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Vda. de Bataclan v. Medina, G.R. No.

L-10126, [October 22, 1957], 102 PHIL 181-


189

There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. The only
question is to what degree. The trial court was of the opinion that the proximate cause of the
death of Bataclan was not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the fire that burned the bus,
including himself and his co-passengers who were unable to leave it; that at the time the fire
started, Bataclan, though he must have suffered physical injuries, perhaps serious, was still
alive, and so damages were awarded, not for his death, but for the physical injuries suffered by
him. We disagree. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages
695-696 of American Jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:

". . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause
is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."

It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely
causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the
overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle
sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate
cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case
and under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the
proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason
that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a
lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most
probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about
2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from
a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch, the most
handy and available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently
approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from them.
In other words, the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for
outside help. What is more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the
negligence of the carrier, through its driver and its conductor. According to the witnesses, the
driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver
should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline
could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in and around the bus,
this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can be smelt and
detected even from a distance, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to
have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the
bus.

Manila Electric Co. v. Remonquillo, G.R. No. L-8328, [May 18, 1956], 99 PHIL 117-
126

On August 22, 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio Peñaloza, his
stepbrother, located on Rodriguez Lanuza street, Manila, to repair a "media agua" said to be in
a leaking condition. The "media agua" was just below the window of the third story. Standing
on said "media agua", Magno received from his son thru that window a 3' X 6' galvanized iron
sheet to cover the leaking portion, turned around and in doing so the lower end of the iron
sheet came into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company (later referred to
as the Company) strung parallel to the edge of the "media agua" and 2 1/2 feet from it, causing
his death by electrocution.

***

To us it is clear that the principal and proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric
wire, evidently a remote cause, but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning
around and swinging the galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution, such as looking
back toward the street and at the wire to avoid its contacting said iron sheet, considering the
latter's length of 6 feet. For a better understanding of the rule on remote and proximate cause
with respect to injuries, we find the following citation helpful:

"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause
of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of
the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

Raynera v. Hiceta, G.R. No. 120027, [April 21, 1999], 365 PHIL 546-555

Proximate cause is "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred."

During the trial, it was established that the truck had no tail lights. The photographs taken of
the scene of the accident showed that there were no tail lights or license plates installed on the
Isuzu truck. Instead, what were installed were two (2) pairs of lights on top of the steel plates,
and one (1) pair of lights in front of the truck. With regard to the rear of the truck, the photos
taken and the sketch in the spot report proved that there were no tail lights. cdtai

Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents' truck was visible in the
highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour. It
used the service road, instead of the highway, because the cargo they were hauling posed a
danger to passing motorists. In compliance with the Land Transportation Traffic Code (Republic
Act No. 4136)" respondents installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicle's
cargo load extended beyond the bed or body thereof.

We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim. Traveling behind
the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him. He was in
control of the situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable him to see what
was in front of him. He was traversing the service road where the prescribed speed limit was
less than that in the highway.

Ilusorio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 139130, [November 27, 2002], 441 PHIL 335-
347

Petitioner's failure to examine his bank statements appears as the proximate cause of his own
damage. Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. In the instant case, the bank was not shown to be remiss in its duty of sending
monthly bank statements to petitioner so that any error or discrepancy in the entries therein
could be brought to the bank's attention at the earliest opportunity. But, petitioner failed to
examine these bank statements not because he was prevented by some cause in not doing so,
but because he did not pay sufficient attention to the matter. Had he done so, he could have
been alerted to any anomaly committed against him. In other words, petitioner had sufficient
opportunity to prevent or detect any misappropriation by his secretary had he only reviewed the
status of his accounts based on the bank statements sent to him regularly. In view of Article
2179 of the New Civil Code, when the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate
and proximate cause of his injury, no recovery could be had for damages.

Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. Court of Appeals and Benjamin C. Napiza, G.R. No.
112392, [February 29, 2000]

While it is true that private respondents having signed a blank withdrawal slip set in motion the
events that resulted in the withdrawal and encashment of the counterfeit check, the negligence
of petitioners personnel was the proximate cause of the loss that petitioner sustained.
Proximate cause, which is determined by a mixed consideration of logic, common sense, policy
and precedent, is "that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.” The proximate cause of the withdrawal and eventual loss of the amount of
$2,500.00 on petitioners part was its personnels (sic) negligence in allowing such withdrawal in
disregard of its own rules and the clearing requirement in the banking system. In so doing,
petitioner assumed the risk of incurring a loss on account of a forged or counterfeit foreign
check and hence, it should suffer the resulting damage.

Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result would not have
occurred. 26 Proximate cause is determined by the facts of each case upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. 27||| (Consolidated Bank and
Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 138569, [September 11, 2003], 457 PHIL
688-713)

An intervening cause, to be considered efficient, must be "one not produced by a wrongful act
or omission, but independent of it, and adequate to bring the injurious results. Any cause
intervening between the first wrongful cause and the final injury which might reasonably have
been foreseen or anticipated by the original wrongdoer is not such an efficient intervening
cause as will relieve the original wrong of its character as the proximate cause of the final
injury." 74 I||| (Abrogar v. Cosmos Bottling Co., G.R. No. 164749, [March 15, 2017])

The Supreme Court has further held that an injury or damage is


proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from
the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part
in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the
injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable
consequence of the act or omission. It is the dominant, moving or
producing cause.1

There is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based upon mixed
considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. Plaintiff must, however, establish
a sufficient link between the act or omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be
remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or injury must be a
natural and probable result of the act or omission. In the precedent-setting Vda. de Bataclan v.

1
Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124354, December 29, 1999.
Medina, this Court discussed the necessary link that must be established between the act or
omission and the damage or injury, viz.:

It may be that ordinarily, when a passenger bus overturns, and pins down a passenger, merely
causing him physical injuries, if through some event, unexpected and extraordinary, the
overturned bus is set on fire, say, by lightning, or if some highwaymen after looting the vehicle
sets it on fire, and the passenger is burned to death, one might still contend that the proximate
cause of his death was the fire and not the overturning of the vehicle. But in the present case
and under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not hesitate to hold that the
proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus, this for the reason
that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming of the men with a
lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only by the passengers, but most
probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because it was very dark (about
2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them; and coming as they did from
a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available, they had to use a torch, the most
handy and available; and what was more natural than that said rescuers should innocently
approach the overturned vehicle to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from
them. In other words, the coming of the men with the torch was to be expected and was
natural sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers' bus, the
trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.

The ruling in Bataclan has been repeatedly cited in subsequent cases as authority for the
proposition that the damage or injury must be a natural or probable result of the act or
omission. Here, We agree with the RTC that the damage caused to the Nissan van was a
natural and probable result of the improper parking of the prime mover with trailer. As
discussed, the skewed parking of the prime mover posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists.
Limbaga failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The skewed parking of the prime mover
triggered the series of events that led to the collision, particularly the swerving of the passenger
bus and the Nissan van.||| (Dy Teban Trading, Inc. v. Ching, G.R. No. 161803, [February 4,
2008], 567 PHIL 531-554)

Cruz v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122445, [November 18, 1997], 346 PHIL 872-894

In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing
appellant's negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of
breach of duty on the part of the surgeon as well as a causal connection of such breach and the
resulting death of his patient. In Chan Lugay v. St. Luke's Hospital, Inc., where the attending
physician was absolved of liability for the death of the complainant's wife and newborn baby,
this Court held that:
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown
that the 'injury for which recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence
of the wrong done; the connection between the negligence and the injury must
be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient
causes.' In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the
injury. For, 'negligence, no matter in what it consists cannot create a right of
action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.' And 'the
proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.'"

Ramos v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124354, [December 29, 1999], 378 PHIL 1198-
1247)

Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or a failure to act,
whenever it appears from the evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial
part in bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or damage
was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the act or omission. It is the
dominant, moving or producing cause.

Applying the above definition in relation to the evidence at hand, faulty intubation is undeniably
the proximate cause which triggered the chain of events leading to Erlinda's brain damage and,
ultimately, her comatosed condition.

Urbano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72964, [January 7, 1988], 241
PHIL 1-14

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of
the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. (People v. Cardenas, supra) And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death must
convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings, however, lead us to a
distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause
later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was,
therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. (People v. Rellin, 77 Phil. 1038)

Doubts are present. There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its
subsequent infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. As we ruled
in Manila Electric Co. v. Remoquillo, et al. (99 Phil. 118)

"'A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such remote
cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or
remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause
of the injury, even though such injury would not have happened but for such
condition or occasion. If no danger existed in the condition except because of
the independent cause, such condition was not the proximate cause. And if an
independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the
circumstances, which result in injury because of the prior defective condition,
such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.' (45 C.J. pp. 931-932)."
(at p. 125)

Fernando v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92087, [May 8, 1992]

To be entitled to damages for an injury resulting from the negligence of another, a claimant
must establish the relation between the omission and the damage. He must prove under Article
2179 of the New Civil Code that the defendant's negligence was the immediate and proximate
cause of his injury. Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred (Vda. de Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, 102 Phil.
181, 186). Proof of such relation of cause and effect is not an arduous one if the claimant did
not in any way contribute to the negligence of the defendant. However, where the resulting
injury was the product of the negligence of both parties, there exists a difficulty to discern
which acts shall be considered the proximate cause of the accident. In Taylor v. Manila Electric
Railroad and Light Co. (16 Phil. 8, 29-30), this Court set a guideline for a judicious assessment
of the situation:

"Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party


shall be considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple.
Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury, between the
event itself, without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of
the victim not entering into it, independent of it, but contributing to his own
proper hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident under review was the
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produced the
event giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking of the track and the
sliding of the iron rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the
side of the car did not contribute, although it was an element of the damage
which came to himself. Had the crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly
through his act or omission of duty, that would have been one of the
determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would have been
responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the
occurrence, he contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount
that the defendant responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a
sum deemed a suitable equivalent for his own imprudence."
Mckee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68102, 68103, [July 16, 1992]

In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that his
negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause has been defined as:

". . . 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient
intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.'
And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the
injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom."

Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all
negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the
eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the
negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the
car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter heeded the
emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give the car an opportunity to go back
into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down and swerving to the far right of the road, which
was the proper precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver
continued at full speed towards the car. The truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent
in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and
the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by
side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to spare. Furthermore, the bridge has a level sidewalk
which could have partially accommodated the truck. Any reasonable man finding himself in the
given situation would have tried to avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on.

Ramos v. C.O.L. Realty Corp., G.R. No. 184905, [August 28, 2009], 614 PHIL 169-
178

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.
Quezon City Government v. Dacara, G.R. No. 150304, [June 15, 2005], 499 PHIL
228-246

Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have
occurred otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a
combined consideration of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.

Abrogar v. Cosmos Bottling Co., G.R. No. 164749, [March 15, 2017]

We hold that the negligence of Intergames was the proximate cause despite the intervening
negligence of the jeepney driver.

Proximate cause is "that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new
cause, produces an event, and without which the event would not have occurred." In Vda. de
Bataclan, et al. v. Medina, the Court, borrowing from American Jurisprudence, has more
extensively defined proximate cause thusly:

"* * * 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury and without which the result
would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause
is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting
other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events,
each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable
result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent
person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom."

To be considered the proximate cause of the injury, the negligence need not be the event
closest in time to the injury; a cause is still proximate, although farther in time in relation to the
injury, if the happening of it set other foreseeable events into motion resulting ultimately in the
damage. According to an authority on civil law:"A prior and remote cause cannot be made the
basis of an action, if such remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise
to the occasion by which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior
or remote cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated and efficient cause, even
though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no damage
exists in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was not
the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into
operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior defective condition, such
act or condition is the proximate cause."
Bouvier adds:

In many cases important questions arise as to which, in the chain of acts tending
to the production of a given state of things, is to be considered the responsible
cause. It is not merely distance of place or of causation that renders a cause
remote. The cause nearest in the order of causation, without any efficient
concurring cause to produce the result, may be considered the direct cause. In
the course of decisions of cases in which it is necessary to determine
which of several causes is so far responsible for the happening of the
act or injury complained of, what is known as the doctrine
ofproximate cause is constantly resorted to in order to ascertain
whether the act, omission, or negligence of the person whom it is
sought to hold liable was in law and in fact responsible for the result
which is the foundation of the action.

xxx xxx xxx

The question of proximate cause is said to be determined, not by the


existence or non-existence of intervening events, but by their
character and the natural connection between the original act or
omission and the injurious consequences. When the intervening cause
is set in operation by the original negligence, such negligence is still
the proximate cause; x x x If the party guilty of the first act of
negligence might have anticipated the intervening cause, the
connection is not broken; x x x. Any number of causes and effects may
intervene, and if they are such as might with reasonable diligence have
been foreseen, the last result is to be considered as the proximate
result. But whenever a new cause intervenes, which is not a
consequence of the first wrongful cause, which is not under control of
the wrongdoer, which could not have been foreseen by the exercise of
reasonable diligence, and except for which the final injurious
consequence could not have happened, then such injurious
consequence must be deemed too remote; x x x.

An examination of the records in accordance with the foregoing concepts supports the
conclusions that the negligence of Intergames was theproximate cause of the death of Rommel;
and that the negligence of the jeepney driver was not an efficient intervening cause.

First of all, Intergames' negligence in not conducting the race in a road blocked off from
vehicular traffic, and in not properly coordinating the volunteer personnel manning the
marathon route effectively set the stage for the injury complained of. The submission that
Intergames had previously conducted numerous safe races did not persuasively demonstrate
that it had exercised due diligence because, as the trial court pointedly observed, "[t]hey were
only lucky that no accident occurred during the previous marathon races but still the danger
was there."

Secondly, injury to the participants arising from an unfortunate vehicular accident on the route
was an event known to and foreseeable by Intergames, which could then have been avoided if
only Intergames had acted with due diligence by undertaking the race on a blocked-off road,
and if only Intergames had enforced and adopted more efficient supervision of the race through
its volunteers.
And, thirdly, the negligence of the jeepney driver, albeit an intervening cause, was not efficient
enough to break the chain of connection between the negligence of Intergames and the
injurious consequence suffered by Rommel. An intervening cause, to be considered efficient,
must be "one not produced by a wrongful act or omission, but independent of it, and adequate
to bring the injurious results. Any cause intervening between the first wrongful cause and the
final injury which might reasonably have been foreseen or anticipated by the original wrongdoer
is not such an efficient intervening cause as will relieve the original wrong of its character as
the proximate cause of the final injury."
In fine, it was the duty of Intergames to guard Rommel against the foreseen risk, but it failed
to do so.

Gaid v. People, G.R. No. 171636, [April 7, 2009], 602 PHIL 858-876

Proximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. In order to establish a motorist's liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle,
it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the
injuries or damages complained of. Thus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing factor
in the causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an injury.

Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Suarez, G.R. No. 167750, [March 15, 2010], 629
PHIL 305-319

Proximate cause has been defined as "any cause which, in natural and continuous sequence,
unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the result complained of and without
which would not have occurred."

Vallacar Transit, Inc. v. Catubig, G.R. No. 175512, [May 30, 2011], 664 PHIL 529-
547

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not
have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
natural and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural
and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person
responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person
might probably result therefrom.
Our Lady of Lourdes Hospital v. Spouses Capanzana, G.R. No. 189218, [March 22,
2017]

We affirm the findings of the courts below that the negligent delay on the part of the nurses
was the proximate cause of the brain damage suffered by Regina. In Ramos, the Court
defines proximate cause as follows:

Proximate cause has been defined as that which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is
proximately caused by an act or a failure to act, whenever it appears from the
evidence in the case, that the act or omission played a substantial part in
bringing about or actually causing the injury or damage; and that the injury or
damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the
act or omission. It is the dominant, moving or producing cause. (Underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, a failure to act may be the proximate cause if it plays a substantial part in bringing about
an injury. Note also that the omission to perform a duty may also constitute
the proximate cause of an injury, but only where the omission would have prevented the
injury. The Court also emphasizes that the injury need only be a reasonably probable
consequence of the failure to act. In other words, there is no need for absolute certainty that
the injury is a consequence of the omission.

The essence of usurpation of authority under Article 177 of the RPC is false and malicious
representation. The "gravamen of the offense of usurpation of authority is the false
representation, maliciously made, that one is an officer, agent or representative of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government."||| (Miranda v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
154098, [July 27, 2005], 502 PHIL 423-474)

Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code on usurpation of authority or official functions, under
which the petitioner was charged, punishes any person: (a) who knowingly and falsely
represents himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the
Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or (b) who, under pretense of official
position, performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government or any agency thereof, without being lawfully
entitled to do so. The former constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority under which the
petitioner stands charged, while the latter act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official
functions.||| (Gigantoni y Javier v. People, G.R. No. L-74727, [June 16, 1988], 245 PHIL 133-
139)

Bahilidad v. People[37] is instructive:

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical
acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from
the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken
together, however, the evidence must be strong enough to show the community of criminal
design. For conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit
an offense. Conspiracy is the product of intentionality on the part of the cohorts.

It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect
contribution to the execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of active
participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of moral assistance
to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by exerting moral
ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the
discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is
not enough for purposes of conviction.

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