CASE DIGESTS

ARTICLE 176

1.)Dinah B. Tonog vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with
Edgar V. Daguimol. A year after the birth of Gardin, Dinah left for the USA where she found a
work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and paternal grandparents.
Edgar filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin in the RTC of Quezon City. In March 1992, the
court granted the petition and appointed Edgar as legal guardian of Gardin.
In May 1992, Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment. She averred that she learned of the
judgment only on April 1, 1992. The trial court set aside its original judgment and allowed Dinah
to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration.
In 1993, Dinah filed a motion to remand custody of Gardin to her. In 1994, the trial court issued a
resolution denying Edgar's motion for reconsideration and granting Dinah's motion for custody of
Gardin. Dinah moved for the immediate execution of the resolution. Edgar, thus, filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon
motion for reconsideration, CA modified its decision and let Gardin remain in the custody of Edgar
until otherwise adjudged.Dinah appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that she is entitled to
the custody of the minor, Gardin, as a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin Faith, the law
confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin
cannot be separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven. Employing
simple arithmetichowever, it appears that Gardin Faith is now twelve years old.
Issue:
Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship proceeding?
Held:
In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of
the child.
Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an informed decision. Insofar as illegitimate
children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code provides that illegitimate children shall be
under the parental authority of their mother. Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides
that “[n]o child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.” It will be observed that in both provisions, a strong
bias is created in favor of the mother. This is specially evident in Article 213 where it may be said
that the law presumes that the mother is the best custodian. As explained by the Code
Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid many a tragedy where a mother has seen her
baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of
her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for “compelling reasons” for
the good of the child.
For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven
years of age for “compelling reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment,
unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, and afflictionwith a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is
allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise
its discretion by disregarding the child’s preference should the parentchosen be found to be unfit,
in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person. In the case
at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since
it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated,
and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor. Bearing
in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court
did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. Meanwhile,
the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange
environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an
attachment. Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be
properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be recalled that in
a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We are not in the best position
to assess the parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their opposing claims for custody. Yet another
sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the
statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the
choice of which parent should have the custody over her person. For the present and until finally
adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor should remain with her father, the private
respondent herein pending final judgment of the trial court. (Dinah B. Tonog vs. Court of
Appeals and Edgar V. Daguimol, G.R. No. 122906. February 7, 2002)

2. Dela Cruz VS. Gracia

Facts:
The petitioner Jenie San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) cohabited with her partner Christian Dominique
Tomas Aquino (Dominique) for several months leading up to Dominique's death. They were not
legally married. Two months after Dominique's death, Jenie gave birth to their child, Christian.

Jenie applied to register Christian with Dominique's surname and presented written evidence that
Dominique had acknowledged that Christian was his child before his death. The application was
denied on the ground that the child was considered to be born out of wedlock and Dominique has
no capacity to acknowledge paternity of Christian or provide the documents required following his
death.

Jenie filed a complaint against the decision and argued that Dominique's written
acknowledgement of paternity prior to his death, was also supported and verified by his brother,
falls within the documents required under the law. The trial court dismissed Jenie's complaint as
Dominique's written acknowledgement was not signed and held that even if it was signed, did not
contain an express acknowledgement and therefore did not meet the legal requirements. Jenie
appealed and argued that the law did not require an acknowledgement to be signed and that the
trial court had erred in not recognising a clear and unmistakable acknowledgement of paternity.

Issue:
Paternity of child born out of wedlock. Whether or not the unsigned handwritten statement of the
deceased father can be considered a recognition of paternity in a "private handwritten instrument"
within the meaning of Article 176 of the Family Code. The Court held that it did and ordered
Christian to be registered with Dominique's surname.

Ruling:
Although there is no express requirement in the law stating that a written instrument
acknowledging paternity needs to be signed, the requirement for due execution is implied. In the
present case, however, special circumstances exist to hold that Dominique's acknowledgement
of paternity though unsigned by him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.

Since Dominique died two months prior to the child's birth and is prevented from acknowledging
paternity in person. And also, the written acknowledgement of paternity was handwritten and its
authenticity was supported by the facts and evidence that Jenie presented. For example,
Dominique's brother's corroboration and confirmation of the authenticity of the written
acknowledgement despite such testimony being prejudicial to his own rights to inheritance.
Furthermore, the fact that Jenie and Dominique lived together and Jenie continues to live with
Dominique's parents provide further factual verification. There is therefore no doubt or dispute
that Dominique's written acknowledgement is authentic and that paternity is established.

The law states that the welfare of the child shall be the "paramount consideration". It is in
Christian's best interests to have legal certainty of his paternity and to allow him to bear the
surname of his now deceased father and have a definitive name reflected in his birth certificate
and avoid the stigma of illegitimacy.
Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 - Requirements for the Child to Use the
Surname of the Father: The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public
document is executed by the father. If admission of paternity is made through a private
handwritten instrument, the child shall use the surname of the father, provided the registration is
supported by certain documents. In Article 176 of the Family Code: Illegitimate children shall use
the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother. Illegitimate children may
use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognised by the father through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or
private handwritten instrument is made by the father. The father has the right to institute an action
before the courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime.

ARTICLE183-193

1.Republic VS. Toledano

Facts:
On February 21, 1990, Spouses Alvin Clouse, a natural-born US Citizen and Evelyn Clouse, a
former Filipino who became a naturalized US citizen, filed a petition to adopt Solomon Alcala, a
minor who is Evelyn's youngest brother. The trial court granted the petition. Republic, through the
Office of the Solicitor General appealed contending that the lower court erred in granting the
petition for the spouses are not qualified to adopt under Philippine Law.

Issue:
Whether or not Spouses Clouse are qualified to adopt

Held:
Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise known as "The Family
Code of the Philippines", private respondents spouses Clouse are clearly barred from adopting
Solomon Joseph Alcala.

Article 184, paragraph (3) of Executive Order No. 209 expressly enumerates the persons who are
not qualified to adopt, viz.:

(3) An alien, except:

(a) A former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity;

(b) One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his or her Filipino spouse; or

(c) One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a
relative by consanguinity of the latter.
Aliens not included in the foregoing exceptions may adopt Filipino children in accordance with the
rules on inter-country adoption as may be provided by law.

There can be no question that private respondent Alvin A. Clouse is not qualified to adopt
Solomon Joseph Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the
first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of
America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor
the legitimate child of his spouse. In the third place, when private respondents spouses Clouse
jointly filed the petition to adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February 21, 1990, private respondent
Evelyn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost her Filipino citizenship when she was
naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988.

Private respondent Evelyn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to
paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipinocitizen. She sought to adopt
her younger brother. Unfortunately, the petition foradoption cannot be granted in her favor alone
without violating Article 185 which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and wife. It reads:

Article 185. Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(1) When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate child; or
(2) When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child of the other.

Article 185 requires a joint adoption by the husband and wife, a condition that must be read along
together with Article 184.

Under the Family Code, joint adoption by husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. As the child
to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses
to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.

2.Republic v CA (MAXIMO WONG)

3. Tamargo v. CA
Facts:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle.
Jennifer's natural parents filed civil complaints for damages with the RTC against Bundoc's natural
parents.
In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition was granted
in November 1982.
Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were indispensable
parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to them from the moment the petition for
adoption was decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that since Adelberto was then actually living
with his natural parents, parental authority had not ceased by mere filing and granting of the
petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the spouses Tamargo's petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed by
Adelberto.

Ruling:
No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of
their unemancipated children living in their company and under their parental authority subject to
the appropriate defences provided by law." In the case at bar, parental authority over Adelberto
was still lodged with the natural parents at the time the shooting incident happened. It follows that
the natural parents are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting
parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not consider that retroactive effect may be given
to the decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting parents accruing at the
time when adopting parents had no actual custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may
be essential if it permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.

3. In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim et al

Facts:
Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were
childless. Minor children, were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as
shown by a certification of DSWD. The spouses registered the children making it appears as if
they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died. She then married an American
Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of
the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she
filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was
then 25 years old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle
and her husband including Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an
affidavit.

Issue:
WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

Ruling:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband
and wife shall jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In
case spouses jointly adopts, they shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word
“shall” signifies that joint adoption of husband and wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with
the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a
legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of consent given
by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American
Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on
residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant
to Sec 7. Parental authority is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring
and rearing the children for civic consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral
mental and physical character and well-being.

2.Castor v. Gregorio
Facts:
This is a petition for review on Certiorari assailing the decision of the CA which denied the petition
for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the appellate court sought to
annul the judgment of the trial court that granted Rs’ decree of adoption.
Atty. Castro was allegedly married to Rosario Castro (Petitioner). Unfortunately, they separated
later on due to their incompatibilities and Jose’s alleged homosexual tendencies. Their marriage
bore two daughters: Rose Marie, who succumbed to death after nine days from birth due to
congenital heart disease, and Joanne Benedicta Charissima Castro (Petitioner).

On August 2000, A petition for adoption of Jose Maria Jed Gregorio (Jed) and Ana Maria Regina
Gregorio (Regina) was instituted by Atty. Jose Castro. Atty. Castro alleged that Jed and Regina
were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Gregorio (Rosario’s housekeeper). After a Home Study
Report conducted by the Social Welfare Officer of the TC, the petition was granted.

A disbarment complaint was filed against Atty. Castro by Rosario. She alleged that Jose had been
remiss in providing support to his daughter Joanne for the past 36 year; that she single-handedly
raised and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver
and allege lover, Larry, and even went to the extent of adopting Larry’s two children, Jed and
Regina, without her and Joanne knowledge and consent. Atty. Castro denied the allegation that
he had remiss his fatherly duties to Joanne. He alleged that he always offered help but it was
often declined. He also alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children that’s why he
adopted them. Later on Atty. Castro died.

Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of judgment seeking to annul the decision of
the TC approving Jed and Regina’s adoption.

Petitioner allege that Rosario’s consent was not obtained and the document purporting as
Rosario’s affidavit of consent was fraudulent. P also allege that Jed and Regina’s birth certificates
shows disparity. One set shows that the father to is Jose, while another set of NSO certificates
shows the father to be Larry. P further alleged that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose’s
illegitimate children but the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time
of their birth. CA denied the petition.

CA held that while no notice was given by the TC to Rosario and Joanne of the adoption, it ruled
that there is “no explicit provision in the rules that spouses and legitimate child of the adopter. . .
should be personally notified of the hearing.”

CA also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information contained in the different sets of birth
certificates required the determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was,
therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud could not
be classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of judgment.

Issues:
1. Whether extrinsic fraud exist in the instant case?
2. Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter is
required?
Decision:
1. The grant of adoption over R should be annulled as the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic
fraud.
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of any other interested
party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed
through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony during the trial.

Jose’s actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable opportunity to contest
the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have
hesitated to grant Jose’s petition since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the
law. There can be no other conclusion than that because of Jose’s acts, the trial court granted
the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.

RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not only the
consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III, Sec. 7, RA 8552)
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however, provides
for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or
her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. But, the
spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.In the absence of any
decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally married despite their
de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify
her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.

The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or older
(ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by
Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse
and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to
rely on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be
privileged over substantive statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings,
it never validly acquired jurisdiction.

ARTICLE 198

1.Lim-Lia VS. Lua

Facts:
Susan Lim-Lua filed a petition against Danilo Lua for a declaration of nullity of marriage with
a prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two children amounting to P500,000.00 per
month. Citing respondent’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and
businesses here and abroad.

After due hearing, RTC cited Art. 203 of the Family Code, stating that support is demandable from
the time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only from the date of judicial demand,
and thus also granted support pendente lite of P250,000.00.

The husband filed for Motion for Reconsideration asserting that petitioner is not entitled to
spousal support considering that she does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their
children and respondent has continued to support the family for their sustenance and well- being
in accordance with family’s social and financial standing.

The husband also assert that the P250,000 monthly support and the 1,750,000.00 retroactive
support is unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not having considered the
needs of the respondent

MR denied thus he appealed to the CA wherein it reduced the monthly support

to P115,000.00 which ruling was no longer questioned by both parties.

The controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondent’s compliance with the final CA
decision indicated that he deducted from the total amount in arrears (P2,645,000.00) the sum
of P2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two cars for the children, their cost of maintenance
and advances are given to the petitioner and his children.

CA ruled in favor of the husband that the expenses incurred by the husband be considered
advances which may be properly deducted from the support in arrears due to the petitioner and
the two children.
Thus ordered the deduction of the amount of PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in
arrears of Danilo to his wife, Susan Lim Lua and their two children.

Issue:
Whether certain expenses already incurred by the respondent may be deducted from the total
support in arrears owing to the petitioner and her children.

Ruling:
The SC partly granted CA’s decision. First, is to resume payment of his monthly support of
PhP115,000.00 pesos starting from the time payment of this amount was deferred by him.
Second, that only the amount of Php 648,102.29 may be allowed as deductions from the accrued
support pendente lite for petitioner and her children and not PhP3,428,813.80 (rendered by the
CA).

ARTICLE 209 & 211

1.Santos, Sr. VS. CA

Facts:

Leouel Santos, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met Julia.
The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986,
the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of Iloilo City,
followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter’s parents
at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy,
and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference
by Julia’s parents into the young spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also
start a “quarrel” over a number of other things, like when and where the couple should start
living independently from Julia’s parents or whenever Julia would express resentment on
Leouel’s spending a few days with his own parents.

On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite
Leouel’s pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989,
Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home
upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit
the United States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to
somehow get in touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.

Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of
Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for “Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family
Code” (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation in Negros Oriental.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with
him, for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:

(T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia Rosario BediaSantos
failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A wife who does not care to inform her
husband about her whereabouts for a period of five years, more or less, is psychologically
incapacitated.

Issue:

Whether or not the failed to communicate and inform her husband about her whereabouts for a
period of five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.

Held:

Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated.

The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands
aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can
always provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED.