LSE SRM MSC Dissertation Titelman

“Money can´t buy me love”: Class and descriptive
representation in the Chilean presidential elections
CANDIDATE NUMBER: 82742

WORD COUNT (without graphs and tables): 9860
MSC SOCIAL RESEARCH METHODS 2017-2018
METHODOLOGY INSTITUTE
SUPERVISOR: DR. BENJAMIN LAUDERDALE
10 AUGUST 2018
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Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge the great support that I received preparing this dissertation.
First, to the Becas Chile programme of the Chilean government, for the funding of this
academic project. To have received this funding from a country which faces such urgent and
devastating needs, like ours, is a privilege and an honor. I will take with me the responsibility
this implies for the rest of my professional life.
Second, I wanted to acknowledge my family for their never-ending support and especially my
wife, Scarlett, who came with me to the other side of the world, to spend our first months as a
married couple under the cloudy skies of London.
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Abstract
Chile has presented falling levels of support for its political representatives. At the same time,
there is growing evidence of deficits in the descriptive representation of various social groups.
In this research, electoral data and data from several surveys are used to study the way these
two aspects are connected. First, data gathered by the United Nations’ Program for
Development is used to characterise the perception of misrepresentation and analyse the levels
of this perception in different social groups of the Chilean population. Second, the descriptive
characteristics of all the candidates of the Chilean presidential elections, since the end of the
dictatorship in 1989, are coded and this information is combined with the historical electoral
results. Finally, five opinion polls implemented by the Chilean NGO, Centro de Estudios
Publicos, are analysed. For the 2013 and 2017 presidential elections, an analysis is made
regarding the association between respondents and candidates sharing descriptive
characteristics and the voting preferences and opinions the respondents hold on the candidates.
The relevance of descriptive representation is further analysed by implementing a meta-
analysis for these two elections and the 1993, 1999, and 2005 presidential elections, focusing
on the association between sharing descriptive characteristics and the opinion held on
candidates.
Regarding class representation, evidence is found which is consistent with the descriptive
representation theoretical framework. According to the findings, respondents from lower
classes tend to have a stronger perception of misrepresentation by authorities. At the same time,
under some forms of measuring class membership and model assumptions, class distance,
between respondents and presidential candidates, is associated with a more negative opinion
of candidates.
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The findings are not consistent with descriptive representation theory when observing other
characteristics such as gender and geographical origins, or when observing electoral behaviour.
Thus, the findings reinforce the importance of class representation when compared to more
frequently studied descriptive aspects such as gender. Additionally, they suggest that there are
potential benefits from policies aimed at correcting the paradox of class being associated with
public opinion on candidates, but not with voting behaviour.
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Contents list
Abstract ............................................................................................................................. 3
Contents list ....................................................................................................................... 5
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................... 6
2. Background and literature review .............................................................................. 9
2.1. Meaningful Descriptive Characteristics ....................................................................... 11
2.1.1. Class (Social-Economic) ............................................................................................................. 12
2.1.2. Age ............................................................................................................................................ 17
2.1.3. Gender ...................................................................................................................................... 18
2.1.4. Spatial differences (centre-periphery) ....................................................................................... 18
2.1.5. Ethnicity, race, and cultural origin ............................................................................................. 19
3. Data and Methods ................................................................................................... 21

3.1. Preliminary analysis ................................................................................................................... 21
3.2. Main analysis: Elites, elections and relationship between elites and non-elites ......................... 24
4. Results ..................................................................................................................... 29
4.1. Preliminary analysis ................................................................................................................... 29
4.2. Main analysis: Elites, elections and relationship between elites and non-elites ......................... 40
5. Discussion and conclusion ........................................................................................ 74
5.1. Academic discussion .................................................................................................................. 74
5.2. Policy discussion ........................................................................................................................ 76
5.3. Conclusions and challenges for further research ....................................................................... 76
References ....................................................................................................................... 78
Appendix: Electoral results in presidential elections (since 1989) ...................................... 81
Appendix: Coding categories ............................................................................................ 83
Appendix: Coding of presidential candidates.................................................................... 84
Appendix: Dictionary for variables ................................................................................... 90
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1. Introduction
In 2017, the United Nation`s Development Program (PNUD is its Spanish acronym),
released a book called "Unequals". In this book, the PNUD presented an historical account
of the multidimensional facets of inequality in Chile. There are two elements in this text,
which are crucial in explaining the motivation for the present research: First, the critical
exclusion of important social groups from the Chilean polity. Chilean politicians shared
among themselves several traits which differentiated them from the general population. As
Pitkin (1972) famously asserted, in the “descriptive representation” perspective, the
representative represents a group in so much as it shares descriptive characteristics with
that group. Thus, under such perspective, if politicians were significantly different from the
general population they were failing to represent their constituencies. Second, the PNUD
approach and findings implied the revitalisation of the category of class as essential in the
analysis of exclusion and political representation, alongside the more studied aspects of
gender and ethnicity.
Additionally, the analysis of political representation has become especially relevant in the
context of falling levels of support and trust that politicians and candidates are facing in
Chile (e.g. CERC-MORI, 2016).
In the background of the above-mentioned aspects the present research seeks to bring forth
and investigate new elements relevant to the debate.
On the one hand, whether the deficits in descriptive representation explain the falling levels
of support for Chilean politicians and candidates is still to be proven. Specifically, in the
case of presidential candidates: is (the lack of) descriptive representation of Chilean
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presidential candidates associated with (less) favourable opinions towards those
politicians?
On the other hand, if the answer to the first question is affirmative, why are Chilean
representatives significantly different from the population? There seem to be at least two
possible explanations. The first one is a "supply-side" explanation. An extreme version of
this explanation is that Chileans do not vote for candidates that are more like them in
descriptive characteristics, simply because those candidates do not appear on the voting
ballot. A softer version of this explanation is that candidates with elite characteristics have
more access to relevant resources (economic, political, or of other nature). A second
explanation, from the "demand side", suggests a slightly more complex causal mechanism.
Even if voters have a more positive view of candidates who are more similar to them, it is
possible that this does not translate into their voting behaviour. This apparent paradox may
be the result of the electorate deciding its votes based on other factors, such as substantive
representation, or because in real elections voters have incomplete information and
candidates may influence perceptions, hiding or emphasising their descriptive attributes.
The present research brings suggestive evidence to contribute to the solution of some
aspects of these puzzles.
This document is structured in the following way: Chapter two, explains the main
conceptual background in the literature that surrounds the debate, including descriptive
representation theory and elite theory. From this literature review, “meaningful” descriptive
characteristics will be derived, for the Chilean context, including class.
Chapter three will describe the origins of the data, including the way the meaningful
descriptive characteristics were operationalised employing the available data. This chapter
will also describe the regression forms, explanatory variables, outcome variables, control
variables, and other relevant specifications for the analysis.
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Chapter four will present the results of the described analysis in two subchapters:
preliminary analysis and main analysis. The preliminary analysis will set the ground for the
elements of the main analysis. Firstly, data obtained by a survey undertaken by the PNUD
(2017) on the perception of the population regarding representativeness is analysed,
assessing correlations with the population's meaningful descriptive characteristics.
Secondly, the presidential candidates for the seven Chilean presidential elections, since the
return of the democratic rule, were coded using the meaningful characteristics. This
analysis will allow to show the restrictions on the options which Chileans face and how
they relate to electoral results. The main analysis will consist of analysing, through the
survey data of Centro de Estudios Públicos (a Chilean NGO), the 2013 and 2017
presidential elections individually, followed by a meta-analysis of five out of the seven
elections undertaken in Chile, since the end of the dictatorship.
Finally, chapter 5 will present academic and policy discussions emerging from the research
findings and will summarise the main conclusions and avenues for further research.
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2. Background and literature review
Following the end of Pinochet’s dictatorship, in 1989, there have been seven Chilean
presidential elections. A simple majority rule in two rounds defines the winner of these
elections: If none of the candidates obtains more than 50% in the first round, the candidates
with the two highest majorities pass to a second round of elections (PNUD, 2014). Until 2010,
the ruling coalition was the “Concertacion”, a centre-left coalition. In 2010, President Sebastian
Piñera was elected, backed by a centre-right coalition (PNUD, 2014). The next period (2014-
2018) saw the return of Michelle Bachelet (who was in office during the 2006-2010 period),
as the elected candidate of another centre-left coalition. Finally, in the recent 2017 elections,
Piñera was re-elected, returning into power, backed by a new centre-right coalition (a detailed
account of electoral results in Table 25).
Chile has shown declining levels of electoral participation. In the period between 1990 and
2016, Chilean electoral participation has fallen more than 35 points, down to only 50.9%, one
of the sharpest falls in the world (PNUD, 2016). Together with this falling electoral
participation, there has been an important increment in the reported mistrust towards politics,
which grew from 33%, in 1993, to 44%, in 2016 (CERC-MORI, 2016). In line with this trend,
in 1993, when asked for their opinion on the presidential candidates of that period’s elections,
the candidates obtained an average of 31.4% positive mentions. For 2017 the same proportion
was only 25.6%. Even more noticeably, the best-evaluated candidate in 1993, achieved 74.5%
of positive opinions. In 2017, none of the candidates achieved more than 40% of positive
opinions (CEP, 1993; CEP, 2017).
The falling levels of participation and support for presidential candidates have been
accompanied by the perception that politicians have relevant descriptive differences with the
general population (PNUD, 2017). This perception is coherent with deficits in the presence of
certain characteristics of officials in both the Chilean legislature and executive power (PNUD,
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2014; PNUD, 2017). Furthermore, the PNUD (2017) asserts that in Chile there are significant
differences in the real capacity of different groups to exercise their citizenship rights, which
violates the democratic principle of equality. This fact brings a distortion in the way society is
represented in the formal spaces of deliberations and decision making (such as the legislative
and executive) and the characteristics of those who participate in those spaces.
This assertion converges with both Pitkin´s (1972) theoretical perspective of descriptive
representation and the discussions on elite theory (e.g. Mosca, 1939; Pareto, 1935; Michels,
1962). On the one hand, in the descriptive representation perspective, the representative
represents a group in so much as it shares descriptive characteristics with that group: to
represent is to be something similar to the represented group. On the other hand, the elite theory
perspectives may be summarised in Mosca's (1939) assertion that "In all societies…two classes
of people appear—a class that rules and a class that is ruled. The first class, always the less
numerous, performs all political functions, monopolizes power and enjoys the advantages that
power brings…" (p.50). While elite perspective means that the people ruling a country are
inherently different from the majority of the population, descriptive representation postulates
that these differences in the characteristics of the “ruling class” necessarily bring incomplete
representation. The combination of these two perspectives presents one of the main
complexities of the relationship between political elites and the non-elite members of the
population, which is the focus of the present research.
Discussions on descriptive representation have produced three main lines of research: i) the
relation between the presence of descriptive characteristics in public officials and the tendency
to behave in favour of the interests of groups who share those characteristics (e.g. Bratton &
Ray, 2002; Chattopadhyay & Duflo, 2004; Clots-Figueras, 2011; Celis, 2012; Krook et al.,
2014; McEvoy, 2016); ii) the relationship between descriptive representation of candidates and
voting preferences of the population (e.g. Dolan, 2004; Sanbonmatsu, 2002; Matson & Fine,
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2006; Trent et al., 2010; Campbell & Cowley, 2014a; Carnes & Lupu, 2016), and iii) the
relationship between descriptive representation and trust and satisfaction with public officials
and elected representatives (e.g. Bobo and Gilliam, 1990; Howell and Fagan, 1988;
Mansbridge, 1999 Gay, 2002; Pantoja & Segura, 2003; Ulbig, 2007; Atkeson & Carillo, 2007).
This literature has confirmed the existence, in several contexts, of relevant links between the
descriptive characteristics of candidates and voting preferences and, central to this research, a
tendency for members of social groups to trust elected representatives with similar
characteristics. As Schmidt & Miles (2017) assert: “people from social groups are more trusting
of elected officials from their own social groups…" (p. 187). This tendency to trust similar
representatives may explain why the distorted representation of society, in which elites are
overrepresented in governments, may bring the mistrust of the population.
2.1. Meaningful Descriptive Characteristics
If descriptive representation is relevant, this is materialised in specific descriptive
characteristics. Defining those specific traits, to analyse elites and the way non-elites perceive
them, is not trivial. Behind this definition, there is an underlying assumption that having power
in a sphere of society is related to having power in the political sphere. This assumption is the
"agglutinative hypothesis", which states that: "[f]orms of power and influence are
agglutinative: Those with some form tend to acquire other forms also" (Lasswell and Kaplan,
1950, p.57). Therefore, to define meaningful descriptive characteristics is to define spheres of
power which are connected to political power.
The above-mentioned literature on the relationship between descriptive representation, voting
preferences, and trust and support is focused around a vast variety of characteristics including
gender, ethnicity, age, place of residence, education, prior occupation, and class. For this
research, relevant descriptive characteristics will be chosen based on the above-mentioned
literature review. One aspect is of particular interest to this study: social class.
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As the PNUD (2017) explains, social class is one of the aspects with the highest descriptive
representation deficiency in most democracies, yet it has not been as widely studied in this
context, as other categories have (e.g. gender and ethnicity) (p.380). The relative lack of
research in the relevance of social class, when analysing the impact of descriptive
representation, comes from a strong consensus in the academic debates originated in the late
seventies (Carnes and Lupu, 2015, p.4). The consensus can be summarised in Putnam (1976)
assertion that even though: "the assumption of a correlation between attitude and social origin
lies behind most studies of the social backgrounds of elites...most of the available evidence
tends to disconfirm this assumption" (in Carnes and Lupu, 2015, p.4). However, this assertion
has become increasingly challenged. As Carnes (2013) explains for the case of the USA: "a
person's class is one of the best predictors of a variety of behaviours…we may not like talking
about class, but it permeates just about everything we do…Including holding public office"
(p.4)
The following subchapters explain how these categories will be operationalised in the context
of the Chilean society.
2.1.1. Class (Social-Economic)
When asked about the main reasons for mistreatment in the Chilean society, the PNUD (2017)
found the following are the most commonly mentioned aspects:
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Figure 1: Perceived reasons for being mistreated1
Being a man 9
Ethnic, racial or cultural background 10
Educational level 23
Age 26
Work or Occupation 26
Other reason 27
Place where one lives 28
Being a woman 41
Social Class 43
0 10 20 30 40 50
Source: Modified from PNUD (2017)
As canbe seen in the graph, social class stands out as the main reason for such mistreatment.
Additionally, the qualitative research undertaken by the PNUD (2017), suggests that class may
be a particularly relevant characteristic in the issue of misrepresentation in Chile. Their
qualitative findings can be summarised with the following three conclusions (p. 387-388):
• People consider that the political leadership is isolated in its functions and that it does
not account for its action.
• People believe that this group (the political leaders) have a different socioeconomic
composition than the general population.
• Because of their socioeconomic differences, the political leadership does not
experience the same lifestyle that lay people do.
1
The percentages were calculated for the 41% of respondents who declared having experienced mistreatments. Respondent
could choose more than one alternative.
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Class seems to be in the centre of Chilean social life and mediates several of the interaction in
it. Defining "class" and operationalising such a definition to categorise the Chilean population
is a complex issue, which may be undertaken in several different ways. This research will
mainly rely on a categorisation based on consumption patterns (and indirectly income levels).
However, a complex category like this one has many different dimensions which will be
relevant. Following the PNUD’s (2017) classification, two other elements will be considered:
education and occupation. As expected, all of these elements are strongly correlated and put
together provide a more exhaustive understanding of the multiple implications of class. The
following table summarises some of these relevant relations in the Chilean context:
Table 1: Social Classes in Chile
Social Class Occupations Education Salary (per capita % of

(Average median in Chilean population
years) pesos)
Lower Class Unqualified manual 8,8 250.000 25,8
work, secondary
and service sector.
Manual work in the
primary sector
Middle Lower Qualified waged 11,2 376.048 50,7
Class labour and semi-
qualified in
extractive
agroindustry and
secondary sector.
Non-manual waged
labour in the
services sector and
small enterprise
owners
Middle Class Higher level 15 660.000 12,9
technicians, school
teachers low
ranking
professionals,
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micro-businesses
owners
Higher Middle Professionals, 17,2 1.400.000 10,6
Class and managers, and
Higher Class directives in large
public and private
firms
Source: PNUD (2017), with data from Casen (2015)
a. Consumption patterns
As the PNUD (2017, p.71) explains, a well-established nomenclature for social classes in Chile
comes from the marketing industry. Following the European Society for Opinion and
Marketing Research (ESOMAR), since the 1980s, the Chilean population has been classified
through a methodology adapted to the Chilean context by the Asociacion de Investigadores de
Mercado (AIM). This methodology divides the population according to five categories (ABC1,
C2, C3, D, and E). Each household is given a score, according to their ownership of certain
goods –which determines their consumption capacity— (such as refrigerator, car, and
dishwasher, among others) and the level of education of the head of the household. The lowest
10% is assigned to the E category, the following 35% is assigned to the D category, the
following 25% is assigned to the C3 category, and the following 20% is assigned to the C2
category. Finally, the highest category, ABC1, is given to the top 10% of the score (PNUD,
2017, p.71).
A positive aspect of using this classification is that, as the PNUD (2017, p.71) explains, the
classification has become so pervasive in Chilean society, that the category "ABC1" is even
used in everyday speech to refer to people from higher social-economic level.
b. Occupation
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Social class definition varies across the literature. However, most definitions are based on
occupational differences (Hout, 2008). Additionally, research has shown significant relevance
of the descriptive representation of occupation in voters’ preferences (e.g. Campbell and
Cowley, 2014a).
In the Chilean context, a subgroup of traditionally high-class occupations is especially relevant.
Following research conducted by Seminarium (Capital, 2014), the PNUD (2017) found that
80% of leadership positions in major firms, operating in Chile, employ people who studied
Commercial Engineering (Economics and Business Administration), Civil Engineering, and
Law. Following the PNUD classification, these three professions will be considered "elite"
characteristics. Together with these elite occupations, the PNUD (2017) describes "medicine"
as one of the best-remunerated professions, and, together with the mentioned three occupations,
includes it as a "prestige" occupations (p.34). For the purposes of the present research al four
professions will be considered elite occupations.
c. Education
High school education and higher education are two particularly informative elements in
determining the socioeconomic origins of the Chilean population and their expected future
incomes (PNUD, 2017, pp. 381-382). As Valenzuela et al. (2014) state, the Chilean schooling
system is considered one of the most extreme cases of socioeconomic status (SES) segregation:
“while low-SES students tend to attend public schools, middle-SES students tend to attend
voucher private schools, and high-SES students tend to attend non-subsidized private schools”
(p. 221). Within this highly segmented context, the PNUD (2017, p.382), elaborated a list of
16 schools, according to the frequencies in which they have been mentioned in prior researches,
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as “elite schools”2 . As expected, the vast majority of them (14) are private non-subsidized
schools, and only two are (highly selective) public schools.
Similarly, having a higher education is also a very informative element in Chilean inequalities.
By 2011, only 28% of the students from the poorest decile accessed higher education. In
contrast, for the highest decile, this proportion was 91% (Espinoza & Gonzalez, 2015).
Accessing higher education and the specific higher institution that accessed are good predictors
of work trajectories and the occupational status of Chileans (PNUD, 2017). A first important
distinction is between universities and other technical higher education institutions (known as
Institutos Profesionales and Centros de Formación Técnica). For example, by 2009, the
average student in technical higher education institutions was at least one decile lower in its
income level compared to the average university student (Orellana, 2011).
Within university education, a subgroup of two institutions is especially linked with higher
class and elite status: Pontificia Universidad Catolica and Universidad de Chile. An example
of this is the fact that 70% of the professionals, in 80% of the leadership positions in major
firms operating in Chile, obtained their degrees in those two institutions (Capital, 2014 in
PNUD, 2017). Following the PNUD classification, these two institutions will be considered
“elite” institutions.
2.1.2. Age
There are important differences in the average age of politicians in office and the general
population. Between 1990 and 2016, the median age, for Chileans over 18, was 42 years
2
The list corresponds to most frequently named schools in Seminarium (2003), Capital (2014), Thumala
(2007), Madrid (2016) and Zimmerman (2015). The schools are: Alianza Francesa, Colegio Alemán de Santiago, Liceo Alemán
de Santiago, Cordillera, Craighouse, Saint George’s College, San Ignacio El Bosque, Tabancura, Verbo Divino, Instituto Luis
Campino, Sagrados Corazones de Manquehue, Santiago College, Scuola Italiana, The Grange School, San Benito, Newland, Instituto
Nacional and Liceo José Victorino Lastarria
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(PNUD, 2017). For that same period, the median for political authorities (both in the legislative
and executive power) was 51 years.
2.1.3. Gender
For the period between 1990 and 2016, the average participation of male individuals in the
population was 49%. For that same period, the average of male political authorities (both in
the legislative and executive power) was 76.9% (PNUD, 2017).
2.1.4. Spatial differences (centre-periphery)
Chile has shown a particularly extreme version of the tendency to inequalities in the territorial
distribution of wealth (Veyl, 2015) For example, all the elite schools and universities
mentioned before are in the Metropolitan Region3, where the capital, Santiago, is located. As
Aroca and Atienza (2016) explain: “Chile stands as a classic instance of spatial inequality and
persistence of concentration despite economic growth and development…” (p. 239)
This concentration is most dramatically noticeable in the growing participation of the
percentage of the population that lives in the Metropolitan Region, which surpasses 40% (see
Figure 2).
3
Chile is divided administratively into 15 regions.
18
Figure 2: Concentration of total population in the Metropolitan Region (1865-2009)
Source: Aroca & Atienza (2016, p.241) based on Chilean Census and CASEN (2009) and (2015)
This economic and demographic differences also have social and political expressions. Since
the XIX Century, the Chilean political system has shown an extreme concentration of power
in the “centre” (where the Metropolitan Region and Santiago are located) of the country (Ortiz
& Valenzuela, 2013). This concentration of power has been disputed by the other regions on
several occasions (Ortiz & Valenzuela, 2013).
2.1.5. Ethnicity, race, and cultural origin
According to the 2012 census, the Mapuche population consists of 1.842.607 inhabitants and
11.1% of the total Chilean population (Castillo, 2016). There is evidence that this element is
an essential descriptive characteristic. On the one hand, it has been shown that voters with
Mapuche background tend to vote for Mapuche candidates (Maureira, S. T., & Jaramillo-Brun,
2014). On the other hand, the PNUD (2017) has shown the lack of individuals with “prestige
professions” in this group.
An example of the lack of descriptive representation of this groups is that until 2017 there was
no Mapuche MPs and in the period between 1992 and 2016, less than 4, 5% of the candidates
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to local elections were Mapuche (PNUD, 2017, p.380). Furthermore, central to this research,
there has not been any Mapuche presidential candidate since the return of democracy.
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3. Data and Methods
This chapter presents the data and methods. One central element of the method of analysis is
the coding in meaningful categories. The way these categories were operationalised depended
on the conceptual background, the Chilean context and the available information. A summary
of all the employed categories is presented in Table 26 of the appendix.
3.1. Preliminary analysis
3.1.1. Descriptive characteristics and the perceived misrepresentation
For this part of the analysis, the data came from a survey undertaken by the PNUD (2017). This
face-to-face survey had a nation-wide sample population of Chileans, aged over 18, stratified
by region, gender, and socio-economic level. The sample size consisted of 2.613 individuals4.
The respondents were coded in the following categories5:
1. Education level (less than high school/high school/higher technical
education/university).
2. Occupation (elite-prestige occupations/non-elite-prestige occupations).
3. Geographical differences (Metropolitan Region/non-Metropolitan Region).
4. Gender (male/female).
5. Ethnicity (non-Mapuche/ Mapuche).
6. Age.
4
All the analyses were done taking into account the design effect
5
For this analysis, the respondents were only categorised in terms of the education level (and not the typology of elite/non-
elite educational institutions). Additionally, “elite occupations” category for respondents was broader than that employed to
categorise the candidates, as it included high-level military officials and other high-level professions.
21
Education and occupation were used as alternative measurements of class. For this, an index
was constructed in which, a respondent with less education than high school would obtain a
score of 0, one with only high school education would obtain a score of 1, one with higher
technical education a score of 2, and one with a university education, a score of 3. Additionally,
if the respondent had an elite occupation, one more unit was added to the respondent´s elite
index (therefore, the index levels went from 0 to 4). Similarly, the index constructed through
consumption patterns was translated into five levels from 0 to 4 (E, D, C3, C2, and ABC1).
The analysis consisted in observing the associations6 between the descriptive characteristics of
the respondents with the answer given to four questions on the representativeness of authorities.
The four measured questions asked about the representativeness of authorities in the following
matters:
i) Whether the authorities care about “people like us”.
ii) Whether the authorities care about the electors.
iii) Whether the authorities would do something if there were a “serious problem in my
neighbourhood”.
iv) Whether the authorities are mainly interested in what business owners want.
The responses consisted of five levels from “definitely disagree” to “definitely agree”.
Additionally, the association of these characteristics with having voted in the presidential
elections (the 2013 election) was analysed (the answers were formulated in a simple yes/no
option).
The regression form for the analysis was ordinal logistic for the first four questions and logistic
(binary) for the voting question, with the following specifications:
(1) 𝑌1 = 𝛼 + 𝑧𝛾 + 𝑑𝜋 + 𝑡𝛿
6
The associations were studied while controlling for ideological tendencies (regarding left-right affiliation)
22
(2) 𝑌2 = 𝛼 + 𝑧𝛾 + 𝑐𝜎 + 𝑡𝛿
(3) 𝑌3 = 𝛼 + 𝑘µ + 𝑡𝛿
Where:
1. 𝑌1 ,𝑌2 and 𝑌3 are vectors of responses to the outcome questions.
2. 𝑘 is a matrix of all the explanatory variables (characteristics of the respondents).
3. 𝑧 is a matrix of the explanatory variables (characteristics of the respondents) excluding
education and occupation.
4. 𝑑 is the vector of values of the descriptive index of class (based on occupation and
education).
5. 𝑐 is the vector of values of the consumption index of class (based on consumption patterns).
6. t is a vector of the political affiliation of the respondent (used as a control variable).
Additionally, as a way of confirming the validity of the class indexes, the association between
the consumption pattern index and the other aspects of the respondents was analysed.
3.1.2. Descriptive statistics on elections and the supply side coding
The 40 presidential candidates of the seven elections undertaken since the return of democracy
(for more information on each election see Table 25), were codified in “meaningful” categories.
To classify the candidates, the characteristics used were:
1. Education level (high school/higher technical education/university).
2. High school typology (in terms of private (non-subsidized)7/public and elite/non-elite).
3. Higher education typology (elite institution/non-elite institution).
4. Occupation (elite-prestige occupations/non-elite-prestige occupations).
7
There were no candidates from private subsidised schools
23
5. Geographical differences (Metropolitan Region/non-Metropolitan Region).
6. Gender (male/female).
7. Ethnicity (non-Mapuche/ Mapuche).
8. Age.
This classification allowed for a supply-side analysis of all the Chilean candidates, which was
crossed with the electoral results of these candidates, from the official Chilean electoral office
(SERVEL).
For this codification, the data for the candidates came from public information available in
public statements required by Chilean transparency laws, the Chilean Congress’s Library,
newspapers and public information disclosed during the campaigns. The results of this coding
process are presented in Table 27 in the appendix.
3.2. Main analysis: Elites, elections and relationship between elites and non-elites
For this part of the analysis, the data came from a survey undertaken by a Chilean NGO called,
Centro de Estudios Publicos. This survey, which has gathered opinion polls since the end of
the dictatorship, "…has acquired an uncontested national legitimacy" (Navia, 2003) in the
Chilean political debates. The survey´s sample size has fluctuated at around 1500 elements,
and its sample population is nation-wide Chileans, over the age of 18. It is stratified by gender,
socio-economic level, regions and smaller administrative units (provinces and communes). The
survey is implemented in a face-to-face8 modality.
The respondents of the CEP surveys for the 2017 and 2013 elections were codified following
the same categories as the ones from the PNUD survey.
8
All the analyses were done taking into account the design effect
24
Once the data set was modified to include the coded descriptive characteristics, the following
descriptive representation variables were created9:
1. In the case of age, a new variable resulting from the difference (in absolute terms)
between the age of the respondent and the politician.
2. In the case of discrete variables, a new dummy variable which has the value of one
when the characteristics match between the respondent and the candidate.
To test the validity of the class index, through consumption patterns, the correlations between
this measure and all other characteristics were analysed, in the same way as with the PNUD
data, for the 2013 and 2017 elections. As expected, both education and occupation are
significantly associated with this index. However, for 2017, ethnicity is associated with the
index, even when controlling for education and occupation. The same happens with age and
being from the Metropolitan Region for the 2013 elections. It is not possible to distinguish
whether this is an actual association between class and those attributes, which goes beyond
education and occupation, or if it is a problem with the validity of the index. The full regression
is presented at the end of the respective chapters.
The class index, through education and occupation, for respondents was constructed in the
same way as for the respondents of the PNUD (2017) survey. For the candidates, the class
index was constructed by adding the value of the dummies of education (one dummy that
equals one if the candidate studied in private school, another dummy that equals one if the
candidate studied in an elite school, another dummy that equals one if the candidate studied in
an elite university and, finally, another dummy that equals one if the candidate has an elite
occupation). This meant that, as the class index for respondents, the candidates were
9
Since all of the candidates finished high school and only candidates with less than 1% of votes did not finish university, the
level of education was not used as a matching characteristic but was only used to measure class in the respective class index
for the respondents. Similarly, as all of the candidates were non-Mapuche, a matching dummy was not created, and the
ethnicity of the respondents was only used as a control variable.
25
categorised into five groups, from 0 to 4. The distribution of the candidates in this index can
be viewed in Table 28 in the appendix.
The regressions for the analyses are ordinal logistic regressions for the evaluation of politicians
and multinomial logistic for the voting preferences. When analysing the voting preferences,
candidates with less than 5% of the votes were omitted (the analysis was done initially with all
candidates, with no difference in results). For opinion regressions, all candidates were included
(all respondents were asked to evaluate all candidates). The following are the models’
specifications:
(1) 𝑌3 = 𝛼 + 𝑥𝛽 + 𝑞𝜀
(2) 𝑌4 = 𝛼 + 𝑝𝛾 + 𝑑𝜋 + 𝑞𝜀
(3) 𝑌5 = 𝛼 + 𝑝𝛾 + 𝑐𝜎 + 𝑞𝜀
(4) 𝑌6 = 𝛼 + 𝑥𝛽 + 𝑤𝛾 + 𝑞𝜀 + 𝑤𝛾
(5) 𝑌7 = 𝛼 + 𝑝𝛾 + 𝑑𝜋 + 𝑞𝜀 + 𝑤𝛾
(6) 𝑌8 = 𝛼 + 𝑝𝛾 + 𝑐𝜎 + 𝑞𝜀 + 𝑤𝛾
Where:
1. 𝑌3 , 𝑌4 , 𝑌5 are vectors of the expressed voting preferences (categorical variable).
2. 𝑌6 ,𝑌7 𝑌8 are vectors of the evaluation given to politicians (ordinal variable).
3. 𝑥 is the matrix of all variables for matching characteristics (and age difference).
4. 𝑞 is the matrix of control variables (characteristics of the respondents and political
affiliation matching).
5. 𝑐 is the difference between the class indexes of respondents and candidates when
respondents’ class index is measured through consumption patterns.
6. d is the difference between the class indexes of respondents and candidates when
respondents class index is measured through occupation and education.
26
7. p is the matrix of all variables for matching characteristics which are not class related
8. w is a fix effect matrix of every candidate.
Control variables consisted of the respondents’ characteristics in terms of age, years of
education (when this was not incorporated in the respective index), ideology (in terms of right-
left). 10, and ethnic background. Additionally, for the opinion outcomes, a fixed effect variable
for each candidate was incorporated11, as well as controlling for the stated voting preference.
Another important control variable was an ideological distance variable. The candidates were
classified in terms of a right-left scale (following their public definitions, those of their coalition
or party, or according to the perceived political position of the candidates, as presented in one
of the survey’s questions). A “substantive distance” variable was thus created, to control for
this association. This means that the association measured in the explanatory variable can be
understood as the “marginal descriptive association”. This association can then be seen as
either reinforcing the substantive tendency or pushing to defect the political ideology.
The outcome variables were the voting preferences and evaluation given to the candidates.
The opinion consisted in evaluating a list of politicians, including the presidential candidates,
in five possible levels, from “very negative” to “very positive”.
3.2.1. Meta-analysis
A final analysis consisted of implementing a meta-analysis including the data of the CEP
surveys for the elections of 1993, 1999, and 2005. The meta-analysis was conducted on the
10
In the Chilean case, this is a better measure than party affiliation, as less than 30% of the respondents have any affiliation
to any party, compared to almost 50% that has an ideological affiliation in the right-left scale.
11
A fix effect per respondent was also incorporated as an alternative model. The outcomes of this model are
omitted from the presentation. However, details of any significant change when incorporating these variables
are given in footnotes.
27
association between class difference, measured through the consumption pattern index, and
the opinion on the candidates. For this analysis, both “fixed effect” and “random effect”
approaches were employed.
28
4. Results
This chapter presents the results of the analyses. For clarity purposes, intercepts and control
variables are omitted in the tables presented in the analysis12. The full regressions are shown
in the tables at the end of every subchapter. The variables are defined in the variable
dictionary available in Table 29 of the appendix.
4.1. Preliminary analysis
4.1.1. Descriptive characteristics and perceived misrepresentation
A first analysis is to corroborate that both the approach based on education and occupation and
the approach based on consumption patterns are measuring the same underlying characteristic:
class (intercept omitted for presentation).
Table 2: Validity of class index PNUD data
Class_Index_C
University 1.334 1.266
(5.60)** (5.09)**
Higher_Tec 1.674 1.685
(7.34)** (6.99)**
School 2.154 2.110
(12.08)** (11.48)**
Occupation 1.679 1.717
(8.55)** (8.72)**
Age -0.003
(0.67)
Man 0.069
(0.51)
MR 0.115
(0.81)
Non_Native 0.395
12
In parentesis, under the point estimates, are the respective statistics` values
29
(1.70)
N 2,583 2,504
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
The regression shows that education levels and occupation are significantly correlated with
consumption pattern index. Additionally, when controlling for education and occupation, none
of the other descriptive characteristics is significantly associated with the consumption index.
This relationship suggests that both indexes for class measure the same underlying concept,
and that other descriptive characteristics do not explain this concept. Given this confirmation,
the associations with the descriptive characteristic of class were measured in the two ways.
When running the regression between the survey questions and the descriptive characteristics
of the respondents (details of regressions are at the end of this subchapter) the following results
are found:
• Only age is associated with having voted.
• Being from the Metropolitan Region significantly increases the odds of having a better
perception of the representativeness of authorities with electors.
• Being of a higher class (measured in both ways) is associated with a higher belief that
the authorities will do something if there is a problem in the respondent´s
neighbourhood (a similar finding appears with age, but it is not robust to different
measurements of class).
• None of the descriptive characteristics is significantly associated with the belief that
political leaders are mainly concerned with business owners.
However, the most relevant finding for this research question is summarised in the following
table:
30
Table 3: perception of misrepresentation
People (1) (2) (3)

Like
Us
Non_Native 0.226 0.112 0.180
(0.47) (0.23) (0.37)
MR -0.109 -0.004 -0.014
(0.52) (0.02) (0.07)
Man -0.041 -0.002 0.027
(0.22) (0.01) (0.14)
Age 0.019 0.019 0.022
(2.91)** (3.02)** (3.24)**
Class_Index_C 0.247
(2.67)**
Class_Index_De 0.227
(2.91)**
University 0.085
(0.25)
Higher_Tec 0.006
(0.02)
School 0.582
(2.23)*
Occupation 0.321
(1.28)
N 895 890 890
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Class is found to be significant at the 1% level for the question of whether political leaders care
about "people like us" (as well as age). This finding is robust to both ways of measuring class.
This is consistent with the predictions that descriptive representation theory would suggest,
given that people of lower socioeconomic level are underrepresented in the polity. However,
even though other groups are strongly underrepresented, the same significant association is not
found for the other studied characteristics.
Summarizing, from this preliminary analysis two main conclusions are derived:
• The class indexes in both definitions are related to each other and not to other
descriptive characteristics, which is evidence in favour of their reliability.
31
• Perceptions of misrepresentation are associated with class and age (people of lower
classes and younger people have a stronger perception misrepresentation). However
other descriptive characteristics do not seem to show this association.
32
Full Regressions
Table 4: Full "Voted in previous elections" regression
Voted (1) (2) (3)

Non_Native -0.908 -0.971 -1.024
(1.64) (1.73) (1.82)
MR 0.546 0.580 0.626
(1.79) (1.89) (2.06)*
Man 0.047 0.126 0.004
(0.18) (0.47) (0.01)
Age 0.049 0.052 0.045
(5.03)** (5.25)** (4.61)**
Class_Index_C 0.104
(0.80)
2.Ideology 0.595 0.383 0.648
(1.21) (0.84) (1.25)
3.Ideology -0.325 -0.234 -0.198
(0.94) (0.67) (0.56)
4.Ideology 0.044 0.076 0.049
(0.08) (0.14) (0.09)
5.Ideology 0.069 0.108 0.061
(0.19) (0.29) (0.16)
(1.07)
University -0.633
(1.12)
Higher_Tec 1.064
(2.12)*
School -0.393
(1.04)
_cons -0.500 -0.472 0.172
(0.58) (0.63) (0.21)
N 904 898 904
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
33
Table 5: Full Perceived Representation 1
People Voters
Like Us
Non_Native 0.226 0.112 0.180 Non_Native -0.647 -0.654 -0.612
(0.47) (0.23) (0.37) (1.60) (1.56) (1.44)
MR -0.109 -0.004 -0.014 MR 0.589 0.704 0.695
(0.52) (0.02) (0.07) (2.89)** (3.45)** (3.42)**
Man -0.041 -0.002 0.027 Man -0.130 -0.101 -0.073
(0.22) (0.01) (0.14) (0.63) (0.48) (0.36)
Age 0.019 0.019 0.022 Age 0.001 0.000 0.004
(2.91)** (3.02)** (3.24)** (0.21) (0.05) (0.49)
Class_Index_C 0.247 Class_Index_C 0.183
(2.67)** (1.62)
2.Ideology 0.737 0.518 0.515 2.Ideology -0.435 -0.525 -0.529
(2.03)* (1.52) (1.47) (1.41) (1.69) (1.67)
(2.96)** (2.81)** (2.56)* (1.26) (1.35) (1.72)
4.Ideology 0.375 0.340 0.369 4.Ideology 0.044 -0.033 -0.033
(1.12) (1.05) (1.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09)
(1.02) (1.08) (1.01) (0.59) (0.66) (0.86)
cut1 _cons 1.299 0.773 1.089 cut1 _cons -1.697 -2.188 -1.799
(1.81) (1.30) (1.70) (2.20)* (3.46)** (2.58)*
cut2 _cons 3.241 2.738 3.063 cut2 _cons -0.160 -0.659 -0.240
(4.44)** (4.55)** (4.74)** (0.22) (1.12) (0.36)
cut3 _cons 4.212 3.674 4.003 cut3 _cons 0.513 -0.031 0.398
(5.86)** (6.10)** (6.23)** (0.71) (0.05) (0.60)
Class_Index_De 0.227 Class_Index_De 0.080
(2.91)** (0.80)
University 0.085 University 0.223
(0.25) (0.73)
Higher_Tec 0.006 Higher_Tec -0.386
(0.02) (1.43)
School 0.582 School 0.639
(2.23)* (1.89)
Occupation 0.321 Occupation -0.043
34
(1.28) (0.18)
cut4 _cons 6.269 5.712 6.044 cut4 _cons 1.962 1.420 1.857
(7.63)** (8.15)** (8.18)** (2.65)** (2.43)* (2.75)**
N 895 890 890 N 885 880 880
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Table 6: Full Perceived Representation 2
Business Owners My Neighbourhood

Non_Native -0.220 -0.296 -0.249 Non_Nativ -0.157 -0.256 -0.245
e
(0.52) (0.71) (0.59) (0.36) (0.58) (0.55)
MR -0.322 -0.260 -0.271 MR 0.258 0.323 0.322
(1.70) (1.36) (1.41) (1.31) (1.64) (1.65)
Man 0.001 0.046 0.062 Man -0.302 -0.272 -0.272
(0.00) (0.24) (0.33) (1.60) (1.43) (1.41)
Age 0.011 0.014 0.015 age 0.016 0.016 0.018
(1.87) (2.40)* (2.52)* (2.72)** (2.85)** (2.98)**
Class_Index_C 0.099 Class_Inde 0.399
x_C
(1.06) (4.27)**
2.Ideology 0.264 0.089 0.063 2.Ideology 0.515 0.374 0.419
(0.73) (0.26) (0.18) (1.31) (0.97) (1.06)
(2.51)* (2.54)* (2.31)* (0.65) (0.77) (0.55)
(1.06) (1.30) (1.32) (0.23) (0.46) (0.50)
5.Ideology -0.178 -0.087 -0.093 5.Ideology -0.206 -0.104 -0.167
(0.64) (0.31) (0.33) (0.77) (0.37) (0.59)
cut1 _cons 0.114 0.102 0.313 cut1 _cons 0.386 -0.319 -0.085
(0.16) (0.19) (0.51) (0.56) (0.53) (0.14)
cut2 _cons 2.040 2.080 2.298 cut2 _cons 2.289 1.601 1.854
(2.85)** (3.73)** (3.66)** (3.28)** (2.69)** (2.97)**
cut3 _cons 3.337 3.364 3.584 cut3 _cons 3.290 2.574 2.829
(4.80)** (6.03)** (5.75)** (4.67)** (4.23)** (4.47)**
Class_Index_De 0.140 Class_Inde 0.414
x_De
(1.73) (4.86)**
University 0.212 University 0.193
(0.61) (0.64)
Higher_Tec -0.187 Higher_Te 0.442
35
c
(0.56) (1.45)
School 0.377 School 0.796
(1.41) (2.94)**
Occupation 0.292 Occupatio 0.141
n
(1.30) (0.57)
cut4 _cons 4.934 4.898 5.118 cut4 _cons 4.929 4.222 4.473
(6.36)** (7.58)** (7.15)** (6.29)** (6.16)** (6.37)**
N 893 887 887 N 879 873 873
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
36
4.1.2. Descriptive statistics on elections and the supply side coding
The following graph summarises the distribution of the studied characteristics across all
candidates of the first round of the Chilean presidential elections.
Figure 3:Candidates' Descriptive Characteristics - All elections
120,0% 60
100,0% 53 50
100,0%
80,0% 40
82,5% 80,0%
77,5% 77,5%
60,0% 67,5% 70,0% 30
53,8% 52,5%
40,0% 47,5% 20
20,0% 10
0,0% 0
During the period between 1990 and 2016, the presence of these characteristics in the general
Chilean population was the following: 49% were males, 7,7% were educated in private (non-
subsidized) schools, and 17,7% were university educated (PNUD, 2017). Additionally,
according to the 2012 national census, approximately 89% of the population was non-
Mapuche, and by 2015, around 40% of the Chilean population resided in the Metropolitan
Region (Aroca & Atienza, 2016). Finally, although definitions vary, according to the PNUD
(2017), approximately 10% of the population has higher middle class/ high-class occupations
and the Chilean median age (for people over 18) in the 1990-2016 period was 42. In other
words, the overrepresentation of all elite characteristics in the statistics presented in the
previous graph is noticeable.
37
One first conclusion is that, regarding the puzzle between supply side and demand side factors,
there have not been any candidates who have not finished high-school nor has there been any
candidates with a Mapuche background. Similarly, candidates without a university degree are
scarce (less than 8% of the candidates). Two characteristics which are particularly striking are
having studied in an elite school and an elite university. While these represent a minuscule
proportion of the population, almost 50% of the candidates went to one of these schools, and
more than 80% went to one of these universities.
This overall image of the characteristics of candidates is somewhat misleading. When the focus
is placed on the candidates with the two highest levels of voting (who pass to the second round),
elite characteristics generally become more prevalent, as can be seen in the following graph:
Figure 4: Candidates' Descriptive Characteristics - Top 2 Candidates
120,0% 100,0%
100,0% 100,0% 100,0%
100,0%
92,5% 92,9%
100,0% 85,7%
82,5% 85,7%
80,0% 77,5%
71,4%
80,0% 64,3% 70,0%
62,5%
57,1%
60,0% 47,5%
40,0%
20,0%
0,0%
All candidates Top 2 candidates
Apart from private schooling and belonging to the Metropolitan Region, all other elite
characteristics are equal or more frequent in the highest voted candidates13. These two highest
majorities, in all of the seven elections, have belonged to the two major political coalitions (the
centre-right and centre-left coalitions).
13
The median age of the top 2 candidates is 60.5 years (omitted form graph for presentation)
38
Even more noticeably, the following graphs present the frequency of the elite characteristics
for candidates who obtained less than 5% (13 candidates) of the votes and those who obtained
more than 5% (27 candidates).
Figure 5: Candidates' Descriptive Characteristics - 5% Candidates
120,0%
100,0%
100,0% 95,8% 100,0%
100,0%
100,0% 84,6% 87,5%
76,9% 79,2%
75,0%
80,0% 70,8% 69,2%
62,5% 61,5%
53,8% 54,2% 53,8%
60,0%
40,0% 23,1%
20,0%
0,0%
Candidates with more than 5% Candidates with less than 5%
Practically all of the elite characteristics are less frequent in the candidates with less than 5%
of the votes (except for age14 and gender).
Summarizing, from this preliminary analysis two main conclusions are derived:
• Elite characteristics are overrepresented in presidential candidates. Nevertheless,
except for education level and ethnicity, some alternative candidates possess non-elite
characteristics.
• Historically, voters have tended to vote for candidates who possess elite characteristics.
This tendency is observed even though other candidates, who may have been more
similar to them, did appear on the ballot, supported by parties or coalitions which were
not the traditional ones (who were not from the two main coalitions).
14
Median age for candidates with more than 5% is 53.2 and 54.2 for candidates with less than 5% (omitted form graph for
presentation)
39
4.2. Main analysis: Elites, elections and relationship between elites and non-elites
4.2.1. 2017 Elections
The following results, both for voting preferences and opinion, should be taken with precaution
before extrapolating to other presidential elections. On the one hand, in the 2017 elections, the
two main centre-right and right-wing candidates (Sebastian Piñera and Jose Antonio Kast),
who concentrated approximately 40% of the votes, both ranked on the top of the class elite
index. On the other hand, the two main centre-left and left candidates (Alejandro Guillier and
Beatriz Sanchez), who concentrated approximately another 40% of the votes, ranked on the
lowest and low levels of the index. This means voters faced unusually large class differences
between ideological lines. Furthermore, the difference in the class index between the two
leading candidates (Sebsatian Piñera and Alejandro Guillier) is the maximum possible, with 4
points. This is the highest difference for the seven elections, and it is mainly due to an unusually
low score of the centre-left candidate (for more details, see Table 28 in the appendix).
Electoral Preferences
When analysing the relevance of matching characteristics (without employing indexes) several
characteristics seem to be significant.
First, for each characteristic, a Wald test is applied to the null hypothesis that the characteristic
is simultaneously non-significant for all candidates (coefficient is zero in every equation of
every candidate). This null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% threshold for every characteristic,
meaning each characteristic is overall significant.
Second, when focusing on the two main candidates, the main centre-left candidate, Alejandro
Guillier, who is from out of the Metropolitan Region, has better odds of getting a vote from
someone from Santiago (compared to the main centre-right candidate, Sebastian Pinera). That
is to say, an inverse association to what descriptive representation theory would suggest. In
occupation --Alejandro Guillier has a non-elite occupation-- and age, the relationship follows
40
what descriptive representation theory would predict: people with non-elite occupations and
smaller age difference have higher odds of voting for him (compared with voting Sebastian
Pinera). Gender is non-significant. For the third most voted candidate, Beatriz Sanchez, all of
the matching characteristics are significant, but the geographical matching (she is from out of
the Metropolitan Region), gender matching (she is female) and age, have the opposite effect
than that suggested by descriptive theory (comparing with odds of voting for Sebastian Pinera).
With occupation, however, the relationship is as theory would predict (she has a non-elite
occupation). More in general, while the other descriptive characteristics have mixed or contrary
results to what descriptive theory would suggest, occupation seems to have the expected
positive sign for the relationship in all candidates.
To further research whether class descriptive characteristics, such as occupation, are relevant
for this association the two previously explained indexes were employed (one based on
education and occupation and one based on consumption patterns). The results of the regression
between voting preferences and the differences in class indexes of the respondents and the
candidates are presented in the end of this subchapter.
The results are robust in showing that class difference, measured in both indexes, have a
negative relationship with the odds of voting for a candidate (as well as in age distance). In
conclusion, for the 2017 presidential elections, it seems that the voters were divided across
class lines and that they tended to vote for candidates with similar class characteristics and
ages. However, their relationship with the other descriptive characteristics is non-significant or
contradictory with theory.
Opinion
The following table shows the estimates for the association between all matching descriptive
characteristics and opinion on the candidates (Model (2) controls for voting preference)
41
Table 7: Opinion. Matching Characteristics. 2017
Opinion (1) (2)

Mat_Metropolitan -0.031 -0.198
(0.38) (1.83)
Mat_Gender 0.005 -0.022
(0.07) (0.29)
D_Age -0.002 0.001
(0.53) (0.38)
Mat_Occupation 0.253 0.311
(2.30)* (2.68)**
N 3,357 2,849
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Occupation stands out as the only consistently significant descriptive matching variable. This
relationship becomes significant at the 1% level when controlling for voting preference.
A similar exercise as the one done for voting preference is done for the opinion of the
respondents on the candidates. That is, the regression is implemented with class distance
measured with the two class indexes. The result is presented in the following table.
Table 8: Opinion. Class indexes. 2017
Opinion (1) (2)

(0.56) (0.23)
Mat_Gender 0.001 0.008
(0.01) (0.11)
D_Age 0.000 0.002
(0.05) (0.50)
D_Class_Index_De -0.054
(1.60)
Class_Index_De -0.092
(3.18)**
D_Class_Index_C -0.171
(3.89)**
Class_Index_C -0.154
(3.78)**
N 3,349 3,516
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
42
The result shows that the class of the respondents is significant in both measurements.
However, class distance is only significant when evaluating class in terms of consumption
patterns15.
This relationship remains when controlling for voting preferences, as can be seen, in the
following table.
Table 9: Opinion given vote. Class indexes. 2017
Opinion (1) (2)

(2.04)* (1.38)
Mat_Gender -0.026 -0.012
(0.34) (0.16)
D_Age 0.003 0.004
(0.88) (1.26)
(1.42)
(3.20)**
(3.84)**
(4.41)**
N 2,841 2,989
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
15
When a fix effect per respondent is included, class distance measured by education and occupation becomes significant as
well.
43
Full Regressions
Table 10: Full. Validity of class index. 2017
Class_Index_C
School 1.449 1.514
(9.80)** (9.38)**
(3.40)** (3.45)**
(2.67)** (2.54)*
(9.86)** (9.59)**
/ cut1 -3.558 -2.353
(15.58)** (6.78)**
cut2 0.374 1.612
(3.67)** (5.05)**
cut3 3.276 4.621
(21.04)** (13.26)**
cut4 6.017 7.344
(21.70)** (17.31)**
Man 0.223
(1.76)
MR 0.054
(0.41)
Non_Native 0.863
(3.89)**
Age 0.007
(1.74)
N 1,332 1,301
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
44
Table 11: Full. Electoral preferences. 2017
Voting preferences – (1) Voting Preferences – Class (1) (2)

Matching Characteristics Distance
Marco_Enriquez_Ominami Non_Native -0.327 Marco_Enriquez_Ominami Non_Native -0.944 -0.763
(0.34) (3.39)** (2.57)*
Mat_Metropolitan -0.379 Mat_Metropolitan 0.189 0.206
(0.46) (0.91) (0.94)
Mat_Gender -0.295 Mat_Gender -0.357 -0.292
(0.52) (1.78) (1.61)
Mat_Occupation 3.669 D_Age -0.201 -0.142
(2.65)** (10.30)** (6.68)**
Education_Years -0.139 D_Class_Index_De -0.360
(2.27)* (7.02)**
D_Age -0.154 Class_Index_De -0.585
(2.68)** (5.77)**
Ideology 0.989 D_Ideology 0.011 0.193
(5.11)** (0.12) (2.20)*
Age -0.092 Ideology 0.953 0.915
(2.00)* (13.43)** (13.40)**
_cons 2.568 Age -0.124 -0.073
(0.68) (7.60)** (4.38)**
Carolina_Goic Non_Native 0.495 _cons 7.070 4.018
(0.48) (6.69)** (3.38)**
Mat_Metropolitan -1.319 Carolina_Goic Non_Native 0.143 0.625
(1.98)* (0.43) (1.62)
Mat_Gender -0.508 Mat_Metropolitan -1.070 -1.054
(0.89) (4.52)** (4.56)**
Mat_Occupation 4.249 Mat_Gender -0.542 -0.213
(5.06)** (2.92)** (1.12)
Education_Years -0.145 D_Age -0.059 -0.032
(1.84) (3.49)** (2.65)**
D_Age -0.074 D_Class_Index_De -0.977
(1.67) (16.17)**
Ideology 1.067 Class_Index_De -0.733
(5.18)** (7.12)**
Age -0.045 D_Ideology -0.318 -0.222
(1.09) (1.98)* (1.44)
_cons -1.914 Ideology 1.079 0.934
(0.53) (13.56)** (10.32)**
Alejandro_Guillier Non_Native 0.758 Age -0.030 -0.009
(1.13) (2.09)* (1.10)
45
Mat_Metropolitan 0.117 _cons 1.223 1.910
(0.29) (0.94) (2.04)*
Mat_Gender -0.055 Alejandro_Guillier Non_Native 0.340 0.151
(0.15) (1.47) (0.74)
Mat_Occupation 3.698 Mat_Metropolitan 0.436 1.007
(9.15)** (3.62)** (9.27)**
Education_Years -0.048 Mat_Gender 0.010 -0.223
(1.01) (0.09) (2.24)*
D_Age -0.067 D_Age -0.058 -0.053
(4.17)** (9.85)** (9.25)**
Ideology 1.545 D_Class_Index_De -0.830
(8.75)** (15.56)**
Age -0.023 Class_Index_De -0.275
(1.85) (5.57)**
_cons -4.978 D_Ideology -0.195 -0.326
(3.18)** (1.88) (2.90)**
Jose_Antonio_Kast Non_Native 13.698 Ideology 1.625 1.453
(22.79)** (24.84)** (24.63)**
Mat_Metropolitan 0.318 Age -0.013 -0.006
(0.48) (2.85)** (1.31)
Mat_Gender 0.776 _cons -1.996 -3.449
(1.21) (3.52)** (7.01)**
Mat_Occupation -0.055 Jose_Antonio_Kast Non_Native 13.759 14.903
(0.06) (69.33)** (90.09)**
Education_Years 0.003 Mat_Metropolitan 0.288 0.151
(0.03) (1.33) (0.70)
D_Age -0.196 Mat_Gender 0.799 0.696
(5.11)** (3.52)** (3.22)**
Ideology 0.117 D_Age -0.178 -0.166
(0.45) (13.41)** (11.80)**
Age -0.168 D_Class_Index_De -0.218
(3.91)** (2.74)**
_cons -5.950 Class_Index_De -0.040
(2.00)* (0.73)
Beatriz_Sanchez Non_Native -0.343 D_Ideology 0.210 0.265
(0.49) (1.58) (1.84)
Mat_Metropolitan -0.168 Ideology 0.171 0.170
(0.36) (1.51) (1.48)
Mat_Gender -0.664 Age -0.155 -0.143
(1.52) (9.76)** (9.30)**
Mat_Occupation 2.847 _cons -6.730 -9.146
(5.28)** (5.71)** (7.64)**
Education_Years -0.012 Beatriz_Sanchez Non_Native -0.704 -0.944
46
(0.21) (2.67)** (4.24)**
D_Age -0.217 Mat_Metropolitan -0.342 0.268
(5.94)** (2.14)* (1.85)
Ideology 1.324 Mat_Gender -0.894 -0.795
(5.71)** (5.43)** (5.56)**
Age -0.154 D_Age -0.227 -0.208
(4.59)** (15.53)** (15.53)**
_cons 5.093 D_Class_Index_De -1.417
(1.91) (17.48)**
N 484 Class_Index_De -0.032
(0.46)
D_Ideology 0.766 0.629
(6.54)** (5.94)**
Ideology 1.720 1.447
(19.69)** (19.95)**
Age -0.151 -0.141
(12.54)** (11.86)**
(11.12)**
(2.96)**
(11.74)**
(9.23)**
D_Class_Index_C 0.232
(3.93)**
(7.97)**
(3.86)**
Class_Index_C 0.200
(2.35)*
(8.22)**
(0.15)
_cons 7.026 5.810
(8.68)** (7.80)**
N 3,864 4,064
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
47
Table 12: Full. Opinion. 2017
Opinion – (1) (2) Opinion – (1) (2)

Class Matching
Distance Characteristics
(Given vote)
2Candidate -0.034 -0.276 2Candidate -0.059 0.113
(0.20) (1.59) (0.35) (0.57)
3.Candidate 0.440 0.173 3.Candidate 0.444 0.656
(2.55)* (0.95) (2.59)** (3.26)**
(5.75)** (5.49)** (5.79)** (5.55)**
(3.60)** (2.77)** (3.94)** (4.30)**
(0.68) (0.65) (0.62) (1.42)
(4.41)** (3.73)** (4.72)** (5.51)**
(5.70)** (4.48)** (5.86)** (5.88)**
Non_Native -0.175 -0.137 Mat_Metropolitan -0.031 -0.198
(1.31) (1.02) (0.38) (1.83)
Mat_Metropolitan -0.046 -0.018 Mat_Gender 0.005 -0.022
(0.56) (0.23) (0.07) (0.29)
Mat_Gender 0.001 0.008 D_Age -0.002 0.001
(0.01) (0.11) (0.53) (0.38)
D_Age 0.000 0.002 Mat_Occupation 0.253 0.311
(0.05) (0.50) (2.30)* (2.68)**
D_Class_Index_De -0.054 D_Ideology -0.577 -0.600
(1.60) (15.01)** (14.65)**
D_Ideology -0.578 -0.578 Education_Years -0.027 -0.029
(15.09)** (15.48)** (2.80)** (2.79)**
Class_Index_De -0.092 Non_Native -0.139 -0.033
(3.18)** (1.03) (0.24)
Ideology -0.133 -0.150 Ideology -0.129 -0.210
(4.09)** (4.66)** (3.98)** (5.06)**
/ cut1 -3.475 -4.009 Age -0.004 -0.005
(12.13)** (13.67)** (2.09)* (2.02)*
cut2 -1.705 -2.206 / cut1 -3.586 -3.437
(6.07)** (7.68)** (10.30)** (7.92)**
cut3 -0.329 -0.810 cut2 -1.811 -1.662
48
(1.19) (2.86)** (5.25)** (3.84)**
cut4 1.896 1.377 cut3 -0.434 -0.378
(6.71)** (4.80)** (1.27) (0.88)
D_Class_Index_C -0.171 cut4 1.790 1.916
(3.89)** (5.23)** (4.47)**
Class_Index_C -0.154 3Can_Vote 0.158
(3.78)** (0.50)
N 3,349 3,516 4.Can_Vote 0.439
(1.67)
5.Can_Vote 0.109
(0.36)
7.Can_Vote 0.009
(0.03)
8.Can_Vote 0.472
(1.62)
N 3,357 2,849
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
49
Table 13: Full. Opinion given vote. 2017
Opinion – Class Distance (Given (1) (2)

vote)
2Candidate 0.139 -0.197
(0.70) (0.94)
3.Candidate 0.657 0.291
(3.25)** (1.35)
4.Candidate 1.120 1.005
(5.54)** (5.02)**
5.Candidate 0.849 0.602
(3.89)** (2.74)**
6.Candidate 0.316 0.259
(1.50) (1.22)
7.Candidate 1.116 0.891
(5.12)** (4.13)**
8.Candidate 1.102 0.849
(5.82)** (4.32)**
3Can_Vote 0.260 0.100
(0.82) (0.33)
4.Can_Vote 0.542 0.321
(1.99)* (1.24)
5.Can_Vote 0.217 0.195
(0.71) (0.64)
7.Can_Vote 0.110 0.008
(0.43) (0.03)
8.Can_Vote 0.589 0.411
(1.97)* (1.42)
Non_Native -0.078 -0.019
(0.57) (0.14)
(2.04)* (1.38)
Mat_Gender -0.026 -0.012
(0.34) (0.16)
D_Age 0.003 0.004
(0.88) (1.26)
(1.42)
D_Ideology -0.605 -0.602
(14.78)** (15.22)**
(3.20)**
50
Ideology -0.216 -0.216
(5.20)** (5.35)**
/ cut1 -3.262 -4.040
(8.53)** (10.33)**
cut2 -1.492 -2.231
(3.93)** (5.76)**
cut3 -0.210 -0.928
(0.56) (2.41)*
cut4 2.085 1.318
(5.47)** (3.43)**
(3.84)**
(4.41)**
N 2,841 2,989
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
51
4.2.2. 2013 Elections
In these elections, the leading centre-left candidate, Michelle Bachelet, and the main centre-
right candidate, Evelyn Matthei, who together account for over 70% of the votes, present
smaller descriptive differences, compared to 2017 elections. They are both females, from the
Metropolitan Region, and have an elite occupation. The only difference they present is in
their elite index score, since the main centre-left candidate did not assist to a private, elite
school, as the main centre-right candidate did. This means that the difference in the elite
index is 2 points (more details in Table 27 and Table 28).
Electoral Preferences
The second most voted candidate, the main centre-right candidate, shows a significant
association with the geographic characteristic (she is from the Metropolitan Region) and for
occupation (she has an elite occupation) and non-significant for gender. The point estimation
for the first two is positive and negative for gender. However, since the base candidate, the
main centre-left candidate, has the same category of region (there are both from the
metropolitan region), occupation (they both have elite occupation) and gender (they are both
females), the results are not relevant for the question on the significance of descriptive
representation: a positive association for one candidate means a negative association for the
other. Therefore, not much can be concluded from this relation. Given that these two candidates
account for 70% of the votes, these elections were not defined by the associations captured in
descriptive theory representation
As for the third most voted candidate, Marco Enriquez Ominami, occupation shows a
significant association, with the expected sign (the candidate had a non-elite occupation) and
so does age. Finally, the fourth most voted candidate, Franco Parisi, shares the elite descriptive
characteristics with the two leading candidates (he is from the Metropolitan Region and has an
elite occupation), except for gender (he is male). Therefore, similarly to the case of voting
52
behaviour between the two first majorities, descriptive representation cannot account for the
voting behaviour of his electorate, in the case of geographic origin and occupation. As for
gender, this last attribute is significant for this candidate and has the sign that descriptive
representation would suggest (positive).
When employing the two class indexes, the following results are found:
Table 14: Voting preferences. Class indexes. 2013
Evelyn_Matthei
(1.92)
(1.50)
(0.50)
Class_Index_C 0.485
(4.47)**
MarcoEnriquez_Ominami
(1.70)
(1.76)
(2.33)*
Class_Index_C 0.396
(2.83)**
FrancoParisi
(4.02)**
(1.46)
(4.41)**
(0.31)
N 4,599 4,770
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
The distance in indexes is not significant for the second main candidate (Evelyn Matthei) and
significant when measured with consumption for the third most voted candidate (Marco
53
Enriquez Ominami). For the fourth most voted candidate, class difference seems to hold
significant association, robustly to the way it is measured.
Overall, the results give mixed if not contradictory evidence in terms of the relevance of
descriptive representation.
Opinion
When replicating the exercise implemented for the 2017 elections, analysing the relationship
between matching characteristics and opinion on the candidates, the following results are
obtained (Model (2) controls voting preferences)
Table 15: Opinion. Matching Characteristics. 2013
Opinion (1) (2)

(1.46) (1.22)
Mat_Gender -0.147 -0.157
(1.47) (1.50)
D_Age -0.004 -0.004
(0.95) (0.98)
Mat_Occupation 0.047 0.064
(0.30) (0.38)
N 3,166 2,927
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
No descriptive characteristic is significant16. The association remains non-significant when
controlling for voting preference as well.
When evaluating the association with class distance, the following are the results.
16
When a fixed effect variable per respondent is included, age distance becomes significant and negative (as expected by
descriptive representation theory).
54
Table 16: Opinion. Class indexes. 2013
Opinion (1) (2)

(1.61) (1.34)
Mat_Gender -0.150 -0.144
(1.51) (1.48)
D_Age -0.004 -0.003
(0.95) (0.66)
D_Class_Index_De 0.053
(0.58)
(0.64)
(0.09)
Class_Index_C 0.032
(0.36)
N 3,169 3,295
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Once again, none of the associations is statistically significant17. This result does not change
when controlling for voting preferences, as the following table shows.
Table 17: Opinion given vote. Class indexes. 2013
Opinion (1) (2)

(1.24) (1.13)
Mat_Gender -0.161 -0.163
(1.55) (1.59)
D_Age -0.005 -0.003
(1.05) (0.73)
(0.55)
Class_Index_C 0.005 -0.005
(0.06) (0.05)
(0.16)
N 2,930 3,036
17
When a fixed effect variable per respondent is included, age distance becomes significant and negative (as expected by
descriptive representation theory).
55
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Class (and other descriptive characteristics) distance does not seem to be a significant
variable in its association with the respondents´ opinions, for the 2013 elections.
56
Full Regressions
Table 18: Full. Validity of class index. 2013
Class_Index_C
School 1.464 1.739
(8.15)** (8.73)**
(4.07)** (3.86)**
(5.09)** (4.95)**
(3.40)** (2.78)**
/ cut1 -3.934 -2.809
(13.64)** (6.23)**
cut2 0.591 1.765
(5.32)** (4.59)**
cut3 3.934 5.107
(18.94)** (11.92)**
cut4 5.587 6.799
(16.90)** (12.88)**
Man -0.089
(0.53)
MR 0.353
(2.02)*
Non_Native 0.368
(1.25)
Age 0.013
(2.62)**
N 1,384 1,353
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
57
Table 19: Full. Electoral preferences. 2013
Evelyn_Matthei Mat_Metropolitan 0.395 Evelyn_Matthei Non_Native 1.111 0.977

(3.53)** (5.72)** (4.78)**
Mat_Gender -0.111 Mat_Metropolitan 0.373 0.387
(0.96) (2.44)* (2.56)*
Mat_Occupation 0.488 Mat_Gender 0.508 0.499
(3.13)** (3.12)** (3.17)**
Education_Years 0.124 D_Age 0.005 0.014
(6.35)** (0.60) (1.79)
D_Age 0.007 D_Class_Index_De -0.298
(1.35) (1.92)
Non_Native 0.913 D_Ideology -2.118 -2.207
(4.19)** (15.80)** (17.46)**
D_Ideology -0.075 Class_Index_De 0.155
(1.07) (1.50)
_cons -3.585 Ideology -2.712 -2.718
(10.93)** (27.14)** (27.82)**
MarcoEnriquez_Ominami Mat_Metropolitan -0.206 _cons 6.941 5.557
(1.07) (12.35)** (10.30)**
Mat_Gender 0.363 MarcoEnriquez_Ominami Non_Native 0.111 -0.281
(1.83) (0.31) (0.77)
Mat_Occupation 4.224 Mat_Metropolitan 0.389 0.447
(12.66)** (2.38)* (2.88)**
Education_Years 0.070 Mat_Gender 0.303 0.326
(1.82) (1.77) (2.02)*
D_Age -0.119 D_Age -0.110 -0.096
(7.13)** (12.18)** (11.78)**
Non_Native -0.516 D_Class_Index_De -0.281
(1.58) (1.70)
D_Ideology 1.301 D_Ideology 1.108 0.939
(10.40)** (9.00)** (7.91)**
_cons -4.395 Class_Index_De 0.248
(10.23)** (1.76)
FrancoParisi Mat_Metropolitan -1.092 Ideology -0.308 -0.311
(5.71)** (5.42)** (5.62)**
Mat_Gender 0.518 _cons -0.669 -0.915
(2.80)** (1.00) (1.46)
Mat_Occupation -0.887 FrancoParisi Non_Native -0.650 -0.927
(4.18)** (2.78)** (3.90)**
Education_Years 0.197 Mat_Metropolitan -0.827 -0.886
(13.13)** (4.42)** (4.65)**
58
D_Age -0.048 Mat_Gender 0.676 0.620
(9.49)** (3.52)** (3.40)**
Non_Native -0.595 D_Age -0.039 -0.026
(2.65)** (7.73)** (5.60)**
D_Ideology 0.370 D_Class_Index_De -0.708
(3.06)** (4.02)**
_cons -2.771 D_Ideology -0.345 -0.433
(9.75)** (2.12)* (2.91)**
N 4,590 Class_Index_De -0.232
(1.46)
Ideology -0.879 -0.854
(6.18)** (6.63)**
(0.50)
Class_Index_C 0.485
(4.47)**
(2.33)*
Class_Index_C 0.396
(2.83)**
(4.41)**
(0.31)
_cons 4.510 4.081
(5.44)** (6.10)**
N 4,599 4,770
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
59
Table 20: Full. Opinion. 2013
Opinion – (1) (2) Opinion – (1) (2)

Class Distance Matching
Characteristics
(Given vote)
2Candidate 2.003 2.034 2Candidate 1.997 2.091
(8.66)** (9.13)** (8.63)** (8.45)**
(6.19)** (6.19)** (5.14)** (4.85)**
(4.82)** (4.82)** (4.81)** (4.78)**
(0.79) (1.48) (1.08) (1.20)
(5.25)** (4.98)** (5.22)** (5.08)**
(2.73)** (2.98)** (2.29)* (2.21)*
(2.23)* (2.26)* (2.48)* (2.52)*
(0.65) (1.22) (0.68) (0.96)
Non_Native -0.154 -0.155 Mat_Metropolitan -0.161 -0.138
(0.88) (0.88) (1.46) (1.22)
Mat_Metropolitan -0.172 -0.142 Mat_Gender -0.147 -0.157
(1.61) (1.34) (1.47) (1.50)
Mat_Gender -0.150 -0.144 D_Age -0.004 -0.004
(1.51) (1.48) (0.95) (0.98)
D_Age -0.004 -0.003 Mat_Occupation 0.047 0.064
(0.95) (0.66) (0.30) (0.38)
D_Class_Index_De 0.053 D_Ideology -0.711 -0.697
(0.58) (13.31)** (11.76)**
D_Ideology -0.712 -0.689 Education_Years -0.002 -0.010
(13.29)** (12.57)** (0.15) (0.69)
Class_Index_De 0.055 Non_Native -0.152 -0.006
(0.64) (0.87) (0.03)
Ideology -0.290 -0.280 Ideology -0.293 -0.273
(7.08)** (6.77)** (7.11)** (4.97)**
cut1 _cons -4.052 -4.056 cut1 _cons -4.238 -4.093
(10.43)** (9.88)** (12.24)** (10.70)**
cut2 _cons -2.447 -2.397 cut2 _cons -2.629 -2.470
(6.35)** (5.94)** (7.75)** (6.53)**
60
cut3 _cons -0.566 -0.552 cut3 _cons -0.748 -0.660
(1.46) (1.37) (2.20)* (1.74)
D_Class_Index_C 0.009 2Can_Vote -0.109
(0.09) (0.61)
Class_Index_C 0.032 3.Can_Vote 0.380
(0.36) (1.55)
cut4 _cons 1.509 1.545 4.Can_Vote -0.164
(3.75)** (3.73)** (0.73)
N 3,169 3,295 6.Can_Vote 0.044
(0.15)
7.Can_Vote -1.096
(1.04)
8.Can_Vote 0.833
(1.64)
9.Can_Vote 0.204
(0.13)
cut4 _cons 1.324 1.374
(3.69)** (3.44)**
N 3,166 2,927
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
61
Table 21: Full. Opinion given vote. 2013
Opinion – Class Distance (Given

vote)
2Candidate 2.098 2.130
(8.49)** (8.94)**
3.Candidate 1.309 1.278
(5.96)** (5.92)**
4.Candidate 1.038 0.988
(4.78)** (4.72)**
5.Candidate 0.217 0.348
(1.06) (1.52)
6.Candidate 1.164 1.091
(5.11)** (4.81)**
7.Candidate 0.709 0.732
(2.69)** (2.96)**
8.Candidate 0.708 0.662
(2.47)* (2.28)*
9.Candidate 0.215 0.330
(0.97) (1.43)
2Can_Vote -0.096 -0.124
(0.54) (0.72)
3.Can_Vote 0.377 0.335
(1.54) (1.38)
4.Can_Vote -0.168 -0.171
(0.74) (0.76)
6.Can_Vote 0.033 -0.038
(0.11) (0.13)
7.Can_Vote -1.087 -1.193
(1.02) (1.13)
8.Can_Vote 0.826 0.737
(1.62) (1.43)
9.Can_Vote 0.256 0.295
(0.17) (0.19)
Non_Native -0.008 -0.008
(0.04) (0.04)
(1.24) (1.13)
Mat_Gender -0.161 -0.163
62
(1.55) (1.59)
D_Age -0.005 -0.003
(1.05) (0.73)
(0.55)
D_Ideology -0.694 -0.672
(11.77)** (11.20)**
Class_Index_C 0.005 -0.005
(0.06) (0.05)
Ideology -0.274 -0.256
(5.01)** (4.69)**
cut1 _cons -3.907 -3.889
(9.81)** (8.78)**
cut2 _cons -2.288 -2.213
(5.82)** (5.04)**
cut3 _cons -0.479 -0.446
(1.22) (1.02)
(0.16)
cut4 _cons 1.557 1.624
(3.78)** (3.58)**
N 2,930 3,036
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
63
4.2.3. Meta-analysis for class and opinion (1993-2017)
Given the different results on the relevance of class obtained in the 2013 elections and the 2017
elections, a meta-analysis is conducted, with focus on the association between class measured
by consumption patterns and opinion. The reason for omitting the analysis for class in terms of
education and occupation is that occupation of the respondents is only measured in the 2013
and 2017 elections. Additionally, the way education is measured (the possible responses) has
suffered several changes over the last two decades. The class index, through consumption
patterns, has been consistently measured and following the same standardised methodology.
The individual results for the 1993, 1999, and 2005 elections included in this analysis (for
which there was available data) are shown in the following table18.
Table 22: Opinion. Class indexes. 1993/1999/2005
Opinion 1993 1999 2005

Mat_Metropolitan -0.148 -0.057 -0.009
(1.83) (0.73) (0.13)
Mat_Gender -0.064 -0.107 0.130
(0.98) (1.65) (2.02)*
D_Age 0.037 0.006 0.005
(1.23) (2.02)* (1.44)
D_Class_Index_C -0.035 -0.132 -0.237
(0.53) (2.44)* (4.13)**
Class_Index_C 0.009 -0.154 -0.133
(0.15) (3.03)** (2.83)**
N 7,081 3,334 3,504
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
18
Native American status was not available for the 1993 and 1999 elections. The opinion data for three candidates with less
than 1% of intention to vote were not collected in the 1999 elections
64
The results show that, for two out of the three elections, class distance was significantly
associated with a more negative perception of the candidates19. Combining this with the
previous analysis means class distance was significant in three out of the five analysed
elections. When controlling for voting preference, the results remain similar, as can be seen in
the following table.
Table 23: Opinion given vote. Class indexes. 1993/1999/2005
Opinion 1993 1999 2005

Mat_Metropolitan -0.237 -0.053 0.006
(2.65)** (0.62) (0.09)
Mat_Gender -0.088 -0.141 0.134
(1.40) (2.04)* (2.01)*
D_Age 0.029 0.006 0.005
(1.00) (1.80) (1.45)
D_Class_Index_C -0.029 -0.148 -0.246
(0.49) (2.55)* (4.01)**
Class_Index_C -0.018 -0.160 -0.172
(0.36) (2.84)** (3.36)**
N 6,534 2,965 3,296
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
Meta-analyses are usually used where several different estimations, obtained in the context of
different studies, are pooled together to give an overall estimation. In this research, meta-
analysis is used to pool together data collected at different moments, allowing for eventual
heterogeneity of the measured associations over time. Following, Hunter and Schmidt (2000),
a first element to define when conducting a meta-analysis is the level of heterogeneity between
the several estimations. Even though in this case the estimations are obtained from samples of
the same population, in terms of being representative of the Chilean electorate, it is possible
that the measured relationship has changed over time and between the different surveys. If this
19
When including a fix effect per respondent, the significance of the associations is the same (non-significant
for 1993 and significant for 1999 and 2005, at the 5% threshold)
65
were the case, a simple pooling together of the data would not be an adequate reflection of this
association and the way it has variated. The meta-analysis will allow to not only measure an
“average” association, but also how much the association has varied between surveys.
To conduct this analysis, first, the meta-analysis is implemented assuming "fixed effect"
(association in this case) (Mantel & Haenszel, 1959).
The following graph presents the results (in odds ratio) assuming “fixed effect” (association):
66
Figure 6: Class-Opinion Metanalysis. Fixed
67
Figure 7: Class-Opinion Metanalysis. Vote Controlled. Fixed
68
The heterogeneity test (chi-squared) cannot be rejected at the 5% threshold (p=0,19). It is,
therefore, suggestive evidence that it is possible to pool these estimations assuming a "fixed
effect" (association in this case). Under this assumption, the aggregate association is significant
and negative: one additional point in class distance diminishes between 13% (controlling for
voting preference) and 14% (not controlling for vote) the odds of being in a higher category of
public opinion20. This would imply that the association has been present over the measuring
period (25 years).
In any case, as the following graphs show, under the assumption of “random effects” or
heterogeneity in the associations (considering the variance between estimations) (DerSimonian
& Laird, 1986), the overall association is still significantly negative.
20
When including a fix effect per respondent, the associations are also significant at the 5% level, for both random and fix
effect models.
69
Figure 8: Class-Opinion Metanalysis. Random
70
Figure 9: Class-Opinion Metanalysis. Vote Controlled. Random
71
Full Regressions
Table 24: Full. Opinion and Opinion given vote. 1993/1999/2005
Opinion Opinion –
– Class Class
(1993) (1999) (2005) (1993) (1999) (2005)
Distance Distance
(Given vote)
2Candidate -1.024 -1.372 2Candidate -1.002 -1.370
(8.43)** (12.81)** (8.52)** (12.47)**
3.Candidate 2.042 -0.083 3.Candidate 2.191 -0.071
(12.17)** (0.69) (14.04)** (0.55)
4.Candidate -0.178 -0.622 4.Candidate -0.141 -0.640
(1.44) (5.80)** (1.17) (5.80)**
(2.99)** (16.29)** (3.26)** (15.84)**
6.Candidate -0.219 1.734 6.Candidate -0.220 1.717
(1.35) (18.46)** (1.45) (16.99)**
Mat_Metropolitan -0.148 -0.057 -0.009 2Can_Vote -0.175 -0.005
(1.83) (0.73) (0.13) (0.63) (0.04)
Mat_Gender -0.064 -0.107 0.130 3.Can_Vote -0.271 -0.356
(0.98) (1.65) (2.02)* (1.69) (4.48)**
D_Age 0.037 0.006 0.005 4.Can_Vote -0.220 -1.006 -0.590
(1.23) (2.02)* (1.44) (0.70) (1.91) (3.02)**
D_Class_Index_C -0.035 -0.132 -0.237 5.Can_Vote -0.082 -0.363
(0.53) (2.44)* (4.13)** (0.44) (1.18)
D_Ideology -0.533 0.134 -0.644 6.Can_Vote 0.124 -0.608
(15.72)** (4.04)** (20.45)** (0.54) (1.96)
Ideology -0.133 0.088 Mat_Metropolitan -0.237 -0.053 0.006
(4.62)** (3.58)** (2.65)** (0.62) (0.09)
Class_Index_C 0.009 -0.154 -0.133 Mat_Gender -0.088 -0.141 0.134
(0.15) (3.03)** (2.83)** (1.40) (2.04)* (2.01)*
/ cut1 -3.911 -1.441 -4.843 D_Age 0.029 0.006 0.005
(17.80)** (7.04)** (17.49)** (1.00) (1.80) (1.45)
cut2 -1.892 0.319 -3.248 D_Class_Index_C -0.029 -0.148 -0.246
(9.29)** (1.58) (11.93)** (0.49) (2.55)* (4.01)**
cut3 -0.290 1.417 -1.920 D_Ideology -0.545 0.122 -0.673
(1.45) (6.97)** (7.15)** (16.06)** (3.50)** (20.75)**
cut4 1.648 3.576 0.566 Ideology -0.112 0.034
(7.82)** (16.88)** (2.11)* (3.52)** (1.12)
mb_p15_ 3.Candidate -0.333 Class_Index_C -0.018 -0.160 -0.172
72
(3.00)** (0.36) (2.84)** (3.36)**
Non_Native -0.017 / cut1 -4.100 -2.065 -5.143
(0.10) (15.23)** (5.34)** (16.66)**
N 7,081 3,334 3,504 cut2 -2.105 -0.345 -3.517
(8.02)** (0.90) (11.60)**
cut3 -0.523 0.689 -2.226
(2.01)* (1.79) (7.46)**
cut4 1.427 2.790 0.247
(5.34)** (7.17)** (0.84)
mb_p15_ 3Candidate -0.326
(2.79)**
3Can_Vote -0.381
(1.01)
Non_Native 0.001
(0.01)
N 6,534 2,965 3,296
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01
73
5. Discussion and conclusion
This chapter presents discussions that branch out from the results of the research and the main
inferable conclusions. The discussions are divided into "academic discussions" and "policy
discussions". As expectable, the two are connected, but such a distinction is implemented for
clarity purposes.
5.1. Academic discussion
Regarding the academic debates, one of the most relevant findings is the evidence that class
matters in terms of descriptive representation. This may seem like a fairly modest assertion,
however, given the academic landscape of the last decades, this is not a trivial finding. In this
research, class seems more relevant in descriptive representation than other much more studied
aspects, such as gender.
One of the expressions of the recent reincorporation of class in the debates over descriptive
representation has been the surge of survey experiments to test the relevance of this attribute
in the relationship between candidates and the general population, by making the respondents
choose between two hypothetical candidates variating in their class characteristics (e.g.
Hainmuller et al., 2014; Carnes & Lupu, 2016; Campbel & Cowley, 2014a, Campbel &
Cowley, 2014b).
Within this emerging literature, the present research brings forth three relevant elements.
First, as was already mentioned, most of the research has been undertaken in well-established
democracies21. Relatively “new democracies”, like the Chilean one, present different
challenges and relationships. One of them is, undoubtedly, the implementation of the
democratic principles of democracy, such as equality, which needs to replace previous
principles of their dictatorial pasts.
21
An exception is Carnes and Lupu (2016), who incorporates this discussion to the context of Argentina
74
Second, this research has shown that the associations found in electoral relationships need not
be equal to those that organise public support. In other words, there is a necessity to study these
two aspects separately: an attribute that may not mobilise votes may mobilise public opinion.
Examples such as Campbel & Cowley, (2014a), in which along with electoral preferences,
broader issues of perception of candidates are studied seem to show this is an important aspect.
Finally, this research shows the importance of complementing survey experiments and other
Randomized Controlled Trials (RCTs) studies with observational studies such as this one.
There is a relative consensus that in "low information" decisions, voters decide by resorting to
stereotyping candidates by group affiliation, such as belonging to a demographic group
(Hamilton 1981). In this sense, one of the more challenging aspects of interpreting the results
of several survey experiments is that it is not clear that the sort of information that the
respondents are exposed to in the experiments (low information races) is relatable to the sort
of information to which electors are exposed22. This is especially relevant as candidates react
strategically to the preferences of voters, highlighting or hiding aspects. Additionally, voters
are presented with different sources of information from which it may be difficult to discern
the truth. Furthermore, this difficulty variates across attributes. While an attribute such as
gender or ethnicity may be relatively straightforward (through names and physical
characteristics), class is harder to recognise. It is harder to presume that in real life elections a
relatively uninterested voter would know the prior occupation or income of a candidate. The
fact that this research has shown that, despite this difficulty, class is associated with differences
in public opinion is, therefore, a relevant contribution to the academic debate.
22
Typically in these survey expermients, the respondents would be faced with short descriptions of hypothetical candidates
differing in the studied characteristic.
75
5.2. Policy discussion
The research presents suggestive evidence that, regarding policy, if an objective is to improve
public opinion on politicians, having more candidates that represent class diversity may help.
This is of particular interest given the recent context of Chile, which implemented gender
quotas in the latest parliamentary elections. The fact that gender and ethnicity (the latest
parliamentary elections also saw the election of the first Mapuche MP since the return of
democracy) has dominated the debates may explain why these two have been the first to be
tackled. Additionally, the fact that implementing gender quotas is a relatively simple measure
which cannot be easily replicated for class may have also contributed to it.
This research has shown that class is associated to public opinion while giving mixed or
contradictory evidence on its relevance for voting preferences. Thus, fruitful public policies
could be devised to address this apparent inconsistency. Government policies that promote
class diversity in representation may be relevant to improve the perception of the public on
politicians. However, the way in which such policy would be enacted is less clear. Since the
implementation of quotas, in this case, does not seem possible, other measures such as political
education directed at poorer members of the population may be an alternative.
5.3. Conclusions and challenges for further research
The present research has brought forth evidence that the members of lower classes (and
younger people) in Chile present stronger perceptions of misrepresentation by the political
elite. Additionally, this research has shown the over-representation of elite characteristics in
the Chilean presidential candidates and has also presented evidence that class distance is
associated with a more negative public perception of those candidates. However, somewhat
unexpectedly when considering the previous findings, matching descriptive characteristics
76
(such as class) and voting preferences do not seem to be positively associated, as would be
expected by descriptive representation theory.
Class distance was not found to be significant when measured with an alternative measurement
of class (through education and occupation). Due to the available data, it was not possible to
confirm the mentioned associations through a meta-analysis. As more data becomes available,
future researches may include this alternative index in a meta-analysis.
A relevant shortcoming of this research, which will hopefully be overcome by future research,
is associated to the particular type of election studied: presidential election. This is uninominal
and national, and therefore does not allow for as many variations and detail analysis as
subnational elections which, also, may show higher variations in the characteristics of
candidates. (For example, there are mayors and parliamentary members who do belong to the
Mapuche people). Further development for this research would be to replicate it in the
subnational level, such as local governments and the legislative. This could provide more
robust evidence to extrapolate the findings on presidential elections to other elections.
Hopefully the findings of this research will help promote such research at the sub-national level
in the near future.
77
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Appendix: Electoral results in presidential elections (since 1989)
Table 25: Electoral results in presidential elections since the return of democracy
Election Total valid Candidates (first Electoral Electoral

year votes (not round) result result
including (votes) (votes)
blank and
null votes)
1989 6.979.859 Hernán Büchi Buc 2.052.116 29,40%
Francisco Javier Errázuriz 1.077.172 15,43%

Talavera
Patricio Aylwin Azócar 3.850.571 55,17% President
1993 6.968.950 Manfred Max Neef 387.102 5,55%
Eugenio Pizarro Poblete 327.402 4,70%
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle 4.040.497 57,98% President
Cristián Reitze Campos 81.675 1,17%
Arturo Alessandri Besa 1.701.324 24,41%
José Piñera Echeñique 430.950 6,18%
1999 7.055.128 Arturo Frei Bolívar 26.812 0,38%
Sara María Larraín Ruiz-Tagle 31.319 0,44%
Gladys Marín Millie 225.224 3,19%
Tomas Hirsch Goldschmidt 36.235 0,51%
Ricardo Lagos Escobar 3.383.339 47,96% President
Joaquin Lavin Infante 3.352.199 47,51% Passed to

second round
2005 6.942.041 Sebastián Piñera Echeñique 1.763.694 25,41% Passed to
second round
Michelle Bachelet Jeria 3.190.691 45,96% President
Tomas Hirsch Goldschmidt 375.048 5,40%
Joaquín Lavin Infante 1.612.608 23,23%
2009 6.977.544 Jorge Arrate Mac-Niven 433.195 6,21%
Marco Enríquez-Ominami 1.405.124 20,14%

Gumucio
Sebastián Piñera Echenique 3.074.164 44,06% President
Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle 2.065.061 29,60% Passed to

second round
81
2013 6.585.808 Franco Aldo Parisi Fernandez 666.015 10,11%
Marcel Claude Reyes 185.072 2,81%
Ricardo Israel Zipper 37.744 0,57%
Marco Enriquez-Ominami 723.542 10,99%

Gumucio
Roxana del Carmen Miranda 81.873 1,24%

Meneses
Michelle Bachelet Jeria 3.075.839 46,70% President
Evelyn Matthei Fornet 1.648.481 25,03% Passed to

second round
Alfredo Sfeir Younis 154.648 2,35%
Tomás Jocelyn-Holt Letelier 12.594 0,19%
2017 6.596.329 Carolina Goic Boroevic 387.780 5,88%
Jose Antonio Kast Rist 523.213 7,93%
Sebastián Piñera Echenique 2.417.216 36,64% President
Alejandro Guillier Alvarez 1.497.116 22,70% Passed to

second round
Beatriz Sanchez Munoz 1.336.824 20,27%
Marco Enríquez-Ominami 376.471 5,71%

Gumucio
Eduardo Artes Brichetti 33.690 0,51%
Alejandro Navarro Brain 24.019 0,36%
Source: adapted from Chilean Electoral Service (SERVEL) in <https://historico.servel.cl/>

and <http://pv.servelelecciones.cl/> (2018)
82
Appendix: Coding categories
Table 26: Coding map for descriptive characteristics
Grouping Characteristic Dimension 1 Dimension 2 Code Class

Index
Class Consumption Socio-Economic ESOMAR-AIM ABC1 4
patterns level classification C2 3
C3 2
D 1
E 0
Education Level Higher Education University 3
Technical higher education 2

School High school 1
Less than High school 0
School Typology Typology of Private non-subsidized 1
schools by
ownership
Public and private subsidized 0

Typology of Elite institution 1
schools by elite Non-elite institution 0
status23
Higher Education Typology of Elite institution 1
Typology higher24
education
institutions by
elite status Non-elite institution 0
Occupation Typology of Typology of Elite-prestige occupations25 1
occupations occupations by
elite status Non-elite-prestige 0
occupations
Non- Age Age26 -
Class Gender Typology of Male -
gender Female -
Spatial Typology of Metropolitan Region -
differences geographical Out-of-Metropolitan-Region -
differences27
Ethnicity, race, Typology of Non-Mapuche -
and cultural origin ethnicity, race, Mapuche28 -
and cultural origin
23 Not available for respondents.

24 Not available for respondents.
25 Business and economics, engineering, law, and medicine.
26 Subtracting the year of birth of the candidate or respondent to the year of the corresponding elections.
27 This will be assigned by place of birth.
28 In the case of candidates, this category will be designated by last names. Chilean law (Law 19.253, known as “indigenous
law”) recognizes last names (of either the father or mother) as evidence of affiliation to an indigenous group, such as
Mapuche. A list of frequent Mapuche last names is available in Painemal (2011). In respondents, belonging to an ethnic
group is one of the self-reported elements of the identification module.
83
Appendix: Coding of presidential candidates
Table 27: Candidates Coding
Electi Candida Fin Tech Unive Priva Elite Elite Elite Age Male Metr Non- Information source29
on tes (first ish nical rsity te Scho Unive Occu opolit Mpa
year round) ed Highe (non- ol rsity patio an uche
Hi r subsi n Regio
gh Educ dized n
Sc ation schoo
ho l)
ol
1989 Hernán 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 40 1 0 1 Monckeberg , M. O. (2017) El poder de la UDI. Santaigo: Penguin Random

Büchi House.
Buc
Francisc 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 47 1 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Francisco_Javier
o Javier _Err%C3%A1zuriz_Talavera
Errázuri
z
Talaver
a
Patricio 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 71 1 0 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Patricio_Aylw
Aylwin in_Az%C3%B3car
Azócar
1993 Manfre 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 61 1 0 1 https://www.max-neef.cl/ "La generación del cambio climático: una

d Max aproximación desde el enfoque del cao", by Manuel Guzman. P.351
Neef
Eugenio 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 51 1 0 1 https://www.lemondediplomatique.cl/Padre-Eugenio-Pizarro-Poblete-50.html
Pizarro http://blogs.periodistadigital.com/ungido-para-
Poblete evangelizar.php/2013/01/23/ungido-para-evangelizar-a-los-pobres-y-d
30
29
All information from internet retrieved on 20 June 2018
30
Seminarist. The Episcopal Seminar of Santiago has an agreement with the Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, through which seminarist may obtain a university degree in theology.
However, for the analysis, the candidate was considered to hold a vocational (technical) degree.
84
Eduard 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 51 1 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Eduardo_Frei
o Frei _Ruiz-Tagle
Ruiz-
Tagle
Cristián 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 43 1 1 1 http://www.anim.cl/la-anim-estrena-directiva-y-renueva-su-gestion/
Reitze http://impresa.lasegunda.com/2017/07/28/A/U0372HUQ/OM3732D3
Campos https://web.archive.org/web/20131017104517/http://blog.felipebarriga.cl/do
31 wnloads/servel_junaeb/inscritos/INSCRI13V.txt
http://www.caras.cl/tag/cristian-
reitze/http://diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id={eef3c6ee-b758-42df-
8281-9363ba123712}
Arturo 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 70 1 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Arturo_Aless
Alessan andri_Besa
dri Besa
José 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 45 1 1 1 http://www.josepinera.org/josepinera/jp_jp.htm
Piñera http://ciperchile.cl/2010/11/11/verbo-divino-los-secretos-y-el-poder-del-
Echeñiq colegio-favorito-de-la-elite/ https://www.sebastianpinera.cl/biografia/ (implicit
ue birth in Santiago)
1999 Arturo 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 60 1 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Erwin_Arturo
Frei _Frei_Bol%C3%Advar
Bolívar
Sara 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 47 0 1 1 http://diario.elmercurio.cl/detalle/index.asp?id={cef0abbc-0c94-40d4-8eb5-
María e33fa61ab886}
Larraín
Ruiz-
Tagle
Gladys 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 59 0 0 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Gladys_del_C
Marín armen_Mar%C3%ADn_Millie
Millie
Tomas 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 43 1 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Tom%C3%A1
Hirsch s_Ren%C3%A9_Hirsch_Goldschmidt
Goldsch
midt
Ricardo 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 61 1 1 1 https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ricardo-Lagos
Lagos
Escobar
31
Finished university studies after being a candidate. For the analysis only the technical degree was considered
85
Joaquin 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 46 1 1 1 http://www.joaquinlavin.cl/#Resumen_y_datos_biograficos
Lavin
Infante
2005 Sebasti 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 56 1 1 1 https://www.sebastianpinera.cl/biografia/
án
Piñera
Echeñiq
ue
Michell 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 54 0 1 1 https://www.britannica.com/biography/Michelle-Bachelet
e http://www.uchile.cl/portal/presentacion/historia/grandes-figuras/presidentes-
Bachele de-chile-ex-alumnos-de-la-u/22624/michelle-bachelet-jeria
t Jeria
Tomas 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 49 1 1 1 Previously given
Hirsch
Goldsch
midt
Joaquín 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 52 1 1 1 Previously given
Lavin
Infante
2009 Jorge 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 68 1 1 1 http://blogs.cooperativa.cl/opinion/jorge-arrate/

Arrate
Mac-
Niven
Marco 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 36 1 1 1 http://biografias.bcn.cl/wiki/Marco_Antonio_Enr%C3%ADquez-
Enríque Ominami_Gumucio http://www.marcoenriquezominami.cl/project/infancia/
z-
Omina
mi
Gumuci
o
Sebasti 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 60 1 1 1 Previously given
án
Piñera
Echeniq
ue
Eduard 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 67 1 1 1 Previously given
o Frei
Ruiz-
Tagle
86
2013 Franco 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 46 1 1 1 https://web.archive.org/web/20120508205841/http://parisielpoderdelagente.c
Aldo l/site/bienvenidos/ (spent a few years in Instituto Nacional, but finished in
Parisi military school)
Fernand
ez
Marcel 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 56 1 1 1 http://www.lasegunda.com/Noticias/Nacional/2013/09/880126/las-razones-
Claude del-candidato-marcel-claude-desciendo-de-un-zapatero-frances-anarquista
Reyes https://www.publimetro.cl/cl/candidatos/2013/05/03/marcel-claude.html
Ricardo 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 63 1 0 1 http://ricardoisraelpresidente2014.blogspot.com/p/programa-de-
Israel gobierno.html
Zipper http://www.lasegunda.com/Noticias/Impreso/2013/09/879010/las-mil-y-una-
historias-de-ricardo-israel-el-centro-perdido-que-quiere-representar-el-
candidato
Marco 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 40 1 1 1 Previously given
Enrique
z-
Omina
mi
Gumuci
o
Roxana 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 46 0 1 1 https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/bachelet-es-
del mentira_b_4175429.html?guccounter=1
Carmen https://web.archive.org/web/20130529230356/http://roxanamiranda.cl/roxan
Mirand a-miranda/
a
Menese
s
Michell 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 62 0 1 1 Previously given
e
Bachele
t Jeria
Evelyn 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 60 0 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Evelyn_Matt
Matthei hei_Fornet
Fornet
Alfredo 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 66 1 1 1 http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/alfredo-sfeir-el-economista-y-lider-
Sfeir espiritual-que-aspira-a-llegar-a-la-moneda/ Servicio de Registro Civil e
Younis Identificación, Circunscripción: Recoleta, Nro. inscripción: 1.898, Año: 1947
(infromation on place and date of birth)
Tomás 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 50 1 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Tom%C3%A1
Jocelyn- s_Jocelyn_Holt_Letelier
87
Holt
Letelier
2017 Carolina 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 45 0 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Carolina_Goi

Goic c_Boroevic
Boroevi
c
Jose 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 51 1 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Jos%C3%A9_A
Antonio ntonio_Kast_Rist
Kast
Rist
Sebasti 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 68 1 1 1 Previously given
án
Piñera
Echeniq
ue
Alejand 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 64 1 0 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Alejandro_Ren
ro %C3%A9_Eleodoro_Guillier_%C3%81lvarez
Guillier
Alvarez
Beatriz 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 47 0 0 1 http://www.emol.com/especiales/2017/actualidad/nacional/elecciones/candid
Sanchez ata-sanchez.asp http://www2.latercera.com/noticia/beatriz-sanchez-la-politica/
Munoz
Marco 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 44 1 1 1 Previously given
Enríque
z-
Omina
mi
Gumuci
o
Eduard 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 66 1 0 1 http://unionpatriotica.cl/artespresidente/
o Artes http://www.t13.cl/noticia/politica/eduardo-artes-union-patriotica-candidato
Brichett
i
Alejand 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 59 1 1 1 https://www.bcn.cl/historiapolitica/resenas_parlamentarias/wiki/Alejandro_Nav
ro arro_Brain
Navarro
Brain
88
Table 28: Class Index for Candidates
1989 1993 1999 2005 2009 2013 2017

Class Class Class Class Class Class Class
Candidate Candidate Candidate Candidate Candidate Candidate Candidate
index index index index index index index
Sebastián Franco Aldo

Hernán Büchi Manfred Max Arturo Frei Jorge Arrate Carolina Goic
3 2 3 Piñera 4 3 Parisi 2 2
Buc Neef Bolívar Mac-Niven Boroevic
Echeñique Fernandez
Marco
Francisco Javier Sara María
Eugenio Pizarro Michelle Enríquez- Marcel Claude Jose Antonio
Errázuriz 4 2 Larraín Ruiz- 2 2 3 2 4
Poblete Bachelet Jeria Ominami Reyes Kast Rist
Talavera Tagle
Gumucio
Sebastián
Patricio Aylwin Eduardo Frei Gladys Marín Tomas Hirsch Ricardo Israel Sebastián Piñera
2 4 0 3 Piñera 4 2 4
Azócar Ruiz-Tagle Millie Goldschmidt Zipper Echenique
Echenique
Marco
Cristián Reitze Tomas Hirsch Joaquín Lavin Eduardo Frei Enriquez- Alejandro
3 3 3 4 3 0
Campos Goldschmidt Infante Ruiz-Tagle Ominami Guillier Alvarez
Gumucio
Roxana del
Arturo Ricardo Lagos Carmen Beatriz Sanchez
4 3 0 1
Alessandri Besa Escobar Miranda Munoz
Meneses
Marco Enríquez-
José Piñera Joaquin Lavin Michelle
4 3 2 Ominami 3
Echeñique Infante Bachelet Jeria
Gumucio
Evelyn Matthei Eduardo Artes
4 0
Fornet Brichetti
Alfredo Sfeir Alejandro

4 0
Younis Navarro Brain
Tomás Jocelyn-
4
Holt Letelier
89
Appendix: Dictionary for variables
Table 29: Variables dictionary
Name Definition Possible values

Education_Years
Years of Education Integer value from 0 to
99
School Respondent has high school education or higher 0/1
Higher_Tec Respondent has higher technical education or 0/1
higher
University Respondent has university education 0/1
Non_Native Not belonging to Native population (Mapuche) 0/1
MR Respondent is from the Metropolitan Region 0/1
Man Respondent is Male 0/1
Age Age of respondent Integer values higher
than 17
i.Candidate Fix effect for candidate (variable has value of 1 0/1
when the evaluated candidate is candidate i)
i.Can_Vote Fix effect for voting preference (variable has 0/1
value of 1 when the expressed voting preference
is candidate i)
Ideology Ideology of respondent. Lower levels are “more 0,1,2,3,4
to the right”. Higher levels are “more to the left”
D_Ideology Difference, in absolute value, in political 0,1,2,3,4
ideology between candidate and respondent
Mat_Occupation Both candidate and respondent have an elite 0/1
occupation or both candidate and respondent
have a non-elite occupation
Mat_Metropolitan Both candidate and respondent are from the 0/1
Metropolitan Region or both candidate and
respondent are not from the Metropolitan Region
Mat_Gender Both candidate and respondent are male or both 0/1
candidate and respondent are female
D_Age Age difference, in absolute terms, between Integer values higher
candidate and respondent than 0
Class_Index_De Class index of respondent measured through 0,1,2,3,4
occupation and education
D_Class_Index_De Difference in class indexes of respondent and 0,1,2,3,4
candidate, in absolute terms. Respondent´s class
is measured through occupation and education
Class_Index_De Class index of respondent measured through 0,1,2,3,4
consumption patterns
D_Class_Index_C Difference in class indexes of respondent and 0,1,2,3,4
candidate, in absolute terms. Respondent´s class
is measured through consumption patterns
90

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“Money can´t buy me love”: Class and descriptive

representation in the Chilean presidential elections

CANDIDATE NUMBER: 82742

this implies for the rest of my professional life.

married couple under the cloudy skies of London.

regarding the association between respondents and candidates sharing descriptive

The relevance of descriptive representation is further analysed by implementing a meta-

representation theoretical framework. According to the findings, respondents from lower

public opinion on candidates, but not with voting behaviour.

3. Data and Methods ................................................................................................... 21

Pitkin (1972) famously asserted, in the “descriptive representation” perspective, the

representative represents a group in so much as it shares descriptive characteristics with

gender and ethnicity.

Chile (e.g. CERC-MORI, 2016).

and investigate new elements relevant to the debate.

case of presidential candidates: is (the lack of) descriptive representation of Chilean

possible explanations. The first one is a "supply-side" explanation. An extreme version of

more access to relevant resources (economic, political, or of other nature). A second

representation, or because in real elections voters have incomplete information and

candidates may influence perceptions, hiding or emphasising their descriptive attributes.

aspects of these puzzles.

characteristics will be derived, for the Chilean context, including class.

variables, and other relevant specifications for the analysis.

(2017) on the perception of the population regarding representativeness is analysed,

assessing correlations with the population's meaningful descriptive characteristics.

presidential elections individually, followed by a meta-analysis of five out of the seven

elections undertaken in Chile, since the end of the dictatorship.

account of electoral results in Table 25).

opinions (CEP, 1993; CEP, 2017).

represents a group in so much as it shares descriptive characteristics with that group: to

population, which is the focus of the present research.

overrepresented in governments, may bring the mistrust of the population.

2.1. Meaningful Descriptive Characteristics

If descriptive representation is relevant, this is materialised in specific descriptive

1950, p.57). Therefore, to define meaningful descriptive characteristics is to define spheres of

power which are connected to political power.

The above-mentioned literature on the relationship between descriptive representation, voting

research, relevant descriptive characteristics will be chosen based on the above-mentioned

of the Chilean society.

2.1.1. Class (Social-Economic)

found the following are the most commonly mentioned aspects:

Ethnic, racial or cultural background 10

Place where one lives 28

Source: Modified from PNUD (2017)

be a particularly relevant characteristic in the issue of misrepresentation in Chile. Their

not account for its action.

composition than the general population.

• Because of their socioeconomic differences, the political leadership does not

experience the same lifestyle that lay people do.

Table 1: Social Classes in Chile

Social Class Occupations Education Salary (per capita % of

Source: PNUD (2017), with data from Casen (2015)

through a methodology adapted to the Chilean context by the Asociacion de Investigadores de

used in everyday speech to refer to people from higher social-economic level.

of the descriptive representation of occupation in voters’ preferences (e.g. Campbell and

In the Chilean context, a subgroup of traditionally high-class occupations is especially relevant.

Commercial Engineering (Economics and Business Administration), Civil Engineering, and

professions will be considered elite occupations.

schools, and only two are (highly selective) public schools.

income level compared to the average university student (Orellana, 2011).

and executive power) was 51 years.

the legislative and executive power) was 76.9% (PNUD, 2017).

2.1.4. Spatial differences (centre-periphery)