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Chapter 20 right of the accused

MARTELINO vs. ALEJANDRO

FACTS:
Major Eduardo Martelino is charged with the violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of War, as a
result of the alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then undergoing
commando training on the island of Corregidor. On August 12, 1969 Martelino sought the
disqualification of the President of the general court-martial, following the latter's admission that
he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. Martelino contended that the case had
received such an amount of publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was being
exploited for political purposes in connection with the presidential election on November 11, 1969
as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the challenge.
Respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had received, no proof has been
presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness and impartiality have been impaired.
On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's own counsel expressed confidence in the "integrity,
experience and background" of the members of the court.
ISSUE:
Whether the publicity given to the case against the petitioners was such as to prejudice their right
to a fair trial?
HELD: NO,
the spate of publicity in this case did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the
responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If
there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent
here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused from massive publicity
encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the
release of information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of
prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial of the petitioners was
being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance of those imperative
decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with due process. Granting the existence
of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners here do not contend that the
respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of
publicity, we think that the suspension of the court-martial proceedings has accomplished the
purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by postponing the trial of the petitioner
until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has since been cleared and the publicity
surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that we believe the trial may now be
resumed in tranquility.

■ Chavez vs. Court of Appeals


Posted on April 2, 2013 by winnieclaire
Standard
24 SCRA 663 (1968)
Facts: Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle(thunderbird car together
with accessories). An information was filed against the accused together with other accused,that
they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without theconsent of owner Dy Lim,
took the vehicle.All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution)
asked roger Chavez to be thefirst witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends
that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of
accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled in favor of the fiscal.

Petitioner was convicted.

ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self – incrimination had been
violated – to warrant writ of HC?

HELD: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his
constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not
volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness;

Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky
defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original
claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection – even to
the guilty

Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to


release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused’s constitutional
rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore
invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was
violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which
precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is
less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his
appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be
granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of habeas
corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person
whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case, involving a
violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:

A court’s jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost “in the course of the proceedings” due to
failure to complete the court — as the Sixth Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an
accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional
guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not
complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction
pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain
release of habeas corpus.

Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case
presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule
102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, “to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.


De la Camara vs. Enage
Facts:Mayor de la Camara was arrested and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his
allegedparticipation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of the
Tirador LoggingCo. 18 days later, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed cases of multiple
frustrated murder and formultiple murder against petitioner, his co-accused Tagunan and Galgo.
On January 14, 1969 anapplication for bail was filed by petitioner which was granted and the
amount was fixed at the excessiveamount of P1,195,200.00.

ISSUE:WON the amount of the bailbond is excessive

HELD:Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that
isexcessive. So the Constitution commands. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail
becomesmeaningless. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the amount of P1,195,200.00 is
clearlyviolative of this constitutional provision under the circumstances

RICARDO DE LA CAMARA VS. HON. LOPEZ ENAGE

Facts: Petitioner De la Camara was the Mun. Mayor of Misamis Oriental who was arrested and
detained at the Prov. Jail of Agusan for his alleged participation in the killing of 14 & wounding of
12 other laborers at the Tirador Logging Co., at Agusan del Sur. The Prov. Fiscal of Agusan filed
with the CFI a case for multiple frustrated murder and another for multiple murder against
petitioner. He then filed an application for bail filed with the lower court asserting that there was
no evidence to link him with such fatal incident which the court granted and fixed the amount at
Php 1,195,200.00 which is the sum of Php 840,000.00 for the information charging multiple
murder and Php 355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder.

Issue: W/N the amount of bail required by the court is proper?

Held: NO! Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses
when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such right flows from the presumption of innocence in favor
of every accused who should not subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be
entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Where, however, the
right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the
Constitution commands. It is understandable why. If there were no prohibition, the right to bail
becomes meaningless. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order fixing the
amount of bail at Php 1,195,200.00 as the bail should be posted by petitioner is clearly violative of
the constitutional provision.
■ borja vs mendoza

Facts: Borja was accused of slight physical injuries in the City of Cebu. However, he was not
arraigned. That not withstanding, respondent Judge Senining proceeded with the trial in absentia
and rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime charged. The case was appealed to
the Court o First Instance in Cebu presided by respondent Judge Mendoza. It was alleged that the
failure to arraign him is a violation of his constitutional rights. It was also alleged that without any
notice to petitioner and without requiring him to submit his memorandum, a decision on the
appealed case was rendered The Solicitor General commented that the decision should be annulled
because there was no arraignment.

Issue: Whether or Not petitioner’s constitutional right was violated when he was not arraigned.

Held: Yes. Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be
informed as to why he was indicted and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on
a showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the
evidence against him. It is also not just due process that requires an arraignment. It is required in
the Rules that an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge
that confronts him. It is imperative that he is thus made fully aware of possible loss of freedom,
even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. At the very least then, he
must be fully informed of why the prosecuting arm of the state is mobilized against him. Being
arraigned is thus a vital aspect of the constitutional rights guaranteed him. Also, respondent Judge
Senining convicted petitioner notwithstanding the absence of an arraignment. With the violation of
the constitutional right to be heard by himself and counsel being thus manifest, it is correct that the
Solicitor General agreed with petitioner that the sentence imposed on him should be set aside for
being null. The absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements
of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial.

Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is granted. The decision of respondent Judge Romulo R.
Senining dated December 28, 1973, finding the accused guilty of the crime of slight physical
injuries, is nullified and set aside. Likewise, the decision of respondent Judge Rafael T. Mendoza
dated November 16, 1976, affirming the aforesaid decision of Judge Senining, is nullified and set
aside. The case is remanded to the City Court of Cebu for the prosecution of the offense of slight
physical injuries, with due respect and observance of the provisions of the Rules of Court, starting
with the arraignment of petitioner.

■ JOSEFINO C. DRACULAN Provincial Fiscal of Isabela and PATRICIO T. DURIAN, Fourth


Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PROCORO DONATO, Judge, Court of First Instance of Isabela, Branch V, respondent.
CUEVAS, J.:

Assailed and challenged in this petition for certiorari and MANDAMUS, for allegedly having
been issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, are two orders issued by the Honorable respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. V-351
of the defunct Court of First Instance of Isabela-Echague, Branch V. One dated April 13, 1976 1
denying petitioners' motion to dismiss; and another one, issued on May 28, 1976 2 denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order of dismissal.

The pertinent background facts are as follows:

On June 25, 1973, the Chief of Police of San Isidro, Isabela filed with the Municipal Court of the
said place, a complaint for Less Serious Physical Injuries against Florencio Miguel. The case was
docketed in the said court as Criminal Case No. 63.

Tried after pleading not guilty upon arraignment, accused Miguel was convicted as charged and
thereafter accordingly sentenced in a decision promulgated on November 14, 1973.

From the aforesaid decision, Miguel appealed to the then Court of First Instance of Isabela, where
his appeal was docketed as Criminal Case No. V-351 and assigned to Branch V of the said court
presided by the Honorable respondent Judge. 'The record of the said case was then transmitted and
referred by the Clerk of Court to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela

Upon a review of the evidence made by the provincial fiscal's office, petitioners found that
accused-appellant Miguel should have been charged with "Direct Assault Upon a Person in
Authority" it appearing that Benjamin Antonio, the offended party, is a person in authority then
engaged in the performance of his official duties when assaulted. In view thereof, petitioners'
office, then conducted a new preliminary investigation and upon a prima facie showing that direct
assault was actually the, crime committed by accused- appellant Miguel, petitioners filed with the
respondent court t a Motion to Dismiss the appealed Less Serious Physical Injury case.
Simultaneously, a new information for Direct Assault was filed against Miguel which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. V-419 Upon receipt of the records of this assault case, respondent
Judge, in an order dated December 17, 1975, directed that it be returned to the Fiscal's Office on
the ground that it was prematurely filed considering that at that time, the prosecution's motion to
dismiss the appeal was still pending resolution.

Undaunted by such a disposition, petitioners then filed a new information which they caused to be
docketed also as Criminal Case No. V-351 similar to that of the appealed less serious physical
injury case, and thereafter again moved for the dismissal of the appealed case. Petitioners' motion
was denied and so with their motion for reconsideration of the order of denial.

Hence, the instant petition wherein it is prayed that the aforementioned orders of respondent Judge
dated April 13, 1976 and May 28, 1976 be declared null and void; that respondent Judge be
ordered to dismiss the appealed less serious physical injury case; and that a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining respondent from proceeding with the trial of the appealed less serious
physical injury case be issued which should be made permanent after hearing on the merits.

the petition is devoid of merits. consequently its dismissal is in order.

Criminal Case No. V-351 is an appeal, not an original case. It is before the Court of First Instance
(now Regional Trial Court) of Isabela pursuant to the appeal interposed by accused Florencio
Miguel from the decision of the Municipal Court of San Isidro convicting him of Less Serious
Physical Injuries. The Court of First Instance then took cognizance of such case in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction. And since the appeal was subsequent to the passage of Republic Act No.
6031, 3 which took effect on August 4, 1969, the appeal must now be disposed of on the basis of
the evidence presented and admitted in the municipal court. No trial de novo is necessary but the
parties may merely submit and/or be required to file their respective briefs or memoranda. 4

But since the proceeding before the San Isidro Municipal Court was not duly recorded because of
the absence of a qualified stenographer, the court of First Instance of Isabela must now conduct a
trial de novo of the case on appeal.

The question therefore posed before us is—may the prosecution amend the information and/or file
a new information charging an offense different from that with which accused-appellant was tried
and convicted in the court below?

Petitioners' answer to this query is in the affirmative, relying on Section 13 of Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court, 5 which provides:

Section 13. Amendment. The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form,
without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and during the trial
as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done
without prejudice to the rights of the defendant.

If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new
one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double
jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.

The above section contains two parts: one authorizes the amendment of an information or
complaint, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads,
and thereafter, only as to matters of form. The other provides that, if it appears at any time before
judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court may dismiss the
original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one charging the proper offense,
provided the defendant would not be placed in double jeopardy.

The amendment 6 or the filing of a new case where there had been a mistake in charging the
proper offense after the dismissal of an existing one, 7 spoken of and therein provided for apply,
only to an original case where no judgment has as yet been rendered. Much less does the said
section apply to an appealed case such as the instant proceeding. 8

The reason is obvious and that is because the right to amend or to file a new complaint or
information charging the proper offense after the dismissal of the original complaint or
information, is subject to the rule on double jeopardy, which petitioners in the instant case
miserably missed,

In the case at bar, the original charges was that of less serious physical injuries. Whether the new
charge for direct assault with less serious physical injuries is by way of amendment or through a
new information is immaterial since in both instances accused's former conviction would be a bar
to a subsequent prosecution for the second offense. This was the dictum laid down in the case of
People vs. Bonotan 9 and which doctrine was reiterated in the recent case of Tacas vs. Cariaso 10
Thus:

The charge of direct assault upon a person in authority with physical injuries contained in the
fiscal's information is not included in the charge contained in the complaint of the chief of police,
which is merely that of less serious physical injuries unqualified by any allegation that those
injuries were inflicted upon the offended municipal councilor, admittedly a person in authority,
while he was in the performance of his official duties or on the occasion thereof, a qualification
essential to the offense charged in the information. The converse is no less obvious, that is, that the
charge, of direct assault upon a person in authority with physical injuries as set out in the
information necessarily includes the offense of less serious physical injuries charged on the
complaint, specially because in both the information and the complaint, the physical injuries
inflicted are alleged to have required medical assistance of a period of 14 days and incapacitated
the offended party from labor for the same period of time. As proof that the offense charged in the
information includes the offense charged in the complaint, conviction of the defendants of this
latter offense may, without question, be had under the information if the other ingredients of the
crime charged in said information are not proved. Hence, the defense of double jeopardy was wen
taken. The order of dismissal was thus affirmed precisely or. the very same constitutional ground
relied upon in this petition. 11

We find the said pronouncement "on all fours" to the instant case. Petitioners' submittal not being
in accord therewith may not be sustained.

But the more serious repercussion of which the petitioners appeared unmindful of, is the fact that
with the withdrawal of the appeal, the old judgment of conviction is revived and the accused loses
his right to a review of the evidence on appeal by way of questioning the validity of his
conviction. What is sought to be dismissed is not the main case, 12 but merely the appeal which
was docketed as Criminal Case No. V-351

WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition to be without merit, the same is DISMISSED. The
appropriate Regional Trial Court of Isabela to which Criminal Case No. V-351 was reassigned is,
therefore, hereby directed to proceed immediately with the trial of the said case until its final
termination.

No pronouncement as to costs.

■ People of the Philippines vs Judge Donato & Rodolfo Salas

Habeas Corpus – Right to Bail – Rebellion

Salas aka NPA’s “Ka Bilog” was arrested and was charged for rebellion. He was charged together
with the spouses Concepcion. Salas, together with his co-accused later filed a petition for the
WoHC. A conference was held thereafter to hear each party’s side. It was later agreed upon by
both parties that Salas will withdraw his petition for the WoHC and that he will remain in custody
for the continued investigation of the case and that he will face trial. The SC then, basing on the
stipulations of the parties, held to dismiss the habeas corpus case filed by Salas. But later on, Salas
filed to be admitted for bail and Judge Donato approved his application for bail. Judge Donato did
not bother hearing the side of the prosecution. The prosecution argued that Salas is estopped from
filing bail because he has waived his right to bail when he withdrew his petition or habeas corpus
as a sign of agreement that he will be held in custody.

ISSUE: Whether or not Salas can still validly file for bail.

HELD: The SC ruled that Salas did waive his right to bail when he withdrew his petition for the
issuance of the WoHC. The contention of the defense that Salas merely agreed to be in custody
and that the same does not constitute a waiver of his right to bail is not tenable. His waiver to such
right is justified by his act of withdrawing his petition for WoHC.

ADDITIONAL....

Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellion on October 2, 1986 for
acts committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash
alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and
(d) the criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987
Respondent filed a petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail
anymore since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART.
135 of RPC. On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among
others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the
bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00 and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once
every two months within the first ten days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration indirectly asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present
evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will not
comply with this main condition of his bail. It was contended that:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention
when arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a
Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity
and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was
offered and paid for his arrest.

This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.

Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital
offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital
offense that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the
amount of bail from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution.

Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to
the crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.

Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements
were made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit
themselves in the jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security
given for the release of a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule
that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which
is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

■ Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber

Facts of the case


Willie Francis, a 16-year-old black youth, was convicted of murder in Louisiana and sentenced to
death by electrocution. On the appointed day, Francis was strapped in the chair and the
executioner threw the switch. Electric current passed through Francis's body but it was insufficient
to kill him. The malfunction required a repair of the chair. In the meantime Francis sought to
prevent the second execution attempt.

Question
Does the second attempted execution deny Francis due process of law because of double jeopardy
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment and because of cruel and unusual punishment of the Eighth
Amendment?

Conclusion
No and no. The equipment failure does not bring due process into play. This was not the wanton
infliction of unnecessary pain in the execution of the death sentence. And the cruelty of the Eighth
Amendment refers to cruelty in method, not that cruelty which is part of the actual suffering
accompanying a lawful sentence of death.

■ Benigno Aquino Jr. vs Military Commission No. 2, Chief of Staff, Chief Justice et al

Martial Law – Open Court Theory – Military Courts

In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial Law, Ninoy was arrested and was placed under
custody. He was brought to Fort Bonifacio, a military camp. He filed for the issuance of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus which was denied by the SC. Ninoy then questioned the validity of the denial as
well as the declaration of martial law; at the same time he questioned the authority of the military
court [No. 2] created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to try him and his other companions. He was being
charged for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives. He was also being charged
for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. All were filed before the military court.
Ninoy argued that the military court has no jurisdiction or civilian courts are still operational.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ninoy can be validly charged before the military court.

HELD: The SC upheld the power of the president to create military tribunals or military courts
which are authorized to try not only military personnel but also civilians even at that time civil
courts were open and functioning. The SC basically rejected the “open court’ theory observed in
the USA.

■ people vs obsania

Facts: The accused was charged with Robbery with Rape before the Municipal Court of Balungao,
Pangasinan. He pleaded not guilty. His counsel moved for the dismissal of the charge for failure to
allege vivid designs in the info. Said motion was granted. From this order of dismissal the
prosecution appealed.

Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in Double Jeopardy.

Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the following requisites must have
obtained in the original prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.

In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the Trial Judge upon the defendant's
motion to dismiss. The “doctrine of double jeopardy” as enunciated in P.vs. Salico applies to wit
when the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will not be a
bar to another prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case is dismissed
constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege for the reason that he thereby prevents the
Court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against
him.

In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only with the express consent of
the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect. 9
Rule 113, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.

■ MELO VS PEOPLE
DOCTRINE OF SUPERVENING EVENT/ SUPERVENING FACT DOCTRINE

FACTS:
Petitioner herein was charged with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon
Benjamin Obillo with a kitchen knife and with intent to kill, several serious wounds on different
part of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and
incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time.

During the arraignment, the petitioner pleaded not guilty, but on the same day, during the night,
the victim died from his wounds. Evidence of death of the victim was available to the prosecution
and the information was amended.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, but was
denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the amended information constitutes double jeopardy.

HELD:
Rule 106, section 13, 2nd paragraph provides:
If it appears at may time before the judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper
offense, the court may dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new
one charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed thereby in double
jeopardy, and may also require the witnesses to give the bail for their appearance at the trial.

“No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense”. It meant that when
a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or
in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the
same or identical offense.
The protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the
only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that if an act is punished by a law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the
same act. “SAME OFFENSE” under the general rule, has always been construed to mean not only
the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also
that the two offenses are identical.

There is identity between two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense
would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This is called SAME-EVIDENCE-TEST.
In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the
ESSENTIAL INGREDIENTS of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter; vice
versa.

This rule however does not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the
first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused,
during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.Thus, where
the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured person dies, the
charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible,
which charges the character of the offense and, together with the fact existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense.

■ April 1977.

22
NOV
[BARREDO, J.]

FACTS:

On April 12, 1975, Fama Jr., attacked Viajar by throwing a piece of stone upon his right cheek,
inflicting physical injuries which would require medical attendance for a period from 5 to 9 days
barring complication as per medical certificate of the physician. A criminal complaint for slight
physical injuries was filed against Fama Jr. on April 15, 1975, docketed as Case No. 3335.
Meanwhile, Viajar filed another complaint on July 28, 1975, docketed as Case No. 5241, for the
same instance of throwing a stone but this time for serious physical injuries because it left
permanent scar and deformation on his right face. The first case proceeded and Fama Jr. pleaded
not guilty during arraignment. After several postponements by the prosecution, Fama
Jr.successfully sought dismissal of the first criminal case invoking the constitutional right to
speedy trial. Fama Jr. now moves for the dismissal of the second case on the ground of double
jeopardy.
ISSUE: Whether or not the additional allegation of deformity in the information in Case No. 5241
constitutes a supervening element which should take this case out of the rule of identity resulting
in double jeopardy.

HELD: YES.

This rule of identity does not apply… when the second offense was not in existence at the time of
the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused
during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent Thus, where
the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured dies, the charge of
homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy.

[Here], when the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only three days had passed since the
incident in which the injuries were sustained took place, and there were yet no indications of a
graver injury or consequence to be suffered by said offended party. Evidently, it was only later,
after Case No. 3335 had already been filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had already
healed, that the alleged deformity became apparent. In other words, in the peculiar circumstances
of this case, the plea of double jeopardy of private respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold.


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CITY COURT OF MANILA || 154 SCRA 175 (1987)
Facts:

Agapito Gonzales and Roberto Pangilinan was accused of violating Section 7 of RA 3060 (An
Act Creating the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures) in relation to Article 201 (Immoral
doctrines , obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows) of the RPC. On April 07,
1972, two information were filed against the accused.

The first one, filed for violation of RA 3060


, alleged that the accused, without having previously submitted to the Board of censors for Motion
Pictures for preview and examination, exhibited a motion film in a public place.

The second one, filed for violation of Article 201,


alleged that the accused exhibited motion
pictures “
depicting and showing scenes of totally naked female and male persons with exposed private parts
doing the sex act in various lewd and obvious positions, among other similarly and equally
obscene and morally offensive scenes, in a place open to public view, to wit: at Room 309, De
Leon Building, Raon Street corner Rizal Avenue.
Accused Gonzales moved to quash the information in the criminal case for ground of double
jeopardy as the case pending against him for violation of RA 3060, allegedly contains the same
allegations in the criminal case.

Respondent City Court (City Court of Manila, Branch 6) dismissed the criminal case on the basis
that the allegations in the two information are identical and the plea entered in one case by the
accused herein can be reasonably seen as exposing him to double jeopardy in the other case.

Petitioner contends that the accused could not invoke the constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy, when there had been no conviction, acquittal, dismissal or termination of criminal
proceedings in another case for the same offense.
Issue:
WON there was double jeopardy in the case at hand. NO
Held:

It is a settled rule that to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present: (1)
a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been
validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the second
offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an
attempt to commit the same or a frustration thereof.

All these requisites do not exist in this case.

The two (2) informations with which the accused was charged, do not make out only one offense,
contrary to private respondent's allegations. In other words, the offense defined in section 7 of
Rep. Act No. 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by the Board of
Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not included in the offense defined in Article
201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent and immoral motion
pictures.

The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each other. A scrutiny of the two (2) laws
involved would show that the two (2) offenses are different and distinct from each other.


It is evident that the elements of the two (2) offenses are different. The gravamen of the offense
defined in Rep. Act No. 3060 is the
public exhibition of any motion picture
which has not been previously passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures
. The motion picture may not be indecent or immoral but if it has not been previously approved by
the Board, its public showing constitutes a criminal offense.

■ SALONGA vs PAÑO

G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985

Facts: The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by
the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing
of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit and prevent the
respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of
the democratic opposition in the Philippines.

The case roots backs to the rash of bombings which occurred in the Metro Manila area in the
months of August, September and October of 1980. Victor Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of
the bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as one of those responsible.

On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a “Notice of Preliminary
Investigation” in People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused),
stating that “the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at 2:30 o’clock
p.m. on December 12, 1980” and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge
sheet and the supporting evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states
that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and despite assurance to the
contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called
supporting evidence.

The counsel for Salonga was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero
Olivas, dated 12 March 1981, charging Salonga, along with 39 other accused with the violation of
RA 1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel for
Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the charges against Salonga for failure of the prosecution to
establish a prima facie case against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding
Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4
January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution ordering the filing of an information for violation of
the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against 40 people, including Salonga. The
resolutions of the said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4 January 1982 are the subject of the
present petition for certiorari. It is the contention of Salonga that no prima facie case has been
established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He states that to
sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no
rule of law exists in the Philippines today.

Issues: 1. Whether the above case still falls under an actual case

2. Whether the above case dropped by the lower court still deserves a decision from the Supreme
Court

Held: 1. No. The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court’s judgment
had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was circulating for concurrences and separate opinions,
if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of
respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant
to instructions of the Minister of Justice, the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to
seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the information filed under
the questioned resolution.
The court is constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw
the draft ponencia from circulating for concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in
the Court’s crowded agenda for further deliberations.

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is
concerned, this decision has been rendered moot and academic by the action of the prosecution.

2. Yes. Despite the SC’s dismissal of the petition due to the case’s moot and academic nature, it
has on several occasions rendered elaborate decisions in similar cases where mootness was clearly
apparent.

The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent
of protection given by constitutional guarantees.

In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the court ruled that:

“The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth
in language clear and unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to
the unequivocal command of the Constitution that excessive bail shall not be required.”

In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could
validly be created through an executive order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the
Center’s new charter pursuant to the President’s legislative powers under martial law.
Nevertheless, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development
of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).

In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the petition was
moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from
promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.


ELIAS CARREDO
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GANCAYCO,
J.: Facts:
On February 3, 1983, petitioner was charged with malicious mischief before the Municipal Trial
Court of Malabuyoc, Cebu City. He deposited a cash bond for his provisional liberty. Upon
arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty and thereafter he filed a written waiver of appearance.
At the hearing on August 14, 1985 the prosecution moved for the recall of its principal witness for
the purpose of identifying the accused-petitioner who was not then present. Hence, a subpoena
was issued to petitioner who failed to appear on said date. The defense counsel justified
petitioner's absence in that the latter's presence can no longer be required as he already filed a
written waiver of appearance. The municipal judge issued an order of arrest of petitioner.
Issue:
Whether or not an accused who, after arraignment, waives his further appearance during the trial
can be ordered arrested by the court for non-appearance upon summons to appear for purposes of
identification.
Held:
It is important to state that the provision of the Constitution authorizing the trial
in absentia
of the accused in case of his non-appearance after arraignment despite due notice simply means
that he thereby waives his right to meet the witnesses face to face among others. An express
waiver of appearance after arraignment, as in this case, is of the same effect. However, such
waiver of appearance and trial
in absentia
does not mean that the prosecution is thereby deprived of its right to require the presence of the
accused for purposes of identification by its witnesses which is vital for the conviction of the
accused. Such waiver of a right of the accused does not mean a release of the accused from his
obligation under the bond to appear in court whenever so required. The accused may waive his
right but not his duty or obligation to the court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED

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