MECANO VS COA
Eventually, petitioner’s claim was returned by
FACTS:
Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was
hospitalized and on account of which he incurred
medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount
of which he is claiming from the COA.
He requested reimbursement for his expenses on the
ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section
699 of the RAC (Revised Administrative Code), the
pertinent provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness
incurred in performance of duty. —the proper Head of
Department may direct that absence during any period
of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay,
though not more than six months. He may in his
discretion also authorize the payment of the medical
attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and
hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the case
contemplated shall be charged first against vacation
leave, if any there be.
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with
the performance of some act in the line of duty, the
Department head may in his discretion authorize the
payment of the necessary hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner’s claim, to the
Secretary of Justice who favorably recommended the
payment of petitioner’s claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice, Bello III,
returned petitioner’s claim to Director Lim, having
considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA
to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim with a copy of
Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of then Secretary of Justice
stating that “the issuance of the Administrative Code did
not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the
Revised Administrative Code, including the particular
Section 699 of the latter”.
Director Lim transmitted anew Mecano’s claim to then
Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration;
Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner’s claim to the COA
Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA
Chairman however, denied petitioner’s claim on the
ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed
by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason
that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in
the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented,
however, that the claim may be filed with the
Employees’ Compensation Commission, considering that
the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the
effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Administrative Law Case Digests
Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro to Director Lim
with the advice that petitioner “elevate the matter to
the Supreme Court if he so desires”.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or
abrogated Section 699 of the RAC
HELD:
No. The Court resolves to GRANT the petition;
respondent is hereby ordered to give due course to
petitioner’s claim for benefits.
The question of whether a particular law has been
repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of
legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a
law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which
expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws,
and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed.
A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause,
that a particular and specific law, identified by its
number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all
others are implied repeals
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question,
the ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of
the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new
Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing
clause of the new Code. This provision is found in
Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees,
orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof,
inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or
modified accordingly.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new
Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire
subject matter of the old Code. There are several
matters treated in the old Code which are not found in
the new Code.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the
provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject
claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can
be no such conflict because the provision on sickness
benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has
not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction
that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored.
The presumption is against inconsistency and
repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the
existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted
inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
1
LEVERIZA VS IAC
FACTS:
Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic issues
in the instant case:
Contract A — a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between
the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Civil
Aeronautics Administration (CAA) and Leveriza over a
parcel of land containing an area of 4,502 square meters,
for 25 years.
Contract B — a lease contract (in effect a sublease) of
May 21, 1965 between Leveriza and Mobil Oil
Philippines, Inc., over the same parcel of land, but
reduced to 3,000 square meters for 25 years; and
Contract C — a lease contract of June 1, 1968 between
defendant CAA and plaintiff Mobil Oil over the same
parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for
25 years.
The parties were aware that the subject matter of the
three contracts of lease is the same parcel of land, with
the noted difference in area. However, it appears that
defendant CAA as LESSOR, leased the same parcel of
land, for durations of time that overlapped to two
lessees, to wit: (1) Leveriza and Mobil Oil, and the latter,
as LESSEE, leased the same parcel of land from two
lessors, to wit: (1) Leveriza and (2) CAA for durations of
time that also overlapped.
Mobil Oil seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract
A and B on the ground that Contract A from which
Contract B is derived and depends has already been
cancelled by the defendant CAA and maintains that
Contract C with the defendant CAA is the only valid and
subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land, subject
to the present litigation is concerned.
Defendants Leverizas’ claim that Contract A which is
their contract with CAA has never been legally cancelled
and still valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C which
should be declared void.
CAA asserts that Contract A is still valid and subsisting
and asks the court to annul Contract A because of the
violation committed by Leveriza in leasing the parcel of
land to plaintiff by virtue of Contract B without the
consent of CAA. CAA further asserts that Contract C not
having been approved by the Director of Public Works
and Communications is not valid.
After trial, the lower courts rendered judgment:
1. Declaring Contract A as having been validly cancelled
on June 28, 1966, and has therefore ceased to have any
effect as of that date;
2. Declaring that Contract B has likewise ceased to have
any effect as of June 28, 1966 because of the
cancellation of Contract A;
3. Declaring that Contract C was validly entered into on
June 1, 1968, and that it is still valid and subsisting;
CAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, averring that
because the lot lease was properly registered in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines, it was only the
President of the Philippines or an officer duly designated
by him who could execute the lease contract pursuant to
Administrative Law Case Digests
Sec. 567 of the Revised Administrative Code. Said
motion was however denied.
On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the decision of the
lower court. Hence this petition for Review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said Contract A is still subsisting after its
cancellation by CAA on the ground of a sublease
executed by petitioners with Mobil Oil (CONTRACT B)
without the consent of CAA and the execution of
another contract of lease between CAA and Mobil Oil
(CONTRACT C)
The issue narrows down to: WON there is a valid ground
for the cancellation of Contract A
HELD:
Yes. Contract A was entered into by CAA as the lessor
and the Leverizas as the lessee specifically “for the
purpose of operating and managing a gasoline station by
the latter, to serve vehicles going in and out of the
airport.”
As regards prior consent of the lessor to the transfer of
rights to the leased premises, the provision of paragraph
7 of said Contract reads in full:
7. The Party of the Second part may transfer her rights
to the leased premises but in such eventuality, the
consent of the Party of the First Part shall first be
secured. In any event, such transfer of rights shall have
to respect the terms and conditions of this agreement.
Paragraph 8 provides the sanction for the violation of
the above-mentioned terms and conditions of the
contract. Said paragraph reads:
8. Failure on the part of the Party of the Second Part to
comply with the terms and conditions herein agreed
upon shall be sufficient for revocation of this contract by
the Party of the First Part without need of judicial
demand.
The cancellation of the contract was made in a letter by
Jurado, Airport General Manager of CAA addressed to
Rosario Leveriza. Respondent Leverizas and the CAA
assailed the validity of such cancellation, claiming that
the Airport General Manager had no legal authority to
make the cancellation. They maintain that it is only the
(1)Secretary of Public Works and Communications,
acting for the President, or by delegation of power, the
(2)Director of CCA who could validly cancel the contract.
Petitioners argue that cancelling or setting aside a
contract approved by the Secretary is, in effect,
repealing an act of the Secretary which is beyond the
authority of the Administrator.
Such argument is untenable. The terms and conditions
under which such revocation or cancellation may be
made, have already been specifically provided for in
Contract “A” which has already been approved by the
Department Head, It is evident that in the
implementation of aforesaid contract, the approval of
said Department Head is no longer necessary if not
redundant
2
LUZON DEVELOPMENT BANK VS ASSO. OF LDB
EMPLOYEES
FACTS:
From a submission agreement of the LDB and the
Association of Luzon Development Bank Employees
(ALDBE) arose an arbitration case to resolve the issue:
“Whether or not the company has violated the
CBA provision and the MOA on promotion.”
At a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of
their respective Position Papers. Atty. Garcia, in her
capacity as Voluntary Arbitrator, received ALDBE’s
Position Paper ; LDB, on the other hand, failed to submit
its Position Paper despite a letter from the Voluntary
Arbitrator reminding them to do so. As of May 23, 1995
no Position Paper had been filed by LDB.
Without LDB’s Position Paper, the Voluntary Arbitrator
rendered a decision finding the Bank has not adhered to
the CBA provision nor the MOA on promotion.
Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking
to set aside the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator and
to prohibit her from enforcing the same.
ISSUE:
WON a voluntary arbiter’s decision is appealable to the
CA and not the SC.
HELD:
Yes. The Court resolved to REFER this case to the Court
of Appeals.
The jurisdiction conferred by law on a voluntary
arbitrator or a panel of such arbitrators is quite limited
compared to the original jurisdiction of the labor arbiter
and the appellate jurisdiction of the NLRC for that
matter. While there is an express mode of appeal from
the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic Act No. 6715 is
silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a
voluntary arbitrator.
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7902, provides that the Court of Appeals shall
exercise:
(B) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final
judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of
RTC s and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities,
boards or commissions… except those falling within the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in
accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as
amended, the provisions of this Act, and of
subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and
subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17
of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
Although voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary
arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a quasi-
judicial agency, board or commission, still both he and
the panel are comprehended within the concept of a
“quasi-judicial instrumentality.”
Administrative Law Case Digests
IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY VS COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioner Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) was created by
Presidential Decree No. 272 dated August 9, 1973 in
order, to develop and promote the iron and steel
industry in the Philippines. P.D. No. 272 initially created
petitioner ISA for a term of 5 years, and when ISA’s
original term expired on October 10, 1978, its term was
extended for another 10 years.
The National Steel Corporation (NSC) then a wholly
owned subsidiary of the National Development
Corporation, which is itself an entity wholly owned by
the National Government, embarked on an expansion
program embracing, among other things, the
construction of an integrated steel mill in Iligan City.
Pursuant to the expansion program of the NSC,
Proclamation No. 2239 was issued by the President of
the Philippines on November 16, 1982 withdrawing from
sale or settlement a large tract of public land located in
Iligan City and reserving that land for the use and
immediate occupancy of NSCs.
Since certain portions of the public land subject matter
of Proclamation No. 2239 were occupied by a non-
operational chemical fertilizer plant owned by private
respondent Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC),
LOI No. 1277, also dated 16 November 1982, was issued
directing the NSC to “negotiate with the owners of
MCFC, for and on behalf of the Government, for the
compensation of MCFC’s present occupancy rights on
the subject land.” LOI No. 1277 also directed that should
NSC and private respondent MCFC fail to reach an
agreement within a period of 60 days from the date of
the LOI, petitioner ISA was to exercise its power of
eminent domain under P.D. No. 272 and to initiate
expropriation proceedings in respect of occupancy rights
of private respondent MCFC relating to the subject
public land as well as the plant itself and related facilities
and to cede the same to the NSC.
Negotiations between NSC and private respondent
MCFC did fail.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines is entitled
to be substituted for ISA in view of the expiration of ISA's
term.
HELD:
Clearly, ISA was vested with some of the powers or
attributes normally associated with juridical personality
but did not possess general or comprehensive juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of the
Government. The ISA in fact appears to the Court to be a
non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines. ISA may
thus be properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the
Republic of the Philippines.
3
When the statutory term of a non-incorporated agency
expires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the
assets and liabilities of that agency revert back to, and
are re-assumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the
absence of special provisions of law specifying some
other disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution or
transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc. to
some other identified successor agency or
instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines. When
the expiring agency is an incorporated one, the
consequences of such expiry must be looked for in the
charter of that agency and, by way of supplementation,
in the provisions of the Corporation Code. Since, in the
instant case, ISA is a non-incorporated agency or
instrumentality of the Republic, its powers, duties,
functions, assets and liabilities are properly regarded as
folded back into the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and hence assumed once again by the
Republic, no special statutory provision having been
shown to have mandated succession thereto by some
other entity or agency of the Republic.
In the instant case, ISA instituted the expropriation
proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or
representative of the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to its authority under P.D. No. 272.
From the foregoing premises, it follows that the Republic
of the Philippines is entitled to be substituted in the
expropriation proceedings as party-plaintiff in lieu of ISA,
the statutory term of ISA having expired. Put a little
differently, the expiration of ISA's statutory term did not
by itself require or justify the dismissal of the eminent
domain proceedings.
BALICAS VS. FACT-FINDING AND INTELLIGENCE
BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
FACTS:
In the development of the Cherry Hills Subdivision (CHS),
Philjas Corp. applied for the issuance of ECC from the
DENR-Region IV.
BALICAS, PENRO senior environmental management
specialist, monitored the implementation of the CHS
Project Development to check compliance with the
terms and conditions in the ECC. She conducted another
monitoring on the project for the same purpose. In both
instances, she noted that the project was still in the
construction stage hence, compliance with the
stipulated conditions could not be fully assessed, and
therefore, a follow-up monitoring is proper. It appeared
from the records that this August 23, 1995 monitoring
inspection was the last one conducted by the DENR.
Immediately after the tragic incident, landslide, on
August 3, 1999, a fact-finding investigation was
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman through its
Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), which duly
filed an administrative complaint with the Office of the
Administrative Law Case Digests
Ombudsman against several officials of the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the
local government of Antipolo.
The charge against petitioner involved a supposed
failure on her part to monitor and inspect the
development of CHS, which was assumed to be her duty
as DENR senior environmental management specialist.
The petitioner claimed that she monitored the
development of CHS as evidenced by 3 monitoring
reports .She further claimed good faith and exercise of
due diligence, insisting that the tragedy was a fortuitous
event. She reasoned that the collapse did not occur in
Cherry Hills, but in the adjacent mountain eastern side of
the subdivision.
The Office of the Ombudsman rendered a decision
imposing upon petitioner the supreme penalty of
dismissal from office for gross neglect of duty.
Petitioner seasonably filed a petition for review of the
Ombudsman’s decision with the CA who dismissed the
petition for lack of merit and affirmed the appealed
decision. Motion for reconsideration was also denied.
This petition for review on certiorari
ISSUE:
WON Balicas is guilty of gross neglect of duty
HELD:
No. The petition is hereby GRANTED, The CA decision is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioners
REINSTATEMENT to her position with back pay and
without loss of seniority rights is hereby ordered.
In order to ascertain if there had been gross neglect of
duty, we have to look at the lawfully prescribed duties of
petitioner. Unfortunately, DENR regulations are silent on
the specific duties of a senior environmental
management specialist. Internal regulations merely
speak of the functions of the Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Office (PENRO) to which petitioner
directly reports.The monitoring duties of the PENRO
mainly deal with broad environmental concerns,
particularly pollution abatement. This general
monitoring duty is applicable to all types of physical
developments that may adversely impact on the
environment.
However, a more specific monitoring duty is imposed on
the HLURB as the sole regulatory body for housing and
land development.
P.D. No. 1586 prescribes the following duties on the
HLURB (then Ministry of Human Settlements) in
connection with environmentally critical projects
requiring an ECC:
4

SECTION 4. Presidential Proclamation of Environmentally
Critical Areas and Projects. The President of the
Philippines may, by proclamation declare certain
projects, undertakings or areas in the country as
environmentally critical. No person, partnership or
corporation shall undertake or operate any such
declared environmentally critical project or area without
first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate
issued by the President or his duly authorized
representative. xxxx
The Ministry of Human Settlements [now HLURB] shall:
(a) prepare the proper land or water use pattern for said
critical project(s) or area(s);
(b) establish ambient environmental quality standards;
(c) develop a program of environmental enhancement or
protective measures against calamitous factors such as
earthquake, floods, water erosion and others; and
(d) perform such other functions as may be directed by
the President from time to time.
The legal duty to monitor housing projects, against
calamities such as landslides due to continuous rain, is
clearly placed on the HLURB, not on the petitioner as
PENRO senior environmental management specialist.
MALAGA VS PENACHOS
FACTS:
The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its
Pre-qualifications, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC)
caused the publication in the November 25, 26 and 28,
1988 issues of an Invitation to Bid for the construction of
a Micro Laboratory Building. The notice announced that
the last day for the submission of pre-qualification
requirements was on December 2, 1988, and that the
bids would be received and opened on December 12,
1988 at 3 o'clock in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, doing business under
the name of BE Construction and Best Built Construction,
respectively, submitted their pre-qualification
documents at two o'clock in the afternoon of December
2, 1988. Petitioner Occeana submitted his own on
December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed
to participate in the bidding as their documents were
considered late.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint
with the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their
refusal without just cause to accept them resulting to
their non-inclusion in the list of pre-qualified bidders.
They sought to the resetting of the December 12, 1988
bidding and the acceptance of their documents. They
also asked that if the bidding had already been
conducted, the defendants be directed not to award the
project pending resolution of their complaint.
Administrative Law Case Digests
On the same date, Judge Lebaquin issued a restraining
order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and
award the project. The defendants filed a motion to lift
the restraining order on the ground that the court is
prohibited from issuing such order, preliminary
injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction in
government infrastructure project under Sec. 1 of P.D.
1818. They also contended that the preliminary
injunction had become moot and academic as it was
served after the bidding had been awarded and closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining
order and denied the petition for preliminary injunction.
It declared that the building sought to be constructed at
the ISCOF was an infrastructure project of the
government falling within the coverage of the subject
law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not ISCOF is a government instrumentality
subject to the provisions of PD 1818?
RULING:
The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government
instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the
National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all
corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies,
chartered institutions, and government-owned or
controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory
Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution - refers to any agency organized or
operating under a special charter, and vested by law
with functions relating to specific constitutional policies
or objectives. This term includes the state universities
and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state.
(Sec. 2 (12) Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a
chartered institution and is therefore covered by P.D.
1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a
government instrumentality. First, it was created in
pursuance of the integrated fisheries development
policy of the State, a priority program of the
government. Second, the Treasurer of the Republic of
the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of
the state college with its accounts and expenses to be
audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly
authorized representative. Third, heads of bureaus and
offices of the National Government are authorized to
loan or transfer to it, such apparatus, equipment, or
supplies and even the services of such employees as can
be spared without serious detriment to public service.
Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been
5
appropriated out of the funds of the National Treasury
and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and
maintenance of the state college would henceforth be
included in the General Appropriations Law.
PRECLARO VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Accused is a project manager/consultant of the Chemical
Mineral Division, Department of Science and
Technology, a component of the Industrial Development
Institute which is an agency of the DOST.
He is to supervise the construction of the ITDI-CMD
building, while the Jaime Sta. Maria Construction
undertook the construction. The structure is jointly
funded by the Philippine and Japanese Governments.
While the said construction has not yet been completed,
accused either directly requested and/or demanded for
himself the sum of P200,000.00, claimed as part of the
expected profit of the contractor.
Petitioner was charged for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act for committing said offense in
relation to the performance of his official duties.
Petitioner asserts in a petition for review that he is not a
public officer because he was neither elected nor
appointed to a public office, but merely a private
individual hired by the ITDI on contractual basis for a
particular project and for a specified period. Hence the
Sandiganbayan erred in taking cognizance of the case.
Section 2 (b) of RA 3019 defines a public officer to
“include elective and appointive officials and employees,
permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or
unclassified or exemption service receiving
compensation, even nominal, from the government…”
ISSUE:
WON a private individual hired on a contractual basis by
the government is a public officer.
HELD:
Yes. The word “includes” used in defining a public officer
indicates that the definition is not restrictive. The terms
“classified, unclassified or exemption service” were the
old categories of position in the civil service which have
been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career
Service by PD 807 providing for the organization of the
Civil Service Commission by the Administrative Code of
1987.
A private individual hired on a contractual basis as
Project Manager for a government undertaking falls
under the non-career service category of the Civil
Service and thus is a public officer as defined by Sec 2(b)
of RA 3019.
Under Book V, Title I, Subtitle A, Chapter 2, Sec 6(2) of
the Administrative Code of 1987, non-career service in
particular is characterized by 1) entrance other than
Administrative Law Case Digests
those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for
the career service; and 2) tenure which is limited to a
period specified by law, or which is coterminous with
that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a
particular project for which purpose employment was
made.
Section 9(4) of the same provides that Non-Career
Service shall include Contractual personnel or those
employment in the government is in accordance with a
special contract to undertake a specific work or job,
requiring special or technical skills not available in the
employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific
period, which in no case shall exceed one year, and
performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under
his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and
supervision from the hiring agency.
Crisostomo vs. CA, 258 SCRA 134 (1996)
FACTS:
Crisostomo was appointed the President of the
Philippine College of Commerce (PCC) by the President
of the Philippines. During his incumbency, two
administrative charges were filed against him for illegal
use of government vehicles, misappropriation of
construction materials, oppression and harassment,
grave misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty before the
Office of the President. Likewise, he was also charged
with violation of Anti-Grant and Corrupt Practices Act
with the Tanod bayan.
As such, he was preventively suspended and Dr. Mateo
was designated as the officer-in-charge in his place.
Meanwhile, Pres. Marcos passed PD 1341 converting
PCC into PUP, defining its objectives, organizational
structure and functions and expanding its curricular
offerings. Mateo continued as the head of the new
University. Crisostomo was later acquitted and his
administrative charges were dismissed and his
reinstatement was ordered together with payment of his
salaries and other benefits during the period of
suspension. However, Dr. Gellor, the acting president of
PUP did not vacate his office. This led to a contempt
citation against Dr. Gellor.
CA rendered a decision setting aside orders and writ of
reinstatement issued by the trial court. The payment of
salaries and benefits after the conversion of the PCC to
PUP was disallowed. Petitioner filed a petition arguing
that PD No. 1341 did not abolish PCC for had the law
intended PCC to lose its existence, it would have
specified that the PCC was abolished and that if PUP was
intended to be a new institution, the law would have
said it was being created.
ISSUE:
Did PD 1314 abolish PCC?
6
HELD:
PD 1314 did not abolish, but only changed the PCC into
what is now PUP. What took place was a change in the
academic status of the educational institution, not in its
corporate life. As a general rule, when the purpose of
the lawmaking authority is to abolish the office and
create a new one, he says so. In the instant case, PD
1314 merely states that PCC is converted into the
PUP. Inaddition, the law does not state that the lands,
buildings and equipment owned by the PCC were being
“transferred” to the PUP but only that they “stand transferred” to
it. “Stand transferred” simply means,
for example, that lands transferred to the PCC were to
be understood as transferred to the PUP as the new
name of the institution.
G.R. No. 115844. August 15, 1997
FACTS:
Viola, as a barangay chairman, filed a petition for
prohibition challenging the validity of the Art III, Sec.1-2
of the Revised Implementing Rules and Guidelines for
the General Elections of the Liga ng mga Barangay
Officers insofar as they provide for the election of first,
second, and third vice presidents and for auditors for the
National Liga ng mga Barangay and its chapters.
He contended that the questioned positions are in
excess of those provided in the LGC Sec.493 which
mentions as elective positions only those of the
president, vice president, and five members of the board
of directors in each chapter at the municipal, city,
provincial, metropolitan political subdivision, and
national levels and thus the implementing rules expand
the numbers in the LGC in violation of the principle that
implementing rules and regulations cannot add or
detract from the provisions of the law they are designed
to implement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the additional positions in question have
been created without authority of law.
RULING:
No. The creation of additional positions is authorized by
Sec. 493 of the LGC which in fact requires – and not
merely authorizes – the board of directors to “create
such other positions as it may deem necessary for the
management of the chapter”. To begin with, the
creation of these positions was actually made in the
Constitution and By-laws of the Liga ng mga barangay
which was adopted by the First Barangay National
Assembly.
There is no undue delegation of power by Congress in
this case. SC decisions have upheld the validity of
reorganization statutes authorizing the President of the
Philippines to create, abolish, or merge offices in the
executive management.
Administrative Law Case Digests
While the board of directors of a local chapter can create
additional positions to provide for the needs of the
chapter, the board of directors of the National Liga must
be deemed to have the power to create additional
positions not only for its management but also for that
of all the chapters at the municipal, city, provincial and
metropolitan political subdivision levels. Otherwise the
National Liga would be no different from the local
chapters. The fact is that Sec. 493 grants the power to
create positions not only to the boards of the local
chapters but to the board of the Liga at the national
level as well.
Petition dismissed.
BIRAOGO VS PTC
FACTS:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission
(PTC) of 2010 was signed by President Aquino. The said
PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the
President tasked to investigate reports of graft and
corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration and
submit their findings and recommendations to
the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. However,
PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes
between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and
asses evidences gathered and make recommendations.
It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine
for such facts if probable cause exist as to warrant the
filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on
the grounds that.
It violates separation of powers as
it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation;
The delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President does
not include the power to create an entirely new office
was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution
when it made the Truth Commission and vesting it the
power duplicating and even exceeding those of the
Office of the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.
7
RULING:
Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of
the equal protection clause. It does not apply equally to
all members of the same class such that the intent of
singling out the "previous administration" as its sole
object makes the PTC an "adventure in partisan
hostility." Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the
commission must also cover reports of graft and
corruption in virtually all administrations previous to
that of former President Arroyo.
The Chief Executive’s power to create the Ad hoc
Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having
been constitutionally granted full control of the
Executive Department, to which respondents belong, the
President has the obligation to ensure that all executive
officials and employees faithfully comply with the law.
With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the
investigation is sustained. Such validity is not affected by
the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC had
the same composition, or that the former used the
offices and facilities of the latter in conducting the
inquiry.
KAPISANAN NG MGA KAWANI NG ENERGY
REGULATORY BOARD vs COMMISSIONER FE B. BARIN
FACTS:
RA 9136, popularly known as EPIRA (for Electric Power
Industry Reform Act of 2001), provides for the abolition
of the ERB and the creation of the ERC. Section 38 of it
states that:
Creation of the Energy Regulatory Commission. There is
hereby created an independent, quasi-judicial regulatory
board to be named the Energy Regulatory Commission
(ERC). For this purpose, the existing Energy Regulatory
Board (ERB) created under Executive Order No. 172, as
amended, is hereby abolished.
The Chairman and members of the Commission shall
assume office at the beginning of their
terms: Provided, That, if upon the effectivity of this Act,
the Commission has not been constituted and the new
staffing pattern and plantilla positions have not been
approved and filled-up, the current Board and existing
personnel of ERB shall continue to hold office.
At the time of the filing of this petition, the ERC was
composed of Commissioner Fe B. Barin and Deputy
Commissioners Alindada, Ibay, Butalid, and Colayco. The
Commissioners assumed office on 15 August 2001. They
issued the proposed Table of Organization, Staffing
Pattern, and Salary Structure which the President of
the Philippines .Meanwhile, KERB submitted to the
Commissioners its Resolution requesting for an
Administrative Law Case Digests
opportunity to be informed on the
proposed plantilla positions with their equivalent
qualification standards.
The Commissioners issued the guidelines for the
selection and hiring of ERC employees. A portion of the
guidelines provide that the provisions of Republic Act
No. 6656 (An Act to Protect the Security of [Tenure of]
Civil Service Officers and Employees in the
Implementation of Government Reorganization) will not
directly apply to ERCs current efforts to establish a new
organization. Civil Service laws, rules and regulations,
however, will have suppletory application.
KERB sent a letter to the Commissioners stating their
objection to the Commissioners stand that Civil Service
laws, rules and regulations have suppletory application
in the selection and placement of the ERC
employees. KERB asserted that RA 9136 did not abolish
the ERB or change the ERBs character as an economic
regulator of the electric power industry. KERB insisted
that RA 9136 merely changed the ERBs name to the ERC
and expanded the ERBs functions and objectives.
Commissioner Barin replied that Civil Service application
form no. 212 and the ERC-prescribed application format
are substantially the same. Furthermore, the creation of
a placement/recruitment committee is no longer
necessary because there is already a prescribed set of
guidelines for the recruitment of personnel. The ERC
hired an independent consultant to administer the
necessary tests for the technical and managerial
levels. Finally, the ERC already posted
the plantilla positions, which prescribe higher standards,
as approved by the Department of Budget and
Management. Commissioner Barin stated that positions
in the ERC do not need the prior approval of the CSC, as
the ERC is only required to submit the qualification
standards to the CSC.
KERB filed the present petition then later filed an Urgent
Ex Parte Motion to Enjoin Termination of Petitioner ERB
Employees. However, before the ERC
received KERBs pleadings, the Selection Committee
already presented its list of proposed appointees to the
Commissioners.
In their Comment, the Commissioners describe the
status of the ERB employees appointment in the ERC as
follows:
Issue:
1. Whether Section 38 of RA 9136 abolishing the ERB is
constitutional; and
Held:
All laws enjoy the presumption of constitutionality. To
justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear
8
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. KERB failed
to show any breach of the Constitution.
The power to create an office carries with it the power
to abolish. President Corazon C. Aquino, then exercising
her legislative powers, created the ERB by issuing
Executive Order No. 172 on 8 May 1987.
The question of whether a law abolishes an office is a
question of legislative intent. There should not be any
controversy if there is an explicit declaration of abolition
in the law itself. Section 38 of RA 9136 explicitly
abolished the ERB. However, abolition of an office and
its related positions is different from removal of an
incumbent from his office.Abolition and removal are
mutually exclusive concepts. From a legal standpoint,
there is no occupant in an abolished office. Where there
is no occupant, there is no tenure to speak of. Thus,
impairment of the constitutional guarantee of security of
tenure does not arise in the abolition of an office. On the
other hand, removal implies that the office and its
related positions subsist and that the occupants are
merely separated from their positions.[8]
A valid order of abolition must not only come from a
legitimate body, it must also be made in good faith. An
abolition is made in good faith when it is not made for
political or personal reasons, or when it does not
circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil
service employees. Abolition of an office may be brought
about by reasons of economy, or to remove redundancy
of functions, or a clear and explicit constitutional
mandate for such termination of employment. Where
one office is abolished and replaced with another office
vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal
nullity. When there is a void abolition, the incumbent is
deemed to have never ceased holding office.
KERB asserts that there was no valid abolition of the ERB
but there was merely a reorganization done in bad faith.
After comparing the provisions providing for the powers
and functions of the ERB and the ERC to see whether
they have substantially the same functions, it was found
out that the ERC indeed assumed the functions of the
ERB. However, the overlap in the functions of the ERB
and of the ERC does not mean that there is no valid
abolition of the ERB. The ERC has new and expanded
functions which are intended to meet the specific needs
of a deregulated power industry. Because of the
expansion of the ERCs functions and concerns, there was
a valid abolition of the ERB. Thus, there is no merit
to KERB’s allegation that there is an impairment of the
security of tenure of the ERBs employees.
Administrative Law Case Digests
CHREA vs.CHR
FACTS:
Congress passed RA 8522, otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for
Special Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices
Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these
special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution No.
A98-047 adopting an upgrading and reclassification
scheme among selected positions in the Commission.
By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062, the CHR “collapsed”
the vacant positions in the body to provide additional
source of funding for said staffing modification.
The CHR forwarded said staffing modification and
upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for its
approval, but the then DBM secretary denied the
request.
In light of the DBM’s disapproval of the proposed
personnel modification scheme, the CSC-National Capital
Region Office, through a memorandum, recommended
to the CSC-Central Office that the subject appointments
be rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the
plantilla reclassification.
Meanwhile, the officers of petitioner CHR-employees
association (CHREA) in representation of the rank and
file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-Central
Office to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-
Regional Office.
The CSC-Central Office denied CHREA’s request in a
Resolution and reversed the recommendation of the
CSC-Regional Office that the upgrading scheme be
censured. CHREA filed a motion for reconsideration, but
the CSC-Central Office denied the same.
CHREA elevated the matter to the CA,
which affirmed the pronouncement of the CSC-Central
Office and upheld the validity of the upgrading, retitling,
and reclassification scheme in the CHR on the
justification that such action is within the ambit of CHR’s
fiscal autonomy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CHR can validly implement an
upgrading, reclassification, creation, and collapsing of
plantilla positions in the Commission without the prior
approval of the Department of Budget and
Management?
HELD:
No. The CHR Resolutions, without the approval of the
DBM are disallowed.
9
1. RA 6758 or the Salary Standardization Law, provides
that it is the DBM who shall establish and administer a
unified Compensation and Position Classification System.
This power to “administer” is not purely ministerial in
character as erroneously held by the CA. The word to
administer means to control or regulate in behalf of
others; to direct or superintend the execution,
application or conduct of; and to manage or conduct
public affairs, as to administer the government of the
state.
2. The regulatory power of the DBM on matters of
compensation is encrypted not only in law, but in
jurisprudence as well. In the recent case of PRA v.
Buñag, this Court ruled that compensation, allowances,
and other benefits received by PRA officials and
employees without the requisite approval or authority of
the DBM are unauthorized and irregular
In Victorina Cruz v. CA , we held that the DBM has the
sole power and discretion to administer the
compensation and position classification system of the
national government.
In Intia, Jr. v. COA the Court held that although the
charter of the PPC grants it the power to fix the
compensation and benefits of its employees, the
compensation system established by the PPC is,
nonetheless, subject to the review of the DBM.
3. As such, the approval of DBM must first be sought
prior to implementation of any reclassification or
upgrading of positions in government. This is consonant
to the mandate of the DBM under the RAC of 1987,
Section 3, Chapter 1, Title XVII, to wit:
SEC. 3. Powers and Functions. – assist the President in
the preparation of a national resources and
expenditures budget, preparation, execution and control
of the National Budget, preparation and maintenance of
accounting systems essential to the budgetary process,
achievement of more economy and efficiency in the
management of government operations, administration
of compensation and position classification systems,
assessment of organizational effectiveness and review
and evaluation of legislative proposals having budgetary
or organizational implications.
4. The CA incorrectly relied on the pronouncement of
the CSC-Central Office that the CHR is a constitutional
commission, and as such enjoys fiscal autonomy. The
Constitution states in no uncertain terms that only the
CSC, the COMELEC, and the COA shall be tagged as
Constitutional Commissions with the appurtenant right
to fiscal autonomy.
Administrative Law Case Digests
SEC. 29. Other Bodies. – There shall be in accordance
with the Constitution, an Office of the Ombudsman, a
Commission on Human Rights, and independent central
monetary authority, and a national police commission.
Likewise, as provided in the Constitution, Congress may
establish an independent economic and planning
agency.
Nor is there any legal basis to support the contention
that the CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy.
Anak Mindanao Party-list group (AMIN) and Mamalo
Descendants Organization Inc. (MDOI) v Executive
Secretary
Facts:
Petitioners Anak Mindanao Party-List Group (AMIN)
and Mamalo Descendants Organization, Inc. (MDOI)
assail the constitutionality of Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.
364 and 379 (Transforming the DAR to Department of
Land Reform), both issued in 2004, via the present
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for
injunctive relief.
EO. 364, as amended by EO. 379, among other things,
orders that the Presidential Commission for the Urban
Poor (PCUP) placed under the supervision and control of
the Department of Land Reform, and the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)shall be an
attached agency of the Department of Land Reform.
AMIN alleges that by issuing EOs 364 and 379, the
Executive has impaired the powers of Congress. AMIN
contends that since the DAR, PCUP and NCIP were
created by statutes,they can only be transformed,
merged or attached by statutes, not by mere executive
orders.
MDOI alleges that it is concerned with the negative
impact of NCIP becoming an attached agency of the DAR
on the processing of ancestral domain claims.
Issue:
WON the Executive has the power to place the
Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor (PCUP)
under the supervision and control of the DAR, and the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
under the DAR as an attached agency.
HELD:
YES. The Constitution confers, by express provision, the
power of control over executive departments, bureaus
and offices in the President alone. And it lays down a
limitation on the legislative power.
 The Constitution’s express grant of the power of
control in the President justifies an executive
10
 action to carry out reorganization measures
under a broad authority of law.
 Administrative Code of 1987 Sec. 31: “The
President, subject to the policy in the Executive
Office and in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency, shall have continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President”
o The consolidation of functions in E.O.
364 aims to attain the objectives of
simplicity, economy and efficiency as
gathered from the provision granting
PCUP and NCIP access to the range of
services provided by the DARs technical
offices and support systems.
 On the issue of Sec 16 Art. 13 of the
Constitution(The right of the people and their
organizations to effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political, and
economic decision-making shall not be abridged.
The State shall, by law, facilitate the
establishment of adequate consultation
mechanisms)being violated: the state merely
facilitates this participation, and not necessarily
create these mechanisms. The State provides
the support, but eventually it is the people,
properly organized in their associations, who
can assert the right and pursue the objective.
BAGAOISAN VS NAT'L TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION
FACTS:
1. The petitioner was terminated from there position in
the national tobacco administration as a result of the
executive order issued by president Estradawhic
mandates for the stream lining of the national tobacco
administration, a government agency under the
department of agriculture.
2. The petitioners filed a letter of appeal to the civil
service commission to recall the ossp.
3. Petitioner all file a petition for certiorari with
prohibition an mandamus with prayer for preliminary
mandatory injunction and a temporary restraining
order with the regional trial court of Batak to prevent
the respondent from enforcing the notice of termination
and from austing the petitioners in there
respective offices.
4. The regional trial court issued an order ordering the
national tobacco administration to appoint the
petitioner to the osspto position similar to the
one that they hold before.
5. The national tobacco administration appealed to the
Administrative Law Case Digests
court of appeals who reversed the decision of the RTC.
6. Petitioner appealed to the supreme court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not, the reorganization of the national
tobacco administration is valid.
HELD:
According to the SC, the president has the power to
reorganized an office to achieve simplicity ,economy and
efficiency as provided under executive
order 292 sec. 31 and section 48 of RA 7645 which
provides that activities of executive agencies may be
scaled down if it is no longer essential for the
delivery of public service.
WHEREFORE, the Motion to Admit Petition for En Banc
resolution and the Petition for an En Banc Resolution are
DENIED for lack of merit.
Nat’l Land Titles and Deeds Registration Admin
(NALTDRA) VS Civil Service Commission
FACTS:
 Garcia was an LLB grad and a first grade civil service.
 She was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII.
 She was later appointed as Deputy Register of
Deeds III, upon reclassification of the position.
 She was designated as Acting Branch Register of
Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
 Executive Order No. 649 was enacted.
 It authorized the restructuring of the Land
Registration Commission to National Land Titles
and Deeds Registration Administration, and it
regionalized the offices of the registers therein.
 The law imposed a new requirement of BAR
membership to qualify for permanent
appointment as Deputy Register od Deeds II or
higher.
 Garcia issued an appointment as Deputy Register of
Deeds II on temporary status for not being a member
of the Philippine Bar.
 Sec. of Justice notified Garcia of the termination of
her services on the ground that she was receiving
Bribe Money.
 Garcia appealed, but the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) dropped her appeal on
the ground that the termination of her services
was due to the expiration of her temporary
appointment.
 The CSC issued a resolution, directing that Garcia be
restored to her position.
 According to the CSC, under the vested right
theory, the new requirement of the BAR
membership will not apply to her but only to the
11
 filling up of vacant lawyer position on or after
Feb 9, 1981, the date the order took effect.
 NALTDRA assailed the validity of the CSC Resolution
ISSUE:
WON membership in the bar, which is a qualification
requirement prescribed for appointment to the position
of Deputy Register of Deeds under EO. No. 649, Section
4, should be applied only to new applicants and not to
those who were already in service of the LRC as deputy
register of deeds at the time of the issuance and
implementation of the EO.
HELD:
No. The requirement shall also apply to those already in
service.
RATIO:
 EO No. 649, in express terms, provided for the
abolition of existing positions:
 Section 8. Abolition of Existing Positions. All
structural units in the LRC and in the registries of
deeds, and all positions therein shall cease to
exist from the date specified in the
implementing order to be issued by the
president pursuant to the preceding par. The
pertinent functions, applicable appropriations,
records, equipment and property shall be
transferred to the appropriate staff or offices
therein created.
 The law, therefore, mandates that from the
moment an implementing order is issued, all
positions in the LRC is deemed non-existent.
This is NOT removal. Removal implied post
subsists and one is merely separated therefrom,
while here, there is no position at all. Thus,
there can be no tenure to speak of.
 Abolition of office is valid if (1) carried out by a
legitimate body and (2) done in good faith.
(1) LEGITIMATE BODY
 In this case, it was by LEGITIMATE BODY. There
is no dispute over the authority to carry out a
valid reorganization in any branch/agency of
gov’t under Sec 8, Article XVII of the 1973
Consti.
(2) GOOD FAITH
 Re: good faith, if the newly created office has
substantially new, different or additional
functions, duties or powers, so that it may be
said in fact to create an office different from the
one abolished, even though it embraces all or
some of the duties of the old office, it will be
considered an abolition and creation of new
one. The same is true if the office is abolished
Administrative Law Case Digests
and its duties, for reasons of economy, are given
to an existing office.
 In this case, EO No. 649 was enacted to improve
the services and better systematize the LRC. The
requirement of Bar membership was imposed to
meet changing circumstnaces and new
developments. It was imposed concomitant with
a valid reorganization measure.
 Re: “Vested right theory,” no such thing as a vested
interest or estate in an office, except constitutional
offices which provide for special immunity as regards
salary and tenure.
JUDGMENT: Garcia has no vested property right to be
re-employed in a reorganized office. She cannot be
reinstated to her former position. CSC Resolution
reinstating Garcia was set aside.
EUGENIO vs. CSC
FACTS:
Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine
Nuclear Research Institute. She applied for a Career
Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO
rank,. She was given a CES eligibility and was
recommended to the President for a CESO rank by
the Career Executive Service Board.
Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a
Resolution which abolished the CESB, relying on the
provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V
of the Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly
conferring on the Commission the power and
authority to effect changes in its organization as the
need arises. Said resolution states:
“Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service
Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career
Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission.
Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget,
properties and equipment of the Career Executive
Service Board shall now form part of the Office for
Career Executive Service.”
Finding herself bereft of further administrative
relief as the Career Executive Service Board which
recommended her CESO Rank IV has been
abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to
annul, among others, said resolution.
ISSUE:
WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of
the CESB
HELD:
The petition is granted and Resolution of the
respondent Commission is hereby annulled and set
aside
NO
1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created
in PD No. 1 on September 1, 1974. It cannot be
12
disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by
law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This
follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the
creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a
legislative function
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not
enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General
Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the
legislature has set aside funds for the operation of
CESB.
Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section
17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its
power to abolish the CESB.
But as well pointed out by petitioner and the
Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together
with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates
the offices under the respondent Commission.
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that
respondent Commission’s power to reorganize is
limited to offices under its control as enumerated in
Section 16.
2. From its inception, the CESB was intended to be
an autonomous entity, albeit administratively
attached to respondent Commission. As
conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee
“the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to
view the problem of building up executive
manpower in the government with a broad and
positive outlook.”
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is
not negated by its attachment to respondent
Commission. By said attachment, CESB
was notmade to fall within the control of respondent
Commission. Under the Administrative Code of
1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally
inter-related government agency to another is to
attain “policy and program coordination.” This is
clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book
IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral
relationship between the department or its
equivalent and attached agency or corporation for
purposes of policy and program coordination. The
coordination may be accomplished by having the
department represented in the governing board of
the attached agency or corporation, either as
chairman or as a member, with or without voting
rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the
attached corporation or agency comply with a
system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the
progress of programs and projects; and having the
department or its equivalent provide general
policies through its representative in the board,
which shall serve as the framework for the internal
policies of the attached corporation or agency.
Administrative Law Case Digests
LARIN VS. EXECUTVE SECRETARY
FACTS:
Petitioner AquilinoLarin is the Assistant Commissioner of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and he also appears to
be a co- accused in two criminal cases for violating
Section 268(4) of the National Internal Revenue Code
and Section 3 of R.A. 3019. Subsequently petitioner was
convicted and this was reported to the President, the
then Senior Deputy Executive Secretary by the authority
of the president issued Memo order 164 creating an
executive committee to investigate the administrative
charges.
The committee required that petitioner filed a position
paper with regard to the charges against him, the
petitioner complied, and however his statement was
that he cannot comment on the merits of the case for
fear of being cited in contempt by the court. Petitioner
also alleged that the committee doesn’t have any
jurisdiction over his person, that the case cannot be
validly filed without violating res judicata, his rights
against double jeopardy and lastly to proceed with the
investigation would be redundant and oppressive
against him. While all this is pending, the president
issued an order for the streamlining of BIR, in which case
the office of the petitioner was abolished by the order.
His office being abolished, the petitioner was not
reinstated as an assistant commissioner of BIR, instead
another Administrative order was issued in which it
stated that he is being dismissed for being guilty of grave
misconduct in connection to the criminal cases filed
against him.
ISSUES:
a. Who has the power to discipline the petitioner
b. Was due process observed
c. What is the effect of the petitioners acquittal in the
criminal case
d. Does the president have the power to reorganize BIR
e. Was the reorganization done in bad faith.
HELD:
The court ruled that the office of the petitioner falls
under the category of Career Executive Service, which is
appointed by the president and being a presidential
appointee, it follows that the president have the power
13
to discipline the petitioner. Despite the fact that the
constitution grants the president the power to appoint
and the inherent power to remove, such power is not
without limit. Under the Administrative code of 1987,
career services are characterized to have security of
tenure, therefore the petitioner is protected from being
willfully removed by the president, the only way that the
petitioner can be validly removed is for a valid cause and
in accordance with the procedural due process.
According to the Court it found that, although the
procedural due process was followed and complied with
the petitioner was not removed for a valid cause, since
to start with the committee was created to investigate
the administrative aspect of the criminal cases being
faced by the petitioner at that time. Now taking into
consideration that the petitioner was acquitted from the
criminal cases, the court believes that there is no ground
for the administrative case to continue. It is admitted
that criminal cases and administrative cases usually
progress independently, however in this case it was
proven in the criminal case that the petitioner never
committed any of the alleged acts, therefore the case for
the administrative case was also terminated, and
therefore there is no longer any valid cause for the
removal of the petitioner.
As for the validity of E.O. 132 which reorganized the BIR,
the court ruled that the president has the authority to
do so, as seen in the preamble of the E.O. which stated
the legal basis of its issuance. Though it is admitted that
the president had the power to reorganize the BIR, the
court stated that such power is not limitless, the
reorganization to be valid must be done in good faith. In
the instant case the court found that the reorganization
was done in bad faith or at least there are indications of
bad faith, such as when the E.O. abolished the
intelligence and investigation office and at the same
time creating Intelligence and Investigation service to do
the same functions of the abolished office. Most
importantly is the non reappointment of the petitioner,
the petitioner being a holder of a career service, should
have been prioritized or preferred in appointing people
to new offices created by the reorganization, but in this
case the petitioner was never reappointed instead he
was dismissed from service without any separation
benefits at all. The court ruled that the petitioner is
reinstated as an assistant commissioner and is entitled
to back wages.
Administrative Law Case Digests
AZARCON VS SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon owned and operated an
earth-moving business, hauling dirt and ore. His services
were contracted by PICOP. Occasionally, he engaged the
services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks
were left at the former’s premises.
On May 25, 1983, a Warrant of Distraint of Personal
Property was issued by BIR commanding one of its
Regional Directors to distraint the goods, chattels or
effects and other personal property of Jaime Ancla, a
sub-contractor of accused Azarcon and a delinquent
taxpayer. A Warrant of Garnishment was issued to and
subsequently signed by accused Azarcon ordering him to
transfer, surrender, transmit and/or remit to BIR the
property in his possession owned by Ancla. Azarcon then
volunteered himself to act as custodian of the truck
owned by Ancla.
After some time, Azarcon wrote a letter to the Reg. Dir
of BIR stating that while he had made representations to
retain possession of the property of Ancla, he thereby
relinquishes whatever responsibility he had over the said
property since Ancla surreptitiously withdrew his
equipment from him. In his reply, the BIR Reg. Dir. said
that Azarcon’s failure to comply with the provisions of
the warrant did not relieve him from his responsibility.
Along with his co-accused, Azarcon was charged before
the Sandiganbayan with the crime of malversation of
public funds or property. On March 8, 1994, the
Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision sentencing the
accused to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from 10 yrs and 1 day of prision mayor in its maximum
period to 17 yrs, 4 mos and 1 day of reclusion temporal.
Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which was
subsequently denied by Sandiganbayan. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a
private individual designated by BIR as a custodian of
distrained property.
14
HELD:
SC held that the Sandiganbayan’s decision was null and
void for lack of jurisdiction.
Sec. 4 of PD 1606 provides for the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It was specified therein that the only
instances when the Sandiganbayan will have jurisdiction
over a private individual is when the complaint charges
the private individual either as a co-principal, accomplice
or accessory of a public officer or employee who has
been charged with a crime within its jurisdiction.
The Information does no charge petitioner Azarcon of
becoming a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a
public officer committing an offense under the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction. Thus, unless the petitioner
be proven a public officer, Sandiganbayan will have no
jurisdiction over the crime charged.
Art. 203 of the RPC determines who public officers are.
Granting that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for
the truck constructively distrained by the BIR,
commenced to take part in an activity constituting public
functions, he obviously may not be deemed authorized
by popular election. Neither was he appointed by direct
provision of law nor by competent authority. While BIR
had authority to require Azarcon to sign a receipt for the
distrained truck, the National Internal Revenue Code did
not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer.
The BIR’s power authorizing a private individual to act as
a depositary cannot be stretched to include the power to
appoint him as a public officer. Thus, Azarcon is not a
public officer.
THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC VS
COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND
PROBLEMS
FACTS:
Dominican Hills, formerly registered as Diplomat Hills in
Baguio City, was mortgaged to the United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB). It was eventually foreclosed and
acquired later on by the said bank as the highest bidder.
On 11 April 1983, through its President Eduardo
Cojuangco Jr., the subject property was donated to the
Republic of the Philippines. The deed of donation
stipulated that Dominican Hills would be utilized for the
"priority programs, projects, activities in human
settlements and economic development and
governmental purposes" of the Ministry of Human
Settlements.
On December 12, 1986, then President Corazon Aquino
issued EO 85 abolishing the Ministry of Human
Settlements. All agencies under the its supervision as
well as all its assets, programs and projects, were
transferred to the Presidential Management Staff (PMS).
On 18 October 1988, United (Dominican Hills) submitted
its application before the PMS to acquire a portion of the
Dominican Hills property. In a MOA, PMS and United
agreed that the latter may purchase a portion of the said
property from HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY
CORPORATIO, acting as originator, on a selling price of
P75.00 per square meter.
Administrative Law Case Digests
Thus, on June 12, 1991, HIGC sold 2.48 hectares of the
property to UNITED. The deed of conditional sale
provided that ten (10) per cent of the purchase price
would be paid upon signing, with the balance to be
amortized within one year from its date of execution.
After UNITED made its final payment on January 31,
1992, HIGC executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July
1, 1992.
Petitioner alleges that sometime in 1993, private
respondents entered the Dominican Hills property
allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon.
Petitioner was able to secure a demolition order from
the city mayor. Unable to stop the razing of their
houses, private respondents, under the name
DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS
ASSOCIATION (ASSOCIATION, for brevity) filed an action
for injunction before RTC Baguio City. Private
respondents were able to obtain a temporary restraining
order but their prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
was later denied.
The ASSOCIATION filed a separate civil case for damages,
injunction and annulment of the said MOA. It was later
on dismissed upon motion of United. The said Order of
dismissal is currently on appeal with the Court of
Appeals.
The demolition order was subsequently implemented by
the Office of the City Mayor and the City Engineer's
Office of Baguio City. However, petitioner avers that
private respondents returned and reconstructed the
demolished structures.
To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition
order, private respondents filed a petition for annulment
of contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining
order before the Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems (COSLAP) against petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the
City Engineer's Office, the City Mayor, as well as the
Register of Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day,
public respondent COSLAP issued the contested order
requiring the parties to maintain the status quo.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration from the
aforesaid status quo order, petitioner filed the instant
petition questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP.
ISSUE:
WON COSLAP is empowered to hear and try a petition
for annulment of contracts with prayer for a TRO and to
issue a status quo order and conduct a hearing thereof?
RULING:
COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the
controversy. It discharges quasi-judicial functions:
"Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the
actions, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers
or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw
conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action
and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."
However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an
administrative agency, albeit one that exercises quasi-
15
judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are not
considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial
system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals. The
doctrine of separation of powers observed in our system
of government reposes the three (3) great powers into
its three (3) branches — the legislative, the executive,
and the judiciary — each department being co-equal and
coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly,
the executive department may not, by its own fiat,
impose the judgment of one of its own agencies, upon
the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, it is empowered "to determine
whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM VS UY
FACTS:
Dr. Vicente K. Uy, Wellington K. Ong, Jaime Chua, and
Daniel Sy, among others, are owners of a 349.9996-ha
parcel of land located in Barangay Camaflora, Barrio of
San Andres, Municipality of San Narciso, Province of
Quezon. The property is covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. 160988. Sometime in 1993, some 44
farmers who occupied portions of the property filed
petitions in the DAR, seeking to be declared as owners-
beneficiaries. The DAR issued a Notice of Coverage
under the CARP over the property. For his part,
respondent, in behalf of the co-owners, filed an
Application for Exclusion in the form of a letter, through
Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) Durante L.
Ubeda. To substantiate his request to exclude their
landholding from CARP coverage under the Luz Farms
ruling, respondent declared that their property had been
exclusively used for livestock-raising for several years
prior to June 15, 1988. The Provincial Task Force on
Exclusion led by Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
Administrative Law Case Digests
(MARO) Belen T. Babalcon conducted an ocular
inspection of the property and an actual “headcount”
was conducted.
PARO Durante L. Ubeda recommended the exclusion
from CARP coverage a total of 219.50 has: 134 has. for
cattle-grazing, 28 has. for horse and carabao grazing,
12.5 has. for infrastructure and 45 has. for retention of
nine landowners. The applicants, through Uy, wrote a
letter to DAR Region IV Director Percival C. Dalugdug
requesting for a reinvestigation of the Report of PARO
Ubeda. Dir. Daludug affirmed the findings of Ubeda. The
applicants then appealed the order to the DAR
Secretary. The DAR partially granted the appeal only
with respect with the 219.50 hectares. The applicants
appealed the order to the OP via an Appeal with Prayer
for Status Quo/Stay of Execution. The President, through
then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona
rendered a decision dismissing the appeal for lack of
merit, saying that private agricultural lands or portions
thereof exclusively, directly and actually used for
livestock, poultry and swine raising as of 15 June 1988
shall be excluded from the coverage of CARP. Corona
said By simple reading, it is obvious that the livestock,
poultry and swine, in order to be included in the
computation of the area to be exempted from CARP
coverage, should have been existing in the area sought
to be exempted at the time of the effectivity of RA 6657,
which is June 15, 1988. However, on October 5, 1998,
then Chief Presidential Legal Adviser Harriet Demetriou
submitted the following Memorandum to the President,
advising the latter to exclude the land in question
completely. A second motion for reconsideration was
filed and the OP acted upon the said MR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the OP is empowered to entertain the
second motion for reconsideration filed before it.
HELD:
Yes. It is settled that rules of procedure are, as a matter
of course, construed liberally in proceedings before
administrative bodies. Thus, technical rules of procedure
imposed in judicial proceedings are unavailing in cases
before administrative bodies. Administrative bodies are
not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure
and the rules obtaining in the courts of law. Rules of
procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and
technical manner, as they are used only to help secure
and not to override substantial justice. The SC ruled that
the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
empowers the OP to review any determination or
disposition of a department head. In fact, the doctrine
requires an administrative decision to first be appealed
to the administrative superiors up to the highest level
before it may be elevated to a court of justice for review.
Thus, if a remedy within the administrative machinery
can still be had by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide on the matter
that comes within his jurisdiction, then such remedy
16
should be priorly exhausted before the court's judicial
power is invoked
DARIO VS MISON
FACTS:
On March 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino
promulgated Proclamation No. 3, "DECLARING A
NATIONAL POLICY TO IMPLEMENT THE REFORMS
MANDATED BY THE PEOPLE, PROTECTING THEIR BASIC
RIGHTS, ADOPTING A PROVISIONAL CONSTITUTION,
AND PROVIDING FOR AN ORDERLY TRANSITION TO A
GOVERNMENT UNDER A NEW CONSTITUTION. Among
other things, Proclamation No. 3 provided:
SECTION 1. The President shall give priority to measures
to achieve the mandate of the people to:
(a) Completely reorganize the government, eradicate
unjust and oppressive structures, and all iniquitous
vestiges of the previous regime.
Actually, the reorganization process started as early as
February 25, 1986, when the President, in her first act in
office, called upon "all appointive public officials to
submit their courtesy resignations beginning with the
members of the Supreme Court." Later on, she abolished
the BatasangPambansa and the positions of Prime
Minister and Cabinet under the 1973 Constitution.
On May 28, 1986, the President enacted Executive Order
No. 17, "PRESCRIBING RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 2, ARTICLE III OF
THE FREEDOM CONSTITUTION." Executive Order No. 17
recognized the "unnecessary anxiety and demoralization
among the deserving officials and employees" the
ongoing government reorganization had generated, and
prescribed several grounds for the
separation/replacement of personnel.
Specifically, she said on May 28, 1986: WHEREAS, in
order to obviate unnecessary anxiety and demoralization
among the deserving officials and employees,
particularly in the career civil service, it is necessary to
prescribe the rules and regulations for implementing the
said constitutional provision to protect career civil
servants whose qualifications and performance meet the
standards of service demanded by the New
Government, and to ensure that only those found
corrupt, inefficient and undeserving are separated from
the government service. Noteworthy is the injunction
embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should
be made on the basis of findings of inefficiency, graft,
and unfitness to render public service. The President’s
Memorandum of October 14, 1987 should furthermore
be considered. We quote, in part: Further to the
Memorandum dated October 2, 1987 on the same
subject, I have ordered that there will be no further lay-
offs this year of personnel as a result of the government
reorganization.
On January 30, 1987, the President promulgated
Executive Order No. 127, "REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY
OF FINANCE." Among other offices, Executive Order No.
127 provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor.
Administrative Law Case Digests
Three days later, on February 2, 1987, the Filipino
people adopted the new Constitution.
On January 6, 1988, incumbent Commissioner of
Customs Salvador Mison issued a Memorandum, in the
nature of "Guidelines on the Implementation of
Reorganization Executive Orders," prescribing the
procedure in personnel placement. On the same date,
Commissioner Mison constituted a Reorganization
Appeals Board charged with adjudicating appeals from
removals under the above Memorandum. On January
26, 1988, Commissioner Mison addressed several
notices to various Customs officials.
As far as the records will likewise reveal, a total of 394
officials and employees of the Bureau of Customs were
given individual notices of separation. A number
supposedly sought reinstatement with the
Reorganization Appeals Board while others went to the
Civil Service Commission. The first thirty one mentioned
above came directly to this Court. The records indeed
show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394
Customs personnel but replaced them with 522 as of
August 18, 1988.
On June 30, 1988, the Civil Service Commission
promulgated its ruling ordering the reinstatement of the
279 employees. On July 15, 1988, Commissioner Mison,
represented by the Solicitor General, filed a motion for
reconsideration. Acting on the motion, the Civil Service
Commission, on September 20, 1988, denied
reconsideration. On October 20, 1988, Commissioner
Mison instituted certiorari proceedings with this Court.
On November 16, 1988, the Civil Service Commission
further disposed the appeal (from the resolution of the
Reorganization Appeals Board) of five more employees.
On January 6, 1989, Commissioner Misonchallenged the
Civil Service Commission’s Resolution in this Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 127, which
provided for the reorganization of the Bureau of
Customs is valid
RULING:
Yes. There is no question that the administration may
validly carry out a government reorganization — insofar
as these cases are concerned, the reorganization of the
Bureau of Customs — by mandate not only of the
Provisional Constitution, supra, but also of the various
Executive Orders decreed by the Chief Executive in her
capacity as sole lawmaking authority under the 1986-
1987 revolutionary government. It should also be noted
that under the present Constitution, there is a
recognition, albeit implied, that a government
reorganization may be legitimately undertaken, subject
to certain conditions.
The core provision of law involved is Section 16 Article
XVIII, of the 1987 Constitution.
Sec. 16. Career civil service employees separated from
the service not for cause but as a result of the
reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated
March 25, 1986 and the reorganization following the
17
ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to
appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other
benefits accruing to them under the laws of general
application in force at the time of their separation. In
lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may
be considered for employment in the Government or in
any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to
career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with
the existing policy, had been accepted.
It is also to be observed that unlike the grants of power
to effect reorganizations under the past Constitutions,
the above provision comes as a mere recognition of the
right of the Government to reorganize its offices,
bureaus, and instrumentalities.
Other than references to "reorganization following the
ratification of this Constitution," there is no provision for
"automatic" vacancies under the 1987 Constitution.
Invariably, transition periods are characterized by
provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They are dictated
by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the
new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process
and security of tenure.
At this point, we must distinguish removals from
separations arising from abolition of office (not by virtue
of the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried
out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of
functions. In the latter case, the Government is obliged
to prove good faith. In case of removals undertaken to
comply with clear and explicit constitutional mandates,
the Government is not hard put to prove anything,
plainly and simply because the Constitution allows it.
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded
as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a
general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good
faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal
(in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs
because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that
case, security of tenure would not be aChinese wall. Be
that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else
but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons
or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise
not in good faith, no valid "abolition" takes place and
whatever "abolition" is done, is void ab initio. There is an
invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of
nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy
are belied by the existence of ample funds.
It is to be stressed that by predisposing a reorganization
to the yardstick of good faith, we are not, as a
consequence, imposing a "cause" for restructuring.
Retrenchment in the course of a reorganization in good
faith is still removal "not for cause," if by "cause" we
refer to "grounds" or conditions that call for disciplinary
action. Good faith, as a component of a reorganization
under a constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of
each case.
Administrative Law Case Digests
The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison
separated about 394 Customs personnel but replaced
them with 522 as of August 18, 1988. This betrays a clear
intent to "pack" the Bureau of Customs. He did so,
furthermore, in defiance of the President’s directive to
halt further lay-offs as a consequence of reorganization.
Finally, he was aware that lay-offs should observe the
procedure laid down by Executive
Order No. 17. We are not, of course, striking down
Executive Order No. 127 for repugnancy to the
Constitution. While the act is valid, still and all, the
means with which it was implemented is not.
It can be seen that the Act, insofar as it provides for
reinstatement of employees separated without "a valid
cause and after due notice and hearing" is not contrary
to the transitory provisions of the new Constitution. The
Court reiterates that although the Charter’s transitory
provisions mention separations "not for cause,"
separations thereunder must nevertheless be on
account of a valid reorganization and which do not come
about automatically. Otherwise, security of tenure may
be invoked. Moreover, it can be seen that the statute
itself recognizes removals without cause. However, it
also acknowledges the possibility of the leadership using
the artifice of reorganization to frustrate security of
tenure. For this reason, it has installed safeguards. There
is nothing unconstitutional about the Act.
RATIO: Reorganizations have been regarded as valid
provided they are pursued in good faith.
CANONIZADO VS. AGUIRRE
FACTS:
Petitioners were duly appointed Commissioners of the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) – created by
virtue of RA 6975. Upon the passing of the amendatory
law, RA 8851 a.k.a "Philippine National Police Reform
and Reorganization Act of 1998," it declared that the
terms of the current Commissioners were deemed as
expired upon its effectivity.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of sections 4 and 8
of RA 8551. Petitioners argue that their removal from
office by virtue of section 8 of RA 8551 violates their
constitutionally guaranteed right to security of tenure.
18
Public respondents insist that the express declaration in
section 8 of RA 8551 that the terms of petitioners offices
are deemed expired discloses the legislative intent to
impliedly abolish the NAPOLCOM created under RA 6975
pursuant to a bona fide reorganization. Petitioners posit
the theory that the abolition of petitioners offices was a
result of a reorganization of the NAPOLCOM allegedly
effected by RA 8551.
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT petitioners were removed by
virtue of a valid abolition of their office by Congress.
2. WHETHER OR NOT sections 4 and 8 are
unconstitutional.
HELD:
NO. Petitioners were not removed by virtue of a valid
abolition of their office by Congress. First of all, RA 8551
did not expressly abolish petitioners positions. “Public
respondents would have this Court believe that RA 8551
reorganized the NAPOLCOM resulting in the abolition of
petitioners offices.
We hold that there has been absolutely no attempt by
Congress to effect such a reorganization…No bona fide
reorganization of the NAPOLCOM having been
mandated by Congress, RA 8551, insofar as it declares
the terms of office of the incumbent Commissioners,
petitioners herein, as expired and resulting in their
removal from office, removes civil service employees
from office without legal cause and must therefore be
struck down for being constitutionally infirm.”
YES. In the dispositive portion of the decision, the Court
granted the petition “but only to the extent of declaring
section 8 of RA 8551 unconstitutional for being in
violation of the petitioners right to security of tenure.
The removal from office of petitioners as a result of the
application of such unconstitutional provision of law and
the appointment of new Commissioners in their stead is
therefore null and void.”
SOLID HOMES INC VS PAYAWAL
FACTS:
Payawal is a buyer of a certain subdivision lot who is
suing Solid Homes for failure to deliver the certificate of
title. The complaint was filed with the RTC. Solid Homes
contended that jurisdiction is with the National Housing
Authority (NHA) pursuant to PD 957, as amended by PD
1344 granting exclusive jurisdiction to NHA.
ISSUE:
W/N NHA has jurisdiction to try the case and the
competence to award damages
Administrative Law Case Digests
HELD:
SC held that NHA (now HLURB) has jurisdiction.
In case of conflict between a general law and a special
law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of
their enactment. It is obvious that the general law in this
case is BP 129 and PD 1344 the special law.
On the competence of the Board to award damages, we
find that this is part of the exclusive power conferred
upon it by PD 1344 to hear and decide “claims involving
refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or
condominium unit buyers against the project owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman.”
As a result of the growing complexity of the modern
society, it has become necessary to create more and
more administrative bodies to help in the regulation of
its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields
assigned to them, they can deal with the problems
thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be
expected from the legislature or the courts of justice.
This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-
legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not
unreasonably called the fourth department of the
government.
Statues conferring powers on their administrative
agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to
discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the
legislative purpose.
GLOBE WIRELESS LTD VS. PUBLIC SERVICE
COMMISSION AND ANTONIO B. ARNAIZ
Challenged in this petition for certiorari is the
jurisdiction of the defunct Public Service Commission
[PSC] under Section 21 of Commonwealth Act No. 146,
as amended, to discipline and impose a fine upon
petitioner, Globe Wireless, Ltd., a duly-organized
Philippine corporation engaged in international
telecommunication business under a franchise granted
by Public Acts Nos. 3495, 3692 and 4150, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4630.
A message addressed to Maria Diaz, Monte Esquina 30,
Madrid, Spain, filed by private respondent Antonio B.
Arnaiz with the telegraph office of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Dumaguete City was transmitted
to the Bureau of Telecommunications in Manila. It was
forwarded to petitioner Globe Wireless Ltd. for
transmission to Madrid. Petitioner sent the message to
the American Cable and Radio Corporation in New York,
19
which, in turn, transmitted the same to the Too basic in administrative law to need citation of
EmpresaNacional de Telecomunicaciones in Madrid. The jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction and powers
latter, however, mislaid said message, resulting in its of administrative agencies, like respondent Commission,
non-delivery to the addressee. are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily
After being informed of said fact, private respondent implied from those granted in the legislation creating
Arnaiz sent to then Public Service Commissioner Enrique such body; and any order without or beyond such
Medina an unverified letter-complaint relating the jurisdiction is void and ineffective. The order under
incident. The complaint was docketed as PSC Case No. consideration belonged to this category.
65-39-OC and petitioner was required to answer the ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is hereby granted
same. Petitioner, in its answer, questioned PSC's and the order of respondent Public Service Commission
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the letter- in PSC Case No. 65-39-OC is set aside for being null and
complaint, even as it denied liability for the non-delivery void.
of the message to the addressee.
Hearing ensued, after which the PSC issued an order
finding petitioner "responsible for the inadequate and
unsatisfactory service complained of, in violation of the
Public Service Act", and ordering it "to pay a fine of TWO
HUNDRED [P200.00] PESOS under Sec. 21 of Com. Act
146, as amended." Petitioner was likewise required to
refund the sum of P19.14 to the remitter of the
undelivered message.
Its motion for reconsideration having been denied,
petitioner instituted the instant petition.
We find for petitioner.
Verily, Section 13 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as
amended, otherwise known as the Public Service Act,
vested in the Public Service Commission jurisdiction,
supervision and control over all public services and their
franchises, equipment and other properties. However,
Section 5 of Republic Act No. 4630, the legislative
franchise under which petitioner was operating, limited
respondent Commission's jurisdiction over petitioner
only to the rate which petitioner may charge the public.
Thus,

"Sec. 5. The Public Service Commission is hereby given

jurisdiction over the grantee only with respect to the
rates which the grantee may charge the public subject to
international commitments made or adhered to by the
Republic of the Philippines." (Underscoring supplied.)
The act complained of consisted in petitioner having
allegedly failed to deliver the telegraphic message of
private respondent to the addressee in Madrid, Spain.
Obviously, such imputed negligence had nothing
whatsoever to do with the subject matter of the very
limited jurisdiction of the Commission over petitioner.
Moreover, under Section 21 of C.A. No. 146, as
amended, the Commission was empowered to impose
an administrative fine in cases of violation of or failure
by a public service to comply with the terms and
conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions or
regulations of the Commission. Petitioner operated
under a legislative franchise, so there were no terms nor
conditions of any certificate issued by the Commission to
violate. Neither was there any order, decision or
regulation from the Commission applicable to petitioner
that the latter had allegedly violated, disobeyed, defied
or disregarded.
RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
(RCPI) VS NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION (NTC)
FACTS:
Private respondent Juan A. Alegre's wife, Dr. Jimena
Alegre, sent two (2) RUSH telegrams through petitioner
RCPI's facilities in Taft Ave., Manila at 9:00 in the
morning of 17 March 1989 to his sister and brother-in-
law in Valencia, Bohol and another sister-in-law in
Espiritu, Ilocos Norte.
Both telegrams did not reach their destinations on the
expected dates. So, private respondent filed a letter-
complaint against RCPI with National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) for poor service,
with a request for the imposition of the appropriate
punitive sanction against the company. Taking

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cognizance of the complaint, NTC directed RCPI to
answer the complaint and set the initial hearing.
NTC held that RCPI was administratively liable for
deficient and inadequate service under Section 19(a) of
C.A. 146 and imposed the penalty of fine payable within
thirty (30) days from receipt in the aggregate amount of
one thousand pesos.
Hence, RCPI filed this petition for review invoking C.A.
146 Sec. 19(a) which limits the jurisdiction of the Public
Service Commission (precursor of the NTC) to the fixing
of rates.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Public Service Commission (precursor of
the NTC) has jurisdiction to impose fines
HELD:
The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside for
lack of jurisdiction of the NTC to render it.
NTC has no jurisdiction to impose a fine. Under Section
21 of C. A. 146, as amended, the Commission was
empowered to impose an administrative fine in cases of
violation of or failure by a public service to comply with
the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders,
decisions or regulations of the Commission. Petitioner
operated under a legislative franchise, so there were no
terms nor conditions of any certificate issued by the
Commission to violate. Neither was there any order,
decision or regulation from the Commission applicable
to petitioner that the latter had allegedly violated,
disobeyed, defied or disregarded.
No substantial change has been brought about by
Executive Order No. 546 invoked by the Solicitor
General's Office to bolster NTC's jurisdiction. The
Executive Order is not an explicit grant of power to
impose administrative fines on public service utilities,
including telegraphic agencies, which have failed to
render adequate service to consumers. Neither has it
expanded the coverage of the supervisory and
regulatory power of the agency. There appears to be no
alternative but to reiterate the settled doctrine in
administrative law that:
Too basic in administrative law to need citation of
jurisprudence is the rule that jurisdiction and powers of
administrative agencies, like respondent Commission,
are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily
implied from those granted in the legislation creating
such body; and any order without or beyond such
jurisdiction is void and ineffective (Globe Wireless case).
MECANO VS COA
FACTS:
Mecano, an NBI Director, was hospitalized for
cholecystitis, for which he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is
Administrative Law Case Digests
claiming from the COA, based on sec. 699 of the RAC.
COA contended that the RAC has been repealed by the
Administrative Code of 1987, specifically sec. 699 was
not restated nor re-enacted in the Code.
ISSUE:
W/N the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or
abrogated sec. 699 of the RAC
HELD:
The question of whether or not a particular law has been
repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of
legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a
law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which
expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws,
and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed.
A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause,
that a particular and specific law, identified by its
number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all
others are implied repeals.
Under sec. 27, Bk. VII (Final Provisions) of the
Administrative Code of 1987, the repealing clause states
that “all laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or
portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.”
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature
of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate
the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather,
it is an example of a general repealing provision. It is a
clause which predicates the intended repeal under the
condition that a substantial conflict must be found in
existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific
repealing clause indicates the intent was not to repeal
any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency
and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old
laws. The latter situation falls under the category of an
implied repeal.
(NOTA BENE: This means that the RAC, despite the
passage of the Administrative Code of 1987, may still be
a source of administrative law)
PEOPLE VS TOLEDANO
FACTS:
Bunao, while a member of Sangguniang Bayan, entered
into a lease contract covering 2 public market stalls. Two
administrative cases were filed against against him
violating RA3019 and R6713 with the Ombudsman.
However, said cases were dismissed. An information for
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violation of Sec41(1) in relation to Sec221 of BP337 was
filed against respondent before the RTC of Iba, Zambales
which prohibits gov’t officials from engaging in any
business transaction with the local government unit. The
RTC, upon motion of the accused, dismissed the criminal
case on the ground of the dismissal of the administrative
cases.
HELD:
There is nothing in the law(Art 89RPC) which states that
exoneration from an administrative charge extinguishes
criminal liability. It is a fundamental principle of
administrative law that administrative law that
administrative cases a independent from criminal
actions for the same act or omission. RA 7160,LGC of
1991, which replaced BP337 reenacted in its Sec89 the
legal provision of Sec 41 of BP337.Thus, the act
committed before the reenactment continuous to be a
crime.
petition was just denied by the CA.A petition for review
was raised to the SC stressing that one month
suspension, as stated in the Ombudsman Act of 1998, is
appealable considering that it is not among those
enumerated as final and unappealable.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the provision in R.A. No. 6770, otherwise
known as the Ombudsman Act of 1998, providing
suspension of not more than one month’s salary is final
and unappealable.
HELD:
Sec. 27 of RA No. 6770 states that: “any order, directive
or decision imposing the penalty of public censure,
reprimand, suspension of not more than one month’s
salary shall be final and unappealable…”
Salary suspension is an effect of work suspension
following the “no work, no pay” principle. It will be the
employee concerned who will be suspended and such
suspension without pay,being final, and unappealable, is
clearly expressed the law. RA No. 6770, therefore, is a
legal and clear basis of denying the petitioner’s appeal.

RENATO HERRERA VS ELMER BOHOL

FACTS:
Renato F. Herrera, former Director III at DAR Central
Office, approved the request for shift of item number of
Plaridel Elmer J. Bohol, a Senior Agrarian Reform officer
at the BARIE. The shift or item number from 577-1 of
Fund 108 to 562-3 of Fund 101 resulted to Bohol
ontaining his salary under Fund 101. When Bohol was
informed that he could not draw his salary under such
item anymore because his item was recalled and was
given to another person, he charged Herrera before the
Office of the Ombudsman, with Grave Misconduct
and/or Inefficiency and Incompetence. The Ombudsman
found Renato Herrera guilty of simple misconduct and
was suspended for one month without pay. Such
decision was contested by Herrera and he even appealed
to the CA on the ground that he did not fail to take
measures to correct respondent’s recall; but, such
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Administrative Law Case Digests