Persons Reviewer

Persons reviewer Atty Senga
PERSONS REVIEWER
I. Effect and Application of Laws (Arts. 1-18)
Article 1. This Act shall be known as the "Civil Code of the Philippines." (n)
 When did the civil code take effect? August 30, 1950
 Give a brief history of the civil code: prepared by the Roxas Code commission created by
EO No. 48 of March 20, 1947. They started working on the code on May 8, 1947, and
ended on December 15, 1947. On January 26, 2949, RA 386 was passed which is “An
Act to Ordain and Institute the Civil Code of The Philippines.”
Effectivity of Laws (Art. 2)
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.
1. Publication Requirement; What to Publish
Rules:
1. Shorter/longer period than the 15 day period, the period provided by statute shall
prevail
2. Takes effect immediately after publication with the 15 day period being dispensed
with
3. If there is no provision as to it’s effectivity, effective 15 days after publication
Coverage:
1. PD’s
2. Laws which refer to all statutes, including local and private laws
3. Admin rules and regulations, the purpose of which is to enforce/ implement existing law
pursuant to a valid delegation
4. Charter of a city
5. Circulars issued by the monetary board the purpose of which is not merely to interpret
but to fill in the details of the Central bank
6. Circulars and regulations which prescribe a penalty for it’s violation
7. Executive orders
Publication not required:
1. Interpretive regulations
2. Letters of instruction issued by administrative superiors on rules/guidelines to be
followed by subordinates in the performance of their duties
3. Those internal in nature, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency
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Date of effectivity of MO NOT covered by this rule but by the LGC
Importance of Publication
1. Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, 29 December 1986, 146 SCRA 446
All laws, in order to take effect, MUST be published in the Official Gazette. The “unless
otherwise provided” in section 2 of the Civil Code refers to the 15 day requirement. The clear
object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non
excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
2. De Roy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80718, 29 January 1988
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court
decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming
effective.
3. People vs., Que Po Lay 94 Phil 640
Circulars and regulations especially like Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank which prescribes a
penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective.
4. NPC v. Pinatubo Commercial, G.R. No. 176006, 26 March 2010.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.
5. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers G.R. No. 180643 March
25, 2008
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted in
accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to
publish the rules for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published rules
clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or
repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. The Court declared void unpublished rules of procedure in
Senate inquiries insofar as such rules affect the rights of witnesses. The Court cited Section 21, Article
VI of the Constitution which mandates: Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective Committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published
rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
(Emphasis supplied)
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6. Pimentel v. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, GR No. 187714, March 8, 2011
The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules
of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such
rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules
can take effect. Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself
provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is
not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is
required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. The majority of the members of the
Senate approved the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, and the publication requirement
which they adopted should be considered as the will of the majority. Respondent cannot dispense with
the publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee had already been published
in the Official Gazette. To reiterate, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole expressly require
publication before the Rules can take effect. To comply with due process requirements, the Senate must
follow its own internal rules if the rights of its own members are affected.
Ignorance of Law excuses no one (Art. 3)
Art. 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.
 Article 3 only applies to mandatory and prohibitory laws

 Ignorantia legis non excusat
Mistake of law v. Mistake of Fact:
MISTAKE OF LAW MISTAKE OF FACT

- Mistake of law is a defense that the - Mistakes of fact arise when a criminal
criminal defendant misunderstood the defendant misunderstood some fact that
law as it existed at the time. The onus is negates an element of the crime. For
generally placed on individuals to be instance, if an individual is charged
aware of the laws of their state or with larceny but believed that the
community, and thus this defense only property he took was rightfully his, this
applies in very limited circumstances. misunderstanding negates any intent to
Specifically, mistake of law can be deprive another of the property. One
used as a defense in four limited important qualification, however, is
circumstances: that this mistake of fact must be honest
and reasonable. Thus, a defendant
 When the law has not been published; cannot later claim that he or she was
 When the defendant relied upon a law or mistaken when he or she actually knew
statute that was later overturned or the situation. Likewise, the mistake
deemed unconstitutional; must be one that would appear
 When the defendant relied upon a judicial reasonable to a judge or jury. If the
decision that was later overruled; or same individual was repeatedly told
 When the defendant relied upon an that the property was not his, and he
interpretation by an applicable official. could not take it, it would no longer be
reasonable for him to mistakenly have
Additionally, the defendant’s reliance on any
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of these sources must have been reasonable, believed that he could rightfully take
much like mistake of fact. Thus, a defendant the property.
cannot claim that he was relying on a case
from 200 years ago when it is apparent that Mistakes of fact may apply to a variety of
there have been subsequent developments in crimes. Some crimes may set forth that mistake
the law. of fact is a defense. Otherwise, if the criminal
defendant can prove that the mistake
reasonably negated an element of the crime,
the defense will usually be held to apply and
absolve the defendant of liability.
- Art. 526 –mistake on doubtful or

difficult provision of law is basis for
good faith - mitigates but does not
extinguish liability.
- Third paragraph “Mistake upon a
doubtful or difficult question of law
may be the basis of good faith”
- Art. 1334 – mutual error on legal effect

of agreement- may vitiate consent;
- Art. 2155. Payment by reason of a

mistake in the construction or
application of a doubtful or difficult
question of law may come within the
scope of the preceding article.
(obligation to return it arises)
Prospective Application of Laws (Art. 4)
Art. 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided.
1. Exception
a. If provided in the law itself
b. Procedural law, emergency laws
c. Penal law if favorable to the accused
d. Curative and Repealing statutes;
e. Creating new rights
f. Tax statutes
g. Interpretative Statutes
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2. Exception to the Exception

a. Ex post facto laws;
b. Penal laws not favorable to the accused;
c. Substantive laws impairing vested rights, laws that impair the obligations of
contracts
1.Valeroso v. People, G.R. No. 164815, 22 February 2008
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the
character of an ex post facto law.1[82] An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is
advantageous to the accused.
2.PNB v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 104528, 18 January 1996
Under Article 4 of the Civil Code, there shall be no retroactive effect of the law unless the
contrary is provided. PD 957, though implied, intended to include real estate mortgages executed
prior to its enactment and therefore must take effect to protect the innocent purchasers from
swindling and fraudulent manipulations and illegal scheme of subdivision developers. The court
ascertained that they will not follow the letter of the statue if it will not reflect the intent and
purpose of the legislature, which is to uphold social justice and the protection of human rights.
3.Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc., G.R. No. 168129,
24 April 2007
BIR rulings have no retroactive effect where a grossly unfair deal would result to the prejudice of
the taxpayer.
Acts Contrary to Mandatory or Prohibitory Provisions are Void (Art. 5)
Art. 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory or prohibitory laws shall be void,
except when the law itself authorizes their validity
 What is a mandatory law? refers to something that is required, and not optional or subject
to discretion. In legal construction of statutes, mandatory requirements of law are
typically found by the use of words such as "must", "will" and "shall".
 What is a prohibitory law? mandatory laws that imposes duty to refrain from doing a
forbidden act.
Exceptions
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a. The law makes the act valid BUT punishes THE VIOLATOR
b. The law itself authorizes its validity
c. The law makes the act only voidable
d. The law declares the nullity of an act but recognizes its effects as legally existing
Waiver of Rights (Art. 6)
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.
1. Requisites
Requisites of a valid waiver
- (Herrera vs. Boromeo)

a. Existence of a right
b. Knowledge of the existence of the right
c. An intention to relinquish the right (implied in this is the capacity to dispose of the
right)
- Paras book
a. Full capacity
b. Unequivocal
c. Rights must exist at the time of the waiver
d. It must not be contrary to law, public policy, morals, or good customs
e. Must not be prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law
f. When formalities are required, the same must be complied with
General Rule: Rights can be waived.
2. Exceptions
a. Waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs;
b. If the waiver is prejudicial to a third party with a right recognized by law.
c. Alleged rights which really do not yet exist, as in the case of future inheritance
d. If the right is a natural right, such as right to be supported.
1. D.M. Consunji vs. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this
case, the fact that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioners
employees, of which private respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a
resolution stating that there may be civil liability. In Floresca, it was the negligence of the
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mining corporation and its violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or
violation of government rules and regulations, for that matter, however, is not a fact, but a
conclusion of law, over which only the courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one
until the courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake
of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied in Floresca and in the case at bar.
2. Cui vs. Arellano University 2 SCRA 205
The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set therein was
advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question, asking previous students
to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound
policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null
and void.
Repeal of Laws (Art. 7)
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are
not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (5a)
1. Kinds of Repeal
a. Express: Express repeal occurs where express words are used in a statute to repeal an earlier
statute.
b. Implied (not favored): The doctrine of implied repeal is a concept in constitutional theory
which states that where an Act of Parliament or an Act of Congress conflicts with an earlier one,
the later Act takes precedence and the conflicting parts of the earlier Act are repealed.
2.Effects
3. Sec. 444, Local Government Code
Mecano v. COA, G.R. No. 103982, 11 December 1992
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Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are
not favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes
Judicial Decisions form part of the law of the land (Art. 8)
Art. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
Doctrine of stare decisis: Stare decisis is Latin for “to stand by things decided.” In short, it is
the doctrine of precedent.
Courts cite to stare decisis when an issue has been previously brought to the court and a ruling
already issued. According to the Supreme Court, stare decisis “promotes the evenhanded,
predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions,
and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.” In practice, the
Supreme Court will usually defer to its previous decisions even if the soundness of the decision
is in doubt. A benefit of this rigidity is that a court need not continuously reevaluate the legal
underpinnings of past decisions and accepted doctrines. Moreover, proponents argue that
the predictability afforded by the doctrine helps clarify constitutional rights for the public. Other
commentators point out that courts and society only realize these benefits when decisions are
published and made available. Thus, some scholars assert that stare decisis is harder to justify in
cases involving secret opinions.
In order to invoke stare decisis, the following must occur:
1. Same facts
2. Same issues
3. Same law
People v. Licera G.R. No. L-39990, July 2, 1975
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction's legal system. These
decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The
application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of the
enactment of the said law since the Court's application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect.
Duty of Judges (Art. 9)
Art. 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence,
obscurity or insufficiency of the laws
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Chu Jan vs. Bernas, 34 Phil 631 (1916)
Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge regarding law applicable to a case

submitted to him for decision are not reasons that can serve to excuse the
court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding on
the issue. Such excuse is less acceptable because foreseeing that a case may
arise to which no law would be applicable, the Civil Code in 2 nd paragraph of
Art 6, provides that Customs of the place shal l be observed and
in absence thereof, the general principles of law.
Doubtful Statues (Art. 10)
Art. 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the
lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
People vs. Purisima, G.R. Nos. L-42050-66, L-46229-32, L-46313-16, L-46997, 20 November
1978
While the preamble is not a part of the statute, it implies the intent and spirit of the decree. The
preamble and whereas clauses also enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the
decree and the stiff sanctions provided.
Customs (Art. 11-12)
Art. 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced. (n)
Art. 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence
1. Requisites to make a custom an obligatory rule

a. Plurality or repetition of acts;
b. Practiced by the great mass of the social group;
c. Continued practice for a long period of time;
d. The community accepts it as a proper way of acting, such that it is considered as obligatory
upon all
1.Martinez vs. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil 79 (1910)
Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have, therefore, been
acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, can not be held to be
themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted by
society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial.itc-alf Accidents sometimes happen and injuries
result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary results. To hold
that, because such an act once resulted in accident or injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go
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far. The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does
not in any sense militate against the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates a prima facie
case, and that only in the absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act complained of was
performed.
2.Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales, G.R. No. 55960, November 24, 1988
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and custom of
China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as proof of China's law
or custom on marriage not only because they are
self-serving evidence, but more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on
the subject matter.
Computation of Period and Time (Art. 13)
Art. 13. When the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that
years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-
four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days
which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included. (7a)
1. Rule on Computation of Period: First day excluded, last day included

a. Years- 365 days, unless year identified
b. Months-30 days, unless month identified
c. Days – 24 hours
d. Nights - sunset to sundown
2. Exception: Computation of age - each year based on birth anniversary
3. Policy if last day is a Sunday or Legal Holiday:
- if the act to be performed within the period is prescribed of allowed by the a. ROC b. by
the order of the court, or c. by any other applicable statute, the last day will automatically
be considered the next working day
- If the act to be performed within the period arises from contractual relationship, the act
will become due despite the fact that the last day falls on a Sunday or Holiday
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CIR vs. Primetown, G.R. 162155, August 28, 2007(NOTE: ma’am said to read the case in the
original. I have included the full text at the back)
Legal Periods. Year shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; month of thirty days,
unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the
number of days the specific month contains; day, to a day of twenty-four hours and; night from
sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)
Penal Laws (Art. 14)
Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who
live or sojourn in the Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public international
law and to treaty stipulations.
 Territoriality rule governs regardless of the nationality but subject to principles of

international law and to treaty stipulations
a) Applicability in the Philippines if committed here
b) Territoriality
c) Exceptions:
- Public International Law (Diplomatic Immunity, etc)
- Treaty Stipulations
Civil Laws (Art. 15-17)
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
(9a)
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is stipulated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (10a)
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall
be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine
laws shall be observed in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have, for their
object, public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
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foreign country.
1. General Rule: National Law of Decedent –Lex nationalii, Article 15. Nationality
Principle. The nationality affects the Filipino wherever he may be on the following:
a. Family Rights and Duties
b. Status
c. Condition
d. Legal Capacity
2. Exceptions
i. Art. 26, par. 2 FC
When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
therefore validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have the capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
ii. Property transactions (real or personal) – lex situs or lex rei sitae, Article 16
- law of the place where the property is situated is the basis for determining law applicable.
This covers both REAL and PERSONAL property.
- EXCEPTIONS: intestate and testamentary succession both with respect to the 1. Order of
succession 2. Amount of successional rights 3. Intrinsic validity of testamentary
provisions, capacity to succeed FOLLOWS THE NATIONAL LAW OF
DECDENDENT, LEX NATIONALII, ARTICLE 15
iii. Lex Loci Celebrationis, Law of the place where the contract was executed, Article 17
- Covers only forms and solemnities

- Exception: Intrinsic validity and Art. 26, par. 1 FC (All marriages solemnized outside
The Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where they were
solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country except those
prohibited under Articles 35 (1) (4) (5) and (6), 36, 37, 38.
3. Renvoi Doctrine
- The Doctrine of Renvoi is a legal doctrine which applies when a court is faced with a
conflict of law and must consider the law of another state, referred to as private
international law ("PIL") rules. This can apply when considering foreign issues arising in
succession planning and in administering estates.The word “Renvoi” comes from the
French “send back” or “return unopened”. The “Doctrine of Renvoi” is the process by
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which the court adopts the rules of a foreign jurisdiction with respect to any conflict of
law that arises. The idea behind the doctrine is that it prevents forum shopping and the
same law is applied to achieve the same outcome regardless of where the case is actually
dealt with. The system of Renvoi attempts to achieve that end.
- Occurs when a citizen of another country dies as a domiciliary of another country. Where
the conflict rules of the forum refer to a foreign law, and the latter refers it back to the
internal law, the law of the forum shall apply.
Van Dorn vs. Ronillo, Jr. et al., 139 SCRA 139
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according
to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653
Nationality principle
San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. Nos. 133743 & 134029, February 6, 2007
Nationality principle
Art. 18 Suppletory application of Civil Code in matters governed by special law
Art. 18. In matters which are governed by the Code of Commerce and special laws, their
deficiency shall be supplied by the provisions of this Code.
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II. Human Relations (19-36)
Art. 19-21
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to
another, shall indemnify the latter for the same. (acts contrary to law)
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage. (acts contra bonus mores)
 Articles 19 and 21 refer to intentional acts whereas Article 21 refers to willfull or

negligent acts
 Doctrine of Abuse of Right: In civil law jurisdictions, abuse of rights (also known as
Prohibition of Chicane) is the exercise of a legal right only to cause annoyance, harm, or
injury to another. The abuser is liable for the harm caused by their actions. Some
examples of this are abuse of power, barratry, frivolous or vexatious litigation, a spite
fence, forum shopping, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, tax avoidance (vs. anti-
avoidance rules, step transaction doctrine, economic substance), etc. The principle is a
creature of case law and was expanded from the neighborhood law doctrine of aemulatio
vicini under the jus commune. This principle departs from the classical theory that “he
who uses a right injures no one”, instead embracing the maxim “a right ends where abuse
begins” (= le droit cesse où l'abus commence)
 Requisites of Abuse of Right
1. Existence of a legal right or duty
2. Which is exercised in bad faith
3. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another
 Doctrine of Volenti non fit Injuria
It refers to self-inflicted injuries or to the consent to injury which precludes the recovery
of damages by one who has knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if
he is not negligent in doing so.
 Damnum Absque Injuria
A person who exercises his legal right does no injury. However, it cannot be said that a
person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another or offends morals or
good customs. Thus, when damages result from a person’s exercise of rights, it is
damnum absque injuria. (in here, there is no bad faith)
 Acts Contra Bonus Mores (against good morals, Article 21 of the Civil Code)
Requisites
1. There is a legal act
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2. But which is contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or public policy
3. It is done with intent to injure
 Breach of Promise to Marry
This is the issue in the 1964 case of Wassmer vs. Velez (G.R. No. L-20089). Let’s briefly
discuss the case.In the words of the Supreme Court, the facts that culminated in that case
started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious endeavors,
but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation. A couple,
following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set a date for the
wedding. They applied for and was issued a marriage license. Invitations were printed
and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances. The bride-to-be’s trousseau, party
dresses and other apparel for the important occasion were purchased. Dresses for the
maid of honor and the flower girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories,
was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received. And then, with but two days
before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply left a note for plaintiff
stating: “Will have to postpone wedding. My mother opposes it…” He enplaned to his
home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff:
“Nothing changed rest assured returning soon.” But he never returned and was never
heard from again. The would-be bride sued the runaway groom.The case is not merely for
a breach of promise to marry, which is not an actionable wrong. In fact, Congress
deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would
have it so. It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary
to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code
provides that any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage. To formally set a wedding and go through all the preparations and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different.
This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be
held answerable in damages.
1.Uypitching vs. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006
The basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code .Article
19, also known as the "principle of abuse of right," prescribes that a person should not use
his right unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith ,otherwise he opens himself to
liability. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure
another.The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was
established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to harm
another.In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners‘ instance was
not only attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in
conjunction with the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the
mortgaged vehicle was utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent.
2. Wassmer vs. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964
15
Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But formally set a
wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity and only to walk out of it
when matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpable and unjustifiable
to good customs which holds liability in accordance with Art. 21 on the New Civil Code.
When a breach of promise to marry is actionable under the same, moral and exemplary damages
may not be awarded when it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in wanton, reckless and
oppressive manner.
3.Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, et all vs. Reyes G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform
with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be responsible."60 The object of this article,
therefore, is to set certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one’s
rights but also in the performance of one’s duties.61 These standards are the following: act
with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.62 Its antithesis,
necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1)
There is a legal right or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of
prejudicing or injuring another.63 When Article 19 is violated, an action for damages is proper
under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising from a violation
of law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right to ask Mr.
Reyes to leave. A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, the act
complained of must be intentional.
4. Gashem Shookat Baksh vs. CA, G.R. No. 97336, February 19, 1993
Mere breach of marriage is not punishable by law. However, since the respondent was proved to
have a good moral character, and that she had just let her virginity be taken away by the
petitioner since the latter offered a promise of marriage, then she could ask for payment for
damages. Furthermore, since she let her lover, the petitioner, “deflowered” her since she believed
that his promise to marry was true, and not due to her carnal desire, then she could have her
claims against the petitioner. Moreover, the father of the respondent had already looked for pigs
and chicken for the marriage reception and the sponsors for the marriage, and then damages were
caused by the petitioner against the respondents, which qualified the claims of the respondent
against the petitioner.
5. Pe vs. Pe, G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962
Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals,

good customs and public policy contemplated in Article 21 of the civil code. The
wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married
man.
16
6. Globe Mackay Cable vs. CA, 176 SCRA 778
The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has
already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the
manner in which the right is exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done
abusively, then the employer is liable for damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of the
instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias,
giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
7.University of the East vs. Jader, G.R. No. 132344, February 17, 2000
The Supreme Court held that UE is liable for damages. It is the contractual obligation of the
school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student
as to where he or she had already complied with the entire requirement for the conferment of a
degree or whether they should be included among those who will graduate. The school cannot be
said to have acted in good faith. Absence of good faith must be sufficiently established for a
successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in suit for abuse of right under Article 19 of the
CivilCode.
Unjust Enrichment (Art. 22 and 23)
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means,
acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or
legal ground, shall return the same to him.
Art. 23. Even when an act or event causing damage to another's property was not due to
the fault or negligence of the defendant, the latter shall be liable for indemnity if through
the act or event he was benefited.
1. Accion in rem verso
It is an action for recovery of what has been paid without just cause. This differs from solution
indebiti (which is article 2154) because in SI, payment made by mistake is an essential element
to maintain the action for recovery whereas in accion in rem verso, it is not necessary that the
payment was made by mistake. Payment could have been knowingly and voluntarily.
Nevertheless, there would be recovery of what has been paid.
Application:
i.when a thing is acquired by or comes into possession of another (delivery or acquisition of

things) and
17
ii. when the acquisition be undue and at the expense of another (without just or legal ground)
Requisites for Accion in rem verso:
i.enrichment without just or legal ground
ii.defendant has been enriched
iii. Plaintiff has suffered a loss
iv. he has no other action based on contract, quasi contract, crime, or quasi-delict
Art. 24. (COURT VIGILANCE) In all contractual, property or other relations, when one
of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance,
indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for
his protection.
Art. 25. (EXTRAVAGANCE DURING EMERGENCY) Thoughtless extravagance in

expenses for pleasure or display during a period of acute public want or emergency may be
stopped by order of the courts at the instance of any government or private charitable
institution.
Respect for Other’s Privacy, Personality, Etc. (Art. 26)
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of
his neighbors and other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not
constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for damages, prevention and
other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence:
(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in
life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
1.Tenchavez vs. Escano, 15 SCRA 355
(regarding par 2 of Art 26) Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation
of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good
faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved.
2.St Louis Realty vs. CA, 133 SCRA 179
18
St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up residences in a widely circulated publication.

Furthermore, it never made any written apology and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented
itself with a cavalier "rectification ".The trial court awarded Aramil P8,000 as actual damages,
P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the
Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement for the reason that “St. Louis Realty committed an
actionable quasi-delict under articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because the questioned
advertisements pictured a beautiful house which did not belong to Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil
who, naturally, was annoyed by that contretemps”.St. Louis Realty should have immediately
published a rectification and apology. He found that as a result of St. Louis Realty's mistake,
magnified by its utter lack of sincerity, Doctor Aramil suffered mental anguish and his income
was reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right
to privacy (Art. 26, Civil Code).
3.Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 179799, September 11, 2009
It appears that Gregorio’s rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were
infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the
identity of the person they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault
was compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of
the opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not given proper notice. Because she was
not able to refute the charges against her, petitioner was falsely indicted for three (3) counts of violation
of B.P. Blg. 22.
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee
refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for
damages and other relief against he latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary
administrative action that may be taken.
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises or in labor

through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive
or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damage.
Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same
act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond
to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court
shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the
text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Art. 30. When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a
19
criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the
civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act
complained of.
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Independent Civil Actions
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
(1) Freedom of religion;
(2) Freedom of speech;
(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;
(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;
(5) Freedom of suffrage;
(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;
(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;
(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;
(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;
(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;
(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not
contrary to law;
(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the government for
redress of grievances;
(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;
20
(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;
(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public
trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure
the attendance of witness in his behalf;
(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being
forced to confess guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward
to make such confession, except when the person confessing becomes a State
witness;
(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the
same is imposed or inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been
judicially declared unconstitutional; and
(19) Freedom of access to the courts.
In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission
constitutes a criminal offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely
separate and distinct civil action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and mat be
proved by a preponderance of evidence.
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.
The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or
omission constitutes a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.
Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or
protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be
primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible
therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal
proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely
21
separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant.
What are the independent civil actions?
1. Breach of Constitutional and Other Rights - Art. 32

2. Defamation, Fraud, Physical Injuries – Art. 33
3. Refusal or failure of city ot municipal police to render protection – Art. 34
4. Quasi Delict or Culpa Aquilana – Art. 2176, 2177
Art. 35. When a person, claiming to be injured by a criminal offense, charges another with
the same, for which no independent civil action is granted in this Code or any special law,
but the justice of the peace finds no reasonable grounds to believe that a crime has been
committed, or the prosecuting attorney refuses or fails to institute criminal proceedings,
the complaint may bring a civil action for damages against the alleged offender. Such civil
action may be supported by a preponderance of evidence. Upon the defendant's motion,
the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to indemnify the defendant in case the
complaint should be found to be malicious. If during the pendency of the civil action, an
information should be presented by the prosecuting attorney, the civil action shall be
suspended until the termination of the criminal proceedings.
Prejudicial Question (Art. 36)
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal prosecution may
be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme Court
shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.
1. General Rule: If both criminal and civil cases are filed in court, Criminal Case takes
precedence
2. Exception:
i.Prejudicial question
Requisites:
1. Previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately

related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action
2. The resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action
may proceed
 If both civil and criminal cases have similar issues or the issue in one is intimately related
to the issues raised in the other, then a prejudicial question would likely exist, provided
the other element or characteristic is satisfied. For example, in a criminal case for
22
bigamy, the accused may raise the pendency of a civil suit for the declaration of nullity of
his first marriage to defer the proceedings of the bigamy case.
 Mere similarity of issues does not suffice to uphold the validity of a prejudical question.
It must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the
criminal prosecution would be based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in
the civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused. If the resolution of the issue in the civil action will not determine the criminal
responsibility of the accused in the criminal action based on the same facts, or there is no
necessity _that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case,_
therefore, the civil case does not involve a prejudicial question. Neither is there a
prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed
independently of each other.
 It must be remebered however, that a prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve
the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in
the information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party
who raises a prejudicial question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the
essential elements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information,
considering that the prosecution has not yet presented a single evidence on the indictment
or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on
the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal
charge through a non-criminal suit.
ii. Independent civil action granted by law
1. Breach of constitution and other rights (Art 32)

2. Defamation, fraud, physical injuries (Art 33)
3. Refusal or failure of city or municipal police to give protection (art 34)
4. Quasi-delict or culpa-aquilina (Art 2177)
iii. Sec. 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. —
(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising
from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the
prosecution starts presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a
reasonable opportunity to make such reservation.
23
When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral,
nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages without specifying the amount thereof in the
complaint or information, the filing fees thereof shall constitute a first lien on the judgment
awarding such damages.
Where the amount of damages, other than actual, is specified in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court.
Except as otherwise provided in these Rules, no filing fees shall be required for actual damages.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by the accused in the

criminal case, but any cause of action which could have been the subject thereof may be litigated
in a separate civil action. (1a)
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party shall pay in full
the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be considered as the actual
damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also seeks to recover liquidated, moral,
nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the offended party shall pay additional filing fees
based on the amounts alleged therein. If the amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages
are subsequently awarded by the court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall
constitute a first lien on the judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may
be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If
the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of
this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal actions. (cir. 57-97)
3. Application to civil, criminal, administrative cases
Civil Criminal Administrative

For a civil action to be “A petition for suspension of Neither did the filing of said
considered prejudicial to the criminal action based upon civil case for annulment
a criminal case as to the pendency of a prejudicial necessitate the suspension
question in a civil action may of the administrative
cause the suspension of be filed in the office of the proceedings before the
the criminal proceedings prosecutor or the court PRC Board. As discussed
until the final resolution conducting the preliminary above, the concept of
of the civil, the following investigation. When the prejudicial question
requisites must be criminal action has been filed involves a civil and a
present: in court for trial, the petition criminal case. We have
to suspend shall be filed in the previously ruled that there
(1) the civil case involves same criminal action at any is no prejudicial question
24
facts intimately related to time before the prosecution where one case is
those upon which the criminal rests.” administrative and the
prosecution would be based; other is civil.i[29]
As can be gleaned from above,
(2) in the resolution of the a petition for suspension of the Furthermore, Section 32 of
issue or issues raised in the criminal action based on the the Rules and Regulations
civil action, the guilt or existence of prejudicial Governing the Regulation
innocence of the accused question may be raised either and Practice of
would necessarily be during the preliminary Professionals of the PRC
determined; and investigation stage before the Board expressly provides
prosecutor conducting the that the administrative
(3) jurisdiction to try said same or during the pendency proceedings before it shall
question must be lodged in of a criminal trial where it is not be suspended
another tribunal.”13 filed before the court hearing notwithstanding the
the case. existence of a criminal
If both civil and criminal cases and/or civil case against the
have similar issues or the issue Jurisprudence has also defined respondent involving the
in one is intimately related to a prejudicial question as that same facts as the
the issues raised in the other, which arises in a case the administrative case:
then a prejudicial question resolution of which is a logical
would likely exist, provided antecedent of the issue The filing or pendency of a
the other element or involved therein, and the criminal and/or civil cases
characteristic is satisfied.14 It cognizance of which pertains in the courts or an
must appear not only that to another tribunal. The administrative case in
the civil case involves the prejudicial question must be another judicial body
same facts upon which the determinative of the case against an examinee or
criminal prosecution would before the court but the registered professional
be based, but also that the jurisdiction to try and resolve involving the same facts as
resolution of the issues the question must be lodged in in the administrative case
raised in the civil action another court or tribunal. It is filed or to be filed before the
would be necessarily a question based on a fact Board shall neither suspend
determinative of the guilt or distinct and separate from the nor bar the proceeding of
innocence of the accused.15 crime but so intimately the latter case. The Board
connected with it that it shall proceed
If the resolution of the issue in determines the guilt or independently with the
the civil action will not innocence of the accused. (See investigation of the case
determine the criminal Rojas vs. People, 57 SCRA and shall render therein its
responsibility of the accused 246; People vs. Aragon, 94 decision without awaiting
in the criminal action based on Phil. 357; Zapanta vs. for the final decision of the
the same facts, or there is no Montessa, 4 SCRA 510 and courts or quasi-judicial
necessity “that the civil case Benitez vs. Concepcion, 2 body.
be determined first before SCRA 178)
taking up the criminal case,” It must also be noted that
therefore, the civil case does the allegations in the
not involve a prejudicial administrative complaint
question.16 Neither is there a before the PRC Board are
25
prejudicial question if the civil not confined to the issue of

and the criminal action can, the alleged bigamous
according to law, proceed marriage contracted by
independently of each other.17 petitioner and Santella.
Petitioner is also charged
Thus, the issue in the criminal with immoral conduct for
cases for violation of Batas continued failure to perform
Pambansa Bilang 22 is his obligations as husband
whether the accused to private respondent and
knowingly issued worthless as father to their child, and
checks. The issue in the civil for cohabiting with Santella
action for specific without the benefit of
performance, overpayment, marriage.ii[30] The existence
and damages is whether of these other charges
complainant Sabandal justified the continuation of
overpaid his obligations to the proceedings before the
Philippines Today, Inc. If, PRC Board. (case of Te v
after trial in the civil case, CA)
petitioner is shown to have
overpaid respondent, it does
not follow that he cannot be
held liable for the bouncing
checks he issued, for the mere
issuance of worthless checks
with knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds to
support the checks is itself an
offense.18 EDDIE B.
SABANDAL vs. HON. FELIPE S.
TONGCO G.R. No. 124498 October 5,
2001
1.Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013
.The elements of bigamy are:

1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the
absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
When Capili married Tismo, all the above elements are present. The crime of bigamy was already
consummated. It is already immaterial if the second (or first marriage, see Mercado vs Tan) was
subsequently declared void. The outcome of the civil case filed by Karla Medina had no bearing to
26
the determination of Capili’s guilt or innocence in the bigamy case because all that is required for
the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted. He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of the
first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.The Supreme Court also notes that
even if a party has reason to believe that his first marriage is void, he cannot simply contract a
second marriage without having such first marriage be judicially declared as void. The parties to the
marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be
submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that
themarriageexists.
2. Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, 18 February 2004

As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that
the second marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity. As a second or
subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely
regardless of petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. Thus, as
soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence
of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. Moreover, the
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not
an indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. In this
case, all the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by
petitioner and Ancajas. Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the
second marriage with the required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial
Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence of at least two witnesses. The decision of the Court of
Appeals convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of the crime of Bigamy is AFFIRMED.
3. Montañez v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, 22 October 2012
The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may
feel that he is adversely affected. The reason is that as a general rule, no vested right may attach
to, nor arise from, procedural laws. In the case at bar, the respondent’s clear intent was to obtain
judicial declaration of nullity to escape from the bigamy charges against her.
4. San Miguel Proeprties, Inc., v. Perez, G.R. No. 166836, 4 September 2013
A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and the cognizance of which pertains to
27
another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged
in another court or tribunal. It is based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately
connected with the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale behind the
principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions. The determination of whether the
proceedings ought to be suspended because of a prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and
issues raised in the pleadings in the specific performance case were so related with the issues raised in the
criminal complaint for the violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, such that the resolution of the issues
in the former would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case. An examination of the
nature of the two cases involved is thus necessary. An action for specific performance is the remedy to
demand the exact performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or according to the
precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it. Evidently, before the remedy of specific
performance is availed of, there must first be a breach of the contract. On the other hand, Presidential
Decree No. 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots and condominiums in view of the
increasing number of incidents wherein "real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or
sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly" the basic
requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of alarming magnitude of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators
28
III. Persons (Art. 37-51)
BOOK I
PERSONS
Title I. - CIVIL PERSONALITY
CHAPTER 1
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is
the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. (n)
Art. 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and
civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the
incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or
from property relations, such as easements. (32a)
Art. 39. The following circumstances, among others, modify or limit capacity to act: age,
insanity, imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, penalty, prodigality, family relations,
alienage, absence, insolvency and trusteeship. The consequences of these circumstances are
governed in this Code, other codes, the Rules of Court, and in special laws. Capacity to act
is not limited on account of religious belief or political opinion.
A married woman, twenty-one years of age or over, is qualified for all acts of civil life,
except in cases specified by law. (n)
CHAPTER 2
NATURAL PERSONS
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for
all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified
in the following article. (29a)
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is
completely delivered from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine
life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after
its complete delivery from the maternal womb. (30a)
Art. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.
The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by
contract and by will. (32a)
Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are called to succeed each
other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other,
shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time
29
and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other. (33)
CHAPTER 3
JURIDICAL PERSONS
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose,
created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted
according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to

which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member. (35a)
Art. 45. Juridical persons mentioned in Nos. 1 and 2 of the preceding article are governed
by the laws creating or recognizing them.
Private corporations are regulated by laws of general application on the subject.
Partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose are governed by the
provisions of this Code concerning partnerships. (36 and 37a)
Art. 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as incur
obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations
of their organization. (38a)
Art. 47. Upon the dissolution of corporations, institutions and other entities for public
interest or purpose mentioned in No. 2 of Article 44, their property and other assets shall
be disposed of in pursuance of law or the charter creating them. If nothing has been
specified on this point, the property and other assets shall be applied to similar purposes
for the benefit of the region, province, city or municipality which during the existence of
the institution derived the principal benefits from the same. (39a)
Title II. - CITIZENSHIP AND DOMICILE
Art. 48. The following are citizens of the Philippines:
(1) Those who were citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of the
Constitution of the Philippines;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of foreign parents who, before the adoption of said
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippines;
30
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines;
(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age
of majority, elect Philippine citizenship;
(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law. (n)
Art. 49. Naturalization and the loss and reacquisition of citizenship of the Philippines are
governed by special laws. (n)
Art. 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile
of natural persons is the place of their habitual residence. (40a)
Art. 51. When the law creating or recognizing them, or any other provision does not fix the
domicile of juridical persons, the same shall be understood to be the place where their legal
representation is established or where they exercise their principal functions. (41a)
1. Juridical Capacity vs. Capacity to Act
Juridical Capacity Capacity to Act

 Fitness to be the subject of legal  Power to do acts with legal effects
relations  The status is active
 Passive status  Acquisition is merely acquired
 Acquisition is inherent  Lost through death and restricted by
 Judicial capacity is lost only through other causes
death  Always exists with juridical capacity
 Judicial capacity can exist without
capacity to act
a. Restrictions/Limitations and Modifications on Capacity to Act
i. minority (does not exempt the minor from certain obligations, as when the latter arises from his
acts or from property relations. Thus, he may acquire property using the capital of his parents,
said property belong to the latter in ownership and usufruct)
ii. insanity or imbecility
iii. state of being deaf mute (may either be sane or insane)
iv. prodigality ( it is the state of squandering money or property with a morbid desire to prejudice
the heirs of a person)
v. civil interdiction
The same does not exempt the incapacititated person from certain obligations as when the latter
arises from his acts or from property relations such as easements
31
b. MODIFICATIONS OF CAPACITY TO ACT:
a. Family relations
b. Insanity
c. Imbecility
d. Insolvency
e. Trusteeship
f. Penalty
g. Prodigality
h. Age
i. Alienage
j. Absence
k. State of being deaf mute
2.Natural Persons
a. Beginning and End of Personality
- GENERAL RULE: birth determines personality (Actual personality)
- EXCEPTION: The civil personality of the child shall commence from the time of it’s
conception for all purposes favorable to him, subject to the requirements of article 41. It has two
charactersitics 1. Limited 2. Provisional or conditional. The concept of provisional personality
cannot be invoked to obtain damages for an in behalf of an aborted child.
When child considered born: For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it sis alive at the
time it is completely delivered from the mother’s womb, EXCEPT if the fetus had an intra-urine
life of less than 7 months, it is not deemed born if it dies within 24 hours after its complete
delivery from the maternal womb.
b. Theory of General Capacities
This applies to natural persons. The effect applies except only in those specific circumstances
where the capacity to act is restrained. This differs from the theory of special capacities, which
applies to juridical persons and limists the power of juridical persons only to those that are
espressly conferred upon them or those which can be implied therefrom or incidental therto
1.Quimiguing vs. Icao, G.R. No. L-26795, July 31, 1970
Supreme Court held that “a conceive child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional
personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines”. The conceive child may also receive donations and be accepted by those
persons who will legally represent them if they were already born as prescribed in Article 742.Lower
court’s theory on article 291 of the civil code declaring that support is an obligation of parents and
illegitimate children does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn violates article 40
32
aforementioned. Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao being a married man forced a woman
not his wife to yield to his lust and this constitutes a clear violation of Carmen’s rights. Thus, she is
entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.
2.Geluz vs. CA, G.R. No. L-16439, July 20, 1961
The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn fetus that is not
endowed with personality and incapable of having rights and obligations. Since an action for pecuniary
damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right of action
could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child. The damages which the parents of an
unborn child can recover are limited to the moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development
of the fetus, on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of their
parental expectations. In this case, however, the appellee was indifferent to the previous abortions of his
wife, clearly indicative that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental hopes and
expectations. The decision is reversed and the complaint ordered is dismissed.
4.R.A. 6809
Republic Act No. 6809 December 13, 1989
AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM TWENTY-ONE TO

EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER
NUMBERED TWO HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress

assembled::
Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise
provided, majority commences at the age of eighteen years."
Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are hereby repealed.
Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby amended to read as follows:
"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental authority over the person and property
of the child who shall then be qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life, save the
exceptions established by existing laws in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent until the age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of
parents and guardians for children and wards below twenty-one years of age mentioned
33
in the second and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills, bequests, donations, grants, insurance
policies and similar instruments containing references and provisions favorable to minors will
not retroact to their prejudice.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its publication in at least two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: December 13, 1989
4. Juridical Persons
A juridical person is a being of legal existence susceptible of rights and obligations, or of being
the subject of juridical relations.
Who are juridical persons?
i.state and it’s political subdivisions
ii. corporations for public interest (quasi-public corporations, goverened either by the corporation
code or their special charters passed by the legislature and of the members of it’s sanggunian
uness some other time is fixed therefor by the law or ordinance creating it. For quasi-puclid
corporations, their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law
iii. corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest
a. How Created/ Terminated
Beginning of personality:
NATURAL PERSON: General rule, birth, exception, civil personality shall commence from the
time of the child’s conception for all purposes favorable to him subject to the requirements of
Article 41 of the Civil Code.
JURIDICAL PERSON:
Corporation: Their personality exists from the moment a certificate of incorporation is granted to
it from the SEC
Quasi-public corporations: Personality exists as soon as they have been constituted according to
law
34
Public corporations: the corporate existence shall commence upon the election and qualification
of its chief executive and a majority of the members of it’s sangguian, unless some other time is
fixed therefor by the law or ordinance creating it.
Termination of personality
NATURAL PERSON: civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the
rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract, and by will (Art 42)
JURIDICAL PERSON:
b. Theory of Special Capacities
This applies to juridical persons. It limits the power of juridical persons only to those that are
expressly conferred upon them or those which can be implied therefrom or incidental thereto.
Limjoco vs. Estate of Pedro Fragante, G.R. No. L-770, 27 April 1948
The estate of Fragrante must be extended an artificial judicial personality. If Fragrante had lived, in view
of the evidence of record, would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was
applying. The situation has not changed except for his death, and the economic ability of his estate to
appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received
from the decedent himself. It has been the constant doctrine that the estate or the mass of property, rights
and assets left by the decedent, directly becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which
survive after his demise. The reason for this legal fiction, that the estate of the deceased person is
considered a "person", as deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, is the avoidance of injustice or
prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such legal
obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. The estate of
Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and
distribution of his estate which, include the exercise during the judicial administration of those rights and
the fulfillment of those obligations of his estate which survived after his death. The decedent's rights
which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his
estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. It includes
those rights and fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which survived after his death like his pending
application at the commission.
5.Rules on Survivorship
Art 42: If there is doubt as to whom, between or among two or more persons called to succeed
each other, died first, the following rules shall apply:
1. Whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other shall prove the same
35
2. In the absence of proof, it shall be presumed that they died at the same time.
There shall be no transmission of rights from one another.
Rule 131 Sec 3: Presumption in case two persons who are not called to succeed died in the same
accident
1. If both sexes under the age of 15 years old, the older is deemed to have
survived
2. If both were below 60 years old, the younger is deemed to have survived
3. If one is under 15 and the other above 60, the one below 15 is deemed to
have survived
4. If both are over 15 and under 60, the male is deemed to have survived if
different sex, if same sex, the older
5. If one is below 15 or over 60 and the other between those ages, the one
between is deemed to have survived.
6. Domicile vs. Residence
Domicile Residence
 Denotes a fixed permanent residence  Indicates a place of abode, whether
which, when absent, one has the permanent or temporary
intention of returning  There can be several places of
 There can only be one place of residence
domicile  No length or residence without
 It is residence coupled with intention to intention of remaining will constitute
remain for an unlimited time. domicile
1.Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. CID, 41 SCRA 292
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born
or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise,an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he
takes his oath as Filipino citizen,provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4.Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of
an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go
through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen here of, it
should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytime
the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative
case,Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and
36
again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino
citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a
Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.
2.Republic v. Batuigas, G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization
under CA 473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien
women married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that:“Any
woman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”Under this provision, foreign women
who are married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither
necessary for them to prove that they possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their
marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization. Records, however, show that
in February 1980, Azucena applied before the then Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID)
for the cancellation of her Alien Certificate of Registration by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
The CID granted her application. However, the Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it
found no sufficient evidence that Azucena’s husband is a Filipino citizen, as only their marriage
certificate was presented to establish his citizenship. As the records before this Court show, Santiago’s
Filipino citizenship has been adequately proven. Under judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth
certificate indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos. He also submitted voter’s registration,
land titles, and business registrations/licenses, all of which are public records. Moreover, the Court
acknowledged that the main objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife is to maintain
a unity of allegiance among family members, thus: It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished
traditions of family unity and identity that a husband should be a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the
national treatment of one should be different from that of the other. Azucena has clearly proven, under
strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the grant of that privilege, and this Court will not stand in
the way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
3. Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, June 28, 1996
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying Frivaldo was rendered in
connection with the 1988 elections while that in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992
elections. That he was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be changed. Indeed,
decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with
finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for that matter lose, his citizenship under
any of the modes recognized by law for the purpose. "Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or
indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative
authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands."
4. Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300
37
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitoner’s claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite
her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s domicile of origin by operation of
law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and acts which correspond
with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husband’s domicile because the term “residence” in Civil Law
does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to choose a new
one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated
that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner even
obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living in her brother’s house, an act,
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones
38
THE FAMILY CODE
IV. Marriage
1. Definition (Art. 1)
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation
of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
a. Special Contract vs. Ordinary Contract
special contract: this term is often used to denote an express or explicit contract, one which
clearly defines and settles the reciprocal rights and obligations of the parties, as distinguished
from one which must be made out, and its terms ascertained, by the inference of the law from the
nature and circumstances of the transaction.
Ordinary contract: An ordinary contract takes place between two or more parties and either
agree orally or in writing to its terms
Marriage contract (which is a special contract) Ordinary contract

 Contracting parties must be only two  Two or more parties regardless of
persons – one man and one woman gender
 Permanent contract  Parties can fix a period for it’s efficacy
 Breach of obligation of husband and to be ineffective after a few years
wife does not give rise to an action for  Breach of ordinary contract gives rise
damages. The law provides penal and to an action for damages
civil sanctions such as prosecution for  Can be dissolved by mutual agreements
adultery or concubinage and and by other legal causes
proceedings for legal separation, action  Merely a contract
for support, etc  Merely a contract
 Can be dissolved only by death or  Governed by law on contract
annulment, not by mutual agreement  Generally subject to stipulation
 Special contract  Minor’s may contract through their
 Governed by law on marriage parents or guardians or in some cases
 Not subject of stipulation except in by themselves
property relations
 Personal legal capacity required
Notes from Sta Maria:
39
I.Nature and importance of marriage
- marriage is one of the basic civil rights of man. The freedom to marry is one of the vital
personal rights essential to the ordinary pursuit of happiness by free men. The marital relations,
unlike ordinary contractual relations, is the basis of social organization. The preservation of that
relation is deemed essential to public welfare.
- In case where the petitioner filed for annulment of his marriage on the ground that he never had
any intention of marrying respondent because the main consideration was to name his child who
died before born, annulment could not be granted. Marriage is not at most a civil contract, but at
least a civil contract with status and the interest of the State added to it. Nothing short of a real
marriage could have given the child a name ( Bove v Pinciotti)
2. Requirements (Art. 2-6)

a. Essential
i. Legal Capacity
1. Sex
2. Age
a. 18-21 requires parental consent: voidable if none
b. 21-25 parental advice: valid if none but issuance of marriage license suspended for 3 months
i. Effect if license issued before 3 months – mere irregularity
3. Absence of Impediments (Art.35(4),36-38,52-53)
ii. Consent
b. Formal
c. Effects
i. Absence of Essential or Formal: Void
1. Exception: Art. 35(2)
ii. Defective Essential: Voidable
iii. Irregular Formal: Valid but persons liable punished civilly, criminally or administratively
1. Exception: Voidable if no consent from parents, either or both of contracting parties at 18 or
above but below 21
3. Authority of solemnizing officer (Art 7)
a. Persons authorized
b. Exception: Either or both parties in good faith, person unauthorized to solemnize marriage
Art. 35(2)
Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996
4. Valid Marriages License

a. Art. 9, Art. 10, Art. 20
b. Marriages Exempt from Marriage License (Art. 27-34)
i. No Good faith exception
c. When either or both parties are foreign citizens, Stateless persons or refugees (Art. 21)
40
Kho v. Republic, G.R. No. 187462, June 1, 2016

Niñal vs. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
Diaz-Salgado v. Anson, G.R. No. 204494, July 27, 2016
Republic v. Dayot, G.R. Nos. 175581 & 179474, March 28, 2008
5. Marriage Ceremony
a. No particular form prescribed
b. Minimum requirements:
i. Appear before Solemnizing officer
1. Proxy Marriage
ii. Declaration that they take each other as husband and wife
iii. Presence of at least 2 witnesses of legal age
1. Absence merely an irregularity
6. Non-Essential/Non-Formal Requirements
a. Marriage Certificate – best evidence
b. Venue of Marriage (Art. 8)
i. Directory, not affect validity of marriage
7. Foreign Marriage
a. General Rule: Where one or both parties to the marriage are citizens of the Philippines, the
foreign marriage is valid in this country if solemnized in accordance with the laws of the country
of celebration
b. Exceptions:
i. contracted by a national who is below 18 years of age
ii. bigamous or polygamous (except as provided in Art. 41, FC)
iii. contracted through mistake of one party as to the identity of the other
iv. contracted following the annulment or declaration of nullity of a previous marriage but before
partition
v. void due to psychological incapacity
vi. incestuous
vii. void for reasons of public policy
c. Divorce (Art. 26(2))
i. Requisites
1. Valid marriage between Filipino citizen and foreigner
2. Valid divorce obtained by alien spouse capacitating him/her to remarry
Garcia v. Receio, G.R. No. 138322, Oct. 2, 2002

Rep. vs. Cipriano Obrecido III, GR No. 154380, Oct. 5, 2005
Van Dorn vs. Ronillo, Jr. et al., 139 SCRA 139
Republic vs. Iyoy, G.R. No. 152577, 21 September 2005, 470 SCRA 508
Fujiki v. Marinay, G.R. No. 196049, June 26, 2013
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
41
Void Marriage
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003
A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC, March 4, 2003
1. Where any party is below 18, even with consent of parents/guardians (Art. 35(1))
2. Absence of authority of person who solemnized the marriage (Art. 35(2))
a. Exception: Any or both of parties in good faith
3. Absence of Marriage License
a. Exceptions: Art 27-34
4. Bigamous or Polygamous (Art. 35(4))
Santiago v. People, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015

Capili v. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150758, 18 February 2004
Montañez v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, 22 October 2012
a. Presumptive Death (Art. 41)

i. Effect of Reappearance of Absent Spouse
Republic v. Tampus, G.R. No. 214243, March 16, 2016

Republic v. Sareñogon, Jr., G.R. No. 199194, February 10, 2016
5. Mistake in (Physical) Identity (Art. 35(5))

6. Void Subsequent Marriage
a. Without judicial declaration of nullity of previous void marriage (Art. 40)
Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993

Castillo v. De Leon Castillo, G.R. No. 189607, April 18, 2016
Montañez v. Cipriano, G.R. No. 181089, 22 October 2012
Vitangcol v. People, G.R. No. 207406, January 13, 2016
Cariño v. Cariño, G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001
b. Without judicial declaration of presumptive death of absent spouse (Art. 41)

c. Where the absent spouse was presumed dead, and both the present spouse and would–be
spouse were in bad faith in contracting marriage (Art. 44)
d. Failure to record in the civil registry and registry of property the judgment of annulment or of
absolute nullity of the marriage, partition and distribution of the property of the spouses and the
delivery of the children’s presumptive legitimes (Arts. 52–53)
e. Effect of Termination of Subsequent Marriage (Art. 43)
i. Children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to its termination shall be considered
legitimate;
ii. Dissolution & liquidation of the absolute community or conjugal partnership. If either spouse
acted in bad faith, his share in the net profits shall be forfeited:
1. In favor of the common children;
2. If none, in favor of the children of the guilty spouse by previous marriage; or
3. In default of children, in favor of the innocent spouse;
42
iii. Donations by reason of marriage remain valid except if the donee contracted the marriage in
bad faith;
iv. The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the spouse in bad faith as the beneficiary
in any insurance policy; and
v. The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit
from the innocent spouse by testate or intestate succession
7. Psychological Incapacity
a. Elements
b. Molina Doctrine
Republic v. Molina G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997

Marcos v. Marcos, G.R. No. 136490, October 19, 2000
Castillo v. Republic, G.R. No. 214064, February 6, 2017
Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA, GR No. 119190, Jan. 16, 1997
Noel Buenaventura v. CA, et al., GR No. 127358, March 31, 2005
Carating-Siayngo vs. Siayngo, G.R. No. 158896, October 27, 2004
Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009
Matudan v. Republic, G.R. No. 203284, November 14, 2016
8. Incestuous (Art. 37)

a. Between ascendants and descendants of any degree
b. Between brothers and sisters whether of the full or half blood
9. Void for Reasons of Public Policy
a. Collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or illegitimate up to the 4th civil degree
b. Step–parents & step children
c. Parents–in–law & children–in–law
d. The adopting parent & the adopted child
e. The surviving spouse of the adopting parent & the adopted child
f. The surviving spouse of the adopted child & the adopter
g. Adopted child & a legitimate child of the adopter
h. Adopted children of the same adopter
i. Parties where one, with the intention to marry the other, killed the latter’s spouse, or his/her
spouse.
j. There is no need for conviction in a criminal case of the guilty party. The fact of killing
committed by one of the parties to the marriage can be proved in a civil case
Mallion vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528, October 3, 2006

Republic v. Olaybar, G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014
Garcia-Quiazon v. Belen, G.R. No. 189121, July 31, 2013
Voidable Marriage
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, March 4, 2003
A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC, March 4, 2003
1. Grounds: Must exist at time of Marriage (Art. 45)

a. 18 or over but below 21 without consent of parents or guardian
43
b. Either party unsound mind

c. Consent obtained by Fraud
i. Non-disclosure of previous conviction by final judgment – crime involving moral turpitude
ii. Wife Concealed pregnancy by another at time of marriage
Aquino vs. Delizo, G.R. No. L-15853, July 27, 1960

Anaya vs. Palaroan, GR. No. L–27930, November 26, 1970
iii. Concealment of STD existing at time of marriage

iv. Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or homosexuality or lesbianism at time of
marriage
d. Consent obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence
e. Either physically incapable of consummating marriage, incapacity continues and appears to be
incurable
i. Doctrine of Triennial Cohabitation
Sarao vs. Guevarra, G.R. No. 47063, 40 OG 263 (CA)
f. Either party afflicted with serious STD which appears to be incurable
2. Persons who may file action for annulment, Period for filing
a. Parents/Guardian who did not give consent before party reaches 21
b. Party within 5 years from majority unless freely cohabited
c. During the lifetime, either party or any relative or person having legal charge
d. Within 5 years from discovery by injured party unless thereafter freely cohabited
e. Within 5 years after force, intimidation or undue influence ceased by the injured party unless
thereafter freely cohabited
f. Injured party within 5 years from marriage for STD and or incapacity to consummate marriage
3. Role of Prosecuting Attorney/ Public Prosecutor
Tuason vs. CA, G.R. No. 116607, April 10, 1996
4. Effect of Termination of Marriage

a. Children
i. Status
ii. Custody
iii. Support (Spouse, child)
iv. Presumptive Legitime
v. Property Relation
vi. Liquidation of Community of Property
vii. Testate or Intestate Succession
viii. Insurance Policy
ix. Donation Propter Nuptias
Espiritu vs. CA, G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995

Lim-Lua v. Lua, G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 5, 2013
44
Mangonon vs. CA, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006

Domingo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993
Legal Separation
A. M. NO. 02-11-11-SC, March 15, 2003
A.M. No. 02-11-12-SC, March 4, 2003
1. Grounds (Art. 55)
Gandionco v. Peñaranda, G.R. No. 79284, November 27, 1987
a. Effects of Filing Petition
Sabalones v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106169, February 14, 1994
b. Cooling-off Period (Art. 58); Sec. 19, RA 9262
Somosa-Ramos v. Vamenta Jr., G.R. No. L-34132, July 29, 1972
2. Grounds for Denial of Petition (Art. 56)
Ong Eng Kiam v. Ong, G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006
Bugayong v. Ginez, G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956
Busuego v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 196842, October 9, 2013
Sy v. Eufemio, G.R. No. L-30977, January 31, 1972
3. Period for filing (Art. 57)

4. Effects of Decree of Legal Separation
Siochi v. Gozon, G.R. No. 169900, 169977, March 18, 2010

Maquilan v. Maquilan, G.R. No. 155409, June 8, 2007
5. Effects of Reconciliation
Rights and Obligations Between Husband and Wife

(Art. 68-73)
Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda, 35 Phil 252 (1916)

Arroya vs. Vazquez de Arroyo, 42 Phil 54 (1921)
Illusorio v. Bildner, G.R. No. 139789 & 139808, 12 May 2000
Tenchavez v. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, [November 29, 1965], 122 PHIL 752-776)
Property Relations Between Husband and Wife
1. Marriage Settlement
a. Requisites
45
b. Modifications: Must be made before marriage

i. Exception: Judicial Separation of Property During Marriage (Art. 76)
Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr., G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012
2. Absence of Marriage Settlement, Joint Administration (Art. 96, Art. 124(1))

a. General Rule: Property Relation governed by Phil Laws (Art. 80)
b. Exception:
i. Both spouses aliens
ii. As to extrinsic validity of Contracts
1. Not situated and executed in the Philippines
2. Situated in the foreign country but not executed in the Philippines
iii. Contrary Stipulation
3. In case of Disagreement, Husband’s Decision Prevails
a. Wife – relief from courts within 5 years from transaction
4. Incapacity of Spouse or cannot provide for joint administration – Assumption of Sole
Administration (Art. 96, 124(2))
5. Transfer of Administration (Art. 142)
6. Administration vs. Acts of Ownership
7. Management of Household
8. Failure to Comply with Obligation (Art. 101, 128)
9. Donations By Reason of Marriage
a. Requisites
b. Distinguished from ordinary donation
Valencia v. Locquiao, G.R. No. 122134, October 3, 2003
10. Donation Between Spouses during the marriage
Matabuena v. Cervantes, G.R. No. L-28771, March 31, 1971

Arcaba v. Vda. de Batocael, G.R. No. 146683, November 22, 2001
11. Grounds for Revocation
Property Relations Governed By

1. Marriage Settlement
2. By provisions of the Code
3. By Local Customs
Absolute Community of Property
1. General Rule: consist of all property owned by the spouses at the time of the marriage or
acquired thereafter (Art. 91)
2. Exceptions
a. property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate descendants by a
former marriage
b. property for personal and exclusive use except jewelry
46
c. property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title, except when the donor, testator or
grantor expressly provides otherwise (Art. 92)
Nobleza v. Nuega, G.R. No. 193038, March 11, 2015
3. Administration and Disposition
Flores v. Spouses Lindo, Jr., G.R. No. 183984, [April 13, 2011
4. Rule on Game of Chance

5. Remedies of Present Spouse in case of Abandonment
De la Cruz v. De la Cruz, G.R. No. L-19565, January 30, 1968
6. Charges upon and Obligations

7. Liquidation (Art. 102)
8. Grounds for Termination (Art. 99)
Conjugal Partnership of Gains
1. Properties under Conjugal Partnership of Gains
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143286, April 14, 2004

Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Posadas, Jr., 56 Phil 215 (1931)
Jocson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-55322, February 16, 1989
Jovellanos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100728, June 18, 1992
Castillo, Jr. v. Pasco, G.R. No. L-16857, May 29, 1964
2. Exclusive Property of Each Spouse (Art. 109)
Magallon v. Montejo, G.R. No. 73733, December 16, 1986

Vda. de Padilla v. Vda. de Padilla, 74 Phil 377 (1943)
Lilius v. Manila Railroad Co., 62 Phil 56 (1935)
3. Rule in case of Improvement of Exclusive Property

a. Accession
b. Reverse Accession
Villanueva v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74577, December 4, 1990
4. Charges Upon and Obligations
BA Finance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-61464, May 28, 1988
Security Bank v. Mar Tierra Corp., GR No. 143382, November 29, 2006
Carandang v. Heirs of de Guzman, G.R. No. 160347, November 29, 2006
Spouses Go v. Yamane, G.R. No. 160762, May 3, 2006
47
Ching v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124642, February 23, 2004

Borlongan v. Banco de Oro, G.R. Nos. 217617 & 218540 (Resolution), April 5,
2017
Lacson v. Diaz, G.R. No. L-19346, May 31, 1965
Pana v. Heirs of Juanite, Sr., G.R. No. 164201, December 10, 2012
Spouses Wong v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70082, August 19,
1991
5. Administration of Conjugal Partnership Property
Pelayo v. Perez, G.R. No. 141323, June 8, 2005

Homeowners and Savings Loan Bank vs. Dailo, GR No 153802, March 11,
2005
Jose Uy vs. CA, G.R. No. 109557, November 2, 2000
Jader-Manalo v. Spouses Camaisa, G.R. No. 147978, January 23, 2002
Spouses Guiang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998
6. Dissolution and Liquidation

Quiao v. Quiao, G.R. No. 176556, July 4, 2012
Domingo v. Spouses Molina, G.R. No. 200274, April 20, 2016
Separation of Property
1. Marriage Settlement (Art. 134)

2. Judicial Order
a. Causes
b. Effects
Union Without Marriage
1. Art. 147 and 148

a. Applicability
b. Salaries and Wages
c. Property Acquired Exclusively By other Party
d. Property Acquired by Both
e. Presumption
Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996
Diño v. Diño, G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
Barrido v. Nonato, G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014
Agapay v. Palang, G.R. No. 116668, July 28, 1997]
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Teodoro, G.R. No. L-20530, June 29, 1967
Francisco vs. Master Iron Works & Construction Corp., G.R. No. 151967, February 16, 2005
Atienza vs. De Castro, Atienza v. De Castro, G.R. No. 169698, November 29, 2006
The Family
48
1. Family Relation
2. Mandatory Prior Recourse to Compromise (Art. 151, NCC)
a. Exceptions
Martinez v. Martinez, G.R. No. 162084, June 28, 2005
Gayon v. Gayon, G.R. No. L-28394, November 26, 1970
3. Family Home
a. General Rule: Exempt from executions
b. Exceptions
Manacop v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97898, August 11, 1997

Taneo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108532, March 9, 1999
Modequillo v. Breva, G.R. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
Patricio v. Dario III, G.R. No. 170829, November 20, 2006
Eulogio v. Bell, Sr., G.R. No. 186322, July 8, 2015
Legitimate Children
1. General Rule: Conceived or born during a valid marriage
De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon, G.R. No. 142877, October 2, 2001

Social Security System v. Aguas, G.R. No. 165546, February 27, 2006
2. Exceptions
a. Artificial Insemination
b. Born of voidable marriage before decree of annulment
c. Conceived or born before judgment of nullity under Art. 36 has become final and executory
d. Conceived or born of Subsequent marriage under Art. 53
e. Conceived or born of mothers who might have declared against legitimacy or sentenced as
adultress
f. Legally adopted
g. Legitimated
3. Rules on Impugning Legitimacy
a. Generally instituted only by husband
b. Prescriptive period
c. Exception: Heirs may file
1. Husband dies before period expires (have the remainder)
2. Posthumous birth (full period)
3. Continue case instituted by husband
d. Grounds
Concepcion v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005

Estate of Ong v. Diaz, G.R. No. 171713, December 17, 2007
Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105625, January 24, 1994
Geronimo v. Santos, G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015
Salas v. Matusalem, G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013
49
Babiera v. Catotal, G.R. No. 138493, June 15, 2000

Agustin v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 162571, June 15, 2005
Angeles v. Angeles, G.R. No. 153798, September 2, 2005
Ilano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104376, February 23, 1994
Herrera v. Alba, G.R. No. 148220, June 15, 2005
4. Actions to claim Legitimate/ Illegitimate Status

a. Who can claim
b. Proof of Filiation
People v. Malapo, G.R. No. 123115, August 25, 1998

Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86302, September 24, 1991
Liyao, Jr. v. Tanhoti-Liyao, G.R. No. 138961, March 7, 2002
Verceles vs. Posada, G.R. No. 159785, April 27, 2007
5. Adoption
a. Domestic Adoption Act
b. Inter-country Adoption
In the Matter of the Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, G.R. No.
148311, March 31, 2005
In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim, G.R.
Nos. 168992-93, May 21, 2009
Support
1. Basis: Financial Capacity of Giver, Needs of Recipient

a. Not based on parental authority, hence hoes not terminate with emancipation
2. Coverage
a. Substance
b. Dwelling
c. Clothing
d. Medical Attendance
e. Education
f. Transportation
3. Kinds
a. Legal
b. Judicial
c. Conventional
4. Characteristics
a. Personal
b. In transmissible
c. Not subject to waiver or compensation
d. Exempt from attachment or execution
e. Reciprocal
f. Provisional Character of Support Judgment
50
g. Mandatory
5. Persons Obliged to Support each other (Art. 195)
6. Order of Liability if Several Persons Obliged to give Support (Art. 199)
Magnonon vs. CA, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006

Dadivas de Villanueva vs. Villanueva, 54 Phil 93 (1929)
Quintana vs. Lerma, 24 Phil 285 (1913)
Francisco vs. Znadueta, 61 Phil 752 (1935)
Ramirez vs. Redfern, 49 Phil 849 (1926)
Parental Authority
1. General Rule: Exercised Jointly

2. Exceptions:
a. Judicial Order to the Contrary
b. Illegitimate Child
c. Parental Preference Rule
d. Rule in case of Legal Separation
3. Persons exercising Substitute Parental Authority (Art. 216)
4. Persons exercising Special Parental Authority (Art. 218)
5. Kinds of Properties of a Minor
a. Adventitious
b. Profectitious
6. Grounds for Suspension of Parental Authority
a. Emancipation
b. Death
c. Adoption
d. Appointment of another as general guardian
e. Judicial Declaration of Abandonment
f. Final Judgment Divesting Parental Authority
i. Excessive harshness
ii. Corrupting orders
iii. Compelling child to beg
iv. Rape
v. Acts of lasciviousness
vi. Judicial declaration of incapacity
g. Permanent/ Temporary
Santos vs. CA, G.R. No. 113054, March 16, 1995

Sagala-Eslao vs. CA, G.R. No. 116773, January 16, 1997
Vancil vs. Belmes, G.R. No. 132223, June 19, 2001
Espiritu vs. CA, G.R. No. 115640, March 15, 1995
Luna vs. IAC, G.R. No. L-68374, June 18, 1985
Pablo-Gulaberto vs. Gualberto, G.R. No. 154994 & 156254, June 28, 2005
Briones vs. Miguel, G.R. No. 156343, October 18, 204
St. Mary’s Academy vs. William Carpitanos, G.R. No. 143363, February 6, 2002
51
Emancipation and Age of Majority
1. Reaching 18 years of Age

2. RA 6809
Cancellation or Correction of Entries
1. RA 9048
2. Rule 108
3. Grounds
Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008

Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007
Surname
1. Reason for interest of State

a. Prevent confusion of identity
b. Prevent use of name for illegal purposes
2. Legal Name – What appears in Birth Certificate
3. Change – Rule 103, Rules of Court
a. Court Approval
b. Grounds
i. Ridiculous, Dishonorable
ii. Extreme Difficulty to Pronounce
iii. Adoption of Filipino name to remove traces of alienage
iv. Legal cause – adoption, et al.
Gan v. Republic, G.R. NO. 207147, September 14, 2016

Grande v. Antonio, G.R. No. 206248, February 18, 2014
Republic v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 117209, February 9, 1996
In re: Petition for change of name and/or correction/cancellation of entry in civil registry of
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang, G.R. No. 159966, March 30, 2005
Republic v. Cagandahan, G.R. No. 166676, September 12, 2008
Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007
Republic v. CA, GR No. 97906, May 21, 1992
4. Rules on what to use

a. Legitimate or legitimated children
b. Illegitimate children
c. Adopted child
d. Married women
i. May retain maiden name
1. May not do so if has been using husband’s surname for a long time
e. Marriage Annulled
i. Wife guilty
52
ii. Wife Innocent

f. Legal Separation
g. Death of Husband
h. Persons with same names
i. Usurpation of another’s name
Funerals
1. Duty and right to make arrangement about funerals is in accordance with right and
Duty to support under Article 199, FC
2. the funeral shall be in keeping with the social position of the deceased
3. the funeral shall be in accordance with the expressed wishes of the deceased
i. in the absence of the expressed wishes, his religious beliefs or
affiliation shall determine
ii. in case of doubt, the persons in Article 199, FC shall decide
1. any person who disrespects the dead or allows the same shall be liable for damages
If the deceased is married, the tombstone or mausoleum is deemed a part of the funeral expense
and chargeable against the community or conjugal partnership property
Absence
1. Provisional Abesence
2. Declaration of Absence
3. Presumption of Death
4. Reappearance of absentee
a. Effect on subsequent marriage of spouse present
b. Effect on Properties
CASES:
FIRST DIVISION
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL G.R. No. 162155
REVENUE and ARTURO V.
53
PARCERO in his official
capacity as Revenue District
Officer of Revenue District
No. 049 (Makati),
Petitioners, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
-versus- CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
PRIMETOWN PROPERTY
GROUP, INC.,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 28, 2007
x-----------------------------------------x
54
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari2[1] seeks to set aside the August 1,
2003 decision3[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its
February 9, 2004 resolution denying reconsideration.4[3]
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown
Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent
paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero
of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
55
(BIR),5[4] he explained that the increase in the cost of labor and materials and
difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused the
real estate industry to slowdown.6[5] As a consequence, while business was good
during the first quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses amounting to
P71,879,228 that year.7[6]
According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for
income taxes.8[7] Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax
and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total
56
amount of P26,318,398.32.9[8] Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or
tax credit.10[9]
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent
to submit additional documents to support its claim.11[10] Respondent complied
but its claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a petition for
review12[11] in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed
beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or
57
tax credit.13[12] It invoked Section 229 of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC):
Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. -- No suit or

proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national
internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally
assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without
authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with
the Commissioner; but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or
not such tax, penalty, or sum has been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the

expiration of two (2) years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty
regardless of any supervening cause that may arise after payment:
Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even without a claim therefor,
refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which payment
was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid.
(emphasis supplied)
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998.
Thus, its right to claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.14[13]
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
58
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be
understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of
thirty days; days, of twenty-four hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number
of days which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included.
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of
the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the
year 2000 was a leap year, respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days15[14]
after respondent filed its final adjusted return, was filed beyond the reglementary
period.16[15]
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.17[16] Hence, it
filed an appeal in the CA.18[17]
59
On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the
CTA.19[18] It ruled that Article 13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a
regular year and a leap year. According to the CA:
The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular
year is a leap year.20[19]
In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April
15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be
counted as 365 days each or a total of 730 days. A statute which is clear and
explicit shall be neither interpreted nor construed.21[20]
60
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.22[21] Thus, this
appeal.
Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption,
should be strictly construed against claimants.23[22] Section 229 of the NIRC
should be strictly applied against respondent inasmuch as it has been consistently
held that the prescriptive period (for the filing of tax refunds and tax credits)
begins to run on the day claimants file their final adjusted returns.24[23] Hence,
the claim should have been filed on or before April 13, 2000 or within 730 days,
reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return.
61
The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its petition for review in the
CTA within the two-year prescriptive period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC
is correct. Its basis, however, is not.
The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing
of the final adjusted return.25[24] But how should the two-year prescriptive period
be computed?
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law
speaks of a year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In National
Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,26[25] we ruled that a year is equivalent to 365
days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year.27[26]
62
However, in 1987, EO28[27] 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was
enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. Year shall be understood to be twelve calendar

months; month of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in
which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific
month contains; day, to a day of twenty-four hours and; night from sunrise to
sunset. (emphasis supplied)
A calendar month is a month designated in the calendar without regard to the
number of days it may contain.29[28] It is the period of time running from the
beginning of a certain numbered day up to, but not including, the corresponding
numbered day of the next month, and if there is not a sufficient number of days in
the next month, then up to and including the last day of that month.30[29] To
illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1,
63
2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from
February 1, 2008 until February 29, 2008.31[30]
A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is
revoked and abrogated by another) or impliedly (when the provisions of a more
recent law cannot be reasonably reconciled with the previous one).32[31] Section
27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 states:
Sec. 27. Repealing clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it
fails to identify or designate the laws to be abolished.33[32] Thus, the provision
64
above only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the Administrative Code
of 1987.
Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have
been clearly and unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is whether the
subsequent law encompasses entirely the subject matter of the former law and they
cannot be logically or reasonably reconciled.34[33]
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with the same subject matter the
computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365
days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of
1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under
the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of
computing legal periods under the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of
65
1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the
Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the computation
of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987 to this case, the two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time
respondent filed its final adjusted return35[34] on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24
calendar months, computed as follows:
Year 1 1st calendar month April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998
2nd calendar month May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998
3rd calendar month June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998
4th calendar month July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998
5th calendar month August 15, 1998 to September 14, 1998
6th calendar month September 15, 1998 to October 14, 1998
7th calendar month October 15, 1998 to November 14, 1998
8th calendar month November 15, 1998 to December 14, 1998
9th calendar month December 15, 1998 to January 14, 1999
10th calendar month January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999
11th calendar month February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999
12th calendar month March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999
Year 2 13th calendar month April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999
14th calendar month May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999
15th calendar month June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999
16th calendar month July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999
17th calendar month August 15, 1999 to September 14, 1999
18th calendar month September 15, 1999 to October 14, 1999
19th calendar month October 15, 1999 to November 14, 1999
20th calendar month November 15, 1999 to December 14, 1999
21st calendar month December 15, 1999 to January 14, 2000
22nd calendar month January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000
23rd calendar month February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000
66
24th calendar month March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was
filed on the last day of the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its
final adjusted return. Hence, it was filed within the reglementary period.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to
the Court of Tax Appeals which is ordered to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A.
Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
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Persons reviewer Atty Senga

I. Effect and Application of Laws (Arts. 1-18)

Effectivity of Laws (Art. 2)

1. Publication Requirement; What to Publish

Publication not required:

Date of effectivity of MO NOT covered by this rule but by the LGC

2. De Roy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80718, 29 January 1988

3. People vs., Que Po Lay 94 Phil 640

4. NPC v. Pinatubo Commercial, G.R. No. 176006, 26 March 2010.

6. Pimentel v. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, GR No. 187714, March 8, 2011

Ignorance of Law excuses no one (Art. 3)

Art. 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

 Article 3 only applies to mandatory and prohibitory laws

Mistake of law v. Mistake of Fact:

MISTAKE OF LAW MISTAKE OF FACT

- Art. 526 –mistake on doubtful or

- Art. 1334 – mutual error on legal effect

- Art. 2155. Payment by reason of a

Prospective Application of Laws (Art. 4)

2. Exception to the Exception

1.Valeroso v. People, G.R. No. 164815, 22 February 2008

2.PNB v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 104528, 18 January 1996

Acts Contrary to Mandatory or Prohibitory Provisions are Void (Art. 5)

Waiver of Rights (Art. 6)

Requisites of a valid waiver

- (Herrera vs. Boromeo)

General Rule: Rights can be waived.

2. Cui vs. Arellano University 2 SCRA 205

Repeal of Laws (Art. 7)

3. Sec. 444, Local Government Code

Mecano v. COA, G.R. No. 103982, 11 December 1992

Judicial Decisions form part of the law of the land (Art. 8)

In order to invoke stare decisis, the following must occur:

People v. Licera G.R. No. L-39990, July 2, 1975

Duty of Judges (Art. 9)

Chu Jan vs. Bernas, 34 Phil 631 (1916)

Ignorance of the court or lack of knowledge regarding law applicable to a case

Doubtful Statues (Art. 10)

Customs (Art. 11-12)

1. Requisites to make a custom an obligatory rule

1.Martinez vs. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil 79 (1910)

Computation of Period and Time (Art. 13)

1. Rule on Computation of Period: First day excluded, last day included

2. Exception: Computation of age - each year based on birth anniversary

3. Policy if last day is a Sunday or Legal Holiday:

Penal Laws (Art. 14)

 Territoriality rule governs regardless of the nationality but subject to principles of

Civil Laws (Art. 15-17)

i. Art. 26, par. 2 FC

- Covers only forms and solemnities

Van Dorn vs. Ronillo, Jr. et al., 139 SCRA 139

Art. 18 Suppletory application of Civil Code in matters governed by special law

II. Human Relations (19-36)

 Articles 19 and 21 refer to intentional acts whereas Article 21 refers to willfull or

 Damnum Absque Injuria

1.Uypitching vs. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006

2. Wassmer vs. Velez, G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964

5. Pe vs. Pe, G.R. No. L-17396, May 30, 1962

Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals,

6. Globe Mackay Cable vs. CA, 176 SCRA 778

Unjust Enrichment (Art. 22 and 23)

1. Accion in rem verso

i.when a thing is acquired by or comes into possession of another (delivery or acquisition of

Requisites for Accion in rem verso: