BALOGBOG VS. CA
53 provides that “marriages celebrated under the Civil
GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997
FACTS:
Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for
partition and accounting against their Aunt Leoncia and
Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their
grandparents’ estate at the Court of First Instance of Cebu
City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and
Gaudioso appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter
affirmed the lower court’s decision.
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in
1951 and 1961 respectively. They have three children,
Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who
died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that
they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina
Ubas and that, as such they were entitled to the one-third
share in the estate of their grandparents. However,
Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that
their brother has 2 sons and that he was married. They
started to question the validity of the marriage between
their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how Gaudioso
himself admitted during a police investigation proceeding
that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the son
of his elder brother Gavino.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the
validity of their parent’s marriage, they presented Priscilo
Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to
1934 and Matias Pogoy who both testified that he knew
Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they
have three children. Catalina herself testified that she was
handed a “receipt” presumably the marriage certificate by
Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother
Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias. She
obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of
Asturias to the effect that the office did not have a record
of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared
by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga who
testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of
Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in
accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889
because this was the law in force at the time of the alleged
marriage was celebrated.
Art.
Code of 1889 should be proven only by a certified copy of
the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books
thereof have not been kept or have been lost, or unless
they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other
proof, such as that of the continuous possession by
parents of the status of husband and wife, may be
considered, provided that the registration of the birth of
their children as their legitimate children is also submitted
in evidence”.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalina’s marriage is
valid.
HELD:
Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court
and Court of Appeals in rendering Gavino and Catalina’s
marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso
one third of their grandparents’ estate.
The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil
Code of 889 of Spain did not take effect, having been
suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines
shortly after the extension of that code of this
country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force.
Since this case was brought in the lower court in 1968, the
existence of the marriage must be determined in
accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed
the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they
related to vested rights, and the rules of evidence. Under
the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a
woman conducting themselves as husband and wife are
legally married.
Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence
of marriage, failure to present it would not mean that
marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be
presented where in this case evidence consisting of the
testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the
marriage of Gavino and Catalina in 1929, that they have
three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of
six and that they are recognized by Gavino’s family and by
the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.
MORIGO VS. PEOPLE
GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol.
They lost contacts for a while but after receiving a card
from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they
became sweethearts. They got married in 1990. Barrete
went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed
petition for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted.
In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed
a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground
that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo was then
charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of
arraignment since the civil case pending posed a
prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded
not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void
ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second
marriage in good faith.
ISSUE:
Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity
of his marriage with Barrete before his second marriage in
order to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio
considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead
they just merely signed a marriage contract. The
petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of
his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with
Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is
acquitted in the case filed.
GERBERT CORPUZ VS. DAISYLYN STO. TOMAS
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
FACTS:
Gerbert Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired
Canadian citizenship through naturalization on Nov. 2000.
On, Jan. 18 2005, he married a Filipina named Daisylyn Sto.
Tomas. Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after their wedding. He
returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
surprise her wife but was shocked to discover that
Daisylyn was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert went back to Canada and filed a
petition for divorce and was granted.
Two years after, Gerbert fell in love with another Filipina.
In his desire to marry his new Filipina fiancée, Gerbert
went to Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the
Canadian divorce decree on their marriage certificate.
Despite its registration, an NSO official informed Gerbert
that their marriage still exists under Philippine Law; and to
be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must be
judicially recognized by a Philippine court.
Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign
divorce and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved, with
the RTC. Daisylyn offered no opposition and requested for
the same prayer.
RTC denied Gerbert’s petition contending that Art. 26 (2)
applies only to Filipinos and not to aliens. Gerbert
appealed by certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule
45.
ISSUE:
Whether the registration of the foreign divorce decree was
properly made.
HELD:
Supreme Court held in the negative. Article 412 of the Civil
Code declares that “no entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected, without judicial order.” The Rules of
Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by
specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by
which entries in the civil registry may be judicially
cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets
in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements
that must be complied with before a judgment,
authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be
annotated in the civil registry.
GARCIA VS. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322 October 2, 2001
Facts:
Article 26; The respondent, Rederick Recio, a Filipino was
married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Rizal in
1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia.
In 1989, the Australian family court issued a decree of
divorce supposedly dissolving the marriage. In 1992,
respondent acquired Australian citizenship. In 1994, he
married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, herein petitioner, in
Cabanatuan City. In their application for marriage license,
respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino.” Since
October 1995, they lived separately, and in 1996 while in
Australia, their conjugal assets were divided. In 1998,
petitioner filed Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage on the ground of bigamy, claiming that she
learned of the respondent’s former marriage only in
November. On the other hand, respondent claims that he
told petitioner of his prior marriage in 1993, before they
were married. Respondent also contended that his first
marriage was dissolved by a divorce a decree obtained in
Australia in 1989 and hence, he was legally capacitated to
marry petitioner in 1994. The trial court declared that the
first marriage was dissolved on the ground of the divorce
issued in Australia as valid and recognized in the
Philippines. Hence, this petition was forwarded before the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent has legal capacity to marry
Grace Garcia.
Ruling:
In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner,
Article 26 of the Family Code allows the former to contract
a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is “validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry.” A divorce obtained abroad by two aliens,
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is
consistent with their respective laws. Therefore, before
our courts can recognize a foreign divorce, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and
demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
In this case, the divorce decree between the respondent
and Samson appears to be authentic, issued by an
Australian family court. Although, appearance is not
sufficient, and compliance with the rules on evidence
regarding alleged foreign laws must be demonstrated, the
decree was admitted on account of petitioner’s failure to
object properly because he objected to the fact that it was
not registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City, not to its admissibility. Respondent claims that the
Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted as
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to
marry under Australian law. Even after the divorce
becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign
statutes, still restrict remarriage. Respondent also failed to
produce sufficient evidence showing the foreign law
governing his status. Together with other evidences
submitted, they don’t absolutely establish his legal
capacity to remarry.
LLORENTE vs COURT OF APPEALS
345 SCRA 592 (November 23, 2000)
FACTS:
Petitioner Paula Llorente was married to a US Navy
enlisted serviceman Lorenzo Llorente, in Nabua,
Camarines Sur, on February 22, 1937. Before the
outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for the US and
Paula stayed in the conjugal home in Nabua. Lorenzo
became an American citizen on November 30, 1943.
Upon the liberation of the Philippines (1945), Lorenzo
was granted by the US Navy to visit his wife in
the Philippines and found out that Paula was living in
with Lorenzo’s brother Ceferino. In December 1945,
Paula gave birth to Crisologo with the birth certificate
saying that the child was illegitimate, and the father’s
name was left blank.
On February 2, 1946, Paula and Lorenzo had a
written agreement, dissolving their marital union,
suspending his support upon her, and waiving his
authority to file a case of adultery against her.
Lorenzo returned to the US and filed for a divorce in
1951 which was granted in 1952.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia Fortuno,
in the Philippines; afterwhich, they bore three
children: Raul, Luz, and Beverly. In 1981, Lorenzo
executed a will, bequeathing all his property to Alicia
and three children. Before the proceeding could be
terminated, Lorenzo died in 1985.

On Sept. 4, 1985, Paula filed with the RTC of Iriga a
petition for letters of administration over Lorenzo’s
estate, contending that she was Lorenzo’s surviving
spouse.
In 1987, the RTC granted her petition, stating that
Lorenzo’s divorce decree was void and inapplicable in
the Philippines and therefore his marriage to Alicia
was void. The RTC entitled Paula to one-half of their
conjugal properties, and one-third of the estate – the
two-thirds would be divided equally among the
illegitimate children. Paula was appointed as legal
administratix of the estate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Paula Llorente was entitled to inherit
from the estate of Lorenzo Llorente.
HELD:
Since Lorenzo was an American citizen, issues
arising from the case are governed by foreign law.
The CA and RTC called to the fore th er en voi
doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law
of the decedent’s domicile, in this case, the Philippine
law. Most US laws follow the domiciliary theory. Thus,
the Philippine law applies when determining the
validity of Lorenzo’s will. The case was remanded to
the RTC for the ruling on the intrinsic validity of the
will of the deceased.
Mallion v. Alcantara
GR No. 141528October 31, 2006
Facts:
Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court
seeking adeclaration of nullity of his marriage with Editha
Alcantara due topsychological incapacity. The RTC denied
the petition.As the decision attained finality, Mallion filed
another petition for a declarationof nullity of marriage,
this time alleging that his marriage was null and voiddue to
the fact that it was celebrated without a valid marriage
license.
Issue:
Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for
declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of
nullity on the ground of lack of marriage license?
Held:
Res judicata applies. Mallion is simply invoking different
grounds for the same cause of action which is the nullity of
marriage. When the second case was filed based on
another ground, there is a splitting of a cause of action
which is prohibited. He is estopped from asserting that the
first marriage had no marriage license because in the first
case he impliedly admitted the same when he did not
question the absence of a marriage license.
Ninal vs. Bayadog
328 SCRA 122
FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely
Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot
inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24,
1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of
Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and
Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license.
They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived
together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the
marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February
19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma
alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage
license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was
void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for
the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s marriage after his
death?
HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of
the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even
though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they
cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of
Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his
marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed.
Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and
thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact
remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not
the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his
marriage to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and
cannot be the source of rights. It can be questioned even
after the death of one of the parties and any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage.
REPUBLIC VS IYOY (G.R. NO. 152577)
laws. The RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted
thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.
Issue:
Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute
psychological incapacity?
Held:
The evidences presented by the respondent fail to
establish psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates downright
incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume
the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less, ill will, on the part of the errant
spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting
personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility,
physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not
warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the
said Article.”

Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law

Facts:
The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for
thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001
affirming the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage
of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and
void based on Article 36.
thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting aparty even before the celebration of
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”

On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy

married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely
went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus
asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned
that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went
back to the Philippines on several occasions, during one
she attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich
she used her husband’s last name as hers in the invitation.

March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of

nullity alleging that Fely’s acts brought “danger and
dishonor” to the family and were manifestations of her
psychological incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony,
the certification of the recording of their marriage
contract, and the invitation where Fely used her
newhusband’s last name as evidences.

Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a

drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince 1988 she
was already an American citizen and not covered by our
Republic v. CA and Molina
GR 108763, 13 February 1997
Facts:
Roridel Olaviano was married to Reynaldo Molina on 14
April 1985 in Manila, and gave birth to a son a year after.
Reynaldo showed signs of “immaturity and
irresponsibility” on the early stages of the marriage,
observed from his tendency to spend time with his friends
and squandering his money with them, from his
dependency from his parents, and his dishonesty on
matters involving his finances. Reynaldo was relieved of
his job in 1986, Roridel became the sole breadwinner
thereafter. In March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in
Manila and proceeded to Baguio City. Reynaldo left her
and their child a week later. The couple is separated-in-
fact for more than three years.
On 16 August 1990, Roridel filed a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
Evidence for Roridel consisted of her own testimony, that
of two of her friends, a social worker, and a psychiatrist of
the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. Reynaldo
did not present any evidence as he appeared only during
the pre-trial conference. On 14 May 1991, the trial court
rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The
Solicitor General appealed to the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals denied the appeals and affirmed in toto
the RTC’s decision. Hence, the present recourse.
Issue:
Whether opposing or conflicting personalities should be
construed as psychological incapacity
Held:
The Court reiterated its ruling in Santos v. Court of
Appeals, where psychological incapacity should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity, existing at the
time the marriage is celebrated, and that there is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of ‘psychological incapacity’ to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability. In the present case, there is
no clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity; but appears to be more of a
“difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the
performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of
“irreconcilable differences” and “conflicting personalities”
in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.
The Court, in this case, promulgated the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code, removing any visages of it being the most liberal
divorce procedure in the world: (1) The burden of proof
belongs to the plaintiff; (2) the root cause of psychological
incapacity must be medically or clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by expert, and
clearly explained in the decision; (3) The incapacity must
be proven existing at the time of the celebration of
marriage; (4) the incapacity must be clinically or medically
permanent or incurable; (5) such illness must be grave
enough; (6) the essential marital obligation must be
embraced by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code as
regards husband and wife, and Articles 220 to 225 of the
same code as regards parents and their children; (7)
interpretation made by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church, and (8) the
trial must order the fiscal and the Solicitor-General to
appeal as counsels for the State.

The Court of Appeals erred in its opinion the Civil Code The Supreme Court granted the petition, and reversed and
Revision Committee intended to liberalize the application set aside the assailed decision; concluding that the
of Philippine civil laws on personal and family rights, and marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists
holding psychological incapacity as a broad range of and remains valid.
mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse
indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his
or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well
as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of
the principal objectives of marriage; where said conduct,
observed and considered as a whole, tends to cause the
union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, warrants the dissolution of the
marriage.
Republic vs. Orbecido have it, the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a
valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin
472 SCRA 114 requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced”
Facts: Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III and Lady Myros However, since Cipriano was not able to prove as fact his
Villanueva were married in Lam-an, Ozamis City and were wife’s naturalization he is still barred from remarrying.
blessed with a son and a daughter. In 1986, Lady Myros
left for the U. S. bringing along their son and after a few Respondent Orbecido who has the burden of proof, failed
years she was naturalized as an American citizen. to submit competent evidence showing his allegations that
his naturalized American wife had obtained a divorce
Sometime in 2000, respondent Orbecido learned from his decree and had remarried.
son – who was living with his wife in the States – that his
wife had remarried after obtaining her divorce decree.
Thereafter, he filed a petition for authority to remarry with
the trial court invoking par. 2 of Art. 26 of the Family Code.

Having no opposition, on May 15, 2002, the Regional Trial

Court of Zamboanga del Sur granted the petition of the
respondent and allowed him to remarry.

The Solicitor General’s motion for reconsideration was

denied. In view of that, petitioner filed this petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court. Herein petitioner raised the issue of the
applicability of Art. 26 par. 2 to the instant case.

Issue:

Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26(2).

Ruling:

Article 26 par. 2 of the Family Code only applies to case

where at the time of the celebration of the marriage, the
parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant
case is one where at the time the marriage was
solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later
on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and
subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity to
remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen
while residing in the U. S. A. Therefore, the 2nd par. of Art.
26 does not apply to the instant case.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at

the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their
citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an

American citizen, there was still a valid marriage that has
been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would