Florentino VS Supervalue PDF

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 533 06/01/2019, 10)20 PM
156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Florentino vs. Supervalue, Inc.
*
G.R. No. 172384. September 12, 2007.
ERMINDA F. FLORENTINO, petitioner, vs.

SUPERVALUE, INC., respondent.
Obligations and Contracts; Penal Clauses; Words and Phrases;

Penal clause is an accessory undertaking to assume greater liability
in case of breach, attached to an obligation in order to insure
performance and has a double function·(1) to provide for
liquidated damages, and (2) to strengthen the coercive force of the
obligation by the threat of greater responsibility in the event of
breach.·A penal clause is an accessory undertaking to assume
greater liability in case of breach. It is attached to an obligation in
order to insure performance and has a double function: (1) to
provide for liquidated damages, and (2) to strengthen the coercive
force of the obligation by the threat of greater responsibility in the
event of breach. The obligor would then be bound to pay the
stipulated indemnity without the necessity of proof of the existence
and the measure of damages caused by the breach. Article 1226 of
the Civil Code states: Art. 1226. In obligations with a penal clause,
the penalty shall substitute the indemnity for damages and the
payment of interests in case of noncompliance, if there is no
stipulation to the contrary. Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if
the obligor refuses to pay the penalty or is guilty of fraud in the
fulfillment of the obligation. The penalty may be enforced only
when it is demandable in accordance with the provisions of this
Code.
Same; Same; Courts may equitably reduce a stipulated penalty

in the contracts in two instances: (1) if the principal obligation has
been partly or irregularly complied with; and (2) even if there has
been no compliance if the penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable in
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001682384c8c68375abd1003600fb002c009e/p/AQF653/?username=Guest Page 1 of 20
accordance with Article 1229 of the Civil Code.·As a general rule,

courts are not at liberty to ignore the freedoms of the parties to
agree on such terms and conditions as they see fit as long as they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy. Nevertheless, courts may equitably reduce a stipulated
penalty in the contracts in two instances: (1) if the principal
obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with; and (2) even
if there has been no
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
157
VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 157
compliance if the penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable in

accordance with Article 1229 of the Civil Code which clearly
provides: Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty
when the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly
complied with by the debtor. Even if there has been no performance,
the penalty may also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or
unconscionable.
Same; Same; Standard to Determine Whether Penalty is Un-

conscionable.·In ascertaining whether the penalty is
unconscionable or not, this court set out the following standard in
Ligutan v. Court of Appeals, 376 SCRA 560 (2002), to wit: The
question of whether a penalty is reasonable or iniquitous can be
partly subjective and partly objective. Its resolution would depend
on such factor as, but not necessarily confined to, the type, extent
and purpose of the penalty, the nature of the obligation, the mode of
breach and its consequences, the supervening realities, the standing
and relationship of the parties, and the like, the application of
which, by and large, is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. x x x.
Lease; Malls; It is consonant with human experience that les-

sees, before occupying the leased premises, especially store spaces
located inside malls and big commercial establishments, would
renovate the place and introduce improvements thereon according to
the needs and nature of their business and in harmony with their
trademark designs as part of their marketing ploy to attract
customers.·It is consonant with human experience that lessees,
before occupying the leased premises, especially store spaces located
inside malls and big commercial establishments, would renovate
the place and introduce improvements thereon according to the
needs and nature of their business and in harmony with their
trademark designs as part of their marketing ploy to attract
customers. Certainly, no inducement or misrepresentation from the
lessor is necessary for this purpose, for it is not only a matter of
necessity that a lessee should redesign its place of business but a
business strategy as well.
Same; Builders in Good Faith; To be entitled to reimbursement

for improvements introduced on the property, the party claiming
must be considered a builder in good faith.·To be entitled to
reimbursement for improvements introduced on the property, the
petitioner must be considered a builder in good faith. Further,
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code, which allow full
reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reim-
158
bursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one

who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. A
builder in good faith is one who is unaware of any flaw in his title to
the land at the time he builds on it. In this case, the petitioner
cannot claim that she was not aware of any flaw in her title or was
under the belief that she is the owner of the subject premises for it
is a settled fact that she is merely a lessee thereof.
Same; Same; Lessees are not possessors or builders in good

faith.·In Geminiano v. Court of Appeals, 259 SCRA 344 (1996), this
Court was emphatic in declaring that lessees are not possessors or
builders in good faith, thus: Being mere lessees, the private
respondents knew that their occupation of the premises
would continue only for the life of the lease. Plainly, they
cannot be considered as possessors nor builders in good faith.
In a plethora of cases, this Court has held that Article 448 of the
Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which allows
full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor
in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is
the owner thereof. It does not apply where oneÊs only interest is
that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would
always be in the power of the tenant to „improve‰ his
landlord out of his property.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Amiel A. Vicente for petitioner.
Victor L. Chan for respondent.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari

under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, filed by
petitioner Erminda F. Florentino, seeking to reverse and
set aside the
159
VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 159

1 2
Decision, dated 10 October 2003 and the Resolution,
dated 19 April 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 73853. The appellate court, in its assailed Decision and
Resolution, modified the Decision dated 30 April 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 57, in
Civil Case No. 00-1015, finding the respondent Supervalue,
Inc., liable for the sum of P192,000.00, representing the

security deposits made by the petitioner upon the
commencement of their Contract of Lease. The dispositive
portion of the assailed appel-late courtÊs Decision thus
reads:
„WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is PARTLY

GRANTED. The April 30, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 57 is therefore MODIFIED to wit: (a) the portion
ordering the [herein respondent] to pay the amount of P192,000.00
representing the security deposits and P50,000.00 as attorneyÊs fees
in favor of the [herein petitioner] as well as giving [respondent] the
option to reimburse [petitioner] 1/2 the value of the improvements
introduced by the [petitioner] on the leased [premises] should
[respondent] choose to appropriate itself or require the [petitioner]
to remove the improvements, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; and (b) the portion ordering the return to [petitioner] the
properties seized by [respondent] after the fo rmer settled her
3
obligation with the latter is however MAINTAINED.‰
The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant

petition are as follows:
Petitioner is doing business under the business name
„Empanada Royale,‰ a sole proprietorship engaged in the
retail of empanada with outlets in different 4
malls and
business establishments within Metro Manila.
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion with Associate

Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Lucas P. Bersamin, concurring. Rollo,
pp. 8-17.
2 Id., at p. 9.
3 Id., at pp. 16-17.
4 Records, p. 1.
160

Respondent, on the other hand, is a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of leasing stalls and commercial

store spaces5 located inside SM Malls found all throughout
the country.
On 8 March 1999, petitioner and respondent executed
three Contracts of Lease containing similar terms and
conditions over the cart-type stalls at SM North Edsa and
SM Southmall and a store space at SM Megamall. The
term of each contract is for a period of four months
6
and
may be renewed upon agreement of the parties.
Upon the expiration of the original Contracts of Lease,
the parties agreed to renew 7
the same by extending their
terms until 31 March 2000.
Before the expiration of said Contracts of Lease, or on 4
February 2000, petitioner received two letters from the
respondent, both dated 14 January 8
2000, transmitted
through facsimile transmissions.
In the first letter, petitioner was charged with violating
Section 8 of the Contracts of Lease by9 not opening on 16
December 1999 and 26 December 1999.
Respondent also charged petitioner with selling a new
variety of empanada called „mini-embutido‰ and of
increasing the price of her merchandise from P20.00 10
to
P22.00, without the prior approval of the respondent.
Respondent observed that petitioner was frequently
closing earlier than the usual mall hours, either because of
non-delivery or delay in the delivery of stocks to her
outlets, again in violation of the terms of the contract. A
stern warning was thus given to petitioner to refrain from
committing similar
_______________
5 Id.
6 Id., at pp. 55-56.
7 Id., at p. 58.
8 Id.
9 Id.
10 Id.
161
VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 161
infractions in the future

11
in order to avoid the termination
of the lease contract.
In the second letter, respondent informed the petitioner
that it will no longer renew the Contracts of Lease for 12
the
three outlets, upon their expiration on 31 March 2000.
In a letter-reply dated 11 February 2000, petitioner
explained that the „mini-embutido‰ is not a new variety of
em-panada but had similar fillings, taste and ingredients
as those of pork empanada; only, its size was 13
reduced in
order to make it more affordable to the buyers.
Such explanation notwithstanding, respondent still
refused to renew its Contracts of Lease with the petitioner.
To the contrary, respondent took possession of the store
space in SM Megamall and confiscated the equipment and
personal belongings of the petitioner 14
found therein after
the expiration of the lease contract.
In a letter dated 8 May 2000, petitioner demanded that
the respondent release the equipment and personal
belongings it seized from the SM Megamall store space and
return the security deposits, in the sum of P192,000.00,
turned over by the petitioner upon signing of the Contracts
of Lease. On 15 June 2000, petitioner sent respondent
another letter reiterating her previous demands,
15
but the
latter failed or refused to comply therewith.
On 17 August 2000, an action for Specific Performance,
Sum of Money and Damages was filed by the petitioner
against
16
the respondent before the RTC of Makati, Branch
57.
_______________
11 Id.
12 Id., at p. 13.
13 Rollo, p. 39.
14 Id.
15 Id., at pp. 14-15.
16 Records, pp. 1-5.
162

In her Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1015,

petitioner alleged that the respondent made verbal
representations that the Contracts of Lease will be
renewed from time to time and, through the said
representations, the petitioner was induced to introduce
improvements upon the store space at SM Megamall in the
sum of P200,000.00, only to find out a year later that the
respondent will17
no longer renew her lease contracts for all
three outlets.
In addition, petitioner alleged that the respondent,
without justifiable cause and without previous demand,
refused to return
18
the security deposits in the amount of
P192,000.00.
Further, petitioner claimed that the respondent seized
her equipment and personal belongings found inside the
store space in SM Megamall after the lease contract for the
said outlet expired and despite repeated written demands
from the petitioner, respondent
19
continuously refused to
return the seized items.
Petitioner thus prayed for the award of actual damages
in the sum of P472,000.00, representing the sum of security
deposits, cost of improvements and the value of the
personal properties seized. Petitioner also asked for the
award of P300,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and 20
P80,000.00 as attorneyÊs fees and
expenses of litigation.
For its part, respondent countered that petitioner
committed several violations of the terms of their Contracts
of Lease by not opening from 16 December 1999 to 26
December 1999, and by introducing a new variety of
empanada without the prior consent of the respondent, as
mandated by the provision of Section 2 of the Contract of
Lease. Respondent also alleged that petitioner infringed
the lease contract by frequently
_______________
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.
163
VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 163

closing earlier than the agreed closing hours. Respondent

finally averred that petitioner is liable for the amount
P106,474.09, representing the penalty for selling a new
variety of empanada, electricity and water bills, and rental
adjustment, among other charges incidental to the lease
agreements. Respondent claimed that the seizure of
petitionerÊs personal belongings and equipment was in the
exercise of its retaining lien, considering that the petitioner
failed to settle the21 said obligations up to the time the
complaint was filed.
Considering that petitioner already committed several
breaches of contract, the respondent thus opted not to
renew its Contracts of Lease with her anymore. The
security deposits were made in order to ensure faithful
compliance with the terms of their lease agreements; and
since petitioner committed several infractions thereof,
respondent was justified in forfeiting the security deposits
in the latterÊs favor. 22
On 30 April 2001, the RTC rendered a Judgment in
favor of the petitioner and found that the physical takeover
by the respondent of the leased premises and the seizure of
petitionerÊs equipment and personal belongings without
prior notice were illegal. The decretal part of the RTC
Judgment reads:
„WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby

rendered ordering the [herein respondent] to pay [herein petitioner]
the amount of P192,000.00 representing the security deposits made
by the [petitioner] and P50,000.00 as and for attorneyÊs fees.
The [respondent] is likewise ordered to return to the [petitioner]
the various properties seized by the former after settling her
account with the [respondent].
Lastly, the [respondent] may choose either to reimburse the
[petitioner] one half (1/2) of th e value of the improvements
introduced by the plaintiff at SM Megamall should [respondent]

choose to appropriate the improvements to itself or require the
[petitioner] to
_______________
21 Id., at pp. 20-28.

22 Rollo, pp. 38-43.
164

remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may

suffer damage thereby. [Petitioner] shall not, however, cause
anymore impairment upon the said leased premises than is
necessary.
The other damages claimed by the plaintiff are denied for lack of
merit.‰
Aggrieved, the respondent appealed the adverse RTC

Judgment to the Court
23
of Appeals.
In a Decision dated 10 October 2003, the Court of
Appeals modified the RTC Judgment and found that the
respondent was justified in forfeiting the security deposits
and was not liable to reimburse the petitioner for the value
of the improvements introduced in the leased premises and
to pay for attorneyÊs fees. In modifying the findings of the
lower court, the appellate court declared that in view of the
breaches of contract committed by the petitioner, the
respondent is justified in forfeiting the security deposits.
Moreover, since the petitioner did not obtain the consent of
the respondent before she introduced improvements on the
SM Megamall store space, the respondent has therefore no
obligation to reimburse the petitioner for the amount 24
expended in connection with the said improvements. The
Court of Appeals, however, maintained the order of the
trial court for respondent to return to petitioner her
properties after she has settled her obligations to the
respondent. The appellate court denied
25
petitionerÊs Motion
for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated 19 April 2006.
26
Hence, this instant Petition for Review on Certiorari
filed by the petitioner assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision. For the resolution of this Court are the following
issues:
I. Whether or not the respondent is liable to return

the security deposits to the petitions.
_______________
23 Id., at pp. 8-17.

24 Id.
25 Id., at p. 19.
26 Id., at pp. 22-37.
165
VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 165

II. Whether or not the respondent is liable to

reimburse the petitioner for the sum of the
improvements she introduced in the leased
premises.
III. Whether or not 27
the respondent is liable for
attorneyÊs fees.
The appellate court, in finding that the respondent is

authorized to forfeit the security deposits, relied on the
provisions of Sections 5 and 18 of the Contract of Lease, to
wit:
„Section 5. DEPOSIT.·The LESSEE shall make a cash deposit

in the sum of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS (P60,000.00)
equivalent to three (3) months rent as security for the full
and faithful performance to each and every term, provision,
covenant and condition of this lease and not as a pre-
payment of rent. If at any time during the term of this lease the
rent is increased[,] the LESSEE on demand shall make an
additional deposit equal to the increase in rent. The LESSOR shall
not be required to keep the deposit separate from its general funds
and the deposit shall not be entitled to interest. The deposit shall
remain intact during the entire term and shall not be applied as
payment for any monetary obligations of the LESSEE under this
contract. If the LESSEE shall faithfully perform every provision of
this lease[,] the deposit shall be refunded to the LESSEE upon the
expiration of this Lease and upon satisfaction of all monetary
obligation to the LESSOR.
xxxx
Section 18. TERMINATION.·Any breach, non-per formance
or non-observance of the terms and conditions herein
provided shall constitute default which shall be sufficient
ground to terminate this lease, its extension or renewal. In
which event, the LESSOR shall demand that LESSEE immediately
vacate the premises, and LESSOR shall forfeit in its favor the
deposit tendered without prejudice to any such other
28
appropriate action as may be legally authorized.‰
_______________
27 Id., at pp. 27-28.

28 Records, pp. 9-10.
166

Since it was already established by the trial court that the

petitioner was guilty of committing several breaches of
contract, the Court of Appeals decreed that she cannot
therefore rightfully demand the return of the security
deposits for the same are deemed forfeited by reason of
evident contractual violations.
It is undisputed that the above-quoted provision found
in all Contracts of Lease is in the nature of a penal clause
to ensure petitionerÊs faithful compliance with the terms
and conditions of the said contracts.
A penal clause is an accessory undertaking to assume
greater liability in case of breach. It is attached to an
obligation in order to insure performance and has a double
function: (1) to provide for liquidated damages, and (2) to
strengthen the coercive force of the obligation by the 29threat
of greater responsibility in the event of breach. The
obligor would then be bound to pay the stipulated

indemnity without the necessity of proof of the existence
30
and the measure of damages caused by the breach. Article
1226 of the Civil Code states:
„Art. 1226. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall

substitute the indemnity for damages and the payment of interests
in case of noncompliance, if there is no stipulation to the contrary.
Nevertheless, damages shall be paid if the obligor refuses to pay the
penalty or is guilty of fraud in the fulfillment of the obligation.
The penalty may be enforced only when it is demandable in
accordance with the provisions of this Code.‰
As a general rule, courts are not at liberty to ignore the

freedoms of the parties to agree on such terms and
conditions as they see fit as long as they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy.
Nevertheless,
_______________
29 Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138980, 20

September 2005, 470 SCRA 260, 269.
30 Ligutan v. Court of Appeals, 427 Phil. 42, 51; 376 SCRA 560, 568
(2002).
167
VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 167

courts may equitably reduce a stipulated penalty in the

contracts in two instances: (1) if the principal obligation
has been partly or irregularly complied with; and (2) even if
there has been no compliance if the penalty is iniquitous or
unconscionable in accordance with Article 1229 of the Civil
Code which clearly provides:
„Art. 1229. The judge shall equitably reduce the penalty when the
principal obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with by
the debtor. Even if there has been no performance, the penalty may
31
also be reduced by the courts if it is iniquitous or unconscionable.‰
In ascertaining whether the penalty is unconscionable or

not, this court set32 out the following standard in Ligutan v.
Court of Appeals, to wit:
The question of whether a penalty is reasonable or iniquitous can be

partly subjective and partly objective. Its resolution would depend
on such factor as, but not necessarily confined to, the type, extent
and purpose of the penalty, the nature of the obligation, the mode of
breach and its consequences, the supervening realities, the standing
and relationship of the parties, and the like, the application of
which, by and large, is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. x x x.‰
In the instant case, the forfeiture of the entire amount of

the security deposits in the sum of P192,000.00 was
excessive and unconscionable considering that the gravity
of the breaches committed by the petitioner is not of such
degree that the respondent was unduly prejudiced thereby.
It is but equitable therefore to reduce the penalty of the
petitioner to 50% of the total amount of security deposits.
It is in the exercise of its sound discretion that this court
tempered the penalty for the breaches committed by the
peti-
_______________
31 Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29 at pp. 269-

270.
32 Supra note 30 at p. 52; p. 568.
168

tioner to 50% of the amount of the security deposits. The

forfeiture of the entire sum of P192,000.00 is clearly a
usurious and iniquitous penalty for the transgressions
committed by the petitioner. The respondent is therefore
under the obligation to return the 50% of P 192,000.00 to
the petitioner.
Turning now to the liability of the respondent to
reimburse the petitioner for one-half of the expenses

incurred for the improvements on the leased store space at
SM Megamall, the following provision in the Contracts of
Lease will enlighten us in resolving this issue:
„Section 11. ALTERATIONS, ADDITIONS, IMPROVEMENTS,

ETC.·The LESSEE shall not make any alterations, additions, or
improvements without the prior written consent of LESSOR; and
all alterations, additions or improvements made on the leased
premises, except movable or fixtures put in at LESSEEÊs expense
and which are removable, without defacing the buildings or
damaging its floorings, shall become LESSORÊs property without
compensation/reimbursement but th e LESSOR reserves the right
to require the removal of the said alterations, additions or
improvements upon expiration of the lease.‰
The foregoing provision in the Contract of Lease mandates

that before the petitioner can introduce any improvement
on the leased premises, she should first obtain respondentÊs
consent. In the case at bar, it was not shown that petitioner
previously secured the consent of the respondent before she
made the improvements on the leased space in SM
Megamall. It was not even alleged by the petitioner that
she obtained such consent or she at least attempted to
secure the same. On the other hand, the petitioner asserted
that respondent allegedly misrepresented to her that it
would renew the terms of the contracts from time to time
after their expirations, and that the petitioner was so
induced thereby that she expended the sum of P200,000.00
for the improvement of the store space leased.
169
VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 169

This argument was squarely 33addressed by this court in

Fernandez v. Court of Appeals, thus:
„The Court ruled that the stipulation of the parties in their lease
contract „to be renewable‰ at the option of both parties stresses that
the faculty to renew was given not to the lessee alone nor to the
lessor by himself but to the two simultaneously; hence, both must

agree to renew if a new contract is to come about.
PetitionerÊs contention that respondents had verbally agreed to
extend the lease indefinitely is inadmissible to qualify the terms of
the written contract under the parole evidence rule, and
34
unenforceable under the statute of frauds.‰
Moreover, it is consonant with human experience that

lessees, before occupying the leased premises, especially
store spaces located inside malls and big commercial
establishments, would renovate the place and introduce
improvements thereon according to the needs and nature of
their business and in harmony with their trademark
designs as part of their marketing ploy to attract
customers. Certainly, no inducement or misrepresentation
from the lessor is necessary for this purpose, for it is not
only a matter of necessity that a lessee should re-design its
place of business but a business strategy as well.
In ruling that the respondent is liable to reimburse
petitioner one half of the amount of improvements made on
the leased store space should it choose to appropriate the
same, the RTC relied on the provision of Article 1678 of the
Civil Code which provides:
„Art. 1678. If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements

which are suitable to the use for which the lease is intended,
without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the
lessor upon the termination of the lease shall pay the
_______________
33 G.R. No. L-80231, 18 October 1988, 166 SCRA 577, 587-588.

34 Josefa v. San Buenaventura, G.R. No. 163429, 3 March 2006, 484
SCRA 49, 60.
170

lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that time.

Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may
remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may

suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more
impairment upon the property leased than is necessary.‰
While it is true that under the above-quoted provision of

the Civil Code, the lessor is under the obligation to pay the
lessee one-half of the value of the improvements made
should the lessor choose to appropriate the improvements,
Article 1678 however should be read together with Article
448 and Article 546 of the same statute, which provide:
„Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built,
sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as
his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one
who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who
sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of
the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if
the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms
of the lease and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms thereof.
xxxx
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
possessor; but only possessor in good faith may retain the thing
until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good
faith with the same right of retention, the person who has defeated
him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of
the expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may
have acquired by reason thereof.‰
Thus, to be entitled to reimbursement for improvements

introduced on the property, the petitioner must be
considered a builder in good faith. Further, Articles 448
and 546 of the Civil Code, which allow full reimbursement
of useful im-
171
VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 171

provements and retention of the premises until

reimbursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good
faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is
the owner thereof. A builder in good faith is one who is
unaware of 35 any flaw in his title to the land at the time he
builds on it. In this case, the petitioner cannot claim that
she was not aware of any flaw in her title or was under the
belief that she is the owner of the subject premises for it is
a settled fact that she is merely a lessee thereof.
36
In Geminiano v. Court of Appeals, this Court was
emphatic in declaring that lessees are not possessors or
builders in good faith, thus:
„Being mere lessees, the private respondents knew that their

occupation of the premises would continue only for the life of
the lease. Plainly, they cannot be considered as possessors
nor builders in good faith.
In a plethora of cases, this Court has held that Article 448 of the
Civil Code, in relation to Article 546 of the same Code, which allows
full reimbursement of useful improvements and retention of the
premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor
in good faith, i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is
the owner thereof. It does not apply where oneÊs only interest is
that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would
always be in the power of the tenant to „improve‰ his
landlord out of his property.‰
Since petitionerÊs interest in the store space is merely that

of the lessee under the lease contract, she cannot therefore
be considered a builder in good faith. Consequently,
respondent may appropriate the improvements introduced
on the leased premises without any obligation to reimburse
the petitioner for the sum expended.
_______________
35 Lopez v. Sarabia, G.R. No. 140357, 24 September 2004, 439 SCRA

35, 49.
36 328 Phil. 682, 689-690; 259 SCRA 344, 351 (1996).
172

Anent the claim for attorneyÊs fees, we resolve to likewise

deny the award of the same. AttorneyÊs fees may be
awarded when a party is compelled to litigate or to incur
expenses to 37protect its interest by reason of unjustified act
of the other.
In the instant petition, it was not shown that the
respondent unjustifiably refused to grant the demands of
the petitioner so as to compel the latter to initiate legal
action to enforce her right. As we have found herein, there
is basis for respondentÊs refusal to return to petitioner the
security deposits and to reimburse the costs of the
improvements in the leased premises. The award of
attorneyÊs fees is therefore not proper in the instant case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated 10 October 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 73853 is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
respondent may forfeit only 50% of the total amount of the
security deposits in the sum of P192,000.00, and must
return the remaining 50% to the petitioner. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez,

Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition partly granted, judgment affirmed with

modification.
Notes.·It is Article 1678 of the New Civil Code that

governs a lesseeÊs right vis-à-vis the improvements built on
leased premises. (Sia vs. Court of Appeals, 272 SCRA 141
[1997])
Article 1229 of the Civil Code specifically empowers the
judge to reduce the civil penalty equitably, when the
principal
_______________
37 Philippine Air Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 193 Phil. 560, 580;
106 SCRA 391, 411 (1981).
173
VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 173

Sales vs. Commission on Elections
obligation has been partly or irregularly complied with.

(Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Diaz, 493
SCRA 248 [2006])
··o0o··
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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 533 06/01/2019, 10)20 PM

156 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ERMINDA F. FLORENTINO, petitioner, vs.

Obligations and Contracts; Penal Clauses; Words and Phrases;

Same; Same; Courts may equitably reduce a stipulated penalty

accordance with Article 1229 of the Civil Code.·As a general rule,

VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 157

Florentino vs. Supervalue, Inc.

compliance if the penalty is iniquitous or unconscionable in

Same; Same; Standard to Determine Whether Penalty is Un-

Lease; Malls; It is consonant with human experience that les-

Same; Builders in Good Faith; To be entitled to reimbursement

158 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Florentino vs. Supervalue, Inc.

bursement is made, apply only to a possessor in good faith, i.e., one

Same; Same; Lessees are not possessors or builders in good

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari

VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 159

Inc., liable for the sum of P192,000.00, representing the

„WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is PARTLY

The factual and procedural antecedents of the instant

1 Penned by Associate Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion with Associate

160 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Respondent, on the other hand, is a domestic corporation

engaged in the business of leasing stalls and commercial

VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 161

Florentino vs. Supervalue, Inc.

infractions in the future

162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

In her Complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1015,

VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 163

closing earlier than the agreed closing hours. Respondent

„WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, judgment is hereby

introduced by the plaintiff at SM Megamall should [respondent]

21 Id., at pp. 20-28.

164 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

remove the improvements, even though the principal thing may

Aggrieved, the respondent appealed the adverse RTC

I. Whether or not the respondent is liable to return

23 Id., at pp. 8-17.

VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 165

II. Whether or not the respondent is liable to

The appellate court, in finding that the respondent is

„Section 5. DEPOSIT.·The LESSEE shall make a cash deposit

27 Id., at pp. 27-28.

166 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Since it was already established by the trial court that the

obligor would then be bound to pay the stipulated

„Art. 1226. In obligations with a penal clause, the penalty shall

As a general rule, courts are not at liberty to ignore the

29 Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138980, 20

VOL. 533, SEPTEMBER 12, 2007 167

courts may equitably reduce a stipulated penalty in the

In ascertaining whether the penalty is unconscionable or

The question of whether a penalty is reasonable or iniquitous can be

In the instant case, the forfeiture of the entire amount of

31 Filinvest Land, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 29 at pp. 269-

168 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tioner to 50% of the amount of the security deposits. The

reimburse the petitioner for one-half of the expenses

„Section 11. ALTERATIONS, ADDITIONS, IMPROVEMENTS,