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DesfripJive 'fnd Revisionary Metaphysics 23,

, . ,5 S~wso~'s conceptions of space and time are essentially, Ne~pian, ~t~


hcrad's (with certain qualif1cations) Einsteinian. '"

CD 2 Individuals
. '". ..
'
,".-.' ",' $trawson's investigation ot::'our conceptual scheme' bas two stages; (1) he ~es
'p;'~~
for. \he central iimportance of the subject-:predicate distinctiOn,iand for the..iole
;,~
Descriptivel:and Revisz~on:~ry;', of<particy1arsas objects of reference, concluding that, in our conceptual schem~
", ~ parti~, in virtue of their status as 'paradigm logical subjects', have priority
~" Met.aphysics' overumversals; (2) ~~ argues for the priority of material bodies and persons over -
1f', other par,rlculars.' ~

"
"Olltological priority is' defmed in terms of our capacity to picbout and' talk
., ,~ aboutthings; Strawson suggests that Identifiability of at least some individuals of a
1:1',
Susan J-Iaack ""
g!v~nkind.is necessary for the inclusion of that kind in our ontology, and thus
,connects identifiability with ontological commitment, and identifiability-depend-
,
1 IDtroduction en~ with 'priority of ontological commitment. Briefly:
..
A's are ontologically prior to B's iff it would be impossible for us to identifyB's
I first read Whitehead's Concept of Nature (published in 1919) when I was
(ound already
it,har~ to unless we could identify A's, but not vice versa.
acquaintCd'with'Sttawson's Individuals (published in 19.5?),-an41 '

sJ:u'ewd cnuqQe o(.~trawson s auns, "


A speaker,makes an identifyi1Jgreferenceto a particular if he uses an expres-
resist reading Whitehead's work as a ~~~r two sion (name or defmite description) the standard function of which is to enable
.metb,~l\Od ~ults.1 This suggested tl!at, a study of?te cqn~AA be~een ~e
ti1eI\earer .to identify that particular.
books ~Rt be~,a,~ ~int ,(or,~. ~pP'raisa.1
of~tr;1~son s claim that '
~.
s~~ com- ;~, r;:,i:.,,Abeare,r id~ntifies ('hidentifles') the particular if either:
~ ,pnonty ovc;r ,reV1S1onarymetaphrS1~. But ~e some
"

descrip~F metaphy!lics
',('\, .(i) he can sensibly discriminate it (demonstrative hi<ientif1calion); .,
parison pr9ved less ,straightforward than I anticipated, thro~g mto reli~~
and,reV1S1onary ,... !J.~r (ii)he knows, an indi~4uating fact about it which relates it tC,"sOIrie
difficult;,questions underlying the distinction between d~pt1~e o~er particular which he can demonstratively hidentify;
metaphysics..Sothis paper bas a tidy first half, presentingthe contrasts~tween ,-
he kn~ws an individuating fact about it which re~tCs it to aIi
the ~orprogramm,es, and an ~tidy second half, as~g so~e of the 'difficult ~ individual such that (ii);, , " '

quesu0l.l!!" " .:,: '


.. or...etc. "
The contrastsare
..:., ~~;1:.
these:
~ ! I. . 'nI,"
.~, sp'~er. ide~tif1~ (~~identifles')~ particular if he ~eS an iden!#~g
,,'

-
erence tpJh\\'~~ enablesthe h~er to hidentify it. ",;
structur~ of oUr ," ; '
1 'S~son' iUms1'to'-inv~tigate 'our ,oon~ptUai sche~e', ~~ ne~ C01;lceptu~; ~9ry-re1ati:v~jqen.Rfi~tion id~ntif1cation relative to a"range 9fparttc~
~: thought about 'the world~'Whitehead to pro~~ ~ .
Jfk~ ,out only as those being talked about by the speaker; never te,rminating in
~..sffie a4eq~~ "to th~ purp?ses0f scien~; ~.e..Straw,son is ,engaged m
,>'".
emonstrative
:
( hidentif1~tion
..,,- -
is disallowed. ' '
descriptive, Whitehead m reV1S1onary,metaphys1cs., ~fi:.. -.

2 StnJ,wsontakes 'our conceptual scheme' to have been constant ov~~e ~d .


;:~:>g~..argues tha~ when a hearer hidentif1es an individual inpkectly" the
betWeen different languages, 'while Whitehead regards it as,onl~ an histon~ ,d~!JI}g f~t he nee~,,~ know about i~ will have to be ~ .fac~,abou~~ts
andilOca1.accident; i.e. Strawson maintains, but Whi~eh~ demes, a conce ,

' 19~J?'?ral, r~lations to Something demonstratively hidentifiabl~.~,So; since


twd~invariance thesis., ,;:ft:iatiY!r;identif1cationis exclud,ed, any item which can ~ hid~tified must
3 Sttawso~'s criterion of ontological priority is given in terms of identifiabili ", ~. be" or ,be spatiote~poral1y related to, an item within thehearer'li ;aqd
whitehead's in terms of observability. '...
4 In:'Strawson's ontology material bodies (and persons)_orarepr~ses;
given pn?nty o~er
. .,~'~sensory range. lI~nce, it is 'not contingent' that empirical reali!:)' forms
",
m WJ:Ute- jngJe, unified, spatiotemporal system. !
'

~ceptual objects, unobservable objects, and events


h~'s events are given priority over objects, an?, am~ng obJect;s, s~nse objects
;Within ~
frame~ork, ~trawson continues, material bodies,are'oqto.~gically
<I' ,or.,to,pnvate paruculars ~pch as sense data,2 and to unobservable particulars
ov~r physical objects; i.e. Strawson's ontological hierarchy 1Svutually thc;"\ such as the theoretical entities of physics. This isn't surprising, for sidentification
reverse ofWbitehead's.
Descriptiveand Revisionary Metaphysics 25
24 Methodology and OntologicalCommitment

is defined with respect to a two-person situation, w~ich puts publi.c at ~ ad~ant- a simultaneity; a simultaneity has temporal thickness and is an ultimate factor in
Nature, i.e. observable. A moment is all Nature at an instant; an instant has no
age over private particulars, and it must terminate 10 demonstra~ve hldennfica-Among temporal thickness and is unobservable, an abstraction. By means of the 'method
tion, which puts observable at an advantage over u~observ,ablep~cul~s., of extensive abstraction', relying on the relation of extending over which holds
publicly observable particulars, the argument ~~nnues, mat~nal bodIes (thr~e- between durations, Whitehead def10es a moment as a class of ever shorter dura-
dimensional objects occupying space and perslsnng through nme) are ontologIc- tions which converge to it as a limit. Then the relation of extending over is applied
ally prior to events, processes and states; for identification of ~ven~ n01'~ally to events (which have spatial as well as temporal thickness); the method of
proceeds by identification of material bodies, or else b~ mean~ of Idennficanon of extensive abstraction is used to define event particles, which are the limit of the
places which, in turn, are identified by means of matenal b.odles;~urthermore, ~e- gradual, diminution of the temporal and the spatial extent of events. Event-
identification of events requires re-identification of matenal ~d.les, but not V1~e
particles are the ultimate elements of a four-dimensional spatiotemporal manifold,
versa. This is more disputable than the argument for the pnonty of the public
so that 'space and time are each partial expressions of one fundamental relation
over the private and the observable over the unobservable: fo~ tho~gh even~ between events which is neither spatial nor temporal'.
might generally be identified by reference to the persons or .th1Ogs1Ovolve~10
So, in effect, Whitehead reverses Strawson's order of ontological priority
them ('the first time this pencil was used') or to the place at which they occur ( the
among particulars: events are primary; objects, which are abstracted from events,
battle of Hastings'), a person or thing is sometimes identifi~d by ~eference to ~o~e
are secondary; and among objects, sense objects are more fundamental than
event in which it participates ('the murder weapon') - whIch raIses the SUspICIon
physical objects.
that there may be no unique direction of identifiability dependence as between
events and bodies. And this suspicion is of some interest in view of the fact that
Whitehead places events above bodies in his ontological hierarchy.
4 Comparative Remarks
3 The Concept of Nature Is there
~real rivalry between Strawson's.and Whitehead's enterprises, or do their
results dIffer so strikingly just because their aims are different? I think there is a
Whitehead would agree, in large measure, with Strawson's account of 'our co~- real rivalry, disguised by a deep-seated ambiguity in Strawson's book. On the one
ceptual scheme'; 'materialism', Whitehead observes, is thoroughly entrenched 10 hand, Strawson allows that revisionary metaphysics is feasible and valuable; he
our ordinary ways of speaking. But Whitehead does not re~d ~our co~ceptual admits the possibility that others with very different experience might have a
scheme' as privileged; he regards it as an unfortunate histoncal acc.:ldent~a different conceptual scheme from 'ours'; and he claims no deep metaphysical
consequence of the subject-predicate strUcture of Greek, and then of Aristotelian significance for his criterion of ontological priority. On the other hand, he
logic, which encouraged a conception of substance as the ultimate substratum not .. attributes priority to descriptive over revisionary metaphysics; he urges that
,.
predicated of anything else. Whitehead would replace our conceptual scheme by . 'our' conceptual scheme is 'indispensable'; and he takes what is, in his sense,
another more adequate for the purposes of science. For science deals with 'what ontologically prior, to be what 'primarily exists'. Compare:
we obse~e in perception through the senses' ('Nature'), while ~terialism l~ds !o
the postulation of a fundamental ontological category - substance - whIch IJes modest ambitious
behind what is sensorily disclosed. In Whitehead's favoured ontology, by contrast, the best revisionary metaphysics is both revisionary metaphysics is at the service
the category of events is most fundamental; we are sensorily aware. of events, intrinsically admirable and of enduring of descriptive metaphysics... which
which we then discriminate, in thought, into individuals with propernes. philosophical utility. (Individuals, p. 9) needs no justification at all . . .(p. 9)
Whitehead characterizes an event as 'the specific character of a place through a
period of time' (it may, but need not, involve c~ge): so the thesis that what we .. . our concept of reality might. . . have . . . there are categories and concepts
are sensorily aware of is events amounts to the clatm tha.t what ,!,e se~e h~ ~th been different, had the nature of our which. . . change not at all. (p. 10)
spatial and temporal thickness. Reflection on sense expenence ddTere~nates It.mto experience been fundamentally differ-
'factors', among which Whitehead distinguishes sub-events and objects; objects ent. (p. 29) I may perhaps be said to have found
are further classified into sense objects (colours, shapes, smells, etc.), per- some reason in the idea that persons
ceptual objects (associated sense objects) and physical objects (veridical ~rceptual . . . in saying that material bodies are and material bodies are what primarily
objects), and of these, since physical objects presuppose perceptual objects, and basic.. . I am not saying that they exist. (p. 241)
perceptual objects sense objects, sense objects ar~ the most ~~amental.
exist in a primary sense, or that only
Space and time are abstractions from certam characte~s~cs of events, ~e theyare real. (p. 59)
'constants of externality'. A duration is a whole of Nature hmlted only by bemg
Descriptive and Revisionary Metaphysics 27
26 Methodology and Ontological Commitment

(and consider Strawson's ambiguous dismissal of the concept of process-thing, the 'difficult questions' rais~~ by the distinction between descriptive and
which 'we neither have nor need'). revIsIonary metaphysics
The bridge from the modest to the ambitious enterprise is the conceptual
invariance thesis, a thesis introduced when Strawson replies to the anticipated ~escrip~ve m~~physics is content to describe-the actual content of our thought about
objection that metaphysics should resist, or promote, conceptual change, that ~~)10nary metaphysics is concerned to produ~ a better structure. (Indi-
v~:::~ p:
there is a 'massive central core of concepts' which 'have no history'. Though he .
doesn't, unfortunately, tell us which these concepts are, he is .confident that: Strawson's distinction is far more problematic than this ch ara ct'enzabon suggests.
Among ~e questions it raises are these:
there are categories and concepts which, in their most fundamental characters, change
not at all. Obviously these are not the specialities of the most refmed thinking; they is a concept? How are concepts individuated? What is a conceptual scheme?
~t
are the commonplaces of the least refined thinking; and yet are the indispensable core ow are conceptual schemes individuated? What is the relation between a lan-
of the conceptual equipment of the most sophisticated human beings. It is with guage and a conceptual scheme? How are langua ges individuated ? Wh 0 are th e
these. . . that a descriptive metaphysics will be primarily concerned. (p. 10).
. . of '0 ur conce~tu al sc.h eme?' Is descriptive metaphysics possible?4 Is re-
'we'
VISIOnarym~~physlcs possible? What could it mean to say that one conce t-
So 'our conceptual scheme' is common to different times and different languages. ual scheme IS better' than another? Is one looking for the, o~ a, true conce
.
~
The modest picture of descriptive metaphysics is of various alternative con- scheme? Or maght one conceptual scheme be appropriate for one, and anoth:r for
ceptual schemes, one of which is 'ours'. But if there is conceptual invariance over another purpose? If the latter, are there any constraints on the kinds 0f purpose
time and between languages~ there are no such alternatives. The way we do think that could be relevant?
of the world is the only way we could think of the world; and the revisionary
- - The remarks which follow are intended to make a start - only a start - ~t tacklin g
metaphysician is recommending to put it, as Strawson does not, blundy that
we think of-the world differendy from the way we must think of it.
-
some only some - of these questions. .
Whiteh~d, of course, rejectS the conceptual invariance thesis; (1) Strawson's enterprise depends upon the assumption of some ~nnection
, between the langua~e spoken by a group of people, and their conceptual scheme
the materialist theory is a purely intellectual rendering of experience which has had - the Con~ct'on Assumption (C.A.). Local descriptive metaphysics (Strawson's
the luck to get itself formulated at the dawn of scientific thought. It has domin- (c:J.
ated . . . the language of science since science flourished in Alexandria, with the result ~d.iffeest enterpnse) needs the assumption that different c.s.'s are connected with
. r;nt langu~ges - ~e Local Connection Assumption; global descriptive metaphy-
. .

that it is now hardly possibleto speak at all without appearing to assume its immediate SICS( ~wson s amblbous enterprise) the assum p tion that the same C.S.IScon-
obviousness.. . . But when it is distinctiyformulated. . . the theory is very far from obvious
nectedWIthall Ianguages- th~Glo~a/ c.0nnectionAssumption. (The global C.A. is
(The Conceptof Nature, p. 71, my italics) .
me ffi
,ect, a restatement the mterlingulStic conceptual invariance thesis.) Whit~
~~
head s:a:ount o~the ongIDSof the materialist c.s., like Strawson's local descriptive
'Our conceptual scheme' is a local, and temporary,-!ccident.
~etap YSICS, ~elies on ~e Local C.A. Whorf's work on the Hopi is local descri
Strawson's critics have urged, like Whitehead, that the Conceptual invariance
thesis is false: Burtt points to the radical changes which the concept of cause has
bve metaphY~lcs, and
~ ~
thesis of 'linguistic relativity' is a version of the
C.A. So, If his con~luslons about the Hopi C.S.are correct, they falsify the Global
undergone since Aristode; Mei argues that the subject-predicate distinction, at
C.~., :md. underma?e Straws~n's pretensions to global descriptive metaph sics'
least as Strawson formulates it, does not apply in Chinese; Burtt also refers to
while If.his conclusIOns are rejected because the Local C.A. is denied this Ieniai
Whorf's work on American Indian languages, especially Nookta, which, according '
undermanes Strawson's proj,ect of local descriptive metaphysics.
to Whorf, has no subject-predicate distinction at all, and Hopi, which, accord-
ing to Whorf, carries a metaphysic in which events rather than objects are basic, (2) ~at features of a language is a C.S.connected with, and how? Strawson
and in which there is no differenCe of category between space and time.3 ur~es at the relevant features are very general and rather deep grammatical
It is tempting to conclude that the truth of the conceptual invariance thesis traIts, and speaks as ~f ~e fact that a grammati~ feature is specific to a sin Ie
is sufficiendy doubtful to justify scepticism about Strawson's ambitious pro- language ~hows ~t It. IS not of the appropriate depth. This assumption uS:es
gramme and acknowledgement of the pointfulness of revisionary metaphysics. Strawson m the dlfecbon of the Global C.A. Whorf, by contrast though ~e also
But this conclusion would be too hasty; for the evidence for conceptual variance appeals !o dec:p ra~er than superficial grammatical features, d~ not associate
depends on disputable assumptions about tranSlation, the relations between depth WIthu~ve~ty as between languages; hence his commitment to the Local
language and metaphysics, the identity of concepts, and so forth. This leads C.A. Whorf s versIon of the local C.A. is not that each language has its own,
Descriptive and Revisionary Metaphysics 29
28 Methodology and Ontological Commitment
diagnosis is co~ect; Whitehead has succumbed to the nominalizing tendency of
. .
unique c.s.; rather, that while distinct languages may be associated with the same English. '.
c.s., languages so different that they
-
different c.s.'s he suggests, e.g. that
cannot be 'calibrated' are associated with
all 'Standard Average European' languages
. ~t~head lays ~art of the blame for the ascendancy of the subject-predicate
dlStm~?n ?n the mf1ue~ce of Aristotelian logic. But in this respect (despite its
are connected with the same c.s., but Hopi with a quite different one. supenonty m the expressIOnof relations) modem logic isn't notably different. On
the us~, ?bj~tual interpretation quantifiers range over, and singular terms
(3) The Connection between c.s. and language might be either strong or weak; denote~ obJects. .Only expressions which stand where it would be syntactically
i.e. the C.A, might take the form: (strong)if L has certain features, speakers of L proper to put a smgular term can be genuine variables, i.e. can be bound. The
must acknowledge a certain c.s.; or (weak) if L has certain features, it will be syn~ exerts .a n,ominalizing, the semantics a corresponding objectifying pressure.
natural, though not compulsory, for speakers of L to acknowledge a certain c.s. Consider Q!Une s arguments why, if one treats predicate or sentence letters as
Whitehead's diagnosis of the provenance of the materialist metaphysics relies on a variables, o~e is obliged to think. of' F' and 'p' as syntactically like singular terms,
weak local C.A.; his Qbservation that his use of unfamiliar terminology is deliber- and as rangmg over abstract obJects, properties and propositions' or Davidson's
ate policy, to avoid the metaphysical preconceptions that a less innovative ~ch for an appropriate singular8 term for the 'it' in 'he did it slow'ly,with a knife
style would bring, is pertinent here. Whorf sometimes claims a strong connection, the bathroom, ~t ~dnight'. (Historical parenthesis: Peirce argued that th;
remarking that the c.s. of a speaker's native language is 'absolutely obligatory' for
~influ~n~ of nom:nalis.m ~n. modem. philosophy had been so pervasive that
him. His allegiance to the strong C.A. is associated with a. tendency to claim nommalism and nommalisttc platomsm' - the reification of universals into
failure of tranSlatability betwen languages strongly connected with different c.s.'so abstract particulars - had come to seem the only alternatives to the exclusion of
But after claiming that this or that Hopi locution is 'untranSlatable' into bonaf.1derealism~. view of these o~servations, the alte~tive of interpreting
~
SAE languages, Whorf invariably goes on to translate it, albeit into somewhat q~ttfiers subs~tuttonally ~d allowing expressions of different syntactic cat-
strangulated English. This raises many questions: does 'calibrate' mean 'tranSlate' egones as substttuends for different styles of variable has metaphysical as well
or 'tranSlate smoothly'? And if L were comrletely untranslatable into our as formal interest.
language, should we count it as language at all? How is one to obtain evidence . This, though sketchy,sufficesfor my present point: that there is somereasonto
of how people think about the world which is independent of the way they talk. suspect a nominalizing, objectifying-tendency, which suggests
. that there may be
about theworld?6 Isn't there a danger that tranSlation will impose the c.s. of the something in a weak version of the C.A. ~ .
tranSlator? If the strong global C.A. were trUe, there would be no genume alternative to
Though, because of these unanswered questions, IjCaIl't offer a fum conclusion 'our' c.s., and no sense in which a revisionary metaphysician cOuld produce a
about which, if any, version of the C.A. is correct, I can offer comments on a 'better' .c.s. But if there are alternative c.s.'s, there are questions to be asked about
.
.
couple of relevant examples. the choice between them.
(a) Opponents of racism have drawn attention to the prejudicial character of
(~) If c.s.'s are ~ought of as sets of concepts or categories, one would expect a
certain linguistic forms - the derogatory flavour of 'nigger' or of the use of 'boy' to
choice to be mad~ terms o~ expressive adequacyj if, however, c.s. 's are thought of
refer to a black adult, for example. Opponents of sexism have suspected that the ~
as sets of proposlttons or beliefs, one would expect a choice to be made in terms of
pervasiveness of gender distinctions in English may be similarly prejudicial.' How- 9 In the latter case a further question would arise: are 'alternative' c.s. 's rivals,
~th.
ever, Whorf observes that Chinese lacks distinctions of gender, and Professor Geach I.e. are they to be thought of as incompatible metaphysical theories or might
tells me that the same is trUe ofTurkishj and I don't suppose it will be disputed that alternative C.~.'s be both n:ue? Strawson seems to think of a c.s. as co~isting of a
neither the Chinese nor the Turks are especially noted for their freedom from
seto~ categones order~ Wlth respect to ontological priority; the ordering presum-
sexism. This, I think, argues for caution about strong forms of the C.A. ably mtr~uces a quasl-doctrinal element. When Whorf, on the other hand, claims
(b) Whitehead diagnoses the materialist metaphysic as due, in part, to the
tbatHo~1 better than SAE languages at describing vibratile phenomena, he seems
undue influence of the subject-predicate distinction. Strawson argues for the ~
be thinking of a c.s. as composed of concepts rather than propositions.
priority of material bodies, and appeals to the subject-predicate distinction in
support of his ontological hierarchy. But something is amiss: for Strawson appeals,.
~(5)
~ow~ ~e ~dividuation of c.s.'s will require, direcdy or indirecdy, criteria
to the subject-predicate distinction as supporting the priority of particulars oVeJ.'i f~r..~e .mdiVlduatton of concepts. And this raises a question I avoided earlier, in
universals, not as supporting the priority, among particulars, of bodies over discussion of the conceptual in~ariance thesis: when is one to say that a concept
..bas changed, and when that It has been replaced by a new concept? (Has
events; yet it is on this point that his and Whitehead's hierarchi~ differ. S~,
either the subject-predicate distinction is less closely connected Wlth the parti- 'the concept of cause' changed from Aristode to Hume, or is Hume's a different
cular-universal distinction than Strawson thinks, or else Whitehead is less free of concept from Aristode's? - the latter answer would enable' Strawson to defend
the subiect-predicate distinction than he supposed. My hunch is that the latter
Descriptive and Revisionary Metaphysics 31
30 Methodology and Ontological Commitment
shown that neither ~e idea that two c.s.'s are different, nor the idea that they are the
conceptUal invariance against Burtt's criticisms.) An adequate answer, further- ~e, makes sense, his arguments seem to point, instead, to the conclusion that there is
more, would evidendy call for an account of the concept of a concept. Just one conceptual scheme, i.e. to the Global C.A.
For now, though, I must content myself with some remarks about conceptUal 6 a. Bedau, H., review of Whorf, Philosophy ofS&ience24 (1957).
change. There are two rival approaches, one static, the other dynamic. The latter, 7 See, e.g., Beardsley, E. Lane, 'Referential genderisation', in Womenand Philosophy,eds
with which I sympathize, sees our concepts as the result of a long and continuing Go~~, <? ~~ ~artof~ky, M. W. (Putnam, 1976); and especially, Baker, R., · "Pricks"
and chicks m P?lo~op~y and S~x, ~. Baker, R. and Elliston, F. (Prometheus,
evolution, and as containing residues of earlier scientific and metaphysical the- :
1975). Baker, m an mtngumg exerCIse m revisionary metaphysics, draws interesting
ories. (This is Whitehead's view). When Sttawson envisages the possibility that parallels between our talk of b~acksand our talk of women; but whereas, in the fonner
the work of revisionary metaphysicians may fmd its way into our 'unrefmed' view case, he argues that a change m the way people think brought about a change in the
of the world, and thus become a datUm for a modest descriptive metaphysics, he way'they talk (the ~eliberate adoption of 'black'), in the latter case he argues that we
too is taking this approach. From this point of view, the prospect of further should adopt a reV1Sedway of speaking (e.g. dropping sex-indicative pronouns) in
conceptUal ~ange is neither surprising nor alarming. The static pictUre, however, ord~r to change the way people think about women.
is associated,with the idea that proposals for conceptUal revision can be dismissed 8 ~e, W. V. 0., 'Logic and the reification of universals', in From a Logical Point of
Tor~books, 1953);Davidson, D., 'The logical fonn of action sen-
as symptoms of conceptUal confusion. Here is Geach's comment on the event
ontology:
.
VieW
~
tences, m The LogICof Decision and Action, ed. Rescher, N. (Pittsburgh University
Pr~, 196?). See also Grover, D. L., 'Propositional quantifiers' Journal of Philoso-
'
phICalLogICI (1972).
'at the same time' belongs not to a special science but to logic. Our practical grasp of 9
this logic is not to be called into question on account of recondite physics... . A hav~.ar:guedelsew~erethat confusionon this point vitiates Camap's argument in
~
physicist who casts doubt upon it is sawing off the branch he sits upon.lO ,EmpmC1~, ~t1CS and ontology' (Revue Internationale de Philosophie4, 1950); see
Some preliminaries to ontology', Journal of PhilosophicalLogic 5 (1976).
10 Geach, P. !., '~me problems about time' (RoyalInstitute of PhilosophyLecture,
The issues he raises are too large for me to tackle here. But I will reveal my Oxford Umverslty Press, 1965), in: Logic. Matters (Blackwell, 1972), p. 304.
sympathies by urging that we are not on a branch, as in Geach's metaphor, rather,
on a raft, as in Neurath's. And if you object that this means we are all at sea, I reply
that this is no worse, at any rate, than being up in the air.

Notes

I have been helped by comments when' earlier versions of this paper were read at Warwick,
Delaware, Cambridge, Southampton, and University College, LOndon.
1 Whitehead, A. N., The Concept of Nature (Cambridge University Press, 1919); StraW-
son, P. F., Individuals (Methuen, 1959).
2 Contrast Price, H. H., Thinking and Experience (Hutchinson, 1953), cbs 1 and 2. Price
takes as his starting point the experience of a single person, and hence gives priority to
repeatable 'characters', the properties by means of which particulars are recognized.
The comparison with Price's enterprise shows that Strawson's investigation, in ch. 2., of
whether one's conceptUal scheme might be different if one inhabited aassuming
world purely of
a single
sounds, is inconclusive because he changes two relevant variables -
consciousness whose experience consists entirely of sounds - at once.
3 Burtt, E. A., 'Descriptive metaphysics', Mind LXXLL (1953); Mei, Tsu-Lin, 'Subject
and predicate, a grammatical preliminary', PhilosophicalReview LXX (1961); Whorf,
B. L., Language, Thought and Reality, ed. Carroll, J. B. (MIT Press, 1953); compare.
Hacking, I. M., 'A language without particulars', Mind LXXVII (1968).
4 Observe that, for example, Strawson's claim that the concept of person is primitive is, in
view of the traceS of Cartesian dualism in much of our talk about people, normative
rather than purely descriptive.
5 a. Davidson, D., 'The very idea of a conceptUal scheme', Presidential Address to the
American Philosophical Association, 1973. Oddly, though Davidson claims to have

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