Case Digests on Evidence

Submitted by: Patrick James S. Dela Cruz

Student No. 2014-122472

FIDEL T. SALAMERA, petitioner

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, respondent
G.R. No. 121099
February 17, 1999

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioner is an incumbent Mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, province of Aurora.
Petitioner received from Casiguran Barangay Captain Antonio Benavidez one (1) Caliber .
38 Smith & Wesson Revolver, with Serial No. 879886. The said gun was placed in an attaché case
Said firearms was owned by and licensed to Ponciano Benavidez, uncle of Brgy. Capt.
Antonio Benavidez, who mortgaged to the latter.
Petitioner together with his security men, went to Manila, and brought with them the
attache case with the gun in it. On their return to the province, they were accosted in a
checkpoint in Quezon City while the said gun was spotted by Patrolman Alfredo B. Villanueva of
QC Police District.
While the registered owner of the gun demanded the return from the Petitioner, The latter
informed Ponciano that the gun was confiscated by the Quezon City Police.
As a result, on September 30, 1988, Ponciano Benavidez filed with the office of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Aurora a complaint for theft against petitioner and Antonio Benavidez but
subsequently dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Aurora.
Likewise, On December 13, 1988, Ponciano Benavidez filed with the Department of Local
Government, an administrative complaint against petitioner for abuse of authority, ignorance of
the law and conduct unbecoming of a public servant and on April 6, 1989, complainant also filed
a complaint for theft against petitioner with the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila.
However, on August 21, 1990, during the investigation of the administrative case by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Aurora, complainant executed an affidavit of desistance
acknowledging that petitioner had paid the value of the gun and withdrawing the administrative
case and the criminal case he filed against petitioner with the Ombudsman. Thus, the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved a resolution dismissing the administrative case against
petitioner.
Meanwhile, on March 9, 1992, after the ombudsman conducted its investigation, approved
the filing by Special Prosecution Officer Prospero G. Pelayo which upgraded the complaint against
the petitioner for malversation of public funds finding probable cause against petitioners which
was duly filed on March 12, 1992, with the Sandiganbayan, Manila.
On March 30, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest and petitioner posted a
cash bail of P20,000.00.
During the arraignment before the SB, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty and the court
scheduled the case for pre-trial conference.
On August 14, 1992, petitioner was able to contact Pat. Villanueva. The latter said that he
returned the gun to Patrolman Orgas, one of petitioner's security men on the very next day after
he had confiscated it. Unfortunately, Pat. Orgas did not inform petitioner about the recovery of
the gun, and at the time Villanueva so informed petitioner, Pat. Orgas had died.
At the pre-trial conference, the prosecution and the accused-petitioner assisted by counsel
de parte, entered into a stipulation of facts and submitted affidavit by complaining witness
Ponciano Benavidez indicating his desistance from further prosecution thereof for reasons that
there has been restitution of the value of the firearm by the accused-petitioner.
Hence, Trial ensued and the prosecution formally presented its evidence and upon the
admission thereof, rested its case.
On the other hand, the defense presented two (2) witnesses including petitioner.
After the testimony of the witnesses, the court gave the defense counsel ten (10) days to
formally offer his evidence in writing. Thus, In time, the defense formally offered its exhibits and
the court admitted all exhibits except Exhibits 11 and 13, which were rejected for being hearsay.
Said Exhibit 11 and 13 more particularly described as follows:

Exhibit 11 - the Joint Affidavit of the Chairman of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and a certain
Angelito Salamera stating that they were present when payment was made for the gun to the
owner, which is marked as Annex "11 to the Supplemental Affidavit;

Exhibit 13 - the Affidavit executed by Antonio Benavidez dated July 30, 1989, which is marked as
Annex 13 to the Supplemental Affidavit.

On February 17, 1995, after the case was submitted for decision, the SB promulgated its
decision, convicting accused-petitioner of malversation of public property defined and penalized
in Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code and appreciating the mitigating
circumstance of full restitution, imposing upon him the indeterminate sentence of two (2) years
four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum; the penalty of perpetual special disqualification, and a fine
of P5,000.00, the value of the .38 Cal. Smith & Wesson Revolver, with Serial No. 879886.the
decretal portion of which is narrated in the opening paragraph of this opinion.
On March 3, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the SB but was
denied.
Hence, herein petitioner’s appeal before the Supreme Court raising issues.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the SB erred in convicting the petitioner of Malversation under Article 217
in relation to Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code.
Whether or not the SB erred in fixing the value of the gun based on its "reasonable value".
RULING:
The petition has legal basis.

While, Art. 217 of RPC states that Malversation of public funds or property means that a
public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or
property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, or through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public funds or property,
wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation of malversation of such
funds or property.

While, Art. 222 of the same code provide that officers included in the preceding
provisions. The provisions of this chapter shall apply to private individuals who, in any capacity
whatever, have charge of any insular, provincial or municipal funds, revenues, or property and to
any administrator or depository of funds or property attached, seized or deposited by public
authority, even if such property belongs to a private individual.

Likewise, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value
of the property embezzled and failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public
funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses.

In this case, Antonio Benavidez voluntarily turned over the gun, a .38 caliber Smith &
Wesson revolver, to petitioner mayor of the town of Casiguran, Aurora. Antonio surrendered the
gun to the mayor. The gun was duly licensed. It was not seized or confiscated. Antonio obtained
possession of the gun from Ponciano Benavidez, an uncle of his, who was the owner and licensee
of the gun. Ponciano mortgaged it to Antonio.
Moreover, one essential element of the crime of malversation is that a public officer must
take public funds, money or property, and misappropriate it to his own private use or benefit.
The property taken must be public or private property impressed with public attributes or
character for which the public officer is accountable.
In the present case, it is immediately noticeable that some element of Malversation is
lacking.
The subject gun that was surrendered by Antonio to the petitioner mayor does not imbued
with public character sufficient to consider the gun as public property for which the mayor is
accountable. Hence, there was no reason to surrender or confiscate the gun. Antonio should have
returned the gun to Ponciano, the licensed owner or surrendered it to the police authority.
Moreover, by turning over the gun to petitioner mayor, the gun did not become public
property because it was not intended for public use or purpose nor was it lawfully seized. The
gun continued to be private property that is why the gun owner rightfully asked for its return to
him, not to be turned over to the public coffer or treasury. Petitioner's failure to return the gun
after demand by the private owner did not constitute a PRIMA FACIE evidence of
Malversation. The property was private and the one who demanded its return was a private
person, not a person in authority. The presumption of conversion will not apply. Hence, a public
official not responsible for public funds or property and without authority to safeguard the same
cannot be convicted of Malversation.
Evidently, the gun was confiscated by a police officer at a checkpoint in Quezon City. The
policeman should have turned over the confiscated gun to the Constabulary Firearm and
Explosive Unit but instead, he returned the gun to the security aide, in favor of petitioner mayor.
However, the security aide died and apparently, the gun got lost.
Even assuming that the loss was due to petitioner's fault or negligence, he is not
criminally liable for Malversation through Negligence because there was no evidence of
conversion of public property to the use or benefit of the accused-petitioner. Nevertheless,
petitioner made restitution of the value of the gun to the private owner, Ponciano Benavidez.
Obviously, petitioner did not malverse the gun to his private use or benefit.
In connection with the penalty imposed on the accused with regard to the value of the
gun, thus, there was no evidence submitted to the court of the value of the gun to enable the
court to fix the penalty or even assumed that petitioner committed malversation, the penalty for
the offense is dependent on the value of the public property malversed. However, the
Sandiganbayan did not base the penalty on the minimum value of the gun in the absence of
evidence of its true worth. It took judicial notice of its market value and estimated its "reasonable
value" at Php5,000.00. This is a grievous error.
The Sandiganbayan could not take judicial notice of the value of the gun. It must be duly
proved in evidence as a fact. The court cannot take judicial notice of a disputed fact. The court
may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or which are capable of unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. Otherwise, the
court must receive evidence of disputed facts with notice to the parties. This is an innovation
introduced in the Revised Rules of Evidence the Supreme Court adopted on July 1, 1989, which
should not be unknown to the lower courts. The new rule of evidence governs this case, since it
was decided in 1995, six years after its effectivity.
From the foregoing, the Supreme Court reverses the appealed decision and resolution of
the SB in its criminal case and acquits the accused-petitioner Fidel Salamera y Torres, with
costs de oficio. Moreover, the court orders the SB to forthwith cancel the cash bail of the accused
and immediately reimburse the amount to him.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs.
TOMAS TUNDAG, accused-appellant
G.R. Nos. 135695-96
October 12, 2000

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Facts of the case disclosed that on September 5, 1997, victim, Mary Ann Tundag is a 13
year old girl who does not know how to read and write and has an IQ of 76%, at about 10:00 P.M
on the same day, while sleeping along with her father, she noticed that her father who was
already undressed was beside her and embracing her. Then, he undressed her which she resisted
but her father used a knife and told her that he would kill her if she shouts and after that, he
inserted his penis into her vagina and told her not to shout or tell anyone. In effect, his penis
penetrated her genital, which made her vagina bleed and was very painful.

That the same incident was happened in the evening of November 7, 1997, while the
victim at home washing the dishes and at that time, her father was just smoking and
squatting. Subsequently, she lied down to sleep but her father embraced her again, she even
placed a stool between them but he just brushed it aside and lay down with her and was able to
take her womanhood again by using a very sharp knife pointing it at the right side of her neck
which made her afraid.

In the early morning, the following day, she left her father ’s place and went to her
neighbour named Bebie Cabahug and told the latter what her father did to her, who, in turn,
advised her to report the matter to the police, which she did and accompanied by the policemen,
she went to the Southern Islands Hospital where she was examined and thereafter brought back
by the police and subjected to investigation and further charge the accused-appellant for RAPE.

On the other hand, appellants claim that the complainant’s charges were manufactured.

He further contends that on September 5, 1997, he was working as a watch repairman

Mandaue City Market and went home tired and sleepy at around 11:00 P.M. while on November
7, 1997, he claims he was at work. In his brief, he argues that it was impossible for him to have
raped his daughter because when the incidents allegedly transpired, he went to work and
naturally, being exhausted and tired, it is impossible for him to do such wrongdoings.
Appellant likewise points out that it was very unlikely for him to have committed the
crimes imputed to him considering that he and his wife had ten children to attend to and care
for. This argument, however, is impertinent and immaterial. Appellant was estranged from his
wife, and private complainant was the only child who lived with him.
He also contended that his daughter pressed the rape charges against him because she
had quarrelled with him after he had castigated her for misbehavior.

However, the Trial Court find the argument bereft of merit and find him twice guilty of rape
and suffer two death sentences.

Hence, an automatic review before the Supreme Court raising the following issues.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the trial court has committed an error in not absolving him of the crimes
charged in the information despite the presence of reasonable doubt to exculpate him of the
same.

Whether or not the trial court has committed an error in imposing a penalty of death for
the crime charged against him.

RULING:

In the first issue, the appellate courts find no room to disturb the trial courts judgment
regarding the appellant’s guilt, because his defense is utterly untenable.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of R.A. No.
7659, penalizes rape of a minor daughter by her father as qualified rape and a heinous crime. In
proving such felony, the prosecution must allege and prove the elements of rape: (1) sexual
congress; (2) with woman; (3) by force or without her consentand in order to warrant the
imposition of capital punishment, the additional elements that: (4) the victim is under 18 years of
age at the time of the rape and (5) the offender is a parent of the victim.
Appellant’s defense of alibi and denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be given
more weight than the testimony of private complainant who testified on affirmative
matters. Denial is an inherently weak defense, which becomes even weaker in the face of the
positive identification by the victim of the appellant as the violator of her honor. Indeed, the
Supreme Court found that private complainant was undeniable in charging appellant with
ravishing her. The victim’s account of the rapes complained of was straightforward, detailed, and
consistent. Her testimony never wavered even after it had been explained to her that her father
could be meted out the death penalty if found guilty by the court.
As held by the court in a prosecution for rape, the complainant ’s credibility is the single
most important issue. The determination of the credibility of witnesses is primarily the function of
the trial court. The rationale for this is that the trial court has the advantage of having observed
the demeanour of the witnesses and demonstrates a better position to form an accurate
impression and conclusion.
Nor does appellants assertion that private complainant has some psychological problems
and a low IQ of 76 in any way favor his defense. These matters did not affect the credibility of
her testimony that appellant raped her twice. We note that the victim understood the
consequences of prosecuting the rape charges against her own father, as shown by the following
testimony of the victim on cross-examination.
Moreover, complainant’s testimony is corroborated by medical findings conducted by Dr.
Bessie Acebes that lacerations were present in her hymen. He also testified that her findings of
healed hymenal lacerations in the complainant ’s private parts meant a history of sexual congress
on her part and the same may have been caused by the entry of an erect male organ into
complainants genitals. Although during his cross-examination, he stated that the existence of the
datum U-shape fourchette does not conclusively and absolutely mean that there was sexual
intercourse or contact because it can be caused by masturbation of fingers or other
things, however, the presence of the hymenal lacerations tends to support private complainants
claim that she was raped by appellant.
Meanwhile, the Office of the Solicitor General disagrees with appellant and urges the Court
to affirm the trial court decision, with the recommendation that the award of damages and
indemnity.
In resolving the second issue, if the penalty of death imposed upon the accused appellant
is correct?
In this case, it was sufficiently alleged and proven that the offender was the victim ’s father.
However, victim’s age was not properly and sufficiently proved beyond reasonable doubt. She
testified that she was thirteen years old at the time of the rapes. However, she admitted that she
did not know exactly when she was born because her mother did not tell her. She further said
that her birth certificate was likewise with her mother.
Hence, for failure to secure the Birth Certificate of the victim, the prosecutor requested
before the court for judicial notice assuming that the victim is below 18 years old.
Under the Rules of Court, judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts which judges
may properly take and act on without proof because they already know them. It may either be
mandatory or discretionary.

Under Sec.1 of the same rule where judicial notice is mandatory means that a court shall
take judicial notice without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of
states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations,
the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and
history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of
the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.

Additionally, Sec. 2 of the same rule enumerates the instances when courts may take
discretionary judicial notice of facts which means that a court may take judicial notice of matters
which are of public knowledge, or are capable of unquestionable demonstration or ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions. On the other hand, matters which are
capable of unquestionable demonstration pertain to fields of professional and scientific
knowledge.
With respect to other matters not falling within the mandatory or discretionary judicial
notice, the court can take judicial notice of a fact pursuant to the procedure in Section 3 of Rule
129 of the Rules of Court which requires that during the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or
on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow
the parties to be heard thereon.

After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative or
on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard
thereon if such matter is important of a material issue in the case.

In this case, judicial notice of the age of the victim is improper, despite the defense
counsels admission, thereof acceding to the prosecutions motion. As required by Section 3 of
Rule 129, as to any other matters such as age, a hearing is required before courts can take
judicial notice of such fact. Generally, the age of the victim may be proven by the birth or
baptismal certificate of the victim, or in the absence thereof, upon showing that said documents
were lost or destroyed, by other documentary or oral evidence sufficient for the purpose.
Thus, in some prevailing jurisprudence, the Supreme Court ruled that appellant can only
be convicted of simple rape, and not statutory rape, because of failure of the prosecution to
prove the minority of the victim, who was allegedly 10 years old at the time of the rape. The
prosecution failed to present either the birth or baptismal certificate of the victim. Also there was
no showing that the said documents were lost or destroyed to justify their non-presentation. We
held that testimony of the victim and her aunt were hearsay, and that it was not correct for the
trial court to judge the age of the victim by her appearance.
More so, in several recent cases, the Supreme Court has emphasized the need for
independent proof of the age of the victim, aside from testimonial evidence from the victim or
her relatives.
In this case, the first rape was committed on September 5, 1997 and is therefore governed
by the death penalty law, R.A. 7659. The penalty for the crime of simple rape or rape in its
unqualified form under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 11 of R.A. 7659,
is reclusion perpetua. The second rape was committed on November 7, 1997, after the effectivity
of R.A. 8353, also known as the Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on October 22,
1997. The penalty for rape in its unqualified form remains the same.
As to civil indemnity, the trial court correctly awarded for each count of rape as civil
indemnity. However, the award of another P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages under
Article 2219 in relation to Articles 2217 and 2230 of the Civil Code for each count is imprecise. In
rape cases, the prevailing jurisprudence permits the award of moral damages without need for
pleading or proof as to the basis thereof. Thus, pursuant to current jurisprudence, we award the
amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape.
The award of exemplary damages separately is also in order, but on a different basis and
for a different amount. Appellant being the father of the victim, a fact duly proved during trial,
we find that the alternative circumstance of relationship should be appreciated here as an
aggravating circumstance. Under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code, exemplary damages may
be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Hence,
the SC find an award of exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 proper. Note that
generally, in rape cases imposing the death penalty, the rule is that relationship is no longer
appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in view of the amendments introduced by
R.A. Nos. 7659 and 8353. The father-daughter relationship has been treated by Congress in the
nature of a special circumstance which makes the imposition of the death penalty mandatory.
However, in this case, the special qualifying circumstance of relationship was proved but not the
minority of the victim, taking the case out of the ambit of mandatory death sentence. Hence,
relationship can be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance in this instance so that
exemplary damages are called for. In rapes committed by fathers on their own daughters,
exemplary damages may be imposed to deter other fathers with perverse tendency or aberrant
sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters.
Hence, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in a Criminal Case is
hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant Tomas Tundag is found guilty of two (2) counts of
simple rape and for each count, sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim
the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelle

vs.
MANUEL PRUNA y RAMIREZ or ERMAN PRUNA y RAMIREZ, accused-appellant.
G.R. No. 138471
October 10, 2002

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Facts of the case disclosed that on January 3, 1995 at Sitio Tabing-ilog, Brgy. Panilao, Pilar,
Bataan, the said accused MANUEL PRUNA y RAMIREZ or ERMAN PRUNA y RAMIREZ thru force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and succeed to have
sexual intercourse with the offended party, LIZETTE ARABELLE GONZALES, a 3-year-old minor
girl, against her will and consent of the latter, to her damage and prejudice.

Meanwhile, on 27 January 1995, information for rape was filed against accused-appellant
Manuel Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez at RTC, Bataan.

During the Trial, the prosecution presented five witnesses and stated among others their
testimonies disclosed as follows:

First, the mother of the victim, Jacqueline Gonzales, testified that on 3 January 1995, at
9:30 a.m., she was fetching water from the artesian well located ten meters away from her house
and at that time LIZETTE was defecating at the back of the house of their neighbor Gloria
Tolentino. Jacqueline then carried her pail of water and went back to her house. Since LIZETTE
was not home yet, Jacqueline headed toward the place where the former was moving her
bowel. She looked for LIZETTE but did not find her. It was when Jacqueline was already returning
to her house that she saw LIZETTE from behind red-faced, crying, and appeared to be very
frightened. When Jacqueline asked where she came from, LIZETTE answered that she was
brought by a certain Boy to the grassy area located at the back of Gloria ’s house where she was
sexually molested. LIZETTE then pulled her mother and led her to the house of PRUNA, which
was about eight meters away from their house. PRUNA, the only one known in their community
as Boy, was not there. Jacqueline forthwith requested her mother-in-law to report the matter to
the police, while Jacqueline and LIZETTE went to the Bataan Provincial Hospital.

Secondly, victim (LIZETTE) testified that she knew PRUNA whom he called Boy. She
pointed to him inside the courtroom. According to her, PRUNA laid her down in a grassy area and
inserted his penis into her vagina. When the presiding judge asked her whether she knew that it
is a sin to tell a lie, she answered in the affirmative.
Third, the result of the complete physical examination conducted Dr. Emelita Quiroz, an
obstetrician and gynaecologist at the Bataan Provincial Hospital stated in the Medico-Legal
Report that under sperm analysis found positive for sperm cells. Although not stated in the
Medico-Legal Report, the urinalysis report includes a positive finding for sperm cells. Dr. Quiroz
explained that the presence of sperm cells in the vaginal canal signified that sexual intercourse
and ejaculation had occurred on the person of the patient. There was no laceration; but there
was hyperemia, which means reddening of the tissue around the vaginal opening. Among the
causes of hyperemia is the insertion of a hard object like penis and finger.
Fourth, Teresita Magtagnob, the medical technologist who conducted the laboratory
examinations and prepared the corresponding reports, testified that sperm cells were found in
the wet smear specimen and urine taken from LIZETTE.
Fifth, SPO2 Romeo D. Bunsoy, a member of the PNP assigned at the Pilar Municipal Station,
testified that on 3 January 1995, the parent of the minor rape victim filed a complaint against
PRUNA. Upon his advice, the minor was brought to the hospital for examination. When they
returned from the hospital, he took their statements. Later, he conducted an ocular inspection
and investigation at the alleged place of the incident and caused the place to be photographed,
which showed that the grasses were flattened. He inquired from the people in the neighbourhood
and one of them answered that he saw the minor being brought by PRUNA to the place where
the minor was found. When PRUNA was brought to their station by four barangay tanods of
Panilao, Pilar, Bataan, SPO2 Bunsoy tried to converse with him, but the former did not give any
reply.
On the part of the defense, Carlito Bondoc and PRUNA took the witness stand.
The former testified that on 3 January 1995, while he fetched water at the public artesian
well together with Jacqueline. The latter called her daughter, who was then defecating on the
road near the river and they both went home. After a while, the parents of LIZETTE shouted that
their daughter was raped, and then they proceeded to the house of PRUNA and accused him of
having raped the child. He also asserted that PRUNA could not have raped LIZETTE because the
former was in his house from the time that LIZETTE was moving her bowel up to the time that
her mother went to the house of PRUNA. He also knew that PRUNA was at home because the
former was also in the latter’s house to have coffee. Carlito and the Sulit family thereafter
brought PRUNA to the barangay hall. Since the barangay captain was not around, they brought
PRUNA to the municipal building to prove that he was innocent.
Likewise, the accused PRUNA denied having raped LIZETTE. He claimed that in the
morning of 3 January 1995, he was in his house preparing coffee for Carlito. After Carlito left,
several men arrived and boxed him for reasons not known to him. Carlito and the latters friend
then brought him to the barangay hall. There, LIZETTEs father boxed him. He was thereafter
brought to the Pilar Municipal Jail. There, the mother of the child threw at him the lid cover of a
kettle. He was also asked by the police to take off his clothes and lie flat, then he was
mauled. Thereafter, he was told to put his feet between the grills, and he was made to
masturbate. Worse, his testes were burned with cigarette butts. Every night, he was asked to
kneel on a chair and was hit with a 2x 2 piece of wood.
In this connection, PRUNA was convicted by the trial court of the crime of rape in its
qualified form and sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of death and to indemnify the victim.
Hence, an automatic review before the Supreme Court raising the following issues.
ISSUES:

Whether or not LIZETTE was a competent and credible witness considering that she was
allegedly only 3 years old when the alleged rape occurred and 5 years old when she
testified;

Whether or not Jacquelines testimony as to the declarations of LIZETTE is hearsay;

Whether or not the failure of the prosecution to present Gloria Tolentino as a witness is
fatal;
Whether or not appellants guilt has been proved beyond reasonable doubt; and
Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of minority has been duly proved as to
justify the imposition of the death penalty.

RULING:

In the FIRST ISSUE, the SC is not persuaded by appellant’s assertion.

As a general rule, when a witness takes the witness stand, the law, on ground of public
policy, presumes that he is competent. The court cannot reject the witness in the absence of
proof of his incompetency. The burden is, therefore lies upon the party objecting to the
competency of a witness to establish the ground of incompetency.
Under Section 21 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence enumerates the persons who are
disqualified to be witnesses. Among those disqualified are children whose mental maturity is
such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined
and relating them truthfully.
Further, no precise minimum age can be fixed at which children shall be excluded from
testifying. The intelligence, not the age, of a young child is the test of the competency as a
witness. It is settled that a child, regardless of age, can be a competent witness if he can
perceive and, in perceiving, can make known his perception to others and that he is capable of
relating truthfully the facts for which he is examined.
More so, in determining the competency of a child witness, the court must consider his
capacity (a) at the time the fact to be testified to occur such that he could receive correct
impressions thereof; (b) to comprehend the obligation of an oath; and (c) to relate those facts
truly to the court at the time he is offered as a witness. The examination should show that the
child has some understanding of the punishment which may result from false swearing. The
requisite appreciation of consequences is disclosed where the child states that he knows that it is
wrong to tell a lie, and that he would be punished if he does so, or that he uses language which
is equivalent to saying that he would be sent to hell for false swearing. A child can be disqualified
only if it can be shown that his mental maturity renders him incapable of perceiving facts
respecting which he is being examined and of relating them truthfully. The question of
competency of a child-witness rests primarily in the sound discretion of the trial court. This is so
because the trial judge sees the proposed witness and observes his manner of testifying, his
apparent possession or lack of intelligence, as well as his understanding of the obligation of an
oath.
In this case, appellant questions the competency of LIZETTE as a witness solely on the
ground of her age. He failed to discharge the burden of showing her mental immaturity. It can be
gleaned that LIZETTE had the capacity of observation, recollection and communication and that
she could distinguish the consequence of telling a lie.
Hence, the SC in a string of cases, find that the testimony of a rape victim who is of young
or tender age is credible and deserves full credit, especially where no motive is attributed to the
victim that would make her testify falsely against the accused. Indeed, a girl of such age as
LIZETTE would not concoct a story of defloration; allow the examination of her private parts; and
undergo the expense, trouble, inconvenience, and the trauma of a public trial unless she was in
fact raped.
As to the SECOND ISSUE, the term hearsay as used in the law on evidence signifies
evidence which is not founded upon the personal knowledge of the witness from whom it is
elicited and which consequently does not depend wholly for its credibility and weight upon the
confidence which the court may have in him. Its value is measured by the credit to be given to
some third person not sworn as a witness to that fact, and consequently not subject to cross-
examination. If one therefore testifies to facts which he learned from a third person not sworn as
a witness to those facts, his testimony is inadmissible as hearsay evidence.
The reason for the exclusion of hearsay evidence is that the party against whom the
hearsay testimony is presented is deprived of the right or opportunity to cross-examine the
person to whom the statements are attributed. Moreover, the court is without opportunity to test
the credibility of hearsay statements by observing the demeanour of the person who made them.
In the instant case, the declarant LIZETTE herself was sworn as a witness to the fact
testified to by Jacqueline. The appellant even cross-examined LIZETTE. Moreover, the trial court
had the opportunity to observe her manner of testifying. Hence, Jacqueline’s testimony on the
incident related to her by her daughter cannot be disregarded as hearsay evidence.
Hence, Jacqueline’s testimony is proof of the victims conduct immediately after the rape. It
shows that LIZETTE immediately revealed to her mother the rape incident and the identity of her
defiler. As will be discussed later, such conduct is one of the earmarks of the truth of the charge
of rape.
As to the THIRD ISSUE, the prosecutions failure to put on the witness stand Gloria
Tolentino, who was listed as a witness and executed an affidavit that she saw the appellant
carrying and bringing LIZETTE to a grassy area at the back of her house is undisputed since
Gloria had already moved out of her residence and could not be found anymore. In this case, as
opined by the OSG, her intended testimony could be meted out, as it would only be corroborative
of LIZETTEs testimony that Pruna brought her to a grassy area.
In the FOURTH ISSUE, When LIZETTE was put in the witness stand, she promptly identified
PRUNA, their neighbour, as the one who dishonoured her. A rape victim can easily identify her
assailant especially if he is known to her because during the rape, she is physically close to her
assailant that enables her to have a good look at the latter ’s physical features.
Further, when a woman says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was truly committed. She is also not expected to remember all the
ugly details of the outrage committed against her and apparently, when her testimony passes
the test of credibility, the accused can be convicted on the basis thereof, where in most cases, it
is the only evidence that can be offered to establish his guilt.
Likewise, victim’s mother who testified that right after the incident, LIZETTE disclosed what
happened to her and directly identified PRUNA as the culprit. She even led her mother to the
house of PRUNA and thereafter, the two went to the police authorities to report the incident and
subsequently to the hospital for LIZETTE’s medical examination.
Hence, medical evidence lends credence to LIZETTEs testimony that PRUNA inserted his
penis into her vagina. The Medico-Legal Report shows that there was hyperemia or reddening of
the vaginal opening of LIZETTE. As opined by Dr. Quiroz, who was presented as an
expert witness, hyperemia can be caused by the insertion of a hard object like penis and
finger. The presence of sperm cells in the vaginal canal and urine of LIZETTE is also a mute
testimony of the sexual contact that further strengthens LIZETTEs claim of rape.
Well accepted is the rule that rape is consummated by the slightest penile penetration of
the labia or pudendum of the female. The presence of hyperemia in the victim’s vaginal opening
and the existence of sperm cells in her vaginal canal and urine are clear indications that accused
PRUNA’s organ indeed touched the labia or pudendum of LIZETTE.
As to the FINAL ISSUE, Article 335 of the RPC provides that the death penalty shall be
imposed if the crime of rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years old. We have
held that in such a case the minority of the victim must be proved with equal certainty and
clearness as the crime itself. Otherwise, failure to sufficiently establish the victims age is fatal
and consequently bars conviction for rape in its qualified form.
In the instant case, it may be observed that no birth certificate was presented and the SC
ruled that the age of the victim was not duly proved by the prosecution.
The SC in some cases, have the occasion to rule that in order to remove any confusion
that may be engendered by some cases, hereby set the following guidelines in appreciating age,
either as an element of the crime or as a qualifying circumstance.
1. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of
the certificate of live birth of such party.
2. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal
certificate and school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove
age.
3. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or
otherwise unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victims mother or a member of
the family either by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting
pedigree such as the exact age or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Section 40,
Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence shall be sufficient under the following circumstances:

a. If the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 7 years old;

b. If the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 12 years old;

c. If the victim is alleged to be below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is
that she is less than 18 years old.

4. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the
victims mother or relatives concerning the victims age, the complainants testimony will suffice
provided that it is expressly and clearly admitted by the accused.
5. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of
the accused to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
From the foregoing, in order for PRUNA to be convicted of rape in its qualified form and
meted the supreme penalty of death, it must be established with certainty that LIZETTE was
below 7 years old at the time of the commission of the crime.
In view of the uncertainty of LIZETTE’s exact age, corroborative evidence such as her birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other authentic document should be introduced in
evidence in order that the qualifying circumstance of below seven (7) years old is appreciated
against the appellant. The lack of objection on the part of the defense as to her age did not
excuse the prosecution from discharging its burden. Such being the case, PRUNA cannot be
convicted of qualified rape, and hence the death penalty cannot be imposed on him.
Nevertheless, the testimony of LIZETTE’s mother that she was 3 years old at the time of
the commission of the crime is sufficient for purposes of holding PRUNA liable for statutory rape
or rape of a girl below 12 years of age under Article 335 of RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 7659
punishable by reclusion perpetua. Thus, the penalty to be imposed on PRUNA should be reclusion
perpetua, and not death penalty.
Hence, the decision of the RTC, in Criminal Case is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification
that accused Manuel Pruna y Ramirez or Erman Pruna y Ramirez is held guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of statutory rape, and not qualified rape, and is sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and
to pay the victim as moral damages in addition to the indemnity of P50,000.