REPUBLIC ACT No.

4200
AN ACT TO PROHIBIT AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER RELATED
VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person
or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, That the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned
in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
Section 2. Any person who willfully or knowingly does or who shall aid, permit, or cause to be done any
of the acts declared to be unlawful in the preceding section or who violates the provisions of the following
section or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such violation shall, upon conviction
thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than six months or more than six years and with the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification from public office if the offender be a public
official at the time of the commission of the offense, and, if the offender is an alien he shall be subject to
deportation proceedings.
Section 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful or punishable for any peace
officer, who is authorized by a written order of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be
unlawful in the two preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war
and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition,
kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of Commonwealth Act No. 616,
punishing espionage and other offenses against national security: Provided, That such written order shall
only be issued or granted upon written application and the examination under oath or affirmation of the
applicant and the witnesses he may produce and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to
believe that any of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being committed or is
about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy
and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, and
inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior proof that a rebellion or acts of
sedition, as the case may be, have actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the conviction of any person for, or to the
solution of, or to the prevention of, any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily
available for obtaining such evidence.
The order granted or issued shall specify: (1) the identity of the person or persons whose communications,
conversations, discussions, or spoken words are to be overheard, intercepted, or recorded and, in the case
of telegraphic or telephonic communications, the telegraph line or the telephone number involved and its
location; (2) the identity of the peace officer authorized to overhear, intercept, or record the
communications, conversations, discussions, or spoken words; (3) the offense or offenses committed or
sought to be prevented; and (4) the period of the authorization. The authorization shall be effective for the
period specified in the order which shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the date of issuance of the order,
unless extended or renewed by the court upon being satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the
public interest.
All recordings made under court authorization shall, within forty-eight hours after the expiration of the
period fixed in the order, be deposited with the court in a sealed envelope or sealed package, and shall be
accompanied by an affidavit of the peace officer granted such authority stating the number of recordings
made, the dates and times covered by each recording, the number of tapes, discs, or records included in
the deposit, and certifying that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part thereof have been made,
or if made, that all such duplicates or copies are included in the envelope or package deposited with the
court. The envelope or package so deposited shall not be opened, or the recordings replayed, or used in
evidence, or their contents revealed, except upon order of the court, which shall not be granted except
upon motion, with due notice and opportunity to be heard to the person or persons whose conversation or
communications have been recorded.
The court referred to in this section shall be understood to mean the Court of First Instance within whose
territorial jurisdiction the acts for which authority is applied for are to be executed.
Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or
meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any
person in violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any
judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative hearing or investigation.
Section 5. All laws inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or accordingly
amended.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 1405

AN ACT PROHIBITING DISCLOSURE OF OR INQUIRY INTO, DEPOSITS WITH ANY
BANKING INSTITUTION AND PROVIDING PENALTY THEREFOR.
Section 1. It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Government to give encouragement to the people to
deposit their money in banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that the same may be
properly utilized by banks in authorized loans to assist in the economic development of the country.
Section 2. 1 All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including
investments in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written
permission of the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of
bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the
subject matter of the litigation.
Section 3. It shall be unlawful for any official or employee of a banking institution to disclose to any
person other than those mentioned in Section two hereof any information concerning said deposits.
Section 4. All Acts or parts of Acts, Special Charters, Executive Orders, Rules and Regulations which are
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed.
Section 5. Any violation of this law will subject offender upon conviction, to an imprisonment of not
more than five years or a fine of not more than twenty thousand pesos or both, in the discretion of the
court.
Section 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA
Section 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
Sec. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in
cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and
parents; or chanrobles virtual law library
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil degree
of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or chanrobles
virtual law library
Sec. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where the petitioner or
respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered,
collected or stored, at the option of the petitioner. chanrobles virtual law library
The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan
when the action concerns public data files of government offices.
Sec. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the writ is issued by a Regional Trial Court or any judge
thereof, it shall be returnable before such court or judge.
When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, it may be returnable
before such court or any justice thereof, or to any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or
respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered,
collected or stored.
When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable before such Court or any
justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any
Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction
over the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored.
The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees shall be required from an indigent petitioner. The
petition of the indigent shall be docked and acted upon immediately, without prejudice to subsequent
submission of proof of indigency not later than fifteen (15) days from the filing of the petition.
Sec. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should contain:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if known;
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the
database or information or files kept by the respondent.
In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining the act complained of; and
(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.
Sec. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice or judge shall immediately
order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under
the seal of the court and cause it to be served within three (3) days from the issuance; or, in case of urgent
necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under his or her own hand, and may deputize any officer
or person serve it.
The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition which shall not be later than
ten (10) work days from the date of its issuance.chanrobles virtual law library
Sec. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of court who refuses to issue the writ
after its allowance, or a deputized person who refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court,
justice or judge for contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary actions.
Sec. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the respondent by a judicial officer or by
a person deputized by the court, justice or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of
service. In case the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on substituted service
shall apply.
Sec. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a verified written return together with supporting
affidavits within five (5) working days from service of the writ, which period may be reasonably extended
by the Court for justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things, contain the following:
(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged communications, confidentiality
of the source of information of media and others;
(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information subject of the
petition;
(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of such data or information, and
the purpose for its collection;
(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and confidentiality of the data or
information; and
(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and,
(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.
A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.
Sec. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may punish with imprisonment or fine a respondent who
commits contempt by making a false return, or refusing to make a return; or any person who otherwise
disobeys or resist a lawful process or order of the court.
Sec. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. - A hearing in chambers may be conducted where
the respondent invokes the defense that the release of the data or information in question shall
compromise national security or state secrets, or when the data or information cannot be divulged to the
public due to its nature or privileged character.
Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and motions are prohibited:
(a) Motion to dismiss;
(b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position paper and other pleadings;
(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;
(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;
(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;
(f) Third-party complaint;
(g) Reply;
(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;
(i) Intervention;
(j) Memorandum;
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders; and
(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order.
Sec. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court, justice or judge shall
proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless
the court in its discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence.
Sec. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be summary. However, the court, justice or
judge may call for a preliminary conference to simplify the issues and determine the possibility of
obtaining stipulations and admissions from the parties.
Sec. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time the petition is
submitted for decision. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall
enjoin the act complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the erroneous data or
information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just and equitable; otherwise, the privilege of the
writ shall be denied.
Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful officers as may be
designated by the court, justice or judge within five (5) working days.
Sec. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed the final judgment shall, within three (3) days from
its enforcement, make a verified return to the court. The return shall contain a full statement of the
proceedings under the writ and a complete inventory of the database or information, or documents and
articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies served on the petitioner and the respondent.
The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and complied with by the respondent,
as well as all objections of the parties regarding the manner and regularity of the service of the writ.
Sec. 18. Hearing on Officer-s Return. - The court shall set the return for hearing with due notice to the
parties and act accordingly.
Sec. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to the Supreme Court under
Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or law or both.
The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of the judgment or final order.
The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo cases.
Sec. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of a petition for the writ of habeas data shall not
preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or administrative actions.
Sec. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the filing of a petition for the writ,
the latter shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a petition for a writ of habeas
data, the petition shall be consolidated with the criminal action.
After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern the disposition of the reliefs in
the petition.
Sec. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate
petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved party by
motion in the criminal case.
The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of habeas
data.
Sec. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.
Sec. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. - The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily
insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.
Sec. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication in three
(3) newspapers of general circulation.
Republic Act No. 10173
August 15, 2012
Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Fifteenth Congress
Second Regular Session
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-fifth day of July, two thousand eleven.
[REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10173]
AN ACT PROTECTING INDIVIDUAL PERSONAL INFORMATION IN INFORMATION AND
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS IN THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR,
CREATING FOR THIS PURPOSE A NATIONAL PRIVACY COMMISSION, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
CHAPTER I
GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the “Data Privacy Act of 2012”.
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is the policy of the State to protect the fundamental human right of
privacy, of communication while ensuring free flow of information to promote innovation and growth.
The State recognizes the vital role of information and communications technology in nation-building and
its inherent obligation to ensure that personal information in information and communications systems in
the government and in the private sector are secured and protected.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – Whenever used in this Act, the following terms shall have the respective
meanings hereafter set forth:
(a) Commission shall refer to the National Privacy Commission created by virtue of this Act.
(b) Consent of the data subject refers to any freely given, specific, informed indication of will, whereby
the data subject agrees to the collection and processing of personal information about and/or relating to
him or her. Consent shall be evidenced by written, electronic or recorded means. It may also be given on
behalf of the data subject by an agent specifically authorized by the data subject to do so.
(c) Data subject refers to an individual whose personal information is processed.
(d) Direct marketing refers to communication by whatever means of any advertising or marketing
material which is directed to particular individuals.
(e) Filing system refers to any act of information relating to natural or juridical persons to the extent that,
although the information is not processed by equipment operating automatically in response to
instructions given for that purpose, the set is structured, either by reference to individuals or by reference
to criteria relating to individuals, in such a way that specific information relating to a particular person is
readily accessible.
(f) Information and Communications System refers to a system for generating, sending, receiving, storing
or otherwise processing electronic data messages or electronic documents and includes the computer
system or other similar device by or which data is recorded, transmitted or stored and any procedure
related to the recording, transmission or storage of electronic data, electronic message, or electronic
document.
(g) Personal information refers to any information whether recorded in a material form or not, from
which the identity of an individual is apparent or can be reasonably and directly ascertained by the entity
holding the information, or when put together with other information would directly and certainly identify
an individual.
(h) Personal information controller refers to a person or organization who controls the collection,
holding, processing or use of personal information, including a person or organization who instructs
another person or organization to collect, hold, process, use, transfer or disclose personal information on
his or her behalf. The term excludes:
(1) A person or organization who performs such functions as instructed by another person or
organization; and
(2) An individual who collects, holds, processes or uses personal information in connection with the
individual’s personal, family or household affairs.
(i) Personal information processor refers to any natural or juridical person qualified to act as such under
this Act to whom a personal information controller may outsource the processing of personal data
pertaining to a data subject.
(j) Processing refers to any operation or any set of operations performed upon personal information
including, but not limited to, the collection, recording, organization, storage, updating or modification,
retrieval, consultation, use, consolidation, blocking, erasure or destruction of data.
(k) Privileged information refers to any and all forms of data which under the Rules of Court and other
pertinent laws constitute privileged communication.
(l) Sensitive personal information refers to personal information:
(1) About an individual’s race, ethnic origin, marital status, age, color, and religious, philosophical or
political affiliations;
(2) About an individual’s health, education, genetic or sexual life of a person, or to any proceeding for
any offense committed or alleged to have been committed by such person, the disposal of such
proceedings, or the sentence of any court in such proceedings;
(3) Issued by government agencies peculiar to an individual which includes, but not limited to, social
security numbers, previous or cm-rent health records, licenses or its denials, suspension or revocation, and
tax returns; and
(4) Specifically established by an executive order or an act of Congress to be kept classified.
SEC. 4. Scope. – This Act applies to the processing of all types of personal information and to any natural
and juridical person involved in personal information processing including those personal information
controllers and processors who, although not found or established in the Philippines, use equipment that
are located in the Philippines, or those who maintain an office, branch or agency in the Philippines subject
to the immediately succeeding paragraph: Provided, That the requirements of Section 5 are complied
with.
This Act does not apply to the following:
(a) Information about any individual who is or was an officer or employee of a government institution
that relates to the position or functions of the individual, including:
(1) The fact that the individual is or was an officer or employee of the government institution;
(2) The title, business address and office telephone number of the individual;
(3) The classification, salary range and responsibilities of the position held by the individual; and
(4) The name of the individual on a document prepared by the individual in the course of employment
with the government;
(b) Information about an individual who is or was performing service under contract for a government
institution that relates to the services performed, including the terms of the contract, and the name of the
individual given in the course of the performance of those services;
(c) Information relating to any discretionary benefit of a financial nature such as the granting of a license
or permit given by the government to an individual, including the name of the individual and the exact
nature of the benefit;
(d) Personal information processed for journalistic, artistic, literary or research purposes;
(e) Information necessary in order to carry out the functions of public authority which includes the
processing of personal data for the performance by the independent, central monetary authority and law
enforcement and regulatory agencies of their constitutionally and statutorily mandated functions. Nothing
in this Act shall be construed as to have amended or repealed Republic Act No. 1405, otherwise known as
the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act; Republic Act No. 6426, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency
Deposit Act; and Republic Act No. 9510, otherwise known as the Credit Information System Act (CISA);
(f) Information necessary for banks and other financial institutions under the jurisdiction of the
independent, central monetary authority or Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to comply with Republic Act No.
9510, and Republic Act No. 9160, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Money Laundering Act and
other applicable laws; and
(g) Personal information originally collected from residents of foreign jurisdictions in accordance with the
laws of those foreign jurisdictions, including any applicable data privacy laws, which is being processed
in the Philippines.
SEC. 5. Protection Afforded to Journalists and Their Sources. – Nothing in this Act shall be construed as
to have amended or repealed the provisions of Republic Act No. 53, which affords the publishers, editors
or duly accredited reporters of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation protection
from being compelled to reveal the source of any news report or information appearing in said publication
which was related in any confidence to such publisher, editor, or reporter.
SEC. 6. Extraterritorial Application. – This Act applies to an act done or practice engaged in and outside
of the Philippines by an entity if:
(a) The act, practice or processing relates to personal information about a Philippine citizen or a resident;
(b) The entity has a link with the Philippines, and the entity is processing personal information in the
Philippines or even if the processing is outside the Philippines as long as it is about Philippine citizens or
residents such as, but not limited to, the following:
(1) A contract is entered in the Philippines;
(2) A juridical entity unincorporated in the Philippines but has central management and control in the
country; and
(3) An entity that has a branch, agency, office or subsidiary in the Philippines and the parent or affiliate of
the Philippine entity has access to personal information; and
(c) The entity has other links in the Philippines such as, but not limited to:
(1) The entity carries on business in the Philippines; and
(2) The personal information was collected or held by an entity in the Philippines.
CHAPTER II
THE NATIONAL PRIVACY COMMISSION
SEC. 7. Functions of the National Privacy Commission. – To administer and implement the provisions of
this Act, and to monitor and ensure compliance of the country with international standards set for data
protection, there is hereby created an independent body to be known as the National Privacy Commission,
winch shall have the following functions:
(a) Ensure compliance of personal information controllers with the provisions of this Act;
(b) Receive complaints, institute investigations, facilitate or enable settlement of complaints through the
use of alternative dispute resolution processes, adjudicate, award indemnity on matters affecting any
personal information, prepare reports on disposition of complaints and resolution of any investigation it
initiates, and, in cases it deems appropriate, publicize any such report: Provided, That in resolving any
complaint or investigation (except where amicable settlement is reached by the parties), the Commission
shall act as a collegial body. For this purpose, the Commission may be given access to personal
information that is subject of any complaint and to collect the information necessary to perform its
functions under this Act;
(c) Issue cease and desist orders, impose a temporary or permanent ban on the processing of personal
information, upon finding that the processing will be detrimental to national security and public interest;
(d) Compel or petition any entity, government agency or instrumentality to abide by its orders or take
action on a matter affecting data privacy;
(e) Monitor the compliance of other government agencies or instrumentalities on their security and
technical measures and recommend the necessary action in order to meet minimum standards for
protection of personal information pursuant to this Act;
(f) Coordinate with other government agencies and the private sector on efforts to formulate and
implement plans and policies to strengthen the protection of personal information in the country;
(g) Publish on a regular basis a guide to all laws relating to data protection;
(h) Publish a compilation of agency system of records and notices, including index and other finding aids;
(i) Recommend to the Department of Justice (DOJ) the prosecution and imposition of penalties specified
in Sections 25 to 29 of this Act;
(j) Review, approve, reject or require modification of privacy codes voluntarily adhered to by personal
information controllers: Provided, That the privacy codes shall adhere to the underlying data privacy
principles embodied in this Act: Provided, further,That such privacy codes may include private dispute
resolution mechanisms for complaints against any participating personal information controller. For this
purpose, the Commission shall consult with relevant regulatory agencies in the formulation and
administration of privacy codes applying the standards set out in this Act, with respect to the persons,
entities, business activities and business sectors that said regulatory bodies are authorized to principally
regulate pursuant to the law: Provided, finally. That the Commission may review such privacy codes and
require changes thereto for purposes of complying with this Act;
(k) Provide assistance on matters relating to privacy or data protection at the request of a national or local
agency, a private entity or any person;
(l) Comment on the implication on data privacy of proposed national or local statutes, regulations or
procedures, issue advisory opinions and interpret the provisions of this Act and other data privacy laws;
(m) Propose legislation, amendments or modifications to Philippine laws on privacy or data protection as
may be necessary;
(n) Ensure proper and effective coordination with data privacy regulators in other countries and private
accountability agents, participate in international and regional initiatives for data privacy protection;
(o) Negotiate and contract with other data privacy authorities of other countries for cross-border
application and implementation of respective privacy laws;
(p) Assist Philippine companies doing business abroad to respond to foreign privacy or data protection
laws and regulations; and
(q) Generally perform such acts as may be necessary to facilitate cross-border enforcement of data
privacy protection.
SEC. 8. Confidentiality. – The Commission shall ensure at all times the confidentiality of any personal
information that comes to its knowledge and possession.
SEC. 9. Organizational Structure of the Commission. – The Commission shall be attached to the
Department of Information and Communications Technology (DICT) and shall be headed by a Privacy
Commissioner, who shall also act as Chairman of the Commission. The Privacy Commissioner shall be
assisted by two (2) Deputy Privacy Commissioners, one to be responsible for Data Processing Systems
and one to be responsible for Policies and Planning. The Privacy Commissioner and the two (2) Deputy
Privacy Commissioners shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines for a term of three (3)
years, and may be reappointed for another term of three (3) years. Vacancies in the Commission shall be
filled in the same manner in which the original appointment was made.
The Privacy Commissioner must be at least thirty-five (35) years of age and of good moral character,
unquestionable integrity and known probity, and a recognized expert in the field of information
technology and data privacy. The Privacy Commissioner shall enjoy the benefits, privileges and
emoluments equivalent to the rank of Secretary.
The Deputy Privacy Commissioners must be recognized experts in the field of information and
communications technology and data privacy. They shall enjoy the benefits, privileges and emoluments
equivalent to the rank of Undersecretary.
The Privacy Commissioner, the Deputy Commissioners, or any person acting on their behalf or under
their direction, shall not be civilly liable for acts done in good faith in the performance of their duties.
However, he or she shall be liable for willful or negligent acts done by him or her which are contrary to
law, morals, public policy and good customs even if he or she acted under orders or instructions of
superiors: Provided, That in case a lawsuit is filed against such official on the subject of the performance
of his or her duties, where such performance is lawful, he or she shall be reimbursed by the Commission
for reasonable costs of litigation.
SEC. 10. The Secretariat. – The Commission is hereby authorized to establish a Secretariat. Majority of
the members of the Secretariat must have served for at least five (5) years in any agency of the
government that is involved in the processing of personal information including, but not limited to, the
following offices: Social Security System (SSS), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Land
Transportation Office (LTO), Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PhilHealth), Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), Department
of Justice (DOJ), and Philippine Postal Corporation (Philpost).
CHAPTER III
PROCESSING OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
SEC. 11. General Data Privacy Principles. – The processing of personal information shall be allowed,
subject to compliance with the requirements of this Act and other laws allowing disclosure of information
to the public and adherence to the principles of transparency, legitimate purpose and proportionality.
Personal information must, be:
(a) Collected for specified and legitimate purposes determined and declared before, or as soon as
reasonably practicable after collection, and later processed in a way compatible with such declared,
specified and legitimate purposes only;
(b) Processed fairly and lawfully;
(c) Accurate, relevant and, where necessary for purposes for which it is to be used the processing of
personal information, kept up to date; inaccurate or incomplete data must be rectified, supplemented,
destroyed or their further processing restricted;
(d) Adequate and not excessive in relation to the purposes for which they are collected and processed;
(e) Retained only for as long as necessary for the fulfillment of the purposes for which the data was
obtained or for the establishment, exercise or defense of legal claims, or for legitimate business purposes,
or as provided by law; and
(f) Kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the
purposes for which the data were collected and processed: Provided, That personal information collected
for other purposes may lie processed for historical, statistical or scientific purposes, and in cases laid
down in law may be stored for longer periods: Provided, further,That adequate safeguards are guaranteed
by said laws authorizing their processing.
The personal information controller must ensure implementation of personal information processing
principles set out herein.
SEC. 12. Criteria for Lawful Processing of Personal Information. – The processing of personal
information shall be permitted only if not otherwise prohibited by law, and when at least one of the
following conditions exists:
(a) The data subject has given his or her consent;
(b) The processing of personal information is necessary and is related to the fulfillment of a contract with
the data subject or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract;
(c) The processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the personal information
controller is subject;
(d) The processing is necessary to protect vitally important interests of the data subject, including life and
health;
(e) The processing is necessary in order to respond to national emergency, to comply with the
requirements of public order and safety, or to fulfill functions of public authority which necessarily
includes the processing of personal data for the fulfillment of its mandate; or
(f) The processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the personal
information controller or by a third party or parties to whom the data is disclosed, except where such
interests are overridden by fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection
under the Philippine Constitution.
SEC. 13. Sensitive Personal Information and Privileged Information. – The processing of sensitive
personal information and privileged information shall be prohibited, except in the following cases:
(a) The data subject has given his or her consent, specific to the purpose prior to the processing, or in the
case of privileged information, all parties to the exchange have given their consent prior to processing;
(b) The processing of the same is provided for by existing laws and regulations: Provided, That such
regulatory enactments guarantee the protection of the sensitive personal information and the privileged
information: Provided, further, That the consent of the data subjects are not required by law or regulation
permitting the processing of the sensitive personal information or the privileged information;
(c) The processing is necessary to protect the life and health of the data subject or another person, and the
data subject is not legally or physically able to express his or her consent prior to the processing;
(d) The processing is necessary to achieve the lawful and noncommercial objectives of public
organizations and their associations: Provided, That such processing is only confined and related to
the bona fide members of these organizations or their associations: Provided, further, That the sensitive
personal information are not transferred to third parties: Provided, finally,That consent of the data subject
was obtained prior to processing;
(e) The processing is necessary for purposes of medical treatment, is carried out by a medical practitioner
or a medical treatment institution, and an adequate level of protection of personal information is ensured;
or
(f) The processing concerns such personal information as is necessary for the protection of lawful rights
and interests of natural or legal persons in court proceedings, or the establishment, exercise or defense of
legal claims, or when provided to government or public authority.
SEC. 14. Subcontract of Personal Information. – A personal information controller may subcontract the
processing of personal information: Provided, That the personal information controller shall be
responsible for ensuring that proper safeguards are in place to ensure the confidentiality of the personal
information processed, prevent its use for unauthorized purposes, and generally, comply with the
requirements of this Act and other laws for processing of personal information. The personal information
processor shall comply with all the requirements of this Act and other applicable laws.
SEC. 15. Extension of Privileged Communication. – Personal information controllers may invoke the
principle of privileged communication over privileged information that they lawfully control or process.
Subject to existing laws and regulations, any evidence gathered on privileged information is inadmissible.
CHAPTER IV
RIGHTS OF THE DATA SUBJECT
SEC. 16. Rights of the Data Subject. – The data subject is entitled to:
(a) Be informed whether personal information pertaining to him or her shall be, are being or have been
processed;
(b) Be furnished the information indicated hereunder before the entry of his or her personal information
into the processing system of the personal information controller, or at the next practical opportunity:
(1) Description of the personal information to be entered into the system;
(2) Purposes for which they are being or are to be processed;
(3) Scope and method of the personal information processing;
(4) The recipients or classes of recipients to whom they are or may be disclosed;
(5) Methods utilized for automated access, if the same is allowed by the data subject, and the extent to
which such access is authorized;
(6) The identity and contact details of the personal information controller or its representative;
(7) The period for which the information will be stored; and
(8) The existence of their rights, i.e., to access, correction, as well as the right to lodge a complaint before
the Commission.
Any information supplied or declaration made to the data subject on these matters shall not be amended
without prior notification of data subject: Provided, That the notification under subsection (b) shall not
apply should the personal information be needed pursuant to a subpoena or when the collection and
processing are for obvious purposes, including when it is necessary for the performance of or in relation
to a contract or service or when necessary or desirable in the context of an employer-employee
relationship, between the collector and the data subject, or when the information is being collected and
processed as a result of legal obligation;
(c) Reasonable access to, upon demand, the following:
(1) Contents of his or her personal information that were processed;
(2) Sources from which personal information were obtained;
(3) Names and addresses of recipients of the personal information;
(4) Manner by which such data were processed;
(5) Reasons for the disclosure of the personal information to recipients;
(6) Information on automated processes where the data will or likely to be made as the sole basis for any
decision significantly affecting or will affect the data subject;
(7) Date when his or her personal information concerning the data subject were last accessed and
modified; and
(8) The designation, or name or identity and address of the personal information controller;
(d) Dispute the inaccuracy or error in the personal information and have the personal information
controller correct it immediately and accordingly, unless the request is vexatious or otherwise
unreasonable. If the personal information have been corrected, the personal information controller shall
ensure the accessibility of both the new and the retracted information and the simultaneous receipt of the
new and the retracted information by recipients thereof: Provided, That the third parties who have
previously received such processed personal information shall he informed of its inaccuracy and its
rectification upon reasonable request of the data subject;
(e) Suspend, withdraw or order the blocking, removal or destruction of his or her personal information
from the personal information controller’s filing system upon discovery and substantial proof that the
personal information are incomplete, outdated, false, unlawfully obtained, used for unauthorized purposes
or are no longer necessary for the purposes for which they were collected. In this case, the personal
information controller may notify third parties who have previously received such processed personal
information; and
(f) Be indemnified for any damages sustained due to such inaccurate, incomplete, outdated, false,
unlawfully obtained or unauthorized use of personal information.
SEC. 17. Transmissibility of Rights of the Data Subject. – The lawful heirs and assigns of the data subject
may invoke the rights of the data subject for, which he or she is an heir or assignee at any time after the
death of the data subject or when the data subject is incapacitated or incapable of exercising the rights as
enumerated in the immediately preceding section.
SEC. 18. Right to Data Portability. – The data subject shall have the right, where personal information is
processed by electronic means and in a structured and commonly used format, to obtain from the personal
information controller a copy of data undergoing processing in an electronic or structured format, which
is commonly used and allows for further use by the data subject. The Commission may specify the
electronic format referred to above, as well as the technical standards, modalities and procedures for their
transfer.
SEC. 19. Non-Applicability. – The immediately preceding sections are not applicable if the processed
personal information are used only for the needs of scientific and statistical research and, on the basis of
such, no activities are carried out and no decisions are taken regarding the data subject: Provided, That
the personal information shall be held under strict confidentiality and shall be used only for the declared
purpose. Likewise, the immediately preceding sections are not applicable to processing of personal
information gathered for the purpose of investigations in relation to any criminal, administrative or tax
liabilities of a data subject.
CHAPTER V
SECURITY OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
SEC. 20. Security of Personal Information. – (a) The personal information controller must implement
reasonable and appropriate organizational, physical and technical measures intended for the protection of
personal information against any accidental or unlawful destruction, alteration and disclosure, as well as
against any other unlawful processing.
(b) The personal information controller shall implement reasonable and appropriate measures to protect
personal information against natural dangers such as accidental loss or destruction, and human dangers
such as unlawful access, fraudulent misuse, unlawful destruction, alteration and contamination.
(c) The determination of the appropriate level of security under this section must take into account the
nature of the personal information to be protected, the risks represented by the processing, the size of the
organization and complexity of its operations, current data privacy best practices and the cost of security
implementation. Subject to guidelines as the Commission may issue from time to time, the measures
implemented must include:
(1) Safeguards to protect its computer network against accidental, unlawful or unauthorized usage or
interference with or hindering of their functioning or availability;
(2) A security policy with respect to the processing of personal information;
(3) A process for identifying and accessing reasonably foreseeable vulnerabilities in its computer
networks, and for taking preventive, corrective and mitigating action against security incidents that can
lead to a security breach; and
(4) Regular monitoring for security breaches and a process for taking preventive, corrective and
mitigating action against security incidents that can lead to a security breach.
(d) The personal information controller must further ensure that third parties processing personal
information on its behalf shall implement the security measures required by this provision.
(e) The employees, agents or representatives of a personal information controller who are involved in the
processing of personal information shall operate and hold personal information under strict confidentiality
if the personal information are not intended for public disclosure. This obligation shall continue even after
leaving the public service, transfer to another position or upon termination of employment or contractual
relations.
(f) The personal information controller shall promptly notify the Commission and affected data subjects
when sensitive personal information or other information that may, under the circumstances, be used to
enable identity fraud are reasonably believed to have been acquired by an unauthorized person, and the
personal information controller or the Commission believes (bat such unauthorized acquisition is likely to
give rise to a real risk of serious harm to any affected data subject. The notification shall at least describe
the nature of the breach, the sensitive personal information possibly involved, and the measures taken by
the entity to address the breach. Notification may be delayed only to the extent necessary to determine the
scope of the breach, to prevent further disclosures, or to restore reasonable integrity to the information
and communications system.
(1) In evaluating if notification is unwarranted, the Commission may take into account compliance by the
personal information controller with this section and existence of good faith in the acquisition of personal
information.
(2) The Commission may exempt a personal information controller from notification where, in its
reasonable judgment, such notification would not be in the public interest or in the interests of the
affected data subjects.
(3) The Commission may authorize postponement of notification where it may hinder the progress of a
criminal investigation related to a serious breach.
CHAPTER VI
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR TRANSFER OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
SEC. 21. Principle of Accountability. – Each personal information controller is responsible for personal
information under its control or custody, including information that have been transferred to a third party
for processing, whether domestically or internationally, subject to cross-border arrangement and
cooperation.
(a) The personal information controller is accountable for complying with the requirements of this Act
and shall use contractual or other reasonable means to provide a comparable level of protection while the
information are being processed by a third party.
(b) The personal information controller shall designate an individual or individuals who are accountable
for the organization’s compliance with this Act. The identity of the individual(s) so designated shall be
made known to any data subject upon request.
 CHAPTER VII
SECURITY OF SENSITIVE PERSONAL
INFORMATION IN GOVERNMENT
SEC 22. Responsibility of Heads of Agencies. – All sensitive personal information maintained by the
government, its agencies and instrumentalities shall be secured, as far as practicable, with the use of the
most appropriate standard recognized by the information and communications technology industry, and as
recommended by the Commission. The head of each government agency or instrumentality shall be
responsible for complying with the security requirements mentioned herein while the Commission shall
monitor the compliance and may recommend the necessary action in order to satisfy the minimum
standards.
SEC. 23. Requirements Relating to Access by Agency Personnel to Sensitive Personal Information. – (a)
On-site and Online Access – Except as may be allowed through guidelines to be issued by the
Commission, no employee of the government shall have access to sensitive personal information on
government property or through online facilities unless the employee has received a security clearance
from the head of the source agency.
(b) Off-site Access – Unless otherwise provided in guidelines to be issued by the Commission, sensitive
personal information maintained by an agency may not be transported or accessed from a location off
government property unless a request for such transportation or access is submitted and approved by the
head of the agency in accordance with the following guidelines:
(1) Deadline for Approval or Disapproval – In the case of any request submitted to the head of an agency,
such head of the agency shall approve or disapprove the request within two (2) business days after the
date of submission of the request. In case there is no action by the head of the agency, then such request is
considered disapproved;
(2) Limitation to One thousand (1,000) Records – If a request is approved, the head of the agency shall
limit the access to not more than one thousand (1,000) records at a time; and
(3) Encryption – Any technology used to store, transport or access sensitive personal information for
purposes of off-site access approved under this subsection shall be secured by the use of the most secure
encryption standard recognized by the Commission.
The requirements of this subsection shall be implemented not later than six (6) months after the date of
the enactment of this Act.
SEC. 24. Applicability to Government Contractors. – In entering into any contract that may involve
accessing or requiring sensitive personal information from one thousand (1,000) or more individuals, an
agency shall require a contractor and its employees to register their personal information processing
system with the Commission in accordance with this Act and to comply with the other provisions of this
Act including the immediately preceding section, in the same manner as agencies and government
employees comply with such requirements.
CHAPTER VIII
PENALTIES
SEC. 25. Unauthorized Processing of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information. – (a)
The unauthorized processing of personal information shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging from
one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00)
but not more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who process
personal information without the consent of the data subject, or without being authorized under this Act
or any existing law.
(b) The unauthorized processing of personal sensitive information shall be penalized by imprisonment
ranging from three (3) years to six (6) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than Four million pesos (Php4,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons
who process personal information without the consent of the data subject, or without being authorized
under this Act or any existing law.
SEC. 26. Accessing Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information Due to Negligence. – (a)
Accessing personal information due to negligence shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging from one
(1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but
not more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who, due to negligence,
provided access to personal information without being authorized under this Act or any existing law.
(b) Accessing sensitive personal information due to negligence shall be penalized by imprisonment
ranging from three (3) years to six (6) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than Four million pesos (Php4,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons
who, due to negligence, provided access to personal information without being authorized under this Act
or any existing law.
SEC. 27. Improper Disposal of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information. – (a) The
improper disposal of personal information shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging from six (6)
months to two (2) years and a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) but not
more than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who knowingly or
negligently dispose, discard or abandon the personal information of an individual in an area accessible to
the public or has otherwise placed the personal information of an individual in its container for trash
collection.
b) The improper disposal of sensitive personal information shall be penalized by imprisonment ranging
from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos
(Php100,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons
who knowingly or negligently dispose, discard or abandon the personal information of an individual in an
area accessible to the public or has otherwise placed the personal information of an individual in its
container for trash collection.
SEC. 28. Processing of Personal Information and Sensitive Personal Information for Unauthorized
Purposes. – The processing of personal information for unauthorized purposes shall be penalized by
imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and six (6) months to five (5) years and a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00)
shall be imposed on persons processing personal information for purposes not authorized by the data
subject, or otherwise authorized under this Act or under existing laws.
The processing of sensitive personal information for unauthorized purposes shall be penalized by
imprisonment ranging from two (2) years to seven (7) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be
imposed on persons processing sensitive personal information for purposes not authorized by the data
subject, or otherwise authorized under this Act or under existing laws.
SEC. 29. Unauthorized Access or Intentional Breach. – The penalty of imprisonment ranging from one
(1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but
not more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) shall be imposed on persons who knowingly and
unlawfully, or violating data confidentiality and security data systems, breaks in any way into any system
where personal and sensitive personal information is stored.
SEC. 30. Concealment of Security Breaches Involving Sensitive Personal Information. – The penalty of
imprisonment of one (1) year and six (6) months to five (5) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) shall be
imposed on persons who, after having knowledge of a security breach and of the obligation to notify the
Commission pursuant to Section 20(f), intentionally or by omission conceals the fact of such security
breach.
SEC. 31. Malicious Disclosure. – Any personal information controller or personal information processor
or any of its officials, employees or agents, who, with malice or in bad faith, discloses unwarranted or
false information relative to any personal information or personal sensitive information obtained by him
or her, shall be subject to imprisonment ranging from one (1) year and six (6) months to five (5) years and
a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos
(Php1,000,000.00).
SEC. 32. Unauthorized Disclosure. – (a) Any personal information controller or personal information
processor or any of its officials, employees or agents, who discloses to a third party personal information
not covered by the immediately preceding section without the consent of the data subject, shall he subject
to imprisonment ranging from one (1) year to three (3) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00).
(b) Any personal information controller or personal information processor or any of its officials,
employees or agents, who discloses to a third party sensitive personal information not covered by the
immediately preceding section without the consent of the data subject, shall be subject to imprisonment
ranging from three (3) years to five (5) years and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00).
SEC. 33. Combination or Series of Acts. – Any combination or series of acts as defined in Sections 25 to
32 shall make the person subject to imprisonment ranging from three (3) years to six (6) years and a fine
of not less than One million pesos (Php1,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos
(Php5,000,000.00).
SEC. 34. Extent of Liability. – If the offender is a corporation, partnership or any juridical person, the
penalty shall be imposed upon the responsible officers, as the case may be, who participated in, or by
their gross negligence, allowed the commission of the crime. If the offender is a juridical person, the court
may suspend or revoke any of its rights under this Act. If the offender is an alien, he or she shall, in
addition to the penalties herein prescribed, be deported without further proceedings after serving the
penalties prescribed. If the offender is a public official or employee and lie or she is found guilty of acts
penalized under Sections 27 and 28 of this Act, he or she shall, in addition to the penalties prescribed
herein, suffer perpetual or temporary absolute disqualification from office, as the case may be.
SEC. 35. Large-Scale. – The maximum penalty in the scale of penalties respectively provided for the
preceding offenses shall be imposed when the personal information of at least one hundred (100) persons
is harmed, affected or involved as the result of the above mentioned actions.
SEC. 36. Offense Committed by Public Officer. – When the offender or the person responsible for the
offense is a public officer as defined in the Administrative Code of the Philippines in the exercise of his
or her duties, an accessory penalty consisting in the disqualification to occupy public office for a term
double the term of criminal penalty imposed shall he applied.
SEC. 37. Restitution. – Restitution for any aggrieved party shall be governed by the provisions of the
New Civil Code.
CHAPTER IX
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
SEC. 38. Interpretation. – Any doubt in the interpretation of any provision of this Act shall be liberally
interpreted in a manner mindful of the rights and interests of the individual about whom personal
information is processed.
SEC. 39. Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). – Within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of
this Act, the Commission shall promulgate the rules and regulations to effectively implement the
provisions of this Act.
SEC. 40. Reports and Information. – The Commission shall annually report to the President and Congress
on its activities in carrying out the provisions of this Act. The Commission shall undertake whatever
efforts it may determine to be necessary or appropriate to inform and educate the public of data privacy,
data protection and fair information rights and responsibilities.
SEC. 41. Appropriations Clause. – The Commission shall be provided with an initial appropriation of
Twenty million pesos (Php20,000,000.00) to be drawn from the national government. Appropriations for
the succeeding years shall be included in the General Appropriations Act. It shall likewise receive Ten
million pesos (Php10,000,000.00) per year for five (5) years upon implementation of this Act drawn from
the national government.
SEC. 42. Transitory Provision. – Existing industries, businesses and offices affected by the
implementation of this Act shall be given one (1) year transitory period from the effectivity of the IRR or
such other period as may be determined by the Commission, to comply with the requirements of this Act.
In case that the DICT has not yet been created by the time the law takes full force and effect, the National
Privacy Commission shall be attached to the Office of the President.
SEC. 43. Separability Clause. – If any provision or part hereof is held invalid or unconstitutional, the
remainder of the law or the provision not otherwise affected shall remain valid and subsisting.
SEC. 44. Repealing Clause. – The provision of Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9372, otherwise known as
the “Human Security Act of 2007”, is hereby amended. Except as otherwise expressly provided in this
Act, all other laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 45. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least
two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
 Republic of the Philippines
Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila
Thirteenth Congress
Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the nineteenth day of February, two thousand seven.
Republic Act No. 9372 March 6, 2007
AN ACT TO SECURE THE STATE AND PROTECT OUR PEOPLE FROM TERRORISM
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Short Title. - This Act shall henceforth be known as the "Human Security Act of 2007."
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - It is declared a policy of the State to protect life, liberty, and property
from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the national security of the
country and to the welfare of the people, and to make terrorism a crime against the Filipino people,
against humanity, and against the law of nations.
In the implementation of the policy stated above, the State shall uphold the basic rights and fundamental
liberties of the people as enshrined in the Constitution.
The State recognizes that the fight against terrorism requires a comprehensive approach, comprising
political, economic, diplomatic, military, and legal means duly taking into account the root causes of
terrorism without acknowledging these as justifications for terrorist and/or criminal activities. Such
measures shall include conflict management and post-conflict peace-building, addressing the roots of
conflict by building state capacity and promoting equitable economic development.
Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a curtailment, restriction or diminution of constitutionally
recognized powers of the executive branch of the government. It is to be understood, however that the
exercise of the constitutionally recognized powers of the executive department of the government shall
not prejudice respect for human rights which shall be absolute and protected at all times.
SEC. 3. Terrorism.- Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following provisions of
the Revised Penal Code:
a. Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters);
b. Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
c. Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private persons;
d. Article 248 (Murder);
e. Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
f. Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under
1. Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
2. Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control
Act of 1990);
3. Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);
4. Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
5. Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974);
and,
6. Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal and
Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms,
Ammunitions or Explosives)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime
of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole
as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.
SEC. 4. Conspiracy to Commit Terrorism. - Persons who conspire to commit the crime of terrorism shall
suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of the
crime of terrorism as defined in Section 3 hereof and decide to commit the same.
SEC. 5. Accomplice. - Any person who, not being a principal under Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code
or a conspirator as defined in Section 4 hereof, cooperates in the execution of either the crime of terrorism
or conspiracy to commit terrorism by previous or simultaneous acts shall suffer the penalty of from
seventeen (17) years, four months one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 6. Accessory. - Any person who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism, and without having participated therein, either as principal or accomplice
under Articles 17 and 18 of the Revised Penal Code, takes part subsequent to its commission in any of the
following manner: (a) by profiting himself or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime;
(b) by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects, or instruments thereof, in order to
prevent its discovery; (c) by harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal or
conspirator of the crime, shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.
Notwithstanding the above paragraph, the penalties prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon
those who are such with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted
brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees, with the single exception of
accessories falling within the provisions of subparagraph (a).
SEC. 7. Surveillance of Suspects and Interception and Recording of Communications. -The provisions
of Republic Act No. 4200 (Anti-Wire Tapping Law) to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law
enforcement official and the members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals,
listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other
surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways
and means for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written
words between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group
of persons or of any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism.
Provided, That surveillance, interception and recording of communications between lawyers and clients,
doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be
authorized.
SEC. 8. Formal Application for Judicial Authorization. - The written order of the authorizing division
of the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words of any person suspected of the crime of terrorism
or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall only be granted by the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals upon an ex parte written application of a police or of a law enforcement official who has
been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file
such ex parte application, and upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the
witnesses he may produce to establish: (a) that there is probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism
has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed; (b) that there is probable cause
to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that evidence, which is essential to the
conviction of any charged or suspected person for, or to the solution or prevention of, any such crimes,
will be obtained; and, (c) that there is no other effective means readily available for acquiring such
evidence.
SEC. 9. Classification and Contents of the Order of the Court. - The written order granted by the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals as well as its order, if any, to extend or renew the same, the
original application of the applicant, including his application to extend or renew, if any, and the written
authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified
information: Provided, That the person being surveilled or whose communications, letters, papers,
messages, conversations, discussions, spoken or written words and effects have been monitored, listened
to, bugged or recorded by law enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the
law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the legality of
the interference before the Court of Appeals which issued the written order. The written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall specify the following: (a) the identity, such as name
and address, if known, of the charged or suspected person whose communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words are to be tracked down, tapped, listened to,
intercepted, and recorded and, in the case of radio, electronic, or telephonic (whether wireless or
otherwise) communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, the
electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down, tapped, listened to,
intercepted, and recorded and their locations or if the person suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully known, such person shall be subject to continuous
surveillance provided there is a reasonable ground to do so; (b) the identity (name, address, and the police
or law enforcement organization) of the police or of the law enforcement official, including the individual
identity (names, addresses, and the police or law enforcement organization) of the members of his team,
judicially authorized to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record the communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words; (c) the offense or offenses committed, or being
committed, or sought to be prevented; and, (d) the length of time within which the authorization shall be
used or carried out.
SEC. 10. Effective Period of Judicial Authorization. - Any authorization granted by the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals, pursuant to Section 9(d) of this Act, shall only be effective for the length
of time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which shall not
exceed a period of thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the written order of the authorizing division
of the Court of Appeals by the applicant police or law enforcement official.
The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the said authorization for another
non-extendible period, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original period:
Provided, That the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals is satisfied that such extension or renewal
is in the public interest: and Provided, further, That the ex parte application for extension or renewal,
which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism
Council.
In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled to file the application for
extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the original applicant among the members of the team
named in the original written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall file the
application for extension or renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice to the liability of the police or law
enforcement personnel under Section 20 hereof, the applicant police or law enforcement official shall
have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period granted by the Court of Appeals as provided in
the preceding paragraphs within which to file the appropriate case before the Public Prosecutor's Office
for any violation of this Act.
If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or law enforcement official shall
immediately notify the person subject of the surveillance, interception and recording of the termination of
the said surveillance, interception and recording. The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12)
years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the applicant police or law enforcement official who fails to
notify the person subject of the surveillance, monitoring, interception and recording as specified above.
SEC. 11. Custody of Intercepted and Recorded Communications. - All tapes, discs, and recordings made
pursuant to the authorization of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, including all excerpts
and summaries thereof as well as all written notes or memoranda made in connection therewith, shall,
within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the written order of the authorizing
division of the Court of Appeals or within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of any extension or
renewal granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, be deposited with the authorizing
Division of the Court of Appeals in a sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, and shall be
accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the members of
his team.
In case of death of the applicant or in case he is physically disabled to execute the required affidavit, the
one next in rank to the applicant among the members of the team named in the written order of the
authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall execute with the members of the team that required
affidavit.
It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or any custodian of the tapes, discs and recording, and
their excerpts and summaries, written notes or memoranda to copy in whatever form, to remove, delete,
expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the items enumerated above in whole or in part under
any pretext whatsoever.
Any person who removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys the items enumerated above
shall suffer a penalty of not less than six years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 12. Contents of Joint Affidavit. - The joint affidavit of the police or of the law enforcement official
and the individual members of his team shall state: (a) the number of tapes, discs, and recordings that
have been made, as well as the number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written
notes and memoranda, if any, made in connection therewith; (b) the dates and times covered by each of
such tapes, discs, and recordings; (c) the number of tapes, discs, and recordings, as well as the number of
excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written notes and memoranda made in connection
therewith that have been included in the deposit; and (d) the date of the original written authorization
granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex parte application to conduct the
tracking down, tapping, intercepting, and recording, as well as the date of any extension or renewal of the
original written authority granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.
The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part of any
of such tapes, discs, and recordings, and that no duplicates or copies of the whole or any part of any of
such excerpts, summaries, written notes, and memoranda, have been made, or, if made, that all such
duplicates and copies are included in the sealed envelope or sealed package, as the case may be, deposited
with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.
It shall be unlawful for any person, police or law enforcement official to omit or exclude from the joint
affidavit any item or portion thereof mentioned in this Section.
Any person, police or law enforcement officer who violates any of the acts prescribed in the preceding
paragraph shall suffer the penalty of not less than ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.
SEC. 13. Disposition of Deposited Material. -The sealed envelope or sealed package and the contents
thereof, which are deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be deemed and
are hereby declared classified information, and the sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be opened
and its contents (including the tapes, discs, and recordings and all the excerpts and summaries thereof and
the notes and memoranda made in connection therewith) shall not be divulged, revealed, read, replayed,
or used as evidence unless authorized by written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals,
which written order shall be granted only upon a written application of the Department of Justice filed
before the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals and only upon a showing that the Department of
Justice has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file the application with
proper written notice the person whose conversation, communication, message discussion or spoken or
written words have been the subject of surveillance, monitoring, recording and interception to open,
reveal, divulge, and use the contents of the sealed envelope or sealed package as evidence.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing the
persons subject of the surveillance as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to
eight years of imprisonment.
SEC. 14. Application to Open Deposited Sealed Envelope or Sealed Package. - The written application
with notice to the party concerned to open the deposited sealed envelope or sealed package shall clearly
state the purpose or reason: (a) for opening the sealed envelope or sealed package; (b) for revealing or
disclosing its classified contents; (c) for replaying, divulging, and or reading any of the listened to,
intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written
words (including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in
connection therewith); [ and, (d) for using any of said listened to, intercepted, and recorded
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words (including any of the
excerpts and summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in connection therewith) as
evidence.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify as defined
above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.
SEC. 15. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Materials. - Any listened to, intercepted, and recorded
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, or any part or parts
thereof, or any information or fact contained therein, including their existence, content, substance,
purport, effect, or meaning, which have been secured in violation of the pertinent provisions of this Act,
shall absolutely not be admissible and usable as evidence against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
SEC. 16. Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Interceptions and/or Recordings. - Any police or law
enforcement personnel who, not being authorized to do so by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals, tracks down, taps, listens to, intercepts, and records in whatever manner or form any
communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written word of a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an
offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the penalty of
ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment and the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification from public office shall be imposed upon any police or law enforcement
personnel who maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen to,
intercept, and record in whatever manner or form any communication, message, conversation, discussion,
or spoken or written words of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy
to commit terrorism: Provided, That notwithstanding Section 13 of this Act, the party aggrieved by such
authorization shall be allowed access to the sealed envelope or sealed package and the contents thereof as
evidence for the prosecution of any police or law enforcement personnel who maliciously procured said
authorization.
SEC. 17. Proscription of Terrorist Organizations, Association, or Group of Persons. - Any
organization, association, or group of persons organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, or
which, although not organized for that purpose, actually uses the acts to terrorize mentioned in this Act or
to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order
to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall, upon application of the Department of
Justice before a competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice and opportunity to be heard given to the
organization, association, or group of persons concerned, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed
organization, association, or group of persons by the said Regional Trial Court.
SEC. 18. Period of Detention Without Judicial Warrant of Arrest. - The provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code to the contrary notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel, who,
having been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council has taken custody of a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall,
without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial
authorities, deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of
three days counted from the moment the said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or
arrested, detained, and taken into custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel: Provided,
That the arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result
from the surveillance under Section 7 and examination of bank deposits under Section 27 of this Act.
The police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the person suspected of the
crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at the latter's residence or office nearest the place
where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among other
things, to ascertain the identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person or persons they
have arrested and presented before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why they have arrested the
person and determine by questioning and personal observation whether or not the suspect has been
subjected to any physical, moral or psychological torture by whom and why. The judge shall then submit
a written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper court
that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. The judge shall forthwith submit his/her
report within three calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office.
Immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement personnel shall notify in writing the judge
of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest: Provided ,That where the arrest is made during
Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the written notice shall be served at the residence of
the judge nearest the place where the accused was arrested.
The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the
police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify and judge as Provided in the preceding paragraph.
SEC. 19. Period of Detention in the Event of an Actual or Imminent Terrorist Attack. - In the event of
an actual or imminent terrorist attack, suspects may not be detained for more than three days without the
written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission or
judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest
the place of the arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the
arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to the residence of any
of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested. The approval in
writing of any of the said officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned
within five days after the date of the detention of the persons concerned: Provided, however, That within
three days after the detention the suspects, whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not
established, shall be released immediately.
SEC. 20. Penalty for Failure to Deliver Suspect to the Proper Judicial Authority within Three Days. -
The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon
any police or law enforcement personnel who has apprehended or arrested, detained and taken custody of
a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and fails
to deliver such charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within the period of three
days.
SEC. 21. Rights of a Person under Custodial Detention. - The moment a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism is apprehended or
arrested and detained, he shall forthwith be informed, by the arresting police or law enforcement officers
or by the police or law enforcement officers to whose custody the person concerned is brought, of his or
her right: (a) to be informed of the nature and cause of his arrest, to remain silent and to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel of
his or her choice, the police or law enforcement officers concerned shall immediately contact the free
legal assistance unit of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) or the Public Attorney's Office (PAO).
It shall be the duty of the free legal assistance unit of the IBP or the PAO thus contacted to immediately
visit the person(s) detained and provide him or her with legal assistance. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of the counsel of choice; (b) informed of the cause or causes of his
detention in the presence of his legal counsel; (c) allowed to communicate freely with his legal counsel
and to confer with them at any time without restriction; (d) allowed to communicate freely and privately
without restrictions with the members of his family or with his nearest relatives and to be visited by them;
and, (e) allowed freely to avail of the service of a physician or physicians of choice.
SEC. 22. Penalty for Violation of the Rights of a Detainee. - Any police or law enforcement personnel,
or any personnel of the police or other law enforcement custodial unit that violates any of the aforesaid
rights of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to
commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to
twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
Unless the police or law enforcement personnel who violated the rights of a detainee or detainees as
stated above is duly identified, the same penalty shall be imposed on the police officer or hear or leader of
the law enforcement unit having custody of the detainee at the time the violation was done.
SEC. 23. Requirement for an Official Custodial Logbook and its Contents. - The police or other law
enforcement custodial unit in whose care and control the person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism has been placed under custodial arrest and
detention shall keep a securely and orderly maintained official logbook, which is hereby declared as a
public document and opened to and made available for .the inspection and scrutiny of the lawyer or
lawyers of the person under custody or any member of his or her family or relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the fourth civil degree or his or her physician at any time of the day or night without any
form of restriction. The logbook shall contain a clear and concise record of: (a) the name, description, and
address of the detained person; (b) the date and exact time of his initial admission for custodial arrest and
detention; (c) the name and address of the physician or physicians who examined him physically and
medically; (d) the state of his health and physical condition at the time of his initial admission for
custodial detention; (e) the date and time of each removal of the detained person from his cell for
interrogation or for any purpose; (f) the date and time of his return to his cell; (g) the name and address of
the physician or physicians who physically and medically examined him after each interrogation; (h) a
summary of the physical and medical findings on the detained person after each of such interrogation; (i)
the names and addresses of his family members and nearest relatives, if any and if available; (j) the names
and addresses of persons, who visit the detained person; (k) the date and time of each of such visits; (1)
the date and time of each request of the detained person to communicate and confer with his legal counsel
or counsels; (m) the date and time of each visit, and date and time of each departure of his legal counsel
or counsels; and, (n) all other important events bearing on and all relevant details regarding the treatment
of the detained person while under custodial arrest and detention.
The said police or law enforcement custodial unit shall upon demand of the aforementioned lawyer or
lawyers or members of the family or relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of
the person under custody or his or her physician issue a certified true copy of the entries of the logbook
relative to the concerned detained person without delay or restriction or requiring any fees whatsoever
including documentary stamp tax, notarial fees, and the like. This certified true copy may be attested by
the person who has custody of the logbook or who allowed the party concerned to scrutinize it at the time
the demand for the certified true copy is made.
The police or other law enforcement custodial unit who fails to comply with the preceding paragraph to
keep an official logbook shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.
SEC. 24. No Torture or Coercion in Investigation and Interrogation. - No threat, intimidation, or
coercion, and no act which will inflict any form of physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or
psychological pressure, on the detained person, which shall vitiate his freewill, shall be employed in his
investigation and interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism;
otherwise, the evidence obtained from said detained person resulting from such threat, intimidation, or
coercion, or from such inflicted physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure,
shall be, in its entirety, absolutely not admissible and usable as evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
SEC. 25. Penalty for Threat, Intimidation, Coercion, or Torture in the Investigation and Interrogation
of a Detained Person. - Any person or persons who use threat, intimidation, or coercion, or who inflict
physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, which shall vitiate the free-will of a
charged or suspected person under investigation and interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the crime
of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of twelve (12)
years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
When death or serious permanent disability of said detained person occurs as a consequence of the use of
such threat, intimidation, or coercion, or as a consequence of the infliction on him of such physical pain
or torment, or as a consequence of the infliction on him of such mental, moral, or psychological pressure,
the penalty shall be twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 26. Restriction on Travel. - In cases where evidence of guilt is not strong, and the person charged
with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is entitled to bail and is granted the same,
the court, upon application by the prosecutor, shall limit the right of travel of the accused to within the
municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and
public safety, consistent with Article III, Section 6 of the Constitution. Travel outside of said municipality
or city, without the authorization of the court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of
his bail, which shall then be forfeited as provided under the Rules of Court.
He/she may also be placed under house arrest by order of the court at his or her usual place of residence.
While under house arrest, he or she may not use telephones, cellphones, e-mails, computers, the internet
or other means of communications with people outside the residence until otherwise ordered by the court.
The restrictions abovementioned shall be terminated upon the acquittal of the accused or of the dismissal
of the case filed against him or earlier upon the discretion of the court on motion of the prosecutor or of
the accused.
SEC. 27. Judicial Authorization Required to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The
provisions of Republic Act No. 1405 as amended, to the contrary notwithstanding, the justices of the
Court of Appeals designated as a special court to handle anti-terrorism cases after satisfying themselves
of the existence of probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose that: (1) a person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or, conspiracy to commit terrorism, (2) of a judicially declared and
outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; and (3) of a member of such judicially
declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons, may authorize in writing any police
or law enforcement officer and the members of his/her team duly authorized in writing by the anti-
terrorism council to: (a) examine, or cause the examination of, the deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets and records in a bank or financial institution; and (b) gather or cause the gathering of any relevant
information about such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records from a bank or financial
institution. The bank or financial institution concerned, shall not refuse to allow such examination or to
provide the desired information, when so, ordered by and served with the written order of the Court of
Appeals.
SEC. 28. Application to Examine Bank Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The written order of the
Court of Appeals authorizing the examination of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records: (1) of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism; (2) of any judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of
persons, or (3) of any member of such organization, association, or group of persons in a bank or financial
institution, and the gathering of any relevant information about the same from said bank or financial
institution, shall only be granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte
application to that effect of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in
writing to file such ex parte application by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to
file such ex parte application, and upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and, the
witnesses he may produce to establish the facts that will justify the need and urgency of examining and
freezing the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records: (1) of the person charged with
or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) of a judicially declared and
outlawed terrorist organization, association or group of persons; or (3) of any member of such
organization, association, or group of persons.
SEC. 29. Classification and Contents of the Court Order Authorizing the Examination of Bank
Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The written order granted by the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals as well as its order, if any, to extend or renew the same, the original ex parte application of the
applicant, including his ex parte application to extend or renew, if any, and the written authorizations of
the Anti-Terrorism Council, shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified information: Provided,
That the person whose bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records have been examined,
frozen, sequestered and seized by law enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts
done by the law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the
legality of the interference. The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals
designated to handle cases involving terrorism shall specify: (a) the identify of the said: (1) person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) judicially
declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; and (3) member of such
judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons, as the case may be. whose
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are to be examined or the information to be
gathered; (b) the identity of the bank or financial Institution where such deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records are held and maintained; (c) the identity of the persons who will conduct the
said examination and the gathering of the desired information; and, (d) the length of time the
authorization shall be carried out.
SEC. 30. Effective Period of Court Authorization to Examine and Obtain Information on Bank
Deposits, Accounts, and Records. - The authorization issued or granted by the authorizing division of the
Court of Appeals to examine or cause the examination of and to freeze bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records, or to gather information about the same, shall be effective for the length of
time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which shall not
exceed a period of thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of the written order of the authorizing division
of the Court of Appeals by the applicant police or law enforcement official.
The authorizing division of the Court of Appeals may extend or renew the said authorization for another
period, which shall not exceed thirty (30) days renewable to another thirty (30) days from the expiration
of the original period: Provided, That the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals is satisfied that
such extension or renewal is in the public interest: and, Provided, further, That the application for
extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly authorized in writing
by the Anti-Terrorism Council.
In case of death of the original applicant or in case he is physically disabled to file the application for
extension or renewal, the one next in rank to the original applicant among the members of the ream
named in the original written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals shall file the
application for extension or renewal: Provided, That, without prejudice to the liability of the police or law
enforcement personnel under Section 19 hereof, the applicant police or law enforcement official shall
have thirty (30) days after the termination of the period granted by the Court of Appeals as provided in
the preceding paragraphs within which to file the appropriate case before the Public Prosecutor's Office
for any violation of this Act.
If no case is filed within the thirty (30)-day period, the applicant police or law enforcement official shall
immediately notify in writing the person subject of the bank examination and freezing of bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records. The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12)
years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the applicant police or law enforcement official who fails to
notify in writing the person subject of the bank examination and freezing of bank deposits, placements,
trust accounts, assets and records.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing as
defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.
SEC. 31. Custody of Bank Data and Information Obtained after Examination of Deposits, Placements,
Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. - All information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda,
working sheets, reports, and other documents obtained from the examination of the bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime of
terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of any such organization, association, or
group of persons shall, within forty-eight (48) hours after the expiration of the period fixed in the written
order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals or within forty-eight (48) hours after the
expiration of the extension or renewal granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, be
deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals in a sealed envelope or sealed package, as
the case may be, and shall be accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant police or law enforcement
official and the persons who actually conducted the examination of said bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records.
SEC. 32. Contents of Joint Affidavit. - The joint affidavit shall state: (a) the identifying marks, numbers,
or symbols of the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records examined; (b) the identity and
address of the bank or financial institution where such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records are held and maintained; (c) the number of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and
records discovered, examined, and frozen; (d) the outstanding balances of each of such deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets; (e) all information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda,
working sheets, reports, documents, records examined and placed in the sealed envelope or sealed
package deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals; (f) the date of the original
written authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex parte
Application to conduct the examination of the said bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and
records, as well as the date of any extension or renewal of the original written authorization granted by
the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals; and (g) that the items Enumerated were all that were
found in the bank or financial institution examined at the time of the completion of the examination.
The joint affidavit shall also certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the information, data,
excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and documents acquired from the
examination of the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records have been made, or, if
made, that all such duplicates and copies are placed in the sealed envelope or sealed package deposited
with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals.
It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or custodian of the bank data and information obtained
after examination of deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records to copy, to remove, delete,
expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the items enumerated above in whole or in part under
any pretext whatsoever,
Any person who copies, removes, deletes, expunges, incinerates, shreds or destroys the items enumerated
above shall suffer a penalty of not less than six years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 33. Disposition of Bank Materials. - The sealed envelope or sealed package and the contents
thereof, which are deposited with the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be deemed and
are hereby declared classified information and the sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be opened
and its contents shall not be divulged, revealed, read, or used as evidence unless authorized in a written
order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, which written order shall be granted only upon
a written application of the Department of Justice filed before the authorizing division of the Court of
Appeals and only upon a showing that the Department of Justice has been duly authorized in writing by
the Anti-Terrorism Council to file the application, with notice in writing to the party concerned not later
than three days before the scheduled opening, to open, reveal, divulge, and use the contents of the sealed
envelope or sealed package as evidence.
Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing as
defined above shall suffer the penalty of six years and one day to eight years of imprisonment.
SEC. 34. Application to Open Deposited Bank Materials. - The written application, with notice in
writing to the party concerned not later than three days of the scheduled opening, to open the sealed
envelope or sealed package shall clearly state the purpose and reason: (a) for opening the sealed envelope
or sealed package; (b) for revealing and disclosing its classified contents; and, (c) for using the classified
information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and documents as
evidence.
SEC. 35. Evidentiary Value of Deposited Bank Materials. - Any information, data, excerpts, summaries,
notes, memoranda, work sheets, reports, or documents acquired from the examination of the bank
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of: (1) a person charged or suspected of the crime
of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed
terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of such organization, association,
or group of persons, which have been secured in violation of the provisions of this Act, shall absolutely
not be admissible and usable as evidence against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or
administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
SEC. 36. Penalty for Unauthorized or Malicious Examination of a Bank or a Financial Institution. -
Any person, police or law enforcement personnel who examines the deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets, or records in a bank or financial institution of: (1) a person charged with or suspected of the crime
of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially declared and outlawed
terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of such organization, association,
or group of persons, without being authorized to do so by the Court of Appeals, shall be guilty of an
offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any other offense, the penalty of
ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any police or law
enforcement personnel, who maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals to examine the
deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial institution of: (1) a person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially
declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of such
organization, association, or group of persons: Provided, That notwithstanding Section 33 of this Act, the
party aggrieved by such authorization shall upon motion duly filed be allowed access to the sealed
envelope or sealed package and the contents thereof as evidence for the prosecution of any police or law
enforcement personnel who maliciously procured said authorization.
SEC. 37. Penalty of Bank Officials and Employees Defying a Court Authorization. - An employee,
official, or a member of the board of directors of a bank or financial institution, who refuses to allow the
examination of the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records of: (1) a person charged with
or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) a judicially
declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) a member of such judicially
declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons in said bank or financial institution,
when duly served with the written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, shall be
guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.
SEC. 38. Penalty for False or Untruthful Statement or Misrepresentation of Material Fact in Joint
Affidavits. - Any false or untruthful statement or misrepresentation of material fact in the joint affidavits
required respectively in Section 12 and Section 32 of this Act shall constitute a criminal offense and the
affiants shall suffer individually the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of
imprisonment.
SEC. 39. Seizure and Sequestration. - The deposits and their outstanding balances, placements, trust
accounts, assets, and records in any bank or financial institution, moneys, businesses, transportation and
communication equipment, supplies and other implements, and property of whatever kind and nature
belonging: (1) to any person suspected of or charged before a competent Regional Trial Court for the
crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism; (2) to a judicially declared and
outlawed organization, association, or group of persons; or (3) to a member of such organization,
association, or group of persons shall be seized, sequestered, and frozen in order to prevent their use,
transfer, or conveyance for purposes that are inimical to the safety and security of the people or injurious
to the interest of the State.
The accused or a person suspected of may withdraw such sums as may be reasonably needed by the
monthly needs of his family including the services of his or her counsel and his or her family's medical
needs upon approval of the court. He or she may also use any of his property that is under seizure or
sequestration or frozen because of his/her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of the court for any
legitimate reason.
Any person who unjustifiably refuses to follow the order of the proper division of the Court of Appeals to
allow the person accused of the crime of terrorism or of the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism to
withdraw such sums from sequestered or frozen deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records as
may be necessary for the regular sustenance of his/her family or to use any of his/her property that has
been seized, sequestered or frozen for legitimate purposes while his/her case is pending shall suffer the
penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 40. Nature of Seized. Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets
and Records. - The seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and
records belonging to a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism shall be deemed as property held in trust by the bank or financial institution for such
person and the government during the pendency of the investigation of the person suspected of or during
the pendency of the trial of the person charged with any of the said crimes, as the case may be and their
use or disposition while the case is pending shall be subject to the approval of the court before which the
case or cases are pending.
SEC. 41. Disposition of the Seized, Sequestered and Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust
Accounts, Assets and Record. - If the person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism is found, after his investigation, to be innocent by the investigating body,
or is acquitted, after his arraignment or his case is dismissed before his arraignment by a competent court,
the seizure, sequestration and freezing of his bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records
shall forthwith be deemed lifted by the investigating body or by the competent court, as the case may be,
and his bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records shall be deemed released from such
seizure, sequestration and freezing, and shall be restored to him without any delay by the bank or
financial institution concerned without any further action on his part. The filing of any appeal on motion
for reconsideration shall not state the release of said funds from seizure, sequestration and freezing.
If the person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is convicted by a final
judgment of a competent trial court, his seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records shall be automatically forfeited in favor of the government.
Upon his or her acquittal or the dismissal of the charges against him or her, the amount of Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500.000.00) a day for the period in which his properties, assets or funds were seized
shall be paid to him on the concept of liquidated damages. The amount shall be taken from the
appropriations of the police or law enforcement agency that caused the filing of the enumerated charges
against him/her.
SEC. 42. Penalty for Unjustified Refusal to Restore or Delay in Restoring Seized, Sequestered and
Frozen Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. - Any person who
unjustifiably refuses to restore or delays the restoration of seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets and records of a person suspected of or charged with the crime of
terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism after such suspected person has been found innocent by the
investigating body or after the case against such charged person has been dismissed or after he is
acquitted by a competent court shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years
of imprisonment.
SEC. 43. Penalty for the Loss, Misuse, Diversion or Dissipation of Seized, Sequestered and Frozen
Bank Deposits, Placements, Trust Accounts, Assets and Records. - Any person who is responsible for
the loss, misuse, diversion, or dissipation of the whole or any part of the seized, sequestered and frozen
bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of a person suspected of or charged with the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day
to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
SEC. 44. Infidelity in the Custody of Detained Persons. - Any public officer who has direct custody of a
detained person or under the provisions of this Act and who by his deliberate act, misconduct, or
inexcusable negligence causes or allows the escape of such detained person shall be guilty of an offense
and shall suffer the penalty of: (a) twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment, if
the detained person has already been convicted and sentenced in a final judgment of a competent court;
and (b) six years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment, if the detained person has not been
convicted and sentenced in a final judgment of a competent court.
SEC. 45. Immunity and Protection of Government Witnesses. - The provisions of Republic Act No.
6981 (Witness Protection, Security and Benefits Act) to the contrary notwithstanding, the immunity of
government witnesses testifying under this Act shall be governed by Sections 17 and 18 of Rule 119 of
the Rules of Court: Provided, however, That said witnesses shall be entitled to benefits granted to
witnesses under said Republic Act No.6981.
SEC. 46. Penalty for Unauthorized Revelation of Classified Materials. - The penalty of ten (10) years
and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person, police or law
enforcement agent, judicial officer or civil servant who, not being authorized by the Court of Appeals to
do so, reveals in any manner or form any classified information under this Act.
SEC. 47. Penalty for Furnishing False Evidence, Forged Document, or Spurious Evidence. - The
penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any
person who knowingly furnishes false testimony, forged document or spurious evidence in any
investigation or hearing under this Act.
SEC. 48. Continuous Trial. - In cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the judge shall set
the continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as to
ensure speedy trial.
SEC. 49. Prosecution Under This Act Shall be a Bar to Another Prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any Special Penal Laws. - When a person has been prosecuted under a provision of this Act,
upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense or felony which is necessarily included in
the offense charged under this Act.
SEC. 50. Damages for Unproven Charge of Terrorism. - Upon acquittal, any person who is accused of
terrorism shall be entitled to the payment of damages in the amount of Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) for every day that he or she has been detained or deprived of liberty or arrested without a
warrant as a result of such an accusation. The amount of damages shall be automatically charged against
the appropriations of the police agency or the Anti-Terrorism Council that brought or sanctioned the filing
of the charges against the accused. It shall also be released within fifteen (15) days from the date of the
acquittal of the accused. The award of damages mentioned above shall be without prejudice to the right of
the acquitted accused to file criminal or administrative charges against those responsible for charging him
with the case of terrorism.
Any officer, employee, personnel, or person who delays the release or refuses to release the amounts
awarded to the individual acquitted of the crime of terrorism as directed in the paragraph immediately
preceding shall suffer the penalty of six months of imprisonment.
If the deductions are less than the amounts due to the detained persons, the amount needed to complete
the compensation shall be taken from the current appropriations for intelligence, emergency, social or
other funds of the Office of the President.
In the event that the amount cannot be covered by the current budget of the police or law enforcement
agency concerned, the amount shall be automatically included in the appropriations of the said agency for
the coming year.
SEC. 51. Duty to Record and Report the Name and Address of the Informant. - The police or law
enforcement officers to whom the name or a suspect in the crime of terrorism was first revealed shall
record the real name and the specific address of the informant.
The police or law enforcement officials concerned shall report the informant's name and address to their
superior officer who shall transmit the information to the Congressional Oversight Committee or to the
proper court within five days after the suspect was placed under arrest or his properties were sequestered,
seized or frozen.
The name and address of the informant shall be considered confidential and shall not be unnecessarily
revealed until after the proceedings against the suspect shall have been terminated.
SEC. 52. Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. - The provisions of Book I of the Revised Penal Code
shall be applicable to this Act.
SEC. 53. Anti-Terrorism Council. - An Anti-Terrorism Council, hereinafter referred to, for brevity, as
the "Council," is hereby created. The members of the Council are: (1) the Executive Secretary, who shall
be its Chairperson; (2) the Secretary of Justice, who shall be its Vice Chairperson; and (3) the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs; (4) the Secretary of National Defense; (5) the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Government; (6) the Secretary of Finance; and (7) the National Security Advisor, as its other members.
The Council shall implement this Act and assume the responsibility for the proper and effective
implementation of the anti-terrorism policy of the country. The Council shall keep records of its
proceedings and decisions. All records of the Council shall be subject to such security classifications as
the Council may, in its judgment and discretion, decide to adopt to safeguard the safety of the people, the
security of the Republic, and the welfare of the nation.
The National Intelligence Coordinating Agency shall be the Secretariat of the Council. The Council shall
define the powers, duties, and functions of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency as Secretariat
of the Council. The National Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Immigration, the Office of Civil
Defense, the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Anti-Money Laundering
Council, the Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the Philippine National Police intelligence
and investigative elements shall serve as support agencies for the Council.
The Council shall formulate and adopt comprehensive, adequate, efficient, and effective anti-terrorism
plans, programs, and counter-measures to suppress and eradicate terrorism in the country and to protect
the people from acts of terrorism. Nothing herein shall be interpreted to empower the Anti-Terrorism
Council to exercise any judicial or quasi-judicial power or authority.
SEC. 54. Functions of the Council. - In pursuit of its mandate in the previous Section, the Council shall
have the following functions with due regard for the rights of the people as mandated by the Constitution
and pertinent laws:
1. Formulate and adopt plans, programs and counter-measures against terrorists and acts of
terrorism in the country;
2. Coordinate all national efforts to suppress and eradicate acts of terrorism in the country and
mobilize the entire nation against terrorism prescribed in this Act;
3. Direct the speedy investigation and prosecution of all persons accused or detained for the crime
of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and other offenses punishable under this Act, and
monitor the progress of their cases;
4. Establish and maintain comprehensive data-base information system on terrorism, terrorist
activities, and counter-terrorism operations;
5. Freeze the funds property, bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records
belonging to a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9160, otherwise known as the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001, as amended;
6. Grant monetary rewards and other incentives to informers who give vital information leading
to the apprehension, arrest, detention, prosecution, and conviction of person or persons who are
liable for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism;
7. Establish and maintain coordination with and the cooperation and assistance of other nations in
the struggle against international terrorism; and
8. Request the Supreme Court to designate specific divisions of the Court of Appeals and
Regional Trial Courts in Manila, Cebu City and Cagayan de Oro City, as the case may be, to
handle all cases involving the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and all
matters incident to said crimes. The Secretary of Justice shall assign a team of prosecutors from:
(a) Luzon to handle terrorism cases filed in the Regional Trial Court in Manila; (b) from the
Visayas to handle cases filed in Cebu City; and (c) from Mindanao to handle cases filed in
Cagayan de Oro City.
SEC. 55. Role of the Commission on Human Rights. - The Commission on Human Rights shall give the
highest priority to the investigation and prosecution of violations of civil and political rights of persons in
relation to the implementation of this Act; and for this purpose, the Commission shall have the concurrent
jurisdiction to prosecute public officials, law enforcers, and other persons who may have violated the civil
and political rights of persons suspected of, or detained for the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism.
SEC. 56. Creation of a Grievance Committee. - There is hereby created a Grievance Committee
composed of the Ombudsman, as chair, and the Solicitor General, and an undersecretary from the
Department of Justice (DOJ), as members, to receive and evaluate complaints against the actuations of the
police and law enforcement officials in the implementation of this Act. The Committee shall hold office
in Manila. The Committee shall have three subcommittees that will be respectively headed by the Deputy
Ombudsmen in Luzon, the Visayas and Mindanao. The subcommittees shall respectively hold office at
the Offices of Deputy Ombudsman. Three Assistant Solicitors General designated by the Solicitor
General, and the regional prosecutors of the DOJ assigned to the regions where the Deputy Ombudsmen
hold office shall be members thereof. The three subcommittees shall assist the Grievance Committee in
receiving, investigating and evaluating complaints against the police and other law enforcement officers
in the implementation of this Act. If the evidence warrants it, they may file the appropriate cases against
the erring police and law enforcement officers. Unless seasonably disowned or denounced by the
complainants, decisions or judgments in the said cases shall preclude the filing of other cases based on the
same cause or causes of action as those that were filed with the Grievance Committee or its branches.
SEC. 57. Ban on Extraordinary Rendition. - No person suspected or convicted of the crime of terrorism
shall be subjected to extraordinary rendition to any country unless his or her testimony is needed for
terrorist related police investigations or judicial trials in the said country and unless his or her human
rights, including the right against torture, and right to counsel, are officially assured by the requesting
country and transmitted accordingly and approved by the Department of Justice.
SEC. 58. Extra-Territorial Application of this Act. - Subject to the provision of an existing treaty of
which the Philippines is a signatory and to any contrary provision of any law of preferential application,
the provisions of this Act shall apply: (1) to individual persons who commit any of the crimes defined and
punished in this Act within the terrestrial domain, interior waters, maritime zone, and airspace of the
Philippines; (2) to individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the
Philippines, commit, conspire or plot to commit any of the crimes defined and punished in this Act inside
the territorial limits of the Philippines; (3) to individual persons who, although physically outside the
territorial limits of the Philippines, commit any of the said crimes on board Philippine ship or Philippine
airship; (4) to individual persons who commit any of said crimes within any embassy, consulate, or
diplomatic premises belonging to or occupied by the Philippine government in an official capacity; (5) to
individual persons who, although physically outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said
crimes against Philippine citizens or persons of Philippines descent, where their citizenship or ethnicity
was a factor in the commission of the crime; and (6) to individual persons who, although physically
outside the territorial limits of the Philippines, commit said crimes directly against the Philippine
government.
SEC. 59. Joint Oversight Committee. - There is hereby created a Joint Oversight Committee to oversee
the implementation of this Act. The Oversight Committee shall be composed of five members each from
the Senate and the House in addition to the Chairs of the Committees of Public Order of both Houses who
shall also Chair the Oversight Committee in the order specified herein. The membership of the Committee
for every House shall at least have two opposition or minority members. The Joint Oversight Committee
shall have its own independent counsel. The Chair of the Committee shall rotate every six months with
the Senate chairing it for the first six months and the House for the next six months. In every case, the
ranking opposition or minority member of the Committee shall be the Vice Chair. Upon the expiration of
one year after this Act is approved by the President, the Committee shall review the Act particularly the
provision that authorize the surveillance of suspects of or persons charged with the crime of terrorism. To
that end, the Committee shall summon the police and law enforcement officers and the members of the
Anti-Terrorism Council and require them to answer questions from the members of Congress and to
submit a written report of the acts they have done in the implementation of the law including the manner
in which the persons suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism have been dealt with in their
custody and from the date when the movements of the latter were subjected to surveillance and his or her
correspondences, messages, conversations and the like were listened to or subjected to monitoring,
recording and tapping. Without prejudice to its submitting other reports, the Committee shall render a
semiannual report to both Houses of Congress. The report may include where necessary a
recommendation to reassess the effects of globalization on terrorist activities on the people, provide a
sunset clause to or amend any portion of the Act or to repeal the Act in its entirety. The courts dealing
with anti-terrorism cases shall submit to Congress and the President a report every six months of the
status of anti-terrorism cases that have been filed with them starting from the date this Act is
implemented.
SEC. 60. Separability Clause. - If for any reason any part or provision of this Act is declared
unconstitutional or invalid, the other parts or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall
remain and continue to be in full force and effect.
SEC. 61. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executive orders, rules or regulations or parts thereof,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed, amended, or modified accordingly.
SEC. 62. Special Effectivity Clause. - After the bill shall have been signed into law by the President, the
Act shall be published in three newspapers of national circulation; three newspapers of local circulation,
one each in llocos Norte, Baguio City and Pampanga; three newspapers of local circulation, one each in
Cebu, lloilo and Tacloban; and three newspapers of local circulation, one each in Cagayan de Oro, Davao
and General Santos city.
The title of the Act and its provisions defining the acts of terrorism that are punished shall be aired
everyday at primetime for seven days, morning, noon and night over three national television and radio
networks; three radio and television networks, one each in Cebu, Tacloban and lloilo; and in five radio
and television networks, one each in Lanao del Sur, Cagayan de Oro, Davao City, Cotabato City and
Zamboanga City. The publication in the newspapers of local circulation and the announcements over
local radio and television networks shall be done in the dominant language of the community. After the
publication required above shall have been done, the Act shall take effect two months after the elections
are held in May 2007. Thereafter, the provisions of this Act shall be automatically suspended one month
before and two months as after the holding of any election.
 RAMIREZ VS CA, 248 SCRA 590
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related
Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other
device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or
spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all
the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought
to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent
to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier
"any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a
communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
(will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.

GAANAN VS IAC, 145 SCRA 382

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of
secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to
overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other
devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the
wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It
just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to
determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be
taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in
fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66
SCRA 113,120).

OPLE VS TORRES et. Al., GR NO. 127685

The reasonableness of a person's expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct,
the individual has exhibited an expectation of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable. 67 The factual circumstances of the case determines the reasonableness of the
expectation. 68 However, other factors, such as customs, physical surroundings and practices of a particular
activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation. 69 The use of biometrics and computer technology in
A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of privacy. 70 As technology advances,
the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases. 71 The measure of protection granted by the reasonable
expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely accepted. 72 The security of the computer
data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in hardware and
software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable
expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.

PEOPLE VS ALBOFERA
Accused Albofera contends that his letter to prosecution witness, Rodrigo Esma (Exhibit "B"), is
inadmissible in evidence against him under the exclusionary provisions of Section 4, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution (substantially reproduced in Section 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution), which
provides:
 Sec. 4 (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon
lawful order of the Court, or when public safety and order require otherwise.
2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding.
The submission is untenable. The foregoing provision implements another Constitutional provision on the
security of a citizen against unreasonable search and seizure. The production of that letter by the
prosecution was not the result of an unlawful search and seizure nor was it through unwarranted intrusion
or invasion into Albofera's privacy. Albofera admitted having sent the letter and it was its recipient,
Rodrigo Esma himself, who produced and Identified the same in the course of his testimony in Court.
Besides, there is nothing really self-incriminatory in the letter. Albofera mainly pleaded that Esma change
his declaration in his Affidavit and testify in his (Albofera's) favor. Furthermore, nothing Albofera stated
in his letter is being taken against him in arriving at a determination of his culpability.

KMU vs DIR. General of NEDA, 487 SCRA 623

The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government
entities. Some one hundred countries have compulsory national ID systems, including democracies such
as Spain, France, Germany, Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Other countries which do not
have national ID systems, like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Ireland, the Nordic
Countries and Sweden, have sectoral cards for health, social or other public services. [12] Even with EO
420, the Philippines will still fall under the countries that do not have compulsory national ID systems but
allow only sectoral cards for social security, health services, and other specific purposes.
Without a reliable ID system, government entities like GSIS, SSS, Philhealth, and LTO cannot
perform effectively and efficiently their mandated functions under existing laws. Without a reliable ID
system, GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and similar government entities stand to suffer substantial losses arising
from false names and identities. The integrity of the LTOs licensing system will suffer in the absence of a
reliable ID system.

MARQUEZ VS DESIERTO GR NO. 135882

We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a
court of competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to
the subject matter of the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and
the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover
only the account identified in the pending case.
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that Section 2 of the Law on
Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as amended, declares bank deposits to be absolutely
confidential except:
(1) In an examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank that is
specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed
and that it is necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity,
(2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular
audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be
for the exclusive use of the bank,
(3) Upon written permission of the depositor,
(4) In cases of impeachment,
(5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials,
or
(6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation
 PEOPLE VS CABALQUINTO 502 SCRA 419
This case presents an opportunity for the Court not only to once again dispense due requital for
the sufferings of a child who has been defiled by her own father, but also to effectuate the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7610 (RA 7610), otherwise known as the Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, and its implementing rules, RA 9262, otherwise known as
the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, and its implementing rules, and our
own Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children.[1]
The provisions on confidentiality of these enactments uniformly seek to respect the dignity and
protect the privacy of women and their children. Sec. 29 of RA 7610 provides:
Sec. 29. Confidentiality.at the instance of the offended party, his name may be
withheld from the public until the court acquires jurisdiction over the case.
It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of
printed materials, announcer or producer in the case of television and radio broadcasting,
producer and director in the case of the movie industry, to cause undue and
sensationalized publicity of any case of a violation of this Act which results in the moral
degradation and suffering of the offended party.
Sec. 44 of RA 9262 similarly provides:
Sec. 44. Confidentiality.All records pertaining to cases of violence against
women and their children including those in the barangay shall be confidential and all
public officers and employees and public or private clinics or hospitals shall respect the
right to privacy of the victim. Whoever publishes or causes to be published, in any
format, the name, address, telephone number, school, business address, employer, or
other identifying information of a victim or an immediate family member, without the
latters consent, shall be liable to the contempt power of the court.
Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the penalty of one (1) year
imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
Likewise, the Rule on Violence Against Women and their Children states:
Sec. 40. Privacy and confidentiality of proceedings.All hearings of cases of
violence against women and their children shall be conducted in a manner consistent with
the dignity of women and their children and respect for their privacy.
Records of the cases shall be treated with utmost confidentiality. Whoever
publishes or causes to be published, in any format, the name, address, telephone number,
school, business address, employer or other identifying information of the parties or an
immediate family or household member, without their consent or without authority of the
court, shall be liable for contempt of court and shall suffer the penalty of one year
imprisonment and a fine of not more than Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos.
It is worth mentioning in this connection that the Court has resolved to refrain from posting in its
Internet Web Page the full text of decisions in cases involving child sexual abuse in response to a letter
from a mother of a child abuse victim addressed to the Chief Justice expressing anxiety over the posting
of full text decisions of the Supreme Court on its Internet Web Page. The mother submitted that
confidentiality and the best interest of the child must prevail over public access to information and
pleaded that her daughters case, as well as those of a similar nature, be excluded from the Web Page.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 202666 September 29, 2014
RHONDA AVE S. VIVARES and SPS. MARGARITA and DAVID SUZARA, Petitioners,
vs.
ST. THERESA'S COLLEGE, MYLENE RHEZA T. ESCUDERO, and JOHN DOES, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The individual's desire for privacy is never absolute, since participation in society is an equally powerful
desire. Thus each individual is continually engaged in a personal adjustment process in which he balances
the desire for privacy with the desire for disclosure and communication of himself to others, in light of the
environmental conditions and social norms set by the society in which he lives.
- Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom (1967)
The Case
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, in relation to
Section 19 of A.M. No. 08-1-16-SC,1 otherwise known as the "Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data."
Petitioners herein assail the July 27, 2012 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City
(RTC) in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB, which dismissed their habeas data petition.
The Facts
Nenita Julia V. Daluz (Julia) and Julienne Vida Suzara (Julienne), both minors, were, during the period
material, graduating high school students at St. Theresa's College (STC), Cebu City. Sometime in January
2012, while changing into their swimsuits for a beach party they were about to attend, Julia and Julienne,
along with several others, took digital pictures of themselves clad only in their undergarments. These
pictures were then uploaded by Angela Lindsay Tan (Angela) on her Facebook3 profile.
Back at the school, Mylene Rheza T. Escudero (Escudero), a computer teacher at STC’s high school
department, learned from her students that some seniors at STC posted pictures online, depicting
themselves from the waist up, dressed only in brassieres. Escudero then asked her students if they knew
who the girls in the photos are. In turn, they readily identified Julia, Julienne, and Chloe Lourdes Taboada
(Chloe), among others.
Using STC’s computers, Escudero’s students logged in to their respective personal Facebook accounts
and showed her photos of the identified students, which include: (a) Julia and Julienne drinking hard
liquor and smoking cigarettes inside a bar; and (b) Julia and Julienne along the streets of Cebu wearing
articles of clothing that show virtually the entirety of their black brassieres. What is more, Escudero’s
students claimed that there were times when access to or the availability of the identified students’ photos
was not confined to the girls’ Facebook friends,4but were, in fact, viewable by any Facebook user.5
Upon discovery, Escudero reported the matter and, through one of her student’s Facebook page, showed
the photosto Kristine Rose Tigol (Tigol), STC’s Discipline-in-Charge, for appropriate action. Thereafter,
following an investigation, STC found the identified students to have deported themselves in a manner
proscribed by the school’s Student Handbook, to wit:
1. Possession of alcoholic drinks outside the school campus;
2. Engaging in immoral, indecent, obscene or lewd acts;
3. Smoking and drinking alcoholicbeverages in public places;
4. Apparel that exposes the underwear;
5. Clothing that advocates unhealthy behaviour; depicts obscenity; contains sexually suggestive
messages, language or symbols; and 6. Posing and uploading pictures on the Internet that entail
ample body exposure.
On March 1, 2012, Julia, Julienne, Angela, and the other students in the pictures in question, reported, as
required, to the office of Sr. Celeste Ma. Purisima Pe (Sr. Purisima), STC’s high school principal and
ICM6 Directress. They claimed that during the meeting, they were castigated and verbally abused by the
STC officials present in the conference, including Assistant Principal Mussolini S. Yap (Yap), Roswinda
Jumiller, and Tigol. What is more, Sr. Purisima informed their parents the following day that, as part of
their penalty, they are barred from joining the commencement exercises scheduled on March 30, 2012.
A week before graduation, or on March 23, 2012, Angela’s mother, Dr. Armenia M. Tan (Tan), filed a
Petition for Injunction and Damages before the RTC of Cebu City against STC, et al., docketed as Civil
Case No. CEB-38594.7In it, Tan prayed that defendants therein be enjoined from implementing the
sanction that precluded Angela from joining the commencement exercises.
On March 25, 2012,petitioner Rhonda Ave Vivares (Vivares), the mother of Julia, joined the fray as an
intervenor. On March 28, 2012, defendants inCivil Case No. CEB-38594 filed their memorandum,
containing printed copies of the photographs in issue as annexes. That same day, the RTC issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO) allowing the students to attend the graduation ceremony, to which
STC filed a motion for reconsideration.
Despite the issuance of the TRO,STC, nevertheless, barred the sanctioned students from participating in
the graduation rites, arguing that, on the date of the commencement exercises, its adverted motion for
reconsideration on the issuance ofthe TRO remained unresolved.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the RTC a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Data, docketed
as SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB8 on the basis of the following considerations:
1. The photos of their children in their undergarments (e.g., bra) were taken for posterity before
they changed into their swimsuits on the occasion of a birthday beach party;
2. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at "Friends Only." They,
thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy which must be respected.
3. Respondents, being involved in the field of education, knew or ought to have known of laws
that safeguard the right to privacy. Corollarily, respondents knew or ought to have known that the
girls, whose privacy has been invaded, are the victims in this case, and not the offenders. Worse,
after viewing the photos, the minors were called "immoral" and were punished outright;
4. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. Escudero, however, violated their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by
subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of petitioners’
children were intruded upon;
5. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and
digital images happened at STC’s Computer Laboratory; and
6. All the data and digital images that were extracted were boldly broadcasted by respondents
through their memorandum submitted to the RTC in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.
To petitioners, the interplay of the foregoing constitutes an invasion of their children’s privacy
and, thus, prayed that: (a) a writ of habeas databe issued; (b) respondents be ordered to surrender
and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subjectdata before or at the
preliminary hearing; and (c) after trial, judgment be rendered declaring all information, data, and
digital images accessed, saved or stored, reproduced, spread and used, to have been illegally
obtained inviolation of the children’s right to privacy.
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the RTC, through an Order dated July 5, 2012,
issued the writ of habeas data. Through the same Order, herein respondents were directed to file their
verified written return, together with the supporting affidavits, within five (5) working days from service
of the writ.
In time, respondents complied with the RTC’s directive and filed their verified written return, laying
down the following grounds for the denial of the petition, viz: (a) petitioners are not the proper parties to
file the petition; (b) petitioners are engaging in forum shopping; (c) the instant case is not one where a
writ of habeas data may issue;and (d) there can be no violation of their right to privacy as there is no
reasonable expectation of privacy on Facebook.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 27, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision dismissing the petition for habeas data. The dispositive
portion of the Decision pertinently states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The parties and media must observe the aforestated confidentiality.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.9
To the trial court, petitioners failed to prove the existence of an actual or threatened violation of the
minors’ right to privacy, one of the preconditions for the issuance of the writ of habeas data. Moreover,
the court a quoheld that the photos, having been uploaded on Facebook without restrictions as to who
may view them, lost their privacy in some way. Besides, the RTC noted, STC gathered the photographs
through legal means and for a legal purpose, that is, the implementation of the school’s policies and rules
on discipline.
Not satisfied with the outcome, petitioners now come before this Court pursuant to Section 19 of the Rule
on Habeas Data.10
The Issues
The main issue to be threshed out inthis case is whether or not a writ of habeas datashould be issued given
the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of whether or not
there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of
the minors involved in this case.
Our Ruling
We find no merit in the petition.
Procedural issues concerning the availability of the Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or
security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding
the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.11 It is an independent and summary
remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks
to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.12
In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational
privacy, among others. A comparative law scholar has, in fact, defined habeas dataas "a procedure
designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age."13 The writ, however, will
not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person.Availment
of the writ requires the existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to
life, liberty or security on the other.14 Thus, the existence of a person’s right to informational privacy and
a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.15
Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas
datapetition will not prosper. Viewed from the perspective of the case at bar,this requisite begs this
question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and promotes real-
time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers,16 bridging the gap
created by physical space; and (2) that any information uploaded in OSNs leavesan indelible trace in the
provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the end-users––is there a right to informational
privacy in OSN activities of its users? Before addressing this point, We must first resolve the procedural
issues in this case.
a. The writ of habeas data is not only confined to cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
Contrary to respondents’ submission, the Writ of Habeas Datawas not enacted solely for the purpose of
complementing the Writ of Amparoin cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
Section 2 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Sec. 2. Who May File. – Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of habeas data. However, in
cases of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, the petition may be filed by:
 (a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the spouse, children and
parents; or
(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party within the fourth civil
degreeof consanguinity or affinity, in default of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph.
(emphasis supplied)
Had the framers of the Rule intended to narrow the operation of the writ only to cases of extralegal
killings or enforced disappearances, the above underscored portion of Section 2, reflecting a variance of
habeas data situations, would not have been made.
Habeas data, to stress, was designed "to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information
age."17 As such, it is erroneous to limit its applicability to extralegal killings and enforced disappearances
only. In fact, the annotations to the Rule preparedby the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court,
after explaining that the Writ of Habeas Data complements the Writ of Amparo, pointed out that:
The writ of habeas data, however, can be availed of as an independent remedy to enforce one’s right to
privacy, more specifically the right to informational privacy. The remedies against the violation of such
right can include the updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of the database or information or
files in possession or in control of respondents.18 (emphasis Ours) Clearly then, the privilege of the Writ
of Habeas Datamay also be availed of in cases outside of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances.
b. Meaning of "engaged" in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information
Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home
and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.
To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only
against abuses of a person or entity engaged in the businessof gathering, storing, and collecting of data.
As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:
Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas datais a remedy available to any person whose right to
privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
(emphasis Ours)
The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data
is a protection against unlawful acts or omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities
engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his or her correspondences,
or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing
data.
To "engage" in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To "engage" means "to do
or take part in something."19 It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a
business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or
information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element
of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other
reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said
person or entity.
To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very
small group, i.e., private persons and entities whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the
process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ asan instrument designed to protect a right which is easily
violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and communications technology––a right
which a great majority of the users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.
Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the controversy.
The right to informational privacy on Facebook
a. The Right to Informational Privacy
The concept of privacyhas, through time, greatly evolved, with technological advancements having an
influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s
speech, The Common Right to Privacy,20 where he explained the three strands of the right to privacy, viz:
(1) locational or situational privacy;21(2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional privacy.22 Of the three,
what is relevant to the case at bar is the right to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of
individuals to control information about themselves.23
With the availability of numerous avenues for information gathering and data sharing nowadays, not to
mention each system’s inherent vulnerability to attacks and intrusions, there is more reason that every
individual’s right to control said flow of information should be protected and that each individual should
have at least a reasonable expectation of privacy in cyberspace. Several commentators regarding privacy
and social networking sites, however, all agree that given the millions of OSN users, "[i]n this [Social
Networking] environment, privacy is no longer grounded in reasonable expectations, but rather in some
theoretical protocol better known as wishful thinking."24
It is due to this notion that the Court saw the pressing need to provide for judicial remedies that would
allow a summary hearing of the unlawful use of data or information and to remedy possible violations of
the right to privacy.25 In the same vein, the South African High Court, in its Decision in the landmark
case, H v. W,26promulgated on January30, 2013, recognized that "[t]he law has to take into account the
changing realities not only technologically but also socially or else it will lose credibility in the eyes of
the people. x x x It is imperative that the courts respond appropriately to changing times, acting cautiously
and with wisdom." Consistent with this, the Court, by developing what may be viewed as the Philippine
model of the writ of habeas data, in effect, recognized that, generally speaking, having an expectation of
informational privacy is not necessarily incompatible with engaging in cyberspace activities, including
those that occur in OSNs.
The question now though is up to whatextent is the right to privacy protected in OSNs? Bear in mind that
informational privacy involves personal information. At the same time, the very purpose of OSNs is
socializing––sharing a myriad of information,27 some of which would have otherwise remained personal.
b. Facebook’s Privacy Tools: a response to the clamor for privacy in OSN activities
Briefly, the purpose of an OSN is precisely to give users the ability to interact and to stay connected to
other members of the same or different social media platform through the sharing of statuses, photos,
videos, among others, depending on the services provided by the site. It is akin to having a room filled
with millions of personal bulletin boards or "walls," the contents of which are under the control of each
and every user. In his or her bulletin board, a user/owner can post anything––from text, to pictures, to
music and videos––access to which would depend on whether he or she allows one, some or all of the
other users to see his or her posts. Since gaining popularity, the OSN phenomenon has paved the way to
the creation of various social networking sites, includingthe one involved in the case at bar,
www.facebook.com (Facebook), which, according to its developers, people use "to stay connected with
friends and family, to discover what’s going on in the world, and to share and express what matters to
them."28
Facebook connections are established through the process of "friending" another user. By sending a
"friend request," the user invites another to connect their accounts so that they can view any and all
"Public" and "Friends Only" posts of the other.Once the request is accepted, the link is established and
both users are permitted to view the other user’s "Public" or "Friends Only" posts, among others.
"Friending," therefore, allows the user to form or maintain one-to-one relationships with other users,
whereby the user gives his or her "Facebook friend" access to his or her profile and shares certain
information to the latter.29
To address concerns about privacy,30 but without defeating its purpose, Facebook was armed with
different privacy tools designed to regulate the accessibility of a user’s profile31 as well as information
uploaded by the user. In H v. W,32 the South Gauteng High Court recognized this ability of the users to
"customize their privacy settings," but did so with this caveat: "Facebook states in its policies that,
although it makes every effort to protect a user’s information, these privacy settings are not foolproof."33
For instance, a Facebook user canregulate the visibility and accessibility of digital images(photos), posted
on his or her personal bulletin or "wall," except for the user’sprofile picture and ID, by selecting his or her
desired privacy setting:
 (a) Public - the default setting; every Facebook user can view the photo;
(b) Friends of Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends and their friends can view the photo;
(b) Friends - only the user’s Facebook friends can view the photo;
(c) Custom - the photo is made visible only to particular friends and/or networks of the Facebook
user; and
(d) Only Me - the digital image can be viewed only by the user.
The foregoing are privacy tools, available to Facebook users, designed to set up barriers to broaden or
limit the visibility of his or her specific profile content, statuses, and photos, among others, from another
user’s point of view. In other words, Facebook extends its users an avenue to make the availability of
their Facebook activities reflect their choice as to "when and to what extent to disclose facts about
[themselves] – and to put others in the position of receiving such confidences."34 Ideally, the selected
setting will be based on one’s desire to interact with others, coupled with the opposing need to withhold
certain information as well as to regulate the spreading of his or her personal information. Needless to
say, as the privacy setting becomes more limiting, fewer Facebook users can view that user’s particular
post.
STC did not violate petitioners’ daughters’ right to privacy
Without these privacy settings, respondents’ contention that there is no reasonable expectation of privacy
in Facebook would, in context, be correct. However, such is not the case. It is through the availability of
said privacy tools that many OSN users are said to have a subjective expectation that only those to
whomthey grant access to their profile will view the information they post or upload thereto. 35
This, however, does not mean thatany Facebook user automatically has a protected expectation of privacy
inall of his or her Facebook activities.
Before one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her OSN activity, it is first necessary that said
user, in this case the children of petitioners,manifest the intention to keepcertain posts private, through the
employment of measures to prevent access thereto or to limit its visibility.36 And this intention can
materialize in cyberspace through the utilization of the OSN’s privacy tools. In other words, utilization of
these privacy tools is the manifestation,in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his or her right to
informational privacy.37
Therefore, a Facebook user who opts to make use of a privacy tool to grant or deny access to his or her
post orprofile detail should not be denied the informational privacy right which necessarily accompanies
said choice.38Otherwise, using these privacy tools would be a feckless exercise, such that if, for instance,
a user uploads a photo or any personal information to his or her Facebook page and sets its privacy level
at "Only Me" or a custom list so that only the user or a chosen few can view it, said photo would still be
deemed public by the courts as if the user never chose to limit the photo’s visibility and accessibility.
Such position, if adopted, will not only strip these privacy tools of their function but it would also
disregard the very intention of the user to keep said photo or information within the confines of his or her
private space.
We must now determine the extent that the images in question were visible to other Facebook users and
whether the disclosure was confidential in nature. In other words, did the minors limit the disclosure of
the photos such that the images were kept within their zones of privacy? This determination is necessary
in resolving the issue of whether the minors carved out a zone of privacy when the photos were uploaded
to Facebook so that the images will be protected against unauthorized access and disclosure.
Petitioners, in support of their thesis about their children’s privacy right being violated, insist that
Escudero intruded upon their children’s Facebook accounts, downloaded copies ofthe pictures and
showed said photos to Tigol. To them, this was a breach of the minors’ privacy since their Facebook
accounts, allegedly, were under "very private" or "Only Friends" setting safeguarded with a
password.39 Ultimately, they posit that their children’s disclosure was only limited since their profiles
were not open to public viewing. Therefore, according to them, people who are not their Facebook
friends, including respondents, are barred from accessing said post without their knowledge and consent.
Aspetitioner’s children testified, it was Angelawho uploaded the subjectphotos which were only viewable
by the five of them,40 although who these five are do not appear on the records.
Escudero, on the other hand, stated in her affidavit41 that "my students showed me some pictures of girls
cladin brassieres. This student [sic] of mine informed me that these are senior high school [students] of
STC, who are their friends in [F]acebook. x x x They then said [that] there are still many other photos
posted on the Facebook accounts of these girls. At the computer lab, these students then logged into their
Facebook account [sic], and accessed from there the various photographs x x x. They even told me that
there had been times when these photos were ‘public’ i.e., not confined to their friends in Facebook."
In this regard, We cannot give muchweight to the minors’ testimonies for one key reason: failure to
question the students’ act of showing the photos to Tigol disproves their allegation that the photos were
viewable only by the five of them. Without any evidence to corroborate their statement that the images
were visible only to the five of them, and without their challenging Escudero’s claim that the other
students were able to view the photos, their statements are, at best, self-serving, thus deserving scant
consideration.42
It is well to note that not one of petitioners disputed Escudero’s sworn account that her students, who are
the minors’ Facebook "friends," showed her the photos using their own Facebook accounts. This only
goes to show that no special means to be able to viewthe allegedly private posts were ever resorted to by
Escudero’s students,43 and that it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the photos were, in reality,
viewable either by (1) their Facebook friends, or (2) by the public at large.
Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is"Public," it can be surmised that the photographs
in question were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof that petitioners’ children positively
limited the disclosure of the photograph. If suchwere the case, they cannot invoke the protection attached
to the right to informational privacy. The ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez44 is most
instructive:
[A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely intends to forsake and renounce all privacy
rights to such imagery, particularly under circumstances suchas here, where the Defendant did not employ
protective measures or devices that would have controlled access to the Web page or the photograph
itself.45
Also, United States v. Maxwell46 held that "[t]he more open the method of transmission is, the less
privacy one can reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large inthe chat room or e-mail that is
forwarded from correspondent to correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."
That the photos are viewable by "friends only" does not necessarily bolster the petitioners’ contention. In
this regard, the cyber community is agreed that the digital images under this setting still remain to be
outside the confines of the zones of privacy in view of the following:
(1) Facebook "allows the world to be more open and connected by giving its users the tools to
interact and share in any conceivable way;"47
(2) A good number of Facebook users "befriend" other users who are total strangers;48
(3) The sheer number of "Friends" one user has, usually by the hundreds; and
(4) A user’s Facebook friend can "share"49 the former’s post, or "tag"50 others who are not
Facebook friends with the former, despite its being visible only tohis or her own Facebook
friends.
It is well to emphasize at this point that setting a post’s or profile detail’s privacy to "Friends" is no
assurance that it can no longer be viewed by another user who is not Facebook friends with the source of
the content. The user’s own Facebook friend can share said content or tag his or her own Facebook friend
thereto, regardless of whether the user tagged by the latter is Facebook friends or not with the former.
Also, when the post is shared or when a person is tagged, the respective Facebook friends of the person
who shared the post or who was tagged can view the post, the privacy setting of which was set at
"Friends."
To illustrate, suppose A has 100 Facebook friends and B has 200. A and B are not Facebook friends. If C,
A’s Facebook friend, tags B in A’s post, which is set at "Friends," the initial audience of 100 (A’s own
Facebook friends) is dramatically increased to 300 (A’s 100 friends plus B’s 200 friends or the public,
depending upon B’s privacy setting). As a result, the audience who can view the post is effectively
expanded––and to a very large extent.
This, along with its other features and uses, is confirmation of Facebook’s proclivity towards user
interaction and socialization rather than seclusion or privacy, as it encourages broadcasting of individual
user posts. In fact, it has been said that OSNs have facilitated their users’ self-tribute, thereby resulting
into the "democratization of fame."51Thus, it is suggested, that a profile, or even a post, with visibility set
at "Friends Only" cannot easily, more so automatically, be said to be "very private," contrary to
petitioners’ argument.
As applied, even assuming that the photos in issue are visible only to the sanctioned students’ Facebook
friends, respondent STC can hardly be taken to task for the perceived privacy invasion since it was the
minors’ Facebook friends who showed the pictures to Tigol. Respondents were mere recipients of what
were posted. They did not resort to any unlawful means of gathering the information as it was voluntarily
given to them by persons who had legitimate access to the said posts. Clearly, the fault, if any, lies with
the friends of the minors. Curiously enough, however, neither the minors nor their parents imputed any
violation of privacy against the students who showed the images to Escudero.
Furthermore, petitioners failed to prove their contention that respondents reproduced and broadcasted the
photographs. In fact, what petitioners attributed to respondents as an act of offensive disclosure was no
more than the actuality that respondents appended said photographs in their memorandum submitted to
the trial court in connection with Civil Case No. CEB-38594.52 These are not tantamount to a violation of
the minor’s informational privacy rights, contrary to petitioners’ assertion.
In sum, there can be no quibbling that the images in question, or to be more precise, the photos of minor
students scantily clad, are personal in nature, likely to affect, if indiscriminately circulated, the reputation
of the minors enrolled in a conservative institution. However, the records are bereft of any evidence, other
than bare assertions that they utilized Facebook’s privacy settings to make the photos visible only to them
or to a select few. Without proof that they placed the photographs subject of this case within the ambit of
their protected zone of privacy, they cannot now insist that they have an expectation of privacy with
respect to the photographs in question.
Had it been proved that the access tothe pictures posted were limited to the original uploader, through the
"Me Only" privacy setting, or that the user’s contact list has been screened to limit access to a select few,
through the "Custom" setting, the result may have been different, for in such instances, the intention to
limit access to the particular post, instead of being broadcasted to the public at large or all the user’s
friends en masse, becomes more manifest and palpable.
On Cyber Responsibility
It has been said that "the best filter is the one between your children’s ears."53 This means that self-
regulation on the part of OSN users and internet consumers ingeneral is the best means of avoiding
privacy rights violations.54 As a cyberspace communitymember, one has to be proactive in protecting his
or her own privacy.55 It is in this regard that many OSN users, especially minors, fail.Responsible social
networking or observance of the "netiquettes"56 on the part of teenagers has been the concern of many due
to the widespreadnotion that teenagers can sometimes go too far since they generally lack the people
skills or general wisdom to conduct themselves sensibly in a public forum.57
Respondent STC is clearly aware of this and incorporating lessons on good cyber citizenship in its
curriculum to educate its students on proper online conduct may be mosttimely. Too, it is not only STC
but a number of schools and organizations have already deemed it important to include digital literacy and
good cyber citizenshipin their respective programs and curricula in view of the risks that the children are
exposed to every time they participate in online activities.58 Furthermore, considering the complexity of
the cyber world and its pervasiveness,as well as the dangers that these children are wittingly or
unwittingly exposed to in view of their unsupervised activities in cyberspace, the participation of the
parents in disciplining and educating their children about being a good digital citizen is encouraged by
these institutions and organizations. In fact, it is believed that "to limit such risks, there’s no substitute for
parental involvement and supervision."59
As such, STC cannot be faulted for being steadfast in its duty of teaching its students to beresponsible in
their dealings and activities in cyberspace, particularly in OSNs, whenit enforced the disciplinary actions
specified in the Student Handbook, absenta showing that, in the process, it violated the students’ rights.
OSN users should be aware of the risks that they expose themselves to whenever they engage
incyberspace activities.1âwphi1 Accordingly, they should be cautious enough to control their privacy and
to exercise sound discretion regarding how much information about themselves they are willing to give
up. Internet consumers ought to be aware that, by entering or uploading any kind of data or information
online, they are automatically and inevitably making it permanently available online, the perpetuation of
which is outside the ambit of their control. Furthermore, and more importantly, information, otherwise
private, voluntarily surrendered by them can be opened, read, or copied by third parties who may or may
not be allowed access to such.
It is, thus, incumbent upon internet users to exercise due diligence in their online dealings and activities
and must not be negligent in protecting their rights. Equity serves the vigilant. Demanding relief from the
courts, as here, requires that claimants themselves take utmost care in safeguarding a right which they
allege to have been violated. These are indispensable. We cannot afford protection to persons if they
themselves did nothing to place the matter within the confines of their private zone. OSN users must be
mindful enough to learn the use of privacy tools, to use them if they desire to keep the information
private, and to keep track of changes in the available privacy settings, such as those of Facebook,
especially because Facebook is notorious for changing these settings and the site's layout often.
In finding that respondent STC and its officials did not violate the minors' privacy rights, We find no
cogent reason to disturb the findings and case disposition of the court a quo.
In light of the foregoing, the Court need not belabor the other assigned errors.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision dated July 27, 2012
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in SP. Proc. No. 19251-CEB is hereby AFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
 SABIO VS GORDON 504 SRA 704
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person has
exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by
unreasonable government intrusion.[50] Applying this determination to these cases, the important inquiries
are: first, did the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable
expectation of privacy?; and second, did the government violate such expectation?
This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state
interest. In Morfe v. Mutuc,[51] the Court, in line with Whalen v. Roe,[52] employed the rational basis
relationship test when it held that there was no infringement of the individuals right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize the opportunities
for official corruption, maintain a standard of honesty in public service, and promote morality in public
administration.[53] In Valmonte v. Belmonte,[54] the Court remarked that as public figures, the Members of
the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacyas compared to ordinary
individuals, and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the Court ruled
that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern prevails over the right to
privacy of financial transactions.

EJERCITO VS SANDIGANBAYAN 509 SCRA 190

When this Court construed the Ombudsman Act of 1989, in light of the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Law
in Marquez, that before an in camera inspection may be allowed there must be a pending case before a
court of competent jurisdiction, it was, in fact, reversing an earlier doctrine found in Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Purisima[17].
Banco Filipino involved subpoenas duces tecum issued by the Office of the Ombudsman, then
known as the Tanodbayan,[18] in the course of its preliminary investigation of a charge of violation of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
While the main issue in Banco Filipino was whether R.A. 1405 precluded the Tanodbayans
issuance of subpoena duces tecum of bank records in the name of persons other than the one who was
charged, this Court, citing P.D. 1630,[19] Section 10, the relevant part of which states:
(d) He may issue a subpoena to compel any person to appear, give sworn
testimony, or produce documentary or other evidence the Tanodbayan deems relevant to
a matter under his inquiry,
held that The power of the Tanodbayan to issue subpoenae ad testificandum and subpoenae duces
tecum at the time in question is not disputed, and at any rate does not admit of doubt.[20]
As the subpoenas subject of Banco Filipino were issued during a preliminary investigation, in
effect this Court upheld the power of the Tandobayan under P.D. 1630 to issue subpoenas duces tecum
for bank documents prior to the filing of a case before a court of competent jurisdiction.
Marquez, on the other hand, practically reversed this ruling in Banco Filipino despite the fact that
the subpoena power of the Ombudsman under R.A. 6770 was essentially the same as that under P.D.
1630. Thus Section 15 of R.A. 6770 empowers the Office of the Ombudsman to
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in
any investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank
accounts and records;
A comparison of this provision with its counterpart in Sec. 10(d) of P.D. 1630 clearly shows that it is
only more explicit in stating that the power of the Ombudsman includes the power to examine and have
access to bank accounts and records which power was recognized with respect to the Tanodbayan
through Banco Filipino.
The Marquez ruling that there must be a pending case in order for the Ombudsman to validly inspect
bank records in camera thus reversed a prevailing doctrine.[21] Hence, it may not be retroactively applied.
The Ombudsmans inquiry into the subject bank accounts prior to the filing of any case before a court of
competent jurisdiction was therefore valid at the time it was conducted.
In our view, requiring an employer to obtain a warrant whenever the employer wished to enter an
employee’s office, desk, or file cabinets for a work-related purpose would seriously disrupt the
routine conduct of business and would be unduly burdensome. Imposing unwieldy warrant
procedures in such cases upon supervisors, who would otherwise have no reason to be familiar with
such procedures, is simply unreasonable. In contrast to other circumstances in which we have
required warrants, supervisors in offices such as at the Hospital are hardly in the business of
investigating the violation of criminal laws. Rather, work-related searches are merely incident to the
primary business of the agency. Under these circumstances, the imposition of a warrant requirement
would conflict with the "common-sense realization that government offices could not function if every
employment decision became a constitutional matter."

"Determining the reasonableness of any search involves a twofold inquiry: first, one must consider
‘whether the…action was justified at its inception,’ x x x ; second, one must determine whether the
search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place,’"