Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Jiyun Zhao
Associate Professor
Dept. of Mechanical and Biomedical Engr.
City University of Hong Kong
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Part I: Reactor System Safety Characteristics
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Reactor System Safety Characteristics
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Reliability of Engineered Safety Systems
• Redundancy
• Diversity
• Physical separation
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Redundancy
Redundancy provides more safety-system
components or subsystems than are needed to
meet minimum requirements. For example,
although a single emergency cooling pump might
be enough, two or three are provided as a hedge
against failure or unavailability during maintenance.
Systems that meet a single failure proof criterion
have sufficient redundancy to tolerate failure of any
single component and still continue to function as
intended.
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Diversity
Diversity employs two or more systems based on
different design or functional principles for a
particular safety function. This is added protection
against common mode failures, in which redundant
systems are disabled at the same time for the
same reason. Control rods and boric-acid injection,
for example, constitute diverse LWR shutdown
systems. Electrically powered and steam-driven
pumps to supply auxiliary feedwater are another
example.
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Physical separation
Physical separation of components and systems
intended to perform the same function also protects
against simultaneous loss, e.g., by fire or flood. The
primary means of accomplishing this are distance
and physical barriers.
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Safety System Functions
Engineered safety system functions for an LWR are:
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PWR Safety Features
Basic engineered safety system for a pressurized-water reactor are shown in figure
below. They are designed to mitigate the consequences of design-basis and beyond-
design-basis LOCA and other accident sequences.
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PWR Safety Features
Reactor Trip
The reactor trip function occurs by gravity insertion of the control
rods mounted above the core. The core protective system is
designed to induce the trip when operating limits are exceeded.
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PWR Safety Features
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PWR Safety Features
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PWR Safety Features
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PWR Safety Features
Heat Removal
The first post-accident heat removal [PAHR] for large-break
LOCAs occurs when initially “cool” ECCS water is injected and
carries heat out when it leaves through the break. For small
breaks, heat removal may be accomplished with forced
circulation, single-phase natural circulation, or two-phase
natural circulation when the steam generators can be used as
a heatsink. Otherwise, a feed and bleed mode may be
required in which water from the HPI or LPI systems is fed into
the core and steam is discharged [bled off] through the
pressurizer’s pilot-operated-relief valve [PORV] or one of its
safety valves.
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PWR Safety Features
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PWR Safety Features
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PWR Safety Features
Radioactivity Removal
Post-accident removal of radioactivity generally
takes several forms, including:
• charcoal adsorbers capable of fission-product
removal at high temperatures and humidities
• high-efficiency particulate air [HEPA] filters
• reactive coatings for passive removal of halide
fission products
• containment water sprays
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PWR Safety Features
Radioactivity Removal (continuous)
Water sprays “wash” fission products from the
containment atmosphere. Additives for pH control,
such as sodium hydroxide [NaOH] or sodium
thiosulfate [Na2S2O3], can increase removal of
chemically reactive fission products from the
containment atmosphere. (Because the additives
also can cause damage to reactor systems, and
were of questionable value in the TMI-2 accident,
their use in future reactors is unresolved.)
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PWR Safety Features
Radioactivity Removal (continuous)
The inert noble gases and organic halides are not
readily subject to removal from the containment
atmosphere- As with the other products, however,
assuring containment holdup (i.e., the “delay and
decay” approach) reduces their relative hazard.
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PWR Safety Features
Containment
The initial requirement for containment integrity is the
operation of isolation valves to close off containment
penetrations. Such valves are designed to operate
automatically under overpressure conditions characteristic of
a large-break LOCA.
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PWR Safety Features
(Integrated Accident Response)
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PWR Safety Features
(Integrated Accident Response)
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PWR Safety Features
(Integrated Accident Response)
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PWR Safety Features
(Integrated Accident Response)
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PWR Safety Features
(Integrated Accident Response)
Failure of both the spray and injection systems to draw water
from the sump results in the complex behavior shown by Fig.
14-5, path 4. The lack of any core cooling results in rapid boiloff,
zirconium-steam reactions, and hydrogen generation. The
pressure increase is unimpeded due to the spray failure. As
soon as all vessel water has boiled away, natural condensation
allows some pressure decrease. Vessel melt-through results in
concrete interactions, evolution of steam and CO2 , and
renewed pressure increases. Overpressure failure would be
possible at this point. Otherwise, as the concrete reactions slow,
natural condensation may again reduce the pressure until
containment melt-through finally leads to an equilibrium level.
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BWR Safety Features
The major features of the engineered safety systems for an early
boiling-water reactor design are shown below. The principles also
apply to newer systems.
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BWR Safety Features
Reactor Trip
The reactor trip function is accomplished by mechanical
insertion of the cruciform control rods mounted below the core.
The core protection system is designed to initiate the trip when
operating limits are exceeded.
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BWR Safety Features
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BWR Safety Features
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BWR Safety Features
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BWR Safety Features
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BWR Safety Features
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BWR Safety Features
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BWR Safety Features
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BWR Safety Features
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BWR Safety Features
Containment
The BWR containment employs a light-bulb-shaped
steel-lined drywell connected by vent pipes to the
surrounding toroidal (doughnut-shaped) pressure-
suppression pool. As was true for the PWR design,
isolation valves and the pressure-reduction systems
are the primary means of maintaining system
integrity against air-borne release of fission
products. Prevention of core meltdown avoids
containment melt-through failure.
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BWR Safety Features
Containment
Some of the more recent BWR designs accomplish
the same functions through a multiple containment
consisting of a drywell, steel containment shell,
and concrete shield building. The drywell and the
annular pressure-suppression pool are connected
by horizontal vents separated from the drywell by a
weir wall.
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