identify specific articles of the Revised Penal Code for the
application of which any person "directly vested with jurisdiction, etc." is deemed "a person in authority."
Because a penal statute is not to be given a longer reach and broader scope than is called for by the ordinary
meaning of the ordinary words used by such statute, to the disadvantage of an accused, we do not believe
that a teacher or professor of a public or recognized private school may be regarded as a "public authority"
within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, 31 the provision the trial court
applied in the case at bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court dated 31 July 1986 is hereby MODIFIED in the following manner
and to the following extent only:

1. In Criminal Case No. 4007, appellant shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua;

2. In Criminal Case No. 4012 — (a) the aggravating circumstances of evident

premeditation and of having acted with contempt of or insult to the public authorities
shall be DELETED and not taken into account; and (b) the special aggravating
circumstances of acting while under the influence of dangerous drugs and with the use
of an unlicensed firearm shall similarly be DELETED and not taken into account. There
being no generic aggravating nor mitigating circumstances present, the appellant shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The two (2) penalties of reclusion perpetua shall be served successively in accordance with the provisions of
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code. As so modified, the decision of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

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