JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES Makati City, to fetch the latter so that their family could spend time and celebrate
, to fetch the latter so that their family could spend time and celebrate together
G.R. No. 189405 November 19, 2014
SHERWIN DELA CRUZ, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and CARLOS ALBERTO L. GONZALES, in behalf of his
deceased brother, JEFFREY WERNHER L. GONZALES, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to
annul and set aside the May 7, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No.
89257, finding petitioner Sherwin Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Homicide, and its August 19, 2009 Resolution2 denying his motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner was charged with the crime of Homicide in an Information 3 dated March 2,
2005, which alleged:
That on or about the 1st day of January 2005, in the City of Makati, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, with intent to kill and
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot one JEFFREY WERNHER GONZALES Y LIM on the
head, thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and moral gunshot wound which directly
caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
According to the prosecution, on January 1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon,
petitioner went to the office of Sykes Asia Inc. located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s
Summit Center,Ayala Avenue, Makati City. When petitioner was already inside the
building, he went to the work station of the deceased victim, Jeffrey Wernher L. Gonzales
(Jeffrey), who, by the configuration of the eye witness Antonette Managbanag’s sketch, was
seated fronting his computer terminal, with his back towards the aisle. As petitioner
approached Jeffrey from the back, petitioner was already holding a gun pointed at the back
of Jeffrey’s head. At the last second, Jeffrey managed to deflect the hand of petitioner
holding the gun, and a short struggle for the possession of the gun ensued thereafter.
Petitioner won the struggle and remained in possession of the said gun. Petitioner then
pointed the gun at Jeffrey’s face, pulled the trigger four (4) times, the fourth shot finally
discharging the bullet that hit Jeffrey in the forehead, eventually killing him. Finally, after
shooting Jeffrey, petitioner fled the office.
The defense recounted a different version of the facts.
Petitioner claimed that on January1, 2005, at around 2:30 in the afternoon, more or less,
petitioner, together with his children, went to Sykes Asia, the workplace of his wife,
Darlene Dela Cruz (Darlene), located at the 25th Floor of Robinson’s Summit Building in
the New Year’s Day. Before entering the Robinson’s Summit Building, petitioner
underwent the regular security check-up/procedures. He was frisked by the guards-on-
duty manning the main entrance of said building and no firearm was found in his
possession. He registered his name at the security logbook and surrendered a valid I.D.
Upon reaching the 25th Floor of the same building, a security guard manning the entrance
once again frisked petitioner and, likewise, found no gun in his possession; hence, he was
allowed to enter the premises of Sykes Asia. The security guard also pointed to him the
direction towards his wife’s table.
However, as Darlene was then not on her table, petitioner approached a certain man and
asked the latter as to the possible whereabouts of Darlene. The person whom petitioner
had talked towas the deceased-victim, Jeffrey. After casually introducing himself as the
husband of Darlene, Jeffrey curtly told him, "Bakit mo hinahanap si Darlene?"to which he
answered, "Nagpapasundo kasi sa akin."The response given by Jeffrey shocked and
appalled petitioner: "Ayaw na nga ng asawa mo sayo sinusundo mo pa!"
Shocked by the words and reaction of Jeffrey, petitioner tried to inquire from Jeffrey who
he was. But Jeffrey suddenly cursed petitioner. Then, Jeffrey suddenly picked up
something in his chair which happened to be a gun and pointed the same at petitioner’s
face followed by a clicking sound. The gun, however, did not fire.
Seeing imminent danger to his life,petitioner grappled with Jeffrey for the possession of
the gun.While grappling, the gunclicked for two (2) to three (3) more times. Again, the gun
did not fire.
Petitioner was able to wrest away the gun from Jeffrey and tried to run away to avoid any
further confrontation with the latter.However, Jeffrey immediately blocked petitioner’s
path and shouted, "Guard! Guard!" Immediately then, Jeffrey took hold ofa big fire
extinguisher, aimed and was about to smash the same on petitioner’s head.
Acting instinctively, petitioner parried the attack while still holding the gun. While in the
act of parrying, the gun accidentally fired due to the reasonable force and contact that his
parrying hand had made with the fire extinguisher and the single bullet discharged hit the
forehead of Jeffrey, which caused the latter to fall on the floor and die.
Petitioner left the gun and went out ofthe premises of Sykes Asia and proceeded towards
the elevator. On his way to the elevator, he heard Darlene shout, "Sherwin anong
nangyari?", but he was not able to answer.
After said incident, Darlene abandoned petitioner and brought with her their two (2)
young children. Petitioner later learned that Darlene and Jeffrey had an illicit relationship
when he received a copy of the blog of Darlene, dated January 30, 2005, sent by his friend.
During his arraignment, on August 22, 2005, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel,
pleaded "Not Guilty" to the charge. Thereafter, pretrial conference was conducted on even
date and trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
During the trial of the case, the prosecution presented the oral testimonies of Marie
Antonette Managbanag (Managbanag), Maria Angelina Pelaez (Pelaez) and Carlos Alberto
Lim Gonzales (Gonzales), respectively. The prosecution likewise formally offered several
pieces of documentary evidence to support its claim.
For its part, the defense presented aswitnesses, petitioner himself; his brother, Simeon
Sander Dela Cruz III (Cruz), Greg Lasmarias Elbanvuena (Elbanvuena) and Managbanag,
who was recalled to the witness stand as witness for the defense.
On February 26, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC)of Makati City, Branch 147, rendered
a Decision5 finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, as
defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the fallo thereof
reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is rendered finding herein accused Sherwin Dela Cruz y Gloria
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide as defined and penalized under
Art. 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of Eight (8) years and One (1) day of prision mayor medium as Minimum to Fourteen (14)
years eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal medium as Maximum; to
indemnify the Heirs of Jeffrey Wernher Gonzales y Lim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 plus
moral damages in the amount of ₱1 Million, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.6
On March 28, 2007, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal, while private respondent, through
the private prosecutor, filed a Notice of Appeal on April 11, 2007 insofar as the sentence
rendered against petitioner is concerned and the civil damages awarded.
After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioner elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals (CA). However, the latter denied their appeal and affirmed the RTC
decision with modification on the civil liability of petitioner. The decretal portion of the
Decision7 reads: WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 147 dated 26 February 2007 finding accused-appellant Sherwin Dela
Cruz y Gloria GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime ofHomicide with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
(1) to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;
(2) the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;
(4) the amount of ₱3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity.
(5) to pay the costs of the litigation.
SO ORDERED.8
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.
Raised are the following issues for resolution:
1. WHETHER ALL THE REQUISITES OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
SELF-DEFENSE, AS PROVIDED FOR BY LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE,
ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE.
2. WHETHER THE FIRING OF THE GUN WHEREIN ONLY A SINGLE BULLET WAS
DISCHARGED THEREFROM WAS MERELY ACCIDENTAL WHICH OCCURRED
DURING THE TIME THAT THE PETITIONER-APPELLANT WAS STILL IN THE
ACT OF DEFENDING HIMSELF FROM THE CONTINUOUS UNLAWFUL
AGGRESSION OF THE DECEASED VICTIM.
3. WHETHER THE PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO PROVE ALL THE ESSENTIAL
ELEMENTS CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF HOMICIDE.
4. WHETHER THE PRIVILEGED MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-
DEFENSE IS APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.
5. WHETHER PETITIONER-APPELLANT MAY BE HELD CIVILLY LIABLE FOR
THE DEATH OF THE VICTIM ARISING FROM THE ACCIDENT THAT
TRANSPIRED.9
There is no question that petitioner authored the death of the deceased-victim, Jeffrey.
What is leftfor determination by this Court is whether the elements of self-defenseexist to
exculpate petitioner from the criminal liability for Homicide.
The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel
such aggression; and (3) lackof sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting
to self-defense.10 In other words, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked
attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe
wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack.11
Considering that self-defense totally exonerates the accused from any criminal liability, it
is well settled thatwhen he invokes the same, it becomes incumbent upon him to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself.12 The burden of
proving that the killing was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor
shifts upon him.13 As such, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of the prosecution for, even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot be
disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted the killing.14
Measured against this criteria, wefind that petitioner's defense is sorely wanting. Hence,
his petition must be denied.
First. The evidence on record does not support petitioner's contention that unlawful
aggression was employed by the deceased-victim, Jeffrey, against him.
Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual,
sudden, unexpected or imminent danger — not merely threatening and intimidating
action.15 There is aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and immediate threat
to his life.16 The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely
speculative.17 In the case at bar, other than petitioner’s testimony, the defense did not
adduce evidence to show that Jeffrey condescendingly responded to petitioner’s questions
or initiated the confrontation before the shooting incident; that Jeffrey pulled a gun from
his chair and tried to shoot petitioner but failed — an assault which may have caused
petitioner to fear for his life.
More, a review of the testimony of the prosecution witness, Pelaez, will show that if there
was unlawful aggression in the instant case, the same rather emanated from petitioner,
thus: DIRECT EXAMINATION
Atty. Mariano:
Q: Can you relate to the Court, Ms. Witness, how did this incident happen?
A: We were still at work, we were expecting calls but there were no calls at the moment
and I was standing at my work station and then Sherwin approached Jeff and he pointed a
gun at the back of the head of Jeff.

Even assuming arguendothat the gun originated from Jeffrey and an altercation Q: And then what happened?
transpired, and therefore, danger may have in fact existed, the imminence of that danger
had already ceased the moment petitioner disarmed Jeffrey by wresting the gun from the A: And then Jeff parried the gun and they started struggling for the possession of the gun.
latter. After petitioner had successfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful
aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the need to kill Jeffrey. As aptly Q: How far were you from this struggle when you witnessed it?
observed by the RTC, petitioner had every opportunity to run away from the scene and
seek help but refused to do so, thus:
A: Probably 10 to 12 feet.
In this case, accused and the victim grappled for possession of the gun.1avvphi1 Accused
admitted that he wrested the gun from the victim. From that point in time until the victim Q: Going back to your story, Ms. Witness, you mentioned that after Jeffrey warded off the
shouted "guard, guard", then took the fire extinguisher, there was no unlawful aggression gun, they started to struggle, what happened after that, if any?
coming from the victim. Accused had the opportunity to run away. Therefore, even
assuming that the aggression with use of the gun initially came from the victim, the fact A: After they struggled, the gun clicked three times and then after that Jeff tried to get hold
remains that it ceased when the gun was wrested away by the accused from the victim. It of the fire extinguisher and the fourth shot went off and then Jeffrey fell down.
is settled that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to
kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is Q: And who was holding the gun?
committed (Peo Vs. Tagana, 424 SCRA 620). A person making a defense has no more right
to attack an aggressor when the unlawful aggression has ceased (PeoVs. Pateo, 430 SCRA
609). A: Sherwin was holding the gun. (TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 12-14) CROSS-EXAMINATION:
Atty. Agoot:

Accused alleged that the victimwas about to smash the fire extinguisher on his (accused’s)
headbut he parried it with his hand holding the gun. This is doubtful as nothing in the Q: So you did not see when Sherwin approached Jeffrey because he came from the other
records is or would be corroborative of it.In contrast, the two (2) Prosecution witnesses side? Atty. Mariano:
whose credibility was not impeached, both gave the impression that the victim got the fire
extinguisher to shieldhimself from the accused who was then already in possession of the Objection, your Honor, witness already answered that.
gun.18
Atty. Agoot:
Thus, when an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts
to self-defense has no right to kill or even wound the former aggressor.19 To be sure, when I am on cross examination, your Honor.
the present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object
of his attack was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would
warrant legal self-defense on the part of the offender.20 Undoubtedly, petitioner went COURT
beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and
fatal injuries on Jeffrey, even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased. You didn’t not see when he approached Jeffrey? A: No, as I said, I saw him point the gun at
the back of Jeff and he did not come from my side so that means…
COURT Witness demonstrating how the victim Jeffrey Gonzales was holding the fire extinguisher
upright with his right hand above the fire extinguisher and his left hand below the fire
No, the question is, You did not actually see Sherwin approached Jeffrey? extinguisher.

A: I saw him already at the back of Jeffrey. Witness:

Atty. Agoot The left hand would support the weight basically.

He was already at the back of Jeffrey when you saw him? Atty. Agoot

A: Yes, Sir. Q: And then he used that fire extinguisher to protect himself from the slapping of that
person who was in possession of the gun?
(TSN, Oct. 17, 2005, pp. 26-27)21
Witness
Clearly, petitioner's allegation that when he approached Jeffrey, the latter pulled a gun
from his chair and tried to shoot him, is not corroborated by separate competent evidence. A: Yes, sir.
Pitted against the testimony of prosecution witnesses, Managbanag and Pelaez, it pales
incomparison and loses probative value. We have, on more thanone occasion, ruled that Atty. Agoot
the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is not only
uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence but also extremely doubtful in Q: And then after that there was again a grappling?
itself.22
Witness
In addition, other than petitioner’s testimony, there is dearth of evidence showing that the
alleged unlawful aggression on the part of Jeffrey continued when he blocked the path of
petitioner while the latter tried to run away to avoid further confrontation with Jeffrey. A: No more grappling for possession. Because Jeffrey was still holding the fire extinguisher
We also agree with the findings of the RTC that there was no proof evincing that Jeffrey at thattime. And then he fell holding on to the fire extinguisher.
aimed and intended to smash the big fire extinguisher on petitioner’s head. Alternatively,
the prosecution witnesses maintained an impression that Jeffrey used the same to shield Atty. Agoot
himself from petitioner who was then in possession of the gun, a deadly weapon. An
excerpt of the testimony of Managbanag bares just that, to wit: Q: You said here which I quote "binaril siya ng lalaki ng sunod-sunod pero hindi pumutok"
Do you affirmand confirm this statement?
Atty. Agoot
Witness
Q: And then after pulling the fire extinguisher from the wall Jeffrey again faced the person
who was holding the gun already? A: Yes, sir. They were pushing each other. The other person was trying to point the gun at
Jeffrey and Jeffrey was trying to cover himself with the fire extinguisher so nagkakatulakan
Witness: sila at the same time.

A: He was holding the fire extinguisher like this. Atty. Agoot

COURT Q: You said that the gun clicked, how many times did the gun click without firing?

For the record. Witness

Atty. Mariano: A: Three (3) times, sir.

Atty. Agoot
Q: And what did the late Jeffrey do when the gun clicked but did not fire?
Witness
A: They were still pushing each other at that time.
Atty. Agoot
Q: Using the fire extinguisher, heused that to push against the person…
Witness
A: Basically trying to cover himself and trying to push away the person who was pointing
the gun at him.
Atty. Agoot
Q: And why do you know that Jeffrey was trying hard to push the fire extinguisher?
Witness
A: Because I was seated roughly about 5 to 6 feet away from them. So I clearly saw what
was going on at that time.
(Direct Examination of Marie Antonette Managbanag for the Defense, TSN dated 04
September 2006, pp. 12-17, emphasis supplied)23
Petitioner’s contention that Jeffrey’s unlawful aggression was continuous and imminent
is, therefore, devoid of merit.
Given that the criteria of unlawful aggression is indubitably absent in the instant case, the
severe wounds inflicted by petitioner upon Jeffrey was unwarranted and, therefore,
cannot be considered a justifying circumstance under pertinent laws and jurisprudence.
Second. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from the deceased victim,
Jeffrey, the means employed by petitioner was not reasonably commensurate to the
nature and extent of the alleged attack, which he sought to avert. As held by the Court in
People v. Obordo:24
Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
accused-appellant likewise failed to prove that the means he employed to repel Homer's
punch was reasonable. The means employed by the person invoking self-defense
contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense.
Accused appellant claimed that the victim punched him and was trying to get something
from his waist, so he (accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his hunting knife. His act
of immediately stabbing Homer and inflicting a wound on a vital part ofthe victim's body
was unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as alleged by accused-appellant
himself, the victim used his bare fist in throwing a punch at him.25
Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be rationally
necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. The opposite was, however,
employed by petitioner, as correctly pointed out by the RTC, thus:
The victim was holding the fire extinguisher while the second was holding the gun. The
gun and the discharge thereof was unnecessary and disproportionate to repel the alleged
aggression with the use of fire extinguisher. The rule is that the means employed by the
person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of
attack and the defense (Peo vs. Obordo, 382 SCRA 98).
It was the accused who was in a vantage position as he was armed with a gun, as against
the victim who was armed, so to speak, with a fire extinguisher, which is not a deadly
weapon. Under the circumstances, accused’s alleged fear was unfounded. The Supreme
Court has ruled that neither an imagined impending attack nor an impending or
threatening attitude is sufficient to constitute unlawful aggression (Catalina Security
Agency Vs. Gonzales-Decano, 429 SCRA 628). It is a settled rule that to constitute
aggression, the person attacked must be confronted by a real threat on his lifeand limb;
and the peril sought to be avoided is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary (Senoja
v. Peo., 440 SCRA 695).26
If petitioner had honestly believed that Jeffrey was trying to kill him, he should have just
run, despite any obstruction, considering that he was already in possession of the gun. He
could have also immediately sought help from the people around him, specifically the
guard stationed at the floor where the shooting incident happened. In fact, he could have
reported the incident to the authorities as soon as he had opportunity to do so, if it was
indeed an accident or a cry of self-preservation. Yet, petitioner never did any of that.
We find it highly specious for petitioner to go through the process of tussling and hassling
with Jeffrey, and inthe end, shooting the latter on the forehead, not only once, but four
times, the last shot finally killing him, if he had no intention to hurt Jeffrey. Thus:
Moreover, the Prosecution’s eyewitnesses were consistent in declaring that while there
was prior struggle for the possession of the gun, it was nevertheless accused who was
holding the gun at the time of the actual firing thereof (TSN, p. 30, October 10, 2005; TSN,
p. 14, October 17, 2005). Witness Managbanag even alleged that while the victim (Jeffrey),
who was in possession of the fire extinguisher, and the accused were pushing each other,
accused pointed the gun at the victim. She heard three (3) clicks and on the 4th , the gun
fired (TSN, p. 12, October 10, 2005). Under the circumstances, it cannot be safely said that
the gun was or could have been fired accidentally. The discharge of the gun which led to
the victim’s death was no longer made in the course of the grapple and/or struggle for the
possession of the gun.27
The observation of the RTC dispels any doubt that the gun may have been shot accidentally
to the detriment of Jeffrey. The fire was neither a disaster nor a misfortune of sorts. While
petitioner may nothave intended to kill Jeffrey at the onset, at the time he clicked the
trigger thrice consecutively, his intent to hurt (or even kill) Jeffrey was too plain to be
disregarded. We have held in the pastthat the nature and number of wounds are
constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia which disprove a plea of self-
defense.28 Thus, petitioner’s contention that an accident simultaneously occurred while
hewas in the act of self-defense is simply absurd and preposterous at best. There could
nothave been an accident because the victim herein suffered a gunshot wound on his head,
a vital part of the body and, thus, demonstrates a criminal mind resolved to end the life of
the victim.
Besides, petitioner’s failure to inform the police of the unlawful aggression on the part of
Jeffrey and to surrender the gun that he used to kill the victim militates against his claim
of self-defense.29
In view of the foregoing, we find it illogical to discuss further the third element of self-
defense since it is recognized that unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua nonfor
upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense.30 If there is nothing to prevent or
repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis.31 Hence, there is no basis
to entertain petitioner’s argument that a privileged mitigating circumstance of selfdefense
is applicable in this case, because unless the victim has committed unlawful aggression
against the other, there can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, on the part of the
latter.32
Anent petitioner’s argument thatthe RTC erred when it failed to consider as suppression
of evidence the prosecution’s alleged deliberate omission to present the testimonies of the
security guards-on-duty at the time of the shooting incident, the same fails to persuade.
We concur with the decision of the CA on this point, to wit:
Having admitted the killing of the victim, the burden of evidence that he acted in self-
defense, shifted to accused-appellant Dela Cruz. He must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence, for, even if the latter were
weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the killing.
The security guards on duty at the time of the subject incident were at the disposal of both
the prosecution and the defense. The defense did not proffer proof that the prosecution
prevented the security guards from testifying. There is therefore no basis for it to conclude
that the prosecution is guilty of suppression of evidence.
The defense could have easily presented the security guards if it is of the opinion that their
[the security guards] testimonies were vital and material to the case of the defense. It could
have compelled the security guards on duty to appear before the court. xxx.33
It is worthy to note that the question of whether petitioner acted in self-defense is
essentially a question of fact.34 It is the peculiar province of the trial court to determine
the credibility of witnesses and related questions of fact because of its superior advantage
in observing the conduct and demeanor of witnesses while testifying.35 This being so and
in the absence of a showing that the CA and the RTC failed to appreciate facts or
circumstances of such weight and substance that would have merited petitioner's
acquittal, this Court finds no compelling reason to disturb the ruling of the CA that
petitioner did not act in self-defense.36
In this regard, we do not subscribe to petitioner’s contention that since the incident
transpired in Jeffrey’s office, and the witnesses presented by the prosecution are known
officemates of Jeffrey, the witnesses are expected to testify in favor of Jeffrey and against
petitioner. Ascorrectly pointed out by respondent, there appears no motive on the part of
the prosecution witnesses to falsely testify against petitioner.37 The fact that they are
officemates of Jeffrey does not justify a conclusion that Managbanag and Pelaez would
concoct or fabricate stories in favorof Jeffrey for the mere purpose of implicating
petitioner with such a serious crime, especially since they are testifying under oath.
All told, we find no basis to doubt ordispute, much less overturn, the findings of the RTC
and the CA that the elements of homicide are present in the instant case as amply shown
by the testimonies of the prosecution eyewitnesses, and they constitute sufficient proof of
the guilt of petitioner beyond cavil or doubt.
Nevertheless, with regard to the appreciation of the aggravating circumstance of use of an
unlicensed firearm, we deviate from the findings of the CA. A perusal of the Information
will show that the use of unlicensed firearm was expressly alleged in the killing of Jeffrey.
This allegation was further proved during trial by the presentation of the Certification
from the PNP Firearms and Explosives Division, dated November 11, 2005, certifying that
petitioner is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and calibre, per
verification from the records of the said Division. Accordingly, under Paragraph 3 of
Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8294, amending Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.)
No. 1866, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance, to wit:
xxxx
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
x x x x.
Under Article 249 of the RPC, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. There being
an aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, the penalty imposable on
petitioner should be in its maximum period.38Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the petitioner shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as the minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum, as the maximum penalty.
As to the award of civil indemnity, moral damages, and damages for loss of earning
capacity in favor ofprivate respondent, we sustain the findings of the CA in so far as they
are in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, we find the grant of
exemplary damages in the present case in order, since the presence of special aggravating
circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm has been established.39 Based on current
jurisprudence, the award of exemplary damages for homicide is ₱30,000.00.40

Finally, pursuant to this Court’s ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,41 an interest of six
percent (6%) per annum on the aggregate amount awarded for civil indemnity and
damages for loss of earning capacity shall be imposed, computed from the time of finality
of this Decision until full payment thereof.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The May 7, 2009 Decision and August 19, 2009
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89257, finding petitioner Sherwin
Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, are hereby AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATIONS, to wit:

(1) Petitioner shall be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from ten (10) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as the minimum penalty, to seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum, as the maximum penalty;

(2) Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim the following:

a. the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

b. the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;

c. the amount of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages;

d. the amount of ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages;

e. the amount of ₱3,022,641.71 as damages for loss of earning capacity;

f. for the civil indemnity and the damages for loss of earning capacity, an interest
of six percent (6%) per annum, computed from the time of finality of this
Decision until full payment thereof; and

g. the costs of the litigation.

SO ORDERED.
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
G.R. No. 170462 February 5, 2014
RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
BRION, J.:
We review in this petition for review on certiorari1 the decision2 dated October 24, 2005
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28899. The CA affirmed, with modification
on the amount of damages, the joint decision3 dated April 16, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 20, Cauayan City, Isabela, finding Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra
(petitioners) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of frustrated homicide and
homicide.
Factual Antecedents
Rodolfo and his son, Joey, were charged with the crimes of frustrated homicide and
homicide under two Informations which read:
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1560 for Frustrated Homicide:
That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province of
Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill and without
any just motive, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack,
hack and stab for several times with a sharp pointed bolo one Erwin Ordonez, who as a
result thereof, suffered multiple hack and stab wounds on the different parts of his body,
which injuries would ordinarily cause the death of the said Erwin Ordonez, thus,
performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of homicide as
a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of
their will, that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to the said Erwin
Ordonez, which prevented his death.4
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide:
That on or about the 8th day of January, 2000, in the municipality of Alicia, province of
Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
conspiring, confederating together and helping one another, with intent to kill and without
any just motive, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, assault, attack,
hack and stab for several times with a sharp pointed bolo one David Ordonez, who as a
result thereof, suffered multiple hack and stab wounds on the different parts of his body
which directly caused his death.5
Although the informations stated that the crimes were committed on January 8, 2000, the
true date of their commission is November 8, 2000, as confirmed by the CA through the
records.6 The parties failed to raise any objection to the discrepancy.7
On arraignment, the petitioners pleaded not guilty to both charges.8 The cases were jointly
tried with the conformity of the prosecution and the defense. At the pre-trial, the
petitioners interposed self-defense, which prompted the RTC to conduct a reverse trial of
the case.9
During the trial, the parties presented different versions of the events that transpired on
November 8, 2000.
Version of the Defense
To prove the petitioners' claim of self-defense, the defense presented the testimonies of
Rodolfo, Joey, and the petitioners' neighbor, Balbino Agustin.
Testimony of Rodolfo
Rodolfo, who was then fifty-five (55) years old, narrated that, at around 11 :00 p.m., on
November 8, 2000, brothers Erwin Ordonez and David Ordonez, together with their
companion, Philip Vingua, forced their way into his compound and threw stones at his
house and tricycle. Through the back door of his house, Rodolfo went down to the
basement or "silung' and shouted at the three men to stop. David saw him, threatened to
kill him, and struck him with a ''panabas," hitting him on the palm of his left hand. Rodolfo
responded by reaching for the bolo tucked in the "so/era" of his house, and hacked and
stabbed Erwin and David until the two brothers fell to the ground. Upon seeing Erwin and
David lying on the ground, Rodolfo called on someone to bring the brothers to the hospital.
He stayed in his house until the policemen arrived.
Testimony of Joey
Joey, who was then thirty-one (31) years old, narrated that, at around 11:00 p.m., on
November 8, 2000, he was awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house
in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela. Through the window, he saw Erwin, David and Philip
breaking into their gate, which was made of wood and interlink wire and located five ( 5)
to six ( 6) meters away from their house. He then heard his father Rodolfo say to the three
men, "kung ano man ang problema bukas na natin pag-usapan,"10 and David retorted in
their dialect, "Okininam nga lakay adda ka gayam dita, patayin taka."11
Testimony of Balbino
Balbino narrated that, from inside his house in Bliss, Paddad, Alicia, Isabela, at around
10:00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he heard a person from the outside saying "Sige banatan
ninyo na."12 He opened his door and saw David, Erwin and Philip throwing stones at the
house of his neighbor Crisanto Briones. Briones got mad and scolded the three men, "Why
are you hitting my house? Why don't you hit the house of your enemy, mga tarantado
kayo!"13David, Erwin and Philip then aimed their stones at the petitioners' house. Balbino
heard David calling out to Joey, "Joey, kung tunay kang lalaki lumabas ka diyan sa kalsada
at dito tayo magpatayan,"14 but no one came out of Rodolfo's house. The stoning lasted for
about thirty (30) minutes.
Afterwards, Balbino saw David, Erwin and Philip destroy Rodolfo's gate and pull the gate
towards the road. He heard David say to his companions, "koberan ninyo ako at papasok
kami."15 David, Erwin and Philip entered the petitioners' compound and damaged
Rodolfo's tricycle with stones and their ''panabas." Also, he heard Rodolfo say to David in
Filipino that they could just talk about their problems with him the following day. But
David approached Rodolfo and hacked him with a ''panabas." Rodolfo parried the blow
with the back of his hand, and David and Rodolfo struggled for the possession of the
''panabas."
Balbino also saw Erwin hit Rodolfo on the face with a stone and Joey was hit on his right
foot, causing Rodolfo and Joey to retreat to the "silung" of their house from where Rodolfo
got "something shiny," and with it stabbed David and Erwin. He saw the two brothers fall
to the ground.
Version of the Prosecution
As its rebuttal witness, the prosecution presented the sole testimony of Erwin who
survived the hacking.
Erwin narrated that, at around 10:00 to 11 :00 p.m., on November 8, 2000, he, his brother
David and Philip went to a birthday party and passed in front of the petitioners' compound.
He was walking twenty (20) meters ahead of his companions when, suddenly, Philip ran
up to him saying that David was being stabbed by Joey with a bolo. While approaching the
scene of the stabbing, which was three (3) meters away from where his brother David was,
Erwin was met by Rodolfo who then hacked him, hitting his arm and back. Thereafter,
Rodolfo and Joey dragged Erwin inside the petitioners' compound and kept on hacking
him. He was hacked and stabbed thirteen (13) times. He became weak and ultimately fell
to the ground.
Erwin denied that he and David threw stones at the petitioners' house and damaged
Rodolfo's tricycle.1âwphi1 They did not likewise destroy the petitioners' gate, which was
only damaged when his brother David clung on to it while he was being pulled by Rodolfo
and Erwin into their compound. While they were being hacked and stabbed by Rodolfo
and Erwin, stones actually rained on them and people outside the petitioners' gate were
saying, "Do not kill the brothers. Allow them to come out."16
After the incident, Erwin and David, both unconscious, were brought to the hospital. David
died in the hospital while being treated for his wounds.
The RTC's Ruling
In a decision dated April 16, 2004, the RTC gave credence to the prosecution's version of
the incident and found the petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
frustrated homicide and homicide. It disbelieved the defense's version of the events due
to material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the defense witnesses. It denied the
petitioners' claim of self-defense for lack of clear, convincing and satisfactory supporting
evidence.
The RTC explained in its decision that "[w]hen an accused invokes the justifying
circumstance of self-defense, he loses the constitutional presumption of innocence and
assumes the burden of proving, with clear and convincing evidence, the justification for
his act";17 that self-defense is an affirmative allegation which must be proven with
certainty by sufficient, satisfactory and convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of
criminal aggression on the part of the person invoking it.18 The RTC held that the
petitioners miserably failed to prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the
victims, Erwin and David.
Accordingly, the RTC disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Rodolfo Guevarra and Joey Guevarra guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes for which they are charged, and absent any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance/s that attended the commission of the crimes, the Court hereby
sentences each of the accused to suffer -In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1560 for Frustrated
Homicide - an indeterminate penalty ranging from Three (3) years and one day of prision
correccional as minimum to Nine (9) years of prision mayor as maximum and to indemnify
the victim Erwin Ordonez moral damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand
(₱20,000.00) Pesos, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Cost
against the accused.
In Criminal Case No. Br. 20-1561 for Homicide - an indeterminate penalty ranging from
Eight (8) years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to Fifteen (15) years of
Reclusion Temporal as maximum and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased David
Ordonez Sixty Thousand (₱60,000.00) Pesos plus Thirty Thousand (₱30,000.00) Pesos as
moral damages without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Costs against the
accused.
The bail bonds of the accused are CANCELLED.19
The CA's Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC's judgment and convicted the petitioners of the crimes
charged. As the RTC did, the CA found that Erwin and David committed no unlawful
aggression sufficient to provoke the actions of the petitioners; that "aggression, to be
unlawful, must be actual and imminent, such that there is a real threat of bodily harm to
the person resorting to self-defense or to others whom that person is seeking to
defend."20 Even assuming the truth of the petitioners' claims that David challenged Joey to
a fight and threatened to kill Rodolfo on the night of November 8, 2000, the CA held that
these acts do not constitute unlawful aggression to justify the petitioners' actions as no
real or actual danger existed as the petitioners were then inside the safety of their own
home.
The CA further held that the petitioners' plea of self-defense was belied by the nature and
number of wounds inflicted on Erwin, who sustained thirteen (13) stab wounds on his
arm and back, and David, who suffered around ten (10) stab wounds on his back and
stomach causing his death. These wounds logically indicated that the assault was no longer
an act of self-defense but a determined homicidal aggression on the part of the
petitioners.21
The CA, however, found error in the amounts of civil indemnity and moral damages
awarded by the RTC. Thus, the CA modified the RTC's decision in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. In Crim. Case No.
Br. 20-1561, appellants RODOLFO GUEVARRA and JOEY GUEVARRA are each ordered to
pay the heirs of the deceased David Ordonez the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P.50,000.00) as civil indemnity and another Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) as moral
damages.22
The Petition
In the present petition, the petitioners raise the following issues:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE PRESENCE OF THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE
DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE ELEMENTS OF SELF-
DEFENSE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING FULL
CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE LONE WITNESS OF THE PROSECUTION.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING
PETITIONER JOEY GUEVARRA WHO HAS NO PARTICIPATION IN THE SAID INCIDENT.23
Our Ruling
We deny the present petition as we find no reversible error in the CA decision of October
24, 2005.
At the outset, we emphasize that the Court's review of the present case is via a petition for
review under Rule 45, which generally bars any question pertaining to the factual issues
raised. The well-settled rule is that questions of fact are not reviewable in petitions for
review under Rule 45, subject only to certain exceptions, among them, the lack of sufficient
support in evidence of the trial court's judgment or the appellate court's misapprehension
of the adduced facts.24
The petitioners fail to convince us that we should review the findings of fact in this case.
Factual findings of the RTC, when affirmed by the CA, are entitled to great weight and
respect by this Court and are deemed final and conclusive when supported by the evidence
on record.25 We find that both the RTC and the CA fully considered the evidence presented
by the prosecution and the defense, and they have adequately explained the legal and
evidentiary reasons in concluding that the petitioners are guilty of the crimes of frustrated
homicide and homicide.
In the absence of any showing that the trial and appellate courts overlooked certain facts
and circumstances that could substantially affect the outcome of the present case, we
uphold the rulings of the RTC and the CA which found the elements of these crimes fully
established during the trial.
The crime of frustrated homicide is committed when: (1) an "accused intended to kill his
victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained
fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none
of the qualifying circumstance for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is
present."26
On the other hand, the crime of homicide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the
accused killed that person without any justifying circumstance; (3) the accused had the
intention to kill, which is presumed; and ( 4) the killing was not attended by any of the
qualifying circumstances of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide.27
The petitioners' intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds
sustained by their victims. Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may
consist, among other things, of the means used by the malefactors; the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and the
nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim.28 The CA aptly observed
that the ten (10) hack/stab wounds David suffered and which eventually caused his death,
and the thirteen (13) hack/stab wounds Erwin sustained, confirmed the prosecution's
theory that the petitioners purposely and vigorously attacked David and Erwin. 29
In fact, the petitioners admitted at the pre-trial that "the wounds inflicted on the victim
Erwin Ordonez would have caused his death were it not for immediate medical
attendance."30
By invoking self-defense, the petitioners, in effect, admitted to the commission of the acts
for which they were charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have
exculpated them. With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to the petitioners to
show that the killing and frustrated killing of David and Erwin, respectively, were attended
by the following circumstances: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victims; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the persons resorting to self-defense.31
Of all the burdens the petitioners carried, the most important of all is the element of
unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression is an actual physical assault, or at least a threat
to inflict real imminent injury, upon a person.32 The element of unlawful aggression must
be proven first in order for self-defense to be successfully pleaded. There can be no self-
defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the victim had committed unlawful
aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense.33

As the RTC and the CA did, we find the absence of the element of unlawful aggression on
the part of the victims. As the prosecution fully established, Erwin and David were just
passing by the petitioners' compound on the night of November 8, 2000 when David was
suddenly attacked by Joey while Erwin was attacked by Rodolfo. The attack actually took
place outside, not inside, the petitioners' compound, as evidenced by the way the
petitioners' gate was destroyed. The manner by which the wooden gate post was broken
coincided with Erwin's testimony that his brother David, who was then clinging onto the
gate, was dragged into the petitioners' compound. These circumstances, coupled with the
nature and number of wounds sustained by the victims, clearly show that the petitioners
did not act in self-defense in killing David and wounding Erwin. The petitioners were, in
fact, the real aggressors.

As to the penalties and damages

awarded

We affirm the penalties imposed upon the petitioners, as they are well within the ranges
provided by law, but modify the damages awarded by the CA.

In addition to the ₱50,000.00 civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 moral damages awarded by
the CA, we award ₱25,000.00 to each of the victims as temperate damages, in lieu of the
actual damages they sustained by reason of the crimes. Article 2224 of the Civil Code states
that temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty.

Also, we impose on all the monetary awards for damages interest at the legal rate of six
percent ( 6%) per annum from date of finality of the decision until fully paid.34

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated October 24, 2005 of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the petitioners are also ordered
to pay Erwin Ordonez and the heirs of David Ordonez the amount of ₱25,000.00 as
temperate damages.

The petitioners shall pay interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum on the civil
indemnity, moral and temperate damages from the finality of this decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
G.R. No. 200800 February 9, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
OSCAR SEVILLANO y RETANAL Accused-Appellant.
PEREZ, J.:
For this Court's resolution is the appeal filed by Oscar Sevillano y Retanal (appellant)
assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
04257 which affirmed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) 4 December 2009
Judgment2 finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder.
Factual Antecedents
Appellant was charged before the RTC, Branch 1 7, Manila with murder in an information
that reads:
That on or about March 11, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with
intent to kill and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of
PABLO MADDAUIN y TAMANG by then and there suddenly and unexpectedly stabbing him
several times with a deadly bladed weapon hitting upon the said Pablo T. Maddauin fatal
stab wounds which are the direct cause of his death immediately thereafter.3
During arraignment, appellant, assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Trial thereafter ensued.
Statement of Facts
The version of the prosecution was summarized by the CA thus wise:
Prosecution witnesses Jose Palavorin and Carmelita Cardona, 67 and 46 years old,
respectively, testified that at around 3:00 p.m. of 11 March 2007, they, together with
Victim Pablo Maddauin, were seated on a long bench having their usual chit-chat at the
vacant lot situated at 4th Street Guadal Canal, St., Sta. Mesa, Manila. Witness Jose was the
watchman of this property. While conversing, they saw appellant coming towards their
direction. Appellant could not walk straight and appeared to be drunk. Without warning,
appellant pulled out a knife from his waist and stabbed the victim on the chest. Jose and
Carmelita tried to restrain the appellant from attacking the victim, but Jose experienced
leg cramps and lost his hold on appellant. Appellant turned again on the victim and
continued to stab him several times more. The victim was heard asking appellant, "Bakit?".
Carmelita shouted for help. The victim’s wife came to the scene and embraced appellant
as she wrestled for the knife. Thereafter, [the] victim was brought to the University of the
East Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Medical center; but unfortunately, he died that same
day.4
Appellant, for his part, denied the accusations against him. He interposed self-defense to
absolve himself from criminal liability. He averred that on that fateful afternoon, he went
to the vacant lot where the victim and his friends usually hang-out to feed his chicken.
While thereat, the victim, whom he described to have bloodshot eyes, walk towards him
and stepped on his injured foot. While he was on his knees because of the pain, he saw the
victim draw a knife. The latter thereafter stabbed at him while uttering: "Ikaw pa, putang
ina mo," but missed his target. As he and the victim grappled for the knife, the latter was
accidentally stabbed. When he saw blood oozing out of the victim, he became
apprehensive of the victim’s relative to such extent that he fled the scene and hid to as far
as Bulacan where he was eventually apprehended.
Ruling of the RTC
In a Judgment5 dated 4 December 2009, the trial court found appellant guilty of murder
for the death of Pablo Maddauin (Pablo) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua without eligibility of parole and to pay the heirs of the deceased
₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
The trial court gave credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses that appellant,
who appeared to be intoxicated, unexpectedly arrived and stabbed Pablo seven times with
a knife. The trial court disregarded appellant’s denial as his testimony was outweighed by
the positive statements of the prosecution witnesses. It likewise ruled that treachery
attended the commission of the crime, as demonstrated by the fact that the victim was
seated and engaged in a conversation when suddenly attacked by the appellant. The trial
court ruled that such situation foreclosed any opportunity on the part of the victim to ward
off the impending harm.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In his appeal before the CA, appellant contended that:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S
GUILT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYONDREASONABLE DOUBT.
II
ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS LIABLE, THE TRIAL COURT
GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF MURDER INSTEAD OF
HOMICIDE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED INNOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ACTED IN
SELF-DEFENSE.6
The CA found no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and upheld its ruling but with
modification on the amount of damages awarded. The CA ordered appellant to indemnify
the heirs of Pablo in the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The appellate court held that the
eyewitness accounts of prosecution witnesses Jose Palavorin and Carmelita Cardona, and
their positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator, aptly complemented by the
findings of the postmortem examination, are more plausible than the appellant’s claim of
self-defense.7 The CA likewise sustained the trial court’s findings that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was present in the case. It held that although the attack on the
victim was frontal, it was deliberate, sudden and unexpected, affording the hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no opportunity to resist or to defend himself.8
Issues
Undaunted, appellant is now before this Court continuing to insist that his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt, and that the lower courts erred in rejecting his claim of
self-defense and convicting him of murder instead of homicide.
Our Ruling
We find the appeal bereft of merit.
Well entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial judge is in the best position to
assess the credibility of the witnesses, and has the unique opportunity to observe the
witness first hand and note his demeanor, conduct and attitude under gruelling
examination.9 Absent any showing that the trial court’s calibration of credibility was
flawed, the appellate court is bound by its assessment. In the prosecution of the crime of
murder as defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the following elements
must be established by the prosecution: (1) that a person was killed; (2) that the accused
killed that person; (3) that the killing was attended by treachery; and (4) that the killing is
not infanticide or parricide.10
After a careful evaluation of the records, we find that these elements were clearly met. The
prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the person who stabbed Pablo
several times on the chest which eventually caused the latter’s death. They testified that
they even tried to stop appellant’s attack but unfortunately, were unsuccessful. We find no
reason to disbelieve the testimonies of these witnesses considering that their narration of
facts were straightforward and replete with details that coincide with the medical
examination conducted on the body of the victim. We are not persuaded by the appellant’s
defense of denial as this cannot prevail over the eyewitnesses’ positive identification of
him as the perpetrator of the crime. Denial, like alibi, if not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.11
Anent the presence of the element of treachery as a qualifying circumstance, the
prosecution was able to establish that the attack on the unsuspecting victim, who was
merely seated on a bench and talking with his friends, was very sudden. In fact, the victim
was able to utter only "Bakit?". We note that the essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack on the unsuspecting victim by the perpetrator of the crime, depriving
the former of any chance to defend himself or to repel the aggression, thus insuring its
commission without risk to the aggressor and without any provocation on the part of the
victim.
By invoking self-defense, appellant in effect, admits to having inflicted the stab wounds
which killed the victim.1âwphi1 The burden was, therefore, shifted on him to prove that
the killing was done in self-defense. In Razon v. People,12 this Court held that where an
accused admits the killing, he assumes the burden to establish his plea by credible, clear
and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he
killed the victim. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when corroborated by
independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself.
Under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the following elements must be present in order
that a plea of self-defense may be validly considered in absolving a person from criminal
liability:
First. Unlawful Aggression;
Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
Appellant’s version that it was the victim who was armed with a knife and threatened to
stab him was found by the lower court to be untenable. We agree with the lower court’s
conclusion. Assuming arguendo that there was indeed unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim, the imminence of that danger had already ceased the moment appellant was
able to wrestle the knife from him. Thus, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to
speak of that would justify the need for him to kill the victim or the former aggressor. This
Court has ruled that if an accused still persists in attacking his adversary, he can no longer
invoke the justifying circumstance of self-defense.13 The fact that the victim suffered many
stab wounds in the body that caused his demise, and the nature and location of the wound
also belies and negates the claim of self-defense. It demonstrates a criminal mind resolved
to end the life of the victim.14
As to the penalties and damages
We affirm the penalty imposed upon appellant. Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended,
the crime of murder qualified by treachery is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death.
The lower courts were correct in sentencing appellant to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, upon consideration of the absence of any aggravating and mitigating
circumstances that attended the commission of the offense.
We likewise affirm the CA’s award of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral
damages; and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages to the victim’s heirs, as these amounts
are consistent with current jurisprudence.15 In addition, we impose on all the monetary
awards for damages interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from date of
finality of the resolution until fully paid.16

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 17 August 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 04257 finding Oscar Sevillano y Retanal guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility of parole, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Pablo Maddauin
in the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that he shall
pay interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum on the civil indemnity, moral and
exemplary damages awarded from finality of this resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
G.R. No. 180380 August 4, 2009
RAYMUND MADALI and RODEL MADALI, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners
Raymund Madali (Raymund) and Rodel Madali (Rodel) seek the reversal of the 29 August
2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27757; and its 23 October 2007
Resolution,2 affirming with modifications the 28 July 2003 Decision3 of the Romblon,
Romblon, Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 81, in Criminal Case No. 2179, finding
petitioners guilty of homicide.
For the death of AAA,4 Raymund, Rodel and a certain Bernardino "Jojo" Maestro
(Bernardino) were charged before the RTC with the crime of Murder. The accusatory
portion of the Information reads:
That on or about the 13th day of April 1999, at around 11:00 o’clock in the evening, in the
Barangay XXX, Municipality of Romblon, province of Romblon, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping each other, did then and there by means of treachery
and with evident premeditation, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, strike
with a coconut frond and "llave inglesa" and strangle with a dog chain, one AAA, inflicting
upon the latter mortal wounds in different parts of his body which caused his untimely
death.5
During the arraignment on 31 May 2000, the three accused, with the assistance of counsel,
pleaded not guilty.6
On trial, the prosecution presented eight witnesses, namely: (1) Jovencio Musa (Jovencio),
16 years old, the victim’s cousin and the alleged lone eyewitness to the killing; (2) Senior
Police Officer (SPO) 3 Rogelio Madali, the designated Deputy Chief of Police of the Romblon
Police Station; (3) Police Officer (PO) 3 Nicolas Molo, the police investigator assigned to
the case; (4) BBB, the mother of the deceased victim; (5) Dr. Carmen Lita P. Calsado, Chief
of the Romblon District Hospital, the physician who issued the death certificate of AAA;
(6) Emerson de Asis, the alleged companion of witness Jovencio on the night in question,
who later became a hostile witness; (7) Michael Manasan, also a companion of witness
Jovencio before the killing of the victim occurred; (8) Dr. Floresto Arizala, Jr., a forensic
expert from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Manila, who conducted the
examination of the corpse of the victim after the same was exhumed.
As documentary and object evidence, the prosecution offered the following: (1) Exhibit
"A" – Affidavit of Jovencio executed on 22 April 1999, detailing the circumstances prior to,
during and after the killing of the victim perpetrated by Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino;
(2) Exhibit "B" – Sinumpaang Salaysay of Jovencio dated 8 May 1999, a recantation of the
22 April 1999 Affidavit; (3) Exhibit "C" – Amended Affidavit of Jovencio dated 28 May
1999, which was substantially the same on material points as the 22 April 1999 Affidavit;
(4) Exhibit "D" – Undated Reply Affidavit of Jovencio insisting that the death of the victim
was authored by Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino; (5) Exhibit "E" – Joint Affidavit of
prosecution witnesses SPO3 Rogelio Madali and a certain SPO2 Teresito M. Sumadsad; (6)
Exhibit "F" – the coconut frond recovered by the police officers from the scene of the
incident; (7) Exhibit "G" – a dog chain used as part of a strap that was tied to the victim’s
neck while he was hanging from a tree; (8) Exhibit "H" – the handkerchief that was tied
around the victim’s neck; (9) Exhibit "I" – empty bottles of gin; (10) Exhibit "J" –
cellophanes with rugby; (10) Exhibit "K" – pictures taken from the crime scene including
the picture of the body of the victim tied to a tree; (11) Exhibit "L" – Letter of Request for
the NBI to conduct an examination of the body of the victim; (12) Exhibits "M" to "O" – NBI
routing slips; (14) Exhibit "P" – Death Certificate issued by Dr. Carmen Lita P. Calsado; (15)
Exhibit "Q" – Exhumation Report issued by Dr. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr.; (16) Exhibit "R" –
the Autopsy Report submitted by Dr. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr.; (17) Exhibit "S" – Sketch of the
head of the victim showing the injuries thereon; and (18) Exhibit "T" – handwritten draft
of the exhumation report.
Taken together, the evidence offered by the prosecution shows that at around 5:30 in the
afternoon of 13 April 1999, BBB, who made a living by selling goods aboard ships docked
at the Romblon Pier, and who was constantly assisted by her 15-year-old son AAA, was on
a ship plying her wares. AAA, together with Jovencio and Raymund, was there helping his
mother.7 Sometime later, Raymund and AAA left the ship. Jovencio stayed a little longer.8
At about 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Jovencio and another friend named Michael Manasan
sat beside the Rizal monument in the Poblacion of Romblon, located between the Roman
Catholic Church and Lover’s Inn. Michael had just left Jovencio when Raymund, Rodel,
Bernardino and the victim AAA arrived. After meandering around, the group proceeded to
climb the stairs, atop of which was the reservoir just beside the Romblon National High
School. The victim, AAA, ascended first; behind him were Rodel, Raymund, Bernardino and
witness Jovencio. As soon as they reached the reservoir, Bernardino blindfolded AAA with
the handkerchief of Raymund. Bernardino at once blurted out, "Join the rugby boys." AAA
replied, "That’s enough." Bernardino then struck AAA thrice with a fresh and hard coconut
frond. AAA lost his balance and was made to stand up by Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino.
Raymund took his turn clobbering AAA at the back of his thighs with the same coconut
frond. AAA wobbled. Before he could recover, he received punches to his head and body
from Rodel, who was wearing brass knuckles. The punishments proved too much, as AAA
lost consciousness.
Not satisfied, Raymund placed his handkerchief around the neck of AAA, with its ends tied
to a dog chain. With the contraption, the three malefactors pulled the body up a tree.
Stunned at the sight of his cousin being ill-treated, Jovencio could only muster a faint voice
saying "Enough" every single-time AAA received the painful blows. Bernardino, who
seemed to suggest finishing off the victim, remarked, "Since we’re all here, let’s get on with
it." Before leaving the scene, the three assailants warned Jovencio not to reveal the
incident to anyone, or he would be next.
Tormented and torn between the desire to come clean and the fear for his life, Jovencio
hardly slept that night. He did not divulge the incident to anyone for the next few days.
BBB, the victim’s mother, was worried when her son did not come home. She started
asking relatives whether they had seen her son, but their reply was always in the negative.
It was three days later that a certain Eugenio Murchanto reported to the police authorities
about a dead man found in Barangay ZZZ near the Romblon National High School. When
the policemen went there, they found the cadaver emitting a foul odor, with maggots
crawling all over, hanging from a tree with a handkerchief tied around the neck and a dog
chain fastened to the handkerchief. Also found in the area were paraphernalia for inhaling
rugby, as well as empty bottles of gin and a coconut frond.
The provincial hospital refused to conduct an autopsy, since AAA’s corpse was already
decomposing and stank so badly. It was through the intercession of the NBI that the body
was eventually exhumed and examined by medico-legal experts. Dr. Floresto P. Arizala, Jr.,
who conducted the examination, opined that the victim died due to head injuries and not
to asphyxiation by hanging. He declared that the victim was already dead when he was
tied to the tree, and that the variety of injuries sustained by the victim could be attributed
to more than one assailant.
Upon investigation, Jovencio narrated the incident and pointed to Raymund, Rodel and
Bernardino as the perpetrators of the crime. Thereafter, Jovencio executed his first
affidavit, which was dated 22 April 1999. Because of the threat made on him by a certain
Wilson, an uncle of Raymund and Rodel, Jovencio executed a second affidavit dated 8 May
1999, repudiating his first affidavit. On 28 May 1999, Jovencio made his third sworn
statement substantially reverting to his first affidavit.
The accused, on the other hand, advanced the defense of denial and alibi. They claimed
they had nothing to do with the death of AAA, and that they were nowhere near the locus
criminis when the killing occurred.
According to Rodel, 16 years old, he was with his father Rodolfo Madali in the house of a
friend named Noel Mindoro, located more or less 14 kilometers from the place where the
victim was slain where they spent the whole evening until the following morning. Rodel’s
testimony was corroborated by his father and Noel Mindoro.
On their part, Raymund, 14 years of age, and Bernardino declared that they were in their
respective houses on the night in question. Raymund’s place was allegedly five kilometers
away from the scene of the crime, while Bernardino’s was one kilometer away.
Bernardino’s testimony was supported by his father Bernardino Maestro, Sr. and by his
neighbor Diana Mendez. Raymund’s friend, Pastor Mario Fajiculay backed up the former’s
alibi.
Convinced by the version of the prosecution, the RTC rendered a guilty verdict against the
three accused. On account of the prosecution’s failure to prove the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation, they were only convicted of
homicide. The RTC observed that the incident was a sort of initiation, in which the victim
voluntarily went along with the perpetrators, not totally unaware that he would be beaten.
The RTC also appreciated the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of
the three accused. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused BERNARDO (sic) Jojo MAESTRO, JR., RODEL MADALI
AND RAYMUND MADALI GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, they
are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day to six (6) years and to indemnify the heirs of AAA jointly and
severally the amount of PhP 50,000.00.9
On 6 August 2003, Bernardino applied for probation. Thus, only Raymund and Rodel
elevated their convictions to the Court of Appeals.
In a Decision dated 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the RTC
that Rodel and Raymund killed the victim. However, pursuant to Section 64 of Republic
Act No. 9344, otherwise known as the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006," which
exempts from criminal liability a minor fifteen (15) years or below at the time of the
commission of the offense, Raymund’s case was dismissed. Rodel’s conviction was
sustained, and he was sentenced to six months and one day of prision correccional to eight
years and one day of prision mayor, but the imposition of said penalty was suspended
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9344. The judgment provides:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 28, 2003, rendered by the Regional Trial Court of
Romblon, Romblon (Branch 81) is Criminal Case No. 2179, is affirmed with the following
MODIFICATIONS:
1) Appellant Raymund Madali is declared EXEMPT from criminal liability and the
case, insofar as he is concerned is hereby DISMISSED pursuant to R.A. No. 9344.
2) Appellant Rodel Madali is found guilty of homicide, the proper penalty for
which is fixed at six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor. Imposition of this penalty should,
however, be SUSPENDED, also pursuant to R.A. No. 9344.
3) In addition to the civil indemnity imposed by the trial court in the amount of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00), moral damages in the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00) is hereby awarded in favor of the heirs of the
victim, AAA.
4) x x x x
5) Finally, this case is referred to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DWSD) for further proceedings in accordance with R.A. No.
9344.10
Hence, the instant case.
Petitioners Raymund and Rodel assail both the RTC and the Court of Appeals’ findings, PROS. BENEDICTO continuing:
which gave weight and credence to the account of the incident given by prosecution
witness Jovencio, whose testimony according to them was replete with patent and Q: While you were at Rizal on April 13, 1999 in the evening, [who was your
substantial inconsistencies. First, petitioners set their sights on the conflicting affidavits companion]?
executed by Jovencio. The first affidavit implicated the three accused in the death of AAA,
which was controverted by the second affidavit where Jovencio denied having seen the
three accused butcher the victim, while the third affidavit restated the material points in A: Only Michael.
the first affidavit. Petitioners also pointed out the discrepancy between the first and the
third affidavits, as the former stated that Jovencio was not seen by the three accused when Q: And what were you doing with Michael?
they executed the victim; whereas in the latter affidavit, Jovencio stated he was with the
three when the killing took place. Second, petitioners assert that the testimony of Jovencio A: Only standing by there.
relating to the alleged fact that his companions, Michael Manasan and Emerson de Asis,
saw the three accused and the deceased during the night in question was debunked by the
very testimonies of Michael Manasan and Emerson de Asis wherein they declared Q: Did anything happen while you were standing by with Michael?
otherwise.
A: None, sir.
Moreover, petitioners contend that both the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in
disbelieving the defense of alibi they interposed, considering that the prosecution failed Q: Did anyone arrive while you were there?
to muster the required quantum of proof, and that said defense was corroborated by
testimonies of the other defense witnesses. A: Yes, sir.

The elemental question in this case is the credibility of the parties and their witnesses. Q: Who?

Well-entrenched is the rule that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the A: Jojo [Bernardino] followed by Raymund then AAA, then Rodel.
witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike
appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimonies in light of the declarant’s demeanor,
conduct and position to discriminate between truth and falsehood.11 This is especially true Q: And what happened when they arrived?
when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, because said
findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court, unless it be manifestly A: They were also standing by there.
shown that the lower courts had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and
circumstances of significance in the case.12 Q: How long did they stand by in that place?

The RTC and the Court of Appeals did not overlook any significant facts in the case. A: I do not know how many hours?

This Court itself, in its effort to ferret out the truth based on the evidence on records has Q: Then, what happened next?
diligently pored over the transcripts of stenographic notes of this case and, like the RTC,
finds the testimony of Jovencio credible. Subjected to the grueling examinations on the
witness stand, Jovencio steadfastly pointed to Raymund, Rodel and Bernardino as the A: Around 10:30 o’clock we went there.
persons who slaughtered the victim. He testified as follows:
Q: When you said we, to whom you are referring as your companions?
Q: Mr. Witness, will you tell us where were you on April 13, 1999?
A: Jojo [Bernardino], Rodel, Raymund and AAA.
xxxx
Q: What happened to Michael?
A: I was at the Rizal standing by.
A: He went home.
xxxx
Q: When you said you went there, to which place are you referring?
A: Near the high school at hagdan-hagdan. Q: With what?

Q: There are three (3) main streets in the Poblacion of Romblon, which street did A: Handkerchief.
you take in going to hagdan-hagdan near the high school?
Q: Where did he get that handkerchief?
A: In the middle.
A: From Raymund.
Q: Did you climb the stairs?
Q: After AAA, what is the family name of this AAA?
A: Yes, sir.
A: AAA.
Q: Who was ahead?
Q: After AAA was blindfolded, what happened next?
A: AAA.
A: Then [Bernardino] told him "Join the rugby boys!"
Q: And who came next?
Q: Did AAA make any reply?
A: Rodel.
A: AAA said "That’s enough."
Q: Then, after Rodel, who?
Q: What happened after Jojo Maestro said you join the rugby boys?
A: Raymund.
A: AAA was struck by a coconut frond three (3) times.
Q: Then?
Q: Who struck him with the coconut frond?
A: [Bernardino].
A: [Bernardino].
Q: [Bernardino] who?
Q: What happened to AAA when he was struck three (3) times with the coconut
A: Maestro. fronds?

Q: What is the relation of this Jojo Maestro to Bernardino Maestro you pointed a A: He was made to stand.
while ago?
Q: After standing, what happened next?
A: That Jojo is his alias.
A: AAA was again struck with the coconut frond byRaymund.
Q: Did you reach the top of the stairs?
Q: Was AAA hit?
A: Yes, sir.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Upon reaching the top of the stairs, what did you do, if any?
Q: Where?
A: [Bernardino] blindfolded AAA.
A: Here (witness is pointing to the posterior aspect of his right thigh).
Q: What happened to AAA when he was hit by the coconut frond? Q: What is the family name?

A: As if he became weak. A: AAA.

Q: How about Rodel, what did Rodel do, if any? COURT:

A: He boxed the body and the head. How about Bernardino as part of the question?

Q: Of whom? PROS. BENEDICTO continuing:

A: Of Rodel. Q: Bernardino, what did he do, if any?

Q: Who was boxed by Rodel? A: The chain for the dog was tied to the handkerchief.

A: AAA. COURT:

Q: In Exhibit C you mentioned about llave inglesa, what is this llave inglesa? How about Rodel?

A: Lead llave inglesa. A: They helped in lifting him and making him stand and hooked the tie to the tree.

Q: And how does it look like? Q: What is this tie which was hooked to the tree made of?

A: I forgot already but it was a brass knuckle. A: The chain.

Q: Did Exh. C mention that Rodel punched him in different parts of his body with Q: Referring to the dog chain?
a llave inglesa causing him to fall to the ground, how did Rodel use this llave
inglesa? A: Yes, sir.

A: Worn in his hand (witness raising his right hand and motioning the left as if Q: While all these things were happening, what was Jovencio Musa doing who is
wearing something in his right hand), then punched him. a cousin of AAA?

Q: When he was punched on different parts of his body by Rodel using llave A: I got shock upon seeing it.
inglesa, what happened to AAA?
Q: Did Jovencio Musa utter anything or do something?
A: He lost consciousness.
A: Everytime AAA was being struck I said "Enough!"
Q: When AAA lost consciousness, what did Bernardino Maestro, Raymund Madali
and Rodel Madali do, if any?
(Tama na!).
A: Raymund used his handkerchief in tying the neck of my cousin.
Q: How many times did you say that is enough?
Q: Who is this cousin of yours?
A: Twice.
A: AAA.
Q: How did the three (3) react to your saying "Tama na, tama na!"?
 A: "It is already here so we will proceed."
COURT:
Translate that.
A: "Yari na ini, idiretso na."
xxxx
Q: After tying the dog chain to the tree, what happened next?
A: I was told by the three (3) that if I would reveal I would be the next to be killed.
Q: After that, what happened?
A: No more, we went home already.13
Jovencio saw at close range the incident as it was unfolding before his very eyes as he was
there when it happened. He was in the company of the perpetrators and the victim. Thus,
the incident could not have escaped his attention. The prosecution adequately established
in graphic detail, through the eyewitness, the circumstances that transpired before, during
and after the killing of AAA. At around 11:30 p.m. of 13 April 1999, Jovencio, together with
the victim, as well as with Rodel, Raymund and Bernardino, went to a place near the
Romblon National High School. Jovencio’s earlier companion, Michael Manasan, did not go
with the group, as he had already left a little earlier. As they reached their destination, the
group ascended the stairs leading to a reservoir near the said school. AAA was ahead,
followed by Rodel, Raymund, Bernardino and Jovencio. Upon reaching the top, Bernardino
blindfolded the victim with a handkerchief and told the latter, "Join the rugby boys!" The
victim responded, "That’s enough!" Bernardino then hit the victim thrice, using a green
and hard coconut frond. Unable to withstand the beatings, the victim hit the ground and
was lifted to his feet by Bernardino, Raymund and Rodel. With the same coconut frond,
Raymund hit the victim on his right thigh. Rodel followed by punching the body and the
head of the victim with a brass knuckle (llave inglesa) wrapped around the former’s right
fist. Feeling for his cousin, Jovencio shouted "Tama na! Tama na!" Bernardino responded,
"Yari na ini, ideretso na," (We have come this far, we have to finish it.) The victim’s strength
was no match to the injuries he received. He passed out. Raymund then tied a handkerchief
around the victim’s neck, fastened a dog chain to the ends of the said handkerchief and,
with the aid of Raymund and Rodel, hoisted the victim’s body to and hanged it from a
nearby tree. Shocked at what was happening, Jovencio just watched the whole incident,
failing to muster enough courage to help his dying cousin.
The perpetrators warned Jovencio not to divulge to anyone what he saw, or he would be
the next victim. Then they all left the place, leaving the victim’s body hanging from a tree.
The testimony of Jovencio was substantiated by the medical findings indicating that the
victim was hit in the head by hard blows, causing his death. Other pieces of evidence such
as the coconut frond, the dog chain and the handkerchief found in the scene also supported
Jovencio’s account.
Against the damning evidence adduced by the prosecution, petitioners Raymund and
Rodel could only muster mere denial. Unfortunately for them, their defense was much too
flaccid to stay firm against the weighty evidence for the prosecution. Denial, if
unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence
that deserves no weight in law. It cannot be given greater evidentiary value than the
testimony of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters.14 Between the self-
serving testimonies of petitioners and the positive identification by the eyewitness, the
latter deserves greater credence.15
Petitioners’ alibi, which was supported by the testimonies of close relatives and friends,
cannot overcome the convincing evidence adduced by the prosecution. Such corroborative
testimonies of relatives and friends are viewed with suspicion and skepticism by the
Court.16
Furthermore, for alibi to prosper, two elements must concur: (a) the accused was in
another place at the time the crime was committed; and (b) it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time it was committed. In the case under
consideration, Raymund was within a 5-kilometer distance from the scene, while Rodel
was within a 14-kilometer distance. Even assuming arguendo that Raymund and Rodel’s
defense were true, still, it was not physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene
and to be participants in the gruesome crime. It was not difficult for them to travel from
where they allegedly were and arrive at the scene during the killing episode.
Petitioners made an issue of the affidavit of recantation repudiating the earlier one laying
the blame on them. The affidavit of recantation executed by a witness prior to the trial
cannot prevail over the testimony made during the trial.17 Jovencio effectively repudiated
the contents of the affidavit of recantation. The recantation would hardly suffice to
overturn the trial court’s finding of guilt, which was based on a clear and convincing
testimony given during a full-blown trial. As held by this Court, an affidavit of recantation,
being usually taken ex parte, would be considered inferior to the testimony given in open
court.18 A recantation is exceedingly unreliable, inasmuch as it is easily secured from a
poor and ignorant witness, usually through intimidation or for monetary
consideration.19 Considering the age, the social standing and the economic status of
witness Jovencio, it is not far-fetched that the combination of these factors impelled him
to affix his signature to the recanting affidavit. Besides, Jovencio explained why he
executed the second affidavit or the affidavit of recantation, which supposedly exonerated
petitioners. He had been threatened by a certain Wilson, who was a relative of petitioners.
Jovencio testified:
Q: Alright, in Exh. C specifically C-1, you mentioned that, you said that somebody
fetched me in the evening of May 7, 1999 who told me that Rey Andrade wanted
to talk to me regarding the incident, who was that somebody who fetched you in
the house?
A: I do not know but he is known as Andrade.
 xxxx
Q: What was the subject of your conversation with Andrade?
A: About the Nephew of Wilson.
xxxx
Q: How about this Wilson you were referring to?
A: Wilson all of a sudden arrived there.
Q: Did Wilson say anything?
A: Wilson said, if we will lose, all our expenses will be paid and if he wins I will
be the next.20
Petitioners also place much premium on the alleged contradiction between Jovencio’s
narrative -- which claimed that Emerson de Asis and Michael Manasan saw the victim in
the company of the malefactors immediately prior to the killing -- and the testimonies of
these two witnesses denying such allegation.
Unfortunately, this is just a minor inconsistency. The common narration of Emerson de
Asis and Michael Manasan that they did not see the perpetrators with the victim prior to
the killing are too insignificant, since their narration did not directly relate to the act of
killing itself. Said inconsistency does not dilute the declarations of Jovencio. Given the
natural frailties of the human mind and its incapacity to assimilate all material details of a
given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly
weaken their probative value. It is well settled that immaterial and insignificant details do
not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point bearing on the very act
of accused-appellants.21 As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one
another on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility.
Inconsistencies on minor details do not undermine the integrity of a prosecution
witness.22 The minor inconsistencies and contradictions only serve to attest to the
truthfulness of the witnesses and the fact that they had not been coached or rehearsed. 23
The declaration of Michael Manasan -- that he did not see the petitioners together with
Jovencio and the victim immediately prior the incident -- does not help a bit the cause of
petitioners. As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, Michael could not have seen the
malefactors in the company of the victim because according to Jovencio, Michael had gone
home earlier that evening.
In fine, this Court defers to the findings of the trial court, which were affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, there being no cogent reason to veer away from such findings.
As to the criminal liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals,
Raymund, who was only 14 years of age at the time he committed the crime, should be
exempt from criminal liability and should be released to the custody of his parents or
guardian pursuant to Sections 6 and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. — A child fifteen (15) years of age or
under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
However, the child shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to Section 20
of this Act.
xxxx
The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal Responsibility. — If it has been determined
that the child taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the authority which will
have an initial contact with the child has the duty to immediately release the child to the
custody of his/her parents or guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child's nearest
relative. Said authority shall give notice to the local social welfare and development officer
who will determine the appropriate programs in consultation with the child and to the
person having custody over the child. If the parents, guardians or nearest relatives cannot
be located, or if they refuse to take custody, the child may be released to any of the
following: a duly registered nongovernmental or religious organization; a barangay
official or a member of the Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC); a local
social welfare and development officer; or, when and where appropriate, the DSWD. If the
child referred to herein has been found by the Local Social Welfare and Development
Office to be abandoned, neglected or abused by his parents, or in the event that the parents
will not comply with the prevention program, the proper petition for involuntary
commitment shall be filed by the DSWD or the Local Social Welfare and Development
Office pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as "The Child and Youth
Welfare Code."
Although the crime was committed on 13 April 1999 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect
only on 20 May 2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of Raymund
who was not shown to be a habitual criminal. This is based on Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides:
Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they
favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in
Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final
sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
While Raymund is exempt from criminal liability, his civil liability is not extinguished
pursuant to the second paragraph of Section 6, Republic Act No. 9344.
As to Rodel’s situation, it must be borne in mind that he was 16 years old at the time of the
commission of the crime. A determination of whether he acted with or without
discernment is necessary pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344, viz:
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. – x x x.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected to an intervention program, unless he/she
has acted with discernment, in which case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his
unlawful act.24 Such capacity may be known and should be determined by taking into
consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each case.
The Court of Appeals could not have been more accurate when it opined that Rodel acted
with discernment. Rodel, together with his cohorts, warned Jovencio not to reveal their
hideous act to anyone; otherwise, they would kill him. Rodel knew, therefore, that killing
AAA was a condemnable act and should be kept in secrecy. He fully appreciated the
consequences of his unlawful act.
expenses, which the prosecution claimed to have incurred but failed to support by
receipts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29
August 2007 in CA-G.R. No. 27757, exempting Raymund Madali from criminal liability is
hereby AFFIRMED. With respect to Rodel Madali, being a child in conflict with the law, this
Court suspends the pronouncement of his sentence and REMANDS his case to the court a
quo for further proceedings in accordance with Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344.
However, with respect to the civil liabilities, Rodel Madali and Raymund Madali are
solidarily liable to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.
SO ORDERED.

Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon a person under
18 but above 15 shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law, but always in
the proper period.

The penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion
temporal. Pursuant to Article 68, the maximum penalty should be within prision mayor,
which is a degree lower than reclusion temporal. Absent any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, the maximum penalty should be in the medium period of prision mayor or
8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
should be anywhere within the penalty next lower in degree, that is, prision correccional.
Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, which is 6 months and one day of
prision correccional to 8 years and one day of prision mayor, is in order. However, the
sentence to be imposed against Rodel should be suspended pursuant to Section 38 of
Republic Act No. 9344, which states:

SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application. Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.

Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child,
the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme
Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.

The Court of Appeals awarded ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages in favor of the heirs of the victim. In addition, Rodel and Raymund are
ordered to pay ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of the actual damages for funeral
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
G.R. No. 169641 September 10, 2009
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
RICHARD O. SARCIA, Accused-Appellant.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On automatic review is the decision1 dated July 14, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00717 which affirmed, with modifications, an earlier decision2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case No. 4134, finding
herein accused-appellant Richard O. Sarcia alias "Nogi" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of rape3 committed against AAA,4 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages, and the cost of the suit. However, the CA modified the penalties imposed
by the RTC by imposing the death penalty, increasing the award of civil indemnity to
₱75,000.00, and awarding ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages, aside from the ₱50,000.00
for moral damages.
The crime of rape was allegedly committed sometime in 1996 against AAA, a five (5) year
old girl. After almost four (4) years, AAA’s father filed a complaint5 for acts of
lasciviousness against herein accused-appellant on July 7, 2000. Upon review of the
evidence, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor at Ligao, Albay upgraded the charge to
rape.6 The Information7 dated September 5, 2000 reads:
That sometime in 1996 at Barangay Doña Tomasa, Municipality of Guinobatan, Province
of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd and unchaste design, and by means of force, threats and intimidation,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
[AAA], who was then 6 years of age, against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
At his arraignment on October 25, 2000, accused-appellant, with the assistance of his
counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.8 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented the oral testimonies of the victim AAA; her minor cousin; her
father; and Dr. Joana Manatlao, the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. The
defense presented the accused-appellant himself, who vehemently denied committing the
crimes imputed to him and Manuel Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court
at Guinobatan, Albay.
On January 17, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision 9
finding the accused-appellant
guilty of the crime of rape and imposed the penalty mentioned above.
The record of this case was forwarded to this Court in view of the Notice of Appeal filed by
the accused- appellant.10
Accused-appellant filed his Appellant’s Brief11 on July 15, 2004, while the People, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Appellee’s Brief 12 on December 15, 2004.
Pursuant to our pronouncement in People v. Mateo,13 modifying the pertinent provisions
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure insofar as they provide for direct appeals from
the RTC to this Court in cases in which the penalty imposed by the trial court is death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the Resolution dated September 19, 1995 in
"Internal Rules of the Supreme Court," the case was transferred, for appropriate action
and disposition, to the CA where it was docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717.
As stated at the beginning hereof, the CA, in its decision of July 14, 2005, in CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 000717, affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction pronounced by the
trial court. We quote the fallo of the CA decision:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction is AFFIRMED. The accused, Richard Sarcia y
Olivera, is ordered to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and to pay the victim, [AAA], the amount
of (1) ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and (3) ₱25,000.00
as exemplary damages.
Let the entire records of this case be elevated to the Supreme Court for review, pursuant
to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to
Govern Death Penalty Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004.
SO ORDERED.
On September 30, 2005, the case was elevated to this Court for further review.14
In our Resolution15 of November 15, 2005, we required the parties to simultaneously
submit their respective supplemental briefs. Accused-appellant filed his Supplemental
Brief16 on April 7, 2006. Having failed to submit one, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) was deemed to have waived the filing of its supplemental brief.
In his Brief filed before the CA, accused-appellant raised the following assignment of
errors:
I
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF
[AAA], [her cousin] and [her father].
II
THE LOWER COURT GLARINGLY ERRED IN REJECTING THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI
INTERPOSED BY THE ACCUSED WHICH IS MORE CREDIBLE.
III
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED RICHARD
SARCIA.
The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the OSG in the Appellee's Brief, as
follows:
On December 16, 1996, five-year-old [AAA], together with her [cousin and two other
playmates], was playing in the yard of Saling Crisologo near a mango tree.
Suddenly, appellant appeared and invited [AAA] to go with him to the backyard of Saling
Crisologo’s house. She agreed. Unknown to appellant, [AAA’s cousin] followed them.
Upon reaching the place, appellant removed [AAA’s] shorts and underwear. He also
removed his trousers and brief. Thereafter, he ordered [AAA] to lie down on her back.
Then, he lay on top of her and inserted his penis into [AAA’s] private organ. Appellant
made an up-and-down movement ("Nagdapadapa tabi"). [AAA] felt severe pain inside her
private part and said "aray." She also felt an intense pain inside her stomach.
[AAA’s cousin], who positioned herself around five (5) meters away from them, witnessed
appellant’s dastardly act. Horrified, [AAA’s cousin] instinctively rushed to the house of
[AAA’s] mother, her aunt Emily, and told the latter what she had seen. [AAA’s] mother
answered that they (referring to {AAA and her cousin} were still very young to be talking
about such matters.
Meanwhile, after satisfying his lust, appellant stood up and ordered [AAA] to put on her
clothes. Appellant then left.
Perplexed, [AAA’s cousin] immediately returned to the backyard of Saling Crisologo where
she found [AAA] crying. Appellant, however, was gone. [AAA’s cousin] approached [AAA]
and asked her what appellant had done to her. When [AAA] did not answer, [her cousin]
did not ask her any further question and just accompanied her home.
At home, [AAA] did not tell her mother what appellant had done to her because she feared
that her mother might slap her. Later, when her mother washed her body, she felt a grating
sensation in her private part. Thereafter, [AAA] called for [her cousin]. [AAA’s cousin]
came to their house and told [AAA’s] mother again that appellant had earlier made an up-
and-down movement on top of [AAA]. [AAA’s mother], however did not say anything. At
that time, [AAA’s] father was working in Manila.
Dr. Joana Manatloa is the Municipal Health Officer of Guinobatan, Albay. She testified that:
(1) it was the rural health officer, Dr. Reantaso, who conducted a physical examination on
[AAA]; (2) Dr. Reantaso prepared and signed a medico-legal certificate containing the
result of [AAA]’s examination; (3) Dr. Reantaso, however, had already resigned as rural
health officer of Guinobatan, Albay; (4) as a medical doctor, she can interpret, the findings
in said medico-legal certificate issued to [AAA]; (5) [AAA]’s medical findings are as follows:
"negative for introital vulvar laceration nor scars, perforated hymen, complete, pinkish
vaginal mucosa, vaginal admits little finger with resistance; (6) the finding "negative for
introital bulvar laceration nor scars" means, in layman’s language, that there was no
showing of any scar or wound, and (7) there is a complete perforation of the hymen which
means that it could have been subjected to a certain trauma or pressure such as strenuous
exercise or the entry of an object like a medical instrument or penis.17
On the other hand, the trial court summarized the version of the defense as follows:
Richard Sarcia, 24 years old, single, student and a resident of Doña Tomasa, Guinobatan,
Albay denied he raped [AAA]. While he knows [AAA’s] parents, because sometimes they
go to their house looking for his father to borrow money, he does not know [AAA] herself.
His father retired as a fireman from Crispa in 1991 while his mother worked as an
agriculturist in the Municipality of Teresa, Antipolo, Rizal. As an agriculturist of the
Department of Agriculture, his mother would bring seedlings and attend seminars in
Batangas and Baguio. They were residing in Cainta, Rizal when sometime in 1992 they
transferred residence to Guinobatan, Albay. His father is from barangay Masarawag while
his mother is from barangay Doña Tomasa both of Guinobatan, Albay. After their transfer
in Guinobatan, his mother continued to be an agriculturist while his father tended to his
1-hectare coconut land. Richard testified he was between fourteen (14) and fifteen (15)
years old in 1992 when they transferred to Guinobatan. Between 1992 and 1994 he was
out of school. But from 1994 to 1998 he took his high school at Masarawag High School.
His daily routine was at about 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon after school before proceeding
home he would usually play basketball at the basketball court near the church in Doña
Tomasa about 1 kilometer away from their house. When her mother suffered a stroke in
1999 he and his father took turns taking care of his mother. Richard denied molesting
other girls ... and was most surprised when he was accused of raping [AAA]. He knows
Saling Crisologo and the latter’s place which is more than half kilometer to their house.
Richard claimed Salvacion Bobier, grandmother of Mae Christine Camu, whose death on
May 7, 2000 was imputed to him and for which a case for Murder under Criminal Case No.
4087 was filed against him with the docile cooperation of [AAA’s] parents who are related
to Salvacion, concocted and instigated [AAA’s] rape charge against him to make the case
for Murder against him stronger and life for him miserable. He was incarcerated on May
10, 2000 for the Murder charge and two (2) months later while he already in detention,
the rape case supposedly committed in 1996 was filed against him in the Municipal Trial
Court (MTC) of Guinobatan, Albay. He was to learn about it from his sister, Marivic, on a
Sunday afternoon sometime on July 20, 2000 when his sister visited him in jail. He
naturally got angry when he heard of this rape charge because he did not do such thing
and recalled telling his sister they can go to a doctor and have the child examine to prove
he did not rape her. Subsequently, from his sister again he was to learn that the rape case
was ordered dismissed.
On cross-examination, Richard admitted [AAA’s] mother, is also related to his father, [AAA
mother’s] father, being a second cousin of his father. Richard is convinced it is not the
lending of money by his father to the AAA’s family as the motive for the latter to file the
rape case against him but the instigation of Salvacion Bobier.
Manuel A. Casimiro, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Guinobatan,
Albay, testified on the records of Criminal Case No. 7078 filed in MTC Guinobatan, Albay
against Richard Sarcia for Rape in relation to RA 7610 relative to the alleged withdrawal
of said rape case but the accused through counsel failed to formally offer the marked
exhibits relative to said case.18
Accused-appellant alleges that the trial court erred in convicting him, as the prosecution
was not able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He assailed the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses, AAA, her cousin and her father on the following grounds: (1) the
testimonies of AAA and her cousin were inconsistent with each other; (2) the victim was
confused as to the date and time of the commission of the offense; (3) there was a four-
year delay in filing the criminal case, and the only reason why they filed the said case was
"to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction of this same accused in a murder case filed by
said Salvacion Bobier for the death of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7,
2000." Accused-appellant stressed that the same Salvacion Bobier helped AAA’s father in
filing the said case for rape. Accused-appellant also claimed that the prosecution failed to
prove that he employed force, threats or intimidation to achieve his end. Finally, accused-
appellant harped on the finding in the medical certificate issued by Dr. Reantaso and
interpreted by Dr. Joana Manatlao, stating "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scar
which means that there was no showing of any scar or wound."
In his Appellee's Brief accused-appellant pointed out the inconsistencies between AAA’s
and her cousin’s testimonies as follows: (1) the cousin testified that she played with AAA
at the time of the incident, while AAA testified that she was doing nothing before accused-
appellant invited her to the back of the house of a certain Saling; (2) the cousin testified
that when she saw accused-appellant doing the push-and-pull motion while on top of AAA,
the latter shouted in a loud voice contrary to AAA’s testimony that when accused-appellant
was inside her and started the up-and-down motion, she said "aray"; (3) when the cousin
returned to AAA after telling the latter’s mother what accused-appellant had done to AAA,
she found AAA crying. AAA however testified that, after putting on her clothes, she invited
the cousin to their house; and (4) the cousin testified that other children were playing at
the time of the incident, but AAA testified that there were only four of them who were
playing at that time.
As it is oft-repeated, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, which refer only to
minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the veracity and weight of their
testimonies where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and the
positive identification of the accused. Slight contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen
the credibility of the witnesses and prove that their testimonies are not rehearsed. Nor are
such inconsistencies, and even improbabilities, unusual, for there is no person with perfect
faculties or senses.19 The alleged inconsistencies in this case are too inconsequential to
overturn the findings of the court a quo. It is important that the two prosecution witnesses
were one in saying that it was accused-appellant who sexually abused AAA. Their positive,
candid and straightforward narrations of how AAA was sexually abused by accused-
appellant evidently deserve full faith and credence. When the rape incident happened,
AAA was only five (5) years old; and when she and her cousin testified, they were barely
9 and 11 years old, respectively. This Court has had occasion to rule that the alleged
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses can be explained by their age and their
inexperience with court proceedings, and that even the most candid of witnesses commit
mistakes and make confused and inconsistent statements. This is especially true of young
witnesses, who could be overwhelmed by the atmosphere of the courtroom. Hence, there
is more reason to accord them ample space for inaccuracy.20
Accused-appellant capitalizes on AAA’s inability to recall the exact date when the incident
in 1996 was committed. Failure to recall the exact date of the crime, however, is not an
indication of false testimony, for even discrepancies regarding exact dates of rapes are
inconsequential and immaterial and cannot discredit the credibility of the victim as a
witness.21 In People v. Purazo,22 We ruled:
We have ruled, time and again that the date is not an essential element of the crime of rape,
for the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman. As such, the time or place
of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated. As early as 1908, we already
held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential element of
the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if
it appears that the crime was not committed at the precise time or place alleged, or if the
proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the complaint,
provided it appears that the specific crime charged was in fact committed prior to the date
of the filing of the complaint or information within the period of the statute of limitations
and at a place within the jurisdiction of the court.
Also in People v. Salalima,23 the Court held:
Failure to specify the exact dates or time when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make
the information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The precise date or time when
the victim was raped is not an element of the offense. The gravamen of the crime is the fact
of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. As long as it is alleged that the offense was committed at any time as
near to the actual date when the offense was committed an information is sufficient. In
previous cases, we ruled that allegations that rapes were committed "before and until
October 15, 1994," "sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter," "sometime in
November 1995 and some occasions prior and/or subsequent thereto" and "on or about
and sometime in the year 1988" constitute sufficient compliance with Section 11, Rule 110
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
In this case, AAA’s declaration that the rape incident took place on December 15, 1996 was
explained by the trial court, and we quote:
The rape took place in 1996. As earlier noted by the Court the date December 15, 1996
mentioned by [AAA] may have been arbitrarily chosen by the latter due to the intense
cross-examination she was subjected but the Court believes it could have been in any
month and date in the year 1996 as in fact neither the information nor [AAA’s] sworn
statement mention the month and date but only the year.24
Likewise, witnesses’ credibility is not affected by the delay in the filing of the case against
accused-appellant. Neither does the delay bolster accused-appellant’s claim that the only
reason why this case was filed against him was "to help Salvacion Bobier get a conviction
of this same accused-appellant in the case of murder filed by Salvacion Bobier for the death
of her granddaughter Mae Christine Camu on May 7, 2000."
The rape victim’s delay or hesitation in reporting the crime does not destroy the truth of
the charge nor is it an indication of deceit. It is common for a rape victim to prefer silence
for fear of her aggressor and the lack of courage to face the public stigma of having been
sexually abused. In People v. Coloma25 we even considered an 8-year delay in reporting
the long history of rape by the victim’s father as understandable and not enough to render
incredible the complaint of a 13-year-old daughter. Thus, in the absence of other
circumstances that show that the charge was a mere concoction and impelled by some ill
motive, delay in the filing of the complainant is not sufficient to defeat the charge. Here,
the failure of AAA’s parents to immediately file this case was sufficiently justified by the
complainant’s father in the latter’s testimony, thus:
Q But, did you not say, please correct me if I am wrong, you got angry when your
wife told you that something happened to Hazel way back in 1996?
A Yes, sir.
Q Yet, despite your anger you were telling us that you waited until June to file
this case?
A After I heard about the incident, I and my wife had a talk for which reason that
during that time we had no money yet to use in filing the case, so we waited.
When we were able to save enough amounts, we filed the case.26
Accused-appellant also contends that he could not be liable for rape because there is no
proof that he employed force, threats or intimidation in having carnal knowledge of AAA.
Where the girl is below 12 years old, as in this case, the only subject of inquiry is whether
"carnal knowledge" took place. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary,
since none of these is an element of statutory rape. There is a conclusive presumption of
absence of free consent when the rape victim is below the age of twelve.27
Accused-appellant harps on the medical report, particularly the conclusion quoted as
follows: "negative for introital bulvar laceration nor scars, which means, in layman
language, that there was no showing of any scar or wound." The Court has consistently
ruled that the presence of lacerations in the victim’s sexual organ is not necessary to prove
the crime of rape and its absence does not negate the fact of rape. A medical report is not
indispensable in a prosecution for rape.28 What is important is that AAA’s testimony meets
the test of credibility, and that is sufficient to convict the accused.
Accused-appellant’s defense of denial was properly rejected. Time and time again, we have
ruled that denial like alibi is the weakest of all defenses, because it is easy to concoct and
difficult to disprove. Furthermore, it cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal
identification of appellant by the offended party and other witnesses. Categorical and
consistent positive identification, absent any showing of ill motive on the part of the
eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails over the appellants’ defense of denial and
alibi.29 The shallow hypothesis put forward by accused-appellant that he was accused of
raping AAA due to the instigation of Salvacion Bobier hardly convinces this Court. On this
score, the trial court aptly reached the following conclusion:
…True, Salvacion Bobier actively assisted AAA’s family file the instant case against the
accused, but the Court believes [AAA’s] parents finally decided to file the rape case because
after they have come to realize after what happened to Mae Christine Camu that what
previously [AAA and her cousin] told her mother and which the latter had continually
ignored is after all true.
AAA was barely 9 years of age when she testified. It has been stressed often enough that
the testimony of rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence. It is
improbable for a girl of complainant’s age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself
and her family had she not been truly subjected to the painful experience of sexual abuse.
At any rate, a girl of tender years, innocent and guileless, cannot be expected to brazenly
impute a crime so serious as rape to any man if it were not true.30 Parents would not
sacrifice their own daughter, a child of tender years at that, and subject her to the rigors
and humiliation of public trial for rape, if they were not motivated by an honest desire to
have their daughter’s transgressor punished accordingly.31 Hence, the logical conclusion
is that no such improper motive exists and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and
credence.
The guilt of accused-appellant having been established beyond reasonable doubt, we
discuss now the proper penalty to be imposed on him.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 32 was the
governing law at the time the accused-appellant committed the rape in question. Under
the said law, the penalty of death shall be imposed when the victim of rape is a child below
seven years of age. In this case, as the age of AAA, who was five (5) years old at the time
the rape was committed, was alleged in the information and proven during trial by the
presentation of her birth certificate, which showed her date of birth as January 16, 1991,
the death penalty should be imposed.
However, this Court finds ground for modifying the penalty imposed by the CA. We cannot
agree with the CA’s conclusion that the accused-appellant cannot be deemed a minor at
the time of the commission of the offense to entitle him to the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68(2)33 of the Revised Penal Code. When
accused appellant testified on March 14, 2002, he admitted that he was 24 years old, which
means that in 1996, he was 18 years of age. As found by the trial court, the rape incident
could have taken place "in any month and date in the year 1996." Since the prosecution
was not able to prove the exact date and time when the rape was committed, it is not
certain that the crime of rape was committed on or after he reached 18 years of age in
1996. In assessing the attendance of the mitigating circumstance of minority, all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the accused, it being more beneficial to the latter. In fact, in
several cases, this Court has appreciated this circumstance on the basis of a lone
declaration of the accused regarding his age.34
Under Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code, when the offender is a minor under 18 years,
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be imposed, but always in the
proper period. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to
be reckoned with.35 Thus, the proper imposable penalty for the accused-appellant is
reclusion perpetua.
It is noted that the Court is granted discretion in awarding damages provided in the Civil
Code, in case a crime is committed. Specifically, Article 2204 of the Civil Code provides that
"in crimes, the damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened
according to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances." The issue now is whether the
award of damages should be reduced in view of the presence here of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority of the accused at the time of the commission of the
offense.
A review of the nature and purpose of the damages imposed on the convicted offender is
in order. Article 107 of the Revised Penal Code defines the term "indemnification," which
is included in the civil liability prescribed by Article 104 of the same Code, as follows:
Art. 107. Indemnification-What is included. – Indemnification for consequential damages
shall include not only those caused the injured party, but also those suffered by his family
or by a third person by reason of the crime.
Relative to civil indemnity, People v. Victor36 ratiocinated as follows:
The lower court, however, erred in categorizing the award of ₱50,000.00 to the offended
party as being in the nature of moral damages. We have heretofore explained in People v.
Gementiza that the indemnity authorized by our criminal law as civil liability ex delicto for
the offended party, in the amount authorized by the prevailing judicial policy and aside
from other proven actual damages, is itself equivalent to actual or compensatory damages
in civil law. It is not to be considered as moral damages thereunder, the latter being based
on different jural foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion.
One other point of concern has to be addressed. Indictments for rape continue unabated
and the legislative response has been in the form of higher penalties. The Court believes
that, on like considerations, the jurisprudential path on the civil aspect should follow the
same direction. Hence, starting with the case at bar, if the crime of rape is committed or
effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the death penalty is
authorized by the present amended law, the indemnity for the victim shall be in the
increased amount of not less than ₱75,000.00. This is not only a reaction to the apathetic
societal perception of the penal law, and the financial fluctuations over time, but also an
expression of the displeasure of the Court over the incidence of heinous crimes against
chastity. (Emphasis Supplied)
The Court has had the occasion to rule that moral damages are likewise compensatory in
nature. In San Andres v. Court of Appeals,37 we held:
x x x Moral damages, though incapable of pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an
award designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a
penalty on the wrongdoer. (Emphasis Supplied)
In another case, this Court also explained:
What we call moral damages are treated in American jurisprudence as compensatory
damages awarded for mental pain and suffering or mental anguish resulting from a wrong
(25 C.J.S. 815).38 (Emphasis Supplied)
Thus, according to law and jurisprudence, civil indemnity is in the nature of actual and
compensatory damages for the injury caused to the offended party and that suffered by
her family, and moral damages are likewise compensatory in nature. The fact of minority
of the offender at the time of the commission of the offense has no bearing on the gravity
and extent of injury caused to the victim and her family, particularly considering the
circumstances attending this case. Here, the accused-appelant could have been eighteen
at the time of the commission of the rape. He was accorded the benefit of the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority because of a lack of proof regarding his actual age and
the date of the rape rather than a moral or evidentiary certainty of his minority.
In any event, notwithstanding the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority, which warrants the lowering of the public penalty by one degree, there is no
justifiable ground to depart from the jurisprudential trend in the award of damages in the
case of qualified rape, considering the compensatory nature of the award of civil
indemnity and moral damages. This was the same stance this Court took in People v.
Candelario,39 a case decided on July 28, 1999, which did not reduce the award of damages.
At that time, the damages amounted to ₱75,000.00 for civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 for
moral damages, even if the public penalty imposed on the accused was lowered by one
degree, because of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v.
Salome40 and People v. Quiachon41 is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the
offense because of its heinousness, not the public penalty actually imposed on the
offender.
Regarding the civil indemnity and moral damages, People v. Salome explained the basis
for increasing the amount of said civil damages as follows:
The Court, likewise, affirms the civil indemnity awarded by the Court of Appeals to Sally
in accordance with the ruling in People v. Sambrano which states:
"As to damages, we have held that if the rape is perpetrated with any of the attending
qualifying circumstances that require the imposition of the death penalty, the civil
indemnity for the victim shall ₱75,000.00 … Also, in rape cases, moral damages are
awarded without the need proof other than the fact of rape because it is assumed that the
victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. However, the trial court’s
award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages should also be increased to ₱75,000 pursuant to
current jurisprudence on qualified rape."
It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty,
the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still
heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still ₱75,000.00.
People v. Quiachon also ratiocinates as follows:
With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing
jurisprudence, correctly awarded the following amounts; ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity
which is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances warranting the imposition of
the death penalty; ₱75,000.00.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to have
suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral damages even without
proof thereof, x x x
Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the
prohibition in R.A. No. 9346, the civil indemnity of ₱75,000.00 is still proper because,
following the ratiocination in People v. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the
actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the offense.
The Court declared that the award of ₱75,000.00 shows "not only a reaction to the
apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but
also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes
against chastity."
The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous
character of the crime committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the
death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty actually imposed is reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
As to the award of exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code provides that
exemplary or corrective damages are imposed in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages. Exemplary damages are not recoverable as a matter
of right. The requirements of an award of exemplary damagees are: (1) they may be
imposed by way of example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the
claimant’s right to them has been established; (2) they cannot be recovered as a matter of
right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory damages that may
be awarded to the claimant; (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a
wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.42 Since the compensatory
damages, such as the civil indemnity and moral damages, are increased when qualified
rape is committed, the exemplary damages should likewise be increased in accordance
with prevailing jurisprudence.43
In sum, the increased amount of ₱75,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages
should be maintained. It is also proper and appropriate that the award of exemplary
damages be likewise increased to the amount of ₱30,000.00 based on the latest
jurisprudence on the award of damages on qualified rape. Thus, the CA correctly awarded
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity. However the award of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages is
increased to ₱75,000.0044 and that of ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages is likewise
increased to ₱30,000.00.45
Meanwhile, when accused-appellant was detained at the New Bilibid Prison pending the
outcome of his appeal before this Court, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9344, the Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act of 2006 took effect on May 20, 2006. The RTC decision and CA decision
were promulgated on January 17, 2003 and July 14, 2005, respectively. The promulgation
of the sentence of conviction of accused-appellant handed down by the RTC was not
suspended as he was about 25 years of age at that time, in accordance with Article 192 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 603, The Child and Youth Welfare Code46 and Section 32 of
A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.47 Accused-appellant is
now approximately 31 years of age. He was previously detained at the Albay Provincial
Jail at Legaspi City and transferred to the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City on October
13, 2003.
R.A. No. 9344 provides for its retroactive application as follows:
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. – Persons who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who
were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. x x x
The aforequoted provision allows the retroactive application of the Act to those who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this said Act, and
who were below the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the offense. With
more reason, the Act should apply to this case wherein the conviction by the lower court
is still under review. Hence, it is necessary to examine which provisions of R.A. No. 9344
shall apply to accused-appellant, who was below 18 years old at the time of the
commission of the offense.
Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides for the automatic suspension of sentence of a child in
conflict with the law, even if he/she is already 18 years of age or more at the time he/she
is found guilty of the offense charged. It reads:
Sec. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. – Once the child who is under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child,
the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme
Court on Juvenile in Conflict with the Law.
The above-quoted provision makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense
committed by the child in conflict with the law, unlike P.D. No. 603 and A.M. No. 02-1-18-
SC.48 The said P.D. and Supreme Court (SC) Rule provide that the benefit of suspended
sentence would not apply to a child in conflict with the law if, among others, he/she has
been convicted of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
In construing Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344, the Court is guided by the basic principle of statutory
construction that when the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.49 Since
R.A. No. 9344 does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital
offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser offense, the Court should also not
distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict
with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
Moreover, the legislative intent, to apply to heinous crimes the automatic suspension of
sentence of a child in conflict with the law can be gleaned from the Senate
deliberations50 on Senate Bill No. 1402 (Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act
of 2005), the pertinent portion of which is quoted below:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the CA dated July 14, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00717 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the penalty of death imposed
on accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua;53 and (2) accused-appellant is
ordered to pay the victim the amount of ₱75,000.00 and ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and
exemplary damages, respectively. The award of civil indemnity in the amount of
₱75,000.00 is maintained. However, the case shall be REMANDED to the court a quo for
appropriate disposition in accordance with Sec. 51 of R.A. 9344.

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 years old is charged, accused with, or SO ORDERED.
may have committed a serious offense, and may have acted with discernment, then the
child could be recommended by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), by the Local Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or by my proposed
Office of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go through a judicial proceeding; but the
welfare, best interests, and restoration of the child should still be a primordial or primary
consideration. Even in heinous crimes, the intention should still be the child’s restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration. xxx (Italics supplied)1avvphi1

Nonetheless, while Sec. 38 of R.A. No. 9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still
be applied even if the child in conflict with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or
more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt, Sec. 40 of the same law limits the
said suspension of sentence until the said child reaches the maximum age of 21, thus:

Sec. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have
not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with
the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with
the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.

If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age of
twenty-one (21) years. (emphasis ours)

To date, accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, and the judgment of the RTC had been
promulgated, even before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9344. Thus, the application of Secs. 38
and 40 to the suspension of sentence is now moot and academic.51 However, accused-
appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344, which
provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows:

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training
Facilities. – A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the
court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

The civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense is not affected by the
appropriate disposition measures and shall be enforced in accordance with law.52
EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
G.R. No. 186227 July 20, 2011
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA, Accused-Appellant.
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Decision1 dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment2 dated
September 14, 2005, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case
No. 10250 and Criminal Case No. 10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA)
9165.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City
received a report from an informer that a certain Allen Mantalaba, who was seventeen
(17) years old at the time, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan
City. Thus, a buy-bust team was organized, composed of PO1 Randy Pajo, PO1 Eric Simon
and two (2) poseur-buyers who were provided with two (2) pieces of ₱100 marked bills
to be used in the purchase.
Around 7 o'clock in the evening of October 1, 2003, the team, armed with the marked
money, proceeded to Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust
operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who was sitting at a corner and said
to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to
each other. Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers
and the latter gave the marked money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to
the police officers and told them that the transaction has been completed. Police officers
Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving the
place.
The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials
Richard S. Tandoy and Gresilda B. Tumala, searched the appellant and found a big sachet
of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the barangay officials the marked money, two pieces
of ₱100 bill, thrown by the appellant on the ground.
After the operation, and in the presence of the same barangay officials, the police officers
made an inventory of the items recovered from the appellant which are: (1) one big sachet
of shabu which they marked as RMP-1-10-01-03; (2) one small sachet of shabu which they
marked as RMP 2-10-01-03; and (3) two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money
and a fifty peso (₱50) bill. Thereafter, a letter-request was prepared by Inspector
Ferdinand B. Dacillo for the laboratory examination of the two (2) sachets containing a
crystalline substance, ultra-violet examination on the person of the appellant as well as
the two (2) pieces of one hundred pesos marked money. The request was brought by PO1
Pajo and personally received by Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, Forensic Chemical
Officer of the Regional Crime Laboratory Office XII Butuan City, who immediately
conducted the examination. The laboratory examination revealed that the appellant tested
positive for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet fluorescent powder; and the
crystalline substance contained in two sachets, separately marked as RMP-1-10-01-03 and
RMP-2-10-01-03, were positively identified as methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Thereafter, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC of Butuan City against
appellant for violation of Sections 5 and 11 of RA 9165, stating the following:
Criminal Case No. 10250
That on or about the evening of October 1, 1003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell zero
point zero four one two (0.0412) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise
known as shabu which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW : (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).3
Criminal Case No. 10251
That on or about the evening of October 1, 2003 at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao, Butuan City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously possess
zero point six one three one (0.6131) grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride,
otherwise known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW: (Violation of Section 11, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165).4
Eventually, the cases were consolidated and tried jointly.
Appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges against him. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
In its Omnibus Judgment5 dated September 14, 2005, the RTC found the appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged, the dispositive portion of which, reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 10250 for selling shabu, a dangerous drug, as
defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. As provided for
in Sec. 98 of R.A. 9165, where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by
life imprisonment to death shall be reclusion perpetua to death. As such, Allen Mantalaba
y Udtojan is hereby sentenced to RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 10251, the Court likewise finds accused Allen Mantalaba y Udtojan
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for illegally possessing shabu, a dangerous drug,
weighing 0.6131 gram as defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 and accused being a minor at the time of the commission of the offense, after
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is accordingly sentenced to six (6) years and
one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8) years, as maximum of prision mayor and to pay a
fine of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱300,000.00).
SO ORDERED.6
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC. It disposed of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City dated
September 14, 2005 appealed from finding the accused-appellant Allen Udtojan
Mantalaba guilty beyond reasonable doubt with the crime of Violation of Section 5 and
Section 11, Article II of Republic Act 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act, is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.7
Thus, the present appeal.
Appellant states the lone argument that the lower court gravely erred in convicting him of
the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
According to appellant, there was no evidence of actual sale between him and the poseur-
buyer. He also argues that the chain of custody of the seized shabu was not established.
Finally, he asserts that an accused should be presumed innocent and that the burden of
proof is on the prosecution.
The petition is unmeritorious.
Appellant insists that the prosecution did not present any evidence that an actual sale took
place. However, based on the testimony of PO1 Randy Pajo, there is no doubt that the buy-
bust operation was successfully conducted, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: Will you explain to this Honorable Court why did you conduct and how did
you conduct your buy-bust operation at the time?
A: We conducted a buy-bust operation because of the report from our civilian
assets that Allen Mantalaba was engaged in drug trade and selling shabu. And
after we evaluated this Information we informed Inspector Dacillo that we will
operate this accused for possible apprehension.
Q: Before you conducted your buy-bust operation, what procedure did you take?
A: We prepared the operational plan for buy-bust against the suspect. We
prepared a request for powder dusting for our marked moneys to be used for the
operation.
Q: Did you use marked moneys in this case?
xxxx
Q: Then armed with these marked moneys, what steps did you take next?
A: After briefing of our team, we proceeded immediately to the area.
Q: You mentioned of poseur-buyer, what would the poseur-buyer do?
A: We made an arrangement with the poseur-buyer that during the buying of
shabu there should be a pre-arranged signal of the poseur-buyer to the police
officer.
Q: What happened when your poseur-buyer who, armed with this marked
moneys, approached the guy who was selling shabu at that time?
A: The poseur-buyer during that time gave the marked moneys to the
suspect.
Q: Where were you when this poseur-buyer gave the moneys to the suspect?
A: We positioned ourselves about 10 meters away from the area of the poseur-
buyer and the suspect.
Q: You mentioned of the pre-arranged signal, what would this be?
A: This is a case-to-case basis, your Honor, in the pre-arrangement signal
because in the pre-arranged signal we used a cap and a towel. (sic) In the
case, of this suspect, there was no towel there was no cap at the time of
giving the shabu and the marked moneys to the suspect and considering
also that that was about 7:00 o'clock in the evening. The poseur-buyer
immediately proceeded to us and informed us that the shabu was already
given by the suspect.
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing
white [crystalline] substance, we immediately approached the suspect.
Q: Who was with a (sic) suspect when you conducted the buy-bust operation[?]
Was he alone or did he had (sic) any companion at that time?
A: He was alone.
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this
constitutional rights and we immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the
suspect, we did not immediately searched in. We called the attention of the
barangay officials to witness the search of the suspect.
Q: How many sachets of shabu have you taken from the suspect during the buy-
bust operation?
A: We took from the possession of the suspect one big sachet of shabu.
xxxx
Q: What was the result of the searched (sic) for him?
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces
of 100 peso bills as marked moneys.8
What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust
operation is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 9 From the above
testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that the elements
have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly
identified. The subject dangerous drug, as well as the marked money used, were
also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to the manner in
which the buy-bust operation was conducted.
To corroborate the testimony of PO2 Pajo, the prosecution presented the
testimony of Police Inspector Virginia Sison-Gucor, a forensic chemical officer,
who confirmed that the plastic containing white crystalline substance was
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride and that the petitioner was in
possession of the marked money used in the buy-bust operation, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: What was the result of your examination or what were your findings on the
sachets of suspected shabu?
A: After the preliminary and confirmatory tests were conducted on the stated
specimen, the result was positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.
xxxx
Q: What were your findings when you examined the living person of the accused,
as well as the marked money mentioned in this report?
A: According to my report, the findings for the living person of Allen Udtojan
Mantalaba is positive to the test for the presence of bright orange ultra-violet
flourescent powder. x x x10
The above only confirms that the buy-bust operation really occurred. Once again, this
Court stresses that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure,
sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors.11 It is often utilized
by law enforcers for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution
of their nefarious activities.12 In People v. Roa,13 this Court had the opportunity to expound
on the nature and importance of a buy-bust operation, ruling that:
In the first place, coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before
police authorities may carry out a buy-bust operation. While it is true that Section 8614 of
Republic Act No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the Bureau
of Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related matters,"
the provision does not, by so saying, make PDEA's participation a condition sine qua non
for every buy-bust operation. After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest
sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 11315 of the Rules of the Court, which police authorities may
rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of Republic Act No. 9165 in support of the
PDEA.16 A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with the PDEA.
Neither is the lack of prior surveillance fatal. The case of People v. Lacbanes17 is quite
instructive:
In People v. Ganguso,18 it has been held that prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the
validity of an entrapment operation, especially when the buy-bust team members were
accompanied to the scene by their informant. In the instant case, the arresting officers
were led to the scene by the poseur-buyer. Granting that there was no surveillance
conducted before the buy-bust operation, this Court held in People v. Tranca,19 that there
is no rigid or textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. Flexibility is a trait of
good police work. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense
with the need for prior surveillance.20
The rule is that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to
great respect because trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of the
witnesses as they testify. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the appellate
court. When the trial court's findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said
findings are generally binding upon this Court.21
In connection therewith, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, was also correct in finding that
the appellant is equally guilty of violation of Section 11 of RA 9165, or the illegal
possession of dangerous drug. As an incident to the lawful arrest of the appellant after the
consummation of the buy-bust operation, the arresting officers had the authority to search
the person of the appellant. In the said search, the appellant was caught in possession of
0.6131 grams of shabu. In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug.22
As a defense, appellant denied that he owns the shabu and the marked money confiscated
from him. However, based on his cross-examination, such denial was not convincing
enough to merit reasonable doubt, thus:
PROS. RUIZ:
Q: So it is true now that when these police officers passed you by they
recovered from your possession one sachet of shabu?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And it is true that after you were arrested and when you were searched
they also found another sachet of shabu also in your pocket?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you mentioned in your counter-affidavit marked as Exhibit H for the
prosecution that no money was taken from you because you have none at that
time, is it not?
A: None sir, only the ₱250.00 which Jonald Ybanoso left to me.
Q: This ₱250.00 which Jonald left to you was also confiscated from your
possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were not ₱200 of the ₱250.00 was thrown to the ground during the time you
were arrested by the police?
A: No, sir.
Q: It was taken from your possession?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when the policemen brought you to the crime laboratory and had your
hands tested for ultra-violet fluorescent powder, your hands tested positively for
the presence of the said powder?
A: Yes, sir.23
Incidentally, the defenses of denial and frame-up have been invariably viewed by this
Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense
ploy in prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In order to prosper, the
defenses of denial and frame-up must be proved with strong and convincing evidence.24
Another contention raised by the appellant is the failure of the prosecution to show the
chain of custody of the recovered dangerous drug. According to him, while it was Inspector
Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed the request for laboratory examination, only police
officers Pajo and Simon were present in the buy-bust operation.
Section 21 of RA 9165 reads:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous
Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge
and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition
in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
Non-compliance by the apprehending/buy-bust team with Section 21 is not fatal as long
as there is justifiable ground therefor, and as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the confiscated/seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team.25 Its non-compliance will not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.26 What is of utmost importance is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 27 In this
particular case, it is undisputed that police officers Pajo and Simon were members of the
buy-bust operation team. The fact that it was Inspector Ferdinand B. Dacillo who signed
the letter-request for laboratory examination does not in any way affect the integrity of
the items confiscated. All the requirements for the proper chain of custody had been
observed. As testified to by PO2 Pajo regarding the procedure undertaken after the
consummation of the buy-bust operation:
Prosecutor
Q: What did you do next after that?
A: After examining the sachet of shabu that it was really the plastic containing
white [crystalline] in substance, we immediately approached the suspect.
xxxx
Q: When you rushed up to the suspect, what did you do?
A: We informed the suspect that we are the police officers and he has this
[constitutional] rights and immediately handcuffed him.
Q: Where were the marked moneys?
A: The marked moneys were thrown on the ground. After we handcuffed the
suspect, we did not immediately searched in. We called the attention of the
barangay officials to witness the search of the suspect.
xxxx
Q: Now, before you searched the suspect you requested the presence of the
barangay officials. Now, when these barangay officials were present, what did
you do on the suspect?
A: We immediately searched the suspect.
Q: What was the result of the searched for him? (sic)
A: We confiscated one big sachet of suspected shabu and the retrieval of 2 pieces
of ₱100.00 peso bills as marked moneys.
Q: You said the suspect threw the marked moneys when you searched him,
where were the marked moneys?
A: On the ground.
Q: Who picked these marked moneys?
A: I was the one who picked the marked moneys.
Q: And then after you had picked the marked moneys and after you had the 2
pieces of sachets of shabu; one during the buy-bust and the other one during the
search, what did you do [with] these 2 pieces of sachets of shabu and the marked
moneys?
A: I recorded those items recovered, sir, during the search to the Certificate of
Inventory.28
As ruled by this Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of the
confiscated item which, in the present case, was complied with, thus:
Crucial in proving chain of custody is the marking29 of the seized drugs or other related
items immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the
starting point in the custodial link, thus, it is vital that the seized contraband are
immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the markings
as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the
accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings, obviating switching,
"planting," or contamination of evidence.30
Anent the age of the appellant when he was arrested, this Court finds it appropriate to
discuss the effect of his minority in his suspension of sentence. The appellant was
seventeen (17) years old when the buy-bust operation took place or when the said offense
was committed, but was no longer a minor at the time of the promulgation of the RTC's
Decision.
It must be noted that RA 9344 took effect on May 20, 2006, while the RTC promulgated its
decision on this case on September 14, 2005, when said appellant was no longer a minor.
The RTC did not suspend the sentence in accordance with Article 192 of P.D. 603, The Child
and Youth Welfare Code31 and Section 32 of A.M. No. 02-1-18-SC, the Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law,32 the laws that were applicable at the time of the promulgation of
judgment, because the imposable penalty for violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 is life
imprisonment to death.
It may be argued that the appellant should have been entitled to a suspension of his
sentence under Sections 38 and 68 of RA 9344 which provide for its retroactive
application, thus:
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once the child who is under eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the offense
charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction,
the court shall place the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without
need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child,
the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the Supreme
Court [Rule] on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.
xxxx
Sec. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have
been convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the effectivity of this Act, and who
were below the age of eighteen (18) years at the time of the commission of the offense for
which they were convicted and are serving sentence, shall likewise benefit from the
retroactive application of this Act. x x x
However, this Court has already ruled in People v. Sarcia33 that while Section 38 of RA
9344 provides that suspension of sentence can still be applied even if the child in conflict
with the law is already eighteen (18) years of age or more at the time of the
pronouncement of his/her guilt, Section 40 of the same law limits the said suspension of
sentence until the child reaches the maximum age of 21. The provision states:
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. - If the court finds that the
objective of the disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict with the law have
not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with
the condition of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with
the law shall be brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while under
suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended
sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the maximum age
of twenty-one (21) years.
Hence, the appellant, who is now beyond the age of twenty-one (21) years can no longer
avail of the provisions of Sections 38 and 40 of RA 9344 as to his suspension of sentence,
because such is already moot and academic. It is highly noted that this would not have
happened if the CA, when this case was under its jurisdiction, suspended the sentence of
the appellant. The records show that the appellant filed his notice of appeal at the age of
19 (2005), hence, when RA 9344 became effective in 2006, appellant was 20 years old, and
the case having been elevated to the CA, the latter should have suspended the sentence of
the appellant because he was already entitled to the provisions of Section 38 of the same
law, which now allows the suspension of sentence of minors regardless of the penalty
imposed as opposed to the provisions of Article 192 of P.D. 603.34
Nevertheless, the appellant shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51
of RA No. 9344, which provides for the confinement of convicted children as follows: 35
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and other Training
Facilities. - A child in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the
court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal
institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
In finding the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellant for violation of Section 5 of
RA 9165, the RTC imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua as mandated in Section 9836 of
the same law. A violation of Section 5 of RA 9165 merits the penalty of life imprisonment
to death; however, in Section 98, it is provided that, where the offender is a minor, the
penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided in the same law shall
be reclusion perpetua to death. Basically, this means that the penalty can now be
graduated as it has adopted the technical nomenclature of penalties provided for in the
Revised Penal Code. The said principle was enunciated by this Court in People v.
Simon,37 thus:
We are not unaware of cases in the past wherein it was held that, in imposing the penalty
for offenses under special laws, the rules on mitigating or aggravating circumstances
under the Revised Penal Code cannot and should not be applied. A review of such doctrines
as applied in said cases, however, reveals that the reason therefor was because the special
laws involved provided their own specific penalties for the offenses punished thereunder,
and which penalties were not taken from or with reference to those in the Revised Penal
Code. Since the penalties then provided by the special laws concerned did not provide for
the minimum, medium or maximum periods, it would consequently be impossible to
consider the aforestated modifying circumstances whose main function is to determine
the period of the penalty in accordance with the rules in Article 64 of the Code.
This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that the provisions of the Code
on the graduation of penalties by degrees could not be given supplementary application
to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not components of or contemplated
in the scale of penalties provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of the
Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article 10 of the former, cannot be
invoked where there is a legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the special
law against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the offense is defined in and ostensibly
punished under a special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the Revised Penal
Code in its technical nomenclature and, necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal
effects under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as in this case, the law
involved speaks of prision correccional, in its technical sense under the Code, it would
consequently be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise.
xxxx
Prefatorily, what ordinarily are involved in the graduation and consequently determine
the degree of the penalty, in accordance with the rules in Article 61 of the Code as applied
to the scale of penalties in Article 71, are the stage of execution of the crime and the nature
of the participation of the accused. However, under paragraph 5 of Article 64, when there
are two or more ordinary mitigating circumstances and no aggravating circumstance, the
penalty shall be reduced by one degree. Also, the presence of privileged mitigating
circumstances, as provided in Articles 67 and 68, can reduce the penalty by one or
two degrees, or even more. These provisions of Articles 64(5), 67 and 68 should not
apply in toto in the determination of the proper penalty under the aforestated second
paragraph of section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, to avoid anomalous results which could
not have been contemplated by the legislature.
Thus, paragraph 5 of Article 61 provides that when the law prescribes a penalty in some
manner not specially provided for in the four preceding paragraphs thereof, the courts
shall proceed by analogy therewith. Hence, when the penalty prescribed for the crime
consists of one or two penalties to be imposed in their full extent, the penalty next lower
in degree shall likewise consist of as many penalties which follow the former in the scale
in Article 71. If this rule were to be applied, and since the complex penalty in this case
consists of three discrete penalties in their full extent, that is, prision correccional, prision
mayor and reclusion temporal, then one degree lower would be arresto menor, destierro
and arresto mayor. There could, however, be no further reduction by still one or two
degrees, which must each likewise consist of three penalties, since only the penalties of
fine and public censure remain in the scale.1avvphi1

The Court rules, therefore, that while modifying circumstances may be appreciated to
determine the periods of the corresponding penalties, or even reduce the penalty by
degrees, in no case should such graduation of penalties reduce the imposable penalty
beyond or lower than prision correccional. It is for this reason that the three component
penalties in the second paragraph of Section 20 shall each be considered as an
independent principal penalty, and that the lowest penalty should in any event be prision
correccional in order not to depreciate the seriousness of drug offenses. Interpretatio
fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the
law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect judicial solution cannot be
forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is
accordingly addressed to Congress.38

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority39 can now be

appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA,
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority of the
appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be one degree
lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily, also applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should be taken from the
penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the maximum penalty shall be
taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal, there being no other mitigating
circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.40The ISLAW is applicable in the present case
because the penalty which has been originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to
death), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by
virtue of the presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Therefore, a
penalty of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would be the
proper imposable penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00240-MIN, affirming the Omnibus Judgment dated September 14, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Butuan City in Criminal Case No. 10250 and Criminal Case
No. 10251, finding appellant Allen Udtojan Mantalaba, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA 9165 is hereby AFFIRMED with
the MODIFICATION that the penalty that should be imposed on appellant's conviction of
violation of Section 5 of RA 9165, is six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, and fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. SO ORDERED.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
G.R. No. 107383 December 7, 1994
FELIX NIZURTADO, petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
An information, accusing Felix Nizurtado of having committed the complex crime of
malversation of public funds through falsification of public document, reads:
That on or about August 25, 1983, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto,
in the City of Caloocan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused, a public officer, being then the Barangay Captain
of Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify and attest Resolution No. 17 Series of 1983 by making it
appear that on August 25, 1983 the Barangay council of Panghulo met and
identified T-shirt manufacturing as its livelihood project, when in truth and in
fact, as the accused fully well knew, no such meeting was held, where T-shirt
manufacturing was identified and approved by the Barangay Council as its
livelihood project, and thereafter, accused submitted the falsified resolution to
the MHS-MMC-KKK Secretariat which endorsed the same to the Land Bank of the
Philippines, which on the basis of said endorsement and the falsified resolution,
encashed LBP check No. 184792 in the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS
(P10,000.00), which check was earlier received by him as Barangay Captain of
Panghulo in trust for the Barangay for its livelihood project and for which fund
accused became accountable, and upon receipt thereof herein accused, with
deliberate intent and grave abuse of confidence did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert to his own
personal use and benefit the amount of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) out
of the funds for which he was accountable, to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the said amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
When arraigned by the Sandiganbayan, Nizurtado pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.
During the pre-trial, held on 17 July 1989, the prosecution and the defense stipulated
thusly:
1. That sometime in 1983 and 1984, accused Felix Nizurtado was the Barangay
Captain of Barangay Panghulo of Malabon, Metro Manila and discharged his
functions as such;
2. That sometime in 1983, the Ministry of Human Settlements, the Metro Manila
Commission and Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK) undertook a
Livelihood Program for Barangays in Metro Manila consisting of loans in the
amount of P10, 000.00 per barangay.
3. That as Barangay Captain of Barangay Panghulo, accused received a check in
the amount of P10,000.00 for said barangay's livelihood program;
4. That the check, to be encashed, had to be supported by a project proposal to
be approved by the KKK;
5. That the accused encashed the check received by him in the amount of
P10,000.00 with the Land Bank of the Philippines; and
6. That the accused distributed the amount of P10,000.00 in the form of loans of
P1,000.00 each to members of the barangay council. 2
After evaluating the evidence adduced, the Sandiganbayan came out with its factual
findings and conclusions, hereunder detailed:
It appears from the evidence, testimonial and documentary, as well as from the
stipulations of the parties that accused Felix V. Nizurtado was the Barangay
Captain of Barangay Panghulo, Malabon, Metro Manila from 1983 to 1988.
In April or May 1983, Nizurtado and Manuel P. Romero, Barangay Treasurer of
Panghulo, attended a seminar at the University of Life, Pasig, Metro Manila. The
seminar was about the Barangay Livelihood Program of the Ministry of Human
Settlements (MHS), the Metro Manila Commission (MMC), and the Kilusang
Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran (KKK). Under the program, the barangays in Metro
Manila could avail of loans of P10,000.00 per barangay to finance viable
livelihood projects which the Barangay Councils would identify from the
modules developed by the KKK Secretariat or which, in the absence of such
modules, the Councils would choose subject to the evaluation/validation of the
Secretariat.
After the seminar, Nizurtado received a check for P10,000.00 intended for
Barangay Panghulo and issued in his name. The check, however, could be
encashed only upon submission to the Secretariat of a resolution approved by
the Barangay Council identifying the livelihood project in which the loan would
be invested. He entrusted the check to Romero for safekeeping.
In one of its regular sessions, which was on the second Saturday of each month,
the Barangay Council of Panghulo discussed the project in which to invest the
P10,000.00. Among the proposals was that of Romero that a barangay service
center be established. But the meeting ended without the Councilmen agreeing
on any livelihood project.
A few days after the meeting, Nizurtado got back the check from Romero, saying
that he would return it because, as admitted by Nizurtado during the trial, the
Councilmen could not agree on any livelihood project. Nizurtado signed a receipt
dated August 4, 1983, for the check "to be returned to the Metro Manila
Commission."
After a few more days, Nizurtado asked Romero to sign an unaccomplished
resolution in mimeograph form. All the blank spaces in the form were unfilled-
up, except those at the bottom which were intended for the names of the
Barangay Councilmen, Secretary, and Captain, which were already filled-up and
signed by Councilmen Marcelo Sandel, Jose Bautista, Alfredo Aguilar, Alfredo
Dalmacio, F.A. Manalang (the alleged Barangay Secretary), and Nizurtado. In
asking Romero to sign, Nizurtado said that the MMC was hurrying up the matter
and that the livelihood project to be stated in the resolution was that proposed
by Romero — barangay service center. Trusting Nizurtado, Romero affixed his
signature above his typewritten name. When he did so, the blank resolution did
not yet bear the signatures of Councilmen Santos Gomez and Ceferino Roldan.
The blank resolution having already been signed by Romero, Nizurtado asked
him to talk with Gomez and secure the latter's signature. Romero obliged and
upon his pleading that his proposed barangay service center would be the one
written in the blank resolution, Gomez signed. But before he returned the
resolution, he had it machine copied. The machine copy is now marked Exhibit J.
Unknown to Romero and Gomez, the blank but signed resolution was later on
accomplished by writing in the blank space below the paragraph reading:
WHEREAS, the Barangay Council now in this session had
already identified one livelihood project with the following
title and description:
Title : T-shirt Manufacturing
Description : Manufacture of round neck
T-shirts of
various sizes and colors.
The other blank spaces in the resolution were also filled-up. Thus "Panghulo,"
"Brgy. Hall," and "August 25, 1983" were typewritten in the spaces for the name
of the Barangay, the place where and the date when the council meeting took
place, respectively. In the blank spaces for the names of the members of the
Council who attended the meeting were typewritten the names of
Felix Nizurtado Barangay Captain
Marcelo Sandel Barangay Councilman
Alfredo Aguilar Barangay Councilman
Santos Gomez Barangay Councilman
Jose Bautista Barangay Councilman
Alfredo Dalmacio Barangay Councilman
Ceferino Roldan Barangay Councilman
The word "none" was inserted in the space intended for the names of the
Councilmen who did not attend. The resolution was given the number "17" series
of "1983." Finally, the last line before the names and signatures of the
Councilmen was completed by typewriting the date so that it now reads:
UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED this 25th day of August, 1983.
The resolution as fully accomplished is now marked Exhibit D.
Other supporting documents for the encashment of the check of P10,000.00
were also prepared, signed, and filed by Nizurtado. They were: Project
Identification (Exhibit B), Project Application in which the borrower was stated
to be Samahang Kabuhayan ng Panghulo (Exhibit C and C-1), Project Location
Map (Exhibit E), and Promissory Note
(Exhibit F).
The application for loan having been approved, the Promissory Note (Exhibit F)
was re-dated from August to October 18, 1983, placed in the name of the
Samahang Kabuhayan ng Panghulo represented by Nizurtado, and made
payable in two equal yearly amortizations of P5,000.00 each from its date. The
purpose of the loan was stated to be
T-Shirt Manufacturing of round neck shirts of various sizes and colors.
Nizurtado encashed the check on the same day, October 18, 1983, and re-lent the
cash proceeds to himself, Sandel, Aguilar, Bautista, Dalmacio, and Roldan at
P1,000.00, and to Manalang and Oro Soledad, Barangay Court Secretary and
Barangay Secretary, respectively, at P500.00 each.
On April 25, 1984, Nizurtado who was then on leave wrote Sandel, then acting
Barangay Captain, informing him that per record, he, Romero, and Gomez had
not made any remittance for the account of their P1,000.00 loans from the
barangay livelihood fund of P10,000.00 and advising him to collect, through the
Secretary or Treasurer.
Since Romero and Gomez had not borrowed any amount from the said fund, they
told Sandel to ask Nizurtado if he had any proof of their alleged loans. So Sandel
wrote Nizurtado on May 2, 1984, but the latter did not answer.
This attempt to collect from Romero and Gomez prompted them to make
inquiries. They learned that the check for P10,000.00 was indeed encashed by
Nizurtado and that the blank resolution which they had signed was filled-up to
make it appear that in a Council meeting where all councilmen were present on
August 25, 1983, T-shirt manufacturing was adopted as the livelihood project of
Panghulo. But no such meeting occurred on that day or on any other day. Neither
was Nizurtado authorized by the Council to submit T-shirt Manufacturing as the
livelihood project of Panghulo.
 On August 9, 1984, Romero and Gomez lodged their complaint against Nizurtado
with the Office of the Tanodbayan. After due preliminary investigation, this case
was filed.
As of September 7, 1984, the members of the Council who had received
P1,000.00 each, as well as Bacani (also referred to as Manalang) and Soledad who
had received P500.00 each had paid their respective loans to Nizurtado who, in
turn, remitted the payments to the MMC on these dates:
April 16, 1984 P1,450.00
August 14, 1984 3,550.00
September 7, 1984 3,000.00
————
Total P8,000.00
In June 1987, after demands for payment, Dalmacio remitted the balance of
P2,000.00 from his pocket because, as acting Barangay Captain, he did not want
to leave the Barangay with an indebtedness.3
On the basis of its above findings, the Sandiganbayan convicted the accused of the offense
charged. The dispositive portions of its decision, promulgated on 18 September 1992,
read:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds Felix Nizurtado y Victa guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of malversation of public funds committed through
falsification of public document and, appreciating in his favor . . . two mitigating
circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, imposes upon him
the penalties of imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS, NINE (9) MONTHS,
and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS,
EIGHT (8) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum; perpetual
special disqualification; and a fine of P10,000.00.
No pronouncement is made as to civil liability, there having been complete
restitution of the amount malversed.
With costs.
SO ORDERED.4
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, Nizurtado has filed the instant petition
for review on certiorari. Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan in that —
1. It has committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that Resolution No. 17,
dated August 25, 1983, of the Barangay Council of Panghulo, Malabon, Metro
Manila (Exh. "D") is a falsified document and that the petitioner is the forger
thereof; and
2. It has committed serious error of law and gravely abused its discretion in
finding petitioner guilty of malversation of the amount of P10,000.00 which he
had received as a loan from the then Metro Manila Commission in his capacity as
representative of the Samahang Kabuhayan ng Barangay Panghulo, Malabon,
Metro Manila. 5
The Solicitor General Agrees in all respects with the Sandiganbayan in its findings and
judgment except insofar as it has found petitioner to have likewise committed the crime
of falsification of a public document.
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. — Presumption of
malversation. — Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is
accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall
take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence,
shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property, wholly or
partially, or shall otherwise be guilty the misappropriation or malversation of
such funds or property, shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved in the misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two
hundreds pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the
amount involved is more than two hundred pesos but does not exceed six
thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in
its minimum period, if the amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but
is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved is more than twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two
thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds
malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use.
The elements of malversation, essential for the conviction of an accused, under the above
penal provisions are that —
(a) the offender is a public officer;
(b) he has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of
his office;
(c) the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is
accountable; and
(d) he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or
through abandonment or negligence permitted, the taking by another person of,
such funds or property.
Nizurtado was a public officer, having been the Barangay Captain of Panghulo, Malabon,
Metro Manila, from 1983 to 1988; in that capacity, he received and later encashed a check
for P10,000.00, specifically intended by way of a loan to the barangay for its livelihood
program; and the funds had come from the Ministry of Human Settlements, the Metro
Manila Commission and "Kilusang Kabuhayan at Kaunlaran."
The only point of controversy is whether or not Nizurtado has indeed misappropriated the
funds.
Petitioner was able to encash the check on 18 October 1988 on the basis of a resolution of
the Barangay Council, submitted to the KKK Secretariat, to the effect that a livelihood
project, i.e., "T-shirt manufacturing," had already been identified by the council. The
money, however, instead of its being used for the project, was later lent to, along with
petitioner, the members of the Barangay Council. Undoubtedly, the act constituted
"misappropriation" within the meaning of the law.6
Accused-appellant sought to justify the questioned act in that it was only when the
members of the Barangay Council had realized that P10,000.00 was not enough to support
the T-shirt manufacturing project, that they decided to distribute the money in the form
of loans to themselves. He submitted, in support thereof, a belated 7 certification issued by
Rodolfo B. Banquicio, Chief of District IV of the Support Staff and Malabon Sub-District
Officer of KKK, to the effect that Barangay Captains were given discretionary authority to
invest the money in any viable project not falling within the list of project modules
provided by the MHS-NCR Management. Lending the unutilized funds to the members of
the Barangay council could have hardly been meant to be the viable project contemplated
under that certification. Furthermore, it would appear that only Regional Action Officer
Ismael Mathay, Jr., and Deputy Regional Action Officer Lilia S. Ledesma were the officials
duly authorized to approve such projects upon the recommendation of the KKK
Secretariat.8 We could see no flaw in the ratiocination of the Sandiganbayan, when, in
rejecting this defense, it said:
The defense evidence that the Barangay Council changed the T-shirt
Manufacturing to whatever business ventures each members of the Council
would select for investment of his P1,000.00 has, as already stated, little, if any,
probative value.
But assuming there was such a change, the same is of no avail. The Resolution
marked Exhibit D expressly stated that the P10,000.00 "shall only be
appropriated for the purpose/s as provided in the issued policies and guidelines
of the program." The guidelines, in turn, prescribed that the livelihood project
shall be identified from the modules developed by the KKK Secretariat or, as
stipulated in the Resolution itself, in the absence of such modules, shall be chosen
by the Samahang Kabuhayan "subject to the evaluation/validation of the KKK
Secretariat." There is absolutely no showing that the alleged substitute projects
which each lendee of P1,000.00 would select were among those of the developed
modules or were submitted to the KKK Secretariat for evaluation/validation.9
Accused-appellant criticizes the Sandiganbayan for its having failed to consider the fact
that no valid demand has been made, or could have been made, for the repayment of the
loaned sum. Demand merely raises a prima facie presumption that missing funds have
been put to personal use. The demand itself, however, is not an element of, and not
indispensable to constitute, malversation. Even without a demand, malversation can still
be committed when enough facts, such as here, are extant to prove it. 10
Accused-appellant was charged with having committed the crime through the falsification
of a public document punishable under paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal
Code.
The pertinent provisions read:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or
ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty ofprision mayor and a fine not to
exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee,
or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a
document by committing any of the following acts:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact so participate;
In falsification under the above-quoted paragraph, the document need not be an
authentic official paper since its simulation, in fact, is the essence of falsification.
So, also, the signatures appearing thereon need not necessarily be forged. 11
In concluding that the Barangay Council resolution, Exhibit "D," 12 was a falsified
document for which petitioner should be held responsible, the Sandiganbayan gave
credence to the testimonies of Barangay Councilman Santos A. Gomez and Barangay
Treasurer Manuel P. Romero. The two testified that no meeting had actually taken place
on 25 August 1983, the date when
"T-shirt manufacturing" was allegedly decided to be the barangay livelihood project. The
Sandiganbayan concluded that Nizurtado had induced Romero and Gomez to sign the
blank resolution, Exhibit "J" 13 on the representation that Romero's proposal to build a
barangay service center would so later be indicated in that resolution as the barangay
livelihood project.
The established rule is that unless the findings of fact of the Sandiganbayan are bereft of
substantial evidence to support it, those findings are binding on this court.
The Sandiganbayan has considered the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender
and restitution in favor of Nizurtado. Deputy Clerk of Court Luisabel Alfonso Cortez, on 17
January 1989, has certified to the voluntary surrender of the accused thusly:
CERTIFICATION
THIS CERTIFIES that accused FELIX NIZURTADO in criminal Case No: 13304 voluntarily
surrendered before this court on JANUARY 17, 1989 and posted his bail bond in said case.
Manila, Philippines, JANUARY 17, 1989
(sgd.)
LUISABEL ALFONSO CORTEZ
Deputy Clerk of Court 14
Voluntary surrender (Art. 13, par. 7, Revised Penal Code), therefore, may thus be treated as
a modifying circumstance independent and apart from restitution of the questioned funds by
petitioner (Art. 13, par. 10, Revised Penal Code). We are convinced, furthermore, that
petitioner had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed. (Art. 13, par. 3,
Revised Penal Code), entitling him to three distinct mitigating circumstances.
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, when a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same (the penalty) to be applied in
the maximum period. The penalty prescribed for the offense of malversation of public funds,
when the amount involved exceeds six thousand pesos but does not exceed twelve thousand
pesos, is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period;
in addition, the offender shall be sentenced to suffer perpetual special disqualification and to
pay a fine equal to the amount malversed (Art. 217[3], Revised Penal Code). The penalty
of prision mayor and a fine of five thousand pesos is prescribed for the crime of falsification
under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. The former (that imposed for the malversation),
being more severe than the latter (that imposed for the falsification), is then the applicable
prescribed penalty to be imposed in its maximum period. The actual attendance of two
separate mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and restitution, also found by the
Sandiganbayan and uncontested by the Solicitor General, entitles the accused to the penalty
next lower in degree. For purposes of determining that next lower degree, the full range of
the penalty prescribed by law for the offense, not merely the imposable penalty because of its
complex nature, should, a priori, be considered. It is our considered view that the ruling
in People vs. Gonzales, 73 Phil. 549, as opposed to that of People vs. Fulgencio, 92 Phil. 1069,
is the correct rule and it is thus here reiterated. In fine, the one degree lower than prision
mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum is prision mayor minimum to prision
mayor medium (being the next two periods in the scale of penalties [see Art. 64, par 5, in
relation to Art. 61, par 5, Revised Penal Code]) the full range of which is six years and one day
to ten years. This one degree lower penalty should, conformably with Article 48 of the Code
(the penalty for complex crimes), be imposed in its maximum period or from eight years, eight
months and one day to ten years. The presence of the third mitigating circumstance
of praeter intentionem (lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed)
would result in imposing a period the court may deem applicable. 15 Considering, however,
that the penalty has to be imposed in the maximum period, the only effect of this additional
mitigating circumstance is to impose only the minimum portion of that maximum
period, 16 that is, from eight years, eight months and one day to nine years, six months and
ten days, from which range the maximum of the indeterminate sentence shall be taken.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law (which can apply since the maximum term of
imprisonment would exceed one year), the court is to impose an indeterminate sentence, the
minimum of which shall be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree
(i.e., prision correccional in its medium period to prision correccional in its maximum period
or anywhere from two years, four months and one day to six years) and the maximum of
which is that which the law prescribes after considering the attendant modifying
circumstances. In view of the mitigating circumstances present in this case, the fine of
P10,000.00 may also be reduced (Art. 66, Revised Penal Code) and, since the principal penalty
is higher than prision correccional, subsidiary imprisonment would not be warranted. (Art.
39, par. 3, Revised Penal Code).
The law and the evidence no doubt sustains Nizurtado's conviction. Given all the attendant
circumstances, it is, nevertheless, the personal and humble opinion of the assigned writer of
this ponencia that appellant deserves an executive commutation of the statutory minimum
sentence pronounced by this Court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Sandiganbayan convicting Nizurtado for malversation of
public funds through falsification of public document is AFFIRMED but the sentence, given
the circumstances here obtaining, is MODIFIED by imposing on petitioner a reduced
indeterminate sentence of from two years, four months and one day to eight years, eight
months and one day, perpetual special disqualification and a fine of P2,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013
GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse
under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.1 Only when the laying of hands is shown
beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child
abuse. Otherwise, it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
The Case
On June 22, 2005,2 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the conviction of the petitioner for
the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
Antecedents
On June 26, 2000, the Prosecutor’s Office of Legazpi City charged the petitioner in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Legazpi City with child abuse, an act in violation of Section
10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610, alleging as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of May 2000, in the City of Legazpi Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit on the person of JAYSON DELA CRUZ, a twelve
year-old,
Grade VI pupil of MABA Institute, Legazpi City, acts of physical abuse and/or maltreatment
by striking said JAYSON DELA CRUZ with his palm hitting the latter at his back and by
slapping said minor hitting his left cheek and uttering derogatory remarks to the latter’s
family to wit: "Mga hayop kamo, para dayo kamo digdi, Iharap mo dito ama mo" (You all
animals, you are all strangers here. Bring your father here), which acts of the accused are
prejudicial to the child’s development and which demean the intrinsic worth and dignity
of the said child as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his
older brother, both minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño at Oro Site in
Legazpi City; that when the procession passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s
daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that
the petitioner confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names like "strangers" and
"animals"; that the petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson
on the face;4 that the petitioner then went to the brothers’ house and challenged Rolando
dela Cruz, their father, to a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to take on the
petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson to the Legazpi City Police Station and
reported the incident; that Jayson also underwent medical treatment at the Bicol Regional
Training and Teaching Hospital;5 that the doctors who examined Jayson issued two
medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered the following contusions, to wit: (1)
contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1x1 cm. contusion left zygomatic area and
contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular area, left.6
On his part, the petitioner denied having physically abused or maltreated Jayson. He
explained that he only talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and Cherrylyn,
his minor daughters, had told him about Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and
about Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting invectives at and challenging
Rolando to a fight, insisting that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from harming
his daughters.7
To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary Ann Rose testified that her father did not
hit or slap but only confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her daughters "Kimi"
and why he had burned Cherrlyn’s hair. Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson
and calling him a "sissy." She insisted that it was instead Jayson who had pelted her with
stones during the procession. She described the petitioner as a loving and protective
father.8
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC found and declared the petitioner guilty of child abuse as charged, to
wit:9
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
finding the accused GEORGE BONGALON @ "GI" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Violation of Republic Act No. 7610, and is hereby ordered to undergo imprisonment of six
(6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor in its minimum period.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the credibility of the Prosecution witnesses by citing
their inconsistencies. He contended that the RTC overlooked or disregarded material facts
and circumstances in the records that would have led to a favorable judgment for him. He
attacked the lack of credibility of the witnesses presented against him, citing the failure of
the complaining brothers to react to the incident, which was unnatural and contrary to
human experience.
The CA affirmed the conviction, but modified the penalty,10 viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated October 20, 2003 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 9 of Legazpi City is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that
accused-appellant George Bongalon is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of (4)
years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum term, to six (6)
years, eight (8) months and 1 day of prision mayor as the maximum term.
Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim, Jayson de la Cruz the additional
amount of ₱5,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court.11
The petitioner asserts that he was not guilty of the crime charged; and that even assuming
that he was guilty, his liability should be mitigated because he had merely acted to protect
her two minor daughters.
Ruling of the Court
At the outset, we should observe that the petitioner has adopted the wrong remedy in
assailing the CA’s affirmance of his conviction. His proper recourse from the affirmance of
his conviction was an appeal taken in due course. Hence, he should have filed a petition
for review on certiorari. Instead, he wrongly brought a petition for certiorari. We
explained why in People v. Court of Appeals:12
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of jurisdiction
only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its principal
office is only to keep the inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or to
prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. As observed in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. "the
special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprived it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed
by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a
void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence,
where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision–not the jurisdiction of the court to render said decision–the same is beyond the
province of a special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse of the aggrieved party
from a decision of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court.
It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the CA in his petition. The allegation of grave abuse of discretion no more warrants the
granting of due course to the petition as one for certiorari if appeal was available as a
proper and adequate remedy. At any rate, a reading of his presentation of the issues in his
petition indicates that he thereby imputes to the CA errors of judgment, not errors of
jurisdiction. He mentions instances attendant during the commission of the crime that he
claims were really constitutive of justifying and mitigating circumstances; and specifies
reasons why he believes Republic Act No. 7610 favors his innocence rather than his guilt
for the crime charged.13 The errors he thereby underscores in the petition concerned only
the CA’s appreciation and assessment of the evidence on record, which really are errors of
judgment, not of jurisdiction.
Even if we were to treat the petition as one brought under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, it
would still be defective due to its being filed beyond the period provided by law. Section 2
of Rule 45 requires the filing of the petition within 15 days from the notice of judgment to
be appealed. However, the petitioner received a copy of the CA’s decision on July 15,
2005,14 but filed the petition only on September 12, 2005,15 or well beyond the period
prescribed by the Rules of Court.
The procedural transgressions of the petitioner notwithstanding, we opt to forego quickly
dismissing the petition, and instead set ourselves upon the task of resolving the issues
posed by the petition on their merits. We cannot fairly and justly ignore his plea about the
sentence imposed on him not being commensurate to the wrong he committed. His plea is
worthy of another long and hard look. If, on the other hand, we were to outrightly dismiss
his plea because of the procedural lapses he has committed, the Court may be seen as an
unfeeling tribunal of last resort willing to sacrifice justice in order to give premium to the
rigidity of its rules of procedure. But the Rules of Court has not been intended to be rigidly
enforced at all times. Rather, it has been instituted first and foremost to ensure justice to
every litigant. Indeed, its announced objective has been to secure a "just, speedy and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding."16 This objective will be beyond
realization here unless the Rules of Court be given liberal construction and application as
the noble ends of justice demand. Thereby, we give primacy to substance over form, which,
to a temple of justice and equity like the Court, now becomes the ideal ingredient in the
dispensation of justice in the case now awaiting our consideration.
The petitioner’s right to liberty is in jeopardy. He may be entirely deprived of such
birthright without due process of law unless we shunt aside the rigidity of the rules of
procedure and review his case. Hence, we treat this recourse as an appeal timely brought
to the Court. Consonant with the basic rule in criminal procedure that an appeal opens the
whole case for review, we should deem it our duty to correct errors in the appealed
judgment, whether assigned or not.17
The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is
Section 10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, which relevantly states:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other Conditions
Prejudicial to the Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or
be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those
covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period.
xxxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as
follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms. –
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and
shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting
in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent
incapacity or death.
xxxx
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the RTC and the CA to the effect that the
petitioner struck Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on the face, we
disagree with their holding that his acts constituted child abuse within the purview of the
above-quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond reasonable doubt that his
laying of hands on Jayson had been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of
Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby intended to humiliate or embarrass
Jayson. The records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur
of the moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly
concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at
the hands of Jayson and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific
intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is
resolved in favor of the petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should consider all
possible circumstances in his favor.18
What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?
Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to seven days of medical
attention,19 the petitioner was liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. — The crime of slight physical
injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall
incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require medical
attendance during the same period.
xxxx
The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor, which ranges from one day to 30
days of imprisonment.20 In imposing the correct penalty, however, we have to consider
the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised
Penal Code,21 because the petitioner lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing
the exercise of his will power.22 Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes
existing only in the honest belief of the accused.23 It is relevant to mention, too, that in
passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a diminution of intelligence and intent. With
his having acted under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had thrown stones at his two
minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyn’s hair, the petitioner was entitled
to the mitigating circumstance of passion. Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum
period (i.e., one day to 10 days) in the absence of any aggravating circumstance that offset
the mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence Law
being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year, 24 the petitioner
shall suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.
The award of moral damages to Jayson is appropriate. Such damages are granted in
criminal cases resulting in physical injuries.25 The amount of ₱5,000.00 fixed by the lower
courts as moral damages is consistent with the current jurisprudence.26
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals; and ENTER a new
judgment: (a) finding petitioner George Bongalon GUlLTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised Penal
Code; (b) sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 10 days of arresto menor; and (c)
ordering him to pay Jayson Dela Cruz the amount of ₱5,000.00 as moral damages, plus the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
G.R. No. 178145 July 7, 2014
REYNALDO S. MARIANO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
The courts of law are hereby reminded once again to exercise care in the determination of
the proper penalty imposable upon the offenders whom they find and declare to be guilty
of the offenses charged or proved. Their correct determination is the essence of due
process of law. The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Bulacan charged the petitioner
with frustrated murder for hitting and bumping Ferdinand de Leon while overtaking the
latter's jeep in the information filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, in Malolos,
Bulacan (RTC), viz:
That on or about the 12th day of September, 1999, in the municipality of Angat, Province
of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of the
motor vehicle he was then driving, with evident premeditation, treachery and abuse of
superior strength, hit, bump and run over with the said motor vehicle one Ferdinand de
Leon, thereby inflicting upon him serious physical injuries which ordinarily would have
causedthe death of the said Ferdinand de Leon, thus performing all the acts of execution
which should have produced the crime of murder asa consequence, but nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to said Ferdinand de Leon. Contrary to law. 1
The CA summarized the antecedent events as follows:
At about 6:30 in the evening of September 12, 1999, Ferdinand de Leon was driving his
owner type jeep along Barangay Engkanto, Angat, Bulacan. With him were his wife,
Urbanita, and their two-year old son, as they just came from a baptismal party. Luis de
Leon, an uncle of Ferdinand, also came from the baptismal party and was driving his owner
type jeep. Accused-appellant Reynaldo Mariano was driving his red Toyota pick-up with
his wife, Rebecca, and their helper, Rowena Años, as passengers. They had just attendeda
worship service in Barangay Engkanto.
The Toyota pick-up overtook the jeep of Ferdinand de Leon and almost bumped it.
Ferdinand got mad, overtook the pick-up and blocked its path. Reynaldo Mariano stopped
the pick-up behind the jeep. Ferdinand alighted from his jeep and approached Reynaldo.
Ferdinand claimed that he and Reynaldo had an altercation. However, Reynaldo insisted
that he just stayed inside the pick-up and kept quiet while Ferdinand hurled invectives at
him. Urbanita tried to pacify Ferdinand and sought the assistance of Luis de Leon. Luis
intervened and told Ferdinand and Reynaldo "magpasensiyahan na lamang kayo at
pagpasensiyahan mo si Ferdinand." Ferdinand and Reynaldo heeded the advice of Luis and
they went their separate ways.
Instead of proceeding to his house in Norzagaray, Ferdinand decided to drop by his
mother’s house in San Roque, Angat to pick up some items. He parked his jeep in front of
the house of his mother and alighted therefrom. However, hewas bumped by a moving
vehicle, thrown four (4) meters away and lostconsciousness. Urbanita shouted, "Mommy,
Mommy, nasagasaan si Ferdie." She identified the fast moving vehicle that bumped
Ferdinand as the same red Toyota pick-up driven by Reynaldo.
On the other hand, Reynaldo and his wife, Rebecca, tried to show that the jeep of Ferdinand
stopped on the road in front of the house of the latter’s mother about five (5) to six (6)
meters away from their pick-up. Reynaldo stopped the pick-up as he saw an oncoming
vehicle, which he allowed to pass. Thereafter, Reynaldo made a signal and overtook the
jeep of Ferdinand. However, Ferdinand suddenly alighted from his jeep, lost his balance
and was sideswipedby the overtaking pick-up. Reynaldo did not stop his pick-up and he
proceeded on his way for fear that the bystanders might harm him and his companions.
After bringing his companions to their house in Marungko, Angat, Bulacan, Reynaldo
proceeded to Camp Alejo S. Santos in Malolos, Bulacan to surrender and report the
incident.
Ferdinand was brought to the Sto. Niño Hospital in Bustos, Bulacan, where he stayed for
two and a half days and incurred medical expenses amounting to ₱17,800.00
OnSeptember 15, 1999, Ferdinand was transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center in Quezon
City, where he stayed until September 25, 1999 and incurred medical expenses amounting
to ₱66,243.25. He likewise spent ₱909.50 for medicines, ₱2,900.00 for scanning, ₱8,000.00
for doctor’s fee and ₱12,550.00 for the services of his caregivers and masseur from
September 12 to October 31, 1999. Ferdinand suffered multiple facial injuries, a fracture
of the inferior part of the right orbital wall and subdural hemorrhage secondary to severe
head trauma, as evidenced by the certification issued by Dr. Hernando L. Cruz, Jr. of St.
Luke’s Medical Center. Urbanita, received the amount of ₱50,000.00 from Reynaldo
Mariano by way of financial assistance, as evidenced by a receipt dated September 15,
1999.2
Under its decision rendered on May 26, 2003 after trial, however, the RTC convicted the
petitioner of frustrated homicide,3 to wit:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds the accused Reynaldo
Mariano GUILTYfor the lesser offense of Frustrated Homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Article 50 thereof and is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of three (3) years and four (4) months of Prision Correccional as
minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor as maximum and is hereby
directed to pay the complainant, Ferdinand de Leon, the amount of ₱196,043.25 less
₱50,000.00 (already given) as actual damages, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages, and the
costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.4
On appeal, the CA promulgated itsassailed decision on June 29, 2006,5 modifying the
felony committed by the petitioner from frustrated homicide to reckless imprudence
resulting in serious physical injuries, ruling thusly:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIEDand accused-appellant Reynaldo
Mariano is found guilty of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty oftwo (2) months and one
(1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, seven (7) months and eleven (11)
days of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify Ferdinand de Leon in the
amount of ₱58,402.75 as actual damages and ₱10,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.6
In this appeal, the petitioner arguesthat his guilt for any crime was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt, and claims that Ferdinand’s injuries were the result of a mere accident.
He insists that he lacked criminal intent; that he was not negligent in driving his pick-up
truck; and that the CA should have appreciated voluntary surrender asa mitigating
circumstance in his favor.
Ruling
We affirm the conviction of the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries.
The following findings by the CA compel us to affirm, to wit:
Reynaldo tried to show that he stopped his pick-up five (5) to six (6) meters behind the
jeep of Ferdinand, as he allowed an oncoming vehicle to pass. Thereafter, he overtook the
jeep of Ferdinand. However, the fact that Ferdinand’s body was thrown four (4) meters
away from his jeep showed that Reynaldo was driving his pick-up at a fast speed when he
overtook the jeep of Ferdinand. It is worthy to note that Reynaldo admitted that he has
known Ferdinand and the latter’s family since 1980 because they have a store where he
used to buy things. As aptly observed by the OSG, Reynaldo should have foreseen the
possibilitythat Ferdinand would alight from his jeep and go inside the house of his mother
where the store is also located.
xxxx
As aptly observed by the court a quo, only a vehicle that is moving beyond the normal rate
of speed and within the control of the driver’s hands could have caused Ferdinand’s
injuries. The very fact of speeding is indicative of imprudent behavior, as a motorist must
exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the
conditions encountered, which will enable him or her to keep the vehicle under control
and avoid injury to others using the highway. As held in People v. Garcia:
"A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to
be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not frominstinct, then through fear of incurring
punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which
no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. Otherwise his own
person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-beings, would ever be exposed to all
manner of danger and injury."
Thus, had Reynaldo not driven his pick-up at a fast speed in overtaking the jeep of
Ferdinand, he could have easily stopped his pick-up or swerved farther to the left side of
the road, as there was no oncoming vehicle, when he saw that Ferdinand alighted from his
jeep and lost his balance, in order to avoid hitting the latter or, at least, minimizing his
injuries.7
The findings by the CA are controlling on the Court. Indeed, the findings of both lower
courts on the circumstances that had led to the injuries of Ferdinand fully converged
except for the RTC’s conclusion that malicious intent had attended the commission of the
offense. Such findings cannot be disturbed by the Court in this appellate review, for it is a
well-settled rule that the findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, are
binding and conclusive upon the Court.8
"Reckless imprudence consists involuntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing of failing to perform such act, taking intoconsideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place."9 To constitute the offense of reckless
driving, the act must be something more than a mere negligence in the operation of the
motor vehicle, but a willful and wanton disregard of the consequences is required.10 The
Prosecution must further show the direct causal connection between the negligence and
the injuries or damages complained of. In Manzanares v. People,11 the petitioner was
found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and serious physical
injuries because of the finding that hehad driven the Isuzu truck very fast before it
smashed into a jeepney. In Pangonorom v. People,12 a public utility driver driving his
vehicle very fast was held criminally negligent because he had not slowed down to avoid
hitting a swerving car. In the absence of any cogent reasons, therefore, the Court bows to
the CA’s observations that the petitioner had driven his pick-up truck at a fast speed in
order to overtake the jeep of Ferdinand, and in so attempting to overtake unavoidably hit
Ferdinand, causing the latter’s injuries.
Contrary to the petitioner’s insistence, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
cannot be appreciated in his favor. Paragraph 5 of Article 365, Revised Penal Code,
expressly states that in the imposition of the penalties, the courts shall exercise their
sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code. "The rationale of the law," according to People v. Medroso, Jr.:13
x x x can be found in the fact thatin quasi-offenses penalized under Article 365, the
carelessness, imprudence or negligence which characterizes the wrongful act may vary
from one situation to another, in nature, extent, and resulting consequences, and in order
that there may be a fair and just application of the penalty, the courts must have ample
discretion in its imposition, without being bound by what We may call the mathematical
formula provided for inArticle 64 of the Revised Penal Code. On the basis of this particular
provision, the trial court was not bound to apply paragraph 5 of Article 64 in the instant
case even if appellant had two mitigating circumstances in his favor with no aggravating
circumstance to offset them.
Even so, the CA erred in imposing on the petitioner the penalty for reckless imprudence
resulting in seriousphysical injuries.1âwphi1 The error should be avoided because no
person should be condemned tosuffer a penalty that the law does not prescribe or provide
for the offense charged or proved. Verily, anyone judicially declared guiltyof any crime
must be duly punished in accordance with the law defining the crime and prescribing the
punishment. Injustice would always result to the offender should the penalty exceed that
allowed by the law. The imposition of the correct penalty on the offender is the essence
ofdue process of law.
The penalty for the offender guilty ofreckless imprudence is based on the gravity of the
resulting injuries had his act been intentional. Thus, Article 365 of the Revised Penal
Codestipulates that had the act been intentional, and would constitute a grave felony, the
offender shall suffer arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccionalin its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, arresto mayorin its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; and if it would have constituted a light
felony, arresto menorin its maximum period shall be imposed. Pursuant to Article 9 of the
Revised Penal Code, a grave felony is that to which the law attaches the capital punishment
or a penalty that in any of its periods is afflictivein accordance with Article 25 of
theRevised Penal Code; a less grave felony is that which the law punishes with a penalty
that is correctionalin its maximum period in accordance with Article 25 of the Revised
Penal Code; and a light felony is an infraction of law for the commission of which a penalty
of either arresto menoror a fine not exceeding ₱200.00, or both is provided.
In turn, Article 25 of the Revised Penal Codeenumerates the principal afflictive penaltiesto
be reclusion perpetua, reclusion temporal, andprision mayor; the principal correctional
penaltiesto beprision correccional, arresto mayor, suspension and destierro; and the light
penalties to be arresto menorand fine not exceeding ₱200.00. Under this provision, death
stands alone as the capital punishment.
The Revised Penal Codeclassifies the felony of serious physical injuries based on the
gravity ofthe physical injuries, to wit:
Article 263. Serious physical injuries. — Any person who shall wound, beat, or assault
another, shall be guilty of the crime of serious physical injuries and shall suffer:
1. The penalty of prision mayor, if in consequence of the physical injuries
inflicted, the injured person shall become insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind;
2. The penalty of prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods, if in
consequence ofthe physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have lost
the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or shall have lost an eye, a
hand, a foot, an arm, or a leg or shall have lost the use of any such member, or
shall have become incapacitated for the work in which he was therefor habitually
engaged;
3. The penalty of prision correccionalin its minimum and medium periods, if in
consequence of the physical injuries inflicted, the person injured shall have
become deformed, orshall have lost any other part of his body, or shall have lost
the use thereof, or shall have been ill or incapacitated for the performance of the
work in which he as habitually engaged for a period of more than ninety days;
4. The penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period to prision correccionalin
its minimum period, if the physical injuries inflicted shall have caused the illness
or incapacity for labor of the injured person for more than thirty days.
If the offense shall have been committed against any of the persons enumerated in Article
246, or with attendance of any of the circumstances mentioned in Article 248, the case
covered by subdivision number 1 of this Article shall be punished by reclusion temporalin
its medium and maximum periods; the case covered by subdivision number 2 by prision
correccionalin its maximum period to prision mayorin its minimum period; the case
covered by subdivision number 3 by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods; and the case covered by subdivision number 4 by prision correccionalin its
minimum and medium periods.
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not be applicable to a parent who shall
inflict physical injuries upon his child by excessive chastisement.
In its decision,14 the CA found that Ferdinand had sustained multiple facial injuries, a
fracture of the inferior part of the right orbital wall, and subdural hemorrhage secondary
to severehead trauma; that he had become stuporous and disoriented as to time, place and
person. It was also on record that he had testified at the trial thathe was unable to attend
to his general merchandise store for three months due to temporary amnesia; and that he
had required the attendance of caregivers and a masseur until October 31, 1999.
With Ferdinand not becoming insane, imbecile, impotent, or blind, his physical injuries did
not fall under Article 263, 1, supra. Consequently, the CA incorrectly considered the
petitioner’s act as a grave felony had it been intentional, and should not have imposed the
penalty at arresto mayorin its maximum period to prision correccionalin its medium
period. Instead, the petitioner’s act that caused the serious physical injuries, had it been
intentional, would be a less grave felonyunder Article 25 of the Revised Penal Code,
because Ferdinand’s physical injuries were those under Article 263, 3, supra, for having
incapacitated him from the performance of the work in which he was habitually engaged
in for more than 90 days.
Conformably with Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is arresto
mayorin its minimum and medium periods, which ranges from one to four months. As
earlier mentioned, the rules in Article 64 of the Revised Penal Codeare not applicable in
reckless imprudence, and considering further that the maximum term of imprisonment
would not exceed one year, rendering the Indeterminate Sentence Lawinapplicable, 15 the
Court holds that the straight penalty of two months of arresto mayorwas the correct
penalty for the petitioner.
The Court agrees with the CA’s modification of the award of actual and moral damages
amounting to ₱58,402.75 and ₱10,000.00, respectively.
Actual damages, to be recoverable, must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be
proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. This is because the courts cannot rely on
speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of damages. To
justify an award of actual damages, there must be competent proof of the actual loss
suffered, which should be based on the amounts actually expended by the victim, 16 or
other competent proof. Here, the receipts presented by the Prosecution proved the
expenses actually incurred amounting to₱108,402.75, but such aggregate was reduced by
the victim’s earlier receipt of ₱50,000.00 from the petitioner in the form of financial
assistance. Hence, the victim should recover only the unpaid portion of ₱58,402.75.

Moral damages are given to ease the victim's grief and suffering. Moral damages should
reasonably approximate the extent of the hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong
done.17 Accordingly, the CA properly reduced to ₱10,000.00 the moral damages awarded
to Ferdinand. In addition, we impose an interest of 6% per annum on the actual and moral
damages reckoned from the finality of this decision until the full payment of the obligation.
This is because the damages thus fixed thereby become a forbearance. The rate of 6% per
annum is pursuant to Circular No. 799, series of 2013, issued by the Office of the Governor
of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas on June 21, 2013, and the pronouncement in Nacar v.
Gallery Frames.18 WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 29,
2006, subject to the modifications that: (a) the penalty to be imposed on the petitioner
shall be a straight penalty of two months of arresto mayor; and (b) the awards for actual
and moral damages shall earn 6% interest rate per annum commencing from the finality
of this decision until fully paid.

The petitioner shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
G.R. No. 196434 October 24, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CHITO NAZARENO, Respondent.
ABAD, J.:
This case is about the evidence required for proving conspiracy and the qualifying
circumstance of abuse or superior strength in a murder case.
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila charged the accused Chito Nazareno and
Fernando Saliendra, a barangay tanod, of murder before the Regional Trial Cow1 (RTC) of
that city in Criminal Case 94-133117.1
Since Saliendra remained at-large, only Nazareno was tried. The prosecution presented
Roy Magallanes, Roger Francisco, SPO1 Teodoro Sinag, SPO1 Julian Bustamante, Dr.
Antonio E. Rebosa, and Jovelo Valdez.2
On November 10, 1993 David Valdez (David), Magallanes, and Francisco attended the
wake of a friend. While there, they drank liquor with accused Nazareno and Saliendra. 3 A
heated argument ensued between Magallanes and Nazareno but their companions
pacified them.4
On the following day, November 11, David, Magallanes, and Francisco returned to the
wake. Accused Nazareno and Saliendra also arrived and told the three not to mind the
previous night’s altercation. At around 9:30 in the evening, while David, Francisco, and
their friend, Aida Unos were walking on the street, Nazareno and Saliendra blocked their
path.5 Nazareno boxed Francisco who fled but Saliendra went after him with a
balisong.6 Francisco, who succeeded in hiding saw Nazareno hit David on the body with a
stick while Saliendra struck David’s head with a stone.7 David ran towards a gasoline
station but Nazareno and Saliendra, aided by some barangay tanods, caught up with
him.8 As David fell, the barangay tanods took over the assault.9 This took place as
Magallanes stood about five meters across the highway unable to help his
friend.10 Afterwards, Unos brought David to the hospital.11 Dr. Rebosa performed surgery
on David’s head but he died on November 14, 1993 of massive intra-cranial hemorrhage
secondary to depressed fracture on his right temporal bone 12 in a form of blunt trauma.13
On November 12, 1993 after David’s relatives reported the killing to the police, SPO1 Sinag
investigated the case and took Unos’s statement.14 On November 15, accompanied by SPO1
Bustamante and two other police officers, SPO1 Sinag went to the UST Hospital and took
a look at David’s body, noting the wounds on his forehead.15Subsequently, the officers
went to the crime scene but found no witness there.
In his defense, accused Nazareno claimed that he left his house at around 9:30 in the
evening on November 11, 1993 to buy milk. While on a street near his house, he noted a
commotion taking place nearby. He then bumped into Saliendra. Nazareno proceeded
home and went to bed.16 His wife Isabel supported his testimony, claiming that she asked
her husband on that night to buy milk for their children. When Nazareno returned home,
he informed her of the commotion outside and how someone bumped into him.17
Unos testified that she saw Saliendra chasing David as the latter hang on the rear of a
running jeepney. She claimed that she did not see Nazareno around the place.18
On March 9, 2004, the RTC found Nazareno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder,
qualified by abuse of superior strength and aggravated by treachery. The RTC sentenced
Nazareno to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered him to pay P141,670.25
as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages,
without any subsidiary imprisonment.19
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed with modification the decision of the
RTC. 20 Finding no treachery, it convicted Nazareno of murder qualified by abuse of
superior strength, hence, this appeal.
The issues in this case are:
1. Whether or not Nazareno took part in a conspiracy to kill David;
2. Whether or not a qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
attended the killing of David.
The Court’s Ruling
One. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court are, except for compelling or
exceptional reasons, conclusive to the Court especially when fully supported by evidence
and affirmed by the CA.21 Here, no sound reason exists to alter the findings of the RTC and
the CA with respect to the facts they deemed to have been proved and the credibility of the
witnesses.22
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it.23 Actions indicating close personal
association and shared sentiment among the accused can prove its presence.24 Proof that
the perpetrators met beforehand and decided to commit the crime is not necessary as long
as their acts manifest a common design and oneness of purpose.
Here, both the RTC and the CA found conspiracy in attendance. Magallanes and Francisco
testified that accused Nazareno and Saliendra purposely waited for David and his
companions out on the street as they came out of the wake. The witnesses testified that
each of Nazareno and Saliendra took concerted steps aimed at killing or causing serious
harm to David. Nazareno repeatedly struck David on the area of his neck with a stick;
Saliendra hurled a fist-sized stone on his head. Even when David tried to flee, they still
chased him and together with other barangay tanods, beat him to unconsciousness.
Although Magallanes testified that Saliendra and Nazareno acted "quite differently" from
each other before the attack,25 their actions before and during the incident reveal a
common purpose.26 Saliendra appears to have delivered the fatal blow but Nazareno
cannot escape liability because, in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. 27

Magallanes and Francisco saw the commission of the offense from different angles but the
core of their stories remains cohesive. The result of the autopsy of David’s body
corroborates such stories. True their accounts have certain inconsistencies but these do
not weaken their credibility since they concurred on material points.28 Rather, those small
inconsistencies strengthened their credibility as they evince spontaneity and
candor.29 Completely uniform and identical statements manifest rehearsed testimonies.30

Taken against these considerations, the Court cannot give credence to Nazareno’s defense
of alibi.1âwphi1 To be admissible, not only must he be at a different place during the
commission of the crime, his presence at the crime scene must also be physically
impossible.31 Here, Nazareno even admits that he encountered Saliendra, the accused who
went into hiding, on the street and noticed the commotion.32

Two. The CA held that the killing of David should be characterized as one of murder
qualified by abuse of superior strength. The Court finds no fault in this ruling. There is
abuse of superior strength when the aggressors purposely use excessive force rendering
the victim unable to defend himself.33 The notorious inequality of forces creates an unfair
advantage for the aggressor.

Here, Nazareno and Saliendra evidently armed themselves beforehand, Nazareno with a
stick and Saliendra with a heavy stone. David was unarmed. The two chased him even as
he fled from them. And when they caught up with him, aided by some unnamed barangay
tanods, Nazareno and Saliendra exploited their superior advantage and knocked the
defenseless David unconscious. He evidently died from head fracture caused by one of the
blows on his head.1âwphi1

On the matter of penalty, the Court affirms the imposition of reclusion perpetua. 34 The
Court retains the amount of P141,670.25 as actual damages.35 But, consistent with current
jurisprudence, 36 the Court is awarding P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral
damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. 01308 dated December 17, 2010, that found Chito Nazareno guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength in
Criminal Case 94-133117.

The Court also AFFIRMS the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on accused Nazareno
but MODIFIES the award of damages to P141,670.25 as actual damages, P75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, and to
pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
G.R. No. 190912 January 12, 2015
GARY FANTASTICO and ROLANDO VILLANUEVA, Petitioners,
vs.
ELPIDIO MALICSE, SR. and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, dated January 20, 2010, of petitioners Gary Fantastico
and Rolando Villanueva assailing the Decision2dated August 31, 2007 and
Resolution3 dated January 7, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G. R. CR. No. 31719,
affirming the Decision4 dated March 31, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Manila, in Criminal Case No. 93-127049, finding petitioners guilty of attempted murder.
The following are the antecedents:
On the afternoon of June 27, 1993, Elpidio Malicse, Sr. (Elpidio) was outside the house of
his sister Isabelita Iguiron (Isabelita) in Pandacan, Manila when all of a sudden, he heard
Isabelita's son, Winston, throwing invectives at him. Thus, Elpidio confronted Isabelita but
she also cursed him, which prompted the former to slapthe latter. On that occasion, Elpidio
was under the influence of alcohol.
The Barangay Chairman heard what transpired and went to the place where the
commotion was taking place inorder to pacify those who were involved. Elpidio was
eventually persuaded to go home where he drank some coffee. Thereafter, Elpidio went
back to the house of Isabelita to offer reconciliation. On his way there, he passed by the
house of Kagawad Andy Antonio and requested the latter to accompany him, but was
instead told to go back home, leaving Elpidio to proceed alone.
Upon reaching Isabelita's house, Elpidio saw the former's son, Titus Iguiron (Titus) and
her son-in-law Gary Fantastico (Gary) and asked the two where he can find their parents.
Titus and Gary responded, "putang ina mo, and kulit mo, lumayas ka, punyeta ka."
In his anger with the response of Titus and Gary, Elpidio kicked the door open and saw
Isabelita's elder son, Salvador Iguiron (Salvador) behind the door holding a rattan stick or
arnis. Salvador hit Elpidio on the right side of his head that forced the latter tobow his head
but Salvador delivered a second blow that hit Elpidio on the right eyebrow. Salvador
attempted to hit Elpidio for the third time but the latter got hold of the rattan stick and the
two wrestled on the floor and grappled for the possession of the same rattan stick. Then
Titus ran towards the two and sprayed something on Elpidio's face. Not being able to free
himself from the clutches of Salvador and to extricate himself, Elpidio bit Salvador's head.
Gary hit Elpidio on the right side of his head with a tomahawk axe when the latter was
about to go out of the house. Elpidio tried to defend himself but was unable to take the
tomahawk axe from Gary. Elpidio walked away from Titus but Gary, still armed with the
tomahawk axe and Salvador, with hisarnis, including Titus, chased him.
Roland (Rolly) Villanueva, without any warning, hit Elpidio on the back of his head with a
lead pipe which caused the latter to fall on the ground. Elpidio begged his assailants tostop,
but to no avail. Salvador hit him countless times on his thighs, legsand knees using the
rattan stick.
While he was simultaneously being beaten up by Salvador, Titus, Gary, Rolly, Nestor,
Eugene and Tommy, he tried to cover his face with his arm. Gary hit him with the
tomahawk axe on his right leg, between the knees and the ankle of his leg, which caused
the fracture on his legs and knees. Rolly hit Elpidio's head with a lead pipe, while Tommy
hit him with a piece of wood on the back of his shoulder.
Thereafter, a certain "Mang Gil" tried to break them off but Titus and Gary shouted at him:
"Huwag makialam, away ng mag-anak ito" and the two continued to maul Elpidio. The
people who witnessed the incident shouted "maawa na kayo" but they only stopped
battering him when a bystander fainted because of the incident. Elpidio then pretended to
be dead. It was then that concerned neighbors approached him and rushed him to the
emergency room of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH).
Thus, a case for Attempted Murder under Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code, was filed against Salvador Iguiron, Titus Malicse Iguiron, Saligan Malicse
Iguiron, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao and petitioners Gary
Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva. The Information reads:
That on or about June 27, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused
conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and taking
advantage of superior strength, commence the commission of the crime ofmurder directly
by overt acts, to wit: by then and there hitting the head of Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon
with a piece of rattan, axe, pipe and a piece of wood and mauling him, but the said accused
did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder,
as a consequence, by reason of causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that
is, the injuries inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily mortal.
They all pleaded "not guilty." The defense, during trial, presented the following version of
the events that transpired:
Around 4:30 p.m. of June 27, 1993, Salvador was at the second floor of their house when
he heard his tenth son Winston crying while the latter was being castigated by Elpidio. He
went down and told Elpidio to come back the next day to settle. His wife Isabelita called
the Barangay Chairman two blocks away. Barangay Chairman Joseph Ramos and Elpidio's
wife and daughter went to the house and Elpidio was given warm water, but he showered
his daughter and Winston withit. Elpidio was brought to his house and the former told the
Barangay Chairman that it was a family problem. Elpidio went back to the house of
Salvador where Titus was sitting on the sofa. Elpidio asked Titus to open the door until the
former kicked the door open. Titus escaped through the open door and Salvador went out
of the house because another child was on the roof, afraid that the said child might fall.
Thereafter, Elpidio went to the street.
According to petitioner Gary Fantastico, he was inside their house with his wife and Titus
when the incident occurred. He and his wife ran upstairs, while Titus went out when
Elpidio hit the door. Elpidio had a reputation for hurting people when drunk and Gary
learned that Elpidio was brought to the hospital because he was mauled by the people.
During trial, one of the accused, Salvador Iguiron died. Eventually, the trial court, in a
Decision dated March 31, 2008, acquitted Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy
Ballesteros but found Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for Attempted Murder. The dispositive portion of the said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court finds Gary Fantastico and
Rolando Villanueva GUILTY of the crime of attempted murder and sentences them to an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one(1) day as minimum, to
ten (10) years as maximum. They are also ordered to pay the actual damages of ₱17,300.00
and moral damages of ₱10,000.00.
Accused Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy Ballesteros ACQUITTED.
SO ORDERED.
After their motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioners appealed the case to the CA,
but the latter court affirmed the decision of the RTC and disposed the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, we hereby
AFFIRM the same and DISMISS the instant appeal.
SO ORDERED.
A motion for reconsideration was filed, but it was denied by the same court.
Hence, the present petition.
Petitioners stated the following arguments:
THE CONCLUSIONS DRAWN BY THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT FROM
THE FACTS OF THE CASE ARE INCORRECT.
THE INFORMATION ITSELF IN THIS CASE DOES NOT ALLEGE ALL THE ELEMENTS AND
THE NECESSARY INGREDIENTS OF THE SPECIFIC CRIME OF ATTEMPTED MURDER. NOT
ALL OF THE ELEMENTSOF ATTEMPTED MURDER ARE PRESENT IN THIS CASE. THERE IS
NO TREACHERY OR ANY OTHER QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE TO SPEAK OF IN THIS
CASE.
THE LOWER COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS FAILED TO CONSIDER THE PRESENCE
OF MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES.
THERE ARE MANIFEST MISTAKES IN THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS AND THE TRIAL COURT.
THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONERS WAS BASED ON THE WEAKNESS OF THE
DEFENSE EVIDENCE, NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE.
THE TESTIMONY OF THE RESPONDENT THAT IT WAS THE PETITIONERS WHO
ATTACKED HIM IS INDEED UNCORROBORATED AND THUS SELF-SERVING.
CLEARLY, THERE ARE SO MUCH REVERSIBLE ERRORS IN THE DECISION OF THE COURT
OF APPEALS AND THE LOWER COURT THAT INJURIOUSLY AFFECTED THE
SUBSTANTIAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONERS AND THESE SHOULD BE CORRECTED BY
THIS HONORABLE COURT.
At the outset, it bears stressing that under the Rules of Court, an appeal by certiorari to
this Court should only raise questions of law distinctly set forth in the petition.5
In the present case, the issuesand arguments presented by the petitioners involve
questions of facts. Therefore, the present petition is at once dismissible for its failure to
comply with the requirement of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, that the petition should only
raise questions of law. The distinction between a "question of law" and a "question of fact"
is settled. There is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the
law is on a certain state offacts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented by the parties- litigants. On the other hand, there is a
"question of fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts. Simply put, when there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or
not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct, is a question of law.6
At any rate, the arguments of herein petitioners deserve scant consideration.
It is the contention of the petitionersthat the Information filed against them was defective
because it did not state all the elements of the crime charged. However, a close reading of
the Information would show the contrary. The Information partly reads:
x x x but the said accused did not perform all the acts of the execution which should have
produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes other than their own
spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon
are not necessarily mortal.
From the above-quoted portion of the Information, it is clear that all the elements of the
crime of attempted murder has been included.
The last paragraph of Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code defines an attempt to commit a
felony, thus:
There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.7
The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows:
The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;
He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;
The offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;
The non-performance of all acts ofexecution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontaneous desistance.8
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two (2) elements, namely:
(1) That there be external acts;
(2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed.9
The Court in People v. Lizada10 elaborated on the concept of an overt or external act, thus:
An overt or external act is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the
intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which
if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor bythe spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will
logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The raison d'etre for the law
requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct of the accused
consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is
necessarily so, irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality ofbeing equivocal that
must be lacking before the act becomes one which may be said to be a commencement of
the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the crime itself has
been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains,
no one can say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the
overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design. It
is sufficient if it was the "first or some subsequent step in a direct movement towards the
commission of the offense after the preparations are made." The act done need not
constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt
must have a causal relation to the intended crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts
must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.11
Petitioners question the inclusion of the phrase "not necessarily mortal" in the allegations
in the Information. According to them, the inclusion of that phrase means that there is an
absence of an intent to kill on their part. Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can
discern only through external manifestations, i.e., acts and conduct of the accused at the
time of the assault and immediately thereafter. In Rivera v. People,12 this Court considered
the following factors to determine the presence of an intent to kill: (1) the means used by
the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim;
(3) the conduct of the malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of
the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the
motives of the accused. This Court also considers motive and the words uttered by the
offender at the time he inflicted injuries on the victim as additional determinative
factors.13 All of these, were proven during the trial. Needless to say, with or without the
phrase, what is important is that all the elements of attempted murder are still alleged in
the Information. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states:
Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if
it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the
approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was
committed.
In any case, it is now too late for petitioners to assail the sufficiency of the Information on
the ground that the elements of the crime of attempted murder are lacking. Section 9, Rule
117 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.- The failure of the
accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same
in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the
grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.
Anent the probative value and weight given to the testimony of Elpidio by the CA and the
RTC, the same is not ridden with any error. In People v. Alvarado,14 we held that greater
weight is given to the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution witness
than the accused's denial and explanation concerning the commission of the crime. This is
so inasmuch as mere denials are self-serving evidence that cannot obtain evidentiary
weight greater than the declaration of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative
matters.15
It is clear from the records that Elpidio was able to make a positive identification of the
petitionersas the assailants, thus:
Q. Then what happened next Mr. Witness?
A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador Iguiron, I got out of the door of
the house, then, I saw Gary was hiding in the kitchen door holding an axe.
Tonahawk with blade of ax was dull and had a handle of one foot, with the
diameter of one inch.
Q. Why did you know that the ax blade of the tom was dull? (sic)
A. I also used that.
Q. Where do you usually keep that in the house of Iguiron?
A. In the kitchen.
Q. How far is that kitchen from where Gary emerged from?
A. He is right in the kitchen.
Q. Then what happened?
A. When I was able to free myself from Salvador, Gary Iguiron was hiding in the
kitchen door and holding a tomhack(sic) whose edge is dull and he hit me on my
right side and my headand I got injury (sic) and blood profusely oozing, I want
to get hold of the tomhawk (sic).
Q. Were you able to get of the tomhawk (sic) from Gary?
A. No sir.16
xxxx
Q. You said while on that street somebody hit you from behind, who was that?
A. Rolly Villanueva.
Q. Why do you say that it was Rolly Villanueva, considering that it was hit from
behind?
A. Because they were about 5 of them at the main gate of the compound.
Q. Who are they?
A. Rolando Villanueva, Nestor Ballesteros, Tommy Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao,
Saligan Iguiron.
Q. You said you were hit by Rolando from behind, do you have occasion to see
first before you were hit?
A. When I was hit I fell down and I was able to see who hit (sic), I saw him.
Q. When you fell down, you were able to realize it was Rolando Villanueva who
hit you, you mean you realized what he used in hitting you from behind?
A. It was a pipe. 1/2 inch thick, 24 inches in length.
Q. You said you fell down because of the blow of Rolando Villanueva and you saw
him holding that pipe, how was he holding the pipe when you saw him?
A. When I fell down he was about trying to hit me again.17
In connection therewith, one must not forget the well entrenched rule that
findings of facts of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonial evidence of
the parties as well as its conclusion on its findings, are accorded high respect if
not conclusive effect. This is because of the unique advantage of the trial court to
observe, at close range, the conduct, demeanor and deportment of the witness as
they testify.18 The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said
findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals.19
It is also of utmost significance that the testimony of Elpidio is corroborated by
the medico-legal findings as testified by Dr. Edgar Michael Eufemio, PGH Chief
Resident Doctor of the Department of Orthopedics. He testified as to the
following:
Q. And as head of that office, Mr. Witness, why are you here today?
A. Actually, I was called upon by the complainant to rectify regarding, the
findings supposedly seen when he was admitted and when I saw him in one of
the sessions of our Out Patient Department.
Q. When was this follow-up session at your department did you see this
complainant?
A. Based on the chart, I think it was four (4) months post injury when I first saw
the patient.
Q. Why does he has (sic) to makea follow up in your department?
A. Based on this chart, he sustained bilateral leg fractures which necessitated
casting. Normally, casting would take around three (3) months only but since the
nature of his fracture was relatively unstable, I think it necessitated prolong
immobilization in a case.
PROSECUTOR TEVES:
Q. Did you personally attend on his needs on that date when you saw him?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. And what could have been the cause of these injuries he sustained? A. I think
one of his leg has close fracture, meaning, probably it was caused by a blunt
 injury rather than a hacking injury, one on the left side, with an open wound
which was very much compatible with a hack at the leg area.20
Petitioners also claim that the prosecution was not able to prove the presence of treachery
or any other qualifying circumstance.
In this particular case, there was no treachery. There is treachery when the offender
commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the
offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of
treachery is that the attack comes without a warning and ina swift, deliberate, and
unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed, and unsuspecting victim no chance
to resist or escape. For treachery tobe considered, two elements must concur: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to
defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or
consciously adopted.21 From the facts proven by the prosecution, the incident was
spontaneous, thus, the second element of treachery is wanting. The incident, which
happened at the spur of the moment, negates the possibility that the petitioners
consciously adopted means to execute the crime committed. There is no treachery where
the attack was not preconceived and deliberately adopted but was just triggered by the
sudden infuriation on the partof the accused because of the provocative act of the victim.22
The RTC, however, was correct in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, thus:
In the case at bar, the prosecution was able to establish that Salvador Iguiron hit Elpidio
Malicsi, Sr. twice on the head as he was entered (sic) the house of the former. Gary
Fantastico hit the victim on the right side of the head with an axe or tomahawk. The
evidence also show that Rolando "Rolly" Villanueva hit the victim on the head with a lead
pipe. And outside while the victim was lying down, Gary hit the legs of the victim with the
tomahawk. lvador also hit the victim with the rattan stick on the thighs, legs and knees.
And Titus Iguiron hit the victim's private organ with a piece of wood. The Provisional
Medical Slip (Exh. "D"), Medico Legal Certificate and Leg Sketch (Exh. "D-2") and the
fracture sheet (Exh. "D-4") all prove that the victim suffered injuries to both legs and
multiple lacerations on his head. The injury on one leg which was a close fracture was
caused by a blunt instrument like a piece of wood. This injury was caused by Salvador
Iguiron. The other leg suffered an open fracture caused by a sharp object like a large knife
or axe. This was caused by Gary Fantastico who used the tomahawk or axe on the victim.
The multiple lacerations on the head were caused by Gary, Rolly and Salvador as it was
proven that they hit Elpidio on the head. There is no sufficient evidence that the other,
accused, namely Saligan Iguiron Y Malicsi, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros and
Eugene Surigao harmed or injured the victim. Titus having sprayed Elpidio with the tear
gas is not sufficiently proven. Neither was the alleged blow by Titus, using a piece of wood,
on the victim's private organ sufficiently established as the medical certificate did not
show any injury on that part of the body of the victim.
The said injuries inflicted on the complainant after he went back to his sister Isabelita's
house.1âwphi1 Whenhe kicked the door, the melee began. And the sequence of the injuries
is proven by victim's testimony. But it was a lopsided attack as the victim was unarmed,
while his attackers were all armed (rattan stick, tomahawk and lead pipe). And the victim
was also drunk. This establishes the element of abuse of superior strength. The
suddenness of the blow inflicted by Salvador on Elpidio when he entered the premises
show that the former was ready to hit the victim and was waiting for him to enter. It
afforded Elpidio no means to defend himself. And Salvador consciously adopted the said
actuation. He hit Elpidio twice on the head. Treachery is present in this case and must be
considered an aggravating circumstance against Salvador Iguiron. Rolly Villanueva, Gary
Fantastico and Salvador Iguiron were all armed while Elpidio, inebriated, had nothing to
defend himself with. There is clearly present here the circumstance of abuse of superior
strength.23 (Emphasis supplied)
Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces
between the victim and the aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken advantage of by him in the
commission of the crime."24 "The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim
does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength,
there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim."25 The
evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they
had the deliberate intent to use this advantage.26 "To take advantage of superior strength
means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available
to the person attacked."27 The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on
the age, size, and strength of the parties.28
Anent the penalty imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, which is an indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day as minimum, to ten (10) years as maximum and
ordered them to pay actual damages of ₱17,300.00 and moral damages of ₱10,000.00, this
Court finds an obvious error.
For the crime of attempted murder, the penalty shall be prision mayor, since Article 51 of
the Revised Penal Code states that a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by
law for the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to
commit a felony.29 Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the sentence
shall be that which could be properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and
the minimum shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code. Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in this case, the
maximum of the sentence should be within the range of prision mayor in its medium term,
which has a duration of eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years; and that the
minimum should be within the range of prision correccional, which has a duration of six
(6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. Therefore, the penalty imposed should have
been imprisonment from six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. WHEREFORE, the Petition for
Review on Certiorari dated January 20, 2010 of petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando
Villanueva is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated August 31, 2007 and
Resolution dated January 7, 2010 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the petitioners are sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from six ( 6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years
and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. Petitioners are also ORDERED to pay Pl
7,300.00 as actual damages, as well as Pl 0,000.00 moral damages as originally ordered by
the RTC. In addition, interest is imposed on all damages awarded at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum from date of finality of judgment until fully paid. SO ORDERED.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
G.R. No. 186541 February 1, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
VICENTE VILBAR, Accused-Appellant.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On appeal is the Decision1 dated February 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 00270 which modified the Judgment2 promulgated on August 6, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 35, of Ormoc City, in Criminal Case No. 5876-0. The
RTC originally found accused-appellant Vicente Vilbar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of murder for treacherously stabbing with a knife the deceased Guilbert Patricio
(Guilbert), but the Court of Appeals subsequently held accused-appellant liable only for
the lesser crime of homicide.
The Information charging accused-appellant with the crime of murder reads:
That on or about the 5th day of May 2000, at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening, at the
public market, this city, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, VICENTE VILBAR alias Dikit, with treachery, evident premeditation and
intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab, hit and wound
the victim herein GUILBERT PATRICIO, without giving the latter sufficient time to defend
himself, thereby inflicting upon said Guilbert Patricio mortal wound which caused his
death. Post Mortem Examination Report is hereto attached.
In violation of Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, Ormoc City, June
13, 2000.3
When accused-appellant was arraigned on July 31, 2000, he pleaded not guilty to the
criminal charge against him.4
During the pre-trial conference, the parties already admitted that Guilbert was stabbed at
the Public Market of Ormoc City on May 5, 2000 at around seven o’clock in the evening,
and that immediately before the incident, accused-appellant was at the same place having
a drinking spree with a certain Arcadio Danieles, Jr. and two other companions. However,
accused-appellant denied that it was he who stabbed Guilbert Patricio.5 Trial then ensued.
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Maria Liza Patricio (Maria Liza),6 the widow
of the deceased, and Pedro Luzon (Pedro),7 an eyewitness at the scene. The defense offered
the testimonies of accused-appellant8himself and Cerilo Pelos (Cerilo),9 another
eyewitness. On rebuttal, the prosecution recalled Pedro to the witness stand.10
Below is a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses for both sides:
Maria Liza testified that in the evening of May 5, 2000, she was watching her child and at
the same time attending to their store located in the Ormoc City public market. It was a
small store with open space for tables for drinking being shared by other adjacent stores.
At around 7:00 o’clock in the evening, her husband, Guilbert Patricio (Guilbert) arrived
from work. He was met by their child whom he then carried in his arms. Moments later,
Guilbert noticed a man urinating at one of the tables in front of their store. The man
urinating was among those engaged in a drinking spree in a nearby store. It appears that
the accused was with the same group, seated about two meters away. Guilbert
immediately admonished the man urinating but the latter paid no attention and continued
relieving himself. Guilbert then put down his child when the accused rose from his seat,
approached Guilbert, drew out a knife and stabbed him below his breast. The accused, as
well as his companions, scampered away while Guilbert called for help saying "I’m
stabbed." At that time, she was getting her child from Guilbert and about two feet away
from the accused. She easily recognized the accused because he would sometimes drink at
their store. Guilbert was immediately brought to the hospital where he later expired 11:35
of the same evening. She declared that for Guilbert’s medical and hospitalization expenses,
the family spent about ₱3,000.00. As for the wake and burial expenses, she could no longer
estimate the amount because of her sadness.
Pedro, an eyewitness at the scene, corroborated Maria Liza’s testimonial account of the
events. On that night, he was drinking together with a companion in Maria Liza’s store. He
recalled Guilbert admonishing a person urinating in one of the tables fronting the store.
Thereafter, he saw the accused pass by him, approach Guilbert and then without warning,
stab the latter. The accused then ran away and left. Together with his drinking companion,
they rushed Guilbert to the hospital. Pedro asserted that the area’s illumination was
"intense" because of the big white lamp and that he was certain that it was the accused
who attacked Guilbert.
Denial was the accused’s main plea in exculpating himself of the charge that he killed
Guilbert. He claimed that in the evening of May 5, 2000, he and his wife went to the public
market (new building) to collect receivables out of the sale of meat. Afterwards, they took
a short cut passing through the public market where they chanced upon his wife’s
acquaintances who were engaged in a drinking spree while singing videoke. Among them
were Dodong Danieles (Dodong for brevity) and his younger brother. They invited him
(the accused) and his wife to join them. While they were drinking, Dodong had an
altercation with Guilbert that stemmed from the latter’s admonition of Dodong’s younger
brother who had earlier urinated at the Patricio’s store premises. Suddenly, Dodong
assaulted Guilbert and stabbed him. Fearing that he might be implicated in the incident,
the accused fled and went to the house of his parents-in-law. Thereafter, he went back to
the market for his wife who was no longer there. When he learned that the victim was
brought to the Ormoc District Hospital, he went there to verify the victim’s condition. He
was able to talk with the mother and the wife of Guilbert as well as the police. He was
thereafter invited to the precinct so that the police can get his statement. The next day, the
parents of Dodong Danieles came to his parents-in-law’s house to persuade him not to
help the victim’s family. He declined. Half a month later, he was arrested and charged for
the death of Guilbert Patricio.
The defense also presented one Cerilo Pelos ("Cerilo") who claimed to have personally
witnessed the stabbing incident because he was also drinking in the public market on that
fateful night. He insisted that Guilbert was stabbed by someone wearing a black shirt,
whose identity he later on learned to be Dodong Danieles.11
On August 6, 2001, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding accused-appellant guilty of
murder and decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing duly considered, the Court finds the accused Vicente Vilbar
alias Dikit GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged, and hereby
sentences him to imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, [and ordered] to pay the offended
party the sum of ₱75,000.00 as indemnity, the sum of ₱3,000.00 as medical expenses, the
sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
If the accused is a detainee, his period of detention shall be credited to him in full if he
abides by the term for convicted prisoners, otherwise, for only 4/5 thereof.12
The foregoing RTC Judgment was directly elevated to us for our review, but in accordance
with our ruling in People v. Mateo,13 we issued a Resolution14 dated December 1, 2004
referring the case to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action.
Accused-appellant, represented by the Public Attorney’s Office, 15 and plaintiff-appellee,
through the Office of the Solicitor General,16 filed their Briefs on August 15, 2006 and April
30, 2007, respectively. The Court of Appeals made the following determination of the
issues submitted for its resolution:
On intermediate review, accused (now accused-appellant) seeks the reversal of his
conviction for the crime of murder or in the alternative, the imposition of the proper
penalty for the crime of homicide. He argues that the trial court erred in giving credence
to the inconsistent, irreconcilable, and incredible testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, to wit: (1) the exact number of persons drinking with accused-appellant in the
adjacent store; (2) what Maria Liza was doing at the exact time of stabbing; and (3) the
accused-appellant’s reaction after he stabbed the victim. Moreover, accused-appellant
argues that if he was indeed the culprit, why did he approach Guilbert’s family in the
hospital immediately after the stabbing incident? Granting without admitting that a crime
of murder was committed, accused-appellant insists that he could only be held guilty of
homicide for it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt that treachery and evident
premeditation existed. He specifically directs our attention to the following details: (1)
there was a heated argument between the victim and a member or members of his group;
(2) the stabbing happened in a spur of the moment; and (3) the victim then was not
completely defenseless.
Meanwhile, the OSG stresses that the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses are minor and inconsequential given the positive identification of
the accused-appellant as the assailant. As to accused-appellant’s contention that he is
innocent because he even went to the hospital and conferred with Guilbert’s relatives
immediately after the stabbing incident, the OSG maintains that such actuation is not a
conclusive proof of innocence.
The issues for resolution are first, the assessment of credibility of the prosecution
witnesses; and second, the propriety of conviction of the accused-appellant for murder.17
The Court of Appeals rendered its Decision on February 14, 2008, in which it accorded
great respect to the assessment by the RTC of the credibility of the witnesses. The
inconsistencies and inaccuracies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are
relatively trivial, minor, and do not impeach their credibility. The positive identification
and categorical statements of the prosecution witnesses that it was accused-appellant who
stabbed Guilbert prevail over accused-appellant’s self-serving denial. However, the
appellate court did not find that treachery attended the stabbing of Guilbert and, thus,
downgraded the crime to homicide. It also reduced the award of civil indemnity. The
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision sentenced accused-appellant as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the 1 August 2001 Decision appealed from finding accused-appellant
VICENTE VILBAR @ "Dikit" guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder is MODIFIED. The
Court finds the accused appellant GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of HOMICIDE and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor
medium, as minimum, to fourteen years and eight months of reclusion temporal medium,
as maximum. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of Guilbert Patricio the amounts of
Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity, Php50,000.00 as moral damages, and Php3,000.00 as
actual damages.18
Accused-appellant now comes before us on final appeal.
In our Resolution19 dated April 15, 2009, we gave the parties the opportunity to file their
respective supplemental briefs, but the parties manifested that they had already
exhausted their arguments before the Court of Appeals.20
After a scrutiny of the records of the case, we find that the submitted evidence and
prevailing jurisprudence duly support the findings and conclusion of the Court of Appeals.
Evidence in this case chiefly consists of testimonial evidence. Both the RTC and the Court
of Appeals gave credence and weight to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
Case laws mandate that "when the credibility of a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of
the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are accorded
high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the
appellate court, since it is settled that when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed
by the appellate court, said findings are generally binding upon this Court."21 There is no
compelling reason for us to depart from the general rule in this case.
Prosecution witnesses Maria Liza and Pedro both positively and categorically identified
accused-appellant as the one who stabbed Guilbert.
Maria Liza vividly recounted her traumatic moment as follows:
Q: Mrs. Patricio, do you know the accused in this case in the person of Vicente Vilbar alias Q: What happened after that?
"Dikit?"
A: So at 7:00 o’clock that evening there was somebody urinated and my husband told that
A: Yes, sir. someone not to urinate that place because that was a table.

Q: Why do you know him? Q: Do you know who was this someone admonished by your husband not to urinate
because that was a table?
A: He used to go there for drinking in our store.
A: No, sir.
Q: How long have you known this person?
Q: Do you know where did he come from?
A: About three (3) months.
A: They were drinking.
xxxx
Q: Do you know who was his companion while they were drinking?
Q: Mrs. Patricio, can you recall where were you in the evening at about 7:00 o’clock of May
5, 2000? A: No, only that Vicente Vilbar.

A: I was at the store. Q: From where he came from or from where he was drinking in the group of persons
together with the accused Vicente Vilbar, how far was the place wherein they were
Q: Where? drinking to where he urinated from where the group was drinking?

A: In the market. A: Just near.

Q: What were you doing in the store? Q: When you said near, can you estimate the distance?

A: I was watching after my, attending to my child there. COURT INTERPRETER

Q: How old was the child? The witness estimated a distance at about 2 meters.

A: Two (2) years old. xxxx

Q: When you were attending to your child at this particular time, what happened? Q: What was the reaction of the person urinating when your husband told him not to
urinate?
A: My child saw my husband arriving.
A: He continue urinating.
Q: What happened after your child saw your husband arrived at the store you were
tending? Q: What was the reaction of your husband when he did not heed to the advice not to
urinate?
A: He met him.
A: He put down the child, this Vicente Vilbar rose.
Q: And what did your husband do when he was met by your child?
Q: Rose from where?
A: He cradled the child.
A: From the table. A: Just near, sir, from my husband next was the one who urinated, next Vicente Vilbar and
I was behind.22(Emphases supplied.)
Q: And what happened?
Pedro corroborated Maria Liza’s testimony, recalling the same sequence of events the
A: Without any word stabbed my husband. night of May 5, 2000, viz:

Q: What did he use in stabbing your husband, this Vicente Vilbar? Q: Who was the companion of Guilbert when he arrived in the vicinity?

A: Knife. A: He was alone.

Q: Do you know, were you able to see where he kept the knife which he used in stabbing Q: So what happened after his arrival?
your husband?
A: When he arrived he was with his child.
A: From his waist.
Q: And what did he do with the child?
Q: When the said Vicente Vilbar delivered the stabbed thrust to your husband, was your
husband hit? A: He carried his child in his arms.

A: He was hit. Q: And then what happened after he carried his child?

Q: On what part of his body was your husband hit? A: There was someone who [urinated] somewhere behind us and he was admonished by
this Guilbert Patricio by saying, "Bay, don’t urinate there it would somehow create a bad
A: Just below the breast. smell and considering that this is a drinking area."

xxxx Q: Who was that person who relieved himself just nearby?

Q: Below the left nipple? A: I did not know.

A: Yes, sir. Q: Whose group was he coming from?

Q: What happened after your husband was hit below the left nipple? A: From Vicente Vilbar’s companion.

A: Vicente Vilbar ran away and my husband told me to call for some help and he said, "I’m Q: Did that person who was admonished accede to the request of Guilbert Patricio not to
stab." relieve just nearby?

xxxx A: He just did not do something, he just relieved.

Q: By the way, how far were you to your husband Guilbert Patricio when he was stabbed? Q: So that person who was admonished in fact urinated?

A: I was behind Vicente Vilbar. A: Yes, sir.

Q: When you said you were behind, how far from Vicente Vilbar? Q: And so what happened?
A: I saw this Vicente Vilbar stood up and pass behind me and went to Guilbert Patricio and
just immediately stabbed him.
Q: What was the weapon used in stabbing?
A: It seems like a knife (and the witness demonstrated to the Court the length of the
weapon at about 10 inches with the width of about 2 inches).
Q: When this stabbing incident took place, was it in front of you or was it behind?
A: In front of me but I was facing his back.
xxxx
Q: Will you please point to us a part of your body that he was hit by the stab thrust?
COURT INTERPRETER
The witness demonstrated below his left nipple and the witness was pointing to the
position below his left nipple.
xxxx
Q: At the time of that incident which was on the evening of May 5, 2000, did you already
know that the person whom you just pointed earlier was Vicente Vilbar?
A: I did not know about his complete name but I know of him as "Dikit" as alias and his
face.
xxxx
Q: Under what circumstance that you learned of his name?
A: Because I ask the victim himself, that Guilbert Patricio by saying, "Who was that person
who stabbed you Dong?," and then he said "He is known to be Dikit and his real name is
Vicente Vilbar."
Q: Prior to the incident, have you seen this Dikit or Vicente Vilbar?
A: Yes, because after we had our tuba drinking spree in that same day they were there also.
Q: Would you recall how many times you have seen Vicente Vilbar prior to the incident?
A: I could not just count how many times but what I’m sure is we know him.
Q: Could it be more than five (5) times?
A: It could be.23 (Emphases supplied.)
The RTC, assessing the aforequoted testimonies, declared:
Maria Liza Patricio is credible. She recognizes the accused, she was just behind him when
he stabbed her husband who was facing the accused. There was proper illumination of the
place x x x and her testimony was not destroyed in the cross-examination. Her testimony
is positive and spontaneous. The Court notes nothing in her demeanor and flow of
testimony that would indicate some contradiction or incredibility.
The other witness, Pedro Luzon, corroborates the testimony of Maria Liza Patricio. x x x.24
The RTC and the Court of Appeals brushed aside the alleged inconsistencies in the
testimonies of Maria Liza and Pedro,25 these being relatively trivial and insignificant,
neither pertaining to the act constitutive of the crime committed nor to the identity of the
assailant. Also, these minor contradictions were expected from said witnesses as they
differ in their impressions of the incident and vantage point in relation to the victim and
the accused-appellant.
In contrast, accused-appellant admitted being present at the scene and time of the
commission of the crime but asserted that one Dodong Danieles was the perpetrator
thereof. Yet, the RTC was unconvinced by the version of events as testified to by accused-
appellant himself and Cerilo, because:
In the observation of the Court, the accused is inconsistent and he talked unintelligibly. His
testimony is not credible and perceived to be flimsy excuses. If it is true that his wife was
with him at the time of the incident and he was not involved in the stabbing, why did he
have to leave the place and his wife and go to the house of his parents-in-law rather than
their house? The accused should have presented his wife to corroborate his testimony in
that regard, and also his parents-in-law so the latter can testify regarding the alleged
visitors, the alleged parents of one Dodong Danieles who came to their place when the
accused was also there days after the incident, telling him not to help the family of the
victim.
The accused’s witness, Cerilo Pelos, is the farthest of the expected witnesses for the
defense. He and the accused were not acquaintances and they only came to know each
other in prison where Pelos is also detained for another charge. x x x. The testimony of the
witness is hazy and full of generalities, even the way he speaks, the Court notes some
inconsistency in his voice and incoherence in his testimony.26
A closer perusal of the testimony of accused-appellant’s corroborating witness, Cerilo,
reveals just how incoherent and elusive he was in giving particular details about the
stabbing incident:
Q: Now, while you were there, what happened?
A: When I arrived there, I arrived with this people having a drinking spree and I myself A: They were still talking when the one who urinated went back to the table.
went to the other table near this people and this quite thin or slim guy was standing in
front of them and one of these people who were having drinking spree seemed to relieve Q: And what happened after this person who urinated went back to the table?
himself not to the C.R. but beside the store.
A: They conversed with the one wearing black and after the conversation he stood up and
Q: Now, you said a while ago that there were four (4) companions of the accused. Now, tell went to the slim guy.
us, were all of the four (4) people that you are referring to that exclude the accused?
Q: Who stood up?
A: There were four (4) of them including the accused, sir.
A: The one named Dodong, the one who was in black and the one who stabbed.
Q: Now, you said that there was somebody from the group who relieved himself, is that
right?
Q: So, you said that this one wearing black approached the slim guy?
A: Yes, sir, urinated.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And what happened when he urinated?
Q: And what happened after that?
A: He was confronted by that slim guy because he did not urinate in the C.R. but just beside
the store. A: So then, he stabbed him and the one he stabbed ran away, because he was hit.

Q: And what happened when the confrontation took place? Q: How about the accused, where was the accused then when the man in black stabbed the
slim guy?
A: They exchanged words and after that th[e] slim guy left the one who urinated because
it seemed that they were having an argument. A: There, and they were still convering (sic) with each other with the slim guy, sir.

Q: And then, what happened after that? Q: And what did he do after the man in black stabbed the slim [g]uy?

A: The one who confronted left and this accused stood up went to this slim guy and talked A: He ran away passing by the Apollo and (while the witness was demonstrating by
to him. pressing his hand to his chest) that he was hit.

Q: This slim guy you are referring to is the person who urinated? Q: How about you, what did you do after that?

A: Yes, sir. A: When the commotion of the people subsided, I asked from the people around there
about the name of the man in black and after getting the name of the said person, I called
up the Police Precinct I to inform them about the incident.
Q; And so what happened with that meeting between the accused and the slim guy that
you are referring to?
xxxx
A: They were still and they were talking, sir.
Q: Now, this person whom you said who stabbed the victim, did you meet him before?
Q: Were you able to hear what they were talking about?
A: Not yet, sir.
A: No, sir, because the place was quite cacophonic.
xxxx
Q: And what happened after that?
Q: As such a police asset, did you endeavor to know the personalities who were involved
in that stabbing incident?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, did you get name?
A: I only got one name only the name of that guy in black, sir.
Q: Why, did you interview the man in black?
A: I asked from those who were there hanging out if ever they know that person.
Q: Did you not follow the assailant after the stabbing incident?
A: No sir, because after I asked about his name from the bystanders, I immediately called
up.27 (Emphases supplied.)
Cerilo failed to mention what weapon was used to stab Guilbert or describe the manner
Guilbert was stabbed. Cerilo also appeared to have mixed-up the personalities in his
narration. He first identified the "slim guy" to be Guilbert who reprimanded the person
who urinated, but he subsequently referred to the "slim guy" as the person who urinated.
Moreover, Cerilo’s identification of the purported assailant of Guilbert as a certain
"Dodong" is highly unreliable, given that Cerilo admitted that he learned of said assailant’s
name from an unidentified spectator of the stabbing incident.
The fact that it was accused-appellant who stabbed Guilbert to death on the night of May
5, 2000 was already established beyond reasonable doubt. The next question is what
crime for which accused-appellant should be held liable: murder as held by the RTC or
homicide as adjudged by the Court of Appeals.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that accused-appellant is guilty only of homicide in the
absence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
In a number of cases, surveyed in People v. Rivera,28 we ruled that treachery cannot be
appreciated simply because the attack was sudden and unexpected:
[W]e agree with accused-appellant that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
established. Surveying the leading decisions on this question, in People v. Romeo Magaro
we recently stated:
In People v. Magallanes, this Court held:
"There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make. Thus, for treachery or alevosia to be appreciated as a
qualifying circumstance, the prosecution must establish the concurrence of two (2)
conditions: (a) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and (b) that the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or
form of attack employed by him. . . .
. . . where the meeting between the accused and the victim was casual and the attack was
done impulsively, there is no treachery even if the attack was sudden and unexpected. As
has been aptly observed the accused could not have made preparations for the attack, . . .;
and the means, method and form thereof could not therefore have been thought of by the
accused, because the attack was impulsively done.
Treachery cannot also be presumed from the mere suddenness of the attack. . . . In point
is the following pronouncement we made in People v. Escoto:
We can not presume that treachery was present merely from the fact that the attack was
sudden. The suddenness of an attack, does not of itself, suffice to support a finding of
alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a sudden
and the victim's helpless position was accidental. . . ."
In People v. Bautista, it was held:
". . . The circumstance that an attack was sudden and unexpected to the person assaulted
did not constitute the element of alevosia necessary to raise homicide to murder, where it
did not appear that the aggressor consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the
perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. Treachery cannot be appreciated if the
accused did not make any preparation to kill the deceased in such manner as to insure the
commission of the killing or to make it impossible or difficult for the person attacked to
retaliate or defend himself. . . ."
Applying these principles to the case at bar, we hold that the prosecution has not proven
that the killing was committed with treachery. Although accused-appellant shot the victim
from behind, the fact was that this was done during a heated argument. Accused-appellant,
filled with anger and rage, apparently had no time to reflect on his actions.1âwphi1 It was
not shown that he consciously adopted the mode of attacking the victim from behind to
facilitate the killing without risk to himself. Accordingly, we hold that accused-appellant is
guilty of homicide only.29
Similar to Rivera and the cases cited therein, the prosecution in the instant case merely
showed that accused-appellant attacked Guilbert suddenly and unexpectedly, but failed to
prove that accused-appellant consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the
perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. As aptly observed by the Court of
Appeals:
While it appears that the attack upon the victim was sudden, the surrounding
circumstances attending the stabbing incident, that is, the open area, the presence of the
victim’s families and the attending eyewitnesses, works against treachery. If accused-
appellant wanted to make certain that no risk would come to him, he could have chosen
another time and place to stab the victim. Yet, accused-appellant nonchalantly stabbed the
victim in a public market at 7:00 o’clock in the evening. The place was well-lighted and
teeming with people. He was indifferent to the presence of the victim’s family or of the
other people who could easily identify him and point him out as the assailant. He showed
no concern that the people in the immediate vicinity might retaliate in behalf of the victim.
In fact, the attack appeared to have been impulsively done, a spur of the moment act in the
heat of anger or extreme annoyance. There are no indications that accused-appellant
deliberately planned to stab the victim at said time and place. Thus, we can reasonably
conclude that accused-appellant, who at that time was languishing in his alcoholic state,
acted brashly and impetuously in suddenly stabbing the victim. Treachery just cannot be
appreciated.30

Lastly, we review the penalty and damages imposed by the Court of Appeals upon accused-
appellant.

The penalty prescribed by law for the crime of homicide is reclusion temporal.31 Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum of the sentence shall be that which could be
properly imposed in view of the attending circumstances, and the minimum shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code.

Absent any mitigating or aggravating circumstance in this case, the maximum of the
sentence should be within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium term which has
a duration of fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months; and that the minimum should be within the range of prision
mayor which has a duration of six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Thus, the
imposition of imprisonment from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is in order.

As to the award of damages to Guilbert’s heirs, we affirm the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as

moral damages and ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity. Medical and burial expenses were
indisputably incurred by Guilbert’s heirs but the exact amounts thereof were not duly
proven. So in lieu of actual damages, we award Guilbert’s heirs ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages. Article 2224 of the Civil Code provides that "[t]emperate or moderate damages,
which are more than nominal but less than compensatory damages, may be recovered
when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount can not,
from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty."32

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal of accused-appellant is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
The Decision dated February 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
00270 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Vicente Vilbar is
found GUILTY of the crime of HOMICIDE, for which he is SENTENCED to imprisonment of
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4)
months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ORDERED to pay the heirs of Guilbert
Patricio the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages.

SO ORDERED.
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
G.R. No. 206381
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DANIEL MATIBAG y DE VILLA @ "DANI" or "DANILO", Accused-Appellant.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is an ordinary appeal1 filed by accused-appellant Daniel Matibag y De
Villa @ "Dani" or "Danilo" (Matibag) assailing the Decision 2 dated September 13, 2012 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA- G.R. CR-HC No. 03759 which affirmed in toto the
Decision3 dated August 1, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of Pallocan West, Batangas City,
Branch 3 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 13941, finding Matibag guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Murder.
The Facts
In an Amended Information4 dated May 5, 2005, Matibag was charged with the crime of
Murder defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended,5 the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about March 27, 2005 at around 8:40 o’clock [sic] in the evening at Iron Street,
Twin Villa Subdivision, Brgy. Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with a Beretta
Caliber .9MM Pistol with Serial No. 3191M9, a deadly weapon, with intent to kill and with
the qualifying circumstance of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with said pistol one Enrico Clar de Jesus Duhan, while
the latter was completely defenseless, thereby hitting him and causing gunshot wounds at
his head and chest, which directly resulted to the victim’s death.
That the special aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm is attendant in
the commission of the offense.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Matibag entered a plea of not guilty during his arraignment. After the termination of the
pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued.7
The prosecution asserted that at around 8:40 in the evening of March 27, 2005, Enrico Clar
de Jesus Duhan (Duhan), who just came from a meeting with the other officers of the
homeowners’ association of Twin Villa Subdivision, was walking along Iron Street in Brgy.
Kumintang Ibaba, Batangas City when Matibag confronted Duhan, and asked, "ano bang
pinagsasasabi mo?" Duhan replied "wala," and without warning, Matibag delivered a fist
blow hitting Duhan on the left cheek and causing him to teeter backwards. Matibag then
pulled out his gun and shot Duhan, who fell face-first on the pavement. While Duhan
remained in that position, Matibag shot him several more times. PO2 Tom Falejo, a
member of the Philippine National Police, positively identified Matibag and stated on
record that he arrested the latter on the night of March 27, 2005. Dr. Antonio S. Vertido
who conducted an autopsy on Duhan confirmed that the latter suffered gunshot wounds
in the head and chest which led to his death.8
In his defense, Matibag alleged that on said date, he was at the despedida party of his
neighbor when Duhan arrived together with the other officers of the homeowners’
association. Wanting to settle a previous misunderstanding, Matibag approached Duhan
and extended his hand as a gesture of reconciliation. However, Duhan pushed it away and
said, "putang ina mo, ang yabang mo," thereby provoking Matibag to punch him in the face.
Matibag saw Duhan pull something from his waist and fearing that it was a gun and Duhan
was about to retaliate, Matibag immediately drew his own gun, shot Duhan, and hurriedly
left the place. Matibag went to see his police friend, Sgt. Narciso Amante, to turn himself
in, but the latter was unavailable at the time. As Matibag headed back home, he was
stopped by police officers who asked if he was involved in the shooting incident. He then
readily admitted his involvement.9
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision10 dated August 1, 2008, the RTC convicted Matibag as charged, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of Duhan
the amounts of 50,000.00 as civil indemnity, 50,000.00 as moral damages, 59,000.00 as
actual damages, and 25,000.00 as exemplary damages.11
The RTC refused to give credence to Matibag’s claim of self-defense as he failed to prove
the presence of unlawful aggression on Duhan’s part, finding that: (a) Duhan’s words and
actions prior to Matibag’s attack could not be considered as a real threat against him; (b)
no firearm was recovered from the victim; (c) Matibag’s account that Duhan was about to
pull something from his waist, which thus led him to believe that he was about to be shot,
remained uncorroborated; and (d) the number of gunshot wounds Duhan sustained
contradicts the plea of self-defense.12
Separately, the RTC appreciated the existence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery
since the attack was sudden, unprovoked, and without any warning on the victim who was
unarmed and in a defenseless position.13Likewise, the special aggravating circumstance of
use of unlicensed firearm was appreciated since a firearm was used in the commission of
a crime and, hence, considered unlicensed.14
Dissatisfied, Matibag appealed15 to the CA.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision16 dated September 13, 2012, the CA affirmed Matibag’s conviction in toto.17
The CA agreed with the RTC’s findings that: (a) treachery attended the killing of Duhan as
the attack on him was sudden;18 and (b) an unlicensed firearm was used in committing the
crime, which is considered as a special aggravating circumstance.19
Hence, the instant appeal.
The Issue Before the Court
The sole issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA correctly upheld the
conviction of Matibag for Murder.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is bereft of merit.
In the review of a case, the Court is guided by the long-standing principle that factual
findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, deserve great weight and
respect. These factual findings should not be disturbed on appeal, unless there are facts of
weight and substance that were overlooked or misinterpreted and that would materially
affect the disposition of the case. The Court has carefully scrutinized the records and finds
no reason to deviate from the RTC and CA’s factual findings. There is no indication that the
trial court, whose findings the CA affirmed, overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the
surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, the Court defers to the trial court
on this score, considering too that it was in the best position to assess and determine the
credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties.20
On this score, the Court now proceeds to resolve this case on points of law.
Matibag is charged with the crime of Murder, which is defined and penalized under Article
248 of the RPC, as amended. In order to warrant a conviction, the prosecution must
establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused
killed him or her; (c) the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC; and (d) the killing is not Parricide or Infanticide.21
Under Article 14 of the RPC, there is treachery when the offender commits any of the
crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. In People v. Tan,22the Court
explained that the essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack, without the
slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked.23 In People v. Perez,24 it was
explained that a frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery. The qualifying
circumstance may still be appreciated if the attack was so sudden and so unexpected that
the deceased had no time to prepare for his or her defense.25
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove that Matibag, who was armed with a gun,
confronted Duhan, and without any provocation, punched and shot him on the
chest.26 Although the attack was frontal, the sudden and unexpected manner by which it
was made rendered it impossible for Duhan to defend himself, adding too that he was
unarmed.27 Matibag also failed to prove that a heated exchange of words preceded the
incident so as to forewarn Duhan against any impending attack from his assailant. 28 The
deliberateness of Matibag’s act is further evinced from his disposition preceding the
moment of execution. As the RTC aptly pointed out, Matibag was ready and destined to
effect such dastardly act, considering that he had an axe to grind when he confronted
Duhan, coupled with the fact that he did so, armed with a loaded handgun.29 Based on
these findings, the Court concludes that treachery was correctly appreciated.
This finding of treachery further correlates to Matibag’s plea of self- defense. Note that by
invoking self-defense, Matibag, in effect, admitted to the commission of the act for which
he was charged, albeit under circumstances that, if proven, would have exculpated him.
With this admission, the burden of proof shifted to Matibag to show that the killing of
Duhan was attended by the following circumstances: (a) unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such
aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to
self-defense.30
Among the foregoing elements, the most important is unlawful aggression. It is well-
settled that there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, unless the
victim had committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-
defense.31 Jurisprudence states that not every form or degree of aggression justifies a
claim of self- defense.32 For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual,
sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening or
intimidating attitude,33 as against the one claiming self-defense.
Evidently, the treacherous manner by which Matibag assaulted Duhan negates unlawful
aggression in the sense above-discussed. As mentioned, the prosecution was able to prove
that the attack was so sudden and unexpected, and the victim was completely defenseless.
On the other hand, Matibag’s version that he saw Duhan pull something from his waist
(which thereby impelled his reaction), remained uncorroborated. In fact, no firearm was
recovered from the victim.34 Hence, by these accounts, Matibag’s allegation of unlawful
aggression and, consequently, his plea of self-defense cannot be sustained. The foregoing
considered, the Court upholds Matibag’s conviction for the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery, as charged.
Moreover, as the RTC and CA held, the special aggravating circumstance of use of
unlicensed firearm, which was duly alleged in the Information, should be appreciated in
the imposition of penalty. Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1866,35 as amended by Republic
Act No. (RA) 8294,36 treats the unauthorized use of a licensed firearm in the commission
of the crimes of homicide or murder as a special aggravating circumstance:
Section 1. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read
as follows:
"Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or
Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. – x x x.
xxxx
"If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use
of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
 x x x x (Emphasis supplied) lieu of actual damages, all with legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the finality ofjudgment until full payment.
Further, under Section 5 of RA 8294, the scope of the term "unlicensed firearm" has
already been expanded as follows:37 SO ORDERED.

Sec. 5. Coverage of the Term Unlicensed Firearm. – The term unlicensed firearm shall
include:

1. firearms with expired license; or

2. unauthorized use of licensed firearm in the commission of the

crime. (Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, when Matibag killed Duhan with his firearm, the use thereof was unauthorized
under the purview of RA 8294 and is equally appreciated as a special aggravating
circumstance. As a result, the imposition of the maximum penalty of death, which is
reduced to reclusion perpetua in light of RA 9346,38 stands proper. To this, the Court adds
that Matibag is not eligible for parole.39

Finally, case law provides that for death resulting from the crime of Murder, the heirs of
the victim are entitled to the following awards: (a) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death
of the victim without need of evidence other than the commission of the crime;40 (b) actual
or compensatory damages to the extent proved,41 or temperate damages when some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be provided with certainty; 42 (c)
moral damages;43 and (d) exemplary damages when the crime was committed with one or
more aggravating circumstances.44

In line with recent jurisprudence, civil indemnity in the amount of 100,000.00 and moral
damages in the amount of 100,000.00 are awarded to Duhan’s heirs without need of
evidence other than the commission of the crime and Duhan’s death. Considering further
that the crime was committed with treachery, exemplary damages in the sum of
100,000.00 is also granted.45

The award of P59,000.00 as actual damages should, however, be deleted as the records do
not show that the prosecution was able to prove the amount actually expended.1âwphi1 In
lieu thereof, P25,000.00 as temperate damages is awarded to conform with prevailing
jurisprudence.46 In addition, interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
date of finality of this Decision until fullyonpaid is imposed all monetary awards.47

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision dated September 13, 2012 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 03759 finding accused-appellant Daniel Matibag y De Villa
@ "Dani" or "Danilo" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, defined
and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole, and ordering him to pay the Heirs of Enrico Clar de
Jesus Duhan the amounts of Pl 00,000.00 as civil indemnity, Pl 00,000.00 as moral
damages, Pl 00,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages, in
DEGREE OF PARTICIPATION (ACCOMPLICES)
G.R. No. 172707 October 1, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
vs.
HALIL GAMBAO Y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM Y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN Y SUBOH, TONY
ABAO Y SULA, RAUL UDAL Y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN Y NANDING, JAMAN
MACALINBOL Y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS Y AMPIL, NORA EVAD Y MULOK, THIAN
PERPENIAN Y RAFON A.K.A LARINA PERPENIAN AND JOHN DOES, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS.
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court for Automatic Review is the Decision1 dated 28 June 2005 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00863, which affirmed with modification the
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109 dated 16 October
1998, finding accused-appellants Halil Gambao y Esmail, Eddie Karim y Uso, Edwin
Dukilman y Suboh, Tony Abao y Sula, Raul Udal y Kagui, Teng Mandao y Haron, Theng
Dilangalen y Nanding, Jaman Macalinbol y Katol, Monette Ronas y Ampil, Nora Evad y
Mulok and Thian Perpenian y Rafon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for
ransom as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659.
The accused-appellants, along with an unidentified person, were charged under the
criminal information3 which reads:
Criminal Case No. 98-0928
For Kidnapping for Ransom as amended by RA 7659
That on August 12, 1998 at around 7:30 o’clock in the evening at No. 118 FB Harrison
Pasay City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named-accused
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and grouping themselves
together, did then and there by force and intimidation, and the use of high powered
firearms, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, carry away and deprive Lucia Chan y
Lee of her liberty against her will for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand
for ransom was made as a condition for her release amounting to FOUR HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (₱400,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of Lucia L. Chan in the said
amount and such other amounts as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the
Civil Code.
The antecedent facts were culled from the records of the case:4
Lucia Chan (Chan) was a fish dealer based in Manila. She usually expected fish deliveries,
which were shipped by her suppliers from the provinces. Sometime in the afternoon of 11
August 1998, two persons, one of whom was identified as Theng Dilangalen (Dilangalen),
went to Chan’s residence at FB Harrison St., Pasay City to inquire about a certain passport
alleged to have been mistakenly placed inside a box of fish to be delivered to her. Unable
to locate said passport, the two left. The next morning, Dilangalen, together with another
companion identified as Tony Abao (Abao), returned looking for Chan but were told that
she was out. When the two returned in the afternoon, Chan informed them that the fish
delivery had yet to arrive. Chan offered instead to accompany them to the airport to
retrieve the box of fish allegedly containing the passport. Dilangalen and Abao declined
and told Chan that they would be back later that evening.5
Dilangalen, accompanied by an unidentified person who remains at large, returned to
Chan’s residence that evening. Chan’s houseboy ushered them in and Chan met them by
the stairs.6 Thereat, the unidentified companion of Dilangalen pointed his gun at Chan’s
son, Levy Chan (Levy), and the house companions.7 As the unidentified man forcibly
dragged Chan, her son Levy tried to stop the man by grabbing his mother’s feet. Seeing
this, Dilangalen pointed his gun at Levy’s head forcing the latter to release his grip on
Chan’s feet.8 Levy thereafter proceeded to the Pasay Police Headquarters to report the
incident.9
Chan was forced to board a "Tamaraw FX" van.10 After travelling for about two hours, the
group stopped at a certain house. Accused-appellant Edwin Dukilman (Dukilman) warned
Chan not to shout as he had his gun pointed at her mouth. Chan was ordered to go with
two women,11 later identified in court by Chan as appellants Monette Ronas (Ronas) and
Nora Evad (Evad).12 Chan was brought inside a house and was made to lie down on a bed,
guarded by Ronas, Evad, Dukilman and Jaman Macalinbol (Macalinbol).13 Ronas and Evad
threatened Chan that she would be killed unless she paid 20 Million Pesos.14
On 13 August 1998, Chan was awakened by Evad and was asked to board the "Tamaraw
FX" van. After travelling for about ten minutes, the van stopped and the group alighted.
Chan was brought to a room on the second floor of the house. Inside the room were three
persons whom Chan identified in court as Macalinbol, Raul Udal (Udal) and Halil Gambao
(Gambao).15 Another woman, later identified as Thian Perpenian (Perpenian),
arrived.16 At about 9:00 o’clock in the evening, a man who was later identified as Teng
Mandao (Mandao), entered the room with a handgun and asked Chan "Bakit kayo
nagsumbong sa pulis?"17 Another man, whom Chan identified in court as Eddie Karim
(Karim), ordered Mandao out of the room. Karim informed Chan that he was sent by their
boss to ask her how much money she has.18 Chan was instructed to talk to her son through
a cell phone and she gave instructions to her son to get the ₱75, 000.00 she kept in her
cabinet.19 The group then talked to Chan’s son and negotiated the ransom amount in
exchange for his mother’s release. It was agreed upon that Levy was to deliver
₱400,000.00 at the "Chowking" Restaurant at Buendia Avenue.20
Inspectors Narciso Ouano, Jr. (Inspector Ouano) and Cesar Mancao (Inspector Mancao),
who were assigned at the Pasay City area to conduct the investigation regarding the
kidnapping, were informed that the abductors called and demanded for ransom in
exchange for Chan’s release.21 During their surveillance the following day, Inspectors
Ouano and Mancao observed a Red Transport taxicab entering the route which led to the
victim’s residence. The inspectors observed that the occupants of the taxicab kept on
looking at the second floor of the house. The inspectors and their team tailed the taxicab
until Pansol, Calamba, Laguna, where it entered the Elizabeth Resort and stopped in front
of Cottage 1. Convinced that the woman the team saw in the cottage was the victim, they
sought clearance from Philippine Anti Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) to conduct
a rescue operation.22
On 14 August 1998, P/Insp. Vicente Arnado (Inspector Arnado) received information that
the abductors acceded to a ₱400,000.00 ransom money to be delivered at "Chowking"
Restaurant at Buendia Avenue at around 2:00 am. Upon learning of the information, the
team immediately and strategically positioned themselves around the vicinity of the
restaurant. At about 2:00 am, a light blue "Tamaraw FX" van with 4 people on board
arrived. The four took the ransom money and headed towards the South Luzon
Expressway. The surveillance team successfully intercepted the van and arrested the 4
men, later identified in court as Karim, Abao, Gambao and Dukilman. The team was also
able to recover the ₱400,000.00 ransom.23
At about 5:00 o’clock in the morning of the same day, the police team assaulted Cottage
No. 1, resulting in the safe rescue of Chan and the apprehension of seven of her abductors,
later identified in court as Dilangalen, Udal, Macalinbol, Mandao, Perpenian, Evad and
Ronas.24
During the 7 October 1998 hearing, after the victim and her son testified, Karim
manifested his desire to change his earlier plea of "not guilty" to "guilty." The presiding
judge then explained the consequences of a change of plea, stating: "It would mean the
moment you withdraw your previous pleas of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty, the court
of course, after receiving evidence, as in fact it has received the testimonies of [the] two
witnesses, will [outrightly] sentence you to the penalty provided by law after the
prosecution shall have finished the presentation of its evidence. Now that I have explained
to you the consequences of your entering a plea of guilty, are you still desirous of entering
a plea of ‘guilty’?" Eddie Karim answered, "Yes."25 On hearing this clarification, the other
appellants likewise manifested, through their counsel who had earlier conferred with
them and explained to each of them the consequences of a change of plea, their desire to
change the pleas they entered. The trial court separately asked each of the appellants
namely: Gambao, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad if they
understood the consequence of changing their pleas. All of them answered in the
affirmative.26 Similarly, Dukilman manifested his desire to change his plea and assured the
trial court that he understood the consequences of such change of plea.27 Thereupon, the
trial court ordered their re-arraignment. After they pleaded guilty,28 the trial court
directed the prosecution to present evidence, which it did.
On 16 October 1998, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Gambao, Karim, Dukilman,
Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen, Macalinbol, Ronas, Evad and Perpenian of Kidnapping for
Ransom. Hence, they appealed to the CA.
In a Decision dated 28 June 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modifications the
decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO
y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL
UDAL y KAGUI, TENG MANDAO y HARON, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN
MACALINBOL y KATOL, MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom defined and penalized under Article
267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and imposing upon each of them
the supreme penalty of death is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that each of them is
ordered to pay jointly and severally the victim in the amount of ₱50,000.00 by way of
moral damages.
It appearing that accused-appellant THIAN PERPENIAN y RAFON was only 17 years old at
the time of the commission of the crime, she is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.29
Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-5-03-SC,
the appellate court certified the case to this Court and accordingly ordered the elevation
of the records.
In a Resolution30 dated 20 June 2006, we required the parties to file their respective
supplemental briefs. The issues raised by the accused-appellants in their respective briefs,
supplemental briefs and manifestations will be discussed collectively.
Insufficiency of Evidence
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas, Evad would have this Court believe that the witness,
Chan, was not able to positively identify them because of her failing eyesight due to old
age.
This argument is bereft of merit. We note that both the trial court and the CA found Chan’s
testimony credible and straightforward. During her testimony, she positively identified
the accused-appellants. If she had not met them before, she could not have positively
identified them in open court. In fact, the participation of these accused-appellants was
further established through the testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses.
Time and again, this Court has maintained that the question of credibility of witnesses is
primarily for the trial court to determine. For this reason, its observations and conclusions
are accorded great respect on appeal. They are conclusive and binding unless shown to be
tainted with arbitrariness or unless, through oversight, some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence has not been considered.31 In People v. Tañedo,32 this Court had
occasion to reiterate the ruling that findings of fact of the trial court pertaining to the
credibility of witnesses command great respect since it had the opportunity to observe
their demeanor while they testified in court.33 It can be observed that the briefs submitted
by the accused-appellants are replete with generalities and wanting in relevant
particulars. It is for this reason that we are giving full credence to the findings of the trial
court regarding the credibility of witness Chan.
Perpenian likewise argued that the evidence for her conviction is insufficient. We also find
her argument bereft of merit.
The testimony of Inspector Ouano, establishing Perpenian as one of the seven people
apprehended when they conducted the rescue operation at around 5:00 o’clock in the
morning of 14 August 1998,34 and the positive identification of Perpenian by Chan
constituted adequate evidence working against her defense of denial.
Further, it should be noted that the only defense the accused-appellants proffered was
denial. It is established jurisprudence that denial cannot prevail over the witnesses’
positive identification of the accused-appellants, more so where the defense did not
present convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to have been
present at the crime scene at the time of the commission of the crime.35
The foregoing considered, the positive identification by Chan, the relevant testimonies of
witnesses and the absence of evidence other than mere denial proffered by the defense
lead this Court to give due weight to the findings of the lower courts.
Improvident Plea
As provided for by Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, the
penalty for kidnapping for ransom is death. A review of the records 36 shows that on 7
October 1998, the accused-appellants withdrew their plea of "not guilty" and were re-
arraigned. They subsequently entered pleas of "guilty" to the crime of kidnapping for
ransom, a capital offense. This Court, in People v. Oden,37 laid down the duties of the trial
court when the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense. The trial court is mandated:
(1)
to conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of the plea of guilt,
(2)
to require the prosecution to still prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of
his culpability, and
(3)
to inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence in his behalf and allow
him to do so if he desires.38
The rationale behind the rule is that the courts must proceed with more care where the
possible punishment is in its severest form, namely death, for the reason that the execution
of such a sentence is irreversible. The primordial purpose is to avoid improvident pleas of
guilt on the part of an accused where grave crimes are involved since he might be
admitting his guilt before the court and thus forfeiting his life and liberty without having
fully understood the meaning, significance and consequence of his plea. 39 Moreover, the
requirement of taking further evidence would aid this Court on appellate review in
determining the propriety or impropriety of the plea.40
Anent the first requisite, the searching inquiry determines whether the plea of guilt was
based on a free and informed judgement. The inquiry must focus on the voluntariness of
the plea and the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. This Court finds no
cogent reason for deviating from the guidelines provided by jurisprudence 41 and thus,
adopts the same:
Although there is no definite and concrete rule as to how a trial judge must conduct a
"searching inquiry," we have held that the following guidelines should be observed:
Ascertain from the accused himself
(a) how he was brought into the custody of the law;
(b) whether he had the assistance of a competent counsel during the custodial
and preliminary investigations; and
(c) under what conditions he was detained and interrogated during the
investigations. This is intended to rule out the possibility that the accused has
been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual threats of physical
harm coming from malevolent quarters or simply because of the judge’s
intimidating robes.
Ask the defense counsel a series of questions as to whether he had conferred with, and
completely explained to, the accused the meaning and consequences of a plea of guilty.
Elicit information about the personality profile of the accused, such as his age, socio-
economic status, and educational background, which may serve as a trustworthy index of
his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilty.
Inform the accused the exact length of imprisonment or nature of the penalty under the
law and the certainty that he will serve such sentence. For not infrequently, an accused
pleads guilty in the hope of a lenient treatment or upon bad advice or because of promises
of the authorities or parties of a lighter penalty should he admit guilt or express remorse.
It is the duty of the judge to ensure that the accused does not labor under these mistaken
impressions because a plea of guilty carries with it not only the admission of authorship
of the crime proper but also of the aggravating circumstances attending it, that increase
punishment.
Inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is charged and fully explain to him
the elements of the crime which is the basis of his indictment. Failure of the court to do so
would constitute a violation of his fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature
of the accusation against him and a denial of his right to due process.
All questions posed to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the
latter.
The trial judge must satisfy himself that the accused, in pleading guilty, is truly guilty. The
accused must be required to narrate the tragedy or reenact the crime or furnish its missing
details.
It is evident from the records42 that the aforesaid rules have not been fully complied with.
The questions propounded by the trial court judge failed to ensure that accused-appellants
fully understood the consequences of their plea. In fact, it is readily apparent from the
records43 that Karim had the mistaken assumption that his plea of guilt would mitigate the
imposable penalty and that both the judge and his counsel failed to explain to him that
such plea of guilt will not mitigate the penalty pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal
Code. Karim was not warned by the trial court judge that in cases where the penalty is
single and indivisible, like death, the penalty is not affected by either aggravating or
mitigating circumstances. The trial court judge’s seemingly annoyed statement that a
conditional plea is not allowed, as provided below, is inadequate:
Atty. Ferrer:
Your Honor please, may we be allowed to say something before the trial. For accused Eddie
Karim we manifest and petition this court that he be allowed to be re-arraigned Your
Honor please, considering that he will plead guilty as charged but the imposable penalty
is lowered, Your Honor.
Court:
You cannot make a conditional plea of guilty, that is what the law says. You plead guilty,
no condition attached. Conditional plea is not allowed.
Atty. Ferrer:
Considering, Your Honor, accused Eddie Karim is already repenting
Court:
Nevertheless. Read the law. If you entered a plea of guilty there should be no condition
attached. We cannot make that condition and dictate to the court the penalty. 44
Although the pleas rendered, save for Perpenian’s, were improvidently made, this Court
will still not set aside the condemnatory judgment. Despite the trial court judge’s
shortcomings, we still agree with his ruling on accused-appellants’ culpability.
As a general rule, convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside and the
cases are remanded for further proceedings if such plea is the sole basis of judgement. If
the trial court, however, relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused,
as it did in this case, the conviction must be sustained, because then it is predicated not
merely on the guilty plea but on evidence proving the commission of the offense
charged.45 The manner by which the plea of guilty is made, whether improvidently or not,
loses legal significance where the conviction can be based on independent evidence
proving the commission of the crime by the accused.46
Contrary to accused-appellants’ assertions, they were convicted by the trial court, not on
the basis of their plea of guilty, but on the strength of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, which was properly appreciated by the trial court.47 The prosecution was
able to prove the guilt of the accused-appellants and their degrees of culpability beyond
reasonable doubt.
Degree of Culpability
Accused-appellants Dukilman, Ronas and Evad argue in their respective briefs that
conspiracy, insofar as they were concerned, was not convincingly established. Dukilman
hinges his argument on the fact that he was not one of those arrested during the rescue
operation based on the testimony of Inspector Ouano.48 On the other hand, Ronas and
Evad base their argument on the fact that they had no participation whatsoever in the
negotiation for the ransom money.
We hold otherwise. Although Dukilman was not one of those apprehended at the cottage
during the rescue operation, the testimony of Police Inspector Arnado sufficiently
established that he was one of the four people apprehended when the police intercepted
the "Tamaraw FX" at the Nichols Tollgate.49 Likewise, the testimony of Police Inspector
Ouano sufficiently established that Ronas and Evad were two of those who were arrested
during the rescue operation.50 This Court has held before that to be a conspirator, one
need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every
act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution
of the conspiracy.51 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.52 Moreover, Chan positively identified
the accused-appellants and placed all of them at the crime scenes.
Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more persons
come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It has been a long
standing opinion of this Court that proof of the conspiracy need not rest on direct evidence,
as the same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or
after the commission of the crime indicating a common understanding among them with
respect to the commission of the offense.53 The testimonies, when taken together, reveal
the common purpose of the accused-appellants and how they were all united in its
execution from beginning to end. There were testimonies proving that (1) before the
incident, two of the accused-appellants kept coming back to the victim’s house; (2) during
the kidnapping, accused-appellants changed shifts in guarding the victim; and (3) the
accused appellants were those present when the ransom money was recovered and when
the rescue operation was conducted.
Seeing that conspiracy among Gambao, Karim, Dukilman, Abao, Udal, Mandao, Dilangalen,
Macalinbol, Ronas and Evad was established beyond reasonable doubt based on the
proffered evidence of the prosecution, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
In Perpenian’s Supplemental Brief,54 she directs this Court’s attention to the manifestation
made by the prosecution regarding their disinterest in prosecuting, insofar as she was
concerned.55 However, pursuant to the ruling of this Court in Crespo v. Judge
Mogul,56 once the information is filed, any disposition of the case or dismissal or acquittal
or conviction of the accused rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence and
discretion of the courts; more so in this case, where no Motion to Dismiss was filed by the
prosecution.
The trial court took note of the fact that Perpenian gave inconsistent answers and lied
several times under oath during the trial.57 Perpenian lied about substantial details such
as her real name, age, address and the fact that she saw Chan at the Elizabeth Resort. When
asked why she lied several times, Perpenian claimed she was scared to be included or
identified with the other accused-appellants. The lying and the fear of being identified with
people whom she knew had done wrong are indicative of discernment. She knew,
therefore, that there was an ongoing crime being committed at the resort while she was
there. It is apparent that she was fully aware of the consequences of the unlawful act.
As reflected in the records,58 the prosecution was not able to proffer sufficient evidence to
hold her responsible as a principal. Seeing that the only evidence the prosecution had was
the testimony59 of Chan to the effect that on 13 August 1998 Perpenian entered the room
where the victim was detained and conversed with Evad and Ronas regarding stories
unrelated to the kidnapping, this Court opines that Perpenian should not be held liable as
a co-principal, but rather only as an accomplice to the crime.
Jurisprudence60 is instructive of the elements required, in accordance with Article 18 of
the Revised Penal Code, in order that a person may be considered an accomplice, namely,
(1) that there be community of design; that is knowing the criminal design of the principal
by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; (2) that he cooperates in
the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the intention of supplying material or
moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (3) that there be a
relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged
as accomplice.
The defenses raised by Perpenian are not sufficient to exonerate her criminal
liability.1âwphi1 Assuming arguendo that she just came to the resort thinking it was a
swimming party, it was inevitable that she acquired knowledge of the criminal design of
the principals when she saw Chan being guarded in the room. A rational person would
have suspected something was wrong and would have reported such incident to the
police. Perpenian, however, chose to keep quiet; and to add to that, she even spent the
night at the cottage. It has been held before that being present and giving moral support
when a crime is being committed will make a person responsible as an accomplice in the
crime committed.61 It should be noted that the accused-appellant’s presence and company
were not indispensable and essential to the perpetration of the kidnapping for ransom;
hence, she is only liable as an accomplice.62Moreover, this Court is guided by the ruling in
People v. Clemente, et al.,63 where it was stressed that in case of doubt, the participation
of the offender will be considered as that of an accomplice rather than that of a principal.
Having admitted their involvement in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and considering
the evidence presented by the prosecution, linking accused-appellants’ participation in
the crime, no doubt can be entertained as to their guilt. The CA convicted the accused-
appellants of kidnapping for ransom and imposed upon them the supreme penalty of
death, applying the provisions of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. Likewise, this
Court finds accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals to the crime
of kidnapping for ransom. However, pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,64 we modify the penalty
imposed by the trial court and reduce the penalty to Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility
for parole.
Modification should also be made as to the criminal liability of Perpenian. Pursuant to the
passing of R.A. No. 9344,65 a determination of whether she acted with or without
discernment is necessary. Considering that Perpenian acted with discernment when she
was 17 years old at the time of the commission of the offense, her minority should be
appreciated not as an exempting circumstance, but as a privileged mitigating circumstance
pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code.
Under Section 38 of R.A. No. 9344,66 the suspension of sentence of a child in conflict with
the law shall still be applied even if he/she is already eighteen (18) years of age or more
at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Unfortunately, at the present age of 31, Perpenian can no longer benefit from the aforesaid
provision, because under Article 40 of R.A. No. 9344,67 the suspension of sentence can be
availed of only until the child in conflict with the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-
one (21) years. This leaves the Court with no choice but to pronounce judgement.
Perpenian is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as an accomplice in the crime of
kidnapping for ransom. Since this Court has ruled that death as utilized in Article 71 of the
Revised Penal Code shall no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties
pursuant to R.A. No. 9346,68 the penalty imposed by law on accomplices in the commission
of consummated kidnapping for ransom is Reclusion Temporal, the penalty one degree
lower than what the principals would bear (Reclusion Perpetua).69 Applying Article 68 of
the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty should then be adjusted to the penalty next
lower than that prescribed by law for accomplices. This Court, therefore, holds that as to
Perpenian, the penalty of Prision Mayor, the penalty lower than that prescribed by law
(Reclusion Temporal), should be imposed. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum penalty, which is one degree lower than the maximum imposable penalty, shall
be within the range of Prision Correccional; and the maximum penalty shall be within the
minimum period of Prision Mayor, absent any aggravating circumstance and there being
one mitigating circumstance. Hence, the Court imposes the indeterminate sentence of six
(6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one
(1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum.
As regards Perpenian’s possible confinement in an agricultural camp or other training
facility in accordance with Section 51 of R.A. 9344, this Court held in People v.
Jacinto70 that the age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation
of the judgment is not material. What matters is that the offender committed the offense
when he/she was still of tender age. This Court, however, finds such arrangement no
longer necessary in view of the fact that Perpenian’s actual served term has already
exceeded the imposable penalty for her offense. For such reason, she may be immediately
released from detention.
We note that in the Order71 dated 9 October 1998, the trial court admitted the
documentary evidence offered by the counsel for the defense proving that the real name
of Thian Perpenian is Larina Perpenian.
In view of the death of Mandao during the pendency of this case, he is relieved of all
personal and pecuniary penalties attendant to the crime, his death 72 having occurred
before rendition of final judgement.73
There is prevailing jurisprudence,74 on civil liabilities arising from the commission of
kidnapping for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person under
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. The persons convicted were held liable for
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
We take this opportunity to increase the amounts of indemnity and damages, where, as in
this case, the penalty for the crime committed is death which, however, cannot be imposed
because of the provisions of R.A. No. 9346:75
1. ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity;
2. ₱100,000.00 as moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered
and thus needs no proof; and
3. ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an example for the public good.
MONETTE RONAS y AMPIL and NORA EVAD y MULOK are found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt as principals in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of Reclusion Perpetua, without eligibility of parole. Accused-appellant THIAN
PERPENIAN y RAFON A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
as accomplice in the crime of kidnapping for ransom and sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day of Prision Correccional, as
minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as maximum. Accused-
appellants are ordered to indemnify the victim in the amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages
apportioned in the following manner: the principals to the crime shall jointly and severally
pay the victim the total amount of ₱288,000.00 while the accomplice shall pay the victim
₱12,000.00, subject to Article 110 of the Revised Penal Code on several and subsidiary
liability.
The Court orders the Correctional Institute for Women to immediately release THIAN
PERPENIAN A.K.A. LARINA PERPENIAN due to her having fully served the penalty
imposed on her, unless her further detention is warranted for any other lawful causes.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished for immediate implementation to the Director of
the Correctional Institute for Women by personal service. The Director of the Correctional
Institute for Women shall submit to this Court, within five (5) days from receipt of a copy
of the decision, the action he has taken thereon.
SO ORDERED.

These amounts shall be the minimum indemnity and damages where death is the penalty
warranted by the facts but is not imposable under present law.

The ruling of this Court in People v. Montesclaros76 is instructive on the apportionment of

civil liabilities among all the accused-appellants. The entire amount of the civil liabilities
should be apportioned among all those who cooperated in the commission of the crime
according to the degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual
participation. Hence, each principal accused-appellant should shoulder a greater share in
the total amount of indemnity and damages than Perpenian who was adjudged as only an
accomplice.

Taking into account the difference in the degrees of their participation, all of them shall be
liable for the total amount of ₱300,000.00 divided among the principals who shall be liable
for ₱288,000.00 (or ₱32,000.00 each) and Perpenian who shall be liable for ₱12,000.00.
This is broken down into ₱10,666.67 civil indemnity, ₱10,666.67 moral damages and
₱10,666.67 exemplary damages for each principal; and ₱4,000.00 civil indemnity,
₱4,000.00 moral damages and ₱4,000.00 exemplary damages for the lone accomplice.

WHEREFORE, the 28 June 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR–H.C. No.
00863 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellants HALIL GAMBAO
y ESMAIL, EDDIE KARIM y USO, EDWIN DUKILMAN y SUBOH, TONY ABAO y SULA, RAUL
UDAL y KAGUI, THENG DILANGALEN y NANDING, JAMAN MACALINBOL y KATOL,
CLASSIFICATION OF PENALTIES
G.R. No. 166401 October 30, 2006
[Formerly G.R. Nos. 158660-67]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
ALFREDO BON, appellant.
TINGA, J.:
Two critical issues emerge in this case. The first relates to whether the Court should affirm
the conviction of appellant Alfredo Bon (appellant) for six counts of rape and two counts
of attempted rape, the victims being his then-minor nieces. On that score, we affirm. As a
consequence though, we are ultimately impelled to confront a question much
broader in both scope and import. While the Court had previously declined to
acknowledge the constitutional abolition of the death penalty through the 1987
Constitution,1 we now find it necessary to determine whether the enactment of Republic
Act No. 9346 resulted in the statutory interdiction of the death penalty.
The second issue arises as we are compelled to review the maximum term of reclusion
temporal in the sentence imposed on appellant by the Court of Appeals for the two counts
of attempted rape. The sentence was prescribed by the appellate court prior to the
enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 which ended the imposition of the death penalty in
the Philippines. The proximate concern as to appellant is whether his penalty for
attempted qualified rape, which under the penal law should be two degrees lower than
that of consummated qualified rape, should be computed from death or reclusion perpetua.
First, the antecedent facts.
I.
Eight (8) Informations2 were filed within the period from 21 August 2000 to 23 February
2001 by the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Gumaca, Quezon against appellant,
charging him with the rape of AAA3 and BBB,4 the daughters of his older brother. Appellant
was accused of raping AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6899-G, 6902-G, 6906-G, and 6908-G;
while he was accused of raping BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689-G, 6903-G, 6905-G, and
6907-G.5All these cases were consolidated for trial. The rapes were alleged to have been
committed in several instances over a span of six (6) years.
Both AAA and BBB testified against appellant, their uncle, and both identified him as the
man who had raped them. During trial, their respective birth certificates and the medical
certificates executed by the doctor who physically examined them were entered as
documentary evidence.
AAA testified that she was only six (6) years old when she was first molested in 1994 in
the house appellant had shared with her grandmother.6 She recounted that the incident
took place when she and appellant were alone in the house. Appellant touched her thighs
and vagina, removed her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. Appellant
threatened that she and her parents would be killed should she disclose the incident to
anyone. She thereafter stopped sleeping in the house of her grandmother. It was only three
(3) years after, in 1997, that she slept in the said house, yet again she was sexually abused
by appellant. She was then nine (9) years old.7
AAA recounted that at age eleven (11) in 1999, she was raped by appellant for the third
time, again at the house of her grandmother.8 The following year, when she was twelve
(12), she was abused for the fourth time by appellant. This time, she was raped in an
outdoor clearing9 after having been invited there by appellant to get some vegetables.
While at the clearing, appellant forced her to lie down on a grassy spot and tried to insert
his penis in her vagina. As she cried in pain, appellant allegedly stopped.10
It was only on 12 June 2000 that she decided to reveal to her mother, CCC,11 the brutish
acts appellant had done to her.12 Her mother thus filed a complaint against her uncle. AAA
identified appellant in open court and presented as documentary evidence her birth
certificate to prove that she was born on 3 September 1988.13
BBB, on the other hand, testified that she was first raped by appellant in 1997 when she
was ten (10) years old, also at the house appellant shared with her grandmother. While
alone in the house, appellant poked a knife at her, removed her clothes and inserted his
penis in her vagina. Despite the pain she felt, she could not resist appellant as he was
holding a knife. She did not report the rape to her parents out of fear of appellant's threat
that he would kill her.14 BBB further testified that in 1998 and 1999, she was raped again
by appellant on several occasions, the rapes occurring under threat of a bladed weapon,
and regardless of the time of day.15
BBB stated that she was last raped by appellant on 15 January 2000.16 On that night, she
was sleeping beside her sister AAA in the house of her grandmother when she felt
appellant touching her body. She pushed him away but appellant pulled her three (3)
meters away from AAA towards the door. As appellant was holding a knife, BBB could not
make any noise to alert her sister. Appellant ordered her to remove her clothes and forced
her to lie down. After he took off his clothes, appellant placed himself on top of BBB and
stayed there for three (3) minutes "moving up and down." Thereafter, she put on her
clothes and returned to where her sister was. She added that although it was dark, she
knew it was appellant who had molested her as she was familiar with his smell. Since then,
she never slept in her grandmother's house again.17
It was on 14 June 2000 that BBB disclosed her harrowing experience to her mother. Prior
to that, however, she had already revealed the sexual abuses she had underwent to her
sister AAA. Upon learning of the same, her mother brought her to the police station and
her statement was taken. Thereafter, she was brought to the hospital to be examined.
Furthermore, BBB explained that she only reported the abuses done to her on 14 June
2000 or five (5) months after the last rape because she was afraid of appellant's threat of
killing her and her family.18
The third witness for the prosecution was the mother, CCC. She testified that she only
knew of the abuses done on her daughters on 15 June 2000. Five months earlier, CCC
became concerned after observing that BBB, on the pretext of preparing clothes for a
game, was packing more than enough clothes. She asked her other daughter, DDD, to dig
into the matter and the latter told her that BBB was planning to leave their house. Upon
learning this, she sent somebody to retrieve BBB. However, it was only five months after
that incident that BBB confided to her mother that she was raped by appellant. CCC lost
no time in reporting the matter to the authorities and had BBB and AAA examined in the
hospital. After examination, it was confirmed that BBB was indeed sexually molested.19
CCC initially did not tell her husband about what had happened to their daughters because
she was afraid that her husband might kill appellant. It was only after appellant was
arrested that she disclosed such fact to her husband. After the arrest of appellant, his
relatives became angry at CCC, and her mother-in-law avoided talking to her since then.20
The physician who examined BBB and AAA also testified for the prosecution. Dr. Purita T.
Tullas (Dr. Tullas), medical officer of Gumaca District Hospital, testified that she was the
one who examined BBB and AAA, and thereafter, issued medical certificates for each child.
These medical certificates were presented in court.21
The medical certificate of BBB revealed that at the time of examination, there were no
external sign of physical injury found on her body. However, Dr. Tullas found that the labia
majora and minora of BBB was slightly gaping, her vaginal orifice was admitting two
fingers without resistance and there were hymenal lacerations at "three (3) o'clock" and
"eight (8) o'clock" which might have happened a long time before her examination. Dr.
Tullas concluded that there might have been sexual penetration caused by a male sex
organ for several times.22
AAA's medical certificate stated that at the time of examination, there were no external
physical injuries apparent on her body. AAA's labia majora and minora were well
coaptated and the hymen was still intact. On direct examination, Dr. Tullas said that it
could happen that the hymen would still be intact despite sexual penetration with a person
having an elastic hymen. On the other hand, when asked on cross-examination, she stated
that there was also the possibility that no foreign body touched the labia of the pudendum
of AAA.23
Only appellant testified for his defense, offering denial and alibi as his defense. He averred
in court that from 1994 to 2000, he lived in the house of his parents which was about
"thirty (30) arm stretches" away from the house of BBB and AAA. He denied having raped
BBB on 15 January 2000 because on said date he was at the house of his sister, two (2)
kilometers away from the house of his parents where the rape occurred, from 11:30 in the
morning and stayed there until early morning of the following day.24
He offered a general denial of the other charges against him by BBB and AAA. He claimed
that he seldom saw the two minors. He further asserted that prior to the institution of the
criminal case against him he had a smooth relationship with his nieces and the only reason
the case was filed against him was that CCC, his sister-in-law and the mother of his nieces,
harbored ill-feelings towards his deceased father, who would call CCC "lazy" within
earshot of other family members.25
The RTC convicted appellant on all eight (8) counts of rape.26 The RTC pronounced
appellant's defense of denial and alibi as unconvincing, citing jurisprudence declaring
denial and alibi as intrinsically weak defenses. The RTC concluded that appellant failed to
controvert the clear, candid and straightforward testimonies of his nieces. It further
considered the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victims and the relationship of
the victims and appellant, the latter being the former's relative by consanguinity within
the third degree.
As the penalty imposed consisted of eight (8) death sentences, the records of the case were
automatically elevated to this Court for review. However, in the aftermath of the
pronouncement of the Court in People v. Mateo27 the present case was transferred to the
Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition.
On 29 December 2004, the Court of Appeals agreed with the rulings of the RTC in regard
to six (6) of the eight (8) death sentences imposed on appellant.28 The appellate court
ratiocinated, thus:
We have painstakingly gone over the record of these cases and find no cogent
reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court except in at least two (2)
cases. The prosecution's case which was anchored mainly on the testimonies of
private complainants [BBB] and [AAA], deserve full faith and credit for being
clear, precise and straightforward. Like the trial court, We find no reason to
disbelieve the private complainants. It was established with certitude that the
accused on several occasions sexually assaulted his nieces. The perpetration of
the crimes and its authorship were proved by the victims' candid and
unwavering testimonies both of whom had the misfortune of sharing the same
fate in the hands of their own uncle. The sincerity of [AAA] was made more
evident when she cried on the witness stand in obvious distress over what their
uncle had done to her and her sister.29
The Court of Appeals downgraded the convictions in Criminal Case Nos. 6906 and 6908 to
attempted rape. In these two (2) cases, it was alleged that appellant had raped AAA in 1999
and on 11 June 2000, respectively. According to the appellate court, it could not find
evidence beyond reasonable doubt in those two (2) cases that appellant had accomplished
the slightest penetration of AAA's vagina to make him liable for consummated rape. It
stressed that there was not even moral certainty that appellant's penis ever touched the
labia of the pudendum, quoting portions of the transcript of the stenographic notes where
AAA was asked if appellant was then successful in inserting his penis into her vagina and
she answered in the negative.30 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals reduced the penalties
attached to the two (2) counts of rape from death for consummated qualified rape to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for attempted rape.
Appellant, in his Supplemental Brief31 before this Court, assails the findings of the Court of
Appeals. He cites inconsistencies in the testimony of BBB as to what really transpired on
15 January 2000. Particularly, appellant observes that BBB testified on 6 June 2001 as to
her rape on 15 January 2000. BBB, her sister and appellant had been sleeping side by side.
However, when BBB again testified on 3 July 2002, this time she stated that on that night,
as she and her sister AAA were sleeping in their room at their parents' house (and not at
her grandmother's), the accused passed through a window, entered their room and raped
her again.32 Appellant also latches on the inconsistencies in BBB's testimony as to the
length of the duration of her rape on that day. In BBB's testimony on 6 June 2001, she said
that appellant was atop her for three (3) minutes while in the 3 July 2002 hearing, BBB
stated that the rape lasted for only half a minute.
It must be observed though that BBB was at a tender age when she was raped in 2001.
Moreover, these inconsistencies, which the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not consider
material, were elicited while BBB was testifying in open court. Our observations in People
v. Perez33 on the appreciation of alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of rape victims
who happen to be minors are instructive, thus:
We note that these alleged inconsistencies refer, at best, only to trivial, minor,
and insignificant details. They bear no materiality to the commission of the
crime of rape of which accused-appellant was convicted.[34] As pointed out
by the Solicitor General in the Appellee's Brief, the seeming inconsistencies were
brought about by confusion and merely represent minor lapses during the rape
victim's direct examination and cannot possibly affect her credibility. Minor
lapses are to be expected when a person is recounting details of a traumatic
experience too painful to recall. The rape victim was testifying in open court, in
the presence of strangers, on an extremely intimate matter, which, more often
than not, is talked about in hushed tones. Under such circumstances, it is not
surprising that her narration was less than letter-perfect.[35] "Moreover, the
inconsistency may be attributed to the well-known fact that a courtroom
atmosphere can affect the accuracy of testimony and the manner in which a
witness answers questions."[36]37
Further, the public prosecutor offered a convincing explanation on why BBB was confused
on some points of her two testimonies. Particularly in the Memorandum for the
People38 filed with the RTC, the public prosecutor creditably explained the
inconsistencies, thus:
[BBB]'s testimony on July 3, 2002 might be contradictory to her first testimony
on June 6, 2001, with respect to the last rape on January 15, 2000, as regards the
place of commission—house of her parents or house of accused; and the length
of time he stayed on her top – 3 minutes or half-minute. But she remained
consistent in her declaration that on January 15, 2000, her uncle inserted his
penis into her vagina, and he was moving while on her top then she felt
something came out from him. He was able to rape her because he threatened
her with a knife or bladed weapon. Further, the first she took the witness stand
on June 6, 2001, she was made to recall the last rape, the first rape and many acts
of sexual abuses [sic] against her. She was even confused about her age when she
was first raped by her uncle. After she testified on November 14, 2001, for the
separate charges of rapes in 1997, 1998 and 1999, she was able to recall more
clearly the last rape on January 15, 2000, which happened in her own house.
These noted discrepancies as to the exact place of commission – accused's house
or victim's house – is not an essential element of the crime of rape and both
houses are situated in Brgy. Villa Padua Ilaya, Gumaca, Quezon, which is within
the territorial jurisdiction of this Honorable Court. x x x 39
In addition, we share the lower court's disbelief of appellant's proffered defenses of denial
and alibi. These two defenses are inherently the weakest as they are negative defenses.
Mere denials of involvement in a crime cannot take precedence over the positive
testimony of the offended party. For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for the defendant to
prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed; he must likewise
demonstrate that it is physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime
at the time.40
In the case at bar, appellant's alibi that he was at his sister's house barely two (2)
kilometers away when the rape took place on 15 January 2000 cannot be given credence
by this Court. If we are to thread this line of reasoning, appellant could have easily left his
sister's house in the middle of the night, raped BBB, and then returned to his sister's house
without much difficulty and without anybody noticing his absence.
Well-settled is the rule that a categorical and positive identification of an accused, without
any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter, prevails
over alibi and denial.41 The defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant consideration when
the prosecution has strong, clear and convincing evidence identifying appellant as the
perpetrator.42 In this case, both BBB and AAA, minors and relatives of appellant, positively
identified him as their rapist in open court. The lower courts found no issue detracting
from the credibility of such identification.
It is worthy to note that the alibi presented by appellant is limited to the 15 January 2000
rape of BBB. He offers nothing to counteract the accusations against him involving the
seven (7) other specific acts of rape other than the averment that he did not know anything
about the allegations propounded on him, an infinitesimal defense considering the
evidence against him.
Appellant does claim that the present case was merely instituted because of the grudge of
CCC towards his deceased father. It is outrageous to even suggest that a mother will
subject her daughters to the humiliating experience of coming before the court and
narrating their harrowing experience just because she was tagged by her father-in-law as
lazy. In addition, CCC's father-in-law had died several years before the criminal charges
against appellant were ever instituted. If CCC truly wanted to retaliate and damage the
reputation of her father-in-law, she could have done so when the latter was still alive. No
member of a rape victim's family would dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the
dishonor of the family, more specifically if such accusation is against a member of the
family, unless the crime was in fact committed.43
Besides, no sane woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not
in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her.
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a
woman, more so if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that
is necessary to show that rape has been committed. Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity.44 The weight of such testimonies may be countered by
physical evidence to the contrary, or indubitable proof that the accused could not have
committed the rape, but in the absence of such countervailing proof, these testimonies
shall be accorded utmost value.
The twin aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were properly A – It was painful, Mam. [sic]
appreciated in this case. The minority of the victims and their relationship with appellant
were aptly established xxxx

in the lower court proceedings. Not only did the prosecution allege in the Informations the Q – How many times did he try to insert his penis into your vagina?
ages of the victims when they were raped but the prosecution also presented the birth
certificates of BBB and AAA in court as documentary evidence to prove that they were
both minors when appellant raped them. Appellant, in open court, also admitted that that A – Many times, Mam.48 [sic]
he was the uncle of both victims being the brother of the victims' father, and thus, a relative
of the victims within the third degree of consanguinity. AAA also testified in the same vein in Criminal Case No. 6908-G.

Furthermore, the delay in reporting the repulsive acts of appellant to BBB and AAA is Q – I am now through with Criminal Case No. 6906-G. In Criminal Case No. 6908-
understandably justified, considering that appellant repeatedly threatened to kill them G, also for Rape. When was the last time that this sexual abuse was committed by
and their family should they disclose the incidents to anyone. It has been held time and your Uncle?
again that delay in revealing the commission of rape is not an indication of a fabricated
charge.45 Such intimidation must be viewed in light of the victim's perception and A – June 11, Mam. [sic]
judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast rule. It
is enough that the intimidation produces a fear that if the victim does not yield to the
perverse impulses of the accused, something would happen to her at the moment, or even Q – What year?
thereafter, as when she is threatened with death if she would report the incident. 46
A – June 11, 2000, Mam. [sic]
At the same time, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the two counts of rape in
Criminal Case Nos. 6906-G and 6908-G were not proven beyond reasonable doubt, but xxxx
only the two separate incidents of attempted rape.
Q – What did your Uncle do to you on June 11, 2000?
It is to be noted that there is an attempt to commit rape when the offender commences its
commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all acts of execution which should A – He also removed my clothes, Mam. [sic]
produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance.47 In Criminal Case No. 6906-G, the records show that there was no penetration
or any indication that the penis of appellant touched the labia of the pudendum of AAA. Q – And after removing your clothes, what did he do to you?
This was evident in AAA's testimony at the hearing on 17 October 2001, to wit:
A – He was trying to insert his penis into my vagina, Mam. [sic]
Q – Do you remember of any unusual incident that happened to you when you
were eleven years old? xxxx

A – Yes, Mam. [sic] Q – And what did you feel when he was trying to insert his penis in your
vagina?
Q – What was that?
A – Painful, Mam. [sic]
A – He also touched my vagina and my other private parts and he inserted also
his penis (into) my vagina. [sic] Q – And what did you do when you feel painful?

Q – Was he able to insert his penis into your vagina? A – I cried, Mam. [sic]

A – No, Mam. [sic] Q – When you cried, what did your Uncle do, if any?

Q – Why? A – He did not pursue what he was doing, Mam. [sic]

 xxxx
Q – And your Uncle was not able to penetrate his penis to your vagina?
A – No, Mam.49 [sic]
In downgrading the offense committed and consequently decreasing the penalty, the CA
declared:
It is carnal knowledge, not pain, that is the element to consummate rape. Indeed
pain may be deduced from the sexual act but accused cannot be convicted of rape
by presuming carnal knowledge out of pain. It is well-settled that complete
penetration of the penis into the vagina is not necessary to convict for
consummated rape since the slightest penetration of one into the other will
suffice. However, in People v. Campuhan, the term "slightest penetration" was
clarified to mean that there must be sufficient and convincing proof of the penis
indeed touching at the very least the labias of the female organ. Mere epidermal
contact between the penis and the external layer of the victim's vagina (the
stroking and the grazing of the male organ upon the female organ or the mons
pubis) categorizes the crime as attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness. There
must be positive proof of even the slightest penetration, more accurately, the
touching of the labias by the penis, before rape could be deemed consummated.
We, therefore, take exception to the finding of the trial court that when the
accused was trying to insert his penis into the child's vagina, the act proved
painful to [AAA,] which made the accused stop from further executing the act.
From the testimony of private complainant, [AAA] in the afore-numbered cases,
the prosecution failed to demonstrate beyond any shadow of doubt that accused-
appellant's penis reached the labia of the pudendum of AAA's vagina. There is no
basis then to apply the rule that the introduction of the penis into the aperture
of the female organ (thereby touching the labia of the pudendum) already
consummates the case of rape. x x x 50
It should be added that under Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt when
the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt acts, and does not
perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause
or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In the crime of rape, penetration
is an essential act of execution to produce the felony. Thus, for there to be an attempted
rape, the accused must have commenced the act of penetrating his sexual organ to the
vagina of the victim but for some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous
desistance, the penetration, however slight, is not completed.51
The Court thus affirms the conclusions of the Court of Appeals that it has been established
beyond reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of six (6) counts of rape and two (2)
counts of attempted rape. However, in light of Rep. Act No. 9346, the appropriate penalties
for both crimes should be amended.
II.
We shall not dwell at length on the proper penalty imposable on appellant for the six (6)
counts of rape. The sentence of death imposed by the RTC and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals can no longer be affirmed in view of Rep. Act No. 9346, titled "An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines." Section 2 of the law mandates that in
lieu of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed.
Correspondingly, the Court can no longer uphold the death sentences imposed by lower
courts, but must, if the
guilt of the accused is affirmed, impose instead the penalty of reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment when appropriate. Since the passage of Rep. Act No. 9346, the Court has
had occasion to effectuate such reduction in recent cases such as People v.
Tubongbanua52 and People v. Cabalquinto.53
III.
The question of what should be the appropriate penalty for the two (2) counts of
attempted rape proves to be the more challenging but interesting question facing the
Court.
The Court of Appeals had sentenced appellant, for the attempted rape of AAA, to "an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum," for each count of attempted
rape. There is no doubt as to the validity of this sentence at the time it was meted prior to
the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346. Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code establishes the
penalty to be imposed upon the principals of an attempted felony:
ART. 51. xxx — A penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for
the consummated felony shall be imposed upon the principals in an attempt to
commit a felony.54
What is the penalty "lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law" for attempted
rape? Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, which incorporates the amendments
introduced by Rep. Act No. 8353, prescribes:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with
any of the following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the
victim. x x x55
The prescribed penalty for the consummated rape of a victim duly proven to have been
under eighteen years of age and to have been raped by her uncle, is death under Article
266-B of the Revised Penal Code. The determination of the penalty two degrees lower than
the death penalty entails the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised Penal Code:
 Art. 61. Rules of graduating penalties.—For the purpose of graduating the
penalties which, according to the provisions of Articles 50 to 57, inclusive, of this
Code, are to be imposed upon persons guilty as principals of any frustrated or
attempted felony, or as accomplices or accessories, the following rules shall be
observed:
1. When the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the penalty
next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty
in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71 of this Code.56
xxxx
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code (Article 71) warrants special attention, crucial as it is
to our disposition of this question. The provision reads:
Art. 71. Graduated scales. — In the case in which the law prescribes a penalty
lower or higher by one or more degrees than another given penalty, the rules
prescribed in Article 61 shall be observed in graduating such penalty.
The lower or higher penalty shall be taken from the graduated scale in which is
comprised the given penalty:
The courts, in applying such lower or higher penalty, shall observe the following
graduated scales:
SCALE NO. 1
1. Death
2. Reclusion perpetua
10. Fine57
xxxx
Following the scale prescribed in Article 71, the penalty two degrees lower than death
is reclusion temporal, which was the maximum penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals
on appellant for attempted rape. Reclusion temporal is a penalty comprised of three
divisible periods, a minimum, a medium and a maximum.
At the same time, the Indeterminate Sentence Law prescribes that "the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall be
that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." The purpose of the prescription
of minimum and maximum periods under the Indeterminate Sentence Law is to effect the
privilege granted under the same law, for prisoners who have served the minimum
penalty to be eligible for parole per the discretion of the Board of Indiscriminate
Sentence.58 Thus, convicts sentenced to suffer death penalty or life-imprisonment are
ineligible under that law, as are persons sentenced to reclusion perpetua, an indivisible
penalty without minimum or maximum periods.59
Hence, the Court of Appeals sentenced appellant to suffer the penalty for attempted rape,
with a maximum penalty within the range of reclusion temporal, and a minimum penalty
within the range of the penalty next lower, or prision mayor. If Rep. Act No. 9346 had not
been enacted, the Court would have affirmed such sentence without complication.
However, the enactment of the law has given rise to the problem concerning the imposable
penalty. Appellant was sentenced to a maximum term within reclusion temporal since that
is the penalty two degrees lower than death. With the elimination of death as a penalty,
does it follow that appellant should now be sentenced to a penalty two degrees lower
than reclusion perpetua, the highest remaining penalty with the enactment of Rep. Act No.
9346? If it so followed, appellant would be sentenced to prision mayor in lieu of reclusion
temporal.

3. Reclusion temporal IV.

4. Prision mayor Obviously, our ruling on the appropriate penalty on appellant for attempted rape will
affect not only appellant, but several classes of convicts as well. Before we proceed with
5. Prision correctional the discussion, the Court finds it necessary to make the following qualification.

6. Arresto mayor Prior to the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9346, the death penalty was imposable under two
different frames of reference. This was especially made clear with the 1993 amendments
7. Destierro to the Revised Penal Code through Rep. Act No. 7659, or the Death Penalty Law. Under the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death penalty was provided for in two ways, namely:
as the maximum penalty for "reclusion perpetua to death," and death itself as an automatic
8. Arresto menor and exclusive penalty. Death as the automatic penalty was mandated for the crimes of
qualified bribery "if it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or
9. Public censure present;"60 kidnapping or detention "for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim
or any other person;"61 destructive
arson wherein "death results;"62 and rape qualified by any of the several circumstances
enumerated under the law.
On the other hand, the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death" was imposable on several
crimes, including murder,63 qualified piracy,64 and treason.65 The imposition of the death
penalty for crimes punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death" depended on the
appreciation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances generally outlined in
Articles 13 and 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Reference to those two provisions was
unnecessary if the penalty imposed was death, as opposed to "reclusion perpetua to death."
There is no need for now to discuss the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the penalties for
frustrated and attempted felonies which were punishable by "reclusion perpetua to death"
if consummated, or on accomplices and accessories to such felonies. Such situations do not
relate to the case of appellant, who was convicted of two (2) counts of attempted rape,
which, if consummated, of course would have carried prior to the enactment of Rep. Act
9346 the penalty of death, and not "reclusion perpetua to death."
The Court also recognizes that the graduation of penalties reckoned from "reclusion
perpetua to death" differs from that based on the exclusive penalty of death. For example,
it has been held that the penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death"
is prision mayor.66 In contrast, the Court has likewise held that for qualified rape in the
attempted stage, "the penalty x x x two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of
death for the offense charged x x x is reclusion temporal."67 In People v. Tolentino,68 we
ruled that the accused, who had been sentenced to die for the rape of his nine (9)-year old
stepdaughter, was guilty only of attempted rape. In explaining that "reclusion temporal"
was the proper penalty, the Court, through then Chief Justice Davide, explained:
Under Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for an attempted felony
is the "penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by law for the
consummated felony." In this case, the penalty for the rape if it had been
consummated would have been death, pursuant to Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, since [RT69] was eight years old and
TOLENTINO was the common-law spouse of [RT's] mother. The last paragraph
thereof provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender
is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of
the parent of the victim.
xxxx
The penalty in this case should have been reclusion temporal, which is the
penalty lower by two degrees than death. However, with the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, TOLENTINO may be sentenced to an
indeterminate imprisonment penalty whose minimum shall be within the range
of prision mayor and whose maximum shall be within the range of reclusion
temporal in its medium period pursuant to Article 64 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code.70
This dichotomy results from the application of Article 61 of the Revised Penal Code.
Both reclusion perpetua and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two
indivisible penalties … the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately
following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence,
in passing sentence on those convicted of attempted felonies which warranted the penalty
of "reclusion perpetua to death" if consummated, the Court has consistently held that
penalty two degrees lower than "reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor. In contrast,
if the penalty for the consummated crime is the single indivisible penalty of death, as was
prescribed for several crimes under Rep. Act No. 7659, Article 61(1) of the Revised Penal
Code provides that "the penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty
in the respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71". Thus, the proper penalty two
degrees lower than death is reclusion temporal.
It is also for this reason that the controversy we are now addressing did not similarly arise
after the enactment of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits the imposition of the death
penalty subject to its subsequent readoption at the choice of Congress. Generally, the
highest penalty imposed under the Revised Penal Code was "reclusion perpetuato death,"
a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties. As a result, the Court had no occasion,
after the passage of the 1987 Constitution, to consider the effect of the charter on penalties
downgraded from a single indivisible penalty. It was under Rep. Act No. 7659, passed in
1993, that some commonly occurring crimes, such as qualified rape and kidnapping for
ransom, were penalized with the single indivisible penalty of death.
The discussion for purposes of this decision will only center on crimes, such as qualified
rape as defined in the Revised Penal Code, as amended, for which the imposable penalty
was death alone. Thus, our ruling will bear no direct effect on the sentencing of
accomplices and accessories or persons guilty of the attempted or frustrated stage of
felonies for which the imposable penalty was "reclusion perpetua to death."
Hence, it should be understood that any reference forthwith to the penalty of death
does not refer to the penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death."
V.
If there was a clear intent in Rep. Act No. 9346 to downgrade the penalties for convicts
whose sentences had been graduated beginning from death pursuant to Article 71, the
Court would not hesitate to enforce such downgrading based on clear statutory intent.
However, nothing in Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly refers to those penalties imposed on
frustrated or attempted felonies, or on accessories and accomplices.
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 bears examination:
 Section 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A.
No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection, is
hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A.
No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law, and all other laws,
executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are
hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
If the penalties for attempted rape of a minor,71 among others, were deemed to have been
amended by virtue of Rep. Act No. 9346, such amendment can be justified under the ambit
of the repealing clause, which reads, "all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar
as they impose the death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly." While this
clause may, given its breadth, initially impress as the nature of a general repealing clause,
it is in actuality an express repealing clause. Section 1 specifically repeals all laws,
executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death penalty, and not merely
such enactments which are inconsistent with Rep. Act No. 9346.
Section 1 arguably presents more problems in that regard with its utilization of the
particular phrase "insofar as they impose the death penalty." We can entertain two schools
of thought in construing this provision, both of them rooted in literalist interpretations.
First, it can be claimed that the present application of the penalties for attempted rape of
a minor (among many examples) does not "impose the death penalty," since none of the
convicts concerned would face execution through the application of the penalty for
attempted rape. Hence, the statutory provisions enforced in determining the penalty for
attempted rape, or other crimes not punishable by death, are not amended by Rep. Act No.
9346.
On the other hand, the operation of the provisions imposing the penalty for attempted
rape of a minor necessarily calls for the application, if not its literal imposition, of death as
a penalty, in the context of applying the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71 of
the Revised Penal Code. If we were to construe "impose" as to mean "apply," then it could
be argued that Article 71 was indeed amended by Rep. Act No. 9346. After all, the
application of Article 71 to crimes such as attempted rape of a minor call for the actual
operation of the death penalty not only in theory, but as a means of determining the proper
graduated penalty.
On face value, the attractive worth of the firstly offered line of thinking is enhanced by its
innate conservatism, limiting as it would the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346. It also can be
understood if confronted with the option of employing either a liberal or a conservative
construction, there is a natural tendency to employ the conservative mode. Further, the
reasoning is seemingly consistent with that employed by the Court in People v. Muñoz,72 a
decision which will be thoroughly analyzed in the course of this discussion.
If the true intent of Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the extent of the "imposition" of the
death penalty to actual executions, this could have been accomplished with more clarity.
For example, had Section 1 read instead "insofar as they sentence an accused to death,"
there would have been no room for doubt that only those statutory provisions calling for
actual executions would have been repealed or amended. The inability of Congress to
shape the repealing clause in so specific a fashion does leave open the question whether
Congress did actually intend to limit the operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 to actual
executions only.
But let us for now test that premise by assuming for the nonce that the legislative intent of
Rep. Act No. 9346 was to limit the prohibition of the law to the physical imposition of the
death penalty, without extending any effect to the graduated scale of penalties under
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code.
VI.
There are troubling results if we were to uphold, based on legislative intent, the
interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that limits its effects only to matters relating to the
physical imposition of the death penalty.
Illustrations are necessary. The easy demonstration of iniquitous results is in the case of
accomplices. Under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, kidnapping for
ransom was punishable by death. Let us say X and Y were tried for the crime. X was
charged as a principal for having directly participated in the kidnapping. Y was charged as
an accomplice for having allowed X to use his house to detain the victim, even though Y
was abroad at the time of the crime and otherwise had no other participation therein. Both
X and Y were convicted by final judgment. Since X could no longer be meted the death
penalty, he is sentenced instead to reclusion perpetua. Ordinarily, Y as an accomplice
should receive the penalty next lower in degree, or reclusion temporal. Yet following the
"conservative" interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346, the graduation of penalties remains
unaffected with the enactment of the new law. Thus, under Article 71, which would still
take into account the death penalty within the graduated scale, Y, as an accomplice, would
be sentenced to reclusion perpetua, the same penalty as the principal.
It might be countered that part of the legislative intent of Rep. Act No. 9346, by retaining
the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71, was to equalize the penalties of
principals and accomplices for crimes previously punishable by death. We do not doubt
that the legislature has the theoretical capability to amend the penal law in such fashion.
Yet given the drastic effects of equalizing the penalties for principals and accomplices, a
step that runs contrary to entrenched thought in criminal law, one could reasonably
assume that a legislature truly oriented to enact such change would have been candid
enough to have explicitly stated such intent in the law itself. Of course, nothing in Rep. Act
No. 9346, either in the caption or in the provisions, explicates the intention to equalize the
penalties for principals and accomplices in any crime at all.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that it would, at bare minimum, seem strange that the
penalties for principals and accomplices are equalized in some crimes, and not in others.
Let us return to our previous example of X and Y, but this time, assume that they were
charged for simple kidnapping, with no qualifying circumstance that would have resulted
in the imposition of the death penalty. Since the crime is not punishable by death, Rep. Act
No. 9346 would have no effect in the imposition of the penalty for simple kidnapping.
Accordingly, X would have been sentenced to reclusion perpetua as the principal, while Y
would have been sentenced to reclusion temporal as an accomplice.
Since simple kidnapping is a comparatively lighter crime than kidnapping for ransom, the
lesser penalties are justified. Since Y was merely an accomplice to the crime of simple
kidnapping, the imposition on him of a lighter penalty than X is in accord with the Revised
Penal Code and established juridical and legal thought. Less justifiable would be the notion
that in kidnapping for ransom, the principal and the accomplice would receive the same
penalty, while in simple kidnapping, the principal suffers a higher penalty than the
accomplice. Frankly, there is no rational explanation for such a disparity, and no legal
justification other than the recognition that Congress has the power to will it so.
Admittedly, the impact of Rep. Act No. 9346 is less dramatic in relation to frustrated and
attempted felonies which were punishable by death if consummated. The consummated
felony previously punishable by death would now be punishable by reclusion perpetua. At
the same time, the same felony in its frustrated stage would, under the foregoing premise
in this section, be penalized one degree lower from death, or also reclusion perpetua. It
does not seem right, of course, that the same penalty of reclusion perpetua would be
imposed on both the consummated and frustrated felony. However, the anomaly would be
mainly in theory, as we recognize that those felonies previously punishable by death are
improbable of commission in their frustrated stage, unlike several felonies punishable by
"reclusion perpetua to death,"73 such as murder, which may be frustrated.
Still, it cannot be denied that these felonies previously punishable by death are capable of
commission in their attempted stages and that the Revised Penal Code provides that the
penalty for attempted felonies is "a penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed by
law for the consummated felony." The Court has thus consistently imposed reclusion
temporal, the penalty two degrees lower than death, as the maximum term for attempted
felonies which, if consummated, would have warranted the death penalty. 74 If it were to
be insisted that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not affect at all the penalties for attempted felonies,
then those found guilty of the subject attempted felonies would still be sentenced
to reclusion temporal, even though the "penalty lower by two degrees than that prescribed
by law for the consummated felony" would now be prision mayor.
It should be pointed out that the interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346 that would sanction a
penalty for some attempted felonies that is only one degree lower than the consummated
crime would, again, be disharmonious and inconsistent with the Revised Penal Code and
established thought in criminal law. Conceding again that the legislature has the discretion
to designate the criminal penalties it sees fit, a regime that foists a differential theoretical
basis for the punishment of different attempted felonies resulting in discriminatory
penalties is not only irrational but also, to say the least, highly suspect. Considering that
physical liberties are at stake, it would be a most cruel joke if such discriminatory effects
ensued not from deliberate legislative will, but from oversight.
VII.
The implementation of Rep. Act No. 9346 in a way that leaves extant the penalties for
accomplices, accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies, clearly results in illogical,
iniquitous and inconsistent effects. In contrast, no similar flaws ensue should we construe
Rep. Act No. 9346 instead as not having barred the application of the death penalty even
as a means of depreciating penalties other than death. In particular, the operative
amendment that would assure the integrity of penalties for accomplices, accessories,
frustrated and attempted felonies lies in Article 71, which ranks "death" at the top of the
scale for graduated penalties.
Simply put, the negation of the word "death" as previously inscribed in Article 71 will have
the effect of appropriately downgrading the proper penalties attaching to accomplices,
accessories, frustrated and attempted felonies to the level consistent with the rest of our
penal laws. Returning to our previous examples, Y, the convicted accomplice in kidnapping
for ransom, would now bear the penalty of reclusion temporal, the penalty one degree
lower than that the principal X would bear (reclusion perpetua). Such sentence would be
consistent with Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code, as well as Article 71, as amended, to
remove the reference to "death." Moreover, the prospect of the accomplice receiving the
same sentence as the principal, an anomalous notion within our penal laws, would be
eliminated. Thus, the same standard would prevail in sentencing principals and
accomplices to the crime of kidnapping in ransom, as that prescribed to the crime of simple
kidnapping.
The harmonization that would result if Rep. Act No. 9346 were construed as having
eliminated the reference to "death" in Article 71 would run across the board in our penal
laws. Consistent with Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, those convicted of attempted
qualified rape would receive the penalty two degrees lower than that prescribed by law,
now Rep. Act No. 9346, for qualified rape.
There are principles in statutory construction that will sanction, even mandate, this
"expansive" interpretation of Rep. Act No. 9346. The maxim interpretare et concordare
legibus est optimus interpretandi embodies the principle that a statute should be so
construed not only to be consistent with itself, but also to harmonize with other laws on
the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and intelligible system—a
uniform system of jurisprudence.75"Interpreting and harmonizing laws with laws is the
best method of interpretation. x x x x This manner of construction would provide a
complete, consistent and intelligible system to secure the rights of all persons affected by
different legislative and quasi-
legislative acts."76 There can be no harmony between Rep. Act No. 9346 and the Revised
Penal Code unless the later statute is construed as having downgraded those penalties
attached to death by reason of the graduated scale under Article 71. Only in that manner
will a clear and consistent rule emerge as to the application of penalties for frustrated and
attempted felonies, and for accessories and accomplices.
It is also a well-known rule of legal hermeneutics that penal or criminal laws are strictly
construed against the state and liberally in favor of the accused.77 If the language of the
law were ambiguous, the court will lean more strongly in favor of the defendant than it
would if the statute were remedial, as a means of effecting substantial justice.78 The law is
tender in favor of the rights of an individual.79 It is this philosophy of caution before the
State may deprive a person of life or liberty that animates one of the most fundamental
principles in our Bill of Rights, that every person is presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Resort to the aforementioned principles in statutory construction would not have been
necessary had Rep. Act No. 9346 ineluctably stated that the repeal of all laws imposing the
death penalty did not engender the corresponding modification of penalties other than
death, dependent as these are on "death" as a measure under the graduated scale of
penalties under Article 71. Admittedly, if this were indeed the intent of Congress, and such
intent were unequivocally expressed in Rep. Act No. 9346, the resulting inequities and
inconsistencies we had earlier pointed out would have remained. If that were to be the
case, we would have acknowledged, perhaps tacitly, that such inequities and
inconsistencies fell part of the legislative intent. It does not speak well of a Congress to be
deliberately inconsistent with, or ignorant of its own prior enactments. Yet ultimately,
Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 9346 is not expressive of such rash or injudicious notions, as it is
susceptible to a reading that would harmonize its effects with the precepts and practices
that pervade our general penal laws, and in a manner that does not defy the clear will of
Congress.
VIII.
One who would like to advocate that Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly amend
any of the penalties other than death in our penal laws would most certainly invoke our
ruling in People v. Muñoz,80 decided in 1989. Therein, a divided Court ruled in that the
constitutional bar on the imposition of the death penalty did not enact "a corresponding
modification in the other periods [in penalties]", there being no expression of "such a
requirement… in Article III, Section 19(1) of the Constitution or indicat[ion] therein by at
least
clear and unmistakable implication."81 In so concluding, the Court made the oft-cited
pronouncement that there was nothing in the 1987 Constitution "which expressly
declares the abolition of the death penalty."82
It is time to re-examine Muñoz and its continued viability in light of Rep. Act No. 9346.
More precisely, would Muñozas precedent deter the Court from ruling that Rep. Act No.
9346 consequently downgraded penalties other than death?
It can be recalled that the accused in Muñoz were found guilty of murder, which under the
Revised Penal Code, carried the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to
death. The subject murders therein were not attended by any modifying circumstance, and
thus penalized in the penalty's medium term. Jurisprudence previous to Muñoz held that
the proper penalty in such instances should be "the higher half of reclusion
temporal maximum," with reclusion temporal maximum, divided into two halves for that
purpose. Muñoz rejected this formulation, holding instead that the penalty should
be reclusion perpetua. Towards this conclusion, the Court made the above-cited
conclusions relating to the constitutional abolition of the death penalty, and the charter's
effects on the other periods. Six justices dissented from that ruling, and as recently as
1997, a member of the Court felt strongly enough to publish a view urging the
reexamination of Muñoz.83
It would be disingenuous to consider Muñoz as directly settling the question now befacing
us, as the legal premises behind Muñoz are different from those in this case. Most
pertinently, Muñoz inquired into the effects of the Constitution on the proper penalty for
murder; while herein, we are ascertaining the effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 on the proper
penalty for attempted qualified rape. Muñoz may have pronounced that the
Constitution did not abolish the death penalty, but that issue no longer falls into
consideration herein, the correct query now being whether Congress has banned
the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346. Otherwise framed, Muñoz does not
preclude the Court from concluding that with the express prohibition of the
imposition of the death penalty Congress has unequivocally banned the same.
Muñoz made hay over the peculiar formulation of Section 19(1), Article III, which provided
that "[n]either shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it." Muñoz and its progenies, have
interpreted that provision as prohibiting the actual imposition of the death penalty, as
opposed to enacting an amendatory law that eliminates all references and applications of
the death penalty in our statutes. It can also be understood and appreciated that at the
time Muñoz was decided, it would have been polemical to foster an unequivocal
pronouncement that Section 19(1), Article III abolished the death penalty, since the very
provision itself acknowledged that Congress may nonetheless subsequently provide for
the penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes," as Congress very well did
just four (4) years after Muñoz. No such language exists in Rep. Act No. 9346. Of course,
the legislature has the inherent and constitutional power to enact laws prescribing
penalties for crimes, and the Constitution will not prohibit Congress from reenacting the
death penalty "for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes." Yet it was that express
stipulation in the Constitution that dissuaded the Court from recognizing the
constitutional abolition of the death penalty; and there is no similar statutory expression
in Rep. Act No. 9346, which could be construed as evocative of intent similar to that of the
Constitution.
The doctrine in Muñoz that the constitutional prohibition on the imposition of the death
penalty did not enact a corresponding modification of other penalties is similarly
irrelevant to this case, which calls for an examination as to whether such corresponding
modifications of other penalties arose as a consequence of Rep. Act No. 9346, and not the
Constitution.
For purposes of legal hermeneutics, the critical question is whether Rep. Act No. 9346
intended to delete the word "death" as expressly provided for in the graduated scale of
penalties under Article 71. Muñoz did not engage in an analogous inquiry in relation to
Article 71 and the Constitution, for what was relevant therein was not the general
graduated scale of penalties, but the range of the penalties for murder. Herein, at bare
minimum, no provision in Rep. Act No. 9346 provides a context within which the concept
of "death penalty" bears retentive legal effect, especially in relation to Article 71. Unlike
the Constitution, Rep. Act No. 9346 does expressly stipulate the amendment of all extant
laws insofar as they called for the imposition of the penalty of death.
The impression left by Muñoz was that the use of the word "imposition" in the Constitution
evinced the framer's intent to retain the operation of penalties under the Revised Penal
Code. In the same vein, one might try to construe the use of "imposition" in Rep. Act No.
9346 as a means employed by Congress to ensure that the "death penalty", as applied in
Article 71, remain extant. If the use of "imposition" was implemented as a means of
retaining "death" under Article 71, it would have been a most curious, roundabout means
indeed. The Court can tolerate to a certain degree the deliberate vagueness sometimes
employed in legislation, yet constitutional due process demands a higher degree of clarity
when infringements on life or liberty are intended. We have ruled, on due process grounds,
as arbitrary and oppressive a tax assessed on a standard characterized as "nothing but
blather in search of meaning."84 In the matter of statutes that deprive a person of physical
liberty, the demand for a clear standard in sentencing is even more exacting.
Yet in truth, there is no material difference between "imposition" and "application," for
both terms embody the operation in law of the death penalty. Since Article 71 denominates
"death" as an element in the graduated scale of penalties, there is no question that the
operation of Article 71 involves the actual application of the death penalty as a means of
determining the extent which a person's liberty is to be deprived. Since Rep. Act No. 9346
unequivocally bars the application of the death penalty, as well as expressly repeals all
such statutory provisions requiring the application of the death penalty, such effect
necessarily extends to its relevance to the graduated scale of penalties under Article 71.
We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346 intended to retain the operative
effects of the death penalty in the graduation of the other penalties in our penal
laws. Munoz cannot enjoin us to adopt such conclusion. Rep. Act No. 9346 is not swaddled
in the same restraints appreciated by Muñoz on Section 19(1), Article III. The very
Congress empowered by the Constitution to reinstate the imposition of the death penalty
once thought it best to do so, through Rep. Act No. 7650. Within the same realm of
constitutional discretion, Congress has reversed itself. It must be asserted that today, the
legal status of the suppression of the death penalty in the Philippines has never been more
secure than at any time in our political history as a nation.
Following Muñoz, the sovereign people, through the 1987 Constitution, might not have
willed the abolition of the death penalty and instead placed it under a suspensive
condition. As such, we affirmed the characterization of the death penalty during the
interregnum between the 1987 Constitution and its reimposition through law as being "in
a state of hibernation."85 No longer. It reawakened — then it died; because the sovereign
people, through Rep. Act No. 9346, banned the death penalty. Only by an Act of Congress
can it be reborn. Before that day, the consideration of death as a penalty is bereft of legal
effect, whether as a means of depriving life, or as a means of depriving liberty.
Despite our present pronouncement on the ban against of the death penalty, we do not
acknowledge that Muñozlacked legal justification when it was decided; that its application
as precedent prior to Rep. Act No. 9346 was erroneous; or that previous sentences
imposed on convicts on the basis of Muñoz were wrong. Muñoz properly stood as the
governing precedent in the matter of sentences that passed finality prior to Rep. Act No.
9346; and the consistent reliance by the courts on its doctrines entrenched its footing in
criminal law jurisprudence.
IX.
Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death penalty in the Philippines, also
effectively classified the crimes listed therein as "heinous," within constitutional
contemplation. Such reclassification under Rep. Act No. 7659 was accompanied by certain
legal effects other than the imposition of the death penalty, such as the increase in
imposable fines attached to certain heinous crimes.86 The categorization of certain crimes
as "heinous", constituting as it does official recognition that some crimes are more odious
than others, has also influenced this Court in adjudging the proper pecuniary indemnities
awarded to the victims of these crimes. Hence, a general inclination persists in levying a
greater amount of damages on accused found guilty of heinous crimes.
It should be understood that the debarring of the death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346
did not correspondingly declassify those crimes previously catalogued as "heinous". The
amendatory effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 extend only to the application of the death penalty
but not to the definition or classification of crimes. True, the penalties for heinous crimes
have been downgraded under the aegis of the new law. Still, what remains extant is the
recognition by law that such crimes, by their abhorrent nature, constitute a special
category by themselves. Accordingly, Rep. Act No. 9346 does not serve as basis for the
reduction of civil indemnity and other damages that adhere to heinous crimes.
X.
Having pronounced the statutory disallowance of the death penalty through Rep. Act No.
9346 and the corresponding modification of penalties other than death through that
statute, we now proceed to discuss the effects of these rulings.
As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the application is
immediate. Henceforth, "death," as utilized in Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall
no longer form part of the equation in the graduation of penalties. For example, in the case
of appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape shall be reckoned not
from two degrees lower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua.
Hence, the maximum term of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by
the Court of Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.
There should be little complication if the crime committed was punishable by the free-
standing penalty of "death," as utilized in Rep. Act No. 7659, as opposed to the ranged
penalty of "reclusion perpetua to death," as often used in the Revised Penal Code and other
penal laws. The facts of the present case do not concern the latter penalty, hence our
reluctance to avail of an extended discussion thereof. However, we did earlier observe that
both "reclusion perpetua" and death are indivisible penalties. Under Article 61 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code, "[w]hen the penalty prescribed for the crime is composed of two
indivisible penalties x x x x the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately
following the lesser of the penalties prescribed in the respective graduated scale." Hence,
as we earlier noted, our previous rulings that the penalty two degrees lower than
"reclusion perpetua to death" is prision mayor.
Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be extended to this new
ruling, favorable as it is to persons previously convicted of crimes which, if consummated
or participated in as a principal, would have warranted the solitary penalty of death. We
see no choice but to extend the retroactive benefit. Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
states that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal[87] x x x x although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving
the same." Given that we have ruled that Rep. Act No. 9346 downgraded the penalties for
such crimes, the benefit of Article 22 has to apply, except as to those persons defined as
"habitual criminal[s]." Indeed, Rep. Act No. 9346 expressly recognized that its enactment
would have retroactive beneficial effects, referring as it did to "persons x x x whose of prision mayor as maximum for each count of attempted rape. In addition, appellant is
sentences were reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason of this Act."88 ORDERED to indemnify AAA for each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape in the
amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as moral damages and P10,000.00
It cannot be discounted that by operation of Rep. Act No. 9346 and Article 22 of the Revised as exemplary damages.
Penal Code, there may be convicts presently serving their original sentences whose actual
served terms exceed their reduced sentences. It should be understood that this SO ORDERED.
decision does not make operative the release of such convicts, especially as there
may be other reasons that exist for their continued detention. There are remedies
under law that could be employed to obtain the release of such prisoners, if warranted.
Offices such as the Public Attorney's Office and non-governmental organizations that
frequently assist detainees possess the capacity and acumen to help implement the release
of such prisoners who are so entitled by reason of this ruling.

XI.

We close by returning to the matter of appellant Alfredo Bon. By reason of Rep. Act No.
9346, he is spared the death sentence, and entitled to the corresponding reduction of his
penalty as a consequence of the downgrading of his offense from two (2) counts
consummated rape to two (2) counts of attempted rape. For the six (6) counts of rape, we
downgrade the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua with no eligibility for parole,
pursuant to Rep. Act No. 9346. For each of the two (2) counts of attempted rape, we
downgrade by one degree lower the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. We hold
that there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty of prision mayor
should be imposed in it medium period. Consequently, we impose the new penalty of two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum.

Lastly, as to damages, the Court awards AAA P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,000.00 as
moral damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of attempted rape,
it being the prevailing rate of indemnity as pronounced in the recent case of People v.
Miranda.89

Separately, the Court applies prevailing jurisprudence90 in awarding to BBB and

AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, for each count of consummated rape.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The Court sentences appellant Alfredo J. Bon to the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with no possibility of parole for each of the six (6) counts of
consummated rape committed against AAA in Criminal Case Nos. 6699, 6902, and against
BBB in Criminal Case Nos. 6689, 6903, 6905, and 6907. Appellant is further ORDERED to
indemnify AAA and BBB for the crime of consummated rape, in the amounts of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages
for each of them.

For the two (2) counts of attempted rape of AAA in Criminal Cases No. 6906 and 6908,
appellant is hereby SENTENCED to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccionalas minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
CLASSIFICATION OF PENALTIES
G.R. No. 130492 January 31, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SALVADOR ARROJADO, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City, finding
accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado guilty of murder and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of 30 years of reclusion perpetua and to pay the amounts of P60,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P80,000.00 as moral damages, and the costs to the heirs of the victim Mary Ann
Arrojado.2
The Information against accused-appellant alleged:
That on or about the 1st day of June, 1996, in the City of Roxas, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed
with a knife, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and stab one
Mary Ann Arrojado, on the different parts of the body, to wit:
1. Stab wound, gaping, 1.5 cm. Length with a depth of 5 cm. Located at
the supra sternal area;
2. Stab wound, gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 10 cm. depth,
directed downward 5 cm. above the left nipple area the level of
midclavicular line;
3. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 2.5 cm. in length, 5.5 cm.
depth, located 4 cm. above the left nipple area, midclavicular line;
4. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 18.5 3 cm.
in depth, directed medially downward, located 3 cm. above the left
nipple, midclavicular line;
5. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 10.5 cm.
depth, located 3 cm. medial to the left nipple;
6. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12 cm.
in depth, directed laterally downward, located, 12 cm. in depth,
directed laterally downward, located 2 cm. medial to the left nipple;
7. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12 cm.
in depth, directed laterally, located 2 cm. medial to the left nipple;
8. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 5.5 cm. in
depth directed downward, located at the xiphoid area;
9. Stab wound, elongated gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 4 cm. in
depth, directed medially, located 4 cm. below the left nipple;
10. Stab wound penetration, measuring 4 x 4 cm. in length with
[e]visceration of the small intestine;
Thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds which were the direct
and immediate cause of her death.
That by reason of the death Mary Ann Arrojado, her heirs incurred actual and
moral damages which may be awarded under the Civil Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The information was read and explained to accused-appellant in his native dialect, after
which he pleaded not guilty.5 Trial on the merits then ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution shows the following:
Accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado and the victim Mary Ann Arrojado are first cousins,
their fathers being brothers. The victim's father, Alberto Arrojado, who was living in
Canada, suffered a stroke for which reason he decided to come home to Roxas City and
spend the remainder of his days there. The victim accompanied her father to the
Philippines. They eventually settled in a house in Barangay Tanque, Roxas City, where they
lived on the financial support of the victim's sister Asuncion, who continued to live in
Canada, and her brother Buenaventura, who continued to live in Canada, and her brother
Buenaventura, who lived in Manila.
Starting February 15, 1996, accused-appellant lived with the victim and her father. He
helped care for the victim's father, for which he was paid a P1,000.00 monthly salary. 6
In the early morning of June 1, 1996, accused-appellant went to the house cousin, Erlinda
Arrojado Magdaluyo, and reported that the victim had committed suicide. In response,
Erlinda, together with her husband Romulo Magdaluyo and her father Teodorico Arrojado,
went with accused-appellant to the house in Barangay Tanwue where they found the
victim dead. The victim, who was bloodied, was lying on her left side facing the bedroom
door with her hands clasped together. On her bed was a rosary and a cruifix. Near her was
a knife (Exh. C).7 Erlinda recognized it to be the knife kept in the kitchen. Erlinda also
noticed that the electric fan was turned on full blast, while all the windows were closed
except the window on the east side which was slightly open. As he went to the other room,
where the victim's father stayed, accused-appellant told Erlinda that he was afraid he
might be suspected as the one responsible for the victim's death.8
The matter was reported to the police which noticed that the victim's room "was very neat
as if nothing happened." The police saw no signs of forcible entry.9 They made a sketch of
the victim's position in relation to the whole house (Exh. D) 10 and took pictures of her
(Exhs. E-E-3).11
Dr. Ma. Lourdes Roldan, of the Roxas City Health Office, conducted the postmortem
examination of the victim at 1:30 p.m. of June 1, 1996. Her findings revealed that the victim
sustained the following stab wounds:
1. Stab wound, gaping, 1.5 cm. Length with a depth of 5 cm. Located at the supra
sternal area;
2. Stab wound, gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 10 cm. depth, directed
downward 5 cm. above the left nipple area the level of midclavicular line;
3. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 2.5 cm. in length, 5.5 cm. depth,
located 4 cm. above the left nipple area, midclavicular line;
4. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 18.53 cm. in depth,
directed medially downward, located 3 cm. above the left nipple, midclavicular
line;
5. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 10.5 cm. depth,
located 3 cm. medial to the left nipple;
6. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12 cm. in depth,
directed laterally downward, located, 12 cm. in depth, directed laterally
downward, located 2 cm. medial to the left nipple;
7. Stab wound, elongated, gaping, measuring 3.5 cm. in length, 12 cm. in depth,
directed laterally, located 2 cm. medial to the left nipple;
8. Stab wound, elongated, gaping measuring 3 cm. in length, 5.5 cm. in depth
directed downward, located at the xiphoid area;
9. Stab wound, elongated gaping, measuring 3 cm. in length, 4 cm. in depth,
directed medially, located 4 cm. below the left nipple;
10. Stab wound penetration, measuring 4 x 4 cm. in length with [e]visceration of
the small intestine;12
Dr. Roldan testified that the victim died at around midnight of May 31, 1996 from wound
nos. 2, 4, 6, 7, and 10, which she deemed fatal.13 Thus, in the victim's death certificate (Exb.
B),14 she listed "HEMORRHAGIC SHOCK as the victim's immediate cause of death and
"multiple stab wounds" as the antecedent cause.
Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo testified that the relationship between the victim and
accused-appellant had been strained as the victim constantly picked on accused-appellant
even for the slighest mistake. Erlinda remembered the scolding that the victim gave
accused-appellant on May 27, 1996 over the loss of keys. Accused-appellant was badly
hurt by the victim's tonguelashing, according to Erlinda, and complained to the victim,
"You're too much." Erlinda said she offered to take the victim in her house, but the latter
refused, saying that her place was with her father. The victim entrusted, however, her
jewelry and bank book with signed withdrawal slips to Erlinda. Three days later, on May
30, 1996, Erlinda returned the same and told the victim that she should no be afraid of
accused-appellant because he was taking care of both her (the victim) and her father.
Erlinda said she again met the victim on May 31, 1996 when she reminded the latter of
their agreement to go out the following day, June 1, 1996. On that day, however, the victim
was found dead.15
Another relative of accused-appellant and the victim, Thelma Arrojado, corroborated
Erlinda's testimony. The father of Thelma's husband, Roque Arrojado, is a brother of the
victim's father and that of accused-appellant. Thelma said that she and her husband lived
at one time with the victim, and she knew the latter to be a snob ("suplada") and overly
strict. Because they did not get along with the victim, Thelma and her husband eventually
left. She testified that accused-appellant was angry at the victim and in fact passed by her
store thrice (on May 27, 29, and 31, 1996), complaining to her of the victim's maltreatment
of him.16
Accused-appellant testified in his behalf. He told the court that on June 1, 1996, at around
6:00 a.m., Alberto Arrojado asked him for food, so accused-appellant went to the kitchen
to find out if the victim had already prepared breakfast. When accused-appellant found
that the victim was not in the kitchen, he proceeded to the victim's room. From the
doorway, he saw the victim lying on her bed, bloodied. He thought that the victim had
committed suicide because the victim had told him that she felt tied down taking care of
her father. She in fact once remarked that "It would be better that my father and I commit
suicide." Accused-appellant said that the victim scolded him only once and that was for
buying rotten cabbage.17 He said that the victim was the one who was constantly being
scolded by her father who often found fault with her. When presented with the knife found
on the victim's bed (Exh. C), accused-appellant admitted he was familiar with the knife as
he saw the victim using it in kitchen.1âwphi1.nêt
On April 21, 1997, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds and declares accused
Salvador Arrojado GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of
murder, defined and penalized by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Section 6 of Republic Act 7659, and, there being no aggravating
circumstance, hereby sentences him to imprisonment of thirty (30) years
of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnity the heirs of the deceased Mary Ann
 Arrojado in the amount of P60,000.00, pay them moral damages of P80,000.00,
and pay the costs of this action.
In the service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, the accused,
who is a detention prisoner and not otherwise disqualified, shall be credited with
the full time of his confinement under preventive imprisonment, provided he
voluntarily agrees in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed on
convicted prisoners, pursuant to Art. 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.18
The trial court held that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to convict accused-
appellant for the victim's death. In its decision, the trial court said:
The accused was the only person in the world who had the strong motive to
eliminate from earthly existence the deceased, who had no known enemies, as
he could no longer endure the verbal abuse to which he was frequently
subjected, even on trivial matters, by the deceased whom he must have
perceived as his evil tormetor. Being older [but] every now and then scolded,
insulted, and humiliated, he must have felt that the deceased had no respect for
him as a person and elder cousin. Suicide being physically impossible and there
being no shared of evidence showing that an intruder could have surreptitiously
entered the house as all doors and windows were securely closed, the killing
could have been done only by someone who was already inside the house.
Certainly it could not have been the deceased's old and invalid father who could
not stand on his own, much less walk from his room to the kitchen, get the fatal
weapon, the kitchen knife, from where it was placed therein, walk to his
daughter's room, and then stab her. As there were only the three of them inside
the house, that leaves no one else, by the process of elimination, who could have
perpetrated the dastardly act but the accused who had the only motive to do it
and who was inside the house at the time of the commission of the crime.
Reinforcing this conclusion is the admission of the accused that when he peeped
into the room of the deceased and allegedly saw for the first time the lifeless body
of the victim, he was already sure, even without going near or touching her body
and asking aloud what happened to her, that she was already dead because he
stabbed her not only once, but ten (10) times, inflicting five (5) mortal wounds.
And he had the gall to attribute his cousin's untimely death to suivide because he
could not concoct any other reason to save himself.19
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellants assigns the following errors as allegedly having
been committed by the trial court:
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MARY ANN ARROJADO
WAS STABBED TEN TIMES AT HER HOME.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT MARY ANN ARROJADO
COULD NOT HAVE COMMITTED SUICIDE.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE HOUSE OF MARY
ANN RROJADO WAS TOTALLY CLOSED AND LOCKED AGAINST INTRUDERS.
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT
WAS ABUSED AND OPPRESSED BY MARY ANN ARROJADO THAT LED ACCUSED-
APPELLANT TO KILL MARY ANN ARROJADO.20
First. Accused-appellant claims that most of the victim's wounds were inflicted after she
had already committed suicide to make it appear that she was murdered. He says that he
saw only one wound in the victim's stomach,21while Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo said she
saw only two wounds, one on the victim's neck and the other in her abdomen. These are
wound nos. 1 and 10 in the postmortem examination.22 Of these two, the stomach wound
was fatal, according to Dr. Roldan.23 accused-appellant says that the other wounds may
have been inflicted on the victim between the time the body was brought out of the house
in the morning and the time Dr. Roldan examined the same at around 1:30 o'clock in the
afternoon og June 1, 1996 at the De Jesus funeral parlor.24
Accused-appellant's contention has no merit. That accused-appellant only saw one wound
while Erlinda Magdaluyo saw two one wound while Erlinda Magdaluyo saw two wounds
on the victim does not necessarily mean that the other wounds were inflicted upon the
victim afterwards. The two might have simply missed seeing the other wounds. In
accused-appellant's case, it may be because he did not go inside the room but only viewed
the body from a distance.25 On the other hand, while Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo went
near the victim's chest because the latter was dressed.26 But Dr. Roldan, who conducted a
postmortem examination, testified that the victim actually sustained ten wounds. Between
the cursory examination of the victim by accused-appellant and Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo and Dr. Roldan's exhaustive examination, there is no doubt that the latter's
findings are entitled to credence.
Accused-appellant also argues that the varying depths of wound nos. 2, 4, 5, 8 and 9 (10
cm., 10.5 cm., 5.5 cm., and 4 cm.) despite the fact that they had the same surface length of
3 cm. could only mean that after the victim was found dead, she was again stabbed with a
knife or knives other than the one (Exh. C) found beside her.27
The contention is without merit. The variance in depth does not necessarily mean that
more than one weapon was used. As has been stated:
[I]t is not possible to determine the depth of penetration of a stab wound with
any degree of accuracy, inasmuch as effusion of blood into the tissues, changes
in the position of the viscera, or numerous other circumstances may alter the
conditions existing at the time when the wound was inflicted. Consequently, the
depth of the track at autopsy may be different from the actual penetration of the
instrument at the time of the stabbing. Moreover, it is not always possible to
correlate the depth of the wound with the blade of the stabbing instrument. For
example, a short blade of two inches can penetrate four inches into a soft area
like the thigh or through the anterior abdominal wall because the force of the
thrust may dent the tissues appreciably and thus deepen the wound. Conversely,
a long blade may not be thrust into its full length, and the wound may be shorter
 than the blade. For these reasons attempts to correlate the depth of the track and
the length of the weapon should be made with caution.28
Dr. Roldan in fact testified that the kitchen knife, marked as Exh. C, could have caused all
the wounds sustained by the victim.29 She also testified that the stab wounds could have
all been inflicted in the span of one minute.30Having examined no less than 100 victims of
violence,31 Dr. Roldan's conclusions should be given credence.
Moreover, with the exception of wound no. 10, all the wounds were described by Dr.
Roldan as "gaping." As stated in Forensic Medicine:
… An ante-mortem wound gapes; there is eversion of the edges; a large amount
of blood is present, this is coagulated and infiltrating the wound; and there is
swelling and signs of inflammation and repair. In a post-mortem wound there is
no gaping. The bleeding is slight, if any, and it does not infiltrate the wound.32
This belies accused-appellant's theory that the victim committed suicide and that it was
only after she was found dead that she was again stabbed to make it appear that she had
been killed.
Nor were the bloodsstains which PO2 Orly Baril33 and Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo34 found on the victim's hands necessarily evidence of the victim's suicide. The
bloodstains could have come from the wounds sustained by her rather than from her
attempt to kill herself.
Accused-appellant also insists the victim committed suicide because she was feeling
respondent over her remaining single, her lack of regular employment which made her
dependent on the support of her siblings, and the responsibility of taking care of her father
who had become an invalid. He cites Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo's testimony that the
victim entrusted her jewelry and bankbook to her four days before she died.35
Erlinda, however, testified that the victim did this because she had a premonition that
accused-appellant might harm her, and not became of any intimation that she (the victim)
would kill herself.36
Contrary to the claim of accused-appellant that the victim was a depressed person with a
low sense of self-worth, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo described the victim as "a jolly
person" who had many friends who go to her house. Moreover, according to Erlindam, the
victim, while not earning a fixed income, was not without means of livelihood. The victim
was good at cooking and took orders from neighbors. Erlinda also disclosed that on the
very day the victim was found dead, she and the victim had plans to go out for
relaxation.37 This negates any theory that the victim committed suicide.
Second. Somewhat inconsistently with his claim that the victim was a suicide, accused-
appellant disputes the trial court's conclusion that only one of those residing in the house
could have killed the victim because the police found not sign of a break-in. Accused-
appellant says that in the morning of June 1, 1996, he found that the kitchen door leading
outside was open.38
Accused-appellant's contention must fail. Accused-appellant admitted that it did not occur
to him that an intruder was in the house in the evening of May 31, 1996 because "No
person could get inside because the windows were closed and besides the doors were
closed."39
Significantly, Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo testified that accused-appellant also said that
no person could get inside the house because the doors and the windows were
closed.40 Accused-appellant never told Erlinda that the kitchen door was open that
morning. Indeed, Erlinda testified that "it is not possible that somebody would enter the
house as the doors were securely locked… with additional barrel bolts, and the windows
have grills."41
Third. Accused-appellant contends that Thelma Arrojado's testimony does not deserve
consideration because, by her own admission,42 the victim's sister Asuncion asked her to
testify on accused-appellant's complaints against the victim's treatment of him. He also
claims that it was inconsistent for Erlinda to testify, on the one hand, that the victim was
"loving friendly, and reasonable" and, on the other to say that she was strict and
domineering. Accused-appellant cites the testimony of the victim's brother, Buenaventura
Arrojado, that before her death the victim denied having any quarrel with accused-
appellant.43
To be sure, the evaluation of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that it overlooked certain facts or circumstances of
substance that, if considered, could have affected the outcome of case. This is because the
trial court is in a better position to decide the question of credibility having heard the
witnesses and observed their deportment during the trial.44 In this case, accused-
appellant's contention that the testimonies of Thelma Arrojado and Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo are incredible is without merit. Thelma Arrojado's admission that the victim's
sister Asuncion had asked her to testify does not impair her credibility. Thelma was can
did enough to say that at first she was hesitant to testify because accused-appellant is also
her relative. But she denied having been coached on what to say, stating that she only
testified as to "what Salvador Arrojado said to me" which is that he could not bear the
victim's maltreatment.45
As for Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, she said that she suspected accused-appellant but she
did not want to say anything until she had proof.46 She testified also that so far as she knew,
only accused-appellant harbored a grudge against the victim, and that accused-appellant
himdelf told her so.47 With regard to Erlinda's seemingly inconsistent description of the
victim, suffice it to say that the victim's treatment of accused-appellant does not
necessarily reflect her attitude and behavior toward other people.
Anent the testimony of the victim's brother, Buenaventura Arrojado, that the victim
denied having any quarrel with accused-appellant when he called her up two weeks before
her death,48 it is possible that the victim did not want to bother her brother who was after
all too far (since he lived in Manila) to be of much help. It is only to be expected that Erlinda
Arrojado Magdaluyo and Thelma Arrojdo, who lived near accused-appellant and the
victim, have a much more accurate assessment of the real relationship between accused-
appellant and the victim. Buenaventura Arrojado testified that it was Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo who told him of the alleged quarrel between the victim and accused-
appellant.49
In sum, the following circumstances point to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the
crime:
1. Accused-appellant, the victim, and the latter’s father were the only ones living
in the house in which the crime was committed in the evening of May 31, 1996.50
2. No one from the outside can gain entry since all doors of the house were locked
and the windows had grills.51
3. Accused-appellant had access to the victim’s bedroom because the bedroom
doors were left unlocked so that the victim could check on her father’s condition
during the night. Accused-appellant sleeps in the same bedroom as the victim’s
father.52
4. The murder weapon was a kitchen knife readily accessible to the occupants of
the house.53 As the Solicitor General observed, common sense dictates that if an
outsider entered the house with the intent to kill the victim, he would have
brought his own weapon to ensure the execution of his purpose.54
5. None of the victim’s belongings was missing or disturbed, indicating that the
motive for the crime was not gain but revenge.55
6. Judging from the number and severity of the wounds (10 stab wounds, half of
which were fatal),56 the killer felt deep-seated resentment and anger toward the
victim. Accused-appellant had admitted those feelings to Erlinda Arrojado
Magdaluyo and Thelma Arrojado.57
7. Aside from accused-appellant, no one was known to harbor a grudge against
the victim.58
8. As the Solicitor General also pointed out, accused-appellant’s behavior in the
morning of June 1, 1996 was inconsistent with someone who had just found his
cousin and employer, a person he claims to get along with, dead.59 By his
testimony, he did not even go inside the room to check on her condition on the
lame excuse that he was afraid. He also did not inform his neighbors about the
incident for the equally flimsy reason that he did not know them nor did he go to
the police.60
Under Rule 133, §4 of the Rules on Evidence, cricumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inference are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. As the foregoing discussion shows,
these requisites have been established in this case.
Fourt. With respect to the circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the trial
court correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery against accused-
appellant. To appreciate treachery, two conditions must be present: (1) the employment
of means of execution that gives the person attacked np opportunity to defend himself or
to retaliate and (2) the means of execution is deliberately or consciously adopted. 61 Both
requisites have been established in this case.
Anent the first requisite, Dr. Roldan testified that based on her findings, the victim was not
in a position to fight the assailant and that she might have been stabbed while she was
asleep.62 As regards the second requisite, the number and nature of the wounds sustained
by the victim lead to no other conclusion thatn that accused-appellant employed means in
killong the victim which tended directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk
to himself arising from the defense so many wounds, a total 10, half of which were fatal, if
he had not deliberately adopted such manner of attack.63 Abuse of superior strength also
attended the killing since accused-appellant, a man and armed with a knife, attacked the
victim, an unarmed and dfenseless woman.64 However, since abuse of superior strength is
absorbed in treachery, there is no need to appreciate it separately as an independent
aggravating circumstance.65
The trial court correctly held that there was no proof of evident premeditation since the
requisites thereor, to wit, (a) the time when the accused determined to commit the crime;
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination; and (c)
sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the consequence of his act,66 have not been established in this case.
Nor can the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling be appreciated against accused-
appellant since the latter and the victim lived in the same house.67
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence, however, is present in this case. For
this aggravating circumstance to exist, it is essential to show that the confidence between
the parties must be immediate and personal such as would give the accused some
advantage or make it easier for him to commit the criminal act. The condifence must be a
means of facilitating the commission of the crim, the culprit taking advantage of the
offended party's belied that the former would not abuse said confidence. 68 In this case,
while the victim may have intimated her fear for her safety for which reason she entrusted
her jewelry and bank book to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, her fears were subsequently
allayed as shown by the fact that she took back her personal effects from
Erlinda.69Thinking that accused-appellant would not do her any harm, because he was
after all her first cousin, the victim allowed accused-appellant to sleep in the same room
with her father and left the bedroom doors unlocked.70
The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7659 on December 31,
1993 which increased the penalty for murder from reclusion temporal maximum to death
to reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of confidence and in accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial
court should have imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant. However, on
December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect, requiring that
every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating
circumstances.71 This provision may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well
settled rule that "statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and to that extent."72 The aggravating circumstance of
abuse of confidence not having been alleged in the information, the same therefore could
not be appreciated to raise accused-appellant's sentence to death.1âwphi1.nêt

In accordance with the ruling in People v. Lucas73 that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua remains indivisible notwithstanding the fixing of its duration from twenty (20)
years and one (1) day to forty (40) years,74 the trial court erred in imposing on accused-
appellant the penalty of 30 years of reclusion perpetua. In the with the ruling
in Lucas, accused-appellant should suffer the entire extent of forty (40) years of reclusion
perpetua.75

Consistent with current case law,76 the civil indemnity for the crime of murder should be
reduced from P60,000.00 to P50,000.00, while the award of moral damages in the amount
of P80,000.00 should be reduced to P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Roxas City, is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado is sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua in its entire duration and to its full extent. Furthermore,
he is ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Mary Ann Arrojado the amount of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity and the further sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages and the costs.

SO ORDERED.
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AW
G.R. No. 173473 December 17, 2008
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
BETH TEMPORADA, appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us for review is the February 24, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
affirming with modification the May 14, 2004 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila, Branch 33, convicting accused-appellant Beth Temporada of the crime of large
scale illegal recruitment, or violation of Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended, and five
(5) counts of estafa under Article 315, par. (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The antecedents, as found by the appellate court, are as follows:
From September 2001 to January 2002, accused Rosemarie "Baby" Robles,
Bernadette Miranda, Nenita Catacotan and Jojo Resco and appellant Beth
Temporada, all employees of the Alternative Travel and Tours Corporation
(ATTC), recruited and promised overseas employment, for a fee, to complainants
Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. as technician in Singapore, and Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay,
Evelyn Estacio and Dennis Dimaano as factory workers in Hongkong. The
accused and appellant were then holding office at Dela Rosa Street, Makati City
but eventually transferred business to Discovery Plaza, Ermita, Manila. After
complainants had submitted all the requirements consisting of their respective
application forms, passports, NBI clearances and medical certificates, the
accused and appellant, on different dates, collected and received from them
placement fees in various amounts, viz: a) from Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. – 57,600.00;
b) from Dennis Dimaano – P66,520.00; c) from Evelyn Estacio – P88,520.00; d)
from Soledad Atle – P69,520.00 and e) from Luz Minkay – P69,520.00. As none
of them was able to leave nor recover the amounts they had paid, complainant
lodged separate criminal complaints against accused and appellant before the
City Prosecutor of Manila. On November 29, 2002, Assistant City Prosecutor
Restituto Mangalindan, Jr. filed six (6) Informations against the accused and
appellant, one for Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale under Article 38 (a) of the
Labor Code as amended, and the rest for five (5) counts of estafa under Article
315 paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The Information for large scale illegal recruitment reads:
Criminal Case No. 02-208371:
"The undersigned accuses ROSEMARIE "BABY" ROBLES, BERNADETTE
M. MIRANDA, BETH TEMPORADA, NENITA CATACOTAN and JOJO
RESCO x x x.
That in or about and during the period comprised between the months
of September 2001 and January 2002, inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, representing themselves to have the
power and capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers
for employment abroad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully for a
fee, recruit and promise employment to REGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR.,
DENNIS T. DIMAANO, EVELEYN V. ESTACIO, SOLEDAD B. ATTE and
LUZ MINKAY without first having secured the required license from the
Department of Labor and Employment as required by law, and charge
or accept directly or indirectly from said complainant[s] the amount of
PH57,600.00, PH66,520.00, PH88,520.00, PH69,520.00, PH69,520.00,
respectively, as placement fees in consideration for their overseas
employment, which amounts are in excess of or greater than that
specified in the scheduled of allowable fees prescribed of the POEA and
without reasons and without fault of the said complainants, failed to
actually deploy them and failed to reimburse them the expenses they
incurred in connection with the documentation and processing of their
papers for purposes of their deployment.
Contrary to law."
Except for the name of private complainant and the amount involved, the five (5)
Informations for estafacontain substantially identical averments as follows:
Criminal Case No. 02-208372:
"The undersigned accuses ROSEMARIE "BABY" ROBLES, BERNADETTE
M. MIRANDA, BETH TEMPORADA, NENITA CATACOTAN and JOJO
RESCO x x x.
That in or about and during the period comprised between November
23, 2001 and January 12, 2002, inclusive, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together
and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., in the following manner,
to wit: the said accused, by means of false manifestations and
fraudulent representations which they made to said ROGELIO A.
LEGASPI, JR., prior to and even simultaneous with the commission of
the fraud, to the effect that they have the power and capacity to recruit
and employ ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., as technician in Singapore and
could facilitate the processing of the pertinent papers if given the
necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, induced and
succeeded in inducing said ROGELIO A. LEGASPI, JR., to give and
deliver, as in fact he gave and delivered to said accused the amount of
P57,600.00 on the strength of said manifestations and representations
said accused well knowing that the same were false and fraudulent and
were made solely for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact they did obtain
the amount of P57,600.00, which amount, once in their possession,
with intend to defraud, they willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
 misappropriated, misapplied and converted the same to their own
personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of said ROGELIO
A. LEGASPI, JR. in the aforesaid amount of P57,000.00 Philippine
Currency.
Contrary to law."
The other four (4) Informations for estafa involve the following complainants
and amounts:
1. DENNIS T. DIMAANO P66,520.00
2. EVELYN V. ESTACIO P88,520.00
3. SOLEDAD B. ATLE P69,520.00
4. LUZ T. MINKAY P69,520.003
Only appellant was apprehended and brought to trial, the other accused remained at large.
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty and trial on the merits ensued. After joint
trial, on May 14, 2004, the RTC rendered judgment convicting appellant of all the charges:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the GUILT of accused Beth
Temporada BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT, judgment is hereby rendered
CONVICTING the said accused, as principal of the offenses charged and she is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of Five
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for illegal recruitment; and the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correctional as minimum, to nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum for the estafa committed against complainant Rogelio A. Legaspi, Jr.;
the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correctional as minimum to ten (10) years and one day of prision mayor as
maximum each for the estafas committed against complainants, Dennis
Dimaano, Soledad B. Atte and Luz T. Minkay; and the indeterminate penalty of
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correctional as minimum, to eleven
(11) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum for
the estafa committed against Evelyn Estacio.
The accused is also ordered to pay jointly and severally the complainants actual
damages as follows:
1. Rogelio A. Legaspi Jr. P57,600.00
2. Dennis T. Dimaano 66,520.00
3. Evelyn V. Estacio 88,520.00
4. Soledad B. Atte 66,520.00
5. Luz T. Minkay 69,520.00
SO ORDERED.4
In accordance with the Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo,5 this case was referred to the CA
for intermediate review. On February 24, 2006, the CA affirmed with modification the
Decision of the RTC:
WHEREFORE, with MODIFICATION to the effect that in Criminal Cases Nos. 02-
208373, 02-208375, & 02-208376, appellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as
minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor maximum, as
maximum; and in Criminal Case No. 02-208374, she is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
medium, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal
minimum, as maximum, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED in all other
respects.6
Before this Court, appellant ascribes the lone error that the trial court gravely erred in
finding her guilty of illegal recruitment and five (5) counts of estafa despite the
insufficiency of the evidence for the prosecution.
We affirm the Decision of the CA, except as to the indeterminate penalties imposed for the
five (5) counts of estafa.
Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement thusly:
ART. 13. Definitions. – x x x
(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in
any manner, offers or promises for a fee, employment to two or more persons
shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale, three (3) elements must concur: (a) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage
in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the activities
within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code,
or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code (now
Section 6 of R.A. No. 8042); and, (c) the offender committed the same against three (3) or
more persons, individually or as a group.7
In the case at bar, the foregoing elements are present. Appellant, in conspiracy with her
co-accused, misrepresented to have the power, influence, authority and business to obtain
overseas employment upon payment of a placement fee which was duly collected from
complainants Rogelio Legaspi, Dennis Dimaano, Evelyn Estacio, Soledad Atle and Luz
Minkay. Further, the certification8 issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) and the testimony of Ann Abastra Abas, a representative of said
government agency, established that appellant and her co-accused did not possess any
authority or license to recruit workers for overseas employment. And, since there were
five (5) victims, the trial court correctly found appellant liable for illegal recruitment in
large scale.
Appellant insists that she was merely an employee of ATTC and was just "echoing the
requirement of her employer." She further argues that the prosecution failed to prove that
she was aware of the latter’s illegal activities and that she actively participated therein. In
essence, she controverts the factual findings of the lower courts.
The contention is untenable.
An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held
liable as principal, together with his employer, if it is shown that he actively and
consciously participated in illegal recruitment.9 Appellant actively took part in the illegal
recruitment of private complainants. Rogelio Legaspi testified that after introducing
herself as the General Manager of ATTC, appellant persuaded him to apply as a technician
in Singapore and assured him that there was a job market therefor. In addition to the
placement fee of P35,000.00 which he paid to accused Bernadette Miranda, he also handed
the amount of P10,000.00 to appellant who, in turn, issued him a receipt for the total
amount of P45,000.00. Upon the other hand, Soledad Atle and Luz Minkay, who applied as
factory workers in Hongkong through co-accused, Emily Salagonos, declared that it was
appellant who briefed them on the requirements for the processing of their application,
and assured them and Dennis Dimaano of immediate deployment for jobs abroad. For her
part, Evelyn Estacio testified that aside from the placement fee of P40,000.00 that she paid
to co-accused "Baby" Robles in connection with her purported overseas employment, she
also gave appellant P10,000.00 for which she was issued a receipt for the amount of
P5,000.00.
The totality of the evidence, thus, established that appellant acted as an indispensable
participant and effective collaborator of her co-accused in the illegal recruitment of
complainants. As aptly found by the CA:
Without doubt, all the acts of appellant, consisting of introducing herself to
complainants as general manager of ATTC, interviewing and entertaining them,
briefing them on the requirements for deployment and assuring them that they
could leave immediately if they paid the required amounts, unerringly show
unity of purpose with those of her co-accused in their scheme to defraud private
complainants through false promises of jobs abroad. There being conspiracy,
appellant shall be equally liable for the acts of her co-accused even if she herself
did not personally reap the fruits of their execution. We quote with approval the
trial court’s findings on the matter:
"xxx It is clear that said accused conspired with her co-accused
Rosemarie "Baby" Robles, Bernadette M. Miranda, Nenita Catacotan,
and Jojo Resco in convincing complainants xxx to apply for overseas
jobs and giving complainants Soledad Atle, Luz Minkay and Dennis
Dimaano guarantee that they would be hired as factory workers in
Hongkong, complainant Rogelio Legaspi, as Technician in Singapore
and Evelyn Estacio as quality controller in a factory in Hongkong,
despite the fact that the accused was not licensed to do so.
It should be noted that all the accused were connected with the
Alternative Travel and Tours Corporation (ATTC). Accused Beth
Temporada introduced herself as ATTC’s General Manager. Saod
accused was also the one who received the P10,000.00 given by
complainant Rogelio Legaspi, Jr. and the P10,000.00 given by
complainant Evelyn Estacio as payment for their visa and plane ticket,
respectively."10
Consequently, the defense of appellant that she was not aware of the illegal nature of the
activities of her co-accused cannot be sustained. Besides, even assuming arguendo that
appellant was indeed unaware of the illegal nature of said activities, the same is hardly a
defense in the prosecution for illegal recruitment. Under The Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, a special law, the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale
is malum prohibitum and not malum in se.11 Thus, the criminal intent of the accused is not
necessary and the fact alone that the accused violated the law warrants her conviction. 12
In the instant case, we find no reason to depart from the rule that findings of fact of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are generally accorded
great respect by an appellate court. The assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter
best left to the trial court because it is in the position to observe that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses’ deportment on the stand while testifying,
which opportunity is denied to the appellate courts.13 Further, there is no showing of any
ill-motive on the part of the prosecution witnesses in testifying against appellant. Absent
such improper motive, the presumption is that they were not so actuated and their
testimony is entitled to full weight and credit.
Section 7(b) of R.A. No. 8042 prescribes the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not
less than P500,000.00 nor more than P1,000,000.00 for the crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale or by a syndicate. The trial court, therefore, properly meted the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 on the appellant.
Anent the conviction of appellant for five (5) counts of estafa, we, likewise, affirm the same.
Well-settled is the rule that a person convicted for illegal recruitment under the Labor
Code may, for the same acts, be separately convicted for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a)
of the RPC.14 The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of
confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered
damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.15 The same evidence proving
appellant’s criminal liability for illegal recruitment also established her liability for estafa.
As previously discussed, appellant together with her co-accused defrauded complainants
into believing that they had the authority and capability to send complainants for overseas
employment. Because of these assurances, complainants parted with their hard-earned
money in exchange for the promise of future work abroad. However, the promised
overseas employment never materialized and neither were the complainants able to
recover their money.
While we affirm the conviction for the five (5) counts of estafa, we find, however, that the
CA erroneously computed the indeterminate penalties therefor. The CA deviated from the
doctrine laid down in People v. Gabres;16 hence its decision should be reversed with
respect to the indeterminate penalties it imposed. The reversal of the appellate court’s
Decision on this point does not, however, wholly reinstate the indeterminate penalties
imposed by the trial court because the maximum terms, as determined by the latter, were
erroneously computed and must necessarily be rectified.
The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the RPC, when the amount
defrauded exceeds P22,000.00, is prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum. The minimum term is taken from the penalty next lower or anywhere
within prisión correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months). Consequently, the RTC correctly fixed the minimum term for the
five estafa cases at 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional since this is within the
range of prisión correccional minimum and medium.
On the other hand, the maximum term is taken from the prescribed penalty of prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum in its maximum period, adding 1 year
of imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total
penalty shall not exceed 20 years. However, the maximum period of the prescribed penalty
of prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is not prisión
mayor minimum as apparently assumed by the RTC. To compute the maximum period of
the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum should
be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to form
one period in accordance with Article 6517 of the RPC. Following this procedure, the
maximum period of prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is from 6
years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years.18 The incremental penalty, when proper, shall thus
be added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of
the court.19
In computing the incremental penalty, the amount defrauded shall be subtracted by
P22,000.00, and the difference shall be divided by P10,000.00. Any fraction of a year shall
be discarded as was done starting with the case of People v. Pabalan20 in consonance with
the settled rule that penal laws shall be construed liberally in favor of the accused. The
doctrine enunciated in People v. Benemerito21 insofar as the fraction of a year was utilized
in computing the total incremental penalty should, thus, be modified. In accordance with
the above procedure, the maximum term of the indeterminate sentences imposed by the
RTC should be as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 02-208372, where the amount defrauded was P57,600.00, the RTC
sentenced the accused to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión
correccional as minimum, to 9 years and 1 day of prisión mayor as maximum. Since the
amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P35,600.00, 3 years shall be added to the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months
and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court). The lowest maximum term,
therefore, that can be validly imposed is 9 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisión mayor,
and not 9 years and 1 day of prisión mayor.
In Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, where the amounts
defrauded were P66,520.00, P69,520.00, and P69,520.00, respectively, the accused was
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional as
minimum, to 10 years and 1 day of prisión mayor as maximum for each of the aforesaid
three estafa cases. Since the amounts defrauded exceed P22,000.00 by P44,520.00,
P47,520.00, and P47,520.00, respectively, 4 years shall be added to the maximum period
of the prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8
years, at the discretion of the court). The lowest maximum term, therefore, that can be
validly imposed is 10 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisión mayor, and not 10 years and
1 day of prisión mayor.
Finally, in Criminal Case No. 02-208374, where the amount defrauded was P88,520.00, the
accused was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión
correccional as minimum, to 11 years and 1 day of prisión mayor as maximum. Since the
amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00 by P66,520.00, 6 years shall be added to the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or added to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months
and 21 days to 8 years, at the discretion of the court). The lowest maximum term,
therefore, that can be validly imposed is 12 years, 8 months and 21 days of reclusión
temporal, and not 11 years and 1 day of prisión mayor.
Response to the dissent.
In the computation of the indeterminate sentence for estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the Court has consistently followed the doctrine espoused
in Pabalan and more fully explained in Gabres.The dissent argues that Gabres should be
reexamined and abandoned.
We sustain Gabres.
I.
The formula proposed in the Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Ruben T. Reyes, i.e., the
maximum term shall first be computed by applying the incremental penalty rule, and
thereafter the minimum term shall be determined by descending one degree down the
scale of penalties from the maximum term, is a novel but erroneous interpretation of the
ISL in relation to Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC. Under this interpretation, it is not clear
how the maximum and minimum terms shall be computed. Moreover, the legal
justification therefor is not clear because the meaning of the terms "penalty," "prescribed
penalty," "penalty actually imposed," "minimum term," "maximum term," "penalty next
lower in degree," and "one degree down the scale of penalties" are not properly set out
and are, at times, used interchangeably, loosely and erroneously.
For purposes of this discussion, it is necessary to first clarify the meaning of certain terms
in the sense that they will be used from here on. Later, these terms shall be aligned to what
the dissent appears to be proposing in order to clearly address the points raised by the
dissent.
The RPC provides for an initial penalty as a general prescription for the felonies defined
therein which consists of a range of period of time. This is what is referred to as the
"prescribed penalty." For instance, under Article 24922 of the RPC, the prescribed penalty
for homicide is reclusión temporal which ranges from 12 years and 1 day to 20 years of
imprisonment. Further, the Code provides for attending or modifying circumstances
which when present in the commission of a felony affects the computation of the penalty
to be imposed on a convict. This penalty, as thus modified, is referred to as the "imposable
penalty." In the case of homicide which is committed with one ordinary aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty under the RPC shall
be the prescribed penalty in its maximum period. From this imposable penalty, the court
chooses a single fixed penalty (also called a straight penalty) which is the "penalty
actually imposed" on a convict, i.e., the prison term he has to serve.
Concretely, in U.S. v. Saadlucap,23 a pre-ISL case, the accused was found guilty of homicide
with a prescribed penalty of reclusión temporal. Since there was one ordinary aggravating
circumstance and no mitigating circumstances in this case, the imposable penalty
is reclusión temporal in its maximum period, i.e., from 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20
years. The court then had the discretion to impose any prison term provided it is within
said period, so that the penalty actually imposed on the accused was set at 17 years, 4
months and 1 day of reclusión temporal,24 which is a single fixed penalty, with no minimum
or maximum term.
With the passage of the ISL, the law created a prison term which consists of a minimum
and maximum term called the indeterminate sentence.25 Section 1 of the ISL provides –
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused
to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules
of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty
next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; x x x.
Thus, the maximum term is that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the RPC. In other words, the penalty actually imposed under the
pre-ISL regime became the maximum term under the ISL regime. Upon the other hand, the
minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed
penalty. To illustrate, if the case of Saadlucap was decided under the ISL regime, then the
maximum term would be 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusión temporal and the
minimum term could be anywhere within the range of prisión mayor (6 years and 1 day to
12 years) which is the penalty next lower to reclusión temporal. Consequently, an
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prisión mayor as minimum to 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day of reclusión temporal as maximum could have possibly been imposed.
If we use the formula as proposed by the dissent, i.e., to compute the minimum term based
on the maximum term after the attending or modifying circumstances are considered, the
basis for computing the minimum term, under this interpretation, is the imposable
penalty26 as hereinabove defined. This interpretation is at odds with Section 1 of the ISL
which clearly states that the minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be "within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense."
Consequently, the basis for fixing the minimum term is the prescribed penalty,27 and not
the imposable penalty.
In People v. Gonzales,28 the Court held that the minimum term must be based on the
penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense "without regard to circumstances
modifying criminal liability."29 The Gonzales’ ruling that the minimum term must be based
on the prescribed penalty "without regard to circumstances modifying criminal liability"
is only a restatement of Section 1 of the ISL that the minimum term shall be taken from
within the range of the penalty next lower to the prescribed penalty (and from nowhere
else).30
Further, the dissent proceeds from the erroneous premise that its so-called "regular
formula" has generally been followed in applying the ISL. To reiterate, according to the
dissent, the "regular formula" is accomplished by first determining the maximum term
after considering all the attending circumstances; thereafter, the minimum term is arrived
at by going one degree down the scale from the maximum term. As previously discussed,
this essentially means, using the terms as earlier defined, that the minimum term shall be
taken from the penalty next lower to the imposable penalty (and not the prescribed
penalty.) In more concrete terms and using the previous example of homicide with one
ordinary aggravating circumstance, this would mean that the minimum term for homicide
will no longer be based on reclusión temporal (i.e., the prescribed penalty for homicide)
but reclusión temporal in its maximum period (i.e., the imposable penalty for homicide
with one ordinary aggravating circumstance) so much so that the minimum term shall be
taken from reclusión temporal in its medium period (and no longer from prisión mayor)
because this is the penalty next lower to reclusión temporal in its maximum period. The
penalty from which the minimum term is taken is, thus, significantly increased. From this
example, it is not difficult to discern why this interpretation radically departs from
how the ISL has generally been applied by this Court. The dissent’s"regular formula"
is, therefore, anything but regular.
In fine, the "regular formula" espoused by the dissent deviates from the ISL and
established jurisprudence and is, thus, tantamount to judicial legislation.
II.
There is no absurdity or injustice in fixing or "stagnating" the minimum term within the
range of prisión correccional minimum and medium (i.e., from 6 months and 1 day to 4
years and 2 months). Preliminarily, it must be emphasized that the minimum term taken
from the aforementioned range of penalty need not be the same for every case
of estafa when the amount defrauded exceeds P12,000.00. In People v. Ducosin,31 the Court
provided some guidelines in imposing the minimum term from the range of the penalty
next lower to the prescribed penalty:
We come now to determine the "minimum imprisonment period" referred to in
Act No. 4103. Section 1 of said Act provides that this "minimum which shall not
be less than the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by said Code for the offense."32 We are here upon new ground. It is in
determining the "minimum" penalty that Act No. 4103 confers upon the courts
in the fixing of penalties the widest discretion that the courts have ever had. The
determination of the "minimum" penalty presents two aspects: first, the more or
less mechanical determination of the extreme limits of the minimum
imprisonment period; and second, the broad question of the factors and
circumstances that should guide the discretion of the court in fixing the
minimum penalty within the ascertained limits.
xxxx
We come now to the second aspect of the determination of the minimum penalty,
namely, the considerations which should guide the court in fixing the term or
duration of the minimum period of imprisonment. Keeping in mind the basic
purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem valuable
human material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal
liberty and economic usefulness" (Message of the Governor-General, Official
Gazette No. 92, vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933), it is necessary to consider the criminal,
first, as an individual and, second, as a member of society. This opens up an
almost limitless field of investigation and study which it is the duty of the court
to explore in each case as far as is humanly possible, with the end in view that
penalties shall not be standardized but fitted as far as is possible to the
individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of protecting the social
order.
Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the factors that should be
considered are: (1) His age, especially with reference to extreme youth or old
age; (2) his general health and physical condition; (3) his mentality, heredity and
personal habits; (4) his previous conduct, environment and mode of life (and
criminal record if any); (5) his previous education, both intellectual and moral;
(6) his proclivities and aptitudes for usefulness or injury to society; (7) his
demeanor during trial and his attitude with regard to the crime committed; (8)
the manner and circumstances in which the crime was committed; (9) the gravity
of the offense (note that section 2 of Act No. 4103 excepts certain grave crimes –
this should be kept in mind in assessing the minimum penalties for analogous
crimes).
In considering the criminal as a member of society, his relationship, first, toward
his dependents, family and associates and their relationship with him, and
second, his relationship towards society at large and the State are important
factors. The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting
the social organization against the criminal acts of destructive individuals but
also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends.
In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to individualize the
administration of our criminal law to a degree not heretofore known in these
Islands. With the foregoing principles in mind as guides, the courts can give full
effect to the beneficent intention of the Legislature.33
Admittedly, it is possible that the court, upon application of the guidelines in Ducosin, will
impose the same minimum term to one who commits an estafa involving P13,000.00 and
another involving P130 million. In fact, to a lesser degree, this is what happened in the
instant case where the trial court sentenced the accused to the same minimum term of 4
years and 2 months of prisión correccional in Criminal Case Nos. 02-208372, 02-208373,
02-208375, 02-208376, and 02-208374 where the amounts defrauded were P57,600.00,
P66,520.00, P69,520.00, P69,520.00 and P88,520.00, respectively. However, there is no
absurdity and injustice for two reasons.
One, while it is possible that the minimum term imposed by a court would be the same,
the maximum term would be greater for the convict who committed estafa involving P130
million (which would be 20 years of reclusion temporal) than the convict who swindled
P13,000.00 (which could be anywhere from prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum or from 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years).34 Assuming that both
convicts qualify for parole after serving the same minimum term, the convict sentenced to
a higher maximum term would carry a greater "burden" with respect to the length of
parole surveillance which he may be placed under, and the prison term to be served in
case he violates his parole as provided for in Sections 635 and 836 of the ISL. Under Section
6, the convict shall be placed under a period of surveillance equivalent to the remaining
portion of the maximum sentence imposed upon him or until final release and discharge
by the Board of Pardon and Paroles. Further, the convict with the higher maximum term
would have to serve a longer period upon his re-commitment in prison in case he violates
his parole because he would have to serve the remaining portion of the maximum term,
unless the Board of Pardon and Paroles shall, in its discretion, grant a new parole to the
said convict as provided for in Section 8.
Although the differences in treatment are in the nature of potential liabilities, to this
limited extent, the ISL still preserves the greater degree of punishment in the RPC for a
convict who commits estafa involving a greater amount as compared to one who
commits estafa involving a lesser amount. Whether these differences in treatment are
sufficient in substance and gravity involves a question of wisdom and expediency of
the ISL that this Court cannot delve into.
Two, the rule which provides that the minimum term is taken from the range of the penalty
next lower to the prescribed penalty is, likewise, applicable to other offenses punishable
under the RPC. For instance, the minimum term for an accused guilty of homicide with one
generic mitigating circumstance vis-à-vis an accused guilty of homicide with three
ordinary aggravating circumstances would both be taken from prisión mayor – the penalty
next lower to eclusion temporal. Evidently, the convict guilty of homicide with three
ordinary aggravating circumstances committed a more perverse form of the felony. Yet it
is possible that the court, after applying the guidelines in Ducosin, will impose upon the
latter the same minimum term as the accused guilty of homicide with one generic
mitigating circumstance. This reasoning can be applied mutatis mutandis to most of the
other offenses punishable under the RPC. Should we then conclude that the ISL creates
absurd results for these offenses as well?
In fine, what is perceived as absurd and unjust is actually the intent of the legislature to
be beneficial to the convict in order to "uplift and redeem valuable human material, and
prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic
usefulness."37 By the legislature’s deliberate design, the range of penalty from which the
minimum term is taken remains fixed and only the range of penalty from which the
maximum term is taken changes depending on the number and nature of the attending
circumstances. Again, the reason why the legislature elected this mode of beneficence to a
convict revolves on questions of wisdom and expediency which this Court has no power
to review. The balancing of the State’s interests in deterrence and retributive justice vis-
à-vis reformation and reintegration of convicts to society through penal laws belongs to
the exclusive domain of the legislature.
III.
People v. Romero,38 De Carlos v. Court of Appeals,39 Salazar v. People,40 People v.
Dinglasan41 and, by analogy, People v. Dela Cruz42 do not support the formula being
proposed by the dissent.
The instant case involves a violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC. 43 The penalty for
said violation is–
ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period to prisión mayor in
its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not
exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one
year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusión
temporal, as the case may be. x x x
In contrast, Romero, De Carlos, and Salazar involved violations of Article 315 of the RPC as
amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 168944 because: (1) the funds defrauded were
contributed by stockholders or solicited by corporations/associations from the general
public, (2) the amount defrauded was greater than P100,000.00, and (3) the estafa was
not committed by a syndicate. Section 1 of P.D. No. 1689 provides–
Sec. 1. Any person or persons who shall commit estafa or other forms of
swindling as defined in Article 315 and 316 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, shall be punished by life imprisonment to death if the swindling
(estafa) is committed by a syndicate consisting of five or more persons formed
with the intention of carrying out the unlawful or illegal act, transaction,
enterprise or scheme, and the defraudation results in the misappropriation of
money contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperative,
"samahang nayon(s)", or farmers association, or of funds solicited by
corporations/associations from the general public.
When not committed by a syndicate as above defined, the penalty
imposable shall be reclusión temporal to reclusión perpetua if the amount
of the fraud exceeds 100,000 pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the prescribed penalty is reclusión temporal to reclusión perpetua, the minimum
terms were taken from prisión mayor, which is the penalty next lower to the prescribed
penalty.45 As can be seen, these cases involved a different penalty structure that does not
make use of the incremental penalty rule due to the amendatory law. Thus, the comparison
of these cases with Gabres is improper.
Meanwhile, in Dinglasan, the felony committed was estafa through bouncing checks which
is punishable under Article 315 par. 2(d) of the RPC as amended by Republic Act (RA)
No. 488546–
Sec. 1. Section Two, Paragraph (d), Article Three hundred fifteen of Act
Numbered Thirty-eight hundred and fifteen is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:
"(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an
obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds
deposited therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of the check.
The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the amount necessary
to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the
bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored
for lack or insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie evidence of deceit
constituting false pretense or fraudulent act."
and P.D. No. 81847–
Sec. 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent
acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of reclusión temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
pesos but not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum,
the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period,
adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may
be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection
with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusión perpetua; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Here, the prescribed penalty of prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum
was increased to reclusión temporal by the amendatory law. Consequently, the penalty
next lower to reclusión temporal is prisión mayor from which the minimum term was
taken. This is the reason for the higher minimum term in this case as compared to Gabres.
In fact, Dinglasan is consistent with Gabres–
Since the face value of Check No. 029021, for which appellant is criminally liable
for estafa, exceeds P22,000, the penalty abovecited must be "imposed in its
maximum period, adding 1 year for each additional P10,000." Pursuant to People
vs. Hernando, G.R. No. 125214, Oct. 28, 1999, an indeterminate sentence shall be
imposed on the accused, computed favorably to him. In this case, the
indeterminate sentence should be computed based on the maximum period
of reclusión temporal as maximum, which is from 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day
to 20 years. The minimum period of the sentence should be within the
penalty next lower in degree as provided in the Revised Penal Code,
i.e., prisión mayor, which is from 6 years and 1 day to 12 years
imprisonment. Considering that the excess of the fraud committed, counting
from the base of P22,000, is only P4,400, which is less than the P10,000 stated in
P.D. 818, there is no need to add one year to the maximum penalty
abovecited.48 (Emphasis supplied)
As in Gabres, the penalty next lower (i.e., prisión mayor) was determined without
considering in the meantime the effect of the amount defrauded in excess of P22,000.00
on the prescribed penalty (i.e., reclusión temporal).
Finally, Dela Cruz involved a case for qualified theft. The prescribed penalty for qualified
theft is two degrees higher than simple theft. Incidentally, the penalty structure for simple
theft49 and estafa is similar in that both felonies (1) requires that the prescribed penalty
be imposed in its maximum period when the value of the thing stolen or the amount
defrauded, as the case may be, exceeds P22,000.00, and (2) provides for an incremental
penalty of 1 year imprisonment for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00. It should be
pointed out, however, that the prescribed penalty for simple theft is prisión
mayor minimum and medium while in estafa it is lower at prisión correccionalmaximum
to prisión mayor minimum.
Being two degrees higher, the prescribed penalty for qualified theft is, thus, reclusión
temporal medium and maximum, while the minimum term is taken from the range
of prisión mayor maximum to reclusión temporalminimum, which is the penalty next lower
to reclusión temporal medium and maximum. The penalty next lower to the prescribed
penalty is determined without first considering the amount stolen in excess of P22,000.00
consistent with Gabres. In fact, Dela Cruz expressly cites Gabres–
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the indeterminate
penalty shall be anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower in degree
to that prescribed for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. Since the penalty
prescribed by law is reclusión temporal medium and maximum, the penalty next
lower would be prisión mayor in its maximum period to reclusión temporal in its
minimum period. Thus, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence shall be
anywhere within ten (10) years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months.
The maximum of the indeterminate penalty is that which, taking into
consideration the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
Revised Penal Code. Since the amount involved in the present case exceeds
P22,000.00, this should be taken as analogous to modifying circumstances
in the imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence,
not in the initial determination of the indeterminate penalty. (citing Gabres)
Thus, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty in this case is the
maximum period of reclusión temporal medium and maximum, which ranges
from eighteen (18) years, two (2) months, and twenty one (21) days to twenty
(20) years, as computed pursuant to Article 65, in relation to Article 64 of the
Revised Penal Code.50 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, none of these cases supports the Dissenting Opinion’s thesis that the
minimum term should be computed based on the maximum term. Quite the
contrary, Dinglasan and Dela Cruz are consistent with Gabres.
IV.
The argument that the incremental penalty rule should not be considered as analogous to
a modifying circumstance stems from the erroneous interpretation that the "attending
circumstances" mentioned in Section 1 of the ISL are limited to those modifying
circumstances falling within the scope of Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC. Section 1 of the ISL
is again quoted below –
SECTION 1. Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by
the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused
to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in
view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense; x x x (Emphasis
supplied)
The plain terms of the ISL show that the legislature did not intend to limit "attending
circumstances" as referring to Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC. If the legislature intended
that the "attending circumstances" under the ISL be limited to Articles 13 and 14, then it
could have simply so stated. The wording of the law clearly permits other modifying
circumstances outside of Articles 13 and 14 of the RPC to be treated as "attending
circumstances" for purposes of the application of the ISL, such as quasi-recidivism under
Article 16051 of the RPC. Under this provision, "any person who shall commit a felony after
having been convicted by final judgment, before beginning to serve such sentence, or while
serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty prescribed by
law for the new felony." This circumstance has been interpreted by the Court as a special
aggravating circumstance where the penalty actually imposed is taken from the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period without regard to any generic mitigating
circumstances.52 Since quasi-recidivism is considered as merely a special aggravating
circumstance, the penalty next lower in degree is computed based on the prescribed
penalty without first considering said special aggravating circumstance as exemplified
in People v. Manalo53 and People v. Balictar.54
The question whether the incremental penalty rule is covered within the letter and spirit
of "attending circumstances" under the ISL was answered in the affirmative by the Court
in Gabres when it ruled therein that the incremental penalty rule is analogous to a
modifying circumstance.
Article 315 of the RPC pertinently provides –
ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period
to prisión mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisión
mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may be. x x x
Under Gabres, prisión correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum is the prescribed
penalty55 for estafa when the amount defrauded exceeds P22,000.00. An amount
defrauded in excess of P22,000.00 is effectively considered as a special aggravating
circumstance in the sense that the penalty actually imposed shall be taken from the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period without regard to any generic mitigating
circumstances. Consequently, the penalty next lower in degree is still based on the
prescribed penalty without in the meantime considering the effect of the amount
defrauded in excess of P22,000.00.
What is unique, however, with the afore-quoted provision is that when the amount
defrauded is P32,000.00 or more, the prescribed penalty is not only imposed in its
maximum period but there is imposed an incremental penalty of 1 year imprisonment for
every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00, provided that the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed 20 years. This incremental penalty rule is a special rule
applicable to estafa and theft. In the case of estafa, the incremental penalty is added to the
maximum period of the prescribed penalty (or to anywhere from 6 years, 8 months and
21 days to 8 years) at the discretion of the court, in order to arrive at the penalty actually
imposed (i.e., the maximum term, within the context of the ISL).
This unique characteristic of the incremental penalty rule does not pose any obstacle to
interpreting it as analogous to a modifying circumstance, and, hence, falling within the
letter and spirit of "attending circumstances" for purposes of the application of the ISL.
Under the wording of the ISL, "attending circumstances" may be reasonably interpreted
as referring to such circumstances that are applied in conjunction with certain rules in the
Code in order to determine the penalty to be actually imposed based on the prescribed
penalty of the Code for the offense. The incremental penalty rule substantially meets this
standard. The circumstance is the amount defrauded in excess of P22,0000.00 and the
incremental penalty rule is utilized to fix the penalty actually imposed. At its core, the
incremental penalty rule is merely a mathematical formula for computing the penalty to
be actually imposed using the prescribed penalty as starting point. Thus, it serves the same
function of determining the penalty actually imposed as the modifying circumstances
under Articles 13, 14, and 160 of the RPC, although the manner by which the former
accomplishes this function differs with the latter. For this reason, the incremental penalty
rule may be considered as merely analogous to modifying circumstances. Besides, in case
of doubt as to whether the incremental penalty rule falls within the scope of "attending
circumstances" under the ISL, the doubt should be resolved in favor of
inclusion because this interpretation is more favorable to the accused following the time-
honored principle that penal statutes are construed strictly against the State and liberally
in favor of the accused.56Thus, even if the Dissenting Opinion’s interpretation is
gratuitously conceded as plausible, as between Gabres and the dissent’s interpretation,
Gabres should be sustained since it is the interpretation more favorable to the accused.
V.
The claim that the maximum term should only be one degree away from the minimum
term does not make sense within the meaning of "degrees" under the RPC because
the minimum and maximum terms consist of single fixed penalties. At any rate, the
point seems to be that the penalty from which the minimum term is taken should only be
one degree away from the penalty from which the maximum term is taken.
As a general rule, the application of modifying circumstances, the majority being generic
mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances, does not result to a maximum term
fixed beyond the prescribed penalty. At most, the maximum term is taken from the
prescribed penalty in its maximum period. Since the maximum term is taken from the
prescribed penalty and the minimum term is taken from the next lower penalty, then, in
this limited sense, the difference would naturally be only one degree. Concretely, in the
case of homicide with one ordinary aggravating circumstance, the maximum term is taken
from reclusión temporal in its maximum period which is within the prescribed penalty
of reclusión temporal, while the minimum term is taken from prisión mayor which is the
penalty next lower to reclusión temporal; hence, the one-degree difference observed by
the dissent.
In comparison, under the incremental penalty rule, the maximum term can exceed the
prescribed penalty. Indeed, at its extreme, the maximum term can be as high as 20 years
of reclusión temporal while the prescribed penalty remains at prisión
correccional maximum to prisión mayor minimum, hence, the penalty next lower to the
prescribed penalty from which the minimum term is taken remains at anywhere
within prisión correccional minimum and medium, or from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years
and 2 months. In this sense, the incremental penalty rule deviates from the afore-stated
general rule.57
However, it is one thing to say that, generally, the penalty from which the minimum term
is taken is only one degree away from the penalty from which the maximum term is taken,
and completely another thing to claim that the penalty from which the minimum term is
taken should only be one degree away from the penalty from which the maximum term is
taken.
The one-degree difference is merely the result of a general observation from the
application of generic mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances in the RPC in
relation to the ISL. Nowhere does the ISL refer to the one-degree difference as an essential
requisite of an "attending circumstance." If the application of the incremental penalty rule
deviates from the one-degree difference, this only means that the law itself has provided
for an exception thereto. Verily, the one-degree difference is a mere consequence of the
generic mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances created by the legislature. The
difficulty of the dissent with the deviation from its so-called one-degree difference rule
seems to lie with the inability to view these "attending circumstances" as mere artifacts or
creations of the legislature. It does not make sense to argue that the legislature cannot
formulate "attending circumstances" that operate differently than these generic
mitigating and ordinary aggravating circumstances, and that, expectedly, leads to a
different result from the one-degree difference–for it would be to say that the creator can
only create one specie of creatures. Further, it should be reasonably assumed that the
legislature was aware of these special circumstances, like the incremental penalty rule or
privileged mitigating circumstances, at the time it enacted the ISL as well as the
consequent effects of such special circumstances on the application of said law. Thus, for
as long as the incremental penalty rule is consistent with the letter and spirit of "attending
circumstances" under the ISL, there is no obstacle to its treatment as such.
VI.
Much has been said about the leniency, absurdity and unjustness of the result
under Gabres; the need to adjust the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty to make
it commensurate to the gravity of the estafa committed; the deterrence effect of a stiffer
imposition of penalties; and a host of other similar reasons to justify the reversal of Gabres.
However, all these relate to policy considerations beyond the wording of the ISL in relation
to the RPC; considerations that if given effect essentially seek to rewrite the law in order
to conform to one notion (out of an infinite number of such notions) of wisdom and
efficacy, and, ultimately, of justice and mercy.
This Court is not the proper forum for this sort of debate. The Constitution forbids it, and
the principle of separation of powers abhors it. The Court applies the law as it finds it and
not as how it thinks the law should be. Not too long ago in the case of People v.
Veneracion,58 this Court spoke about the dangers of allowing one’s personal beliefs to
interfere with the duty to uphold the Rule of Law which, over a decade later, once again
assumes much relevance in this case:
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges,
under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted
beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to exercise the duties
of their office, the law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting under its
authority. Under this system, judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to
protect and enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own personal
beliefs.59
VII.
Mr. Justice Adolfo S. Azcuna proposes an interpretation of the incremental penalty rule
based on the phrases "shall be termed prisión mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may
be" and "for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code" found in the last sentence of
said rule, viz:
ARTICLE 315. Swindling (Estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any
of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prisión correccional in its maximum period
to prisión mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such
amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed
shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the
purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prisión mayor or reclusión temporal, as the case may be. x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
While this interpretation is plausible, Gabres should still be sustained because in
construing penal statutes, as between two reasonable60 but contradictory constructions,
the one more favorable to the accused should be upheld, which in this case is Gabres. The
reason for this rule is elucidated in an eminent treatise on statutory construction in this
wise:
It is an ancient rule of statutory construction that penal statutes should be
strictly construed against the government or parties seeking to enforce statutory
penalties and in favor of the persons on whom penalties are sought to be
imposed. This simply means that words are given their ordinary meaning and
that any reasonable doubt about the meaning is decided in favor of anyone
subjected to a criminal statute. This canon of interpretation has been accorded
the status of a constitutional rule under principles of due process, not subject to
abrogation by statute.
The rule that penal statutes should be strictly construed has several justifications
based on a concern for the rights and freedoms of accused individuals. Strict
construction can assure fairness when courts understand it to mean that penal
statutes must give a clear and unequivocal warning, in language people generally
understand, about actions that would result in liability and the nature of
potential penalties. A number of courts have said:
… the rule that penal statutes are to be strictly construed … is a
fundamental principle which in our judgment will never be altered.
Why? Because the lawmaking body owes the duty to citizens and
subjects of making unmistakably clear those acts for the commission of
which the citizen may lose his life or liberty. Therefore, all the canons
of interpretation which apply to civil statutes apply to criminal statutes,
and in addition there exists the canon [of strict construction] …. The
 burden lies on the lawmakers, and inasmuch as it is within their power,
it is their duty to relieve the situation of all doubts.

xxxx

Additionally, strict construction protects the individual against arbitrary

discretion by officials and judges. As one judge noted: "the courts should be
particularly careful that the bulwarks of liberty are not overthrown, in order to
reach an offender who is, but perhaps ought not to be, sheltered behind them."

But also, for a court to enforce a penalty where the legislature has not
clearly and unequivocally prescribed it could result in judicial usurpation
of the legislative function. One court has noted that the reason for the rule is
"to guard against the creation, by judicial construction, of criminal offenses not
within the contemplation of the legislature." Thus the rule requires that before a
person can be punished his case must be plainly and unmistakably within the
statute sought to be applied. And, so, where a statute is open to more than one
interpretation, it is strictly construed against the state. Courts further rationalize
this application of the rule of strict construction on the ground that it was not the
defendant in the criminal action who caused ambiguity in the statute. Along
these same lines, courts also assert that since the state makes the laws, they
should be most strongly construed against it.61 (Emphasis supplied; citations
omitted)

Thus, in one case, where the statute was ambiguous and permitted two reasonable
interpretations, the construction which would impose a less severe penalty was adopted. 62

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED with respect to the
indeterminate penalties imposed on appellant for the five (5) counts of estafa, to wit:

(1) In Criminal Case No. 02-208372, the accused is sentenced to an

indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional as
minimum, to 9 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisión mayor as maximum.

(2) In Criminal Case Nos. 02-208373, 02-208375, and 02-208376, the accused is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión
correccional as minimum, to 10 years, 8 months and 21 days of prisión mayor as
maximum for each of the aforesaid three estafa cases.

(3) In Criminal Case No. 02-208374, the accused is sentenced to an

indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prisión correccional as
minimum, to 12 years, 8 months and 21 days of reclusión temporal as maximum.

In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
PROBATION LAW
G.R. No. 168550 August 10, 2006
URBANO M. MORENO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and NORMA L. MEJES, CHICO-NAZARIO, Respondents.
TINGA, J.:
In this Petition 1 dated July 6, 2005, Urbano M. Moreno (Moreno) assails the Resolution 2 of
the Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc dated June 1, 2005, affirming the
Resolution 3 of the Comelec First Division dated November 15, 2002 which, in turn,
disqualified him from running for the elective office of Punong Barangay of Barangay
Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang
Kabataan Elections.
The following are the undisputed facts:
Norma L. Mejes (Mejes) filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong
Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Four (4) Months and
One (1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28
of Catbalogan, Samar on August 27, 1998.
Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was
already granted probation. Allegedly, following the case of Baclayon v. Mutia, 4 the
imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties, was
thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976
(Probation Law), the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all
civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability
for any fine imposed. The order of the trial court dated December 18, 2000 allegedly
terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he lost as a result of his
conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for in the July 15, 2002 elections.
The case was forwarded to the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor of Samar for
preliminary hearing. After due proceedings, the Investigating Officer recommended that
Moreno be disqualified from running for Punong Barangay.
The Comelec First Division adopted this recommendation. On motion for reconsideration
filed with the Comelec en banc, the Resolution of the First Division was affirmed.
According to the Comelec en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code provides that
those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position. 5 Since
Moreno was released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall
commence on this date and end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation to Moreno
merely suspended the execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from
running for an elective local office.
Further, the Comelec en banc held that the provisions of the Local Government Code take
precedence over the case of Baclayon v. Mutia cited by Moreno and the Probation Law
because it is a much later enactment and a special law setting forth the qualifications and
disqualifications of elective local officials.
In this petition, Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code
applies only to those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the
latter do not serve the adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as
an exception to the Local Government Code because it is a special law which applies only
to probationers. Further, even assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as
Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.
In its Comment 6 dated November 18, 2005 on behalf of the Comelec, the Office of the
Solicitor General argues that this Court in Dela Torre v. Comelec 7 definitively settled a
similar controversy by ruling that conviction for an offense involving moral turpitude
stands even if the candidate was granted probation. The disqualification under Sec. 40(a)
of the Local Government Code subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding
the grant of probation.
Moreno filed a Reply to Comment 8 dated March 27, 2006, reiterating his arguments and
pointing out material differences between his case and Dela Torre v. Comelec which
allegedly warrant a conclusion favorable to him. According to Moreno, Dela Torre v.
Comelec involves a conviction for violation of the Anti-Fencing Law, an offense involving
moral turpitude covered by the first part of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code. Dela
Torre, the petitioner in that case, applied for probation nearly four (4) years after his
conviction and only after appealing his conviction, such that he could not have been
eligible for probation under the law.
In contrast, Moreno alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the
period specified therefor. He never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the
disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to him.
The resolution of the present controversy depends on the application of the phrase "within
two (2) years after serving sentence" found in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code,
which reads:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any
elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence; [Emphasis supplied.]
....
We should mention at this juncture that there is no need to rule on whether Arbitrary
Detention, the crime of which Moreno was convicted by final judgment, involves moral
turpitude falling under the first part of the above-quoted provision. The question of
whether Arbitrary Detention is a crime involving moral turpitude was never raised in the
petition for disqualification because the ground relied upon by Mejes, and which the
Comelec used in its assailed resolutions, is his alleged disqualification from running for a
local elective office within two (2) years from his discharge from probation after having
been convicted by final judgment for an offense punishable by Four (4) Months and One
(1) Day to Two (2) Years and Four (4) Months. Besides, a determination that the crime of
Arbitrary Detention involves moral turpitude is not decisive of this case, the crucial issue
being whether Moreno’s sentence was in fact served.
In this sense, Dela Torre v. Comelec is not squarely applicable. Our pronouncement therein
that the grant of probation does not affect the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code was based primarily on the finding that the crime of fencing of which
petitioner was convicted involves moral turpitude, a circumstance which does not obtain
in this case. At any rate, the phrase "within two (2) years after serving sentence" should
have been interpreted and understood to apply both to those who have been sentenced
by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude and to those who have been
sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of
imprisonment. The placing of the comma (,) in the provision means that the phrase
modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code.
The Court’s declaration on the effect of probation on Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code, we should add, ought to be considered an obiter in view of the fact that Dela Torre
was not even entitled to probation because he appealed his conviction to the Regional Trial
Court which, however, affirmed his conviction. It has been held that the perfection of an
appeal is a relinquishment of the alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the
purpose of which is to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of an accused who,
although already eligible, did not at once apply for probation, but did so only after failing
in his appeal. 9
Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at first glance. The
phrase "service of sentence," understood in its general and common sense, means the
confinement of a convicted
person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court. 10 This seemingly clear and
unambiguous provision, however, has spawned a controversy worthy of this Court’s
attention because the Comelec, in the assailed resolutions, is alleged to have broadened
the coverage of the law to include even those who did not serve a day of their sentence
because they were granted probation.
Moreno argues, quite persuasively, that he should not have been disqualified because he
did not serve the adjudged sentence having been granted probation and finally discharged
by the trial court.
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is
not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held
that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty
of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting
probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her
teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from
public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period 11 imposed upon Moreno
were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even
disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension
from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation.
Clearly, the period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with
service of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the
grant of probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of
probation, 12 the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court
but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation
order. 13
It is regrettable that the Comelec and the OSG have misapprehended the real issue in this
case. They focused on the fact that Moreno’s judgment of conviction attained finality upon
his application for probation instead of the question of whether his sentence had been
served.
The Comelec could have correctly resolved this case by simply applying the law to the
letter. Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code unequivocally disqualifies only those who
have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by imprisonment of one
(1) year or more, within two (2) years after serving sentence.
This is as good a time as any to clarify that those who have not served their sentence by
reason of the grant of probation which, we reiterate, should not be equated with service
of sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office
because the two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code does not even begin to run.
The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging Moreno fortifies his
position. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "[t]he final discharge of the
probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of
his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for
which probation was granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the
court’s finding that he has fulfilled the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was
deemed terminated and all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were
restored to him, including the right to run for public office.
Even assuming that there is an ambiguity in Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code Barangay of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay
which gives room for judicial interpretation, 14 our conclusion will remain the same. and Sangguniang Kabataan Elections.

It is unfortunate that the deliberations on the Local Government Code afford us no clue as
to the intended meaning of the phrase "service of sentence," i.e., whether the legislature
also meant to disqualify those who have been granted probation. The Court’s function, in
the face of this seeming dissonance, is to interpret and harmonize the Probation Law and
the Local Government Code. Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est optimus
interpretandi.
Finally, we note that Moreno was the incumbent Punong Barangay at the time of his
conviction of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. He claims to have obtained a fresh mandate
from the people of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 elections. This
situation calls to mind the poignant words of Mr. Justice now Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban in Frivaldo v. Comelec 18 where he said that "it would be far better to err in
favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms."

Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Commission on Elections en
immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving defendant who thereby banc dated June 1, 2005 and the Resolution of its First Division dated November 15, 2002,
escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was as well as all other actions and orders issued pursuant thereto, are ANNULLED and SET
convicted. 15 Thus, the Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards regarding who ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed to proceed in accordance with this
are qualified for probation. For instance, it provides that the benefits of probation shall Decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
not be extended to those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more
than six (6) years; convicted of any offense against the security of the State; those who SO ORDERED.
have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment
of not less than one (1) month and one (1) day and/or a fine of not less than P200.00; those
who have been once on probation; and those who are already serving sentence at the time
the substantive provisions of the Probation Law became applicable. 16

It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which
also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically
disqualify probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission is significant
because it offers a glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct
class of offenders not covered by the disqualification.

Further, it should be mentioned that the present Local Government Code was enacted in
1991, some seven (7) years after Baclayon v. Mutia was decided. When the legislature
approved the enumerated disqualifications under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code, it is presumed to have knowledge of our ruling in Baclayon v. Mutia on the effect of
probation on the disqualification from holding public office. That it chose not to include
probationers within the purview of the provision is a clear expression of the legislative
will not to disqualify probationers.

On this score, we agree with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an
exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law
which sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the
Probation Law is a special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of
statutory construction that a later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing
a prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special provisions of such earlier
statute. 17

In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that broadens the scope
of the disqualification to include Moreno, the Comelec committed an egregious error
which we here correct. We rule that Moreno was not disqualified to run for Punong
PROBATION LAW
G.R. No. 182748 December 13, 2011
ARNEL COLINARES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that it takes; b)
what distinguishes frustrated homicide from attempted homicide; and c) when an accused
who appeals may still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court.
The Facts and the Case
The public prosecutor of Camarines Sur charged the accused Arnel Colinares (Arnel) with
frustrated homicide before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in
Criminal Case T-2213.1
Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June
25, 2000, he and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their
way, Jesus took a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel
sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 ½ inches
in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.
Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying
by the roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the
right temple, knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him.
Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be
smoking outside his house. He sought the help of a barangay tanod and they brought
Rufino to the hospital.
Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate2 showing that Rufino suffered two
lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these
injuries were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial
treatment.
The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-
defense. He testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus,
and Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor
of Tigaon was but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias
then boxed Arnel several times on the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The
latter picked up a stone and, defending himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When
Ananias saw this, he charged towards Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was
able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his
sister’s house. On September 4, 2000, he voluntarily surrendered at the Tigaon Municipal
Police Station.
Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on
the night of the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes
saw the three engaged in heated argument with Arnel.
On July 1, 2005 the RTC rendered judgment, finding Arnel guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of frustrated homicide and sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from two years and four
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as
maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was only up to
six years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.
Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and, alternatively,
seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with the consequent
reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The CA entirely affirmed the RTC decision but
deleted the award for lost income in the absence of evidence to support it. 3 Not satisfied,
Arnel comes to this Court on petition for review.
In the course of its deliberation on the case, the Court required Arnel and the Solicitor
General to submit their respective positions on whether or not, assuming Arnel committed
only the lesser crime of attempted homicide with its imposable penalty of imprisonment
of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision
correccional, as maximum, he could still apply for probation upon remand of the case to
the trial court.
Both complied with Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for
probation in case the Court metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense
probationable. The language and spirit of the probation law warrants such a stand. The
Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that under the Probation Law no application
for probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected his appeal from the
judgment of conviction.
The Issues Presented
The case essentially presents three issues:
1. Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head
with a stone;
2. Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of
frustrated homicide; and
3. Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a
reduced probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation
on remand of the case to the trial court.
 The Court’s Rulings
One. Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he merely
acted in self-defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone.
When the accused invokes self-defense, he bears the burden of showing that he was legally
justified in killing the victim or inflicting injury to him. The accused must establish the
elements of self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. When successful, the otherwise
felonious deed would be excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the
accused.4
In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires (1)
that the person whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression; (2)
that the offender employed means that is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression; and (3) that the person defending himself did not act with sufficient
provocation.5
If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has nothing
to prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for
being appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected
attack or an imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude
is not enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or with a
weapon.6
Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful aggression.
He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and
Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated Arnel’s testimony that it was Rufino who
started it. Arnel’s only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those
involved having a heated argument in the middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any
medical certificate to prove his point that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and
his companions.7
In contrast, the three witnesses—Jesus, Paciano, and Ananias—testified that Arnel was the
aggressor. Although their versions were mottled with inconsistencies, these do not detract
from their core story. The witnesses were one in what Arnel did and when and how he did
it. Compared to Arnel’s testimony, the prosecution’s version is more believable and
consistent with reality, hence deserving credence.8
Two. But given that Arnel, the accused, was indeed the aggressor, would he be liable for
frustrated homicide when the wounds he inflicted on Rufino, his victim, were not fatal and
could not have resulted in death as in fact it did not?
The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accused’s intent to take his
victim’s life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every
possible doubt regarding homicidal intent.9And the intent to kill is often inferred from,
among other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of
wounds he inflicted on his victim.10
Here, Arnel struck Rufino on the head with a huge stone. The blow was so forceful that it
knocked Rufino out. Considering the great size of his weapon, the impact it produced, and
the location of the wounds that Arnel inflicted on his victim, the Court is convinced that he
intended to kill him.
The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated,
homicide. In Palaganas v. People,11 we ruled that when the accused intended to kill his
victim, as shown by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the victim
did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or
frustrated homicide. If the victim’s wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted
murder or attempted homicide.
Thus, the prosecution must establish with certainty the nature, extent, depth, and severity
of the victim’s wounds. While Dr. Belleza testified that "head injuries are always very
serious,"12 he could not categorically say that Rufino’s wounds in this case were "fatal."
Thus:
Q: Doctor, all the injuries in the head are fatal?
A: No, all traumatic injuries are potentially treated.
Q: But in the case of the victim when you treated him the wounds actually are not
fatal on that very day?
A: I could not say, with the treatment we did, prevent from becoming fatal. But on
that case the patient preferred to go home at that time.
Q: The findings also indicated in the medical certificate only refers to the length of
the wound not the depth of the wound?
A: When you say lacerated wound, the entire length of the layer of scalp.
Q: So you could not find out any abrasion?
A: It is different laceration and abrasion so once the skin is broken up the label of
the frontal lo[b]e, we always call it lacerated wound, but in that kind of wound, we
did not measure the depth.13
Indeed, Rufino had two lacerations on his forehead but there was no indication that his
skull incurred fracture or that he bled internally as a result of the pounding of his head.
The wounds were not so deep, they merely required suturing, and were estimated to heal
in seven or eight days. Dr. Belleza further testified:
Q: So, in the medical certificate the wounds will not require surgery?
A: Yes, Madam.
Q: The injuries are slight?
A: 7 to 8 days long, what we are looking is not much, we give antibiotics and
antit[e]tanus – the problem the contusion that occurred in the brain.
xxxx
Q: What medical intervention that you undertake?
A: We give antibiotics, Your Honor, antit[e]tanus and suturing the wounds.
Q: For how many days did he stay in the hospital?
A: Head injury at least be observed within 24 hours, but some of them would rather
go home and then come back.
Q: So the patient did not stay 24 hours in the hospital?
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: Did he come back to you after 24 hours?
A: I am not sure when he came back for follow-up.14
Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the
prosecution’s claim that Rufino would have died without timely medical intervention.
Thus, the Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted homicide and entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Three. Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having
appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.
But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and holds
that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of
four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision
correccional, as maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the
right to apply for probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.
Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by
the state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the probation law (PD 968)
provides: "That no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the
defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction." 15 Since Arnel
appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he should be deemed permanently
disqualified from applying for probation.
But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has
the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for
that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4
months. If the Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it
is still up to the trial judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation,
taking into account the full circumstances of his case.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the
judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation.
But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a
conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set aside; and, two, a
conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the
probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will
not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on
him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter
penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment—even if this has been
found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial court’s
erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang
nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where
is justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for
probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals 16 that the
probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he
can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between Francisco and this
case.
In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused guilty of
grave oral defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day to one
year and eight months of prision correccional, a clearly probationable penalty. Probation
was his to ask! Still, he chose to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right
to apply for probation. When the acquittal did not come, he wanted probation. The Court
would not of course let him. It served him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it
too. He certainly could not have both appeal and probation.
The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement
"outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused—to wager on the result of
his appeal—that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth
well-nigh at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation
as an ‘escape hatch’ thus rendering nugatory the appellate court’s affirmance of his
conviction."17
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to
apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not
in a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff
penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that
would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty
will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from
judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right
to apply for that privilege.
Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed
on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted,
not frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way,
therefore, Arnel sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where
the law would allow him to apply for probation.
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but
only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him
a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found
him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and
four months maximum.lavvphil This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for
probation.
of the right had the RTC done right by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind
precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right to
apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike the one
erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation?
WHEREFORE, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTS the petition, MODIFIES the Decision dated
July 31, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 29639, FINDS petitioner Arnel Colinares
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide, and SENTENCES him to suffer
an indeterminate penalty from four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years
and four months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to pay Rufino P. Buena the
amount of ₱20,000.00 as moral damages, without prejudice to petitioner applying for
probation within 15 days from notice that the record of the case has been remanded for
execution to the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case T-2213.
SO ORDERED.

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no
fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the
accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the
statutory provisions.18 As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the
Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only
where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the
teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused
not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.19

One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for
probation after he appealed from the trial court’s judgment of conviction would not be
consistent with the provision of Section 2 that the probation law should be interpreted to
"provide an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender." An accused like Arnel
who appeals from a judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.

This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction.
Here, however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, that carried a
penalty in excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime,
which as the Court now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide
with its maximum penalty of 2 years and 4 months.

Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the reduced
penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the
chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose
of the probation law.

At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel
the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have had the right
to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself
PROBATION LAW
G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
SERENO, CJ:
We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo "Lenny"
Villa due to fraternity hazing. While there is nothing new in the arguments raised by the
parties in their respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration, we find a few
remaining matters needing to be clarified and resobed. Sorne oJ' these matters include the
effect of our Decision on the finality of the Court of Appeals judgments insofar as
respondents Antonio Mariano A!meda (Almeda), June] Anthony D. Arna (Arna), Renato
Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are concerned; the question of who are
eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the validity of the probation proceedings and
the concomitant orders of a court that allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.
Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed by
petitioners People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), and
Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson
(collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1 February
2012.1 The Court modified the assailed judgments2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR No. 15520 and found respondents Fidelito Dizon (Dizon), Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and
Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering the criminal liability of Dizon from
the crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict against Tecson et al. from slight
physical injuries. The CA Decision itself had modified the Decision of the Caloocan City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 finding all of the accused therein guilty of the crime
of homicide.3
Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related case docketed as CA-G.R.
S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it dismissed the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II (Escalona), Marcus Joel
Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) on the
ground that their right to speedy trial was violated. Reproduced below is the dispositive
portion of our Decision:5
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgmentin G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito Dizon
guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed Judgment
in G.R. No. 154954 – finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug,
Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries – is also MODIFIED
and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony
Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and penalized under Article 365 in
relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. In
addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil
indemnity ex delicto in the amount of 50,000, and moral damages in the amount of
1,000,000, plus legal interest on all damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of
the finality of this Decision until satisfaction. Costs de oficio.
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby
AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the
criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise AFFIRMED.
Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition in G.R. No. 151258
is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio Villareal deemed CLOSED and
TERMINATED.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the Anti-Hazing
Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident or alumni
fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that would increase the
applicable penalties.
SO ORDERED.
To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present case:6
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School
of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III,
Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo
"Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila
Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s
Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an
Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter
were informed that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time.
Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing," they were
brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their
initiation.
Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults
from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards
the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows
to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation
rites." These rites included the "Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a
gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the
"Bicol Express," which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against
the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their
legs; the "Rounds," in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the
"auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during 6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
initiation rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or withknee
blows on their thighs by two Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the 7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug)
auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During
this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They
survived their first day of initiation. 8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino)

On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to 9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban)
present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize
and recite the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, 10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the
initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The 11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day
of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for the day officially ended.
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of 13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon
and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including 14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds
of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent 15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and
difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer
walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day 16. Antonio General (General)
was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the
carport. 17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and 18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
incoherent mumblings.1avvphi1Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings,
as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really 19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and
helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the
Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival. 20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans: 21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)

In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) 22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)

1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) 23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)

2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal) 24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)

3. Efren de Leon (De Leon) 25. Adel Abas (Abas)

4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson) 26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)

5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama) In Criminal Case No. C-38340

 1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried.
On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-
38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.
On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91),
holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized
with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. A few weeks after
the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340
against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.
On 10 January 2002, the CAin (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of conspiracy by
the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the criminal liability of each
of the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed
away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:
1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants– Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero,
Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada,
Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) –
were acquitted,as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.
2. Four of the accused-appellants– Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio
Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) – were found guilty of the
crime of slight physical injuriesand sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They
were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of ₱30,000 as
indemnity.
3. Two of the accused-appellants– Fidelito Dizonand Artemio Villareal– were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249
of the Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years
of prision mayor to 17 years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to
indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of ₱50,000
and to pay the additional amount of ₱1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against
accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on
different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective
Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October 2006,
the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial court’s Orders and dismissed
the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of
their right to speedy trial.
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were individually
brought before this Court. (Citations omitted)
Motion for Partial Reconsideration
filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration 7 in connection with
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed grave
abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,Saruca,
and Adriano (collectively, Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and Resolution.8 Villa
reiterates her previous arguments that the right to speedy trial of the accused was not
violated, since they had failed to assert that right within a reasonable period of time. She
stresses that, unlike their co-accused Reynaldo Concepcion, respondents Escalona et al.did
not timely invoke their right to speedy trial during the time that the original records and
pieces of evidence were unavailable. She again emphasizes that the prosecution cannot be
faulted entirely for the lapse of 12 years from the arraignment until the initial trial, as there
were a number of incidents attributable to the accused themselves that caused the delay
of the proceedings. She then insists that we apply the balancing test in determining
whether the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated.
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that accused
Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither the felonious intent to kill (animus interficendi) nor
the felonious intent to injure (animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact, it concedes that the
mode in which the accused committed the crime was through fault (culpa). However, it
contends that the penalty imposed should have been equivalent to that for deceit (dolo)
pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. It argues that the nature
and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the accused was so gross that
it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and culpaby considering the act as one
committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the accused conducted the initiation
rites in such a malevolent and merciless manner that it clearly endangered the lives of the
initiates and was thus equivalent to malice aforethought.
With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their acquittal
may also be reversed despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No. 15520). The OSG insists
that Victorino et al. should have been similarly convicted like their other co-accused Dizon,
Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the former also participated in the hazing of
Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed to his death.
Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Tecson et al.
Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No. 154954
(People v. Court of Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the effect of our
Decision insofar as their criminal liability and service of sentence are concerned.
According to respondents, they immediately applied for probation after the CA rendered
its Decision (CAG.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal liability from the crime of
homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical injuries, which
carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al.contend that, as a result, they have already
been discharged from their criminal liability and the cases against them closed and
terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their Applications for Probation on
various dates in January 200211 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended,
otherwise known as the Probation Law. They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City
Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already granted their respective Applications for
Probation on 11 October 200212 and, upon their completion of the terms and conditions
thereof, discharged them from probation and declared the criminal case against them
terminated on various dates in April 2003.13
To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true copies of their respective
Applications for Probation and the RTC Orders granting these applications, discharging
them from probation, and declaring the criminal case against them terminated. Thus, they
maintain that the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already lapsed into finality, insofar as
they were concerned, whenthey waived their right to appeal and applied for probation.
ISSUES
I. Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of their right to speedy trial
II. Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for
intentional felonies
III. Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation
discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against
them DISCUSSION
Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal assertions
raised by petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration concerning G.R. Nos.
178057 & 178080 have already been thoroughly considered and passed uponin our
deliberations, which led to our Decision dated 1 February 2012. We emphasize that in light
of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona et al. to speedy trial, the CA’s dismissal
of the criminal case against them amounted to an acquittal,15 and that any appeal or
reconsideration thereof would result in a violation of their right against double
jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that the acquittal of the accused may be
challenged where there has been a grave abuse of discretion,17 certiorari would lie if it is
convincingly established that the CA’s Decision dismissing the case was attended by a
whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be
shown that the assailed judgment constitutes "a patent and gross abuse of discretion
amounting to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed
by law or toact in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic
manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point so
grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense justice."18 Thus,
grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply because it allegedly
misappreciated the facts and the evidence.19
We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioner’s
arguments and found no basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in
concluding that the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated. Its findings were
sufficiently supported by the records of the case and grounded in law. Thus, we deny the
motion of petitioner Villa with finality.
Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG
We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with
respect to G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).
Many of the arguments raised therein are essentially a mere rehash of the earlier grounds
alleged in its original Petition for Certiorari.
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSG’s theory that even if the act complained of
was born of imprudence or negligence, malicious intent can still be appreciated on account
of the gravity of the actions of the accused. We emphasize that the finding of a felony
committed by means of culpa is legally inconsistent with that committed by means of dolo.
Culpable felonies involve those wrongs done as a result of an act performed without malice
or criminal design. The Revised Penal Code expresses thusly:
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. — Any person who, by reckless imprudence,
shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall
suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period toprisión correccional in its
medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayorin its medium
and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed.
xxxx
Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do an
act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the person performing or failing to perform suchact, taking into consideration his
employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the
damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
(Emphases supplied)
On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate
malicious intent to do an unlawful act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion on
the matter:20 Our Revised Penal Code belongs tothe classical school of thought. x x x The
identity of mens rea– defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal
intent – is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do what the law
prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be
committed by means of doloor "malice."
The term "dolo" or "malice" is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom,
intelligence, and intent. x x x x The element of intent – on which this Court shall focus – is
described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a forbidden act. It refers to
the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.It does not refer to
mere will, for the latter pertains to the act, while intentconcerns the result of the act. While
motive is the "moving power" that impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the
"purpose" of using a particular means to produce the result. On the other hand, the term
"felonious"means, inter alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or
purpose.With these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional
felony must refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind
accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the existence
of dolus malus– that the act or omission be done "willfully," "maliciously," "with deliberate
evil intent," and "with malice aforethought." The maxim is actus non facit reum, nisi mens
sit rea– a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act complained
of is innocent. As is required of the other elements of a felony, the existence of malicious
intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
xxxx
The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital ingredient in
establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the
felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo immediately before or
simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill – or animus interficendi– cannot
and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent.
Furthermore, the victim’s death must not have been the product of accident, natural cause,
or suicide. If death resulted from an act executed without malice or criminal intent – but
with lack of foresight, carelessness, or negligence – the act must be qualified as reckless or
simple negligence or imprudence resulting in homicide.
xxxx
In order to be found guilty ofany of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of the
Revised Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with dolus
malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is fundamental, since
injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer – iniuria ex affectu facientis consistat.
If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found guilty of an intentional felony.
Thus, incase of physical injuries under the Revised Penal Code, there must be a specific
animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do wrong against the physical integrity or
wellbeing of a person, so as to incapacitate and deprive the victim of certain bodily
functions. Without proof beyond reasonable doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the
overt act of inflicting physical injuries per semerely satisfies the elements of freedom and
intelligence in an intentional felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a
man guilty unless his intentions are.
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical injuries,
absentmalicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional
felony.x x x.
xxxx
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the accused
fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code also
punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). According to Article 3
thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of
foresight, or lack of skill.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice, from
which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by reason of an
inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person committing it. In
this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the actor. In contrast, simple
imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without grave fault, from which an injury
or material damage ensues by reason of a mere lack of foresight or skill. Here, the
threatened harm is not immediate, and the danger is not openly visible.
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as follows:
Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed
foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the course about to be
pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take precaution against the
mischievous resultsof the act. Failure to do so constitutes negligence.
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, the
degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger involved.
If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to another person is
great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course of conduct is bound to
be very careful, inorder to prevent or avoid damage or injury. In contrast, if the danger is
minor, not much care is required. It is thus possible that there are countless degrees of
precaution or diligence that may be required of an individual, "from a transitory glance of
care to the most vigilant effort." The duty of the person to employ more or less degree of
care will depend upon the circumstances of each particular case. (Emphases supplied,
citations omitted)
We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the existence of
malicious intent or dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged liable for committing
an intentional felony.
Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we cannot
agree with the argument of the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty for intentional
felony can also be applied to the present case on the ground that the nature of the
imprudence or negligence of the accused was so gross that the felony already amounted
to malice. The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the imposable penalties as
regards felonies committed by means of culpaon the one hand and felonies committed by
means of doloon the other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn between them.
The penalties provided in Article 365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are mandatorily
applied if the death of a person occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of
another. Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of Life)
are automatically invoked if the death was a result of the commission of a forbidden act
accompanied by a malicious intent. These imposable penalties are statutory, mandatory,
and not subjectto the discretion of the court. We have already resolved – and the OSG
agrees – that the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi nor
animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that the
imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration
filed by Tecson et al.
We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents
Tecson et al. vis-à-vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).
The finality of a CA decision will not
bar the state from seeking the
annulment of the judgment via a
Rule 65 petition.
In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA finding
them guilty of slight physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result of their
respective availments of the probation program and their ultimate discharge therefrom.
Hence, they argue that they can no longer be convicted of the heavier offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide.22 Respondents allude to our Decision in Tan v.
People23 to support their contention that the CA judgment can no longer be reversed or
annulled even by this Court.
The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the former
had timely filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule 65 petition is
analogous to an appeal, or a motion for new trial or reconsideration, in that a petition for
certiorarialso prevents the case from becoming final and executory until after the matter
is ultimately resolved.
Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment once
the accused applies for probation, viz:
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. — A judgment of convictionmay, upon motion of the
accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected.
Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes finalafter the lapse of the
period for perfecting an appeal, or whenthe sentence has been partially or totally satisfied
or served, or when the accusedhas waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for
probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied)
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule 122,26 it can be culled from the
foregoing provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect of a criminal
case, especially if the relief being sought is the correction or review of the judgment
therein. This rule was instituted in order to give life to the constitutional edict27against
putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. It is beyond
contention that the accused would be exposed to double jeopardy if the state appeals the
criminal judgment in order to reverse an acquittal or even to increase criminal liability.
Thus, the accused’s waiver of the right to appeal – as when applying for probation – makes
the criminal judgment immediately final and executory. Our explanation in People v.
Nazareno is worth reiterating:28
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred because
the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove the criminal
defendant’s culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a final judgment of
conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional ban on multiple trials
applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the defendant’s already
established innocence at the first trial where he had been placed in peril of conviction, but
also the same untoward and prejudicial consequences of a second trial initiated by a
government who has at its disposal all the powers and resources of the State.
Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily result, as the government would then be
allowed another opportunity to persuade a second trier of the defendant’s guilt while
strengthening any weaknesses that had attended the first trial, all in a process where the
government’s power and resources are once again employed against the defendant’s
individual means. That the second opportunity comesvia an appeal does not make the
effects any less prejudicial by the standards of reason, justice and conscience. (Emphases
supplied, citations omitted)
It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of Rule 120
does not confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have already explained in
our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, and that this rule is
inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very jurisdiction of the court that issued
the criminal judgment.29 The reasoning behind the exception is articulated in Nazareno,
from which we quote:30
In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner done in
an appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the judgment is per
sevoid on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was rendered by a court that had
no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate jurisdiction, whether it acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the
review is on the question of whether there has been a validly rendered decision, not on
the question of the decision’s error or correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule
65 petition, the burden — a very heavy one — is on the shoulders of the party asking for
the review to show the presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to
act in contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted) While this
Court’s Decision in Tan may have created an impression of the unassailability of a criminal
judgment as soon as the accused applies for probation, we point out that what the state
filed therein was a mere motion for the modification of the penalty, and not a Rule 65
petition. A petition for certiorari is a special civil action that is distinct and separate from
the main case. While in the main case, the core issue is whether the accused is innocent or
guilty of the crime charged, the crux of a Rule 65 petition is whether the court acted (a)
without or in excess of its jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking, there is nomodification of judgment
in a petition for certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a re-evaluation of the merits
of the case in order to determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the accused. In a
Rule 65 petition, any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a consequence of
the finding of lack of jurisdiction.
In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must be
that it is inapplicable and irrelevant where the court’s jurisdiction is being assailed
through a Rule 65 petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a criminal
judgment only if the appeal brought before the court is in the nature of a regular appeal
under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, and if that appeal would put the
accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in the partial annulment of the
CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality, as the judgment therein was issued
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The orders of Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
they were issued without jurisdiction.
First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part and
parcel of our criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to
adjudicate and decide the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity of
the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a particular case or matter before it.31 That power and
capacity includes the competence to pronounce a judgment, impose a punishment,32 and
enforce or suspend33 the execution of a sentencein accordance with law.
The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of
Tecson et al. before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not have
competence to take cognizance of the applications, considering that it was not the court of
origin of the criminal case. The OSG points out that the trial court that originally rendered
the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch 121 of the Caloocan City RTC.
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may,
after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said
defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied)
It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for
probation be filed withthe trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning
the court of origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and sentenced Tecson et
al.of the crime of homicide was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the Caloocan City
RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson et al.in their pleadings
have presented any explanation or shown any special authority that would clarify why the
Applications for Probation had not been filed with or taken cognizance of by Caloocan City
RTC Branch 121. While we take note that in a previous case, the CA issued a Decision
ordering the inhibition of Branch 121 Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from hearing and
deciding Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), the ruling was made specifically applicable to the
trial of petitioners therein, i.e. accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. Fernandez.36
Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications with
Caloocan City RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress that applicants are not
at liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek probation, as the requirement under
Section 4 of the Probation law is substantive and not merely procedural. Considering,
therefore, that the probation proceedings were premised on an unwarranted exercise of
authority, we find that Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 never acquired jurisdiction over the
case.
Second, the records of the casewere still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130
granted the probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in
which the criminal action has been properly instituted.37 If a party appeals the trial court’s
judgment or final order,38 jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The execution
of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing party is concerned. 39 The court of
origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire case the moment the other party’s time to
appeal has expired.40 Any residual jurisdiction of the court of origin shall cease – including
the authority to order execution pending appeal – the moment the complete records of the
case are transmitted to the appellate court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that
shall have the authority to wield the power to hear, try, and decide the case before it, as
well as to enforce its decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and
authority shall remain with the appellate court until it finally disposes of the case.
Jurisdiction cannot be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident
would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.
According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "[n]o penalty shall be executed except
by virtue of a final judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the accused
of the offense charged becomes final under any of the following conditions among
others:42 after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal; when the accused waives
the right to appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal ofan appeal; when the sentence has
already been partially or totally satisfied or served; or when the accused applies for
probation. When the decision attains finality, the judgment or final order is entered in the
book of entries of judgments.43 If the case was previously appealed to the CA, a certified
true copy of the judgment or final order must be attached to the original record, which
shall then be remanded to the clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken. 44 The
court of origin then reacquires jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is during
this time that the court of origin may settle the matter of the execution of penalty or the
suspension of the execution thereof,45 including the convicts’ applications for probation.46
A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction
over the case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for
Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their respective
applications47 while a motion for reconsideration was still pending before the CA48 and
the records were still with that court.49 The CA settled the motion only upon issuing the
Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven months after Tecson et al. had
filed their applications with the trial court.50 In September 2002, or almost a month before
the promulgation of the RTC Order dated 11 October 2002 granting the probation
applications,51 the OSG had filed Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with
the CA52 and this Court.53 Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA judgments by filing before
this Court a Petition for Certiorari on 25 November 2002.54 We noted the petition and then
required respondents to file a comment thereon.55 After their submission of further
pleadings and motions, we eventually required all parties to file their consolidated
memoranda.56 The records of the case remained with the CA until they were elevated to
this Court in 2008.57
For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the
probation applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to
suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order their final discharge, and
eventually declare the case against them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux pasis
a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law oran underhanded one-upmanship
on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both – to which this Court cannot give a
judicial imprimatur.
In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied for it.
Probation58 is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who
immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of their
acceptance of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the state affords them a chance to
avoid the stigma of an incarceration recordby making them undergo rehabilitation outside
of prison. Some of the major purposes of the law are to help offenders to eventually
develop themselves into law-abiding and self respecting individuals, as well as to assist
them in their reintegration with the community.
It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an
act of grace orclemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,59 this
Court explained thus:
It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by
others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the
court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only
incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The Probation Law should not therefore be
permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the latter’s prerogatives, rights or
remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this end is clearly expressed, and no
person should benefit from the terms of the law who is not clearly within them. (Emphases
supplied)
The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et
al.60 It points out that when they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the RTC,
they thereby made themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation Law).
We refer again to the full text ofSection 4 of the Probation Law as follows:
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may,
after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by said
defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and
conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for probation shall be
entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of
conviction.
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fine
only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the
application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied)
Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have
appealed the conviction.61 In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this Court was
faced with the issue of whether a convict may still apply for probation even after the trial
court has imposed a non probationable verdict, provided that the CA later on lowers the
original penalty to a sentence within the probationable limit. In that case, the trial court
sentenced the accused to a maximum term of eight years of prisión mayor, which was
beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They only became eligible for probation after
the CA reduced the maximum term of the penalty imposed to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days
of prisión correccional.
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the
accused was ineligiblefor probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In
Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity and
does not provide for any distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clearis that all
offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for appealing,
are disqualified by the law from seeking probation. Accordingly, this Court enunciated in
Lagrosathat the accused are disallowed from availing themselves of the benefits of
probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation only on appeal as a
result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-probationable to probationable.
While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 issued
its various Orders discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in Lagrosa,
however, was a mere reiteration of the reasoning of this Court since the 1989 case
Llamado v. Court of Appeals63 and Francisco. The Applications for Probation of Tecson et
al., therefore, should not have been granted by RTC Branch 130, as they had appealed their
conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents were originally found guilty of homicide
and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accordingly, even if the CA later downgraded their conviction to slight physical injuries
and sentenced them to 20 days of arresto menor, which made the sentence fall within
probationable limits for the first time, the RTC should have nonetheless found them
ineligible for probation at the time.
The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use of
authority, so gross that it divested the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a
consequence, the RTC Orders granting the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. and
thereafter discharging them from their criminal liability must be deemed to have been
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Whether for lack of jurisdiction orfor grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, we declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City
RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation applications of Tecson et al. null and void for
having been issued without jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in Galman v.
Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz:
A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. Through
it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon it are equally
worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis supplied)
The ultimate discharge of Tecson et
al. from probation did not totally
extinguish their criminal liability.
Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been
extinguished as a result of their discharge from probation and the eventual termination of
the criminal case against them by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To support his argument,
he cites the following provision of the Revised Penal Code:
ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. — Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment.
2. By service of the sentence.
3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects.
4. By absolute pardon.
5. By prescription of the crime.
6. By prescription of the penalty.
7. By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code.
(Emphasis supplied)
As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally
speaking, it is as if no judgment had been rendered at all. Considering our annulment of
the Orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation proceedings,
respondents cannot claim benefits that technically do not exist.
In any event, Tecson et al.cannot invoke Article89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we find it
inapplicable to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to
"suspend the execution of the sentence,"66 and not to replace the original sentence with
another, as we pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v. Mutia:67
An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a
suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an
"interlocutory judgment"in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted
defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final
judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final
judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied)
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al.remains.
In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al.
may now reapply for probation.
Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our ruling in Franciscoand modified
our pronouncements insofar as the eligibility for probation of those who appeal their
conviction is concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En Bancin effect
abandoned Lagrosaand settled the following once and for all:69
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals "from the
judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation.
But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a
conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court,now set aside; and, two, a
conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it will apply the
probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment against him. He will
not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment imposed on
him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter
penalty will also have to bend over to the trial court’s judgment — even if this has been
found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial court’s
erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation. Ang kabayo ang
nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw(the horse errs, the carabao gets the whip). Where is
justice there?
The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for
probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appealsthat the
probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he
can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between Franciscoand this
case.
xxxx
Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to
apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. Hewas not in
a position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff
penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that
would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty
will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from
judgments of conviction, when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right
to apply for that privilege.
xxxx
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but
only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him
a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found
him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and
four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no
fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the
accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the
statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the
Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only
where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the
teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused
not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.
xxxx
At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on Arnel
the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would havehad the right
to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would have availed himself
of the right had the RTC doneright by him. The idea may not even have crossed his mind
precisely since the penalty he got was not probationable.
The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness.1âwphi1 Is it fair to deny Arnel the
right to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike
the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation? (Emphases supplied)
In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et
al.ultimately liable for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant
to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense is punishable by arresto mayor in its
maximum period (from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months) to prisión correccional in its
medium period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). Considering
that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable to Tecson et al., we rule that they are
now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) was convicted of the same
crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible for probation.
While we cannot recognize the validityof the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which granted the
Applications for Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have fulfilled
the terms and conditions of their previous probation program and have eventually been
discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for probation, the trial court may, at its
discretion, consider their antecedent probation service in resolving whether to place them
under probation at this time and in determining the terms, conditions, and period thereof.
Final clarificatory matters
We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the
minimum term of the penalty imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While this
issue was not raised by any of the parties before us, this Court deems it proper to discuss
the matter ex proprio motuin the interest of justice. In the first paragraph of the dispositive
portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012, the fourth sentence reads as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión
correccional, as maximum.
As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the "penalty next
lower" than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, in accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law
(ISL),70 the phrase "and one (1) day," which had been inadvertently added, must be
removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of the dispositive portion, the fourth
sentence should now read as follows:
They are hereby sentenced to suffer anindeterminate prison term of four (4) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional,
as maximum. In this instance, we further find it important to clarify the accessory penalties
inherent to the principal penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.
By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding
accessory penalty automatically attaches every time a court lays down a principal penalty
outlined in Articles 25 and 27 thereof.71 The applicable accessory penalty is determined
by using as reference the principal penaltyimposed by the court before the prison
sentence is computed in accordance with the ISL.72 This determination is made in spite of
the two classes ofpenalties mentioned in an indeterminate sentence. It must be
emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory penalties specifically allude
to the actual "penalty"73 imposed, not to the "prison sentence"74 set by a court. We believe
that the ISL did not intend to have the effect of imposing on the convict two distinct sets
of accessory penalties for the same offense.75 The two penalties are only relevant insofar
as setting the minimum imprisonment period is concerned, after which the convict may
apply for parole and eventually seek the shortening of the prison term.76
Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prisión correccionalin its medium period. As this provision grants courts the discretion
tolay down a penalty without regard to the presence of mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, the imposable penaltymust also be within the aforementioned
range.77 Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.
the actual (straight) penalty78 of four years and two months of prisión
correccional.79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prisión
correccional automatically carries with it80 the following accessory penalties: ARTICLE 43.
Prisión Correccional— Its accessory penalties. — The penalty of prisión correccional shall
carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right tofollow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the
duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the
disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.
The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty sans
the ISL; that is, for four years and two months81 or until they have served their sentence
in accordance with law. Their suspension takes effect immediately, once the judgment of
conviction becomes final.82
We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they shall
furthermore suffer a perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. Under
Article 32 of the RevisedPenal Code, if this accessory penalty attaches, it shall forever
deprive them of the exercise of their right (a) to vote in any popular election for any public
office; (b) to be elected to that office; and (c) to hold any public office.83 Any public office
that they may be holding becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment.84 The
aforementioned accessory penalties can only be wiped out if expressly remitted in a
pardon.85
Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of
probation, shouldthe trial court find them eligible therefor. As we explained in
Baclayon,86 the grant of probation suspends the execution of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory penalties. We have reiterated this point in
Moreno v. Commission on Elections:87
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on probation is
not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence. We held
that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition of the principal penalty
of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and
from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted from the order granting
probation the paragraph which required that petitioner refrain from continuing with her
teaching profession.
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension from
public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period imposed upon Moreno
were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even
disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension
from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x. During the period
of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court
but is merely required to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of petitioner
Gerarda H. Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby DENIED. The
Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General concerning G.R. Nos.
155101 and 154954 is also DENIED.
The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano Almeda,
Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise DENIED. In
light of the finding that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130 acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the aforementioned Applications for
Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire probation proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders,
resolutions, or judgments issued in connection thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that
Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Arna, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and
Fidelito Dizon are eligible to apply or reapply for probation in view of our recent ruling in
Colinares v. People of the Philippines,88 without prejudice to their remaining civil liability,
if any.
Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1
February 2012 and hereby delete the phrase "and one (1) day" located in the fourth
sentence of the first paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now read as follows: "They are
hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisi6n correccional, as
maximum."

SO ORDERED.
TOTAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITIES
G.R. No. 200030 April 18, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NELSON BAYOT y SATINA, Accused-Appellant.
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision1 dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 affirming with modification the Decision2 dated 31 July 2000 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, 6th Judicial Region,
Branch 61, in Criminal Case No. 98-2025, finding herein appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina
(appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, committed against
AAA,3 thus, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The appellate court
increased the award of indemnity from ₱40,000.00 to ₱50,000.00. It also ordered
appellant to pay AAA moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00.
Appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina was charged with Rape in an Information4 dated 29
December 1997, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of September, 1997, in the Municipality of XXX, Province of
XXX, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
[appellant], by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with the
[AAA], 44 years old, against her will.5
On arraignment, appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. Trial on the merits
ensued thereafter.
In its 31 July 2000 Decision, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rape and
sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of
₱40,000.00 as indemnity with costs. In convicting appellant, the RTC ratiocinated that
AAA’s testimony as regards her ordeal was simple and straightforward, unshaken by a
rigid cross-examination. There appeared to be no inconsistency in her testimony. Further,
AAA’s declaration that she was raped by appellant was corroborated by a medical
certificate showing contusion on her vagina at 6:00 o’clock quadrant of the crevice, which
was explained by Dr. Rodrigo Cubid to have been caused by forceful vaginal intrusion. The
RTC negates the "sweet heart" defense offered by appellant. It stated that appellant’s claim
of being AAA’s lover was a mere devise to extricate himself from the consequence of his
dastardly lust. AAA’s immediate response of reporting the rape incident carries the stamp
of truth. Moreover, if, indeed, there was such relationship between appellant and AAA, the
latter would not have pursued this case. It bears stressing that despite appellant’s
repeated plea for the dismissal of the case, AAA remained steadfast in seeking justice for
the violation of her womanhood.6
Aggrieved, appellant appealed the aforesaid RTC Decision to this Court by filing a Notice
of Appeal dated 6 September 2000.7 In light, however, of this Court’s pronouncement in
People v. Mateo,8 the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review
per Resolution9 dated 4 October 2004.
In a Decision dated 9 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s conviction with
the modification increasing the award of indemnity from ₱40,000.00 to ₱50,000.00. It
likewise awarded moral damages in favor of AAA in the amount of ₱50,000.00. The Court
of Appeals aptly observed that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that appellant committed the crime of rape against AAA. It further held that other than the
self-serving declaration of appellant that he and AAA were sweethearts; no other evidence
was ever presented to substantiate such claim. Even the testimony of appellant’s daughter,
who claimed that her father and AAA are maintaining an illicit relationship, could not be
given any considerable weight. Aside from the fact that appellant’s daughter could not
point to any other circumstance supporting her claim, except for one incident when she
allegedly saw her father and AAA holding hands during a dance at their barangay fiesta,
her testimony could not be stripped of bias and partiality considering that she is the
daughter of appellant. In the same way, her testimony that she saw her father and AAA in
the act of sexual intercourse deserves scant consideration as she was not present at the
time of the commencement of the said act. She could not, therefore, be in a position to state
with certainty that there was no struggle on the part of AAA. Hence, her testimony
regarding such matter is a mere conclusion of fact.10
However, in a letter dated 29 May 2006,11 Dr. Juanito S. Leopando, Penal Superintendent
IV of the New Bilibid Prison, informed the Court of Appeals that appellant died at the New
Bilibid Prison Hospital on 4 December 2004. Attached in his letter is the original copy of
appellant’s Certificate of Death.12
Nonetheless, the Public Attorney’s Office still appealed, on behalf of appellant, the
aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision to this Court via a Notice of Appeal13 dated 31 May
2006, which was given due course by the Court of Appeals per Resolution14 dated 19
January 2007. The Court of Appeals also directed the Chief of the Judicial Records Division
to forward the entire records of the case to this Court.
Taking into consideration appellant’s death, this Court will now determine its effect to this
present appeal.
Appellant’s death on 4 December 2004, during the pendency of his appeal before the Court
of Appeals, extinguished not only his criminal liability for the crime of rape committed
against AAA, but also his civil liability solely arising from or based on said crime.15
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically provides the effect of
death of the accused on his criminal, as well as civil, liability. It reads thus:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:
1. By death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties,
liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment; [Emphasis supplied].
Applying the foregoing provision, this Court, in People v. Bayotas,16 which was cited in a
catena of cases,17 had laid down the following guidelines:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal
liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment
terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from
and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore."
From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The
rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no
longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery
of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.19
Evidently, as this Court has pronounced in People v. Olaco and People v. Paniterce, 20 it is
already unnecessary to rule on appellant’s appeal. Appellant’s appeal was still pending and
no final judgment had been rendered against him at the time of his death. Thus, whether
or not appellant was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because even
assuming that appellant did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, these were
totally extinguished by his death, following the provisions of Article 89(1) of the Revised
Penal Code and this Court’s ruling in People v. Bayotas.

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of
[the] accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
In the same breath, the appealed Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 – finding appellant guilty of the crime of rape, sentencing him
to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay AAA ₱50,000.00 as indemnity and
₱50,000.00 as moral damages – had become ineffectual.
WHEREFORE, in view of the death of appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina, the Decision dated
9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 is SET ASIDE and
Criminal Case No. 98-2025 before the RTC of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental,
is DISMISSED. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

d) x x x x x x x x x

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action

for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil
action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file
this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution
of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of
limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with [the] provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code,
that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.18
TOTAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITIES
G.R. No. 201447 January 9, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ANASTACIO AMISTOSO y BROCA, Accused-Appellant.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court is the appeal of accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso y Broca
(Amistosn) of the Decision1 dated August 25,2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 04012, affirming with modification the Decision 2dated March 23, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City, Branch 48, in Criminal Case No. 10106, which
found Amistoso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the qualified rape of his daughter AAA.3
Amistoso was charged by the Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate in an Information4 dated
August 30, 2000,5 which reads:
The undersigned 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor upon a sworn complaint filed by
private offended party, accuses ANASTACIO AMISTOSO y BROCA, for VIOLATION OF
ANTI-RAPE LAW OF 1997 (art. 266-A, par. 1 sub par. (d) committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of July 2000, at about 8:00 o’clock in the evening thereof, at
x x x Province of Masbate, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused with lewd design and with intent to have carnal knowledge with
AAA, a 12-year old girl, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in
having carnal knowledge with the victim against her will and without her consent.
With the aggravating circumstance of relationship, accused being the father of the victim.
When arraigned on July 23, 2002, Amistoso pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 6
Trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented three witnesses: AAA,7 the victim herself; Dr. Ulysses V.
Francisco (Francisco),8 the Municipal Health Officer who conducted the physical
examination of AAA; and Senior Police Officer (SPO) 4 Restituto Lipatan (Lipatan),9 the
police investigator on duty at the police station on July 13, 2000. The prosecution also
submitted as documentary evidence the Complaint10 dated July 13, 2000 filed by BBB,
AAA’s mother, against Amistoso; AAA’s Affidavit11 dated July 13, 2000; Dr. Francisco’s
Medico-Legal Report12 dated July 13, 2000; AAA’s Certificate of Live Birth;13 AAA’s
elementary school records;14 and a photocopy of the page in the Police Blotter containing
the entries for July 13, 2000.15
The evidence for the prosecution presented the following version of events:
AAA was born on June 2, 1988, the second of five children of Amistoso and BBB. Their
family lived in a one-room shanty in Masbate. On July 10, 2000, AAA was exactly 12 years,
one month, and eight days old.
Prior to July 10, 2000, Amistoso had often scolded AAA, maliciously pinched AAA’s thighs,
and even whipped AAA. At around 11:00 a.m. of July 10, 2000, Amistoso was again mad at
AAA because AAA, then busy cooking rice, refused to go with her father to the forest to get
a piece of wood which Amistoso would use as a handle for his bolo. Because of this, a
quarrel erupted between Amistoso and BBB. In his fury, Amistoso attempted to hack AAA.
BBB ran away with her other children to her mother’s house in another barangay. AAA
though stayed behind because she was afraid that Amistoso would get even madder at her.
On the night of July 10, 2000, AAA had fallen asleep while Amistoso was eating. AAA was
awakened at around 8:00 p.m. when Amistoso, already naked, mounted her. Amistoso
reached under AAA’s skirt and removed her panties. AAA shouted, "Pa, ayaw man!" (Pa,
please don’t!), but Amistoso merely covered AAA’s mouth with one hand. Amistoso then
inserted his penis inside AAA’s vagina. The pain AAA felt made her cry. After he had
ejaculated, Amistoso stood up. AAA noticed white substance and blood coming from her
vagina. Amistoso told AAA not to tell anyone what happened between them, otherwise, he
would kill her.
The following day, July 11, 2000, AAA left their residence without Amistoso’s consent to
hide at the house of a certain Julie, a recruiter. AAA narrated to Julie her ordeal in
Amistoso’s hands. BBB subsequently found AAA at Julie’s house. On July 13, 2000, AAA
told BBB what Amistoso did to her. BBB brought AAA to the Department of Social Welfare
and Development (DSWD), which in turn, brought AAA to Dr. Francisco for physical
examination.
Thereafter, BBB and AAA went to the police for the execution of AAA’s Affidavit and the
filing of BBB’s Complaint against Amistoso. A Municipal Circuit Trial Court in Masbate,
after conducting the necessary preliminary examination, issued an Order of Arrest against
Amistoso on July 13, 2000. Amistoso was arrested the same day and the fact thereof was
entered in the Police Blotter by SPO4 Lipatan.
Dr. Francisco’s findings in his Medico-Legal Report dated July 13, 2000 were as follows:
Hymen: Old hymenal lacerations noted at 7 and 3 o’clock corresponding to the face of the
clock.
Vaginal canal: Showed less degree of resistance and admits about two of the examiner’s
fingers.
REMARKS:
Physical Virginity has been lost to AAA16
Dr. Francisco explained on the witness stand that the cause of AAA’s hymenal lacerations
was the penetration of a blunt object, which could be a penis. He also opined that a
hymenal laceration, just like any wound, would take at least a week to heal. Upon further
questioning, he answered that "in minimum it would heal in one week time except when
there is no infection."17
The lone evidence for the defense was Amistoso’s testimony.18
Amistoso recounted that on July 10, 2000, he was working, unloading diesel and kerosene,
at his employer’s warehouse. After finishing his work at around 8:00 p.m., Amistoso had
dinner at his employer’s place before going home. The distance between his employer’s
warehouse and his house was about a kilometer, a 10-minute hike away.
When Amistoso arrived home, he found the door and the windows to the house tied shut.
The house was primarily made of nipa with bamboo flooring. It was raised a foot from the
ground. Amistoso’s children were inside the house with BBB and an unknown man.
Although he could not see inside the house, Amistoso heard BBB and the man talking.
Amistoso suspected that BBB and the man were having sexual intercourse because they
did not open the door when Amistoso called out. Amistoso was told to wait so he did wait
outside the house for 15 minutes. Meanwhile, BBB and the man made a hole in the floor of
the house from where they slipped out, crawled under the house, and fled.
Amistoso said the children had been sleeping inside the house, but BBB woke the children
up. When BBB and her lover fled, the children were left together. However, Amistoso also
said that he slept alone in the house on the night of July 10, 2000.19
Amistoso did not take any action after catching BBB and her lover. He did not chase after
BBB and her lover when the two fled on July 10, 2000; he did not report the incident to the
police; and he did not file charges of adultery against BBB in the days after.
Amistoso believed that BBB, afraid she got caught with another man, manipulated AAA to
falsely charge Amistoso with rape. Amistoso averred that BBB actually wanted to reconcile
with him and apologized to him in May 2001 for what had happened, but he refused.20
On March 23, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision finding Amistoso guilty of qualified rape,
to wit:
In view of the foregoing, this Court is convinced and so holds that the prosecution has
proved the guilt of accused Anastacio Amistoso beyond reasonable doubt of qualified rape,
punished under Article 266-B, par. 5, sub. Par. 1.
WHEREFORE, accused ANASTACIO AMISTOSO, having been convicted of Qualified Rape,
he is hereby sentenced to the capital penalty of DEATH; to pay the victim the sum of
Seventy[-]Five
Thousand Pesos (Ph₱75,000.00) as indemnity; to pay the said victim the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (Ph₱50,000.00) as for moral damages, and to pay the costs.21
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed Amistoso’s conviction for qualified rape but
modified the penalties imposed. Below is the decretal portion of the Decision dated August
25, 2011 of the appellate court:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED and the assailed Decision dated March 23, 2006 of
the Regional Trial Court of Masbate City, Branch 48, in Criminal Case No. 10106 is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole. In addition to civil indemnity in the amount of
₱75,000.00, he is ordered to pay the victim ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and ₱30,000.00
as exemplary damages.22
Hence, Amistoso comes before this Court via the instant appeal with a lone assignment of
error:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF
THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.23
Amistoso argues that the defense of denial and alibi should not be viewed with outright
disfavor. Such defense, notwithstanding its inherent weakness, may still be a plausible
excuse. Be that as it may, the prosecution cannot profit from the weakness of Amistoso’s
defense; it must rely on the strength of its own evidence and establish Amistoso’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. Amistoso asserts that the prosecution failed even in this regard.
Amistoso was charged in the Information with statutory rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The elements of said crime are: (1)
that the accused had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that the woman is below 12
years of age or is demented.
According to Amistoso, there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that he had carnal
knowledge of AAA. AAA’s claim that Amistoso was able to insert his penis into her vagina
on July 10, 2000 was contrary to the physical evidence on record. Dr. Francisco testified
that hymenal lacerations would take a minimum of one week to heal; but in his Medico-
Legal Report, prepared on July 13, 2000, just three days after AAA’s alleged rape, he stated
that AAA’s hymenal lacerations were already healed. Amistoso also asserts that AAA had
ulterior motive to falsely accuse him of rape. AAA admitted that Amistoso had been
maltreating her and that she had already developed hatred or ill feeling against Amistoso.
Such admission casts doubts on the veracity and credibility of AAA’s rape charge and
raises the question of whether the act complained of actually occurred.
Amistoso further claims lack of showing that AAA was below 12 years old or demented
when she was supposedly raped on July 10, 2000. According to the prosecution’s own
evidence, AAA was precisely 12 years, one month, and eight days old on July 10, 2000;
while the prosecution did not at all present any evidence of AAA’s mental condition.
Amistoso’s appeal is without merit.
Reproduced hereunder are the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended:
ART. 266-A. Rape; when and how committed. – Rape is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
ART. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be
punished by reclusion perpetua.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent,
ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil
degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. (Emphases supplied.)
Amistoso was specifically charged in the Information with statutory rape under Article
266-A, paragraph (1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. It is undisputed that AAA
was over 12 years old on July 10, 2000, thus, Amistoso cannot be convicted of statutory
rape. Nonetheless, it does not mean that Amistoso cannot be convicted of rape committed
under any of the other circumstances described by Article 266-A, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, as long as the facts constituting the same are alleged in
the Information and proved during trial. What is controlling in an Information should not
be the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular
law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being, by and large, mere conclusions of law
made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited.24 In addition, the Information need not use the language of the statute in
stating the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. What is required
is that the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense are stated in
ordinary and concise language sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know the offense charged.25
In this case, a perusal of the Information against Amistoso reveals that the allegations
therein actually constitute a criminal charge for qualified rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Section 266-B, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended.
The elements of rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, are: (1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such
act was accomplished through force, threat, or intimidation.26 But when the offender is the
victim’s father, there need not be actual force, threat, or intimidation, as the Court
expounded in People v. Fragante27:
It must be stressed that the gravamen of rape is sexual congress with a woman by force
and without consent. In People v. Orillosa, we held that actual force or intimidation need
not be employed in incestuous rape of a minor because the moral and physical dominion
of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his beastly desires. When a
father commits the odious crime of rape against his own daughter, his moral ascendancy
or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation. The absence of
violence or offer of resistance would not affect the outcome of the case because the
overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the father over his daughter takes the
place of violence and offer of resistance required in rape cases committed by an accused
who did not have blood relationship with the victim. (Citations omitted.)
Then to raise the crime of simple rape to qualified rape under Article 266-B, paragraph (1)
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the twin circumstances of minority of the victim
and her relationship to the offender must concur.28
The foregoing elements of qualified rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation
to Article 266-B , paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are sufficiently
alleged in the Information against Amistoso, viz: (1) Amistoso succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of AAA against her will and without her consent; (2) AAA was 12 years old on
the day of the alleged rape; and (3) Amistoso is AAA’s father.
Amistoso cannot claim that he had been deprived of due process in any way. He adequately
understood from the Information that he was being charged with the rape of his own
daughter AAA to which he proffered the defense of denial and alibi, totally refuting the fact
of AAA’s rape regardless of how it was purportedly committed.
Now as to the truth of the charge in the Information, the RTC found, and the Court of
Appeals affirmed, that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the
elements and circumstances necessary for convicting Amistoso for the qualified rape of
AAA. The RTC accorded credence and weight to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, especially the victim AAA, and disbelieved the denial and alibi of Amistoso.
In People v. Aguilar,29 the Court explained that:
Time and again, we have held that when it comes to the issue of credibility of the victim or
the prosecution witnesses, the findings of the trial courts carry great weight and respect
and, generally, the appellate courts will not overturn the said findings unless the trial court
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and xxxx
substance which will alter the assailed decision or affect the result of the case. This is so
because trial courts are in the best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and Q And what happened after that?
spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses’ manner of
testifying, their demeanor and behavior in court. Trial judges enjoy the advantage of
observing the witness’ deportment and manner of testifying, her "furtive glance, blush of A He attempted to hack me.
conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh, or the scant or full
realization of an oath" — all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a Q And what did your mother do?
witness’ honesty and sincerity. Trial judges, therefore, can better determine if such
witnesses are telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh conflicting testimonies. A She ran away.
Again, unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked which, if considered,
might affect the result of the case, its assessment must be respected, for it had the
opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and xxxx
detect if they were lying. The rule finds an even more stringent application where the said
findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals. (Citations omitted.) Q Did she return on that day to your house?

There is no cogent reason herein for the Court to depart from the general rule and reverse A No, she did not.
any of the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.1âwphi1
Q On July 10, 2000, at around eight o’clock in the evening where were you?
AAA gave a clear, consistent, and credible account of the events of July 10, 2000, in a
straightforward and candid manner: A At our house.

ASST. PROS. LEGASPI continuing) Q And who was with you in your house.

Q Now, remember where you were on July 10, 2000, at about eleven o’clock in the A My father.
morning?
Q What were you doing at that time?
xxxx
A I was sleeping.
A At our house.
Q While you were sleeping, do you recall having been awakened?
xxxx
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you recall if there was an incident happened on that particular day and time?
Q Why were you awakened?
xxxx
A Because my father mounted on me.
A My mother and my father have a quarell (sic).
Q And what did you notice from him when he mounted on you?
Q Why did they have a quarell (sic)?
A That he was already naked.
xxxx
Q When he mounted on top of you, what did he do?
A My father got mad at me because I refused to go with him to get a piece of wood for a
handle of our bolo.
A He removed my panty.
COURT to the witness) Q Because you felt pain, did you cry?

Q What about your clothes? A Yes, sir.

A No, only my panty. Q What happened after that?

xxxx A After that he stood up.

ASST. PROS. LEGASPI continuing) Q Did you feel if there was an ejaculation?

Q What did (sic) you wearing at that time? A Yes, there was.

A A skirt. Q Did you notice a white substance in your vagina?

xxxx A Yes, sir.

Q What did you do when he removed your panty? Q After your father had sexual intercourse with you, what did you notice after that?

A I shouted. A There was a blood coming from me.

COURT to the witness) Q What did your father tell you?

Q What was your shouted (sic) about? A That I must not tell anybody, otherwise he will kill us.30

A In order to stop him. AAA’s aforequoted testimony already established the elements of rape under Article 266-
A, paragraph (1)(a) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. AAA had positively and
xxxx categorically testified that Amistoso’s penis had entered her vagina, so Amistoso
succeeded in having carnal knowledge of AAA. The Court reiterates that in an incestuous
rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation need not be employed where the
ASST. PROS. LEGASPI continuing) overpowering moral influence of the father would suffice.31

Q When you shouted "ayaw man", what did your father do? That Dr. Francisco, during his physical examination of AAA on July 13, 2000, already found
healed lacerations, does not negatively affect AAA’s credibility nor disprove her rape.
A He covered my mouth. Worth repeating are the following pronouncements of the Court in People v. Orilla 32:

Q After he covered your mouth, what did he do next.
A He inserted his penis into my vagina.
xxxx
The absence of fresh lacerations in Remilyn’s hymen does not prove that appellant did not
rape her. A freshly broken hymen is not an essential element of rape and healed
lacerations do not negate rape. In addition, a medical examination and a medical certificate
are merely corroborative and are not indispensable to the prosecution of a rape case. The
credible disclosure of a minor that the accused raped her is the most important proof of
the sexual abuse. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)

Q And what did you feel? In addition, while Dr. Francisco testified that hymenal lacerations normally heal in one
week, he did not foreclose the possibility of hymenal lacerations healing in less than a
A I felt pain. week when there is no infection, to wit:
COURT to the Witness)
Q In your opinion Doctor, how many days more or less would the hymenal lacerations
heal?
A In most cases this laceration is the same with any wound and it would heal for one week.
xxxx
PROS. LEGASPI on re-direct)
Q When you made mentioned as to the period of healing of this hymenal lacerations, when
you said within one week time, could it be possible that it heals less than a week?
xxxx
A In minimum it would heal in one week time except when there is no
infection.33 (Emphasis supplied.)
Even the twin circumstances for qualified rape, namely, minority and relationship, were
satisfactorily proved by the prosecution. That AAA was 12 years old on July 10, 2000 and
that she is Amistoso’s daughter were established by AAA’s Certificate of Live Birth 34 and
Amistoso’s admission35 before the RTC.
The Court is not persuaded by Amistoso’s insinuation that AAA and BBB were only falsely
accusing him of rape out of hatred and ill feeling.
Alleged motives of family feuds, resentment, or revenge are not uncommon defenses, and
have never swayed the Court from lending full credence to the testimony of a complainant
who remained steadfast throughout her direct and cross-examinations, especially a minor
as in this case.36
Moreover, the Court finds it difficult to believe that a young girl would fabricate a rape
charge against her own father as revenge for previous maltreatment, ruling in People v.
Canoy37 as follows:
We must brush aside as flimsy the appellant’s insistence that the charges were merely
concocted by his daughter to punish him for bringing in his illegitimate daughters to live
with them and for maltreating her. It is unthinkable for a daughter to accuse her own
father, to submit herself for examination of her most intimate parts, put her life to public
scrutiny and expose herself, along with her family, to shame, pity or even ridicule not just
for a simple offense but for a crime so serious that could mean the death sentence to the
very person to whom she owes her life, had she really not have been aggrieved. Nor do we
believe that the victim would fabricate a story of rape simply because she wanted to exact
revenge against her father, appellant herein, for allegedly scolding and maltreating her.
(Citations omitted.)
Neither is the Court convinced that BBB would use and manipulate her own daughter AAA
to wrongfully accuse Amistoso, her husband and AAA’s father, of rape, just to cover-up her
alleged affair with another man. It is unthinkable that a mother would sacrifice her
daughter’s honor to satisfy her grudge, knowing fully well that such an experience would
certainly damage her daughter’s psyche and mar her entire life. A mother would not
subject her daughter to a public trial with its accompanying stigma on her as the victim of
rape, if said charges were not true.38
The Court rejects Amistoso’s defense of denial and alibi for the very same reasons stated
in People v. Abulon39:
Nothing is more settled in criminal law jurisprudence than that alibi and denial cannot
prevail over the positive and categorical testimony and identification of the complainant.
Alibi is an inherently weak defense, which is viewed with suspicion because it can easily
be fabricated. Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed with strong
evidence of non- culpability to merit credibility.
The records disclose that not a shred of evidence was adduced by appellant to corroborate
his alibi. Alibi must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses,
otherwise, it is fatal to the accused. Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated
that it was physically impossible for appellant to be present at the place where the crime
was committed at the time of its commission. By his own testimony, appellant clearly
failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to have been present at the scene
of the crime when the rapes were alleged to have occurred. Except for the first incident,
appellant was within the vicinity of his home and in fact alleged that he was supposedly
even sleeping therein on the occasion of the second and third incidents. (Citations
omitted.)
Except for his own testimony, Amistoso presented no other evidence to corroborate his
alibi that he was working at his employer’s warehouse when AAA was raped. Amistoso
even admitted that his employer’s warehouse was only a kilometer or a 10-minute hike
away from the house where AAA was raped, so it was not physically impossible for
Amistoso to be present at the scene of the crime at the time it occurred.
Amistoso’s version of events is also implausible and irrational. Amistoso claimed that his
wife BBB was having an affair with another man, but he could not even identify the man.
He did not see the man on the night of July 10, 2000, but purportedly heard BBB and the
man talking inside the house and concluded that the two were having sexual intercourse.
Amistoso further said he wanted to hack BBB and her lover, yet, he patiently waited
outside for 15 minutes before entering the house. It appears physically impossible for BBB
and her lover, both fully grown adults, to escape by crawling through the one-foot space
beneath the house. And finally, Amistoso was unable to explain why he did not run after
BBB and her lover nor took any legal action against the two even days after catching them
having sexual intercourse; where were the children, who BBB supposedly left behind after
running away with her lover on the night of July 10, 2000, as Amistoso claimed he slept
alone at the house that same night; and how would BBB, the spouse allegedly guilty of
having an affair, benefit in influencing AAA to falsely charge Amistoso with rape.
For the qualified rape of his daughter AAA, the Court of Appeals was correct in imposing
upon Amistoso the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the eligibility of parole, in lieu of
the death penalty, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346;40 and ordering Amistoso to pay AAA
the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The Court adds that Amistoso is liable to pay interest
on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
Decision.41

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal of Anastacio Amistoso y Broca
is DENIED. The Decision dated August 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C.
No. 04012 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Amistoso is further OHDERED to
pay interest on all damages awarded at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
TOTAL EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITIES 1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability
as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.1âwphi1 As opined by Justice Regalado, in
G.R. No. 194068 November 26, 2014 this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal
liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense
committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BENJIE CONSORTE y FRANCO, Accused-Appellant. In the case at bar, accused-appellant died before final judgment, as in fact, his motion for
reconsideration is still pending resolution by the Court. As such, it therefore becomes
necessary for us to declare his criminal liability as well as his civil liability ex delicto to
PEREZ, J.: have been extinguished by his death prior to final judgment.11

For the resolution of the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration1 of our Decision dated 9 WHEREFORE, the criminal and civil liability ex delicto of accused appellant Benjie
July 2014,2 which affirmed the conviction of accused appellant Benjie Consorte y Franco Consorte y Franco are declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to final judgment. The
for the murder of Elizabeth Palmar, the dispositive portion of which reads: judgment or conviction against him is therefore SET ASIDE.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 May 2010 in CA-G.R. CR HC SO ORDERED.
No. 01806 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS (1) that the amount of civil
indemnity is increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00; and (2) that the amount of
exemplary damages is increased from ₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00. An interest, at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from
the date of finality of this judgment until they are fully paid.

SO ORDERED.3

Accused-appellant raises the incredibility of his identification as the perpetrator of the

crime.4 He avers that despite the alleged positive identification made by Rolando Visbe
(Visbe), the testimony of prosecution witness Aneline Mendoza clearly shows the
impossibility of the same.5 Moreover, further casting doubt on the alleged identification of
accused appellant is Visbe’s unbelievable and inconsistent statements on how such
identification was made.6Meanwhile, in a Letter dated 21 September 2014,7 the Officer-
inCharge of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) informed the Court that accused appellant died
on 14 July 2014, as evidenced by the attached Death Certificate issued by NBP Medical
Officer III Ruth B. Algones, M.D.8

Owing to this development, the Court now addresses the effect of death pending accused-
appellant’s appeal with regard to his criminal and civil liabilities.

Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code is illuminating:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally
extinguished: (1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment;

xxxx

In People v. Brillantes,9 the Court, citing People v. Bayotas,10 clarified that: