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Ambivalence and Attitudes

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Mark Conner & Paul Sparks
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Chapter 2
Ambivalence and Attitudes

Downloaded by [University of York] at 02:24 22 April 2013
Mark Comer
University of Leeds, UK
Paul Sparks
University of Sussex, UK
ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the concept of ambivalence and its relationship to atti-
tudes. Definitions and different measures of ambivalence are reviewed. We
present three dimensions on which measures of ambivalence can be classified.
We then go on to examine some of the elicitors of ambivalence and present
some preliminary findings on attitude objects that generate high levels of
ambivalence. The major section of the chapter then reviews findings related to
treating the ambivalence construct as an aspect of attitude strength. Research is
presented in relation to four major predictions: (a) temporal stability of
attitudes; (b) impact of attitudes on intentions and behavior, (c) pliability of
attitudes; and (d) impacts on information processing. The final section offers
suggestions for further re-search in this area.
Attitude has retained its position in social psychology as the most distinctive
and indispensable concept for well over 50 years (Allport, 1935). Interest
remains high, with significant advances in our understanding of the antece-
dents and consequences of attitudes (see Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, for an
extensive review). A particular focus of research interest in recent years has
been on aspects of the structure (e.g., Pratkanis, Breckler, & Greenwald, 1989)
and strength (e.g., Petty & Krosnick, 1995) of attitudes. The recent
Correspondence regarding this chapter should be addressed to: Mark Comer, School of Psychol-
ogy, University of Leeds, b e d s LS2 9JT, UK. E-mail: mc@psychology.leeds.ac.uk
European Review of Social Psychology, Volume 12. Edited by Wolfgang Stroebe and Miles Hewstone.
Q 2002 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
38 MARK CONNER AND PAUL SPARKS
interest in attitudinal ambivalence can be partly attributed to the resurgence of

interest in the dimensions of attitude structure and strength within which
ambivalence fits. Attitudinal ambivalence may be defined as a psychological
state in which ". . . a person holds mixed feelings (positive and negative) towards
some psychological object" (Gardner, 1987, p. 241). Ambivalence thus is at odds
with traditional views of the attitude concept as a unidimensio-nal evaluation
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). This chapter explores the am-bivalence concept
through a review of research on its definition, measurement, antecedents, and
consequences.
The ambivalence concept was introduced into social psychology by Scott
(1966,1968,1969), followed by other important contributions by Kaplan (1972),
and Katz and Hass (1988). Nevertheless, the resurgence of interest in the con-cept
has occurred principally in the 1990s (see Jonas, Bromer, & Diehl, 2000; Priester
& Petty, 1996; Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995, for reviews of earlier research
with the ambivalence concept). Research with the ambivalence con-cept since
1990 has principally focused on predictions for the general concept of
ambivalence, although there has also been interest in ambivalence in specific
domains, such as racist attitudes (e.g., Katz & Hass, 1988), sexist attitudes (e.g.,
Glick & Fiske, 1996), and consumer attitudes (Otnes, Lowrey, & Shrum, 1997)
(see Jonas er al., 2000, for a useful review of this research). The present chapter
will focus on the general concept of ambivalence.
Jonas et al. (2000) provided an earlier review of the literature on ambivalence.
That chapter provided an excellent review of the origins and history of the
ambivalence concept and of the relative utility of different formulae employed to
tap measures of ambivalence. Neither of these issues are the focus of attention of
the present chapter. Both chapters consider the implications of treating am-
bivalence as a measure of attitude strength. Jonas er al. focus on distinguishing
ambivalence from attitude strength and give relatively brief attention to empirical
data supporting the presumed implications of treating ambivalence as a measure of
attitude strength. In contrast, the focus in the present chapter is reversed. The first
section of the present chapter explores various definitions of the ambivalence
concept that have been offered. The differing definitions suggest a number of
different forms of ambivalence. In considering the variously used measures of
ambivalence, we present three dimensions along which different measures of
ambivalence can be classified. We then present some preliminary data on the
interrelationship of these different measures of ambivalence and show that the
measures possess discriminant validity, but suggest that further work on this issue is
required. We then go on to explore some of the elicitors of ambivalence. After
presenting some preliminary findings on the types of attitude objects that gener-ate
high levels of ambivalence, we examine the relationship between various individual
difference variables and ambivalence.
The largest section of the present chapter then explores the consequences of
holding ambivalent attitudes. Based on treating ambivalence as a dimen-
AMBIVALENCE AND AlTITUDES 39
sion of attitude strength, we examine the evidence to support four predicted

consequences of ambivalence-its impacts on: (a) the temporal stability of
attitudes; (b) the relationship of attitudes to intentions and behavior; (c) the
pliability of attitudes; and (d) the processing of information (Krosnick & Petty,
1995). The final section of our chapter offers a number of suggestions for further
research with the concept of attitudinal ambivalence.
DEFINITIONS OF AMBIVALENCE
Ambivalence has been defined in various ways. Given our belief in the im-portance
of ambivalence to attitude research, we should spend some time on an assessment of
different approaches to the concept. Most definitions in the psychological literature

make reference to the simultaneous existence of posi-
tive and negative evaluations of an attitude object (see Table 2.1 for a selec-
tion). However, there are important differences between the various definitions
of the concept that merit some attention.
Table 2.1 Internretations and definitions of ambivalence

“The existence of simultaneous or rapidly interchangeable positive and negative
feelings toward the same object or activity, with the added proviso that both the
positive and negative feelings be strong” (Meehl, 1964, quoted in Emmons, 19%)
“A psychological state in which a person holds mixed feelings (positive and negative)
towards some psychological object” (Gardner, 1987, p. 241)
“The extent of beliefs’ evaluative dissimilarity (or inconsistency)” (Eagly & Chaiken,
1993, p. 123)
“A conflict aroused by competing evaluative predispositions” (Breckler, 1994, p. 359)
“. . . the extent to which one’s reactions to an attitude object are evaluatively
mixed in that both positive (favorable) and negative (unfavorable)elements are
included” (Wegener, Downing, Krosnick, & Petty, 1995, p. 460)
An inclination “. . . to give it [an attitude object] equivalently strong
positive or negative evaluations” (Thompson er al., 1995, p. 367).
“An approach-avoidance conflict-wanting but at the same time not wanting
the same goal object” (Emmons, 19%, p. 326)
First, the idea that positive and negative evaluations need to be simultaneous
is not a universal feature of orientations to the ambivalence concept. Ainslie
(1986), for example, with his focus on temporal dimensions of choice, suggests
that long-term interests (e.g., health) and short-term inter-ests (e.g., hedonic
pleasure) are not invariably evaluated in conjunction with one another to form a
consistent choice because each may be “dominant” at
40 MARK CONNER A N D PAUL SPARKS
different times. From Ainslie’s decision-making perspective on competing choice

options, ambivalence is defined as an “inability to make a stable choice between
two alternatives despite familiarity with their consequences” (Ainslie, 1992, p.
370). Moreover, a distinction has been made between diu-chronic ambivalence
and synchronic ambivalence (see Stocker, 1990) to re-flect the distinction
between “inconstancy” and “inconsistency” in evaluations. Like diachronic
ambivalence, the notion of “attitude variability’’ (e.g., Sparks, Hedderley, &
Shepherd, 1992) focuses on vacillating attitudes over time, whereas the
simultaneous experience of positive and negative eval-uations is central to the
(synchronic) ambivalence, which is of predominant current interest to social
psychologists researching the relationship between attitudes and ambivalence.
However, lay people’s responses to, for example, direct measures of ambivalence
in research work (see below) will of course reflect their own interpretations of
the questions put to them.
Second, attitude objects may be, for example, behaviors, targets, events, or
states of affairs. People may be ambivalent towards behaviors (e.g., reducing fat
consumption), towards goals (e.g., losing weight), towards events (e.g.,
Millennium celebrations) or states of affairs [e.g., the existence of 70 mph (112
kph) motorway speed limits]. They may feel ambivalent about a particular
behavior because the behavior has both negative and positive attributes, but there
may also be a fundamental ambivalence about any one attribute. In this chapter,
we are principally concerned with ambivalence towards behaviors, since most
contemporary attitude research also displays this orientation and because we
believe that closely specified personal behaviors are an appropri-ate focus for the
study of motivational conflicts.
Third, some approaches to ambivalence focus more on people’s beliefs, while
others more directly on their attitudes. Given that the relationship between beliefs
and attitudes may be complex, we have a general preference for the more direct
focus on people’s attitudes (although exploratory work on both is of great
interest), since these are central to the evaluative issues at stake in the notion of
ambivalence. While outcome evaluations may be as-sessed in conjunction with
behavioral beliefs within the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA; Fishbein &
Ajzen, 1975) and the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB; Ajzen, 1991), it is the
specific evaluation of behaviors on which we are concentrating here for our
assessment of ambivalence.
Fourth, it is likely to be fruitful to examine other approaches to am-bivalence,
given that this concept attracts attention across different disci-plines. For
example, ambivalence is implicated in political science perspectives on people’s
conflicting values (Zaller & Feldman, 1992), so-ciological work on conflicting
role demands (Merton, 1976), and psychological approaches to both the mixed
feelings that people may have about the objects of their attitudes (Tourangeau,
Rasinski, Bradburn, & D’Andrade, 1989) and to conflicting parts of their
personality (Freud, 1962). It is expected that
AMBIVALENCE AND ATTITUDES 41
insights from these approaches may well serve to develop and expand social
psychologists’ interests in attitudes and ambivalence.
Most attempts to amve at a method for quantifying ambivalence in recent
social psychological research have acknowledged the need to examine both
(a) the “intensity” of people’s feelings (i.e. both how positive and negative
those feelings may be) about an attitude object and (b) the “similarity” of the
intensity of positive and negative feelings. This way of thinking about atti-
tudes involves a departure from some traditional conceptualizations, which
tend to be characterized as referring to attitudes as reflecting either positive
or negative evaluations of an attitude object (see Allport, 1935, for an early
discussion of these issues). As well as having implications for the theoretical
status of the attitude concept, there are also a number of possible empirical
consequences that follow from this way of interpreting attitudes: these form
the focus of the current chapter.
MEASUREMENT OF AMBIVALENCE
There is currently a lack of consensus about the best way to measure am-
bivalence (Breckler, 1994; Conner, Sparks, Povey, James, & Shepherd, 1999~;
Eagly & Chaiken, 1998; Jonas el al., 2000; Priester & Petty, 1996; Thompson et
al., 1995). Previous research into ambivalence has operationalized am-bivalence
in different ways. For example, whilst Lavine, Thomsen, Zanna, and Borgida
(1998) examined affective-cognitive consistency, Bassili (1996) mea-sured global
ambivalence, and Sparks et al. (1992) investigated attitude vari-ability. The extent
to which these are interchangeable is unclear. However, there is good reason to
expect differences between affectivexognitive, evaluative-cognitive, and
evaluative-affective inconsistency (e.g., Chaiken, Pomerantz, & Giner-Sorolla,
1995). In order to ensure that the present discus-sion of ambivalence
measurement is internally coherent, the present chapter focuses on global
measures of ambivalence (see Thompson er al., 1995). Even amongst global
measures of ambivalence there may be a number of forms that possess
discriminant validity. The different measures that have been em-ployed to tap
ambivalence can be classified along three dimensions (see Table
2.2).
The first dimension is in terms of direct versus indirect measurement. Bassili
(1996) usefully divides measures of attitude strength into meta-attitudinal and
operative indexes (see also Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Meta-attitudinal mea-
sures of attitude strength are based upon the attitude holder’s subjective
impression of hidher own attitude. In relation to attitudinal ambivalence, such
measures might tap the subjective impression of the extent to which the
individual’s attitude was “mixed” or consisted of both positive and negative
evaluations, beliefs or feelings. We refer to such measures as direct measures
Table 2.2 Classification of ambivalence measures
Overall evaluation measure]
Direct measures Indirect measures
Cognitive conflicts I have conflicting thoughts My thoughts about X are . . .

about X (extremely positive-not at all
(strongly agree-strongly positive; extremely negative-
disagree) not at all negative)
Affective conflicts I have mixed feelings about X My feelings about X are . . .
(strongly agree-strongly (extremely pleasant-not at
disagree) all pleasant; extremely
unpleasant-not at all unpleasant)
Cognitivel affective My thoughts and feelings My thoughts about X are . .*.
conflicts about X are conflicting (extremely positive-not at all
(strongly agree-strongly positive)
disagree) My feelings about X are . . .
(extremely unpleasant-not at
all unpleasant)
I Note that belief-based measures all fall into the indirect category in this scheme but can be used
to tap cognitive, affective, or cognitive-affective conflicts, based on a classification of the beliefs.
Belief-based measures can also be either closedended (e.g., Van Harreveld et al., 1999)or open-
ended (e.g.. Conner ef al., 1999c), Closed-ended measures present sets of beliefs from which the
respondent selects. Open-ended measures require the respondent to self-generate beliefs.
This represents a measure of pro-cognitivelcon-affective cognitivelaffective ambivalence
(see Thompson et al., 1995). An alternative con-cognitivelpro-affectivecognitivelaffective
am-bivalence might use items such as, “My thoughts about X are . . . extremely positive-not at all
positive” and “My feelings about X are . . . extremely unpleasant-not at all unpleasant”.
(Jonas et al., 2000, use the term “experienced ambivalence”) because they
require respondents to report directly the extent to which they experience mixed
thoughts or feelings (see Tourangeau et al., 1989, for one simple ex-ample of the
use of such a measure). For example, Lipkus, Green, Feaganes, and Sedikides (in
press) report a smoking-specific measure of “felt” am-bivalence. This was a six
item self-report measure (e.g., “You have strong feelings both for and against
smoking”, strongly agree-strongly disagree). Ambivalence is reported as the
mean or summed score across a number of related statements. One advantage of
such measures is the possibility of com-puting internal reliability measures (e.g.,
Cronbach’s alpha). Such measures are often regarded as the “gold standards”
against which to compare other measures of ambivalence (see Jonas et al., 2000;
Thompson et al., 1995). However, it has been suggested that, in general, meta-
attitudinal measures seem to be more open to extraneous influences that can
undermine their validity (Bassili, 1996). For example, it is not clear whether the
information required for an accurate judgment is readily available to
consciousness and so easily retrievable from memory (cf. Wilson, Lindsey, &
Schooler, 2000, on explicit and implicit attitudes).
Indirect or “formula-based’’ (Jonas et al., 2000) measures of ambivalence

consist of separate measures of the positive and negative thoughts or feelings that
an attitude object produces. Such measures possess some similarity to Bassili’s
(1996) operative indexes of attitude strength. Operative indexes of attitude
strength are derived from the attitude judgment process or its out-comes and have
an advantage over meta-attitudinal measures because they stem from the same
cognitive response and information processing respons-ible for judgmental and
behavioral manifestations of the attitude (Bassili, 1996, p. 638). Operative indices
appear to provide a less reactive means of assessing the properties of attitude
strength and might be preferred to direct (or meta-attitudinal) measures of
ambivalence because they are less reactive to extraneous influences (Conner et
al., 1999~)Kaplan. (1972) was the first to suggest such a measure of ambivalence.
He modified a widely used measure of attitudes (the semantic-differential

technique) by separately assessing the positive and negative attributes ascribed to
an attitude object; one measure assessed the positive attributes and another
assessed the negative attributes (usually with the instruction to ignore the
oppositely valenced attributes when making the judgment). Generally, the two
measures have been found to show low negative correlations with one another.
For example, Sparks, Conner, James, Shepherd, and Povey (2001) employed such
split semantic differential measures to tap ambivalence towards eating chocolate
(e.g., “For a moment consider only the positive things about eating chocolate and
ignore any nega-tive things about it. Please rate how positive those positive things
are . . .”, not at all positive-extremely positive; “For a moment consider only the
negative things about eating chocolate and ignore any positive things about it.
Please rate how negative those negative things are . . .”, not at all negative-
extremely negative). These separate judgments are then combined within a
formula into an overall measure of ambivalence (see below). If several posi-tive
and negative judgment items are used, it is possible to compute reliability
coefficients for the sets of positive and negative judgments (Conner et al., 1999~).
The second dimension along which ambivalence measures can be classified is
whether the measures tap overall evaluations or whether they tap beliefs. Overall
evaluation measures are exemplified by the split semantic differential measure of
Kaplan (1972): the attitude object is simply rated on one or more evaluations
designed to tap either positive or negative reactions. Belief-based measures of
ambivalence tend to focus on the nature of object-relevant infor-mation and take
two main forms: either closed-ended measures or open-ended measures. Closed-
ended belief-based measures of ambivalence require respondents to select (or
evaluate) a series of positive and negative beliefs about an attitude object. For
example, Van Harreveld, Van der Pligt, and De Vries (1999) required participants
to select the important attributes they asso-ciated with an attitude object from a
list. Ambivalence is then computed using
a formula based on the number of positive and negative attributes selected as

being important (see Van der Pligt, De Vries, Manstead & Van Harreveld, 2000,
for a review of this research). Open-ended belief-based measures em-ploy a
similar approach, but require respondents to self-generate their beliefs in
response to a prompt (Bell, Esses, & Maio, 1996). For example, Conner er al.
(1999c), in a study of ambivalence towards eating a low-fat diet, used the prompt,
“The thoughts and feelings I associate with eating a low fat diet are
. . .” to elicit such beliefs. Participants can also be requested to rate each belief
in terms of how positive or negative it is (alternatively, independent judges can
rate each belief as positive or negative). The numbers of positive and negative
beliefs or the sum of the ratings of the positive and negative beliefs can then be
entered into an equation to compute a measure of am-bivalence (see Erber,
Hodges, & Wilson, 1995 for a similar “belief homoge-neity” measure).

The third dimension along which measures of ambivalence can be classified is
in terms of the content of ambivalence judgments (focusing on cognitive
conflicts, affective conflicts, cognitive-affective conflicts). So, for example, a
direct ambivalence measure can refer to mixed cognitions or thoughts (e.g., “I
have conflicting thoughts about X”, strongly agree-strongly disagree), mixed
affect or feelings [e.g., “I have mixed (both positive and negative) feelings about
X”, strongly agree-strongly disagree) or a conflict between thoughts and feelings
(e.g., “I have positive thoughts but negative feelings about X”, strongly agree-
strongly disagree). As Thompson et al. (1995) make clear, this latter form of
ambivalence measure (i.e., the heart vs. the mind) can take two distinct forms:
pro-cognition and con-affect versus con-cognition and pro-affect. For example,
an individual may like the taste of one particular food, but dislike the high number
of calories that the food contains (pro-affect, con-cognition) or dislike the taste
of another food, but like the low number of calories the food contains (con-affect,
pro-cognition) (Grogan, Bell, & Con-ner, 1997). These different contents of
ambivalence measures may be dif-ferentially important in different areas (see
also MacDonald & Zanna, 1998). For example, while thinking about an event
such as the introduction of a new social policy may arouse principally cognitive
ambivalence, thinking about a particular politician (an object) may arouse
principally affective ambivalence. Similarly, thinking about an action or behavior
(e.g., using a condom with a new sexual partner) may arouse conflicting thoughts
and feelings. Ortony, Clore, and Collins (1988) similarly propose three aspects
of the world that we can appraise emotionally: events, actions, and objects.
However, they further suggest that, within these categories, it is only appraisals
of events and actions that are likely to produce conflicting emotions (and
ambivalence) because these appraisals can focus on consequences for self and
other or on the immediate future and the more distant future (pp. 51-52). In this
scheme, objects only produce positive or negative reactions for the self in the
immedi-
ate future. However, appraisal of objects and eventdactions could produce

between-category ambivalence. For example, a disliked person (object) per-
forming a kindness (action) might produce such conflicting emotions.
The best way to combine separately obtained positive and negative judg-
ments of an attitude object into an overall measure of ambivalence has re-
ceived attention in a number of studies (Breckler, 1994; Jonas et al., 2000;
Priester & Petty, 1996; Thompson et al., 1995). Kaplan (1972) suggested that
in a measure of ambivalence, scores should increase as the positive and nega-
tive judgments become more polarized (both larger in value) and the more
equal they are in absolute value. A variety of measures of ambivalence have
been proposed to capture these conditions in a measure of ambivalence (see
Jonas et al., 2000, for a recent review). Perhaps the most widely employed
such equation is that devised by Griffin and presented in Thompson et al.

(1995): ambivalence is calculated as half the polarization of the positive (P)
and negative (N) judgments, minus the absolute difference between the two.
That is, ambivalence is denoted by the equation:
Ambivalence = (P +N)/2 - IP - IVl
where P and N are measured on unipolar scales (in absolute values) in two
separate questions. So, for example, an individual who rates an attitude object
as both moderately positive (2) and moderately negative (2) would be as-
signed an ambivalence score of [(2 + 2)/2 - 12- 21 = 21, while an individual
who rates the same attitude object as extremely positive (3) and only mildly
nega-tive (1) would be assigned an ambivalence score of [(3 + 1)/2 - 13 - 1
1 = 01. This equation is the one employed in all the analyses reported in the
present chapter where separate positive and negative ratings are combined
into a single index of overall ambivalence.
Table 2.2 presents the different dimensions of ambivalence and provides
examples of items used to measure ambivalence. In general, very few studies have
reported comparison amongst these different measures of ambivalence.
Thompson et al. (1995) report a significant correlation of 0.40 between a direct
measure of ambivalence and a multi-item split semantic differential measure
(with ambivalence calculated using the Griffin formula; n = 146). Lipkus, et al.
(in press) reported a significant correlation of just 0.19 between the same
measures in a study of smoking (n = 157). In our own research we have compared
levels of ambivalence based on open-ended belief-based measures of ambivalence
and split semantic differential-based measures of ambivalence (Conner et al., 1999c)
and employed the Griffin equation to compute a mea-sure of overall ambivalence.
For both behaviors examined (eating a low fat diet, n = 140, eating five portions of
fruit and vegetables per day, n = 142), the degree of correspondence was only modest
( r = 0.18 and r = 0.27 respectively, both significant). Hence, across the studies that
have reported the relevant
data, there appears to be evidence that the different measures of ambivalence

do not show strong convergent validity.
We believe that an important area for further research with the am-bivalence
construct is a systematic examination of the convergent and dis-criminant validity
of the various ambivalence measures employed across studies (Table 2.2).
Without such data it is difficult to offer good advice about the most appropriate
means to measure ambivalence. Each of the different measures has potential
problems. For example, we have reservations about direct measures of
ambivalence because it is not clear to what extent individ-uals have access to the
relevant information on which to base such judgments. In addition, as noted
earlier, there may be individual differences in the way ambivalence is interpreted,
posing further problems for the potential useful-ness of direct measures of
ambivalence. For example, Priester and Petty (2001) have recently reported data
to indicate that direct measures of am-bivalence tap both intrapersonal
ambivalence and discrepancy between one’s own attitude and that of valued
others (i.e., interpersonal ambivalence).
We also have some concerns about split semantic differential measures of
ambivalence because it is not clear whether respondents are able to comply
with instructions to ignore judgments of the opposite valence (e.g., ignore
negative evaluations when making a positive evaluation) when making a
judg-ment. In addition, there is as yet only limited evidence to support the
view that the positive and negative evaluations supposedly assessed by such
mea-sures are both available for retrieval from memory (Cacioppo, Gardner,
& Bertson, 1997). However, we should note that much of our own research
employing measures based on obtaining separate positive and negative judg-
ments has produced findings consistent with theoretical predictions. Hence,
such measures may have considerable validity.
Nevertheless, we also see the value of belief-based measures of am-
bivalence (see Conner et al., 1999c) as have other authors (e.g., Haddock &
Zanna, 1998; van der Pligt et al., 2000). In fact, we have found both open-
ended and closed-ended belief measures of ambivalence to be useful (see
Haddock & Zanna, 1998; Esses & Maio, this volume, for useful discussions
of open-ended measures of attitudes). Belief-based measures of attitude are
consistent with Erber et al.’s (1995) attitudes-as-constructions model and al-
low one to examine cognitive, affective, and cognitive/affective ambivalence by
classifying the different beliefs. However, such measures are also not with-out
problems. For example, it is not clear that individuals can easily report all the
information upon which their overall attitude judgments are based (Fish-bein &
Ajzen, 1975; Sparks, 1994). Respondents may also find it easier to generate
cognitive correlates of their attitudes compared to other influences such as
affective factors (Conner et al., 1999c; Sparks, 1994). This appears to be in stark
contrast with evidence that affect-based evaluations are more accessible in
memory than cognitive-based evaluations (Verplanken, Hofstee,
& Janssen, 1998). Hence, belief-based measures of ambivalence and split

semantic differential measures may be based upon different information, thus
accounting for their lack of convergent validity. Nevertheless, our own re-
search (Conner ef d.,1999c) demonstrates that despite this lack of
convergent validity, belief-based and split semantic differential measures of
ambivalence are equally well able to moderate the attitude-behavior
relationship (a key prediction for an ambivalence construct).
ELICITORS OF AMBIVALENCE
Comparatively little research has examined the possible elicitors of am-
bivalence. This section reports findings from two approaches to

understanding the bases of ambivalence. The first approach examines what
things commonly produce higher and lower levels of ambivalence across
individuals. The sec-ond approach examines individual difference variables
assumed to be import-ant in the genesis of ambivalent attitudes.
Few studies have investigated what it is that tends to produce considerable
degrees of ambivalence. Theoretically we might expect anything that tends to
generate both strong positive and negative evaluations to be more likely to
produce higher levels of ambivalence. One consequence of the work of
Ortony et af. (1988), referred to earlier, is that actions/events likely to
produce different emotions when focusing on the immediate future compared
to the more distant future should produce greater ambivalence. Our previous
re-search had indicated that this conflict was particularly common for health-
related behaviors, where the conflict was between the immediate
pleasantness/unpleasantness of the behavior and the longer-term positive/
negative health outcome of the behavior. Two types of health-related be-havior
can be distinguished: health protective behaviors, which can be un-pleasant or
onerous (e.g., exercising compared to non-exercising), and health-risking
behaviors, which are pleasant (e.g., drinking alcohol compared to not drinking
alcohol). We did not expect clear differences in ambivalence be-tween health-
protective and health-risking behaviors. Conner, Povey, Sparks, James, and
Shepherd (1998a) identified 12 such health behaviors relevant to students. These
behaviors varied in overall evaluation and also in whether engaging in the
behavior was health-protective or health-risking. Split seman-tic differential
measures were obtained in relation to these 12 different be-haviors from a group
of 143 students. The positive and negative evaluations were combined into
measures of ambivalence using the equation suggested by Griffin (Thompson et
al., 1995) and overall evaluation (by summing the two evaluations). The results
are shown in Table 2.3. There were clearly consider-able differences in the extent
to which these different behaviors produced feelings of ambivalence. Drinking
alcohol produced the highest degree of
ambivalence, while eating a low-fat diet produced the second highest level of
ambivalence. Taking the drug Ecstasy and regularly eating breakfast pro-duced
the lowest levels of ambivalence. The reasonably large standard devia-tions for
several behaviors indicate that people do differ in their reported ambivalence for
a number of behaviors. While health-protective behaviors did tend to be
evaluated positively and health-risking behaviors negatively, there did not appear
to be a consistent relationship to levels of ambivalence (Table 2.3). In addition,
there was no apparent relationship between overall evaluation and ambivalence.
Table 2.3 Ambivalence and evaluation measures for each of 12 behaviors

(Conner el al., 1998a)
Behaviork Ambivalence' Evaluation"
Mean SD Mean SD
~~~ ~
Drinking alcohol (risk) 0.49a 0.16 0.15e 1.88

Reducing fat intake (protect) 0.34b 0.25 2.53* 2.25
Using illicit drugs (risk) 0.31h 0.24 -2.33f 2.82
Avoiding stressful situations (risk) 0.30bC 0.23 2.65' 2.36
Exercising (protect) 0.27Cde 0.21 3.51ab 1.83
Sleeping 7-8 hours per night (protect) 0.29 0.24 3.32ab 2.14
Healthy eating (protect) 0.24e 0.23 3.66' 1.96
Smoking (risk) 0.24e 0.25 -3.599 2.27
Using condoms (protect) 0.24e 0.21 3.71a 2.17
Increasing fruit andor vegetable consumption (protect) 0.23e 0.21 3 . 4 w 1.96
Regularly eating breakfast (protect) 0.23e 0.21 3.07bC 2.42
Taking Ecstasy (risk) 0.22e 0.23 -3.5% 2.58
k Means in the same column not sharing the same letter are significantly different from each
other: risk = health-risking behaviors; protect = health-protecting behaviors.
I Ambivalance is calculated from the positive (scored 0 to +6) and negative (0 to -6) evaluations.
Higher scores indicate greater ambivalence (measures all scaled on the range 0-1).
m Evaluation is the sum of the positive and negative evaluations (possible range -6 to +6). Higher
scores indicate more positive attitudes.
In a second study, we asked a sample of 102 students in a more open-ended

manner to name the things that either made them feel neither positive nor
negative, just positive and not at all negative, just negative and not at all positive,
or both positive and negative (Waterman & Conner, 1999). This latter category
should contain those things that produced high degrees of ambivalence. The
responses were independently coded into a number of cate-gories. Among this
sample the things that most commonly produced both positive and negative
reactions were eating, drinking alcohol, and personal relationships. Eating
chocolate and foods rich in calories and binge drinking were particularly
frequently mentioned. In both these cases the conflict appears to be between a
more immediate pleasant outcome and a more distant negative outcome. The fact
that eating (and eating these foods in
AMBIVALENCE AND AlTITUDES 49
particular) arouses high levels of ambivalence was an important factor in our
choice to examine these behaviors when examining the consequences of am-
bivalence (see Sparks et al., 2001; Armitage & Conner, 2000) (see below).
Amongst the relationship category, the relationship with sexual partner and
family were particularly frequently mentioned. Common here was a conflict
between a liked person performing an action that was not approved of. Exam-
ination of the other (non-ambivalent) categories revealed considerably more
variation in the types of attitude objects reported.
Across these two studies it is interesting to note that ingestive behaviors
(drinking alcohol, eating) are the most frequently reported sources of am-
bivalence. These are behaviors commonly engaged in by the vast majority of
respondents and ones for which both positive and negative outcomes are
common. Interestingly, they are also both behaviors where the ambivalence
is often between appraising immediate outcomes and those some time in the
future or between appraising an object (e.g., family member) and appraising
an event (e.g., performance of a disapproved behavior). The mapping on to
the predictions of Ortony et al. (1988) is noteworthy.
A second approach to understanding the elicitors of ambivalence examines
individual difference variables (Thompson et al., 1995). It is suggested that the
experience of ambivalence is not merely associated with a particular attitude but
may characterize an attitude domain. Thompson and Zanna (1995) dem-onstrated
some convergence in individual levels of ambivalence across five different social
policy issues. Such individual differences in ambivalence across attitude topics
might be attributable to the operation of other individ-ual difference variables.
For example, individuals with particular personality traits might be more or less
likely to resolve conflicts between positive and negative evaluations towards
various attitude topics, and so exhibit lower or higher levels of ambivalence
across topics. Several different personality di-mensions have been examined in
this regard. These include more specific personality dimensions, such as need for
cognition, personal fear of invalidity (Thompson & Zanna, 1995), need for
closure, and self-monitoring (Sparks, Conner, James, Shepherd, & Povey, 1995).
As well as these personality di-mensions, research has also investigated issue
involvement as a potential moderator of this relationship (Sparks et al., 1995;
Thompson & Zanna, 1995).
Thompson and Zanna (1995) report the relationship of a split semantic
differential measure of ambivalence to the personality dimensions of need for
cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), personal fear of invalidity (Thompson,
Naccarato, & Parker, 1989), and level of involvement with the attitude object.
Across five social policy issues, degree of ambivalence was significantly nega-
tively related to need for cognition and positively related to personal fear of
invalidity. Whilst involvement did not show consistent direct relationships with
ambivalence, there was evidence of moderation. In particular, the above
relationships of need for cognition being negatively related to ambivalence
and personal fear of invalidity being positively related were only apparent when
respondents were highly involved with an issue. Hence, the mechanism by which
these personality variables influence ambivalence (i.e., through in-fluencing
propensity to engaging in resolving evaluatively inconsistent reac-tions) may
only operate when individuals are highly involved with an issue.
However, this effect may be relatively weak and only be detectable when
considering the average ambivalence across several attitude topics. For ex-
ample, Sparks et al. (1995) found no evidence that a split semantic differential
measure of ambivalence about eating chocolate or meat was significantly related
to need for cognition, need for closure (Kruglanski, Webster, & Klem, 1993), or
self-monitoring (Snyder & Gangestad, 1986). In addition, there was no evidence
for a moderating effect of involvement with the behavior. Hence, we believe the
current evidence that individual difference variables elicit ambivalence is weak.

We suspect that more specific research hypotheses are required in this area. One
interesting hypothesis is that the consequences of ambivalence may be different
for different personality types (e.g., am-bivalence may be more unpleasant or
anxiety-provoking for those intolerant of ambiguity).
As the above review makes clear, we still know comparatively little about the
elicitors of ambivalence or about how ambivalence might best be manip-ulated.
These are important areas for further research (see below).
CONSEQUENCES OF AMBIVALENCE
If we consider attitudinal ambivalence as a dimension of attitude strength, then
we might anticipate four consequences of holding an ambivalent attitude
(Converse, 1995, p. xi; Krosnick & Petty, 1995): (a) impacts on the temporal
stability of attitudes; (b) impacts on the relationship of attitudes to intentions and
behavior; (c) impacts on the pliability of attitudes; and (d) impacts on information
processing. A number of authors have investigated the effects of attitudinal
ambivalence in relation to each of these consequences, although the evidence in
support of each effect varies considerably. In the following sections we review
the research in relation to each of these four consequences of having an
ambivalent attitude, focusing on the findings from our own research.
Temporal Stability
A variety of studies have demonstrated that strong attitudes are more stable over
time. Indeed, a number of authors have argued that attitude stability is the factor
that all attitude strength measures hold in common (Ajzen, 1996; Doll & Ajzen,
1992; Erber et al., 1995). Other research with intentions (e.g.,
Conner, Sheeran, Norman, & Armitage, 2000, Sheeran, Orbell, & Trafimow,
1999) and personality constructs (e.g., Biesanz, West, & Graziano, 1998) has
noted the importance of temporal stability as a measure of the strength of a
psychological construct. On this view, attitudes high in ambivalence would
represent “weak” attitudes and be predicted to show lower temporal stability
compared to attitudes low in ambivalence.
Wilson and Hodge’s (1992) am’tudes-us-constructionsmodel
provides one framework for understanding this proposed relationship between
ambivalence and attitude stability (see also Erber et af., 1995; Zaller &
Feldman, 1992). Central to the model is the idea that when attitudes are required
(e.g., for decision-making), they may be constructed from available information
(e.g., via contextually-cued beliefs about the attitude object), rather than being
stored in long-term memory. Ambivalence is therefore a function of the extent to

which the underlying information (e.g., beliefs, feelings) on which the attitude is
based is inconsistent. That is, when a person constructs an attitude at different
time points, the degree of attitude @)stability between time points should vary as
a function of the level of evaluative incongruity between positive and negative
evaluations of the object or behavior at each time point. From this perspective,
inconsistency in the determinants of attitudes provides a structural basis for
ambivalence, which in turn regulates stability. It also implies that levels of
ambivalence and attitude stability are inextricably linked. Hence, less am-bivalent
attitudes should be more stable over time.
Two types of research have tackled this predicted consequence of am-
bivalence. In one approach, ambivalence measures have been correlated with
self-report measures of attitude variability and stability (i.e., meta-attitudinal
measures). In our own data using this approach, ambivalence is found to be
positively related to self-reports of attitude variability and negatively to atti-tude
stability. For example, in a study of the use of the drug Ecstasy by clubbers
(Conner, Sherlock, & Orbell, 1998b), we obtained multi-item self-report
measures of ambivalence (using a split semantic differential measure). Although
not in the journal report of this research, we also measured (see Conner &
Sherlock, 1997) attitude variability (e.g., “Sometimes my attitude towards
Ecstasy varies, sometimes it is positive and sometimes it is negative”, strongly
disagree-strongly agree). Ambivalence and attitude variability were found to be
significantly positively related ( r = 0.43). We found a similar level of correlation
between a two-item measure of felt ambivalence (e.g., “I have conflicting
feelings about having casual sex”, strongly disagree-strongly agree) and attitude
variability (“My attitudes about casual sex”, do not vary at all-vary greatly) in a
study of intentions to engage in casual sex amongst students (i.e., a “one-night
stand”), r = 0.61, significant (Conner & Flesch, 1998; see Conner & Flesch, 2001,
for further details of this research). Such data is not wholly convincing because
it is not clear that respondents are clearly able to differentiate the two constructs
when making their responses.
In a second and more defensible approach, ambivalence has been related to

more indirect measures of attitude stability (i.e., operative measures). For
example, Bargh, Chaiken, Govender, and Pratto (1992) showed that respond-ents
who gave the same evaluation to an attitude object at two time points tended to
have less ambivalent attitudes than those who did not give the same evaluation,
( r = 0.27, significant). Bassili (1996) reported contrasting results; ambivalence
was unrelated to stability for attitudes towards introducing quotas, r = 0.00, or
towards pornography, r = 0.03.
In our own research we have examined the stability predictions in one study
(Armitage & Conner, 2000). These authors (study 1) examined the impact of
ambivalence on the stability of attitudes towards eating a low-fat diet over three
time points in a sample of 346 hospital workers. Am-bivalence was assessed
using a split semantic differential measure, while attitudes were assessed using a
reliable multi-item bipolar semantic differen-tial measure. As attitudes were
measured at three time points, a total of three comparisons were possible,
representing time intervals of 3 months, 5 months and 8 months between
measurement of attitudes. The extent to which ambivalence moderated the degree
of attitude stability was investi-gated in two ways. First, we computed a within-
subjects correlation measure of attitude stability. Across respondents, this
measure of the stability of attitudes was unrelated to our measure of ambivalence
(over 3 months, r = -0.02; over 5 months r = -0.01; over 8 months, r = -0.01).
Second, we attempted to discount any problems attributable to error variance by
com-puting measures of attitude stability based on between-subject correlations
disattenuated for measurement error (using LISREL 8; Joreskog & Sorbom,
1993). In this analysis correlations were computed separately for the higher and
lower ambivalence groups (based on a median split). In general, the degree of
attitude stability was high (mean disattenuated r = 0.71), although, as might have
been expected, stability was inversely related to the time interval between
measurements. In no case did the differences in disattenu-ated correlations reach
significance (over 3 months, Zr = 0.00, over 5 months, Zr = 1.59; over 8
months, Zr = 1.24), although the difference was in the predicted direction (Le.,
less stability in the high ambivalence group) for comparisons over the longer time
intervals.
Thus, research provides only limited support for the predicted impact of
ambivalence on attitude stability. Whilst self-reported stability of attitudes
appears to be relatively consistently related to ambivalence, designs employ-ing
prospective measures of stability do not tend to observe this relationship of
ambivalence to attitude stability. The studies based on self-report measures of
stability are particularly open to consistency biases. The one study report-ing a
significant effect using a more defensible measure of attitude stability (Bargh et
al., 1992) employed a relatively small sample (but see Jonas et al., 2000, for
report of a further study producing supportive results).
Attituddntention and Attitude-Behavior Relationships
A key prediction for a measure of attitude strength is that strong attitudes

should be more likely to guide behavior than weak attitudes (Converse, 1995,
p. xi; Krosnick & Petty, 1995, p. 3). As Schwartz (1978) noted, an attitude
assessed at one time is unlikely to predict behavior at a later time if the attitude
does not persist over the intervening time interval. Fishbein and Ajzen (1975)
make a similar observation in relation to the impact of inten-tions on behavior
(see Conner et d.,2000). Some researchers (e.g., Erber. et al., 1995) have
argued that the greater impact of strong attitudes on behavior is solely
attributable to strong attitudes being more likely to persist over time.
However, other mechanisms may also influence the ability of strong attitudes
to influence behavior. For example, Fazio (1986, 1995) has argued that atti-
tudes influence our behavior in part by shaping our perceptions of the world
(the automatic activation effect). That is, the capacity of an attitude to predict
behavior is partly dependent on the attitudes’ ability to bias perceptions of the
attitude object and the context in which the behavior is performed. Strong
attitudes are assumed to be more readily accessible and so more likely to
produce these biasing effects. Thus, one might therefore expect low-
ambivalent attitudes to be more capable of automatic activation and so more
predictive of behavior than high-ambivalent attitudes.
For many attitude objects that elicit high levels of ambivalence, it is useful to
consider consistency of expressed attitudes over context as well as consis-tency
over time. Ambivalence towards a behavior may be associated with a temporal
and/or contextual instability in dominant motives (or evaluations) that arises as a
consequence of fluctuations in the salience and/or strength of different motives.
Ambivalence may not only reflect “mixed feelings” to-wards an attitude object
at a particular moment in time but also changes in the dominance of competing
motives at different points in time as a result of variations in internal and external
contextual cues (cf. Ainslie, 1992). While measured attitudes may show a
consistency over time if elicited in the same context, this consistency may not be
achieved if variations in context are introduced into the measurement procedure:
for example, many people’s expressed attitude towards eating fruit as dessert may
be stable over time if measured in similar laboratory conditions and may only
show variation when measured after dinner in full sight of the chocolate cake
alternative! The strength of the relationship between attitudes, intentions, and
behavior may be expected to be influenced by whether or not the same
evaluations or motives are dominant when attitudes, intentions, and behavior are
measured (cf. Ajzen, 1996 Tesser, 1978). Since ambivalence is associated with
mixed or conflicting motives, the strength of measured attitude-
intention-behavior linkages may be consequently attenuated at higher
levels of ambivalence (compared to lower levels of ambivalence).
54 MARK CONNER AND P A U L SPARKS
In addition, much research in the attitude domain has considered be-

havioral intentions as mediators of attitude-behavior relations (e.g., Ajzen,
1991; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and a considerable body of research supports
this relationship (see Armitage & Conner, in press a; Conner & Armitage,
1998; Conner & Sparks, 1996; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Godin & Kok, 1996;
Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, 1988; Van den Putte, 1991). Indeed, in
researching the attitude-behavior relationship, many studies have employed
measures of behavioral intention as a proxy for actual behavior. Previous
work on attitudinal ambivalence has examined the moderation of either
attitude-intention relations (e.g., Jonas, Diehl, & Bromer, 1997) or attitude-
behavior relationships (e.g., Lavine et af., 1998).
The earliest examination of the moderation effect was by Moore (1973, 1980).
His research demonstrated a moderating effect of attitudinal am-bivalence on the

relationship between attitudes and behavior, such that there was lower
consistency between attitudes and behavior for those high in at-titudinal
ambivalence. However, measures of attitude and behavior were weak and taken
in a cross-sectional manner. Thus, this moderation effect is more accurately
described as influencing attitude-past behavior relationships. Sparks et al. (1992)
examined the moderating role of a mixed measure of attitude ambivalence and
attitude variability on attitude-intention relation-ships in relation to food choices.
Higher levels of ambivalence were associated with an attenuation of the attitude-
intention correlation. Norman and Smith (1995) also used a mixed measure of
attitude ambivalence and attitude vari-ability, but found no moderating effects on
belief-attitude or attitude-intention relationships for exercise behavior. However,
in comparing dif-ferences in zero-order correlations they failed to take account
of potential differences in variance in the higher and lower ambivalence groups
(Aiken & West, 1991; Baron & Kenny, 1986). This problem can be addressed
through the use of moderated regression analysis or structural equation modeling.
Jonas et af. (1997), in a laboratory study, found evidence of stronger attitude-
behavioral intention relations for more ambivalent attitudes. Finally, research by
Lavine et af.(1998) reported that attitude-behavior rela-tions were attenuated by
high levels of affective-cognitive inconsistency.
Hence, previous studies have produced mixed findings on the moderating
impact of ambivalence on attitude-intention and attitude-behavior relation-ships.
However, each of the above studies can be criticized in relation to the design
(Moore, 1973, 1980), the mixed measure of ambivalence employed (Lavine et
af., 1998; Norman & Smith, 1995; Sparks er af., 1992), the analysis method
employed (Norman & Smith, 1995), or the focus on laboratory-generated
attitudes (Jonas ef af., 1997). Our own research has attempted to address this
issue through five cross-sectional studies on attitude-intention relationships
(Conner & Flesch, 1998; Conner, Povey, & Sparks, 1995; Conner et af.,1998b;
Conner, Povey, Sparks, James, & Shepherd, in press; Sparks et
al., 2001) containing seven independent tests, two prospective studies of the
attitude-behavior relationship (Conner et al., 1999c, in press) containing four
independent tests, and one study that examined these relationships
simultaneously in a prospective design (Annitage & Conner, 2000, study 1).
In each case we employed a measure of ambivalence that was consistent with
our definition of ambivalence (although the precise measure varied between
studies) and used appropriate statistical tests (see Conner, Sparks, & Armi-
tage, 1999b; Conner et al., 1998b; Sparks, Conner, James, Povey, & Shepherd,
1997a; Sparks, James, Conner, Shepherd, & Povey, 1997b, for earlier reports
of this work).
A ttitude-Zntention Relationships
One of our studies examined the moderating role of ambivalence on attitude-

intention relationships in relation to students engaging in casual sex (Conner
& Flesch, 1998). The study employed a hypothetical scenario about meeting
a new sexual partner, and involved the respondents producing ratings of atti-
tude, intentions, and ambivalence in relation to having sex with this new
partner. Attitude was assessed by a series of bipolar semantic differentials,
which factor analysis revealed to fall into components assessing cognitive
(three items) and affective (two items) factors. Intentions were assessed by
six items. Ambivalence was assessed by two items intended to tap direct mea-
sures of affective ambivalence (e.g., “I have conflicting feelings about casual
sex”, strongly agree-strongly disagree). Moderated regression analysis
(Baron & Kenny, 1986) demonstrated that both attitude measures signifi-
cantly predicted intentions. Ambivalence also explained significant additional
variance in intentions (higher levels of ambivalence were associated with
stronger intentions to engage in sex). However, most importantly, am-
bivalence significantly moderated the impact of affective attitudes, but not
cognitive attitudes on intentions. This effect was also in the hypothesized
direction, with lower ambivalence being associated with stronger affective
attitude-intention relationships.
In a series of six related studies, we have examined the impact of ambivalence
in moderating the relationship between attitudes and intentions in relation to a series
of food choices (Conner, Sparks, Povey, James, & Shepherd, 1996). Food choices
were selected for study because this is a domain where ambivalence is commonly
reported (e.g., conflict between pleasure and health; see Beardsworth, 1995; Conner
er al., 1998a). The design of the studies was similar. In each case, reliable multi-item
self-report measures of attitude (semantic differential measure) and intention (e.g., “I
intend to eat a low-fat diet”, strongly agree-strongly disagree) were taken. In addition,
a split semantic dif-ferential measure of ambivalence was taken in each case. The
studies examined healthy eating (n = 239 Conner et al., in press), eating a low-fat
diet (n = 158;
Conner et al., 1995; n = 145; Conner et al., 1999c), eating chocolate (n = 155;
Sparks et al., 2001), eating meat (n = 165; Sparks et al., 2001), or eating five
portions of fruit and vegetables per day (n = 149; Conner et al., 1999~)The.
results from these studies are summarized in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4 Summary of moderating effects of attitudinal ambivalence on attitude-

intention and attitude-behavior relationships across studies
Numbers of supporting results Frequency-weighted
correlation
Significant Non- Non- Lower Higher
moderating significant significant ambivalence ambivalence
effect effect effect
(low > high) (high > low)

~~~ ~~ ~
Attitude-intention 2 3 1 0.67.a 0.60'

Attitude-behavior 3 1 0 0.53'b 0.40'
Differences of r from zero: p < 0.001; differences between r: p < 0.09;p < O.OOlb
Moderating effects of ambivalence were assessed by moderated regression

analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986). However, for presentational purposes, we split
the sample at the median on the ambivalence measure in order to create higher
ambivalence and lower ambivalence groups. Correlations between atti-tude and
intention measures were then computed separately for these two groups and then
compared. As can be seen in Table 2.4, the results were mixed, with some studies
demonstrating the predicted direction of modera-tion effect and others failing to
show such an effect. However, in summarizing across studies (Table 2.4) and
comparing the frequency-weighted correla-tions, it becomes clear that across
studies there is evidence for the moderating impact of ambivalence on the
attitude-intention relationship (lower am-bivalence group mean, r = 0.67; higher
ambivalence group mean, r= 0.60), although the difference is modest. We
suspect that the failure to find a moder-ation effect in some studies is attributable
to one of two factors. The first factor is degree of ambivalence. Where the
behavior that is the focus of the intention does not produce a considerable degree
of ambivalence in at least some respondents, the moderation effect is unlikely to
be observed (i.e., the lower and higher ambivalence groups are too similar). To
test this effect we examined the mean degree of reported ambivalence in each of
the six studies reported in Table 2.4. Consistent with these predictions, the
highest mean levels of ambivalence were found in the two studies reporting
significant effects in the prediction direction (Conner et al., 1999c; Sparks et al.,
2001). However, this does not represent a sufficient explanation because one
study where we failed to find an effect also showed high mean levels of
ambivalence (Conner er al., in press).
A second factor which might explain the failure to find consistent effects
is the reliability of the ambivalence measure. A common psychometric
principle to increase reliability is to obtain multiple measures of a construct
and then average or sum across measures where they show high
intercorrelations. In relation to the studies reported in Table 2.4, which
reported high mean levels of ambivalence, the one study not showing a
significant effect (Conner et al., in press) only employed a single-item
measure of ambivalence. We suspect this may have compromised our
comparison of higher and lower ambivalence individuals and masked any
moderation of the attitude-intention relationship. Hence, across studies of
food choices that produce considerable levels of ambivalence (when reliably
assessed), we find consistent evidence for am-bivalence attenuating the
attitude-intention relationship, as assessed in between-subject correlations.

Perhaps because the measures tended to be taken at the same time point, and
so perhaps be masked by consistency biases, the differences were modest.
One problem with between-subject analyses such as these is that they as-
sume that, for a given relationship, the person with the strongest attitude
will form the strongest intention. However, a more psychologically realistic
view would suggest that the behavioral intention selected by an individual
reflects the behavior towards which they have the most positive attitude.
Within-person correlations more accurately reflect this process. A final
study exam-ined the moderating role of ambivalence on attitude-intention
relationships using a within-subjects design (Conner et al., in press); 239
members of the public completed a questionnaire measuring attitudes and
intentions in rela-tion to 20 healthy eating behaviors (e.g., avoiding high-fat
foods, eating fruit and vegetables, etc.). Ambivalence was assessed by a
split semantic differen-tial measure concerning eating a healthy diet. As
before, we created two groups based on a median split of the ambivalence
measure. The analysis then compared the mean within-subjects correlation
between attitudes and inten-tions in the lower ambivalence group (M =
0.86; SD = 0.54) and the higher ambivalence group (M = 0.79;SD =
0.57). This difference was found to be significant. Such analyses avoid
some of the problems with the other datasets and provide good evidence
that ambivalence moderates the attitude-intention relationship, such that
higher levels of ambivalence are associated with weaker attitude-intention
relationships (see also MacDonald & Zanna, 1998, for consonant results).
Attitude-Behavior Relationships
In a series of four independent prospective datasets, we examined the impact
of ambivalence on moderating the relationship between attitudes and self-
reported behavior in relation to a series of food choices (Conner et al., 1996).
Again, the design of these studies were similar. In each case, self-report
measures of attitude (semantic differential measure) and ambivalence (split

semantic differential measures) were taken in an initial questionnaire; while self-
report measures of behavior (e.g., “I have eaten a low-fat diet in the past month”,
strongly agree-strongly disagree) were taken in a later question-naire. The studies
examined healthy eating (Conner er al., in press), eating a low-fat diet (Conner et
al., 1999c; Conner et al., 1995), or eating five portions of fruit and vegetables per
day (Conner el al., 1999~)The. results from these studies are summarized in Table
2.4. For presentational purposes we again split the sample at the median on the
ambivalence measure in order to create a higher and a lower ambivalence group.
Correlations between attitude and behavior measures were computed separately
for these two groups and then compared. As can be seen in Table 2.4 the results
were fairly consistent in showing the predicted moderation effect. The one study
failing to show a significant effect (Conner et al., in press) employed a single-

item measure of ambivalence, which may have compromised its reliability.
Across studies the frequency-weighted correlation shows this effect to be
substantial, with more ambivalent attitudes being less strongly correlated with
behavior assessed prospectively, r = 0.40 vs. r = 0.53 (Table 2.4). In addition, this
effect was also apparent in within-subjects correlations for healthy eating in a
prospective design (Conner et al., in press). The lower ambivalence group (M =
0.57; SD = 0.37) and the higher ambivalence group (M = 0.47; SD = 0.35)
differed signifi-cantly on attitude-behavior correlations in the predicted direction
(i.e., weaker correlations for the higher ambivalence group).
One problem with the above studies is the failure to take account of the effect
of ambivalence on attitude-intention and attitude-behavior relation-ships
simultaneously. Armitage and Conner (2000, Study 1) attempted to rectify this
problem by taking measures of attitude, intention, and behavior at three different
time points. In addition, this study used structural equation modeling in order to
remove any effects due to measurement error. Data were collected from a sample
of 350 hospital workers in relation to eating a low-fat diet. The measure of
ambivalence was a split semantic differential measure that was used to split the
group into a higher and lower ambivalence group (based on a median split). We
then fitted a model to the two groups with structural paths from attitude to
intentions, from attitude to behavior, and from intentions to behavior. As the
interest was in the relationship be-tween the latent constructs (attitude, intentions,
and behavior), we con-strained the model such that the factor loadings for each
construct were equal in the two groups (the factor loading constraint model). This
allows us to make direct comparisons between the regression paths for the higher
and lower ambivalence groups. As predicted, the path from attitude to intention
was stronger in the lower compared to the higher ambivalence group. Also as
predicted, the path from attitude to behavior was stronger in the lower com-pared
to the higher ambivalence group. Formal tests of these differences
revealed them both to be significant. These effects were present despite any
evidence that ambivalence influenced attitude stability in the same data.
Thus, there appears to be growing evidence that ambivalence moderates the
attitude-intention relationship and, particularly, the attitude-behavior relation-
ship, such that higher levels of ambivalence are related to weaker relationships.
It would also appear that such effects are not purely attributable to attitude
stability effects. It has been suggested that this moderation effect may be due to
ambivalence being confounded with attitude extremity. For example, Thompson
et al. (1995) noted that attitudinal ambivalence is necessarily nega-tively
correlated with attitude extremity (p. 382), that is, univalent attitudes should be
more extreme than ambivalent attitudes and therefore more predict-ive of
behavior. This hypothesis is directly supported by Lavine et al. (1998; but see
Jonas et al., 1997) and indirectly supported by Kallgren and Wood (1986). The
latter compared experimental participants, whose attitude extremity had been
manipulated, with a no-treatment control group, and reported attitude-behavior
correlations of 0.85 and 0.19 for the experimental and control condi-tions,
respectively. One might therefore expect less ambivalent attitudes to be more
predictive of behavior than ambivalent attitudes, just because of greater attitude
extremity. Nevertheless, there is evidence that the moderation effects observed
for ambivalence are not merely attributable to differences in attitude extremity.
For example, Conner et af. (in press) while reporting the predicted attitude-
intention and attitude-behavior moderation effects for ambivalence, found these
relationships remained even when ambivalence was unconfounded from
extremity. Most convincing, however, is the data reported by Wester and Petty
(2000). In a study of safer sex behaviors, they compared a lower and a higher
ambivalence group. Ambivalence was found to moderate the attitude-behavior
relationship. They then examined only those respondents checking the most
positive (extreme) attitude category. In this case, lower-ambivalent respondents
were significantly more likely to report performing the behavior than higher-
ambivalence respondents, despite being identical on attitude ex-tremity. In
examining the moderation effects of ambivalence on attitude-intention and
attitude-behavior relationships, it is clearly important to ensure that these effects
are not simply attributable to attitude extremity effects. In addition, these reported
moderation effects need to be confirmed with objective measures of behavior and
in experimental studies.
Pliability of Attitudes
More ambivalent attitudes are expected to be more susceptible to the influ-
ence of a persuasive communication (i.e., more pliable). For example, Eagly
and Chaiken (1995) argue that, “attitudes are strong to the extent that they are
well embedded in an existing attitudinal structure’’ (p. 414). Thus strong
attitudes are held to be more securely “anchored” in knowledge structures.
60 MARK CONNER A N D PAUL SPARKS
Given that ambivalent attitudes are based on conflicting evaluations and in-
consistent information, they should be more weakly anchored and hence more
pliable than univalent attitudes.
Only a few studies have investigated this prediction for ambivalence. Bassili
(1996) tested the pliability of attitudes towards three attitude objects in the face
of persuasive messages. Pliability was found to be significantly related to
ambivalence for two attitude objects ( r = 0.15 in both cases), but not for a third
(two tests: r = 0.06 and r = 0.03) (see also Pomerantz, Chaiken, & Tordesillas,
1995). MacDonald and Zanna (1998) showed individuals high in (cross-
dimensional) ambivalence about a particular social group to be more susceptible
to a priming manipulation in terms of their judgment about that group. Finally,
Maio, Esses, and Bell (2000) found an interaction between strength of message
and ambivalence on attitudes towards residents of Hong Kong, such that only in
the high ambivalence group did message strength produce differential effects on
attitude change.
In our own research we have investigated the impact of ambivalence on the
pliability of attitudes in one study (Armitage & Conner, 2000, Study 2). The
study was a simple pre-post quasi-experimental design. Attitudes and levels of
ambivalence towards eating a low-fat diet were assessed at baseline in a sample
of 344 hospital workers. Attitude measures were based on a multi-item semantic
differential measure, while ambivalence was assessed using a split semantic
differential measure. Five months later, participants were ran-domly assigned to
either an attitude change or control condition and received experimental materials
designed either to change attitudes or provide infor-mation only. Both sets of
intervention materials included UK Government recommendations on dietary fat
intake, epidemiological data on population levels of fat intake, and a description
of sources of fat in the diet. The experi-mental intervention also included a
section designed to change individual attitudes (see Armitage & Conner, in press
b). Based on Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) model of belief-attitude relations, we
provided persuasive information that targeted five beliefs about eating a low-fat
diet, which had previously shown to distinguish who did and did not intend to eat
a low-fat diet (Armi-tage & Conner, 1999).
Analysis of variance revealed that the experimental and control groups did not
differ at baseline on the attitude measures. In order to test the prediction that less
ambivalent attitudes are more resistant to change, we split the group into higher
and lower levels of ambivalence, based on a median split of this measure. Across
both our intervention conditions, attitudes became more positive, although the
change was greater in the experimental group. Of par-ticular interest was the
three-way interaction between condition, am-bivalence, and time. This only
approached significance. Nevertheless examination of the effects of the
intervention demonstrated that it had dif-ferential effects in the two ambivalence
groups. For the lower ambivalence
group, there was no difference between the control and experimental condi-
tions; while for the higher ambivalence group, attitudes became significantly
more positive following the experimental intervention. Hence, the attitude
intervention (experimental) group had significantly more impact on more
ambivalent attitudes supporting the pliability prediction.
Hence, the evidence to date generally supports the idea that ambivalent
attitudes tend to be more pliable in the face of persuasive messages. Nev-
ertheless, further studies across a more diverse range of attitude objects are
required.
Information Processing Impacts of Ambivalence

A further predicted consequence of attitudinal ambivalence is an impact on

the processing of attitude-relevant information. Attitudes characterized by
higher levels of ambivalence are assumed to be less likely to guide process-
ing of information about the attitude object, because of their lower accessib-
ility. Several studies have found evidence to support the relationship of higher
levels of ambivalence to lower attitude accessibility (Bargh et al., 1992;
Bassili, 1996; Bromer, 1998; see Jonas et al., 2000, for a review). For
example, Van der Pligt et al. (2000) hypothesized that those individuals with
ambivalent attitudes would take longer to integrate information into an overall
attitude judgment compared to non-ambivalent individuals, and hence
ambivalent attitudes would show longer response latencies when compared
to non-ambivalent attitudes. Across three different attitude ob-jects support
was found for this effect. In each case the response latency for an overall
attitude judgment was longer for ambivalent compared to non-ambivalent
individuals.
In our own research we have investigated this effect in one study (Conner,
Bainbridge, & Halton, 1999a). This study used a response latency paradigm
to examine the time taken to respond to different attitude objects. Consistent
with previous research, we expected bipolar attitude judgments to show
longer latencies when the respondents reported higher degrees of am-
bivalence. Ambivalence was assessed using split semantic differential mea-
sures to separately assess positive and negative reactions to the attitude object.
However, we further hypothesized that ambivalence would only influ-ence
the response latency to the bipolar attitude measure when the two unipolar
judgments had similar short latencies. Consistent with Erber et d ’ s (1995)
attitudes-as-constructions model, this prediction was based on the view that,
in arriving at an overall judgment about an attitude object (i.e., as tapped by
the bipolar rating), respondents can take account of both negative and positive
evaluations (i.e., as tapped by the unipolar ratings), but will only do so if they
are salient (i.e., have a shorter latency). Thus, only when both unipolar judgments
are salient and in conflict (i.e., ambivalent) will response
latencies for the overall attitude judgment be longer. Within-subject analyses

supported this view, with latencies for bipolar attitude judgments being sig-
nificantly longer when the respondent was ambivalent about the same attitude
object and both unipolar evaluations had similar and short response latencies (see
McGregor, Newby-Clark, & Zanna, 1999, for a similar finding).
Thus, there appears to be reasonably good evidence that ambivalence leads to
lower accessibility. However, the evidence that this reduced accessibility has
significant impacts on the processing of information about the attitude object has
been addressed in fewer studies. Several studies appear to support the idea that
higher levels of ambivalence lead to a more systematic process-ing of attitude-
relevant information. The assumption is that an ambivalent attitude is weaker
than a non-ambivalent attitude and so is less likely to produce a biased processing
of attitude-relevant information (e.g., informa-tion consistent with one’s initial

attitude receives more favorable processing than information that is inconsistent).
For example, Maio, Bell, and Esses (1996) showed that higher levels of
ambivalence about a minority group resulted in more systematic processing of
information about that group. Similarly, Bromer (1998) showed that only
individuals lower in ambivalence showed a preference for attitude-congruent
information in processing mes-sages about European Monetary Union. Jonas et
al. (1997) suggest that the mediating mechanism is confidence in one’s attitude:
high ambivalence pro-duces a reduction in confidence in one’s attitude and
reduced confidence leads to more systematic processing of information.
Summary of Research Findings on the Consequences of Ambivalence

As the above review demonstrates, there is a growing body of research on the
differing consequences of ambivalence. The findings support the view that
ambivalence is an important issue for those involved in attitude research
(Breckler, 1994; Thompson et al., 1995; Priester & Petty, 1996), and that
ambivalence produces many of the effects one might expect of a measure of
attitude strength. Perhaps the strongest evidence concerns the moderating effects
of ambivalence on attitude-intention and attitude-behavior relation-ships. Those
with ambivalent attitudes show significantly weaker relationships between their
attitudes and intentions or attitudes and behavior. We would anticipate that a
range of behaviors that show conflict between cognitive and affective influences
(e.g., safer sex practices, exercise, food choices) might be characterized by high
levels of ambivalence and so show attenuated attitude-behavior relationships.
However, the generality of the moderation effect across different behaviors still
needs to be established and demonstrated experimentally. For example, Jonas et
al. (1997) and Maio et al. (1996) suggest that ambivalence can, under certain
circumstances, lead to stronger attitude-behavior relationships.
The predicted effects of ambivalence on the stability and pliability of attitudes were
less consistent. The prediction that less ambivalent attitudes will be more stable over
time has only been confirmed with meta-attitudinal measures of stability and has been
refuted in two studies using more appropriate measures of attitude stability (Bassili,
19%; Annitage & Conner, 2000, Study 1; but see Bargh et al., 1992). Similarly, the
prediction that ambivalent attitudes will be more pliable has only received limited
support to date (Armitage & Conner, 2000, Study 2; Bassili, 1996). In relation to
information-processingeffects, several stud-ies demonstrate that ambivalent attitudes
are less accessible. However, only two studies (Bromer, 1998; Maio er al., 1996) have
shown impacts of ambivalence on information processing; greater ambivalence
appears to be associated with more systematic processing of attitude-relevant
information.
Given that ambivalence measures show some evidence of producing all the
effects one might expect of a measure of attitude strength, one might ask what
is the relationship of ambivalence to other measures of attitude strength.
Although there have been several empirical studies of the relationships
amongst attitude strength measures (e.g., Bassili, 1996; Eagly & Chaiken,
1995; Jonas et al., 2000; Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent, & Carnot, 1993;
Pomerantz et al., 1995) the relationship of ambivalence to the full range of
attitude strength measures remains under-researched. Ambivalence does tend
to be associated with low accessibility of the attitude (Bargh et al., 1992;
Bromer, 1998), lower attitude extremity (Maio et al., 1996), and lower attitude
certainty (Bassili, 1996; Jonas et al., 1997), and unrelated to evaluative-
cognitive or evaluative-affective consistency (Maio et al., 1996, 2000).
However, the relationship of ambivalence to other attitude strength dimen-
sions, such as attitude importance, knowledge, interest, and intensity remains
an issue for future research.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH WITH THE

AMBIVALENCE CONSTRUCT
Whilst our review has demonstrated that we now have a greater understand-
ing of the ambivalence construct, particularly in relation to some of the con-
sequences of ambivalence, we believe that a number of areas are worthy of
further research attention. We would highlight three such key areas for re-
search. The first is the need to further explore the interrelationship of am-
bivalence measures. As the above review makes clear, there is evidence for
the divergent validity of various different ambivalence measures. However,
there is also a need for researchers working with the ambivalence concept to
be clear about their interpretation of the concept, in order that the area is not
dogged by differences of interpretation that are not made explicit. Further
research is necessary to identify the relationships amongst ambivalence
measures across different attitude objects. A multi-trait multi-method matrix

study (see Campbell & Fiske, 1959) might be particularly informative in this
regard in isolating the degree to which variations were due to differing types of
ambivalence measurement method (e.g., open-ended vs. closed-ended measures;
direct ambivalence vs. split semantic differential measures; split semantic
differential vs. belief-based measures) or attributable to different attitude objects
(e.g., events, objects or actions).
A second key issue for future research is the factors that elicit ambivalence.
We still know relatively little about which attitude objects produce consider-able
levels of ambivalence or the factors promoting the formation of am-bivalence.
Future studies might usefully employ experimental methods to study such effects
(e.g., see Jonas et al., 1997), although it is not clear what might represent the best
means for manipulating ambivalence (Wegener et al., 1995). A third key area
is the consequence of holding an ambivalent attitude, and in particular the
implications for information processing. Whilst a number of studies have
examined other consequences of holding an ambivalent atti-tude, only a few
studies have considered the implications for information processing (but see
Bromer, 1998). An investigation of these effects may throw light on a number of
the other consequences of ambivalence. Other information-processing
implications of holding an ambivalent attitude also deserve further attention.
CONCLUSIONS
In the present chapter, we have reviewed the various definitions of am-bivalence
that have been suggested in the literature and indicated a number of different
forms of ambivalence. We have presented methods for measuring different forms
of ambivalence and some preliminary findings about their degree of
interrelationship. We have also described findings relating to the elicitors of
ambivalence. In the major section of the chapter, we then reviewed findings for
the ambivalence construct in relation to four major predictions based on
considering ambivalence a measure of attitude strength: temporal stability of
attitudes, impact of attitudes on intentions and behavior, pliability of attitudes,
and impacts on information processing. There is evidence for each consequence,
although the strongest evidence supports the moderating role of ambivalence on
attitude-intention and attitude-behavior relation-ships. Finally, we outlined a
number of suggestions for further research: in particular, the need to further
explore the interrelationship of ambivalence measures, the key determinants of
ambivalence, and the information-processing implications of holding ambivalent
attitudes. Further exploration of the concept of ambivalence promises to provide
us with further insights into broader questions about the structure of attitudes.
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Ambivalence and Attitudes

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Ambivalence and Attitudes

interest in attitudinal ambivalence can be partly attributed to the resurgence of

sion of attitude strength, we examine the evidence to support four predicted

different approaches to the concept. Most definitions in the psychological literature

Table 2.1 Internretations and definitions of ambivalence

different times. From Ainslie’s decision-making perspective on competing choice

Table 2.2 Classification of ambivalence measures

Overall evaluation measure]

Direct measures Indirect measures

Cognitive conflicts I have conflicting thoughts My thoughts about X are . . .

Indirect or “formula-based’’ (Jonas et al., 2000) measures of ambivalence

He modified a widely used measure of attitudes (the semantic-differential

a formula based on the number of positive and negative attributes selected as

Hodges, & Wilson, 1995 for a similar “belief homoge-neity” measure).

ate future. However, appraisal of objects and eventdactions could produce

such equation is that devised by Griffin and presented in Thompson et al.

data, there appears to be evidence that the different measures of ambivalence

& Janssen, 1998). Hence, belief-based measures of ambivalence and split

bivalence. This section reports findings from two approaches to

Table 2.3 Ambivalence and evaluation measures for each of 12 behaviors

Drinking alcohol (risk) 0.49a 0.16 0.15e 1.88

In a second study, we asked a sample of 102 students in a more open-ended

current evidence that individual difference variables elicit ambivalence is weak.

stored in long-term memory. Ambivalence is therefore a function of the extent to

In a second and more defensible approach, ambivalence has been related to

Attituddntention and Attitude-Behavior Relationships

A key prediction for a measure of attitude strength is that strong attitudes

In addition, much research in the attitude domain has considered be-

His research demonstrated a moderating effect of attitudinal am-bivalence on the

One of our studies examined the moderating role of ambivalence on attitude-

Table 2.4 Summary of moderating effects of attitudinal ambivalence on attitude-

(low > high) (high > low)

Attitude-intention 2 3 1 0.67.a 0.60'

Moderating effects of ambivalence were assessed by moderated regression

attitude-intention relationship, as assessed in between-subject correlations.

measures of attitude (semantic differential measure) and ambivalence (split

failing to show a significant effect (Conner et al., in press) employed a single-

Information Processing Impacts of Ambivalence

A further predicted consequence of attitudinal ambivalence is an impact on

latencies for the overall attitude judgment be longer. Within-subject analyses

of attitude-relevant information (e.g., informa-tion consistent with one’s initial

Summary of Research Findings on the Consequences of Ambivalence

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR RESEARCH WITH THE

measures across different attitude objects. A multi-trait multi-method matrix

Armitage, C. J., & Comer, M. (1999). Distinguishing perceptions of control from

of alcohol and condom availability on the determinants of intentions. Journal of

Fazio, R. H. (1986). How do attitudes guide behavior? In R. M. Sorrentino & E. T.

Journal of Applied Social Psychology.

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