HEINZ R. HECK v. JUDGE ANTHONY E.

SANTOS

401 SCRA 46 (2003)

Delegating to a counsel of one of the parties the preparation of a decision and parroting it verbatim reflect
blatant judicial sloth.

Heinz R. Heck is one of the defendants in a Civil Case before the Regional Trial presided by Judge Anthony E.
Santos. Heck and his co-defendant did not receive a copy of the order to schedule the trial on June 10 and 11,
1996. Consequently, they and their counsel failed to appear therein. Since only the plaintiff’s counsel, Atty.
Manuel Singson, appeared in that hearing, Judge Santos considered the non-attendance of Heck and his co-
defendant as waiver of their right to present evidence. Judge Santos thereafter ordered that the case to be
submitted for decision. He therefore authorized Atty. Singson to prepare the draft of the decision.

The decision issued by Judge Santos was copied verbatim from the draft which Atty. Singson prepared. Hence,
Heck filed an administrative complaint charging Judge Santos with violation of Section 1, Rule 36 of the Revised
Rules of Court. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found Judge Santos guilty for adopting Singson’s
work as his own.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Judge Santos is guilty of gross ignorance of the law

HELD:

The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA. Santos’ order for the counsel of one of the parties to draft the
decision and his adoption verbatim of the draft clearly violate the Code of Judicial Conduct. The
pertinent canons of which read: Canon 2, a Judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all activities. Canon 3, a Judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality
and diligence adjudicative responsibilities.

By such order, Judge Santos abdicated a function exclusively granted to him by no less than the fundamental law
of the land. It is axiomatic that decision-making, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty
of a member of the bench. He must use his own perceptiveness in understanding and analyzing the evidence
presented before him and his own discernment when determining the proper action, resolution or decision.
Delegating to a counsel of one of the parties the preparation of a decision and parroting it verbatim reflect
blatant judicial sloth.

Lack of malice or bad faith is not an excuse. It bears emphasis that a judge must not only render a just, correct
and impartial decision. He should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness,
impartiality and integrity.

CAYETANO vs. MONSOD

G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991

Facts: Renato Cayetano questioned Christian Monsod’s nomination by President Corazon Aquino as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Cayetano stated that Monsod allegedly lacked the necessary
requirement of practicing law for at least 10 years. However, despite Cayetano’s objection, the Commission on
Appointments (COA) still confirmed Monsod’s appointment.

Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming
Monsod’s appointment.

Held: No. COA’s power to give consent to the nomination of the COMELEC chairman by the President is
mandated by the Constitution under Article IX, Section 1 (2), Sub Article C. It provides:

“The Chairman and the Commissioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members
shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case
shall any Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.”

The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion to whom it is so vested subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualification required by law. Therefore, there is no occasion
for the Supreme Court to exercise its corrective power since COA did not commit grave abuse of discretion
based on the evidence presented.

Villanueva vs Sta.Ana Case. No .251

TOPIC: Legal Ethics, Canon 16 CPR

FACTS:

Villanueva first met Atty. Sta. Ana for the purpose of notarizing documents. Villanueva is to borrow some
amount from a bank or lending institution. Atty. Sta.Ana offered that she could facilitate the loan if Villanueva
would put up a land collateral and a guaranty deposit of P150,000. Villanueva then agreed and gave
Atty. Sta.Ana P144,000 plus the corresponding documents. After a while, Atty. Sta.Ana asked for additional
P109,000 for withholding and documentary stamp taxes and surcharges. Villanueva decided to forego the loan
and demanded her money to be returned. Atty. Sta. Ana failed to do so and avoided Villanueva. Villanueva then
sought help from the Vice President who referred the same to the NBI. NBI recommended charging of estafa and
transmitted such information to the IBP. Upon summon to IBP’s hearings, Atty. Sta. Ana never appeared. She
was recommended to be disbarred.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Sta. Ana’s actions warrant disbarment

HELD: The Supreme Court upheld IBP’s recommendation. Good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to an admission to the legal profession but it must also remain extant in order to maintain one’s good
standing. The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates: CANON 1 — . . . . Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 16 — A lawyer shall hold in trust all
moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. Rule 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for
all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Despite all the opportunities accorded to her, Atty. Sta.Ana failed to present her defense and to refute the
charges or, at the very least, to explain herself.

Petition for Disbarment of Telesforo Diao vs. Severino Martinez

FACTS:

DIAO was admitted to the Bar.

2 years later, Martinez charged him with having falsely represented in his application for the Bar examination,
that he had the requisite academic qualifications.

Solicitor General investigated and recommended that Diao's name be erased from the roll of attorneys

i. DIAO did not complete pre-law subjects:

1. Did not complete his high school training

2. Never attended Quisumbing College

3. Never obtained a diploma.

DIAO admitting first charge but claims that although he had left high school in his third year, he entered the
service of the U.S. Army, passed the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is
equivalent to a high school diploma

Upon return to civilian life, the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent of 3rd and
4th year high school.

No certification. However, it is unnecessary to dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious:

i. Never obtained his diploma. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate.

ii. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano University in April,
1949

1. He said erroneously certified, due to confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
ISSUE:

WON DIAO still continue admission to the Bar, for passing the Bar despite not completing pre-law requirements?
NO.

HELD:

STRIKE OUT NME OF DIAO IN ROLL OF ATTORNEYS. DIAO REQUIRED TO RETURN HIS LAWYER’S DIPLOMA
WITHIN 30 DAYS.

Explanation of error or confusion is not acceptable.

Had his application disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also have disclosed that
he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months
before obtaining his Associate in Arts degree.

He would not have been permitted to take the bar tests:

i. Bar applicant must affirm under oath, "That previous to the study of law, he had
successfully and satisfactorily completed the required pre-legal education (A.A.).

ii. Therefore, Diao was not qualified to take the bar examinations

iii. Such admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is hereby
revoked.

Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed
courses of legal study in the regular manner is equally essential.

Lozano vs. Martinez

FACTS: Petitioners were charged with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (Bouncing Check Law). They moved
seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the
statute being unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case,
wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected
thus appealed.

ISSUES:

1. Does BP 22 is violate the constitutional provision on non-imprisonment due to debt?

2. Does it impair freedom of contract?
3. Does it contravene the equal protection clause?

HELD:

1. The enactment of BP 22 is a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt. The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-
payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay
his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by
the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public order.

Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order
addressed to a bank and partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the
check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is therefore an element of
certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become
widely accepted as a medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come
to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial transactions. The basis or
foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence is shaken, the usefulness of checks as currency
substitutes would be greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that
confidence should be deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles
and the banking community.

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved
in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a
wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.

2. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into “lawful” contracts.
Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in mind that checks can not be
categorized as mere contracts. It is a commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a
convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free from the
regulatory power of the state.

3. There is no substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal protection of the laws or is
discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but not the payee. It is contended that the payee is
just as responsible for the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the
payee by his acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying that, to
give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. The petitioners’ posture
ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause “equal protection of the laws.” The clause does not preclude
classification of individuals, who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification
is not unreasonable or arbitrary. (Lozano vs Martinez, G.R. No. L-63419, December 18, 1986)

People vs. Tuanda [A.M. No. 3360 January 30, 1990]

FACTS:

Atty. Fe Tuanda was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila in violation of B.P. 22 with a fine and
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant Herminia Marquez. Respondent
appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and imposed upon Atty. Fe
Tuanda, in addition, the suspension from the practice of law until further orders from the Supreme Court. The
respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals noted respondent’s Notice
of Appeal and advised her “to address her Notice of Appeal to the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper
forum.” In the said motion, responded stated:

that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful penalty aggravating the lower
court’s penalty of fine considering that accused-appellant’s action on the case during the trial on the merits at
the lower court has always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offense charged
nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the imposed suspension for Atty. Tuanda may be lifted.

HELD:

NO. Motion to Lift Order of Suspension denied.

RATIO:

[T]he crimes of which respondent was convicted [also] import deceit and violation of her attorney’s oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to “obey the laws of the land.”
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does
not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and affects the good
moral character of a person convicted of such offense.

Cui v Cui

Facts:

The Hospicio de San Jose de Barili, is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Dona
Benigna Cui for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless
persons.” It acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239). Sec. 2 of the Act gave the initial
management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or death, to “such persons as they may
nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them. (embodied in Sec. 2 of the spouses deed of donation)”

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the
nephews of the spouses Don Pedro and Dona Benigna Cui. In 1960, the then incumbent administrator of the
Hospicio, resigned in favor of Antonio Cui pursuant to a “convenio” entered into between them that was
embodied on a notarial document. Jesus Cui, however had no prior notice of either the “convenio” or of his
brother’s assumption of the position.

Upon the death of Dr. Teodoro Cui, Jesus Cui wrote a letter to his brother Antonio, demanding that the office be
turned over to him. When the demand was not complied, Jesus filed this case. Lower court ruled in favor of
Jesus.

ISSUE

Who is best qualified as administrator for the Hospicio?

HELD

Antonio should be the Hospicio’s administrator.

Jesus is the older of the two and under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to sec.2 of the deed of
donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the one, among the
legitimate descendants of the nephews named, who if not a lawyer (titulo de abogado), should be a doctor or a
civil engineer or a pharmacist, in that order; or if failing all theses, should be the one who pays the highest taxes
among those otherwise qualified.

Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of laws but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the
examinations. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and although disbarred in 1957, was
reinstated by resolution, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio.

The term “titulo de abogado” means not mere possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but
membership in the Bar after due admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice of law. A Bachelor’s degree
alone, conferred by a law school upon completion of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder
to exercise the legal profession. By itself, the degree merely serves as evidence of compliance with the
requirements that an applicant to the examinations has “successfully completed all the prescribed courses, in a
law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education.

The founders of the Hospicio provided for a lwayer, first of all, because in all of the works of an administrator, it
is presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this criterion, the plaintiff Jesus is not entitled as against defendant, to the office of administrator.
Reference is made to the fact that the defendant Antonio was disbarred (for immorality and unprofessional
conduct). However, it is also a fact, that he was reinstated before he assumed the office of administrator. His
reinstatement is recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for his admission
to the Bar in the first place. Also, when defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and
disabilities resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

AGUIRRE VS RANA

EN BANC[ B.M. No. 1036, June 10, 2003 ]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
EDWIN L. RANA, RESPONDENT

Facts:

Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. before the scheduled mass oath-taking,
complainant Aguirre filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath. Respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the scheduled date but
has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in an election.
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government employee,
being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to
act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of acting as counsel
for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan without the latter engaging respondent’s services. Complainant
claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty
candidate.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission
to the Philippine Bar

Ruling:

the Court held that “practice of law” means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of
law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts
which are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind
of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege
presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust since a
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the
bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar
examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a license.

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyer’s oath. However, it is the signing
in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar
examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.
Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely:
his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.

Ramos vs. Mañalac, 89 Phil. 270

24JUL

FACTS:

Petition for certiorari was filed seeking annulment of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan
regarding a foreclosed parcel of land. Petitioners question the validity of the CFI ruling that they will be held in
contempt for refusing to vacate the land. The said property, being collateral for a loan to a Mr. Rivera, was
foreclosed due to non-payment of loan amount and its interest within the prescribed periods. Mr. Rivera later
sold the property to Ms. Lopez, who later filed petition that she be placed in possession of the land. The
petitioners question the ruling of the court.

ISSUES:

Whether or not:

(1) The decision of the lower court (CFI) is valid;

(2) Directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of Felipa Lopez is valid; and,

(3) (Possible Legal Ethics Issue) the term “appearance” would include only presence in courts.

HELD:

YES on first two issues. NO on the third issue. Petition was dismissed. Cost against the petitioners.

RATIO:

Claim of the petitioners as to the validity of the decision cannot be sustained for the reason that it is in a nature
of collateral attack to judgment which on its face is valid and regular for a long time. It is a well known rule that a
judgment, which on its face is valid and regular, can only be attacked in separate action brought principally for
the purpose (Gomez vs. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717).
The second issue was also not taken for the simple reason that the issuance of writ of possession in foreclosure
proceedings is not an execution of judgment within the purview of Section 6 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, but is
merely ministerial and complementary duty of the court.

In the third issue, the word or term “appearance” includes not only arguing a case before any such body but also
filing a pleading in behalf of a client as “by simply filing a formal motion, plea or answer”.

PATRICIA FIGUEROA, complainant, vs. SIMEON BARRANCO, JR., respondent.

RESOLUTION

ROMERO, J.:

In a complaint made way back in 1971, Patricia Figueroa petitioned that respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. be
denied admission to the legal profession. Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations on the fourth
attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in 1966, 1967 and 1968. Before he could take his oath, however,
complainant filed the instant petition averring that respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a child out
of wedlock was born to them and that respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to marry her.

The facts were manifested in hearings held before Investigator Victor F. Sevilla in June and July
1971. Respondent and complainant were townmates in Janiuay, Iloilo. Since 1953, when they were both in their
teens, they were steadies. Respondent even acted as escort to complainant when she reigned as Queen at the
1953 town fiesta. Complainant first acceded to sexual congress with respondent sometime in 1960. Their
intimacy yielded a son, Rafael Barranco, born on December 11, 1964.[1] It was after the child was born,
complainant alleged, that respondent first promised he would marry her after he passes the bar
examinations. Their relationship continued and respondent allegedly made more than twenty or thirty promises
of marriage. He gave only P10.00 for the child on the latters birthdays. Her trust in him and their relationship
ended in 1971, when she learned that respondent married another woman.Hence, this petition.

Upon complainants motion, the Court authorized the taking of testimonies of witnesses by deposition in
1972. On February 18, 1974, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss the case citing
complainants failure to comment on the motion of Judge Cuello seeking to be relieved from the duty to take
aforesaid testimonies by deposition. Complainant filed her comment stating that she had justifiable reasons in
failing to file the earlier comment required and that she remains interested in the resolution of the present
case. On June 18, 1974, the Court denied respondents motion to dismiss.

On October 2, 1980, the Court once again denied a motion to dismiss on the ground of abandonment filed by
respondent on September 17, 1979.[2] Respondents third motion to dismiss was noted in the Courts Resolution
dated September 15, 1982.[3] In 1988, respondent repeated his request, citing his election as a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Janiuay, Iloilo from 1980-1986, his active participation in civic organizations and good
standing in the community as well as the length of time this case has been pending as reasons to allow him to
take his oath as a lawyer.[4]

On September 29, 1988, the Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for failure of complainant to prosecute the
case for an unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyers oath upon
payment of the required fees.[5]

Respondents hopes were again dashed on November 17, 1988 when the Court, in response to complainants
opposition, resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. On June 1, 1993, the Court referred the case to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The IBPs report dated May 17, 1997 recommended the dismissal of the case and that respondent be allowed to
take the lawyers oath.

We agree.

Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyers oath in 1971 because of the charges of gross immorality
made by complainant. To recapitulate, respondent bore an illegitimate child with his sweetheart, Patricia
Figueroa, who also claims that he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he passes the bar examinations.

We find that these facts do not constitute gross immorality warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent
from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital sexual relations with complainant and promises to marry
suggests a doubtful moral character on his part but the same does not constitute grossly immoral conduct. The
Court has held that to justify suspension or disbarment the act complained of must not only be immoral, but
grossly immoral. A grossly immoral act is one that is so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree.[6] It is a willful, flagrant, or shameless act
which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.[7]

We find the ruling in Arciga v. Maniwang[8] quite relevant because mere intimacy between a man and a woman,
both of whom possess no impediment to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any deceit on the part of
respondent, is neither so corrupt nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of disciplinary sanction
against him, even if as a result of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.[9]

Respondent and complainant were sweethearts whose sexual relations were evidently consensual. We do not
find complainants assertions that she had been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She continued to see
and be respondents girlfriend even after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until 1971. All those years of
amicable and intimate relations refute her allegations that she was forced to have sexual congress with
him. Complainant was then an adult who voluntarily and actively pursued their relationship and was not an
innocent young girl who could be easily led astray. Unfortunately, respondent chose to marry and settle
permanently with another woman. We cannot castigate a man for seeking out the partner of his dreams, for
marriage is a sacred and perpetual bond which should be entered into because of love, not for any other reason.

We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and unforgiving
to the end. It is also intended to make respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually, sacrificing the
profession he worked very hard to be admitted into. Even assuming that his past indiscretions are ignoble, the
twenty-six years that respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer constitute sufficient punishment
therefor. During this time there appears to be no other indiscretion attributed to him.[10] Respondent, who is
now sixty-two years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit belatedly, to take the lawyers oath.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Respondent Simeon Barranco, Jr. is ALLOWED to take his
oath as a lawyer upon payment of the proper fees.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, and Panganiban,
JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., on leave

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. No. 3548. July 4, 2002]

JOSE A. RIVERA, complainant, vs. ATTY. NAPOLEON CORRAL, respondent.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

On September 1, 1990,[1] Jose A. Rivera instituted a Complaint for Disbarment[2] charging Atty. Napoleon Corral
with Malpractice and Conduct Unbecoming a Member of the Philippine Bar. The complaint alleges, inter alia -

(1) That on February 12, 1990, a Decision was penned by the Honorable Presiding Judge Gorgonio Y. Ybaez
on (sic) Civil Case No. 17473 for Ejectment.[3]

(2) That such decision was received by Annaliza Superio, Secretary of Atty. Napoleon Corral, on February 23,
1990.[4]

(3) That on March 13, 1990, a NOTICE OF APPEAL was filed in court by Atty. Napoleon Corral, a copy of which
was served on plaintiffs counsel.[5]

(4) That on March 14, 1990, [at] about 1:50 p.m. Atty. Napoleon Corral came to the Office of the Clerk of Court,
Branch 7, Bacolod City and changed the date February 23, 1990 to February 29, 1990. Realizing later that there is
no 29th in February 1990, he filed a REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS MANIFESTATION claiming therein that he received the
Decision not on the 29th in (sic) February 1990 but on the 28th of February 1990.[6]

(5) That Atty. Napoleon Corral violated the proper norms/ethics as a lawyer by tampering with particularly by
personally and manually changing entries in the courts record without the Courts prior knowledge and
permission, conduct unbecoming of a member of the Philippine Bar much more so because in so doing he was
found to have been motivated by the desire of suppressing the truth.
(6) That on July 13, 1990 Atty. Napoleon Corral filed a MOTION TO DISMISS, among other things he stated that
the court is without jurisdiction to try and decide the case at issue.

In his defense, respondent claimed that the correction of the date was done on the paper prepared by him. He
also alleged that the correction was initiated and done in the presence and with the approval of the Clerk of
Court and the other court employees. According to respondent, the correction was made because of
typographical error he committed. He denied that Annaliza Superio, who received the decision in his behalf, is
his secretary.

In a Resolution dated January 20, 1993, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.[7] Thereafter, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez
submitted his report on August 21, 1997 finding respondent guilty as charged and recommended his suspension
from the practice of law for six (6) months.

On October 25, 1997, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution approving and adopting the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Respondent thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration of the IBP Boards decision. The Board, however,
subsequently issued a Resolution on March 28, 1998 denying the motion for reconsideration and further pointed
out that the pleading is improper because his remedy was to file the same with this Court within fifteen (15)
days from notice thereof pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.

Thus, on May, 19, 1999, respondent filed with the Court a Motion for Reconsideration alleging -

1. THAT THERE WAS NO DUE PROCESS OR HEARING WHICH HAVE BEEN REQUESTED BY RESPONDENT FROM THE
BEGINNING;

2. COMPLAINANT RIVERA COMMITTED PERJURY WHEN HE CLAIMED THAT RESPONDENT ALTERED THE COURT
RECORDS;

3. THAT THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN BACOLOD CITY UNDER JUDGE IBAEZ COMMITTED
MISREPRESENTATION OF FACTS.

Respondents claim that he was not afforded due process deserves scant consideration. The essence of due
process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. [8] In fact

. . . a respondent in an administrative proceeding is not entitled to be informed of the findings and

recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled
only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity
to meet the charges and the evidence presented against him during the hearings of the investigating
committee.[9]

Respondent can not feign he was denied an opportunity to be heard in this case because as borne out by the
records, hearings had to be re-scheduled several times by the investigating commissioner to afford him the
chance to present his evidence. The records disclose that when the case was referred to the IBP by Resolution of
the Court dated January 30, 1993,[10] Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez issued a Notice of Hearing
dated July 12, 1993 ordering complainant and respondent to appear before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline on August 19, 1993.

In response, complainant, who is based in Sta. Fe, Bacolod City, sent a letter dated August 10, 1993 informing
the Commission that owing to his limited finances as a Baptist Pastor he could not afford the expenses involved
in attending the hearings and in view thereof, he requested that the hearings be held without his presence and
that the case be decided based on the evidence submitted. Nothing was heard from respondent, although the
records show that he was furnished a copy of the notice.

On the scheduled hearing of August 19, 1993, both complainant and respondent did not appear. The
investigator, however, noted the letter of complainant dated August 10, 1993. As there was no showing that
respondent received the notice of hearing, the investigator reset the hearing of the case for reception of
respondents evidence to September 30, 1993. Both parties, who were duly furnished copies of the order, again
did not appear on said date. The hearing was again reset to November 8, 1993. Both parties likewise failed to
appear on November 8, 1993 hearing, which was re-scheduled on January 6, 1994. However, complainant sent a
letter dated November 4, 1993 addressed to the investigator requesting that the hearings be continued even in
his absence for the reasons he stated in his previous letter of August 10, 1993. Again nothing was heard from
respondent although he and complainant were furnished copies by registered mail.

Neither complainant nor respondent appeared on the January 6, 1994 hearing, for which reason the investigator
issued an order re-scheduling the hearing for the last time to February 24, 1994 giving respondent a last chance
to present his evidence with the warning that respondents failure to do so will compel the Commission to render
a ruling based on the evidence submitted by the complainant. The investigator, however, noted the
complainants letter of November 4, 1993 wherein the latter manifested that he was resting his case based on
the evidence submitted by him together with the complaint.

On February 15, 1994, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that: 1.] the complaint filed is not
verified; 2.] in the hearings set by the Commission, complainant failed to appear; 3.] unless complainant appears
personally, be sworn to and questioned personally under oath, the complaint is defective; 4.] the complaint
which could be filed by anybody is a form of harassment; 5.] in view of the repeated failure of complainant to
appear and be sworn to, the letter-complaint is merely hearsay.

On March 3, 1994, the investigator denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set for the last time the
hearing on April 21, 1994 for the reception of respondents evidence.

On April 4, 1994, respondent filed a Motion for Postponement praying that the hearing be reset on the last week
of July 1994. Accompanying said motion was an Answer To The Order Of The Commission Dated March 3, 1994
where he averred, among others, that: 1.] it was his right to cross-examine complainant with respect to the
allegations in the complaint; 2.] the allegations in the complaint are not true and complainants use of the name
Reverend was made to deceive the Commission; 3.] what respondent actually did was to correct the date of his
pleading which was erroneously typed by his secretary and this was done in the presence of the court
employees with their knowledge and consent; complainant made it appear that respondent falsified the records;
4.] the correction of the date in the pleading was done in good faith; 5.] this is not the first time complainant
filed complaints to harass people and to misrepresent himself as a Reverend; 6.] in fact, complainant was nearly
stabbed to death by families whom he ejected from their lands using donations of the church to buy the
properties in his name; 7.] respondent intended to file a complaint with the Bible Baptist Association of America
and the Philippines to investigate complainants activities.

To accommodate respondent, the Investigating Commissioner reset the hearing on July 28, 1994 with the
warning that said setting is intransferable and that the Commission will proceed with its investigation on said
date with or without respondents presence. For failure of respondent to appear on said date, the investigator
issued an order considering the case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence presented.

Given the foregoing factual backdrop, respondent can not now complain that he was denied due process. On the
contrary, the Commission was lenient to a fault in accommodating his numerous requests for continuance.
Indeed, the chronology of events shows that the prolonged silence of respondent and the belated filing of his
motion to dismiss followed by the Answer to the investigators March 3, 1994 Order, were deliberately resorted
to hinder the proceedings.

The quintessence of due process is simply that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side and to adduce any evidence he may
have in support of his defense.[11] Entrenched is the rule that due process does not necessarily mean or require
a hearing but simply a reasonable opportunity or a right to be heard or, as applied to administrative proceedings
and opportunity to explain ones side.[12] Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments
or pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process.[13]

In his report, the Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the correction introduced by respondent was
made not to reflect the truth but to mislead the trial court into believing that the notice of appeal was filed
within the reglementary period. The Decision rendered in Civil Case No. 17473 was duly received by a certain
Annaliza Superio, the secretary of respondent, on February 22, 1990. Respondent filed the Notice of Appeal on
March 13, 1990 which was clearly out of time. To extricate himself from such predicament, respondent altered
the date when he allegedly received the Decision from February 23, 1990 to February 29, 1990. Realizing that
there was no February 29, 1990 in the calendar, he sought to change the date again to February 28, 1990 by
means of a reply to Plaintiffs Manifestation.

The Investigating Commissioner further pointed out that respondents claim that the correction was made in the
presence of the Clerk of Court and other court employees was denied by Nilda P. Tronco, the Branch Clerk of the
Municipal Trial Court of Bacolod City, who declared that the alteration was surreptitiously made and would have
been left unnoticed were it not for the timely discovery thereof.[14]

The Court finds the facts as summarized by the investigator fully supported by the evidence. However, the
recommended penalty is not commensurate to the misdeed of respondent.

The primary objective of administrative cases against lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring
individual lawyers but also to safeguard the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public
from the misconduct of lawyers, and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of their
lawyers oath have proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the
bar.[15] A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity,
which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor or unworthy to
continue as an officer of the court.[16]

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended form his office as attorney on the following grounds, to wit: 1.] deceit; 2.] malpractice or other gross
misconduct in office; 3.] grossly immoral conduct; 4.] conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude;
5.] violation of the lawyers oath; 6.] willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court; and 7.] willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority.

While the prevailing facts of the case do not warrant so severe a penalty as disbarment, the inherent power of
the Court to discipline an errant member of the Bar must, nonetheless, be exercised because it can not be
denied that respondent has violated his solemn oath as a lawyer not to engage in unlawful, dishonest or
deceitful conduct.[17]

The relevant rules to the case at bar are Rules 1.01 and Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Rule 1.01 states in no uncertain terms that: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. More specifically, Rule 19.01 mandates that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means
to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

The Court can not overstress the duty of a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession. He can do this by faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his
clients.[18] Along the same vein, in Ong v. Atty. Elpidio D. Unto,[19] the Court ruled that The ethics of the legal
profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the
course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity.[20] Public confidence in the law and lawyers may be eroded by the
irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself
in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[21]

By altering the material dates to make it appear that the Notice of Appeal was timely filed, respondent
committed an act of dishonesty. Under pertinent rules,[22] dishonesty constitutes grave misconduct upon which
the Court, in a recent case,[23] imposed a one-year suspension on respondent therein for inserting in the
records of the case a certification of non-forum shopping and making it appear that the same was already part
of such records at the time the complaint was filed. A one-year suspension was similarly imposed on respondent
in Reyes v. Atty. Rolando Javier[24] for deceiving his client into believing that he filed the petition on time when
in fact it was filed on a much later date. It should be stressed that brazenly resorting to such a legal subterfuge
to mislead the court and to cover up for his failings toward his client is not only a disgraceful indictment on
respondents moral fiber and personal fitness to his calling as a lawyer. It is also an embarrassment to his
brethren in the Bar. Such misconduct warrants a similar penalty for the Court can not tolerate any misconduct
that tends to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Napoleon Corral is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for ONE (1) YEAR and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt with more
severely.

Let copies of this resolution be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Bar and
furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts of the country.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Kapunan, and Austria-Martinez, JJ., concur.