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Asian Journal of Women's Studies

ISSN: 1225-9276 (Print) 2377-004X (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rajw20

Culture, Islamic feminism, and the quest for legal


reform in Indonesia

Zezen Zaenal Mutaqin

To cite this article: Zezen Zaenal Mutaqin (2018) Culture, Islamic feminism, and the quest for legal
reform in Indonesia, Asian Journal of Women's Studies, 24:4, 423-445

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/12259276.2018.1524549

Published online: 15 Nov 2018.

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ASIAN JOURNAL OF WOMEN’S STUDIES
2018, VOL. 24, NO. 4, 423–445
https://doi.org/10.1080/12259276.2018.1524549

Culture, Islamic feminism, and the quest for legal


reform in Indonesia
Zezen Zaenal MUTAQIN
School of Law, University of California, Los Angeles, CA, USA

ABSTRACT
This paper examines the interplay of Islam, history, and feminism and views it in
the legal context of Indonesia. I use social movement theory to examine how
women’s movements here have organized and mobilized resources to
achieve certain goals in this specific socio-political context. This paper sees
the Marriage Act 1974 and the Counter-Legal Draft of the Compilation of
Islamic Law (CLD) as two relevant examples of how women’s movements
have struggled to achieve a particular goal in accordance with their ideals.
These represent two different contexts: while the Marriage Act was enacted
during Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime, the Counter-Legal Draft was
proposed during the Reform Era following the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998.

KEYWORDS Counter legal draft; marriage law 1974; polygamy; women’s movement; compilation;
legal reform

Introduction
When I was a student in elementary school, I vividly remember when our
teacher taught Indonesian history, sharing the names of our founders and
national heroes. Among the greatest heroines for Indonesians of my gener-
ation was Cut Nyak Dhien, the princess of the Sultanate of Aceh, who led a
rebellious guerilla war against the Dutch for 25 years in the wilderness of
Sumatra during the Aceh War (1873–1904) (Graf, Schröter, & Wieringa, 2010;
Siapno, 2002). But she was not an exception; around the same time, in Java,
Raden Ajeng Kartini fought for the equal rights of women, primarily the
right to education. While she was secluded at home in her village in Java,
she regularly wrote letters to her Dutch friends in Europe, such as the socialist
feminist Stella Zeehandelaar, to express her feelings and disquiet regarding
the treatment of women among Javanese aristocrats (Wieringa, 2002). This
correspondence would later be published in the Netherlands, then translated
into English and published in London as Letters of a Javanese Princess in 1921
(Kartini, Symmers, Geertz, & Roosevelt, 1964).

CONTACT Zezen Zaenal MUTAQIN zezen.zaenal@uinjkt.ac.id


© 2018 Asian Center for Women's Studies, Ewha Womans University
424 Z. Z. MUTAQIN

Indonesian history has many other heroines such as Cut Nyak Muetia, Dewi
Sartika, Martha Tiahahu, Maria Maramis, Nyi Ageng Serang, and Fatmawati
Soekarno, who struggled for independence hand-in-hand with their male
counterparts. Following the revolution in 1945, the Indonesian Constitution
was drafted by a committee that included two prominent female leaders,
Maria Ulfah Santoso and Siti Soekaptinah Soenarjo. The former, as the first
female Indonesian lawyer, was very vocal and critical about the absence of
fundamental human rights provisions in the Constitution (Bourchier, 2015).
Her ideas for including full protection of human rights would only be stipu-
lated in the Constitution in 2002, after ratification of its fourth amendment.
Over the years, women have continued to play a growing role in Indone-
sia’s leadership, and its first female supreme court judge, Sri Widoyati
Wiratmo Soekito, was appointed in 1968. Women occupied public positions
as directors, ministers, supreme court judge, and even as president, with
the election of Megawati Sukarnoputri in 2001. However, as I grew up, went
to university, traveled abroad for education, and learned about other national
histories and cultures, I realized that such political participation by women
was not common in other countries. I became aware through my travel and
reading that in some countries, such as in the Middle East, a woman going
out of her compound alone, or driving a car, were unusual or forbidden activi-
ties. One does not find heroines among traditional stories or images of the
American founding fathers. Seeing women become presidents, for many
developed countries, still continues to be rare.
This significant role of women in Indonesian society was possibly
influenced by its cultural milieu. Men and women have lived side by side in
a relatively equal-bilateral relationship. Women have been highly visible in
public life, with somewhat equal roles to men, within families as well as in
larger society.1 It has been argued that most ethnic groups in Java, Sumatra,
and Sulawesi, among the main islands in Indonesia, are bilateral societies,
with some exceptions, like Minangkabau in West Sumatra which is matrilineal
and Batak in North Sumatra, which is patrilineal (Robinson, 2008). It is, there-
fore, difficult to generalize about the pattern of Indonesian culture, as the
country has 300 ethnic groups inhabiting 17,000 islands across the archipe-
lago. It is even more complicated because the culture is comprised of three
layers of traditions that mix and engage in endless negotiation. At the first
layer are gender norms based on ethnic and cultural values, which are very
varied, given the ethnic diversity and range from matrilineal (Minangkabau),
patrilineal (the Batak of North Sumatra), to bilateral models (Java and Sula-
wesi). In addition, certain ethnic groups, such as the Bugis in South Sulawesi,
have a fluid perception of gender relations , that is, they do not clearly differ-
entiate between male and female. Their traditional priests, called bissu, are
transvestite males with a distinct gender definition or expectation, forming
a third sex category that is culturally recognized (Blackburn, 2004; Millar, 1983).
ASIAN JOURNAL OF WOMEN’S STUDIES 425

The second layer of cultural norms includes the expected gender roles
based on a particular type of interpretation of the Islamic tradition, which
came to Indonesia as part of the Islamization of the archipelago, as of the ele-
venth century. This interpretation is dynamic and rich, despite the predomi-
nantly patriarchal interpretation throughout, which emphasizes men’s role
both in domestic and public life. When religious expectations meet conflicting
cultural values, a dynamic of engagement takes place to reach a balance or
compromise.2
In the very top layer, through colonization, Indonesian people were intro-
duced to the new cultural values of democracy, liberalism, and socialism, as
well as the western orientation of gender relations that valued equal relation-
ships between men and women. In fact, because of its different values on
gender relations, this very top layer of the cultural tradition may contradict
the second layer, that is, religious identity, namely Islam, but not the
bottom cultural layer. If the aspiration of gender relations was equality
between men and women, the case of Minangkabau, because of the centrality
of women in its culture, may be more egalitarian even in comparison with
those espoused by western feminism.
Furthermore, as a part of culture, language does indeed matter. My
language, Sundanese, spoken by people of West Java, or Bahasa, the Indone-
sian national language, rooted in Malay, are almost entirely gender-neutral.3
For example, Bahasa does not differentiate between male or female (‘he’ or
‘she’) for the third person. The possessive suffix –nya, (for example: aku men-
cintainya—I love her/him) refers both to men and women. Almost all nouns
are also gender neutral. Thus, Bahasa may be seen to contribute to a relatively
equal gender relationship in Indonesia, at least compared to other Muslim
countries in the world. Of course, this is only a minor aspect of gender relations
and the relationship between language and gender is not a causal one.
The Sundanese, Javanese and most Indonesians do not have family names.
Instead, they have second or ‘last names,’ which in most cases do not link to
their fathers’ names. Many Javanese even have single word names, such as
Sukarno or Suharto, the country’s first and second presidents, respectively.
Names have nothing to do with fathers, grandfathers or great-grandfathers.
Women do not have to take their husbands’ names, instead they maintain
their original ones and have their own property and independent legal
status after marriage. Thus, there is no transmission of names in the male
line, something that has been seen to be part of male-dominant cultures
(Smith & Woodward, 2014), in Indonesian naming traditions.
In addition, as mentioned above, the Minangkabau culture of West
Sumatra is considered the world’s largest matrilineal society (Sankari, 2016).
Its culture is one of ‘modern matriarchy,’ where clan and family names are
transmitted via the mother’s line and the husband is a ‘guest’ in the house,
hosted by his wife (Blackburn, 2004; Nurmila, 2009; Sanday, 2002). The
426 Z. Z. MUTAQIN

Minangkabau case appears uncommon: Islam and Islamic law is already bur-
dened with the contemporary Middle Eastern complication: domestic vio-
lence, the subordination of women, polygamy, terrorism, and war (Lewis,
2002; Lewis, 2004). How then does a religious Muslim society in the very Far
East of the globe present such a contrasting image? (Feillard, 1997; Krier
1995; Sanday, 2002)
Despite the growing interest in the study of Islam and feminism or
women’s studies in Muslim countries, Indonesia is often omitted or understu-
died due to several reasons: language barriers in which Indonesian feminists
are less inclined to write in English or Arabic and focus more on their activist
orientation rather than the academic discourse with respect to the Indonesian
women’s movement; while the bias of Arab-centrism of many western scho-
lars tends to identify Islam with the Middle-East (Blackburn, 2004; Smith &
Woodward, 2014). Utilizing social movement theory, my paper tries to
address this gap by reflecting on the interplay between Islam, culture, and
feminism, placing it within a legal framework, while focusing on Indonesian
cases.4 I will discuss how women’s movements in Indonesia organize and
mobilize resources within a particular framing to achieve certain goals collec-
tively in a specifically socio-political context. This paper uses the Marriage Act
1974 and the Counter-Legal Draft of the Compilation of Islamic Law (herein-
after, CLD) as two relevant examples of how women’s movements have
struggled to achieve certain goals that are in line with their ideals. These rep-
resent two different historical contexts: while the Marriage Act was enacted
during Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime, the CLD was proposed
during the Reform era, following the fall of Suharto in 1998. Cultural and his-
torical explanations are necessary to understand these laws.

The women’s movement and the Marriage Law 1974


Women’s movement in Indonesia
Instead of using the word ‘feminism,’ most Indonesians tend to use ‘women’s
movement’ or ‘women’s emancipation,’ for strategic and historical reasons.
Feminism, like any other -ism, such as liberalism, pluralism, or socialism, has
a negative connotation in Indonesian society as it is ingrained in post-colonial
history, for which everything that comes from the West comes under suspi-
cion for being part of a neo-colonial intrusion into Indonesian values (Saikh,
2008: 149–150). Feminism has been seen as an ideology advancing the
struggle of women against men in a hostile manner and challenging marriage
and traditional familial systems, to the detriment of the fabric of society. These
views are biased, of course, but in terms of strategic options, avoiding the
term feminism is a rational and strategic choice for many Indonesian
women. In contrast, other Indonesians tend to see women’s movements in
ASIAN JOURNAL OF WOMEN’S STUDIES 427

a harmonious and ‘companionate’ milieu instead of implying hostility or com-


petition with men (Locher-Scholten, 2001; Locher-Scholten, 2003).
Women’s movements in Indonesia drew inspiration from their “original”
movement led by Raden Ajeng Kartini as well as other national heroines
like Cut Nyak Dhien and Dewi Sartika. Most Indonesians celebrate Kartini’s
Day on 21 April every year, symbolizing the struggle of women for equality,
while only a handful of activists remember and post things on social media
to remind people to celebrate International Women’s Day on 8 March. Indo-
nesians also celebrate Mother’s Day on 22 December to commemorate the
anniversary of the first Indonesian Women’s Congress, which took place in
1928 as part of both the anti-colonial movement and women’s emancipation
(Robinson, 2008).
This paper does not argue that the Indonesian women’s movement has
been isolated from the rest of the world. In fact, as of the colonial period
until the Reform era, the movement has been inspired by both Islamic and
western feminism in addition to pre-existing cultural gender norms. The
movement has been part of a trans-national feminist dynamic that started
in the late nineteenth century. For example, Isteri Sedar (Women Aware),
one of the most influential women’s organizations, sent delegates to the
meeting of the all-Asia Women Congress in Lahore in 1930 (Robinson,
2008). Putri Mardika (Free Women), established in Java in 1912 by female Java-
nese aristocrats, published a full report on the 1919 Feminist Congress in Paris
in their monthly magazine. In addition, Kartini was herself strongly influenced
by the Dutch feminist movement.
Thus, the women’s movement in Indonesia has been influenced by trans-
national movements, Islam, and national identity. In this paper, I would like to
show how the legal sphere was impacted by these. The Marriage Law of 1974
has been the subject of research, debate, and discussion among legal scholars
and Indonesian experts ever since it came into being (Cammack, 1989;
Cammack, Young, & Heaton, 1996; Katz & Katz, 1975; Katz & Katz, 1978;
Supriadi, 1995). However, the role of women’s movements in negotiating
women’s interest for legal change remains understudied.

The Marriage Law of 1974


As part of the legacy of colonialism, the Indonesian legal system is historically
pluralistic, and three legal regimes—namely Islamic law, customary law (adat)
and the national law inherited from the Dutch—co-exist with certain jurisdic-
tional limits. Islamic law prevails over Muslim families and the domestic sphere
(marital relations and inheritance), Islamic foundations (waqf), religious char-
ities (shadaqa), and Islamic business (Law No. 3, 2006) while adat law, to some
degree, has say regarding traditional land disputes. The national law covers all
remaining spheres. In fact, after independence, the main challenges faced by
428 Z. Z. MUTAQIN

the Indonesian founding fathers was how to place around 300 ethnic groups,
with 19 types of adat law, as well as Shari’a law, under a single unified national
law (Mutaqin, 2011). Islamic groups proposed Sharia-based national law, while
the proponents of adat tried to uphold a ‘genuine’ Indonesian law based on
adat (customs). All efforts, for the most part, failed simply because, as a new
modern state, the country needed a unified legal system. Therefore, the Dutch
legal system was adopted while at the same time Islamic and adat law still
maintained limited control (Bowen, 2003).
The Marriage Law of 1974 was an example of the legal unification project in
post-colonial Indonesia. Before the enactment of the Marriage Law, Marriage
Statute No 22 of 1946 alone regulated procedural laws regarding marriage
registration, divorce, and reconciliation for Muslims, without stipulating sub-
stantive marriage rules (Cammack, 1989). Marriage law at the time varied
across regions, depending on the adat law of the particular place. Thus, a
unified marriage law was necessary. Therefore, the Marriage Law of 1974
can also be seen as an achievement as it came into being after a long struggle
by the women’s movement for seeking equal rights in marriage. It was
designed to reduce the frequency of polygamy, divorce, and child marriage
by creating a more equal structure. For example, this Law, among other
things, regulates the repudiation of marriage equally by introducing taklik
talak,5 whereby the woman has the right to divorce under certain conditions
(Articles 23, 29, 34, 39, 40). This marked a departure from classical Islamic law,
according to which divorce was an absolute right of the husband. This Law
imposed the strict requirement for a man to take a second wife only after
obtaining judicial approval and permission from his first wife (Articles 3, 4
and 5). The Act also prescribed that marriage would be based on the concerns
of all parties, with minimum age for marriage of 16 years for women and 19 for
men. (Articles 6 and 7).
The focus of our discussion will be on the dynamics of women’s move-
ments in Indonesia to achieve these legal, structural, and cultural changes.
The Law is not perfect and in fact it does not accommodate all the
demands made by women. Invalidating polygamy was seen to contradict
the established interpretation of Shari’a. As will be seen, the complete abol-
ition of polygamy has failed, because it faced rejection both by the
women’s movement as well as wider society. But, as I note in this paper,
the strict administrative requirements stipulated for polygamous marriage
represent the middle path between those who sought to allow it and
others who wanted it banned by law.

The beginnings (1900–1945)


After Kartini’s letters were published posthumously in 1911, women’s move-
ments in Indonesia demanded equality with men both in public and domestic
ASIAN JOURNAL OF WOMEN’S STUDIES 429

spheres. The improvement of education for women as well as equal rights in


marriage were the two central issues that bound diverse women’s movements
together at the time. While the first objective represented the general concern
of society, the second specifically challenged existing marriage law based on
the prevalent interpretation of Islamic law. It also challenged the cultural prac-
tice, especially of Javanese aristocrats, to seclude (pingit) women who reached
puberty until they were married.
Kartini’s interests soon became the national agenda of the Indonesian
women’s movement. Two years after her book was published, Kartini’s
school was set up in the district she came from, followed by several others
across Java in subsequent years. Education was seen as the main means of
uplifting women and spreading awareness regarding greater independence.
In fact, before Kartini, in 1904, Dewi Sartika, a female activist in Bandung,
West Java, established the first schools for women. In 1908, Tirto Adhi
Soerjo, the Indonesian journalist who set up the first newspaper, Soenda
Berita (Sunda News), in 1903, established the first newspaper for women,
named Poetri Hindia. In the following year, several nationalist movement
organizations like Budi Utomo (1911), Muhammadiyah, Syarikat Islam
(1912), as well as Isteri Sedar (1912) were established with education as their
primary concern (Wieringa, 2002).
Kartini’s other major concern, equal rights for women in marriage, immedi-
ately became the central agenda for the women’s movement in various cities,
primarily in Java and Sumatra. Indonesia’s elite class of women at the time
were aware that achieving the goal of their struggle would only be possible
through the mobilization of their resources and establishing modern organiz-
ations. To mention the most important ones, these include organizations such
as Puteri Merdika (Free women), Madjoe Kemoelian (Progress and honor), Isteri
Sedar (Women Aware), Isteri Indonesia (Indonesian women), Hati Soetji (Pure
hearth), Aisyiyah (Muslim women’s organization named after the Prophet’s
wife) Diniah Putri (Muslim women’s school), Soenting Melayu (Malay orna-
ment), Siti Fatimah (named for the daughter of the Prophet Muhammad
and belonged to Syarikat Islam),6 and Wanita Katolik (Catholic women),
which were established during the decade. During this time, these organiz-
ations had also expanded their concerns by focusing on other women’s
issues, such as equal wages, working conditions, prostitution, and trafficking
(Robinson, 2008; Wieringa, 2002).
The first National Women’s Congress took place on 22 December 1928, in
which 31 women’s organizations from various religious and ideological back-
grounds participated. The issue of polygamy was a subject of contentious and
heated debate among the participants. Muslim women’s organizations such
as Aisyiyah of Muhammadiyah, played a role in negotiating between advan-
cing women rights and Islamic values, and so they struggled to voice
women’s interests within their organizational constraints. The Congress
430 Z. Z. MUTAQIN

failed to agree on the issue of polygamy. However, it did agree on three pro-
posals for the colonial government: the request to increase the number of
schools for girls, the requirement of taklik talak for marriage contracts to
promote equal rights for women and limit arbitrary divorce, and the
request for assistance to widows and orphans of civil servants (Robinson,
2008; Wieringa, 2002).
Concerning the issue of polygamy and equal marriage, I cannot fail to
mention the role of Maria Ulfah Santoso, a female Dutch-educated lawyer
from a religious Muslim family who negotiated for women’s interests within
Indonesia’s existing religious and cultural constraints. In discussing polygamy,
following the first Congress, she said:
I also wanted monogamy, but I didn’t want to antagonize all Islamic women.
After all, we still needed them to struggle for independence. That’s why I pro-
posed the taklik talak [the provisional divorce set out in the marriage contract,
supported by the 1928 Congress. In that way they could stay within the Qur’an.
(Wieringa, 2002, p. 77)

During the 1939 Women’s Congress, Maria Ulfa proposed a modern mar-
riage draft law that would not violate Islamic law. Her proposal should be
read in light of the campaign for national unification that was designed to
avoid any friction in the struggle for national liberation from colonialism.
Her proposal included the following clauses: 1) the repudiation of marriage
as valid only if approved by state officials or religious courts; 2) the courts
should try to reconcile marriages; 3) the religious court has the power to
cancel arbitrary divorce before a reconciliation hearing; 4) state officials or
courts must explain the implications of taklik talak at the time of entering a
marriage contract; and 5) taklik talak should be formulated comprehensively
as a basis for divorce initiated by women (Robinson, 2008).

Consolidation and achievement (1945–1974)


After the 1945 declaration of independence, under the new Republic, Maria
Ulfa Santoso and Sujatin Kartowijono, the initiators of the 1928 Women’s Con-
gress, sought to unify the women’s movement under a new umbrella organ-
ization called Kongres Wanita Indonesia (Kowani or the Indonesian Women’s
Congress). Under this women’s movements continued to make their
demands, focusing on several issues such as marriage law reform, chaired
by Maria Ulfa Santoso, employment rights, chaired by S.K. Trimurti, and
women’s health, chaired by Sulianti (Robinson, 2008). One apparent
outcome of this new coordinating mechanism was the enactment of the
first Marriage Law of 1946 (Law 22, 1946) for regulating the registration of
marriage, divorce, and reconciliation (rujuk). At this stage, marriage divorce
and reconciliation were valid only if the religious court authorized them,
ASIAN JOURNAL OF WOMEN’S STUDIES 431

which was a radical departure from existing practice. Article 3 of the 1946 law
mentions sanctions including fines and imprisonment for those who failed to
register their marriages.
In addition, during this period a new women’s organization, Muslimat, was
created as a ‘traditionalist’ women’s organization (Blackburn, 2004). Like
Aisyiyah, which was part of Muhammadiyah, Muslimat was created by Nahdla-
tul Ulama, a traditionalist religious organization established in 1926, and is
now the biggest mass Muslim organization in the world with around 45
million members. Both Aisyiyah and Muslimat have played very important
roles in Indonesia. During this period, the women’s movement actively mobi-
lized resources through social movements and political channels to propose a
new, reformed marriage law. In 1950, the Marriage Law Committee was estab-
lished by the government in response to the demands of the Women’s Front
in Parliament as well as other women’s organizations (Nurmila, 2009; Wier-
inga, 2002). The committee consisted of women leaders from various organ-
izations, like Maria Ulfa Santoso, Sujatin Kartowijono, and Mahmudah
Mawardi, who made two drafts of the Marriage Law, which included the mar-
riage law for all Indonesians and a particular marriage law for Muslims that
permitted polygamy under strictly defined conditions. Unfortunately, Presi-
dent Sukarno’s second marriage in 1954 signaled the bleak future of marriage
law reform at the time. These drafts were never submitted to the parliament
until the political regime of the New Order under Suharto rose to power in
1968, following the failed coup d’etat by the Communist party.
Although at the beginning of the New Order, Muslim groups supported
Suharto because of his anti-communist sentiment, toward the early 1970s
his regime consolidated itself under the national ideology of Pancasila7 and
began to suppress political Islam and other potential opponents through
both coercion and cooption. Thus, secular and nationalist women’s organiz-
ations had the opportunity to push their agenda to enact a reformed marriage
law that would ban polygamy. In 1973 the government proposed a marriage
law bill to the parliament. After a long and fierce debate in parliament among
nationalists, secularists, and Muslim groups, the Marriage Act was finally
enacted in 1974, with some articles dropped to accommodate the demands
of Muslim groups. Polygamy, again, was not legally prohibited but instead
was strictly limited.
To place this discussion in perspective, the quest for modernization of law
in general and marriage law in particular, has taken place throughout the
Muslim world. According to Khadduri (1977), the modernization of Islamic
family law started in Turkey in 1917 with the enactment of the Ottoman
Law of Family Rights, which codified personal rules based on the Hanafi
school. Egypt passed law No. 25 of 1920, then followed with the issuance of
law No. 25 of 1929, which gave women the power to sue for divorce. Iran
issued Marriage and Divorce Law in 1931 that was replaced by the Family
432 Z. Z. MUTAQIN

Protection Act in 1967, which would be abrogated by the Protection of Family


Rights Law in 1975, itself later banned and replaced following the Iranian
Revolution in 1979. Tunisia enacted a progressive marriage law by prohibiting
polygamy in the Code of Personal Status in 1956, which underwent several
amendments in subsequent years (Esposito, 2001; Khadduri, 1977; Nurlaela-
wati, 2010).
Khadduri (1977) has argued that Muslim countries can be divided into
three categories with respect to marriage law. Firstly, some have abolished
polygamy, either based on a particular Islamic interpretation or by disregard-
ing Islamic Law. While Tunisia fits the first category, Turkey was a clear
example of the impact of the secularization movement and the adoption of
a European system. The second category included countries which did not
openly ban polygamy, but rather legislated via very strict rules, as they
were concerned that its prohibition would be in direct conflict with the
Quranic verse that states, “If you fear that you will not act with justice
towards the orphans, marry such women as seem good to you, two, three,
four … ” (Al-Qur’an IV:4) However, the same verses also state: “but if you
fear you will not do justice, then only one,” which interprets that polygamy
remained a strict requirement. Countries like Indonesia, Iraq, and Egypt fall
into this category.
In this case, the same interpretation was used in Tunisia, but went further,
arguing that the verses must be read together with another qualifying
Qur’anic clause that says, “you will not be able to do justice between your
wives, even though you be eager to do so” (Al-Qur’an IV: 29), which is quite
often forgotten by jurists in interpreting rules of marriage. The Tunisian
approach to interpretation was rooted in reformist trends, like those proposed
by Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905), a prominent Muslim thinker who said
that no husband in modern societies can do justice to more than one wife.
A final, third category of countries such as Saudi Arabia and other countries
in the Arabian Peninsula, subscribe to a conservative interpretation, according
to which polygamy is allowed unconditionally, based on textual
interpretation.

The compilation of Islamic law and its counter legal draft


The women’s movement under the new order
Suharto’s authoritarian regime, which took over in 1968, had a dual face: on
the one hand, the policy of coercion of political Islam provided opportunities
to the women’s movement to set their agenda and even further implement it
through state policy. Even though the Marriage Law did not prohibit polyg-
amy for the sake of national unity and stability, in subsequent years, the
New Order regime issued Government Regulation No 10/1983 as part of an
ASIAN JOURNAL OF WOMEN’S STUDIES 433

implementing regulation of the Marriage Law to tighten the practice of


divorce and polygamy among civil servants, the police and the military.
Although the Regulation does not specifically prohibit polygamy and
divorce for those in the police, military, and the civil services, in reality it is vir-
tually impossible for them to meet all the administrative requirements to
enter polygamous marriage. According to Suryakusuma (1996, p. 103), the
Regulation was initiated in response to the request of Dharma Wanita (litera-
rily means Women’s Service), a women’s organization established by the
Suharto regime to mobilize wives of civil servants. They often received com-
plaints from their members about their husbands neglecting them for the
sake of taking second wives. Mrs. Tien Suharto who was then the head of
the national Dharma Wanita pushed this request via her husband, President
Suharto (Nurmila, 2009, pp. 58–59). In 1978, in response to international
pressure, Suharto also created the new Ministry for Women’s Role, assigned
to focus on women’s issues.
On the other hand, during the authoritarian Suharto regime, women’s
movements, like others at the time, were kept under total control. Leftist
women’s organizations like Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, Indonesian
Women Movement), which were linked to the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI), were completely banned and their ex-members were arrested or lived
under constant surveillance (Wieringa, 2002). The New Order regime
coopted and appropriated the women’s movement into the state develop-
ment ideology, seeking harmony and stability for the sake of economic
growth. The New Order created a new gender ideology: ‘state ibuism’,
(Nurmila, 2009; Suryakusuma, 1996). Ibu means mother, as a direct correlate
of bapak (father). Under this, while the bapak enjoyed public roles, the ibu
was expected to be a good housewife in the private sphere. Wives’ organiz-
ations, like Dharma Wanita, enjoyed a very central role in the women’s move-
ment during this time.
By the late 1970s, most women’s organizations established during the colo-
nial era had ceased to exist, with two exceptions: Aisyiyah and Muslimat.
These are Muslim women’s organizations and continue to have branches in
most districts and even villages across the country and have around 15
million members (Blackburn, 2004). Both Muslimat and Aisyiyah managed
to maintain some degree of independence from the state. Through their reli-
gious networks, together with their parent organizations, NU and Muhamma-
diyah, they have built schools, universities, hospitals, and orphanages in
almost every district. Over time and because of education, a substantial
number of their members came to be influenced by both western and
Islamic feminist ideas, starting in the late 1980s. This led to the growth in
the number of followers of Islamic feminism who sought to reinterpret reli-
gious doctrines in ways that were more women-friendly (Blackburn, 2004).
434 Z. Z. MUTAQIN

In addition, as of the mid-1980s, a small group of women activists have


established secular non-governmental organizations, separate from estab-
lished state-centric groups like Kowani and Dharma Wanita. Among the
most influential ones established at the time and still exist today are: Kalyana-
mitra (Good Friend or Companion), Lembaga Bantuan Hukum-Asosiasi Perem-
puan untuk Keadilan (LBH-APIK or Legal Aid Foundation-Indonesian Women’s
Association for Justice) and Solidaritas Perempuan (Women’s solidarity). These
organizations have survived and still actively work on issues such as women’s
empowerment and advocacy of gender issues.

Islamic feminism8
Toward the late 1990s, after almost 30 years in power, Suharto’s regime
became more tolerant towards political Islam. Throughout the 1970s and
1980s, Indonesian Islam had become modernized, thanks to economic
improvements and access to education. By the late 1990s, many Muslim
leaders occupied important positions, both within the Suharto regime and
in larger society. Internally, Muslims in Indonesia abandoned their aspirations
for establishing an Islamic state or implementing Shari’a, as these were the
primary reasons for the New Order regime to suppress political Islam.
Under the pressure of student movements and a devastating economic
crisis, Suharto resigned in 1998, ending his 30-year authoritarian New Order
regime. Indonesia entered a new era called the Reformasi (Reform Era),
which emphasized democratization, political openness, and freedom.
Islamic feminism began to grow in this political milieu. As of the early
1990s, gender studies have come to be widely discussed and studied
among intellectuals and activists and are primarily utilized to analyze religious
texts. Books on Islam and feminism, including those by Wadud (1999), an
African-American Muslim feminist, Mernissi (1994, 1999) from Morocco, and
Hasan (1995), a Pakistani feminist, were translated into Bahasa and have
been widely used by Muslim activists, especially within Aisyiyah and Muslimat
(Robinson, 2006). Indonesian scholars at the time also started to publish their
books on Islamic feminism. Umar (1999), a professor at the State Islamic Uni-
versity, published Argumen Kesetaraan Jender: Perspektif Al-Qur’an (Arguing
Gender Equality: Qur’anic Perspective), which provoked heated discussion
among Muslims for his controversial interpretation. Other very popular
books were Wanita Islam dalam Kajian Tekstual dan Kontekstual (Muslim
women in textual and contextual study), edited by Marcoes-Natsir and Meule-
man (1993), and Hal-hal yang Tak Terfikirkan: Tentang Isu-isu Keperempuanan
dalam Islam (The Unthinkable: On Women Issues in Islam) by Hasyim (2001).
One of the main agendas of Islamic feminism is to reinterpret Islamic texts
by eliminating gender bias. Muslim feminists believe that gender inequality
prevalent in their society is an outcome of misinterpretation of the
ASIAN JOURNAL OF WOMEN’S STUDIES 435

fundamental texts, namely Al-Qur’an and Hadith (prophetic sayings and


actions that become traditions). Muslim feminists argue that to reinterpret
the texts and eliminate gender bias, contextual and historical interpretations
must be undertaken (Robinson, 2006). Traditional interpretations of both
Qur’an and Hadith have to be scrutinized in the light of historical contexts,
while at the same time modern interpreters must try to find the central
spirit of the text. The modern methodology of Qur’anic interpretations such
as those proposed by Rahman (2009) has helped feminists to reinterpret
the text in light of modern feminist principles and theory.
The Reform era also marked a rapid increase in the number of NGOs,
including those that focused on Islam and gender issues. Organizations like
Perhimpunan Pengembangan Pesantren9 dan Masyarakat (P3M, Center for
the Development of Pesantren and Society), established by NU-link activists
in 1983, were revitalized to focus more on gender issues among traditionalist
Muslims. Among the prominent activists and scholars from NU-link and those
recognized as advocates for women’s rights were Lies Marcus-Natsir and Kyai
Husein Muhammad. Kyai Husein would later establish Fahmina Institute, an
NGO based in Cirebon, West Java. Rahima, another NU-link organization,
was established by Ciciek Farhah. Islamic State Universities across the
country have created Pusat Studi Wanita (Centers for Women’s Studies),
while at the state level Indonesia’s National Commission on Violence
against Women was established in 1998. Around this time, a leader
emerged who would later become crucial: Siti Musdah Mulia, a prominent
professor at the State Islamic University who also worked for the Ministry of
Religious Affairs during this time.
Along with these promising developments, at the other end of the spec-
trum, Islamic puritanism also gained momentum as a consequence of the
freedom of expression and democracy. The older goal of establishing an
Islamic state based on Shari’a was revived. Triggered by ethnic conflict in
the predominantly Christian area in the eastern part of Indonesia, jihadist
organizations such as Laskar Jihad (The Jihad Soldiers) and Majelis Mujahidin
Indonesia (Indonesian Jihadi council) gained the support of a significant
number of people (Hasan, 2006). Transnational organizations like Hizbut
Tahrir appeared and attracted followers from middle-class Muslims, especially
students in secular universities. The political party of the Islamists, the Justice
and Prosperous Party (PKS), inspired by the Muslim Brotherhood, gained a
substantial number of seats in Parliament. Further, Islamist and fundamental-
ist media expanded their presence both in print and online, spreading Islamic
conservatism, fundamentalism, and even jihadist doctrines (Hasan, 2006).
One particular development at the time that is relevant to the current dis-
cussion, was the organization of the so-called ‘Polygamy Award’ in 2003 by a
network of conservative and fundamentalists Muslims, supported financially
by a successful polygamous businessman who owned a restaurant network
436 Z. Z. MUTAQIN

called Puspo Wardoyo. The event was initiated by the Muslim Journalist
Forum, an association of Muslim fundamentalist media groups for the
purpose of combating the negative image of polygamy and promoting it.
Most polygamous marriages occur in secrecy, because these are both socially
unacceptable and legally it is very difficult to fulfill legal requirements.
Because of the controversy surrounding it, the event was widely covered by
the media and came under criticism from both activists and the wider popu-
lation (Nurmila, 2009).
The issue of polygamy then became a matter of debate between those
who were in favor of Islamic moderation and puritanism. Sinta Nuriyah
Wahid, the former first lady and a prominent leader of NU, launched an
anti-polygamy campaign that included boycotting the Puspo Wardoyo restau-
rant network. She was reportedly furious on seeing lunch boxes from a Puspo
Wardoyo restaurant distributed during the NU Congress in Solo in 2004 and
immediately requested that all participants to throw away the food. (Heru,
2004). At the same time, Siti Musdah Mulia, who then worked for the Ministry
of Religious Affairs, launched the Counter Legal Draft of the Compilation of
Islamic Law (CLD) that proposed eradication of polygamy from any law in
Indonesia.

The compilation and the CLD


The women’s movement returned to perhaps a central debate in Indonesian
feminism since Kartini’s writings in the late nineteenth century: polygamy and
the issue of equal marriage. Inspired by the progressive interpretation of Islam
as proposed by feminists Muslims like Amina Wadud, Fatima Mernisi, Riffat
Hassan and Asgar Ali Engineer, Siti Musdah Mulia launched the Counter
Legal Draft of the Compilation. Briefly, the Compilation of Islamic Law (here-
inafter the Compilation) is an “implementing regulation” of the Marriage
Law of 1974, with a more detailed stipulation focusing on marriage, inheri-
tance, and religious foundations (waqf) designed for Muslims only (Mulia &
Cammack, 2007). There were at least two reasons why the government
passed the Compilation in 1991, almost 20 years after the Marriage Law
was enacted. First, over a decade, the Law was the subject of ongoing judicial
interpretation and clarification. Article 2 of the Law, which stipulated that “a
marriage is lawful when entered in accordance with the laws of the respective
religions and beliefs of the parties,” opened the space for a wide interpret-
ation, for example, regarding the lawfulness and unlawfulness of marriage.10
At the same time, the Islamic court, which presides over marriage for Muslims,
gained greater authority and became more structurally robust after the Mar-
riage Law was issued. Unfortunately, due to the nature of classical Islamic law
and the diversity of opinion about it, there was no consensus on it and no
decisions were arrived at regarding issues under the jurisdiction of the
ASIAN JOURNAL OF WOMEN’S STUDIES 437

Islamic tribunal. Each court and judge could refer to different classical Islamic
texts, which would lead to various legal opinions as well as decisions on the
same concern, depending on which text the courts referred to (Mulia &
Cammack, 2007). The Compilation aimed to unify, inter alia, the application
of the Marriage Law and provide guidelines and primary references for
Islamic court judges.
Secondly, the Compilation complemented the reformation of the religious
judicial system that started in 1989, following the enactment of the Religious
Judicature Act of 1989 (Nurlaelawati, 2010). To become modernized, the reli-
gious court was required to follow basic principles of legality like certainty and
predictability and thus, diverse authoritative classical Islamic laws (fiqh) had to
be reframed in view of the modern nation-state with a certain degree of uni-
formity. This was the logic that provided the primary impetus for the trend to
codify Islamic law in the Muslim world, beginning in the late nineteenth
century in Turkey. Codification provides some degree of certainty, systemati-
zation, and accessibility within a national legal system. In most cases, it also
provides legal solutions for contemporary issues based on new interpretations
of classical texts. Accordingly, the Indonesian Compilation provided unified
rules of Islamic law related to marriage inheritance and religious foundations
in a modern legal format that would be written in the native language of
Bahasa Indonesia and readily available to judges, lawyers, and the general
public (Nurlaelawati, 2010). Before the Compilation was passed, most refer-
ences about these matters were in Arabic and accessible only to those who
understood the language.
The drafters of the Compilation intentionally chose the term ‘compilation’
instead of ‘code,’ so as to imply that their role was simply to re-state and sys-
tematize available and existing doctrines in a more accessible format (Mulia &
Cammack, 2007). The Compilation was ratified under the executive power of a
presidential regulation instead of a legislative act. This was a pragmatic step,
in order to avoid a complicated and lengthy political process, while at the
same time it anticipated ratification by the legislative body in the near
future (Mulia & Cammack, 2007). Signed by President Suharto a day before
he went to Mecca for Hajj in 1991, the Compilation also marked the changing
policy toward Islam.
The Compilation proved to be efficient for establishing a relatively uniform
judicial process in the Islamic court and soon became an established legal
reference on Islamic law in Indonesia. In early 2000, after ten years of very
positive responses, both from society and the government, the Ministry of
Religious Affairs undertook the drafting of a new and extended marriage
law, which incorporated much of the Compilation with some additional
articles (Mulia & Cammack, 2007). However, as the Compilation mirrored
both the 1974 Marriage Law and existing classical Islamic law (fiqh), its new
draft demonstrated a similar male dominant worldview in which women
438 Z. Z. MUTAQIN

were presumed to be inferior. Siti Musdah Mulia, assigned by the Ministry of


Religious Affairs as chairwoman of the Gender Mainstreaming Working Group,
was authorized to review the draft to ensure it was in accordance with the
National Action Plan of ‘zero tolerance’ for violence against women, a national
campaign launched in 2001. Instead of simply reviewing the draft, Musdah
Mulia instead proposed the CLD, which marked a significant departure both
from the Marriage Law of 1974, the Compilation, and the draft. The CLD is a
non-compromising, pro-women draft that fully embraces progressive
interpretations of Islamic law. The CLD was announced and submitted to
the Ministry in 2004 and immediately triggered heated national debate
(Mulia, 2006) in the midst of the controversy about the ‘Polygamy Award,’
mentioned earlier.
The basic spirit of the CLD is a progressive interpretation of classical texts in
the light of modernity, as briefly mentioned above. Musdah Mulia argued that
the Working Group was inspired by the Tunisian approach of interpretation in
reforming marriage law. In the case of polygamy, for example, she said the
ultimate goal of the Qur’anic verses was not meant to confirm polygamy
but rather to abolish it gradually by imposing qualifications and restrictions.
Abolishing polygamous marriage was culturally unthinkable and practically
impossible during the Prophet’s time, and it may have adversely affected
his prophetic mission to spread Islam. As a social reformer, the most feasible
option for the Prophet was gradual change by imposing limits and require-
ments from polygamous to monogamous marriage. Thus, in this spirit,
Qur’anic verses on marriage should be understood to legitimize monogamy
rather than endorse polygamy (Khadduri, 1977; Mulia & Cammack, 2007).
In undertaking the effort to draft the proposal, the working group compris-
ing eight members affiliated to both Muhammadiyah and NU, firmly referred
their methodology of interpretation to the precepts of Islamic jurisprudence
(usul fiqh) (Mulia & Cammack, 2007). Interestingly, of the eight members of
the working group, six were male scholars and activists. The CLD proposed
to reform most of the articles of the Compilation that did not pursue the prin-
ciples of humanism, pluralism, and gender equality. It set out 14 crucial issues
related to the articles of the Marriage Law, compared to only four articles
related to the inheritance law (Mulia, 2006). Discussing the entire proposal
is beyond the scope of this paper, but I would like to mention some of the
most relevant articles (see Wahid, 2014).
Article 2 of the CLD defines marriage as a “powerful bond between a man
and a woman entered into with understanding for the purpose of creating a
family and based on the assent and agreement of the parties.” It mirrors the
definition of marriage both in the Marriage Law and the Compilation except
that both stipulate “ … for the purpose of creating a family based on the
Belief in the God Almighty.” The CLD places value on free choice and
human autonomy with respect to the marriage contract. As some critics
ASIAN JOURNAL OF WOMEN’S STUDIES 439

have noted, in the Indonesian context, these indicate that the CLD was
designed by liberal-minded drafters. It sought to eliminate the gender differ-
ences in minimum age for marriage, as stipulated by the Marriage Law and set
it at 19 years for both genders. It also departed significantly from classical
Islamic law and the Compilation, by proposing that both parties in a marriage
are obliged to make payment of mahar (dowry) (Art 16). In the Compilation,
mahar is an obligation of the prospective husband given to the wife, symbo-
lizing that he is the head of the family and the primary breadwinner (Mulia &
Cammack, 2007).
With respect to the repudiation of marriage or talak, although the Marriage
Law and the Compilation prescribe fairly balanced rights for both parties, by
introducing the taklik talak mechanism, the CLD goes further by prescribing
a single divorce procedure for both parties (Mulia & Cammack, 2007). The
reason for this was that the different mechanisms for separation in the Mar-
riage Law and the Compilation, which in Bahasa are called cerai (divorce) for
husband and gugat cerai (sue for divorce) for wife, still imply that the right
to divorce belongs to the husband. In addition, the CLD also stipulated that
conversion to another religion shall not become a reason for divorce, diver-
ging from the Compilation (Art 70 & 71). The CLD prescribed that interfaith
marriage is lawful, in accordance with the principle of tolerance and the
freedom of religion (Art 54), departing from the prohibitions in case of inter-
faith marriage, stipulated by the Compilation (Art 40). Last but not least, on the
issue of polygamy, the CLD firmly stated that “marriage shall solely be based
upon the principle of monogamy” (Art 3), and because of that, this is the
only legitimate marriage. It thus invalidated conditions and requirements
for polygamous marriage as specified by Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the Marriage
Law.
After submission to the Ministry of Religion in 2004 and following extensive
public hearings and debate, in 2005 the ministry decided to reject the CLD in
order to avoid increasing public and political pressure and criticism. The
articles on polygamy and interfaith marriage were the most debated ones
and made accusations that the CLD was no more than an anti-Islamic infidel
proposal, sponsored by foreign money to divide the nation. Conservative
and fundamentalist groups united to condemn the CLD and its supporters
and threatened them physically (Mulia & Cammack, 2007). The CLD also
came under criticism from academics and legal experts such as professors
at State Islamic Universities and judges. Rifyal Ka’bah, an expert on Islamic
law who was the Supreme Court judge, said that the CLD had disregarded
the authoritative sources of Islamic Shafi’i traditions. He added that the draf-
ters were not adequately qualified as scholars. Tahir Azhari and Hasanudin
AF, both professors at the Islamic State Universities, said that the CLD had
clearly contradicted the holy texts and was methodologically weak (Nurlaela-
wati, 2010).
440 Z. Z. MUTAQIN

Conclusion
After the controversy over the CLD declined, following its withdrawal by the
Ministry of Religious Affairs in 2005, the women’s movement in Indonesia
seems to have accepted that legal rejection of polygamy is currently imposs-
ible in the Indonesian context. The women’s movement, through history, from
its beginnings (1900–1945), consolidation (1945–1974), to the New Order and
the Reform era, has failed to abolish polygamy in law. Thus, establishing strict
limits and rules, such as requirements of court authorization and the consent
of the first wife, appear to be the most realistic solutions (see Article 3 to 5 of
The Marriage Law 1974). Furthermore, Article 3, which states that, in principle,
marriage is monogamous, shows that polygamous marriage is not the norm
but rather an exception. A relatively calm period from 2005 until the
present time (2018) may indicate that the struggle for equal marriage in Indo-
nesia, and the specific goal of abolishing polygamy, has reached equilibrium.
This paper has shown how feminists in Indonesia have continuously tried
to influence national law by mobilizing their resources in certain political situ-
ations. I have elucidated the evolution of a women’s movement in Indonesia,
from Kartini to Maria Ulfa and Siti Musdah Mulia, and explained how certain
ideas were codified and integrated into the country’s legal structure. The Mar-
riage Law of 1974 and the CLD offer two examples of how various ideological
layers, culture, Islam, and feminism in Indonesia have been negotiated to
shape the law. While the current law may not fully satisfy the feminists who
fought for a full accommodation of women’s concerns, it has brought
women’s emancipation to a higher level over the past century. If Kartini
was alive today, I believe she would understand why her dream could not
be fulfilled completely.

Notes
1. Referring to Anthony Reid, one of the most authoritative historians in Indonesian
studies, Susan Blackburn said
from early times visitors to Indonesia, as to other parts of the region, have
been impressed by the apparently high status of female inhabitants, as
evident in their frequent control of family finances and their high
degree of public visibility, particularly in commerce. (2004, p. 6)
For the relationships among family, kinship, culture and the law, especially on
inheritance, see Lev (1962).
2. In matrilineal societies like that of Minangkabau, a compromise is reached, for
example, by creatively dividing two types of inheritance law into ‘high’ and
‘low’ inheritances, where the ‘high inheritance’ (pusako tinggi) is governed by
adat or customary law (matrilineal model) while the ‘low inheritance’ (pusako
rendah) follows Islamic law. High inheritance, or “high heirlooms,” as used by
Bown, is normally an ancestral rice land inherited in the matrilineal line. Low
ASIAN JOURNAL OF WOMEN’S STUDIES 441

inheritance (pusako rendah/pencaharian) is any property earned or acquired


oneself and is not inherited. This type of property is moveable and can be inher-
ited from either mother or father or even both, depending on the agreement of
the family. For a detailed discussion on property and inheritance law of Minang-
kabau, see von Benda-Beckmann (1979) and Chadwick (1991).
3. Feminists have debated whether language systems, gendered and non-gen-
dered, relate to gender relationships. It seems although there might be a link
between language and gendered social patterns, it is not a causal one. See,
for example, Prewitt-Freilino, Caswell, and Laakso (2012). For general discussion
on the relationship between gender and language, see Eckert and McConnell-
Ginet (2003).
4. Discussion on this topic is beyond the purpose of my paper. I take this theory to
frame the whole idea that I will present. For discussions on social movements,
see e.g., Wiktorowicz (2012), della Porta and Diani (2006), and Tilly and Wood
(2013).
5. It is a marriage agreement stated in the marriage certificate in which the
husband grants his wife the right to seek a divorce for certain stated reasons
such as if he does not provide proper support and care for three consecutive
months; if he physically abuses her; or if he neglects her for six consecutive
months. Taklik-talak has been part of the customary law in Indonesia, which
the man recites loudly in front of an audience immediately after the marriage
contract signed (Katz & Katz, 1975).
6. Syarikat Islam or Sarekat Islam was among the first nationalist movement organ-
izations that originated in a commercial organization called Syarikat Dagang
Islam (SDI, Islamic Trading Association) established by H. Samanhoedi in 1911.
It was “the first politically based Indonesian nationalist organization.” It was
one of the first organizations that called for self-government and independence
from the Dutch (Effendy, 2003, p. 16).
7. Pancasila is an Indonesian state ideology, formulated primarily by Sukarno as an
outcome of a reconciliation of three conflicting ideologies, namely Islam, com-
munism, and nationalism (Nasakom). It consists of five principles: belief in one
almighty God, righteous and civilized humanitarianism, unity of Indonesia,
democracy guided by wisdom via consultation of representatives, and social
justice for the people of Indonesia (Prawiranegara, 1984).
8. Islamic feminism here refers to “a feminist discourse and practice articulated
within an Islamic paradigm.” Islamic feminism seeks women’s emancipation
by interpreting Islamic textual references (Badran, 2002).
9. Pesantren is a type of Islamic boarding school that is common to the Indonesian
educational system. It is the oldest existing educational institution but has
undergone some modifications following the pre-Islamic period. For an intro-
duction on Pesantren as an educational institution, see Azra, Afrianty, and
Hefner (2007).
10. It also has triggered controversy about the marriage of indigenous local commu-
nities (adat communities) who do not belong to the six recognized religions
(Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism).
For decades their marriages were not recognized as lawful, and the state
refused to register their marriages. These adat communities have been forced
to use what Mutaqin described as a “get in get out” survival strategy,
whereby they confess to belonging to certain recognized religions (get in)
442 Z. Z. MUTAQIN

when they need state recognition for their marriages and later convert back to
their local religion (get out) (Mutaqin, 2014).

Notes on contributor
Zezen Zaenal MUTAQIN is a doctoral student (SJD) at UCLA School of Law. He gradu-
ated from Melbourne Law School (LLM) and the State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta
(LLB). He is currently a lecturer at the State Islamic University (UIN) Jakarta, School of
Sharia and Law. He has published many articles in peer-reviewed journals, including
Indonesia and the Malay World, The Indonesian Constitutional Review and the Asia
Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law as well as Journal of East Asia and Inter-
national Law. Email: zezen.zaenal@uinjkt.ac.id

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ABSTRACT IN INDONESIAN
Makalah ini mengkaji hubungan antara Islam, sejarah dan feminisme dan
menempatkannya dalam diskusi hukum dengan mengambil dua kasus di
Indonesia. Saya menggunakan pendekatan teori gerakan sosial untuk
memahami bagaimana gerakan perempuan di Indonesia memobilisasi
sumberdaya yang ada untuk tujuan perubahan hukum dalam konteks sosial
politik tertentu. Makalah ini mengkaji UU pernikahan 1974 dan Counter Legal
Draft dari Kompilasi Hukum Islam (CLD) sebagai dua contoh studi kasus dari
dua periode berbeda: UU Pernikahan 1974 disahkan pada zaman otoriter
Orde Baru sementara CLD diusulkan ketika masa Reformasi setelah
tumbangnya rezim otoriter Suharto pada 1998.

KEYWORDS Counter legal draft; UU Pernikahan 1974; poligami; gerakan perempuan; kompilasi;
reformasi hukum

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