Implicit Costs of Empire: Bureaucratic Corruption in Nineteenth-Century Cuba

Author(s): Alfonso W. Quiroz

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Journal of Latin American Studies, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Aug., 2003), pp. 473-511
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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J. Lat.Amer.Stud35,473-511 zoo2003
Cambridge Press
University 47 3
DOI: Io.orI7/Sooz2zi6Xo300686zPrintedin theUnitedKingdom

ImplicitCosts of Empire:Bureaucratic
Corruption in Nineteenth-Century Cuba*

ALFONSO W. QUIROZ

Abstract. Cycles of bureaucratic corruption in nineteenth-century Cuba evolved

according to institutional conditions shaped by interest groups, financial needs, im-
peratives of colonial governance, and internal conflicts and war. Corrupt gain inimi-
cal to general public interest was not a consequence of cultural constants, but of
unreconstructed institutional flaws and weaknesses. The risks of engaging in bu-
reaucratic corruption diminished under the systematic condoning of administrative
faults, collusive allowance of illegal slave trafficking, and a code of illegal rewards
expected by loyalist officials opposing colonial reform. Despite some few anti-
corruption initiatives, the prosecution and punishment of corrupt officials was lax.
The implicit, yet significant, financial, institutional and political costs of corruption
contributed to the demise of Spanish imperial dominion over Cuba and left a
damaging burden and legacy for Cuban civil society.

Corruption in public administration has been widely recognised as a serious

historical problem in Latin America.1 The issue of corruption has had pe-
culiarly important political and social repercussions in Cuba.2 Yet, despite
its importance, corruption in Cuba has not been explained satisfactorily in

Alfonso W. Quirozis Professorof Historyat BaruchCollegeand GraduateCenter,City

Universityof New York, and Fellow (2002-3) at the Woodrow Wilson International
Centerfor Scholars,Washington,DC.
* Researchin Cubaand
Spainwas possible thanksto awardsfrom the ProfessionalStaff
Congress of the City University of New York and the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Rela-
tions. I greatly appreciate comments from Kenneth Andrien, Carolyn Boyd, Ana Cairo,
Jose Cayuela, Joan Casanovas, John Coatsworth, Kenneth Mills, Rafael Tarrag6 and
anonymous reviewers.
1 Among the many recent titles, see Joseph Tulchin and Ralph Espach (eds.), Combating
Corruptionin Latin America (Washington, DC, 2000); Keith Rosen and Richard Downes
(eds.), Corruptionand Political Reformin Brail: The Impact of Collor'sImpeachment(Coral
Gables, 1999); Walter Little and Eduardo Posada-Carb6 (eds.), PoliticalCorruptionin Europe
and Latin America (London, 1996); and Mitchell Seligson, 'The Impact of Corruption on
Regime Legitimacy: A Comparative Study of Four Latin American Countries,' Journal of
Politics,vol. 64, no. 2 (2002), pp. 408-3 3.
2
Corruption scandals have been crucial features in Cuban political and social conflict since
the first republican administrations and during the regimes of Gerardo Machado, Ful-
gencio Batista, Ram6n Grau San Martin, and Carlos Prio Socarris. Serious corruption
issues preceded the suicide of politician Eduardo Chibis in 195i, the Revolution of 1959,
and the execution of General Arnaldo Ochoa in i989. See Guillermo Alonso and Enrique
474 AlfonsoW Quiroz
termsof the institutionalfactorsandvestedintereststhatconditionit. More-
over, surprisingly littleis knownof the long-term,institutionaland economic
costs of persistentandcyclicalcorruption.A detailedanalysisof bureaucratic
corruption- the unlawfulrent-extractionby those with privilegedaccess to
public office for personalor group gain inimicalto publicinterest- in the
prominentcase of Cubais stillwanting.3New contributionsto the studyof
corruptionin Cubashouldbegin by explainingits colonialroots.
During the nineteenth century Cuba became the most importantcol-
onialpossessionof a weakanddiminishedSpanishempireaspiringat revival.
The island'ssugareconomy providedbadlyneeded colonialrevenuesthat
supporteda successionof financiallystrappedgovernmentsstrugglingfor
politicalstabilityin peninsularSpain.Massivepeninsularmigrationto Cuba
occurredin severalwaves, especiallyin the 1820s, i86os and 188os.Political
and social quagmireand conflict in Spain and Cuba had importantreper-
cussionson each other.From the CarlistWarsin I 833-9 and 1873-6 to the
1868'La Gloriosa'revolution,eventsin Spainhaddisruptingcounterpartsin
Cuba.4Conversely,Cubanmovementsfor annexation(to the UnitedStates),
reform, and independenceled to two destructivecivil wars in 1868-78
and 1895-8 thatintensifiedseriouscrisesin the Spanishpeninsula.Spainand
Cubawere intimatelytied througheconomic, social, political,and bureau-
craticlinks. Most significantlyfor this study,bureaucraticcorruptionmade
corrodinginroadsin both the metropolisand its colony.5
Cubawas the preferreddestinationfor under-remunerated yet ambitious
military and civil officials determined to gain rapid promotion, personal
wealth, and politicalpower. Severalpeninsularmilitaryleaders,liberaland
liberal-conservativealike, with decisive roles in Spain's intricatepolitical
affairsserved as militarygovernors (captaingenerals)in Cuba.The island
became a strategichub for corruptnetworksof nepotism and favouritism
plaguingthe Spanishstate bureaucracyand delayingmuch needed colonial

Vignier (eds.), La corrupcidn en CubaI544-19y2(Havana,i973), and

y administrativa
politica
3
Hugh Thomas, CubaorthePursuitofFreedom (New York, 1998).
On the definitionand analysisof differenttypes of corruptionsee ArnoldHeidenheimer
et al. (eds.), PoliticalCorruption:
A Handbook(New Brunswick,1989); Douglass North,
StructureandChange History(New York, 1981); and RobinTheobald,Corruption,
in Economic
Development, andUnderdevelopment (London,1990).
4 On Spanishhistoricalbackground,see CharlesEsdaile,Spainin theLiberalAge:FromCon-
stitutionto CivilWar,so&-1939;(Oxford,2000), andJose VarelaOrtega,Los amigos politicos.
Partidos, elecdonesycadquismoenla Restauracion
(I87f-I9oo)(Madrid,zo200).
5 On bureaucraticmalfunctions,corruptionand other institutionalproblemsin Spain,see
Philip Keefer, 'ProtectionAgainst a CapriciousState: French Investmentand Spanish
Railroads, 845- 875,' JournalofEconomic History,vol. 6, no. (1996),pp. 70-9 ; Martin
Blinkhorn,'Spain:the "SpanishProblem"and the ImperialMyth,'Journalof Contemporary
History,vol. I 5,no. I (1980),pp. 5-z25;and RobertKern,Liberals, Reformers, in
andCadciques
Restoration Spains87y-Igo9(Albuquerque, NM, I974)-
 Bureaucratic inNineteenth-Century
Corruption Cuba 475
reformin Cuba.The systemof provincialcadquismo (patronage), underpinning
the earlyRestorationregime(1874-98)in Spain,articulatedcloselywithtrans-
atlanticinterest groups fuelled by colonial incentives in Cuba. Corrupt
bureaucraticand privategroups activelyfought and lobbied againstCuban
creole reformiststo keep Cuba under strict control at any cost, including
colonialconflictand war.
This articleexaminesthe specificcycles,causalfactorsandlong-termcosts
of administrativecorruptionin Cuba duringthe nineteenthcentury.The
studyfirstanalysesthe roots of colonialbureaucratic corruptionin the early
part of the centurywhen unofficialrulesshieldingillegalslavetradeandother
unruly loyalist transgressionsdefeated previous efforts at administrative
reform.Colonialbureaucratic corruptionis then examinedin two successive
periods of dictatorial
power: that exerted by captaingenerals (1833-68)
and that prevailingin colonialcivil war (1868-78).In these institutionalset-
tings authoritiesmostly condoned corruptionunderpressurefrom loyalists
demandingunlawfulrewardor compensationfor their militantsupportto
Spain'ssterncontrolin Cuba.Finally,the articleaddressesthe persistenceof
relativelyhighlevels of corruptiondespitepartialcolonialreform(1879-95),
and ultimateseparationfrom Spain(1898).
Differenttypesof bureaucratic corruptiondiscussedincludebribing,graft,
connivancein the contrabandof goods and slaves,embezzlement,adminis-
trativeabuseandaccountingfraud.6The objectof thiswide researchsurveyis
to clarifythe specificwaysdifferentmodalitiesof corruptionaffectedthe gen-
eral public interest of the Spanishcolonial state and Cuban civil society,
and to identifywhich specificgroupswithinthe colonialadministrative and
businesssectorswere principallyinvolved.The essayalso providesestimates
of relativefinancialand fiscalcosts associatedwith corruption(as indicators
of actual levels of bureaucraticcorruptionreportedby internaladminis-
trativeinvestigations),especiallyfor the periods 1868-78 and 1880-90 when
unequalpress and literarycoverageindicatedvaryingpublicperceptionsof
corruption.
In more generalterms this essay makes a case for a historicaland in-
stitutionalperspectivein the studyof corruption.7 Historianscanuse an array

6 Analysisin this study centreson administrativecorruptionratherthan electoralcorrup-

tion. This is in part due to the minor role played by elections in Cuba'sinsufficiently
reformedcolonial system until the I88os. On late colonialelections see Ines Roldainde
Montaud'spioneeringLa Restauracidn en Cuba.Elfracasode unprocesoreformista (Madrid,
zooo). For a general historiographicalapproachto electoral corruptionsee Eduardo
Posada-Carb6,'ElectoralJuggling:A ComparativeHistoryof the Corruptionof Suffrage
in Latin America, 1830-1930,'Journalof LatinAmericanStudies,vol. 32, no. 3 (2000),
pp. 611-44.
7 Institutionalapproachesto the studyof corruptionrecogniseit as a seriousproblemfor
efficienteconomic rules,propertyrights,transactioncosts, democraticgovernance,civil
476 AlfonsoW QuiroZ
of declassified,confidentialgovernmentand judicialrecordsto gaugein de-
tail fluctuatinglevels of corruptionover time,the economicandinstitutional
costs of corruption,as well as its politicaland ideologicalimpact.Although
the analysisof publicperceptionsof corruptionmay be a useful thoughin-
direct tool for the study of corruption,8historiansdo not need to rely ex-
clusivelyon perceptionsto estimate real levels of corruptionin different
periods and institutionalsettings.9Historicalanalysiscan also identify es-
tablishedcorruptionpatternsand the interestgroupsbehindthem.10All this
historicalevidence can be used to disprovethe supposed benefits of cor-
ruption as a 'lubricant'in overly regulatedand bureaucratisedsystems."
Likewise,an historicalinstitutionalperspectiveis useful to challengerecent
culturallydeterministicviews on corruption.12

Basesofcolonial (Idoo-}})
corruption
In reactionto the occupationof Havanaby Britishforces in 1762, Spain
implementedstrategicchanges that ultimatelytransformedCuba into the
crown jewel of nineteenth-centurySpanishcolonialism.Unlike other less
successfulBourbonreformselsewherein SpanishAmerica,the militaryand
administrativereformsin Cuba produceda more efficientmanagementof

society, and economic growth in developing countries that strive for economic and
institutionalreform:DouglassNorth,Institutions,
Institutional
Change,andEconomic Peformance
andtheGlobalEconomy
(New York, I990); KimberlyElliott (ed.), Corruption (Washington,
DC, 1997);Alan Doig and RobinTheobald(eds.),Corruption andDemocratisation(London,
2000); RobertWilliamsand Alan Doig (eds.),Controlling Corruption(Cheltenham,2000).
8 Statisticalstudiesof contemporarycorruptionare basedon more or less static,compara-
tive models of indices measuring'perceptionsof corruption'on the basis of interviews
and polls. These perceptionindicescan fluctuateradicallywith periodiccorruptionscan-
dals.Paolo Mauro,'Corruptionand Growth,'Quarterly JournalofEconomics,vol. i i o, no. 3
(I995), 681-712.
pp-
9 Joel Hurstfield,Freedom,
Corruption, in Elizabethan
andGovernment England(London,1973),
chap. 4, argues a difference in real levels of corruption in two distinct periods of in-
stitutionalised political patronage; Linda Peck, CourtPatronageand Corruptionin Early Stuart
England (Boston, 1990), chap. i, limits her analysis to enhanced public perceptions and
rhetoric.
10 On recent approachesto 'harddata' on corruption,R. Di Tella and W. Savedoff(eds.),
DiagnosisCorruption:FraudinLatinAmerica's (Washington,DC, 2001); GrahamK.
Hospitals
Wilson,Interest Groups(Oxford,1990).
11 Nathaniel Leff, 'Economic Development through BureaucraticCorruption,'American
Behavioral vol. 8, no. 3 (1964), pp. 8-14. See also Heidenheimeret al., Political
Scientist,
Corruption. perspectivehas been overtakenby the recent eruption of corruption
This
studies,but it remainsinfluential,especiallyamongLatinAmericanists.
12 Seymour Martin Lipset and Gabriel Salman Lenz,'Corruption, Culture, and Markets',
in Lawrence Harrison and Samuel Huntington (eds.), CultureMatters:How ValuesShape
pp. 11i 2-24.
Human Progress (New York, zooo2000),
 Bureaucratic
Corruption Cuba 477
in Nineteenth-Century

colonial financesand effectiverelaxationof extreme restrictionsto trade.

Reformswere sustainedby a negotiatedofficialcollaborationwith Havana
patricians representingsugar, cattle and commercial interests.13These
changeschallengedcustomaryvenal procedures,articulatinglocal interests
with imperialneeds to meet the administrativecosts of the colony.14The
overhauledand better-paidcolonialadministrationaddressedcorruptionin
Cubaas a damagingandpunishablepracticeagainststateinterests.15 Gradual
liberalisation of trade conceded to the Cuban elite between 1765 and 1818
reduced incentives for corrupt liaisons between business interests and the
colonial bureaucracy.
Despite the progress made by the Bourbon reforms toward administrative
and financial efficiency in Cuba, barriers to an effective curbing of bureau-
cratic corruption persisted in the early i 8oos. Colonial officials in collusion
with smugglers defied the efforts of zealous and empowered treasury in-
tendants. Trade liberalisationconceded to local interests was only partial,and
tariffs for imported goods remained high. Lingering internal and external
trade regulations on items besides sugar and slaves still provided some in-
centives for a corrupt link between provincial business interests and colonial
officers. The outgoing contraband of heavily regulated cattle and tobacco
and other local products, and the incoming contraband of cheap foreign
goods, was recognised as very difficult or impossible to eradicate.16However,
the occasional prosecution and imprisonment of corrupt treasury officers,
and official rewards for the interception and seizure of smuggled articles,

13 On the degreeof success of the Bourbon reforms,see StanleyStein, 'Bureaucracyand

Businessin SpanishAmerica,1759-1804: Failureof a BourbonReformin Mexico and
Peru,' HispanicAmericanHistoricalReview,vol. 61, no. I (I98i), pp. 2-28, and ensuing
debate. For the Cuban case see: Allan Kuethe, 'Guns, Subsidies, and Commercial
Privilege:Some HistoricalFactorsin the Emergenceof the CubanNationalCharacter,
1763-18 15,' CubanStudies,vol. i6 (1986), pp. I23-39, and Cuba, Crown,Militagy,
and Society(Knoxville, 1986); Allan Kuethe and G. Douglas ,77y3-8iy:
Inglis, 'Absolutism and
EnlightenedReform: CharlesIII, the Establishmentof the Alcabala,and Commercial
Reorganisationin Cuba,'PastandPresent, no. Io09(1985),pp. 18-43; andJosep Fradera,
Gobernar colonias(Barcelona,1999),pp. 109-I I.
14 Robert W. Patch,
'ImperialPolitics and Local Economy in Colonial CentralAmerica
1670-1770,' Past andPresent, no. 143 (i994), PP. 77-107; Lance R. Grahn, ThePolitical
Economy of Smuggling:
Regional InformalEconomies in EarlyBourbon New Granada(Boulder,
I997); Kenneth J. Andrien, 'Corruption,Inefficiency, and Imperial Decline in the
Seventeenth-Century Viceroyaltyof Peru,' TheAmericas, vol. 41 (1984),pp. I-zo; Anthony
McFarlane,'PoliticalCorruptionand Reformin BourbonSpanishAmerica,'in Littleand
Posada-Carb6(eds.), PoliticalCorruption, pp. 41-63; Olga PortuondoZtifiiga,Santiago de
Cubadesdesufundacion hastala Guerra delosDiezgAios(Santiagode Cuba,1996), p. 57.
15 'Instrucci6nde D. Juan Ign[ac]ioUrrizaa Dn. Jose Pablo Valientesobre la Intendencia
[de Ejercitoy Hacienda]de la Habana,'Havana,24 May 1787,BibliotecaNacionalJose
Marti,Havana (hereafterBNJM), Colecci6n Manuscrita(C.M.)Vidal Morales,vol. 82,
no. 2, pp. 41-2. 16 'Instrucci6nde Urrizaa Valiente',pp. 42-3.
478 Alfonso W
1Quiroz
contributedto keepingoveralllevels of corruptionundercontrolbefore the
8 2zos.17
Leadersof the Havanaelitehadexertedlegalandpoliticaleffortsto deepen
trade liberalisationand eradicatemonopolies that restrictedtheit growing
interestsin foreigntrade,sugar,and the supplyof slaves.This approachim-
pliedkeepingbureaucratic corruptionundercertainlimits.FranciscoArango
y Parrefio opposed the tobaccomonopolyand other restrictive
(1765--1837)
that bred
policies corruptionin publicadministration. Arangoled a long and
complex struggle that achieved liberalisation
of the slave trade (1788-9),
abolitionof the tobaccomonopoly(i 817),andfreergeneraltrade(i 818).His
reformistefforts also targetedlingeringcorrupt practicesin the colonial
treasuryadministration.InevitablyArangoand his supportersclashedwith
venalofficialsassociatedwith dishonestlocalinterestsandthe royalfavourite
Manuel Godoy (1792--18o8).18 For a short yet crucial period (1824-5) Arango
also servedas treasuryintendantgeneralat a time when that post stillhad a
degree of autonomy from the captaingeneral.The managementstrategy
followed by Arangoas intendantgeneralwas to reducecosts and increase
revenuesin partby curtailingscandalouscases of contrabandandcorruption
in Havana's customs. He introduced a new tariffcode to simplify and ration-
alise customs collection and administration.19This action followed the en-
actment of a free-trade edict in I 818 and official regulation against fraud and
smuggling.20 Key policy incentives for corruption were thus momentarily
curtailed.Arango's innovative fiscal administrativereforms were initiallycon-
tinued by his successor and protege, Claudio Martinez de Pinillos, the Conde
de Villanueva (1780-1852). A creole in charge of the treasury intendancy
with some short interruptions between 182 5 and I85 i, Villanueva was res-
ponsible for an unprecedented increase in the Cuban customs revenues.21

17 Ibid.,pp. 25-31. See also SherryJohnson, '"La GuerraContralos Habitantesde los

Arrabales":ChangingPatternsof LandUse and LandTenancyin and AroundHavana,
1763-1800,' Hispanic American HistoricalReview,vol. 77, no. 2 (1997), PP. 181-209.
18 FranciscoPonte Dominguez,ArangoyParremo. El estadistacolonial
(Havana,I937), p. i68;
AnastasioCarrilloy Arango,Elogiohist6rico delexcelentisimoseiorD. Frandsco ArangoyParreto
(Madrid,I862), p. 52; FranciscoArangoy Parrefio,ObrasdedonFrancisco ArangoyParreo
(Havana,1952),vol. i, p. 44; WilliamW. Pierson,'FranciscoArangoy Parrefio,'Hispanic
American vol. 16, no. 4 (1936),p. 473, note 34. On the corruptliasonsof
HistoricalReview,
RafaelG6mez Roubaud,formertreasuryintendantand enemy of Arango,see Martinez
de Pinillosto Arango,Cadiz,23 April 1811 and 17 Sept. 1812, in BNJM,C. M. Morales,
vol. 82, no. 5; Suplemento
al Diariodela Habana,no. 700, in BNJM,C. M. Morales,v. 79.
19 Ponte
Dominguez,Arangojy Parrefio,
pp. 282-3.
20 Pierson,'Arangoy Parrefio,'p. 475, note 38.
21 Ram6nde La Sagra,Breveideadela administradn delcomercido
y delasrentasygastosdela Islade
Cubadurante losadosde1826a Ir834(Paris,1836),pp. i, 8; Gil Gelpi y Ferro,Historiadela
revoludcinyguerradeCuba(Havana,1887-9), vol. I, p. 23. UnderVillanuevafiscalrevenues
increased40 per cent between 1825 and 1826, CandelariaSaiz Pastor,'El colonialismo
 Bureaucratic
Corruption Cuba 479
inNineteenth-Century
Creole-ledlegal strugglesfor political economic and administrativere-
forms,althoughhelpfulin limitingexaggeratedcorruption,certainlydid not
eliminateentrenchedcorruptpractices.Publicisedchargesagainstintendant
generalAlejandroRamirezin 1820, and the rebuttalsthey stirred,led to a
heightenedpublic awarenessof the issue of corruption.22Cases of em-
bezzlement(desfalco)of royal funds in Havana'streasuryand mail adminis-
trationwere periodicallydiscoveredand prosecuted.23Corruptionamong
the militarybefore 1825 included thefts by officers who had gambling
habits.24Key words used at the time to designatecases of administrative
corruptionincludeddesfalco,fraude, abusosand alcances.
defraudacidn,
The dubiousimplementationof the officialban of the slavetrade(1820),
and the enlargedmilitaryand loyalistpresencein the island, followingthe
independenceof mainlandSpanishAmericain the early18zo20s, were the two
main factorsthat contributedto the ultimatederailmentof reformistefforts
at controllingadministrativecorruptionin the island. Among the conse-
quencestherewas a well-documentedand dramaticincreasein the levels of
colonialbureaucratic corruptionin Santiagode Cuba.Authoritiesin Havana
and Madridreceiveda risingnumberof complaintsand accusationsagainst
local governors,treasuryemployees,judges,and lawyersof Santiago.In two
petitionssent to Madridin 1830 and 183i, a groupof distinguishedmembers
of the regionalelite accused Santiago'sgovernor,FranciscoIllas, and his
associatesof seriousadministrativeand moral corruption.Illas was said to
have bought powerfulofficialprotectionfrom the Spanishministerof war
and two royalcounsellorsof the Councilof Indies, throughthe mediation
of Illas' son, a militaryofficer living scandalouslyin Madrid.Illas mis-
appropriatedfunds of municipalpublic works for personalgain, accepted
bribes for abusinghis authorityin favourof some neighboursand against
others,and intimidatedthe city dwellerswith vengefulacts.25

espafiol en el Caribeduranteel siglo XIX: el caso cubano', in Consuelo Naranjoand

Tomas Mallo(eds.), CubaperladelasAntillas(Madrid,1994), pp. 213-21.
22
'Documentosrelativosa las difamacionespublicadasen el TioBartolo contrael Intendente
de HaciendaAlejandroRamirezen el manejode su cargo,'AlejandroRamirez,Exposicidn
delIntendentedelEjirctoAlejandro
RamireZalpzblicodela Habanasobreimputadones quele hace
dehaberse enriqueddoa expensas ptiblico(Havana,18zo), in BNJM, C. M. Morales,
deleranrio
vol. 79, nos. 28-29; Tio Bartolo,no. 6 (1820), pp. 21-4.
23 A involved a long and costly process of investigationand
conspicuouscase of desfalco
prosecution(i826-1838) of two successivetop administratorsof the mail service,Jose
Fuertes, who died in 1817 owing 125,816 pesos, and Felix L6pez Ayll6n. Archivo His-
t6rico Nacional,Madrid(hereafterAHN), Ultramar-Cuba-Gobierno (U.C.G.),leg. 4605,
exps. 1-5, 9.
24 In 1824 FirstCorporalIgnacioGonzalesdesertedand fled aftergamblingand losing 400
pesos he was transportingfromVillaClarato paythe salariesof the troops at the garrison
ofJagua.ANC, IntendenciaGeneralde Hacienda(I.G.H.),afio 1824, leg. 417, exp. I 5~.
25 'Instanciasin curso. 9 de agosto de 1830oy io abril 1831. Representacionesde varios
individuosde Santiagode Cuba contra el GobernadorD. FranciscoIllas,' signed by
480 Alfonso W
1Quiroz
In 1831 CaptainGeneralDionisio Vives received one signed and two
anonymousletterswith bitter complaintsand threats,this time againstthe
provincialintendantand other treasuryofficers of Santiagode Cuba. Six
retiredpetty officersand soldierssignedthe firstletterof crudehandwriting
and grammar.They complainedthat, despite 'spending our youth at the
serviceof our beloved sovereignwith full loyalty,taintingthe soil with our
own blood', some of them had been forced to peddle the streetsbecause
theirwages had been delayedfor threemonths.They attributedthis abusive
delayto the corruptactionsof the local treasuryofficers.This problemwas
not new; it had existed for at least the past five years.The provincialin-
tendant(officiallyearningonly 4,000 pesos a year),treasurerand customs'
wardens were considered 'shameless thieves for whom all the treasury
proceedswere not enough'. They all had arrivedpoor or heavilyindebted
to occupy theirposts and, in a short time, had acquiredenough money to
gamble,rent or buy luxurioushouses and coffee groves, fancycarriagesand
horses, and supportmistresses.26 The anonymousletterscomplainedabout
in
delays pay and also denounced obvious cases of contrabandallowedby
localcustomsofficers.Vives forwardedalltheselettersto the treasuryintend-
ant general,Conde de Villanueva,who, the ever-cautioustop bureaucrat,
acknowledgedthat he had received similarcomplaintsagainst Santiago's
officials.Citingpassion and revengeas possible motives for such charges,
Villanuevasuggestedthat Vives requesta confidential,independentreport
from the militarycommanderof the easternprovince.
The provincialcommander'sreportwas a scathingconfirmationof the
suspectedillegalpracticesof Santiago'streasuryofficers.A verynegative,and
potentiallydangerous,public opinion had been formed againstthose of-
ficials.Despite local revenuesbeinghigherthanthe expenditures,the army's
local battalionshad not been paid for more than threemonths.The reason
for this state of affairs,accordingto public opinion and ample evidence
corroboratingit, was the 'vice of corruptionamong those who handle
funds ... the greedof corruptedemployees[that]has no limits'.27A sweeping
investigationand prosecutionof corruptofficialsactiveduring 829-34 was
carriedout by a specialvisitador
(judge),who uncoveredenough evidenceto

Augusto Portuondo, Francisco Moro, Felix Pruna, Fernando Kindelin, Jose E.

Maldonado,ManuelJustiz,andManuelMiyares.AHN, Ultramar-Cuba-Hacienda (U.C.H.),
leg. 28 52 (no exp. number).Illas had been reinstatedin his post allegedlythanksto the
influencein Madridof the ministerof warand his wife, the high-ranking bureaucratJorge
Latorreand the consejerosdeIndiasN. Albizuand FranciscoJavierCaso.
26 Pedro Ferrera, Jose Aguilar,AgustinCasero,JuanLe6n,Jose Gazas,and MiguelMore to
CaptainGeneral,Santiagode Cuba, Aug. I831,ANC, I.G.H.,afio i831i, leg. 417, exp. I6.
27 Confidentialreportby the commander 5
generalof the DepartamentoOriental,attached
to letterby Vives to Villanueva,Havana,7 Dec. 1831,ANC, I.G.H., afio 1831,leg. 417,
exp. i6. See also Villanuevato CaptainGeneral,Havana,17 Oct. 1831,ibid.
 Bureaucratic Cuba 481
inNineteenth-Century
Corruption
sentence the ousting of severalmid-rankingofficers,thereafterprohibited
from holding public office. However, the guilty individualswere not im-
prisoned.The mildpunishmentinflictedin theselegallyverifiedcasesof cor-
ruptionwas also inefficaciousbecause,yearslater,at least one of the ousted
officersheld anotherpublicpost.28In other corruptiontrialsin Santiagode
Cuba,the judgesandlawyersaccusedof briberyand sponsoringillegalslave
dealsremainedunpunished.29
The liberalisedslavetradeto Cubawas challengedby the 1817 agreement
betweenthe BritishandSpanishcrownsto prohibitthe slavetradein Spanish
possessionsby 30 May 1820.30 This measure,which also outlawedthe pur-
chase of slaves from illegalshipments,was supervisedby the Britishnavy
anddiplomaticagents.Plantersin CubaneededslavesfromAfrica(bozales) to
supply the labour for
necessary sugarproduction, but the ban increased the
cost of importingslavesto Cuba,jeopardisingthe interestsof plantersand
the exorbitantprofits of slave traders.3'Consequently,a connivingunder-
standingbetween planters,slave traffickers(negreros) and corrupt officials
facilitatedthe clandestineand systematicarrivalof bozales,who were swiftly
taken to privateestates where authoritiesseldom enforced their inquiries.
This type of corruptiondid not causeloss of officialrevenuessince Spanish
fiscalauthoritiescould no longer chargeduties on illegallyimportedslaves.
However,illegalentryof slavesto Cuba,oiled by the bribingof authorities,
causedsocialand humanharmfor the personalgain of a few, and it placed
Spain'sdiplomaticprestigeand foreigncreditat stake.Moreover,this unof-
ficialset of rulesseriouslyunderminedlegalandinstitutionalbasesin Cuba.32

28 ANC, Hac., afio I834, leg. 418, no. 39. In 1842 Morales Tulleda held the position of
paid by the Ministry of the Navy, Provincial Intendant Jose Aguila to the
comisarioordenador
Ministry of Hacienda, Santiago de Cuba, 19 April 1842. AHN, U.C.H., leg. 637 (2), exp. 34,
doc. 2.
29 AHN, Ultramar-Cuba-Gracia y Justicia (U.C.G.J.), leg. 1613
(i), exp. 5, docs. 3 and 5;
exp. i, doc. i.
30 On official corruption linked to illegal slave trading, see David R. Murray, OdiousCommerce:
Britain,Spain,and theAbolitionof the CubanSlaveTrade(Cambridge, 1980); Robert Paquette,
Sugaris MadewithBlood:TheConspiragy of La EscaleraandtheConflict
BetweenEmpiresOver
Slaveryin Cuba(Middletown,CT, 1988);and EnriqueSosa Rodriguez,Negreros catalanesy
gaditanosenla tratacubanaI827-1833
(Havana,1998).
31 See, for
example,the case of Antonio Frias, a conspicuous slave merchant,father of
FranciscoFriasyJacot,Condede Pozos Dulces, and father-in-law of NarcisoL6pez: 'una
empresacomo la de embiarun barcoen buscade esclavosal Africa,decidela suertey la
fortunade negociantesacaudalados,y de un golpe los deja u opulentos o miserables'.
Petitionin the name of Frias,Madrid,i Oct. 1819. AHN, U.C.H., leg. 808 (z), exp.
I7,
doc. 4, ff. 26v-27v.
32 Anotherformal
treatyoutlawingthe slavetradesignedbetweenBrazilandGreatBritainin
1826 was not enforceduntil 1850(QueirozLaw),when the Brazilianpoliticalelitedecided
to effectivelyeradicatethe illegaltradeof slaves,accordingto one specialist,in orderto
precludeslave rebellions,especiallyamong recentarrivals.Unlike Spanishcolonialauth-
oritiesin Cuba,Brazilianauthoritiesthus acted to avoid jeopardisingthe institutionsand
482 Alfonso W
1Quiroz
The first officially recorded case of illegal slave trade was that of the
Spanish brigantine Fellus conspicuously arriving in Havana with 168 slaves
on November I 1820, a date beyond that allowed by the 1817 treaty.33
Among the numerous subsequent, and more covert, entries of slaves, one of
the most prominent occurred through the port of Mariel in 1833 under the
organisation of Lieutenant Colonel Antonio L6pez Mendoza. Yet, Captain
General Mariano Ricafort did not punish L6pez. To avoid inquiries into his
own administration, Ricafort simply pointed to his past meritorious service
and faithful compliance with the royal prohibition on the slave trade.34Other
captain generals also engaged in such shady deals and administrative per-
missiveness for personal and political motivations.
In conjunction with official sheltering of the prohibited slave trafficking,
increased administrativecorruption in the 8zos intertwined the strategic and
political interests of loyalist bureaucrats,the military,and the senior colonial
authorities. The honesty and discipline of public servants and troops had
declined considerably during the administration of Captain General Vives
(1823-32) and that of his successor Ricafort (1832-4). Spain had lost almost
all of its Spanish American colonies by the mid I8 zos, resulting in an inten-
sified loyalist influx that was a factor in the weakening of colonial bureau-
cratic regulation within Cuba. Vives made a shrewd use of his enhanced
political-military powers to repress any signs of creole pro-independence
movements and conspiracies inspired by other Spanish American struggles.
He had to establish a pragmatic understating with the emergent peninsular
and loyalist militarypersonnel arrivingfrom an absolutist Spain and its former
Spanish American territories. The declining morale of the defeated forces,
combined with notorious indiscipline among new recruitsarrivingfrom Spain,
threatened to weaken Vives' stance against Cuban pro-independence con-
spiracies.a5Therefore, in return for a staunch, loyalist support of Spanish rule

stabilityof theirimperialconstitutional
order.Dale Graden,'An Act "Evenof Public
Security": SlaveResistance,
SocialTensions,andtheEndof theInternational
SlaveTrade
to i83 5-1856,' HispanicAmericanHistorical
Review,vol. 76, no. 2 (1996),pp. 249-82.
33 Brazil,
CaptainGeneralJuanManuelCagigalto Intendant Alejandro Ramirez, HavanaII Dec.
82zo,ANC,Gobierno SuperiorCivil(G.S.C.),
afio i8zo,leg. 1675,no. 837I5.
34 'Espediente formadosobrelaquejaquedael administrador derentasrealesdelMarielcon
respectoal desembarco de un cargamento de negrosbozalesporel bergantin [espafiol]
'TresAmigos'cuyadescargadispusose hicierael comandante Dn. AntonioL6pez
Mendoza',ANC, G.S.C.,afio 1833,leg. io22, no. 354z5.For Ricafort's requestto be
exonerated fromajuicioderesidencia.
AHN,U.C.G.J., 3
leg. 6i (z),exp.39.
35 As earlyas 1823 politicalandadministrativeconflictsandabusesin PuertoPrincipe were
stirredby the presenceof the unrulyexpeditionary regimentof Le6nstationedthere.
Publicoutrage in PuertoPrincipe andHavanademanded thecaptain general'scompliance
with royalordersto transferthe regimentelsewhere.'Nuevasocurrencias en Puerto
Principe,'El Americano Libre,No. 38, 9 February 1823,pp. 6-8; 'PuertoPrincipe,'El
RevisorPolitico
Literario(Habana, 1823),no. 38,28 May3823,pp. 1-7.
 Bureaucratic in Nineteenth-Century
Corruption Cuba 48 3

in Cuba, Vives condoned flagrantadministrativeabuses that

(espanolismo)
constituteddifferentforms of corruption.36
The unprecedentedinformalrulescondoningillicitadministrative activities
establisheda new ratio between the costs and benefits of engagingin cor-
ruption,a calculationthat increasinglyfavouredcorruptoptions among the
colonialadministrators.The allowancegrantedto loyalistrankand file con-
tributedfurthermoreto theirunrulinessand to a rise in overallcrimelevels
by the time captaingeneralMiguelTac6n took commandof the island on
I June I834.

Evolving corruption(Ig34-68)

During his administration Tac6n (1834-8) aimed at improving the enforce-

ment of public order and military and administrative discipline. He faced
an alarming degree of demoralisation and corruption in Cuba just after
Fernando VII's death, which unleashed a serious dynastic and political tur-
moil in Spain known as the first Carlist War."7Tac6n attributed the high
incidence of crime in Havana and its environs to the presence of thousands
of unemployed, white and coloured persons often engaged in gambling,
fraud, and fraudulent litigation. Havana was a haven for many loyalists de-
feated and dispossessed by Spanish American independence as well as being
a destination point for unruly peninsular recruits and political exiles from
war-tornSpain.38
According to Tac6n, the municipalpolice in Havana was ineffective
againstcrimeas well as abusivetowardstore-ownersandthe public.39Private
contractorssupplyingfood to prisonerseffectivelymaximisedtheir profits
by starvingthem. Abuses in the administrationof militaryhospitalswere
notorious. Militarydiscipline had reached very low levels. Troops per-
formedcustodialservicesfor privateparties.Even worse, troops 'employed

36 Justo Zaragoza,Las deCuba.Apuntespara deestaIslaenelpresente

insurrecdones la historiapolitica
siglo(Madrid,1873), 2 vols., cited by Benjaminde Cespedes,Laprostitudncinenla cdudaddela
Habana,prologueby EnriqueJose Varona(Havana,i888), pp. 7I-2. One such case of
bureaucraticcondoningof zealousnessand abuseinvolvedaccusationsagainsta 36-year-
old retiredsergeantof the coloured Batall6nde Pardos,Pedro Cortes, for supposedly
pronouncingsubversivewords againstSpaniardsin afondaowned by a Spaniard:ANC,
Comisi6nMilitar(C.M.),afio I826, leg. 4, exp. 2.
37 Reactionary protestagainstliberalchangein Spainopposed the successionof Fernando's
daughter,Isabel,favouringhis brotherCarlos.Civilwarandregionalfactionalismensued:
Esdaile,Spain,pp. 6 5-8.
38 ManuelMoreno
Fraginalsand Jose Moreno Mas6, Guerra,migracidn y muerte(El ejrcito
espaolen Cubacomoviamigratoria) (Colombres,Asturias,1993), PP 47-50.
9 MiguelTac6n,Relacidn delGobierno General
y Capitania
Superior dela IsladeCubaestendidapor el
TenienteGeneraldonMzguelTacdn, marquisdela Uniende Cubaal hacerentregadedichosmandos a
elExmo.SedorJoaquin
su sucesor deEzpeleta(Mexico,1838),pp. 5-7.
484 Alfonso W1Quiroz
themselves in protecting precisely that which they were supposed to punish'.40
After the mandatory three or four years of militaryservice, common soldiers
were not sent back to Spain because new recruits were not arrivingin suf-
ficient numbers. Many forced recruits had been sentenced for crimes in
Spain and were 'corrupted people' who contributed to the low morality of
the army's units.41Tac6n attempted to reorganise the army and police to gain
the loyalty of the 'worthy defenders of the rights of Isabel II and national
integrity'.42
It is not surprisingthat corruptpracticesat higherlevels did not surface
sufficientlyin Tac6n's officialgovernmentalaccountof 1838.His open en-
mity towardthe creole elite, and his relianceon peninsularcapitalistslinked
to the forbiddenslave trade,attractedharshcriticism.43 TacOnwas accused
of receivingbriberypaymentsper each slaveillegallyintroducedto Cubaup
to a total of 450,000 pesos.44(At the time an adultmaleslavewas worth 400
pesos.) His contractingdeals for militaryand publicworks were also ques-
tioned, especiallycontracts for arms supplies with slave traderJulian de
Zulueta,and the buildingof a new fish market,and the Teatro'Tac6n' with
the rag-to-richesCatalanbusinessmanand slave traderFranciscoMartiy
Torrens.45 Creolereformists,such asJose Antonio Saco,who insistedon the
strictobservanceof the lawsbanningthe slavetrade,becameswornenemies
of Spanish authorities, negreros,
and loyalists.46

40 Ibid.,pp.
41 Report by 44-5.
FranciscoVelasco, commanderof the Havanaregiment,to Tac6n, i6 Oct.
1834,ibid.,appendix5, pp. 65-7. 42 Ibid.,p. 50.
43 Accordingto Tac6n- embitteredby the 'ingratitudde los Americanos'he had experi-
enced in otherpartsof SpanishAmerica- the 'hijos del pais' in Cubacarried'en la masa
de la sangresu tendenciaa sacudirsu dominaci6nde la Metr6poli... Proporcionaseles
ocasi6nde desplegarsu genio,y ellaabortariaotrarepuiblica quizamaisborrascosay menos
morigeradaquelas que se danen los antiguosdominiosespafioles'.Tac6nto Secretariode
lo Interior,No. 13 Reservado,Habana, 31 Jan. 1836 (re-affirmingand citing his own
previous reporton 30 June 1835), ServicioHist6rico Militar,Madrid(hereafterSHM),
Documentos de Cuba(D.C.),caja65, doc. 5745.6,pp. 4-Io.
44 JuanPerezde la Riva,'Introducci6n:el generaldon MiguelTac6ny su epoca',in Perezde
la Riva (ed.), Correspondencia
reservadadel CapitdnGeneraldonMiguelTacdnconelgobierno de
Madrid,I834-i836(Havana,I963), pp. 41-3, citingDomingo del Monte,Escritos(Havana,
1929), vol. i, p. 143; Paquette,Sugaris MadeWithBlood,pp. 9z, 135 ; Jose Cayuela,Bahia
de Ultramar. Espaiay Cubaen el sigloXIX. El controlde las relaciones coloniales
(Madrid,
1993), p. 233.
45 Paquette,Sugaris MadeWithBlood,p. 218; Angel BahamondeandJose Cayuela,Hacerlas
Amiricas.Las ilitescolonials enel sigloXZX (Madrid,1991),pp. 34-5; Anonymous,
espafiolas
deun
Apuntadciones empleado de Real
Hacienda envindicacidn General
dela Superintendencia Delegada
sedorcondede Villanueva... (Key West, I 838),
de la Isla de Cuba, bajoel mandodel escelentisimo
P. 9.
46 Fernando Ortiz, 'Prologue,' in Jose Antonio Saco, Historiade la esclavitudde la ragaafricana
en el Nuevo Mundoy en espedialen lospaisesamiico-hispanos(Havana, 19 38), pp. xxv-xxiii.
 Bureaucratic
Corruption Cuba 485
in Nineteenth-Century
The local financial needs of Tac6n's government and its venal peninsular
entourage collided with Intendant General Villanueva's local and overseas
financial responsibilities. Villanueva supervised the allocations and expenses
of the local bureaucracy, military, official contractors, development office
(Junta de Fomento), and other semi-official educational and charitable
agencies in Cuba. Pressed by mounting local expenditures and fund transfers
to Spain under his responsibility, Villanueva denied Tac6n the allocation of
public funds for his special projects and military operations, including an
expedition in 1836 against General Manuel Lorenzo's radicalliberal uprising
in Santiago de Cuba.47In consequence, Tac6n used less orthodox means to
raise funds, setting up an account in the local branch of the government's
Banco de San Fernando aided by the bank's director, the conspicuous pen-
insular slave traffickerJoaquin G6mez, and the peninsular merchant and
landowner Conde de la Reuni6n de Cuba. This bank account received so-
called 'voluntary donations' from private depositors, who were granted
preference in the 'consignment of seized illegal slaves (negrosemandipados)
under established rules and responsibilities'.48
Villanueva was in a particularlydelicate situation as intendant general in
the I83os and I840s, when the deficit-ridden metropolitan treasury de-
pended heavily on Cuban revenues. Villanueva was committed to providing
the metropolitan government and its foreign creditors with a reliable source
of income.49 Villanueva's position and prestige depended on securing and
delivering these requests from Spain for income, whereas Tac6n engaged
with loyalist, anti-creole, peninsular capitalists and slave traders..5Villanueva,
a former representative of the reformist creole elite with strong local in-
terests, had reached an accommodation with suspect royal circles, and a
sizable portion of the transfers Villanueva sent officially to Spain provided
the official personal emolument (asignacidn)of approximately a million
pesos per year to the queen regent, Maria Cristina.51

47Anonymous, deunempleado,
Apuntaciones pp. 3-4.
48 delGobierno
Tac6n,Relacidn p. 43.
Superior,
49 Spanishshort-termdebt was financedthroughinterest-and discount-bearing IOUs
honouredbytheCubantreasury.
(libranZas) TheSpanishgovernment's included
creditors
the Rothschildsof London.At theirmaturity,the creditors'agentspresentedthese
libranzasfor discountandpaymentin Havana.LibranZas yielded11 percentshort-term
interestand18percentdiscountrate:AHN,U.C.H.,leg.618,exp.10,doc. i.
50 In 1824 Villanueva providedthe government in Madrid400,000 pesos'con su propio
credito'at a timeof imperialcrisis.Anonymous, deunempleado,
Apuntaciones p. 21.
51Between1834and1839regular revenuetransfers fromCubaconservatively amounted to
9.5
approximately per cent (more if extraordinary transfersare taken into of
account)
the totalmetropolitan overallrevenues,a considerable increasefrompractically nothing
in 1813-1819. FranciscoComin,Lascuentas dela hacienda en Espa~ia(sgoo-z8yy)
preliberal
(Madrid, 1990),pp. 48-9, 84-5. In the I83osVillanueva tappedfiscalresourcesto pay
up to 3 millionpesosperyearin libranzas, issuedin SpainagainsttheHavanatreasury and
486 Alfonso W.QuiroZ

Fig. I. An annexationist mockingthe succession

engraving of command between twocaptaingenerals.
Leopoldo O'DonnellleavesCubawithhisfamilyloaded Roncalimilks
Federico
withthespoilsofcorruption.
thecowofCuba'streasuryandwealth.ClaudioMartinezdePinillosCondede Villanueva, intendant
treasury
general,assists the
byholding cow's
head. Othersubaltern demand
authorities theirpart.'The milk cow
and her milkers'. Authorunknown. HinckleyEngraver,
Philadelphia, ca. 1848.FondoConradoW1
Massaguer Diag, ANC.

Villanueva'sstrategic financialresponsibilitiesattractedvirulent accu-

sations of corruptionlinked to the highest metropolitanauthoritiesin the
1830S.52A laterpro-annexationistcartoondepictedhim as a creole admin-
istratorwho assistedthe plunderingof Cubanfunds by colonialauthorities
(see Figure I). An expressionof the interestedview of a sector of Cuban
public opinion in exile, this caricatureexpressesa radicalpoliticalview bit-
terlyopposed to Spanishcolonialand financialcontrolin Cuba.
In 1849 Villanuevaacted as the legal representativeof Agustin Mufioz
Sa~nchez,Duque de Riansares- the plebeiansecond husbandof the Spanish
securedby customsrevenuesand emergencywartaxes.In I840 regularand extraordinary
obligationsin libranzas
amountedto 5.4 millionpesos that year.AHN, U.C.H., leg. 621,
exp. 7, doc. I5.
52 Anonymous,Verdaderas causasenquedonJuanAlvarezyMendizabal su opinidnpara
hafundado
queenla islade Cubano ria la constitucidn
politicadela monarquia (Bourdeaux,1837),
espanola
pp. 5-17.
 Bureaucratic in Nineteenth-Century
Corruption Cuba 487

queen mother MariaCristina53 - in establishinga partnershipin Havana

in 1844 between Mufioz,as shareholderand creditor,and Antonio Parejo,
a slave traderand merchant.54Mufioz and MariaCristinahad been Villa-
nueva's powerful contacts in Spain before their political fall in I840.
Mufioz'sconnectionsin Cuba contributedto publicperceptionsof glaring
corruption at the very top of the Spanish administration.55Maria Cristina
herself was identified as the head of an influential and wealthy 'slave-
trafficking society' (sociedadnegrera)based in Madrid with partners and
agents in Cuba.56However, captain generals and other colonial authorities
in Cuba had greater opportunities of becoming the main beneficiaries of the
illegal slave trade.
Substantial evidence exists to show the leniency and interested collusion
of several captain generals, and other high-ranking bureaucratsand military,
with the slave trade. In fact, among Cuba's captain generals between 1834
and I869 only Ger6nimo Valdes and Juan de la Pezuela seem not to have
been involved in the allowance of slave trading. Both displayed earnest
efforts at curbing the slave trade. Valdes (1841-3) was recognised even
by radical creoles as an honest authority that avoided illegal enrichment.57
The efforts by Pezuela (1853-4) to mend diplomatic relations with Great
Britain - by persecuting the banned slave trading, searching for illegally

53 Maria Cristina had secretly married Mufioz in December I833 soon after the death of her
first husband, Fernando VII; the morganatic marriage was publicly formalised only in
1844 and Mufioz granted the title of duque de Riansares. Eduardo Rico, Maria Cristina,la
reinaburguesa(Barcelona, 1994); Wenceslao Ramirez, La reinagobernadora doraMaria Cristina
deBorbdn(Madrid, I925), pp. 161-2; ANC, C.M., afio 1834, leg. io, no. 2, with inserts: 'De
Oficio', Diario de La Habana, no. i22 (2 May I834), p. i, in reference to an article in
Le CourrierdesEtats-Unis, vol. 7, no. i i (New York, 5 April 1834), p. 63.
54 Bahamonde and Cayuela, Hacer las Amiricas, p. 312; deeds of formation (1844) and dis-
solution (1849) of Sociedad Comercial 'Agustin [Mufioz] Sinchez-Antonio Parejo', Ar-
chivo Hist6rico de Protocolos Notariales de Madrid, prot. no. z5,888. I thank Professor
Jose Cayuela for providing xerox copies of these documents.
55 Angel Bahamonde and Jose Cayuela, 'Entre La Habana, Paris y Madrid: intereses
antillanos y trasvase de capitales de Maria Cristina de Borb6n y el duque de Riansares
(1835-1873),' Estudios de Historia Social, nos. 44-7 (1988), pp. 635-49; Esdaile, Spain,
pp. 99, 105; 'Secuestro de Bienes de Sa. Maria Cristina de Borb6n [Bienes Nacionales],
184-18 54.' AHN, Fondos Contempor.neos-Ministerio de Hacienda-Serie General, leg.
2581 (i). On Maria Cristina's investment in sugar estates see Thomas, Cuba,pp. 137, 154,
221, citing Juan Perez de la Riva, 'Riesgo y ventura de San Martin', Revistade la Biblioteca
NacionalJosi Marti (June 1967).
56 Editors of La Verdad,Cuestidnnegrerade la isla de Cubapor los editores de 'La
y colaboradores
Verdad'(New York, 1), p.
185 5.
57 Editors of La Verdad,ThoughtsUpontheIncorporation of CubaintotheAmericanConfederation, in
Contra-Position to ThosePublished1y donJosiAntonio Saco (New York, 1849), p. 4. Cayuela,
Bahia de Ultramar,p. 233, confirms this opinion of Valdes; Paquette, Sugaris Made With
Blood,pp. I45-6. British politicians agreed that Valdes did not take bribes, Murray, Odious
Commerce, p. I183.
 W
488 Alfonso1Quirog
introducedbotales,and correctingabuses againstemancipados- led him into
seriousconflictwith local negreros,
slave owners,and corruptauthorities.58
All the other captaingenerals of this period- Miguel Tac6n, Joaquin
Ezpeleta, Pedro Tellez de Gir6n, Leopoldo O'Donnell, Federico Roncali,
Jose Gutierrezde la Concha, Valentin Cafiedo, Francisco Serrano,and
Domingo Dulce - were lenient towardthe illegalslave trade,activelypro-
59These corruptac-
tected it or receivedillegalpaymentsby slave traders.
tivities were carefullymonitored and documented by British diplomatic
agents and navy officers.An importantBritishinformer,the radicalabol-
itionist David Turnbull,certainlyexaggeratedsome of his accusations,but
evidence of official high-rankingcorruptionlinked to illegal slave trading
in Cuba is amply documentedin British official diplomaticarchivesand
publications.60
In July 1839, during Ezpeleta's administration,the coastal schooner
'Amistad'was violentlyhijackedby 53 bozaleswho were being transported
from Havanato Puerto Principe.This action caused a majorinternational
scandal,which unmaskedthe double standardsof authoritiesin Cuba re-
garding the slave trade.61 O'Donnell (1843-8) expressly favoured slave
traders,took bribesthat madehim wealthy(see Figurei), and launchedthe
cruel repressionof the conspiracyof La Escalerathat made scapegoatsof
prominent free blacks. Roncali (1848-5o) believed in keeping creole de-
mandsat bayby preservingthe relativelylargesize of the slavepopulation.62
This could only be achievedby allowingnew, illegalshipmentsof slaves.
During the firstadministrationof Gutierrezde la Concha(1850-2) the en-
tranceof slavesremainedundiminished.It increaseddramatically by twofold
undercaptaingeneralCafiedo(1852-3).63
Captain General Pezuela unveiled a grim state of official corruption
in I854. He reported challenges to his authorityby greedy 'peninsular
58 Pezuela to Minister of War, Havana 21 Sept. 1854. AHN, U.C.G., leg. 4648 (2), exp. 37,
doc. 2. Pezuela, however, had other racially biased, anti-annexionist motivations. See
Joan Casanovas,Bread,or Bullets!UrbanLaborandSpanishColonialism
in Cuba,i8yo-Is89
(Pittsburgh, 1998), p. 69.
59 Cayuela,Bahiade Ultramar, pp. 234-7; Murray,OdiousCommerce,
passim.,Paquette,Sugar
is MadeWithBlood,pp. 139, 145-6.
60 PublicRecordOffice (Kew,London),ForeignOfficeRecords,F.O. 84 (SlaveTrade),well
researchedby Murrayand Paquette.See also BritishParliamentayPapersonSlaveTrade,
and
Juan Perez de la Rivaand AurelioCortes,'I86o. Un diplomaticoinglesinformasobre la
trataclandestinaen Cuba:Jos. TuckerCrawford,'Revistadela Biblioteca Marti,
NacionalJosi
vol. 63, no. 1 (1972), pp. 8 5-107.
61 ANC, G.S.C., afio I839, leg. 1272, exp. 49909; Howard Jones, Mutinyon theAmistad: The
Saga of a SlaveRevoltand its Impacton AmericanAbolition, Law, and Diplomagy(New York,
1987); Paquette, Sugaris Made WithBlood,p. 188.
62
SHM, D.C., caja 66, no. 5746.39, 133-50.
63 Hondeau to Conde de Alcoy, Madrid 7 Feb. 3. AHN, U.C.G., leg. 3549, exp. i, doc.
I85 5;
ibid., leg. 4642 (i), exp. 12, doc. i.
 Bureaucratic in Nineteenth-Century
Corruption Cuba 489

Catalans',64 'traffickersof negroesandotherpeople of low life', anda group

self-denominated'Friendsof GeneralConcha'.Among the lattergroup he
identified'drunkardsand trickstersled by the clericalofficial [oficial
desecre-
taria],on whose head dangleda deathsentence ... [Dionisio]Galiano... all
of whom are set to transformthroughany means availablethe unfortunate
governmentof this island into one of partisanship,intolerance,and ex-
clusivity'.65Pezuela, acting as ad hoc treasuryintendant general, ousted
five employeesof the customsadministration in Matanzasdue to their'lack
of morals and bad behaviour'.66 He also ousted the lieutenantgovernors
and treasuryofficials of Trinidadand Sancti Spiritusfollowing the illegal
introductionof 650obozales in those jurisdictions.67
The alliancebetween corruptofficials,intolerantloyalists,slave traders,
andgovernmentcontractorswas consolidatedunderthe second,centralising
administrationof Gutierrezde la Concha(1854-8). Gutierrezde la Concha
blamedPezuelafor riskingthe loss of supportfrom loyalists(partido penin-
sular)with his moralisingand anti-slavetrademeasuresamid annexationist
threats.68The formationof a volunteermilitia,the Cuerpode Voluntariosby
Gutierrezde la Concha in 1855, proved fateful in reinforcingthe partido
peninsularandthe corrupttendenciesin its midst.The loyalistcoalitionplayed
a centralrole in the growingtide of administrativecorruptionthat reached
its peakduringthe Ten Years'War(1868-78).Despite mountingcorruption,
Gutierrezde la Conchagave only rhetoricalsupportfor the repressionof
the illegalslave trade.He admittedthat limitingthe slave tradewas 'a sad
necessityif we only considerthe immoralityand corruptionthat this wide-
spreadcensuredtrafficcarrieswith it'.69
In i86o CaptainGeneralFranciscoSerrano(i 859-62) reportedwith em-
barrassmentthe scandalouslandingof 6o00bozalesin Trinidadallowed by
public officers bribed by Serrano'sown relative,Jose MarianoBorrell.70

64 Pezuelato Presidentof Council

of Ministers,Havana18 May I854. AHN, U.C.G., leg.
4642 (I), exp. 6, doc. i.
65 Pezuelato Ministerof
War,Havana21 Sept. 1854.AHN, U.C.G., leg. 4648 (2), exp. 37,
doc. 2.
66
Pezuela to President of Council of Ministers, Havana 17 Feb. 18 54. AHN, U.C.H., leg. 68 8
(I), exp. i. See also D.M. Estorch,Apuntespara dela administracidn
la historia delmarquis
dela
Pezuelaenla IsladeCubadesde 3 dedidembre
dei8}3hasta21 desetiembrede81g4(Madrid,1856),
pp. 8-io.
67 SHM,
D.C., May-July1854,xerox copies kindlyprovidedbyJose Cayuela.
68 Jose Gutierrezde la
Concha,Memoria al Exmo.Sr.D. Francisco
dirzgida Serranoy Domingue7,
CapitainGeneral dela IsladeCuba(Madrid,I 861),pp. 6-7. 69
Ibid.,p. 1I.
70 'I861. Desembarco de negros en Trinidad; cantidad destinada al marques de Torremejia'.
AHN, U.C.G., leg. 4648, exp. IG6,docs. i-9. Letters from Serrano to Minister of War,
Havana12 Nov. 1860; 12 Dec. 1860;6 Jan. 186i, ibid.,docs. I, 2, and
5.
 W
490 Alfonso1Quiroz
Serranoattempteda swift closureof this affairwithoutwaitingupon a legal
inquest,arguingthatin Cubait was impossible
... to conductjudicialinquiriesof satisfactoryresults.Everyonewho bringsin
negroesthinkshe is doinga greatserviceto thecountry... I couldcitenotonebuta
multitudeof examplesof prominentpersonsof highsocialstandingwho defend
with ardourthe illegalentryof negroes... whichis esteemeda meritorious deed
oftendescribed as patriotic,
andso no one is willingto declareas a formalwitness
againstthoseauthorities thatbetraytheirduties.71
In 1863CaptainGeneralDulce (1862-6, 1869)admittedhavingbeen de-
ceived by the politicalgovernorof Havana,PedroA. de Navascues,regard-
ing 700 slaves smuggled through Cienfuegos and held in a dangerously
crowded estate. The insubordinateNavascuesreceiveda substantialbribe
from the traffickersand openly defied Dulce's authority.72 Captaingenerals
also faced a complex situation regardingthe legal aspect of curtailing
the slavetrade.In I853 Cafiedowas confrontedby the concernedauthorities
in Madrid,underdiplomaticpressureby the British,to explainthe increase
in illegallyintroducedslaves under his administration.He repliedthat his
previouseffortsat persecutingthe slave tradehad clashedwith three main
obstacles:the lack of generalcollaborationdue to a publicopinion favour-
able to the slave trade;the divisionof jurisdictionswhich limitedhis auth-
ority; and the existing legal provisions (article9 of the I845 Penal Law)
protectingslave owners and hinderingofficialsearchesof boZales in private
properties.73
Gutierrezde la Concha,under similarpressurefrom Madridduringhis
second administration, also indicatedthe legallimitsto his measuresagainst
the slave trade.Moreover,he added informationon a sizable landing of
slaves in Bahia Honda, in April 1855. Eighty-foursick and dying bozales
had been abandonedin the nearbycountrysideto avoidthe riskof exposing
a crime that is
'the officerswho, as is alwaysthe case, are paid by negreros,
not possibleto provein court'.74Localauthoritieshadinspectedwhatturned
out to be false registrationsof slaves in adjacentsugarmills. Gutierrezde
la Concha admittedhaving left this deceit unpunishedto avoid further
legal problemswith the sugarmill owners. He also admittedhaving been

71 Serrano to Minister of War and Ultramar, 6 March I86 . AHN, U.C.G., leg. 4648, exp. I6,
doc. 8.
72 Dulce to Minister of Ultramar, Havana 28 June I863. AHN, U.C.G., leg. 4648 (2), exp. 43,
doc. i; Navascues to Gutierrez de la Concha, Havana 30 June I863, ibid.,doc. 2.
73 Cafiedo to Minister of Ultramar (Conde de Alcoy), Habana 21 March I853. AHN, U.C.G.,
leg. 3549, exp. i, doc. 6. Cafiedo had, in effect, informed Madrid in August 1852 about
the landing of approximately 400 boIales,near Mariel, consigned by the notorious slave
traffickerJoaquin G6mez. AHN, U.C.G., leg. 4637 (2), exp. 61, doc. i.
74 Gutierrez de la Concha to Minister of Ultramar, Habana 20 Feb. I856. AHN, U.C.G., leg.
3549, exp. 5, doc. 4.
 Bureaucratic in Nineteenth-Century
Corruption Cuba 491
informed confidentially and in detail of every illegal arrival of slaves, but
argued that he lacked the legal power to act against the offenders.75
Official complicity in sheltering the illegal slave trade was, then, not a
secret. Offenders often justified this type of corruption originating at the
top as a patriotic effort to keep Cuba under a re-centralized colonial rule
buttressed by divisive racial policies.76 The slave trade became a loyalist
banner and a source of rewards for senior officials avowedly defending the
colony against internal uprisings and external invasions. For example, the
lieutenant governor of Guanabacoa, separated from his post in i85 3 for
collaborating with slave traders and gamblers, argued that he was being
punished for his patriotic gestures and services.77Moreover, this festering
source of duplicity at the top was penetrating the lower ranks of the colonial
administration dominated by loyalist peninsular and pro-peninsular creole
employees. As Guti&rrezde la Concha argued:
... colludedmalfeasance... is alwaysvery difficultto prove, and for that practiced
by officers and slave traffickersit is absolutelyimpossible to obtain the slightest
proof. State employeesand officerswho in public and notorious fashion connive
with negreros turn againstthe authorityseekingto punish them, accusingit of un-
fairness and arbitrarinesswith the certaintythat nothing will be legally proven
againstthem. The loss of an officialpost ... is insignificantcomparedto receiving
pile upon pile of gold ounces as rewardfor the officer'sconnivance... insteadthe
honourandprestigeof the governmentplummets,immoralityandcorruptionreigns
in all the administrativesphere,and new and grave problemsoccur between Her
Majesty'sgovernmentand thatof GreatBritain.78
This official recognition of corruption, expanding from a core linked to
the illegal slave trade into other administrative sectors during the I 85os
and 186os, is corroborated by different sources including cumbersome and
inconclusive legal proceedings.79

75 'Yo he tenidopuesconocimiento de esosdesembarcos;

de todoslos incidentes se, pero
todo confidencialmente, con todaseguridad, entreque propietarios se han distribuido
los negros,las fincasen queestaban,y la participaci6nquehantenidolos empleados y
funcionariosdelGobierno,y hastaquedinerohanrecibido',ibid.
76 Forconfidential opinionsof keycaptaingenerals,
regardinga centralised
controlon Cuba
througha consciousracial'checkandbalance'ofpeninsulares,creoles,freepeopleof color,
andAfricanslaves,see Roncalito Ministrode Gobernaci6n, Havana9 Set. 1850,SHM,
D.C.,caja66,No. 5746.I9,ff. 133-50;Gutierrez de la Conchato Ministrode Goberna-
ci6n,Havana2 July1851,ibid.,ff. I83-94.
77 Exposici6n de VicenteGuillknBuzarain, 6 Oct. 1853. AHN, U.C.G.,exp. 15, docs. z
and 3.
78 Gutierrezde laConchato Minister Havanazo Feb.1856.AHN,U.C.G.,leg.
of Ultramar,
3549,exp.5,doc.4.
79 In explainingwhy there were severaltrialsinvolvingillicit slave tradingwith sentences
pending, the chief judge of Havana wrote, 'Estos procesos se hacen por lo regular volu-
minosos. El delito principal suele producir otros que afectan la moralidad de los em-
pleados ptiblicos; son negocios complexos que dan lugar a incidentes varios, los cuales
492 Alfonso W1Quiroz
Evidence also indicatesthat smugglingactivitieswere on the rise during
the same period. Customs officialshad the difficulttask of enforcingin-
creasinglyrestrictivetrade policies and higher tariffsthat curbed Cuban
foreign tradesince the I840s. For example,millingand overseastranspor-
tation interestsin Santander,Spain,steadfastlysupporteddrasticlimitations
to foreignwheatandits millingin Cuba.80These tradeobstaclesencouraged
incoming contrabandof wheat and flour from the United States and out-
going contrabandof tobacco.A judgein the port of Nuevitas,investigating
fraudand collusionbetween customs authoritiesand merchantsin the dis-
patch of an Americanvessel, found it difficulteven to start the inquiry
lacking the support of official enforcementagents.81Customs employees
were not paid enough for performingtheir duties, and small rewardsfor
detecting contrabandwere insufficientto encouragehonesty among mid-
and lower-ranking customsofficials.82
In 1857, as a resultof the illegalarrival
of 2z50 barrelsof flourin Matanzas,four customs carabineros and theirchief
lost theirlowly paidposts.83
Corruptionwas also spreadingto other branchesof the colonialadmin-
istration.The revenuesof the profitableand popularlotteryin Cuba,under
official administration,were defraudedin the amount of zo09,232pesos in
1863-4 accordingto a protractedlegal case againsttwo successivetreasury
intendants.84In Havana,animportantregulatinginstitutionemployedofficials

obstruyenla marchadel procedimiento.'Juan FranciscoAlcalde,Discursodeapertura dela

RealAudienda deLa Habana,leidoel2 deenerode1867, porsu regente ... (Havana,I867),
interino
pp. 8-9.
80 Juntade Comerciode Santander,ExposicinquelajuntadeComerdo deSantanderha elevadoa
S.M.la Reinaparaqueprohibala introduccidn detrigosextrangeros
enla islade Cubay Puerto-Rico
(Santander,1849), p. 4. Against high duties on exports of manufacturedtobacco, see
ValentinPardoy Betancourt,Informe ilustrado
y estadistico
quedeordendelSr.Intendente
... sobre
loselementos
deriqueza deltabaco... (Havana,1863),pp. 22-4. On the negativeeffectsof tariff
restrictionsfor Cuba'sterms of trade,see Linda Salvucciand RichardSalvucci,'Cuba
and the Latin AmericanTerms of Trade: Old Theories, New Evidence,'Journalof
History,vol. 21, no. 2 (2000), pp. 197-222.
Interdisciplina~y
81 Angel MariaRevolta to TreasuryIntendant,Nuevitas 30 June 1854, in 'Expediente
promovidopor el Juzgadode la Intendenciasobre fraudescometidospor la Aduanade
Nuevitas en el despachode la barcaamericana"Giralt"'. ANC, G.S.C.,afio 1854,leg.
1665,no. 83221.
82 'Distribuci6nde [39,892]pesos que tubieroningreso en la caja particularde comisos,
importedel rematede 4,350 millaresde tabacoque resultaronescedentes... en la fragata
francesa "Clementina"...', Havana 19 Jan. 1852, in 'Expediente relativo a la re-
clamacionessuscitadasentre D. Ram6n Martinezy D. PatricioMariaPaz ...'. ANC,
G.S.C.,afio 1854,leg. 1665,exp. 83211.
83 'Expediente... sobrela separaci6ndel aventajadoDn. CarlosCastroy varioscarabineros
a consecuenciade un desembarcode harinay cafe qe. trat6 de hacerseen Matanzas'.
ANC, G.S.C.,afio I857, leg. 1174, no. 45751.
84 'Espedientesobre el desfalcoen la Rentade Loteriasde 209,232 pesos [fuertes]y cargos
que se hacena los intendentesde Haciendaque fueron,en los afios 1863a 64, Sres.D. Juan
 Bureaucratic in Nineteenth-Century
Corruption Cuba 493
that repeatedlyengagedin 'open insubordination... in the form of passive
disobedience... and with proven incapacityof executingtasks of even av-
erageimportance'.85Complaintswere raisedagainstofficialcontractorsof
food supply,jailsupervision,andpublicconstructionin the provinces.86 The
official contractorof the overseas mail transportation,Antonio L6pez &
Co. (the owner of which had been engagedin illegalslave traffickingsince
1848) was heavily fined for irregularitiesin fulfillingits responsibilities.87
In 1854 a civilianengineerand architectprotestedagainstthe unfairmon-
opoly and abuseexercisedby militaryengineersin the inspectionand design
of every constructionwork in the island.88'Abuses' and 'embezzlement'
by provincialexecutiveauthoritiesand administrators were often denounced
in officialcorrespondence.89
Attemptsat reformingthe administrationof colonialjustice,widelyrec-
ognisedas corruptandinefficient,includedthe establishmentin 1840of the
Real AudienciaPretorialof Havana aimed at stamping out deep-rooted
'abusesof the forum'.90Courtruleswereintroducedagainstfalsestatements
and the bribingof lawyers,attorneys,and notaries.91 However,as in the case
of other half-heartedreforms, judicialoverhaul floundered.Complaints
againstthe bendingof rulesin the appointmentof judges,and the excessive
numberof lawyersengagedin falsehoodand collusion,were filed in I843.
Disgruntledcriticsallegedthatmanyfamilieshadbeen ruinedbecauseof the

de Arizay Palomary D. IsidroWallcondeArmildezde Toledo'.AHN, U.C.H.,leg. 800 (2),

exp. Io, docs. I, 3, 4.
85 CaptainGeneralto Ministerof WarandUltramar,29Jan. 1863 [copy],referringto second
officerD. FelixBarro,in 'Documentos sobreabusoscometidosen la Inspecci6nGeneral
de Sociedad An6nimas, [Mercantiles],de Seguros y Ferrocarriles'.ANC,
GobiernoGeneral(G.G.),afio 1863,leg. 84, no. 3442. Mtutuos
86 'Expediente... promovidopor variosvecinos de Matanzassobre abusosque se cometen
en el Presidiode aquellaciudad',ANC, G.S.C.,afio I86o, leg. 40, no. 2739; 'Expediente
promovidosobre abusosen la construcci6nde un matadero.Guantainamo'. ANC, G.G.,
leg. 13, exp. 378.
87 'Multasimpuestasa la empresade vaporescorreostransatlinticos:90 mil pesos fuertes.
Por faltascometidasen el cumplimientode las contratas.L6pez y Cia.',1862-1863. AHN,
U.C.G.,leg. 4648 (I), exp. I8, docs. 1-3; MartinRodrigoy Alharilla,AntonioLopeuyLopez
(d8i7-i883)
primermarquis deComillas.Un empresarioy susempresas(Madrid,1996),p. 16.
88 'D. JuanAugan, lamando la
atenci6nsobre un abuso que se comete en esta Isla por el
cuerpomilitar'.ANC, G.S.C.,afio 1854,leg. 18, no. Io28.
89 'Espediente incidentalde otro promovido por el teniente gobernadorde Sa. Ma. del
Rosariode abuso de autoridaden los partidosde aquellajurisdicci6n'.ANC, G.S.C.,afio
1853,leg. iii16, no. 41519; 'Expedientepromovidopor el alcaldede Villa Clarapregun-
tando si el desfalco ocurridoen la administraci6nde aquellapoblaci6n ha ocasionado
perjuicioal serviciopublico'.ANC, I.G.H., afio 1863, leg. 774, no. 50.
Joaquin Ezpeleta y Erice, Discursoque en la solemneaperturade la RealAudiendcia
90so Pretorialde la
Habana el dia 2 de enerode I84opronuncidsupresidente... (Havana, 1840), pp. 3-4.
91 Audiencia Pretorial de la Havana, Auto acordado de la Audiendcia
Pretorialde la Habana en 24 de
febrero de 184o (Havana, I840), pp. 3-7, in AHN, U.C.G.J., leg. 1626 (2), exp. 20, doc. 3.
 W
494 AlfonsoVQuiroz
abusive legal profession and excessive, biased litigation.92Corrupt practices
permeated even the clergy. A bold attempt in 1866 to bribe the minister of
overseas colonies (Ultramar)in Madrid is revealing. The minister was offered
12,000 escudos (6,ooo pesos) for securing an appointment to the post of
archdeacon of Havana's cathedral. An undercover investigation found that
the person seeking to bribe the colonial authority was the priest Juliain
Gonzailez de Benito.93
The combination of all these problems, from misconceived economic
policies to distorted incentives and abusive, corrupt administration en-
couraged in the i86os a renewed movement toward administrative and col-
onial reform, which was fiercely opposed by loyalists and slave owners and
traders. Two successive legal codes (I863-4) for administrative reorganis-
ation, introducing stricter rules for the colonial bureaucracy,did not provide
the comprehensive administrative and political-economic reform demanded
by creole reformists and two reform-minded former captain generals.94
According to the crime statistics of the Audiencia of Havana, offences in-
volving 'the exercise of public duties and professions', punishable with
'dismissal and suspension', increased almost ioo per cent between 1862 and
i866.95 These signs of advancing bureaucratic corruption exploded into
widespread corruption, almost beyond control, during the Ten Years' War.

92 'FranciscoAlvarezde Guevara['espafiolacudeen quejade los empleados de la Islade

Cuba',Havana30 Nov. I843.AHN,U.C.H.,leg.629,exp.2,doc.z. He complains against
the irregularappointment of creoleFernandoO'Reillyin replacement of 'un juezque
vendialajusticia comolibrasdeperas',andcitingamongthemainproblems in Havana'el
ntimerodecincomily picode personasentreabogados, bachilleres,picapleytos,oficiales
de causay testigosfalsos,quecausanla totalruina...
93 'Intentode cohecho',MadridI866.AHN,U.C.G.,leg.4648(2), exp.41,docs.3-12.
94 On officialcentralisingre-organisations, see FranciscoPermanyer, Prqyectodedecretopre-
sentado
a S.M.porelMinistro deUltramar ... paraquesereorganiten deempleados
lasplantillas del
GobiernoSuperiorCivilde Cuba... (Madrid,1863)and Government of Spain,Realesdis-
posiciones la carrera
organirZando administrativa enlasprovincias de Ultramar como tambiin la ad-
ministracin ladeHadenda
dcivily delaIsladeCuba(Havana, I864).Oncreolereformprojects,
see Anonymous, Algunas reformas dela IsladeCuba(London,1865),a pamphlet published
inMadrid,
originally according to theMinister of Ultramar in aletterto authoritiesin Cuba
andPuertoRico,Madrid12June1866,forbidding thecirculation of thispamphlet. AHN,
U.C.G.,leg.4648(1),exp.7, docs.2-3; andCubanDelegatesto theJuntade Informaci6n,
Informacinsobre enCubayPuerto
reformas Rico(NewYork,1867),vol. I, pp.xxix-xxxix.On
pro-reform stancesof formercaptain generals, seeDomingoDulce,Informepresentadopor el
Excmo.Sr.D. Domingo Dulcemarquis deCastellfloriteal MinistrodeUltramar enenero de1867
(Madrid, 1867),pp. 7-10o,andFranciscoSerrano, InformepresentadoporelExcmo.Capitcin
General
duque dela TorrealMinistro deUltramar enmayo dei867(Madrid, I868),pp. I0-29. On
sternoppositionto politicalreformsin Cuba,see AntonioL. de Letona,IsladeCuba.
Rejexionessobresu estadosocial, politicoy economico; su administracin y gobierno (Madrid,
I865), pp. 7-8.
95 Alcalde, Discursode apertura,appendices 4-5. These prosecuted crimes increased from a
total of 25 in 1862, to 49 in I865, and 47 in 1866.
 Bureaucratic inNineteenth-Century
Corruption Cuba 495
Unbridled
corruption, power(dI8-IN78)
informal
The increasinglyintolerantoppositionto colonialand administrative reform
in Cuba in the i86os coincided with a growing new wave of peninsular
immigration,militarypresence and anti-creolesentiment in the island.96
Cubandiscontentand the liberalSeptemberRevolution('La Gloriosa')in
Spainproducedfavourableconditionsfor a majorseparatistinsurrectionin
easternCubain October 1868 that sparkedthe destructiveTen Years'War.
The peninsularand loyalist masses reactedwith virulenceagainstanyone
suspect of sympathisingwith reformism and separatism.Extreme, con-
servativeloyalistslashed out againstwhat they perceivedas weak liberal
authoritiesin Cubaand Spain.
On 2 June 1869 CaptainGeneralDomingo Dulce sent his last telegram
from Havana.The messageto authoritiesin Madridwas succinctyet bitter:
the voluntarioshad rebelledagainsthis authorityduringthe night and forced
his resignation.Officialsunder his command had shown weaknessunder
dangerouspressure.Not a single regularsoldierwas at hand to repel the
militia'suprising.DulceannouncedhisdeparturefromCubawithintwo days.97
Simultaneousrebellions of voluntarios in Matanzas,Cairdenasand Gwiines
deposed their militarygovernors under the menace of violent actions.98
Thus startedan escalationof loyalistabuses of power and administrative
corruptionthat thoroughlyunderminedcolonialauthorityand discipline.
Some daysafterthese reactionaryrebellions,the mayorof Boca de Sagua
witnessedhow a group of voluntarios 'grabbeda North Americanman who
did not speakSpanishand who was being beatento the extremeof making
him screamdesperatelyfor help'. When the mayortriedto stop the bullies
they repliedthat there was no other authoritythere but them.99They pro-
ceeded to insult and threatenthe mayor with sabres and rifles. Circum-
stancesof internalwarhad unleashedthe reactionand intoleranceof unruly
loyalists.
The Ten Years'Warwas foughton two mainfronts.In the countrysideof
the centraland easternprovincesthe regulararmycarriedout a radicalof-
fensive against unconventional separatistwarfare. Summaryexecutions
- the forcedrelocationof
multipliedand the earliestversionof reconcentracidn
ruralpopulationto inhospitableurbansettingsto precludelogistic support

96
JordiMaluquer,Nacidn enCuba(Oviedo, 1992), pp. I5-20, 34-5;
e inmigradn.Losespaioles
MorenoFraginalsand MorenoMas6, Guerra, pp. 55-72.
97 Telegram,Dulce to Madrid,Havana2 June 1869, SHM,D.C., caja67, exp. 5747.2.
98 Telegram,Felipe Ginoves Espinarto Madrid,Havana4 June 1869, ibid.;BrigadierJose
L6pez Pinto to Captain General, Matanzas 3 June 1869, informing details of voluntarios'
seditionagainsthis authority,SHM,D.C., caja84, doc. 5764.10.
99 'Boca de Sagua.Ocurrenciaentre voluntariosy unos americanos'.SHM, D.C., caja 84,
doc. 5764.25-
496 AlfonsoW.Quirog
to insurgents- was implementedby December 1869. In the second front,
in cities and towns especiallyin the western provinces,the voluntarios and
civilian public servantsplayed an indispensablerole of policing, spying,
and harassingpeople suspectedof disloyalbehaviour.In both fronts abuse
and punishmentof innocentciviliansincludedwidespreadseizureof private
property,deportation,and imprisonment.The policy of embargo e incautacidn
debienes (sequestrationandconfiscationof property), introduced in April1869
by Dulce in a vain attemptto appeasethe loyalists,opened ample oppor-
tunitiesfor bureaucratic abuseand graft."xo
FromPuertoPrincipe- the provincethatsufferedthe worst effectsof war
andexpropriation- soon camereportsof administrative conflictandgraftin
the handlingof propertyseizures.The local agencyof expropriations,the
Juntade Vigilancia,rejectedthe authorityof inspectorsand administrators
working for the central administrationof expropriations,the Consejo
Administrativode Bienes Embargadose Incautados,in Havana.1o1 These
inspectorsreported the theft and illicit slaughterof confiscated cattle, for
privategain, in a city afflictedby starvation. Such an illegal'monopoly' of
meat supplywas allowedand openly condonedby local authorities.102
The centraladministration of expropriations hadan unprecedenteddegree
of autonomy and was initiallyheaded by the drasticand corruptloyalist
leader Dionisio L6pez Roberts.l03This agency'saccountingreports were
chronicallydelayedand in a state of thoroughdisorder.It misplacedprov-
incial accountsand was unableto elaboratestatistics.104 In 1874 the senior
accountantof the colonialtreasuryinformedMadridthat, despiteincessant
requestsand instructions,the expropriations'accounts had not been sub-
mittedfor officialinspection,becauseof 'the greatmanydifficultiesthatexist
in allthe administrative branchesof the islandas a consequenceof thewar'.105
Such an excuse did not deter the chief of the correspondingsection of
the foreignministryin Madridto concludethat these accountingviolations
were sufficientlygraveandpunishableby law.The colonialtreasury'scentral
offices (Administraci6nCentralde Propiedadesand ContaduriaGeneralde

100Alfonso Quiroz, 'Loyalist Overkill: The Socioeconomic Costs of "Repressing"the

Historical
SeparatistInsurrectionin Cuba, 1868-1878,' HispanicAmerican Review,vol. 78,
no. 2 (1998),pp. 261-305.
101'Incidenteformadopor desconocerselas facultadesdel Sor.Admor.Inspectorde Puerto
Principepor aquellaJunta local'. ANC, Bienes Embargados(B.E.), afio 1870, leg. 204,
no. 85.
102 'Puerto Principe. Expediente instruido sobre robo de reses pertenecientes a Bienes
Embargados y otros abusos'. ANC, B.E., afio 1870, leg. 2z2, no. 24.
103 Fermin Valdis Dominguez, Tragedyin Havana: November27, I871 (Gainsville, 2000),
pp. 21-3. 104 ANC, B.E., afio 1872, leg. 202, no. 25.
105 'Sobre el estado de la contabilidad de bienes embargados, afio I874'. AHN, U.C.H.,
leg. 852 (2), exp. 48, doc. I, ff. 5v-6.
 Bureaucratic inNineteenth-Century
Corruption Cuba 497
Hacienda)were also blamed for allowing such abandonmentin adminis-
trativeduties.The imperialauthorityassertedthatthe missingaccountsmost
probablyhid 'faults,abuses,andperhapsfelonies'andthat,sincethe startof
the war, 'the previouslyexisting administrativedisorderin that province
[Cuba]is increasing'.106
Despite officialcriticismsand successiveroyalordersurgingtheirformal
rendering,the expropriations'accounts remainedincomplete in January
1877,when anotherofficialinquirytook place.Colonialauthoritiesindicated
thatthe maincausesof this frustratingpatternof inefficiencysince i 872were
'the passiveandeven open resistanceof differentofficers... the vanishingof
officersin chargeof submittingaccounts,as well as the loss of much of the
necessaryinformationdue to fire in the agency'sarchives'.107Also, many
custodiansof expropriatedgoods hadnot submittedtheirformalaccountsor
had fled the island,as in the case of a piano originallyexpropriatedin 1871
from the 'disloyal'FranciscoAgramonteof Santiagode Cuba.The assigned
custodian(depositario),
JuanTarriday Ferratges,had moved, takingthe piano
with him to Barcelona.In 1878the SpanishtreasurydemandedfromTarrida
the paymentof the piano'sestimatedvalue of 2,000 pesos, as well as 1,341
pesos for the labourof an expropriatedslavealso underTarrida'stemporary
custody.108
A few Spanish-bornauthors published scathing criticismsagainst the
abuse and corruptioninherent to the implementationand administration
of expropriations,and their partialsubsequentrestitution.Expropriations
had caused the misery of innocent persons, many of whom sided with
the insurrectiononly aftersuch abusehad been inflictedon them.The cus-
tody over expropriatedslavesandAsianindenturedservants,and slaveswho
had quit the insurrectionistcamp (presentados), was often grantedto private
holders through cronyism.One writer argued that these injusticeswere
due to the 'lack of morality'among unworthyadministrators.Only 'the
most corruptedindividuals'benefitedfrom expropriations.19' A novel pub-
lished abroadmocked the notorious graft of the agency in chargeof the
expropriations' business(negociado deembargos).110
in
Abuse the administration of expropriationsduringthe Ten Years'War
was by no meansisolated.In fact, accordingto multiplesources,it was just

106
Ibid.,ff.9-15.
107GobernadorGeneralto Ministerof Ultramar(copy),Havanaz23Jan. 1877. AHN, U.C.H.,
leg.852 (2), doc.22.
108 'Reclamaci6nde D. FranciscoAgramontede un piano a D. JuanTarrida,1878'. AHN,
U.C.H., leg. 859 (2), exp. 26, docs. I, 2, 8, and i1.
109 Francisco Costa y Alvear, Apreciaciones sobre la insurreccidn de Cuba ... (Havana, I872),
pp. 14-1 5; Nicolas Azcnirate, Votos de un cubano (Madrid, 1869), pp. 16-17.
no Jacinto Hernandez, Cubapor dentro (New York, I871), pp. 10o-I 3.
498 AlfonsoW
1Quiroz
the tip of unmanageablecorruptionpermeatingalmost every sector of the
colonial administration.Authoritiestrying to contain corruptionbelieved
this phenomenonwas in part due to the criticaleconomic, social,and pol-
iticalconditionsandoveralldisordergeneratedby the waritself,as well as the
legacy of previous corrupt administrators.111 However, those same auth-
oritiesalsonoted thatloyalistpublicofficialsandvoluntarios
consideredit their
right to obtain informal or illegal rewardsfor their efforts at defending
Spain'sterritorial'integrity'in Cuba.Wagesand other officialpaymentsto
loyalemployeesweremeagredue to the state'sfinancialdifficultiesduringthe
war. Formalrewardswere clearlynot sufficientfor the heightenedexpec-
tationsof loyalists.The voluntarios
collectivelydemandedmonumentsin their
honour as well as the assignmentof urbanplots and buildingsfor their
institution's own use.112They only obtained very limited official concessions.
Instead, bureaucratsloyal to Spain obtained the rewards they felt they were
entitled to, through corrupt and insubordinate means. Mechanisms of ad-
ministrative control and supervision (visitas)were relaxed, abandoned, or
otherwise made ineffectual.113 Treasury Intendant General Joaquin M. de
Alba explained the underlying reason of widespread bureaucraticcorruption
during the war in the following terms:
In the criticalmoment of the first patrioticenthusiasmamong the Spanish-born,
they armedand stockedthemselves,and dressedin uniforms,at theirown expense.
They becamethe supportersof nationalintegrity.However,these effortsleft them
short of funds and [now] ... they believe they have the perfectrightof permissive-
ness in administrative action ...114

In April 1871, Alba, having obtained information of the abuses per-

petrated in the Administration of Rents, commissioned a trusted accountant
to perform an inquiry.115The first guilty employees soon surfaced but could
not be imprisoned due to the protracted legal actions and counter accu-
sations that ensued. The extensive fraudthat was discovered requireda formal
commission of inquiry headed by a treasury officer, Cayetano Palau, to
examine revenue accounts since 1868. The commission found such complete
disorganisation in the accounts that it could not ascertain the exact magni-
tude of the fraudulent deficit (alcance),
which could only be estimated, in June

111Alba to Ministerof Ultramar,Havana30 June I871. AHN, U.C.H., leg. 790 (1), exp. 3,
doc. 20.
112 Caballerode Rodasto Ministerof Ultramar,Havana26 Feb. i870. AHN, U.C.H.,leg. 859,
exp. 14, doc. 2.
113 Herm6genesPelinery Tolosa (visitadordel papelsellado)to Ministerof Ultramar,Havana
30 June 1871. AHN, U.C.H., leg. 859 (i), exp. I, doc. 2; exp. 4, doc. 2.
114 Alba to Minister of Ultramar, 30 June 1871. AHN, U.C.H., leg. 790 (1), exp. 3, doc. zo20.
115 'Sobre algunos abusos cometidos en la Administraci6n de Hacienda de la capital, 1871'.
AHN, U.C.H., leg. 790 (i), exp. 2, doc. i, ff. i-Iv.
 Bureaucratic in Nineteenth-Century
Corruption Cuba 499
1871, at 241,6o8 escudos (i 20,804 pesos).116However, a month later the total
amount unaccounted for had reached 310,908 escudos (I55,454 pesos), with
169,874 escudos missing from the emancpados accounts and 141,034 escudos
from the state-administeredliens (censosdelEstadoand de regulares).117 A score
of provincial revenue officers defrauded the royal treasury and fled before
being arraigned.118
Accounting problems in the ramode emandpados('one of the most im-
portant agencies of this island') were particularlygrave. All matters pertain-
ing to illegal slaves seized and officially managed by Spanish authorities were
constantly under British and legal scrutiny. The emancipado agency was in
charge of collecting duties from private individuals and companies for the
use of slave labour granted to them by the state. The inquiring commission
discreetly contacted these 'sponsors' (patronos)to ask them to exhibit pay-
ment receipts (cartasdepago).The examination of these receipts revealed the
modality of the fraud: receipts had been falsified and the supposed payment
amounts not entered in the official accounts.119Palau advised caution in
considering legal actions againsttwo implicated officials - administratorFelix
Maria Callejasand accountant Joaquin Gtiell y Rente120- due to the import-
ance of the colluded persons and companies holding vitiated receipts.121
Alba, on the other hand, believed that both the administrators and the rev-
enue debtors had to share the responsibility of the offence.122An appeal by
the lawyer of the prosecuted officials led to the temporarydischarge of Palau,
the official inquirer.123In the meantime, one of the main culprits, Ram6n
Olazarra,the head of the emancipado section in I869-70, had remained at his
desk after his official discharge and continued to forge documents. The
Ministry of Ultramar indicted Olazarra in 1874. He did not even bother to
contest the well-proven case against him for administrative fraud of up to
133,445 escudos (66,723 pesos).124
Other slave-related administrative sections were also plagued with fraud,
corruption, disorder, and insubordination. The officials in charge of the
collection of emergency taxes on slave ownership (capitacidn de esclavos)were

116AHN,U.C.H.,leg.790 (i), exp.2, doc. . 117 AHN,U.C.H.,doc. i i,10 July1871.

118 'Aio 1871. Desfalcoen la colecturia
de Col6npor D. JoaquinMarty',a fraudof ap-
proximately11,400pesos.AHN, U.C.H.,leg. 790 (i), exp. i, doc. i; 'Incidentesobre
reparosdelascuentasdeD.JorgeCondery D. VicenteHerrera delaPuertaadministrador
y contadorquefueronde PinardelRio'.AHN,U.C.H.,leg.852 (i), exp.i, docs.I and6.
119AHN, U.C.H., 790 (1), exp. 2, doc. 22, 25 Sept. 1871; doc. 24, 13 Nov. 1871.
120 Giiell
to Minister
of Ultramar, 15Nov. 1873.AHN,U.C.H.,leg.790 (1),exp.4, doc. 19.
121
Palauto Alba,Havana12 Oct. 1871.AHN,U.C.H.,leg.790(1),doc.27,ff. i-iv.
122 Alba
to Minister
of Ultramar, Havana30June1871.AHN,U.C.H.,exp.3, doc.20.
123
AHN, U.C.H., leg. 790 (1), exp. 3, docs. i8, i9.
124 'Afio i874. Espediente gubernativo formado a D. Ram6n Olazarra, oficial que fue de la
Administraci6n de Contribuciones [de la Habana]'. AHN, U.C.H., leg. 800 (2), exp. 21,
doc. 1.
5oo AlfonsoW1QuiroZ
responsible for a fraudulentloss of revenue of approximately96,350
pesos duringthe year 1873. An inquiryin 1874 had found 'absolutelack
of orderand formalityin the accounting'.125 Falsifiedreceipts,provingthe
officials'guilt and leadingto theirprosecution,were seized only in 1876 at
the residenceof an associate.'26
Another key agencyin troublewas the JuntaCentralProtectorade Lib-
andwho had
ertos, dealingwith slavesrecruitedby the insurrection(libertos)
desertedto the Spanishcampwith the expectationof obtaininga promised
officialfreedom.In earlyI 874,its Havanasection,theJuntaJurisdiccional de
la Havana,under the presidencyof the loyalistand formerslave trafficker
Juliande Zulueta,was immersedin confusionanddisorderonlya few months
afterits formation.Seriouscomplaints,filed againstthe section for abusing
'unfortunateslaves',led to attemptsat reformingit and prosecutingits em-
ployees.However,neglectin its administration, failureto presentreportsand
statistics,and a markeddisobedienceof higherorderscontinueddespitethe
officialinquiries.127
Evidenceof similaror worse corruptpracticesaboundsfor otherimport-
ant sections of the colonialtreasuryadministration. A generalinventoryof
delayedand inactivecases, involvingadministrative and heavy
irregularities
losses for the treasury,listedthirtyvoluminousfilesin 1876.These neglected
files were 'tangibleevidence of the state of abandonof the treasury'sad-
ministration'.128Among such cases there was one against the hacendado
Conde de Casa Barretofor an unpaid fiscal debt amountingto 116,583
pesos in 1872. Accordingto CasaBarreto,the mainofficialsof the collecting
fiscal agency, Ricardo Brusola y Sarriaand Jose Fernandezde la Pefia
had proposed to unburdenhim from that huge debt if he paid them 4,000
pesos. 'Insufficient evidence' thwarted the prosecution of Brusola and
Fernandez.129
Evidence reveals that traditionalbribing of customs officials also in-
creasedduringthe war. Publicopinion at the time cast customs officialsin

125
'Afio 1877. Fallodictadoen el expedientede desfalcode capitaci6nde esclavoscontraD.
Jose RodriguezBarcaza,D. Diego GuillenBucarain,D. Jacinto Deheso y D. Luis de la
Luz'. AHN, U.C.H.,leg. 814 (2), exp. 12, doc. I.
126 '[Certificaci6nde] D. CayetanoPalauy Benvenuti,comisionadoespecialde la Direcci6n
Generalde Hacienda',Havana21 Aug. I876. AHN, U.C.H.,leg. 814 (2), exp. iz, doc. 3.
127 cExpedientepromovidopor la Centralde Libertoscontrael secretariode la jurisdicci6nde
esta capitalpor abusoscometidos'.ANC, G.G., afio 1876,leg. 566,exp. 28180o.
128 'Medidasparacorregirla morosidadque se advierteen el
cumplimientode 6rdenesde este
Ministerio[deUltramar,Direcci6nde Hacienda]recordandoserviciosatrasadosen la Isla
de Cuba.Ahio1876'.AHN, U.C.H.,leg. 859 (i), exp. 3, doc. i.
129'Expedientedel conde de CasaBarretosobre creditoa favorde la Hacienda.Afio I874'.
docs. I and 3.
AHN, U.C.H.,leg. 800 (2), exp. 20zo,
 Bureaucratic
CorruptioninNineteenth-CenturyCuba 5o01
a worse light than other public servants.130 In 1872just one fraudulentcase
discovered in Havana's customs amounted to 776,794 pesetas (234,68I
pesos) in lost revenues.The head supervisor,MarianoPerez del Castillo,
and other customs officialswere dischargedfrom public duty in Cubabut
not indicteddue, once again,to 'lack of evidence'.a31Spanishconsuls and
foreign merchantsin Liverpool,Glasgow, and London reportedin detail
customarysmugglingstrategies.132
From 1875 veiled public complaintsagainstbureaucraticfraudwere be-
ginningto grow. Congratulatory news of successfulmilitaryactionsagainst
the insurrectioncombinedwith a risingoutrageat the 'dominantimmorality'
among officials.Outrightcriticismagainstpublic officials and authorities
was, however,restrained,accordingto one source,in orderto avoid 'dismal
loss of prestige'.133Most of the officersresponsiblefor administrativecor-
ruptionremainedfree or fled the islandwithoutexemplarypunishmentand
protractedlegalproceedingswithinCubainevitablyfloundered.34In 1876a
scandalinvolvingsmuggledlardand opium throughthe customs of Carde-
nas was reported.This time, however,growingpublic concerncontributed
to the imprisonmentof the guiltyofficials.A letterpublishedby the loyalist
newspaperLa Vozde Cubastatedthat the affair
... alarmedthe spiritsof thiscity'spatrioticandhonestneighbours who sawin all
thisa lamentablecorruption, anda powerfulreasonwhythegovernment findsitself
at timesincapableof attendingpressingcommitments. The countryis forcedto
makesacrificesthatwouldnot be as burdensome as they are now if therewas
and
probity honesty in the and
payment receipt of the officialduties.'35
From the fragmentaryinformationcollected it is possible to make an
estimate of the total loss of fiscal income as a result of corruptionand

130
,... siendo dichos funcionarios[de aduanas]los que la opini6n pfiblicacalificabamis
desfavorablemente,en cuanto a purezay rectitud'.AHN, U.C.H., leg. 790 (2), exp. 24,
doc. i.
131 Authorities in Cuba feared that lack of legal indictment could mean 'la vuelta a aquella
aduana de todos esos funcionarios [la cual] produciria malisimo efecto'. AHN, U.C.H.,
leg. 790 (z). docs. 8 and I.
132 'Abusos denunciados por el c6nsul de Espafia en Liverpool al Comisario
Regio en la isla
de Cuba sobre fraudes en las oficians de almacenage de la Habana. 1876'. AHN, U.C.H.,
leg. 807, exp. 3, doc. i. Other reports of disorder and fraud in the customs administration
in ibid., exps. 4, 5, 13, 16, 25; and leg. 817, exps. 4 and ii.
133 Director of Circulo Hispano Americano to Minister of Ultramar, Barcelona 15 June 1875,
in '1876. Legajo reservado. Denuncia del Circulo Hispano Ultramarino de Barcelona
sobre abusos en la administraci6n de la isla de Cuba'. AHN, U.C.H., leg. 807 (3), exp. 25,
docs. 1-2.
134 'Resumen del proceso', ibid.,doc. 21. Only in i878 some rules were introduced to prohibit
the flight of officials before an official inquiry (residencia).AHN, U.C.H., leg. 816 (2),
exp. 2z, doc. i.
'a5 La Vogde Cuba, afio IX, no. 24 (Havana 27 April 1876), i, in AHN, U.C.H., leg. 837 (z),
exp. 15, doc. 4.
502 Alfonso QuiroZ
W.
malfeasance, the viciosorginicosde administracidn, during the critical period of
1868-78. Uncollected accounts due to official 'neglect' added to 1,777,094
pesos (5,885,474 pesetas).136Sundry malfeasance in the treasury adminis-
tration can be estimated conservatively at 30 million pesos. Fraud in the cus-
toms administration amounted approximately to 20 million pesos. The loss
in assets and revenue due to the abusive handling of expropriations added to
70 million pesos. Corruption-related financial costs of the growing public
debt can be estimated at 2.5 million pesos per year (io per cent per year
of the tainted half of the total debt of approximately 5o million pesos) or
25 million pesos for the ten-year period. The addition of the above-itemised
financial costs of corruption results in a total of 147 million pesos or 14.7
million pesos per year for the period 1868-78. This corresponds roughly to
50oper cent of Cuba's average annual fiscal budget during the same period.
The financing of the mounting public debt during the war relied heavily
on the inflationary issue of paper money by the Spanish government's main
creditor in Havana, the Banco de la Habana. Consumers and the
Espafiol
business sector in Cuba were clearly affected by the ever-increasing need to
finance deficits with bank bills. A dangerous monetary and economic crisis
developed by 1873. The government's debt to the bank reached approxi-
mately 70 million pesos in 1874. Increased emergency taxation, and appeals
to the 'abnegation' and 'patriotism' of the militaryand civilian personnel to
cushion the impact of shrinking official salaries,contributed little to lowering
inflation.137Public employees lost approximately 20 per cent of their salaries
due to inflation and fiscal reform.138General administrative, fiscal and debt
reform, was begun in 1876 by Jose Cainovas del Castillo, brother of the
conservative political architect of the Spanish Restoration, Antonio Canovas
del Castillo.139However, distrust of shady deals at high levels and suspicion
of favouritism towards conspicuous government creditors and contractors
continued to prevail. Discriminatory debt consolidation in favour of the two
semi-official banks, the Banco Espafiol de la Habana and the new Banco
Hispano-Colonial (formed in 1876 by speculative creditors headed by shady
contractor Antonio L6pez) was still debated in 1881.140

136JuandelNedo (visitador) to Intendant,Havana6 Sept.1879.AHN,U.C.H.,leg.790 (i),

exp.3, doc.68.
137'Medidasadoptadas paramejorarla Haciendaen la Isla de Cuba.Afio 1874'. AHN,
U.C.H.,leg.8oo(I), exp.1.
138 'Afio I874. Espedientesobredescuentodel zo%de sushaberesa los funcionarios puib-
licosde Cuba'.AHN,U.C.H.,leg.839(I), exp.io, doc. 1.
139 AHN, U.C.H.,leg.
859 (i), exps. i6 and 17. See alsoJose Gutierrezde la Concha,
Empristitode Cuba.Discursospronundciados por el marquisde la Habana (Madrid, I877).
140 Francisco A. Garcia Mariiio, Unos bonossin abono. Injustidcias sufiidaspor los suscritoresal
patridticoempristitode9 de agostode s872, colocadoen la Isla de Cuba en3' de enerode 187}(Madrid,
I881); Rodrigo, Antonio pp. 147-8.
Lopez,
 Bureaucratic inNineteenth-Century
Corruption Cuba 50o3
Fiscaland debt problemscausedby the war,as well as administrative cor-
ruption,deeply affectedthe to the
ability pay military. Under sternwar disci-
pline, fraudby militaryadministrativeofficialswas severelypenalised.The
strictgeneralBlas VillateConde de Valmasedaeven consideredexecuting
those who embezzled militaryfunds.141 The most common cases of em-
bezzlement(desfalco) involvedmilitaryofficialsin chargeof paywho gambled
the embezzled funds and then fled the country.Measuresto expel pro-
fessionalgamblersfrom Cubawere also consideredby authorities.Between
1872 and 1874 there were 8 cases of desfalcos in armyunits and battalions
amounting 51,483 pesos.142Existingrulesrequiredother seniorofficers
to 2
of the defraudedarmyunitsto restorethe lost amounts.Valmasedahimself,
duringhis second administrationas captaingeneralin 1875, and his prede-
cessor captaingeneralJovellar(1873-5), were accused of mismanagement
and fraudin the contractingof food suppliesfor the troops.143 Corruption
among the militarywas a
becoming majorproblem.

anddetested
Inherited corruption
(I879-98)
The gravetroublesposed by wartimecorruptionwere by no means ended
after 1878.A short insurrectionaryrecurrencein 1879-80, the GuerraChi-
quita, led by hard-core separatistsand abolitionists,provoked corrupt
handling of the contracts,purchase of supplies, and accountingof the
Spanish army and navy. An extensive investigationand trial ended with
prisonsentencesfor the guiltynavyofficersand privatecontractors.144
The ensuing peace contributedto the gradualintroductionof political
and social reforms, including the outright abolition of slavery in 1886.
Although late and partial,these reforms together with freer speech and
printing, contributedto narrowingsomewhat the opportunitiesand in-
centivesfor rampantcorruption.Publicopinionwas awakenedby increased
presscoverageandthe exposingof scandalousbureaucratic frauds,including
one involving oo00,000ooo
pesos in debt bonds, perpetratedby groupof public
a
officersandprivatestockbrokersheadedby accountantLuis Oteizain I 889.

141 Telegram by Valmasedato General Second Corporal,9 April I872, in 'Desfalco y

malversaci6n.Espediente de las disposiciones dictadas sobre dichos delitos'. SHM,
C.G.C., caja 1io8, no. 4416.
142'Expedientereferentea los desfalcoso estafashechasen cuerposde esta isla hastael afio
I879 ', ibid.
143 X.
de X., Las contratas en Cubaen tiempode losgenerales
delejrcirdto
parasuministros
de viveres
yJovellarcomparadas.
Valmaseda delascalumnias
Refutacidn deir87(New
contrala adminsitracidn
York, 876),pp. 7-12.
144RealordendelMinistrodeMarinadels6 desetiembre enla Isla de Cuba
deIr82... causainstrmida
(Madrid, I882).
oficialesde la Armaday cuerpoadministrativo
contravariosjefes9y
504 AlfonsoW.Quiroz
Another scandalled to the prosecutionof Havana'streasuryintendantin
1885.145
In January1890 CaptainGeneralManuelde Salamancawrote a long letter
to the Ministerof Ultramar,ManuelBecerra,reportingpersistentcorruption
at differentlevelsof the administration. The directantecedentsof scandalous
embezzlementsand false IOUs (libramientosfalsos), amountingto almost 23
millionpesos, datedbackto the GuerraChiquita.146 GeneralSalamancahad
been quite outspoken in press interviewsin Spain about his intention to
eradicatecorruptionbefore he travelledto Havanato occupy his post.147
In his letter he simply requestedBecerra'ssupportin ratifyingthe drastic
measureshe was consideringand the appointmentof honest officialsfrom
Spainto replacethose he plannedto fire or transfer:
... we areat the criticalmomentof savingandorderingthe island,or makingim-
possibleits government in whichcase... we willlose [theisland]verysoon ... this
is veryrotten,andyouknowthatI amsurrounded byenemiesandnot ableto trust
anyone... becauseherethereis the well rootedidea thatone does not riskthe
dangersanddiscomforts of a long seavoyage,vomit,fevers,andharshclimateto
just 'eat' whatis formallyserved.The few amongus thatdo preciselythathave
difficultyin makingpeoplebelieveus, andthosewho believeus callus dunces.148
Salamancanamed the stern opponents of his inquiriesand measures,
amongthem loyalistconservativeleaders(caciques) Conde de CasaMore and
ManuelCalvo,theiragentsin Madrid,and the corruptofficialsimplicatedin
sizable frauds.Salamancaalso deplored the lack of an effective punitive
system againstcorruptionas well as the legalistic,inefficientjudicialpro-
cedures. Although a Liberalhimself, Salamancaconsideredprior Liberal
appointeesto Cubanposts in the I88os to be the main culprits.Among
the most scandalousdesfalcoshe listed those connectedwith war and mili-
and privatecontractorsfor a total of
tary supplies,transport,libramientos,

145 Causasobresupuesta malversacidn

de oo,0ooo
pesosdela deudadeCuba.Sentencias
delaAudienda y del
TribunalSupremo ... (Madrid,1893); Antonio Zaragoza,Juidooraly publico. Audienciadela
Habana.CausadeOteiza.Resefia delassesiones eneldiario'El Comercio
publicada 'y adicionadacon
la opinion
delcronista
y dosapindices
quecontienen unbreve
resumen delapruebadocumentalleiday la
sentenciapronunciada(Habana,I892); Opinidn quelaprensamadrilenaha emitido
espontaneamente
conpresendade las dos exposiciones que CuervoArangoha dirigidoal Sr. Ministrode Ultra-
mar... defraudadoresy los malosempleados de la Habanael Sr. CastroSerrano
siendointendente
(Madrid, 1885).
146 Salamanca to Becerra, Havana 30 Jan. I890. Archivo General de Indias, Seville (hereafter
AGI), Diversos, Colecci6n Polavieja (D.C.P.), leg. io, exp. i68, docs. I and 2. I thank
Professor Joan Casanovas for the reference to this important source and for the detailed
notes and transcriptions he graciously shared with me.
147Casanovas,Bread,orBullets!p. 183; FranciscoMoreno,Elpais delchocolate. (La inmoralidad
en Cuba)(Madrid,1887), p. 5; El Pais, 13 March 1887, press clippingin BNJM, C. M.
Morales,vol. 2, no. 28.
148Salamancato Becerra,30Jan. 1890, AGI, D.C.P., leg.
io, exp. i68, doc. 2, pp. 1-3.
 Bureaucratic inNineteenth-Century
Corruption Cuba 505o
15,737,563pesos since 1879. To this amountSalamancaadded754,648pesos
defraudedfrom the centraltreasuryand 1,3i18,705pesos lost to malfeasance
in the expropriations'administration.He also estimatedthe fraudof false
IOUs in severalarmyunitsin approximately5 millionpesos.149 Additionally
he counted 4,854,326pesos in customs fraudat Havana,and no less than
I5 millionpesos defraudedfrom provincialcollectionoffices, and 2 million
pesos in sundrypetty fraudand embezzlement.Corruptionamong the of-
ficialsof the volunteermilitiacan be addedto Salamanca's griminventory.150
Salamanca'stotal estimateof the fiscalcosts resultingfrom these diverse
administrativeimproprietiesaddedto a grandtotal of 44,665,842pesos, or
4.5 millionpesos peryear,for the 1880-90 period.151Afteraddingthe annual
cost of 4 million pesos for corruption-related public debt, the yearlytotal
fiscalcost for colonialadministrative corruptionwas 8.5 millionpesos. This
latterfigurerepresentedapproximately20 per cent of Cuba'saverageannual
budget duringthe years 1880-90. Nevertheless,the cost of corruptionin
the I880s was lowerthanthatof 50per cent of the averageannualbudgetfor
the period 1868-78.
Salamanca's generalclaimscan be corroboratedin partby tracingthe files
of fraudinquiriesin the archivesof the Ministryof Ultramar,especiallythose
concerningthe cases of stampedforms (efectos timbrados)and provincialcol-
lecting offices.152 His revelations of corruption also coincided quite closely
with an extremelydetailedtreatiseon administrativecorruptionand nepot-
ism published by Francisco Moreno, a peninsularloyalist writer and
journalist,in i887.153Moreno describedinstancesof corruptionin all sec-
tions of the colonialadministration:
barteringof posts (trdficodecredenciales),
fraudulentIOUs, customsfraud,condoneddirecttaxation;all kindsof fraud
in the administrationof the treasury,public debt and loans, judicialaffairs,
publicworks,jails,communications,municipalgovernments;and even fund
raisingfor charity,among others. Moreover,he attributedthe sad state of
administrative honestyto reasonsof 'high politics' linkingSpanishpolitical
leaderswith the powerfulinterestsof the CompaiiiaTransatlaintica (formerly
AntonioL6pezy Cia.),the BancoHispano-Colonial,andotherunscrupulous

149 This fraud 'consiste en figurar como oro en las Cajas crecidas cantidades que son papel y
cuya diferencia en pago ha de pesar sobre los Generales que autorizaron las operaciones
por abandono u otras causas de que se han derivado crecidas fortunas y lujos', Salamanca
to Becerrra, 30 Jan. 1890, ibid., pp. Io-i i.
accountant unlawfully diverted funds ('malversaci6n to the amount of 3 21
150 A voluntario ') 55
pesos in 1886, Sub-Inspecci6n General de Voluntarios de Cuba. SHM, S.V.C., caja 171.
151 Salamanca to Becerra, 30 Jan. 1890, op. cit., pp. I 1-17.
152AHN,
U.C.H., leg. 85 (), exp. 12, doc. I6; exp. 3, doc. i; leg. 852 (2), exp. 37, doc. i;
exp. 49; leg. 852 (i), exps. 7, Io, 14, 15, 17, 21, and 28.
153a Moreno, Pais delchocolate,
p. 43, estimates 8 million pesos in revenue loss due to corruption
in 1887 alone.
5o6 AlfonsoW.Quiroz
capitalists. Moreno also predicted that Spain would lose Cuba due to the
extent and official toleration of corruption.154
Several other creole authors articulated ideological and political criticism
against colonial administrative corruption during the post-I878 period of
partial reform and freedom of expression. Juan Gualberto G6mez was
among the first to launch a radical attack on the political, administrative,and
moral conditions that fuelled corruption. A black abolitionist and separatist
who had been exiled and imprisoned in the early I188os,G6mez took advan-
tage of restored Spanish constitutional rights to publish his views in Madrid.
He quoted Spanish political, military and police authorities to demonstrate
the corruptive consequences of the colonial system in Cuba.155G6mez
continued a political and ideological tradition, dating back to Cuban exiles
of the I 840s, of equating corruption and low morality with colonial op-
pression and injustice. According to G6mez, bureaucratic and 'moral cor-
ruption' had visibly deteriorated since the onset of the Ten Years' War and
their effects were still visible in 1884.156 G6mez also complained that Cuban-
born government employees were proportionally fewer and occupied mostly
the lower ranks whereas the fortune-seeking Spanish-born employees occu-
pied the higher posts thanks to favouritism and patronage (padrinos)rooted
in Madrid.157G6mez recommended, among other reforms, improved mor-
ality in public administration by allowing local institutions to appoint public
employees.
Other creole writers decried, in archetypalliterary form, the insatiable
bureaucratic nepotism, gambling and corruption of ignorant Spanish-born
immigrants, in contrast to the tragic destiny of honest and hardworking
Cuban men and women.158In 1887 Raimundo Cabrerapublished a popular

154 Moreno,Paisdelchocolate,
pp. 14, I5, 24, 39.
155G6mezcitesformerCaptain Camposassomeoneawareof 'los
GeneralArsenioMartinez
malosempleados,la peor administraci6n de justicia... Las promesasnuncacumpli-
das... los abusosde todogenero... la exclusi6ndelos naturales de todoslos ramosde la
administraci6n', JuanGualberto G6mez,Lacuestidn deCubaenI884. Historiay delos
soludciones
partidos cubanos(Madrid, I885),P. 2. He alsorefersto alarming officialreportsby police
Brigadier DenisandarmyBrigadier March,ibid.,p. 58.
156'Cuba,fromtheviewpointof 1884,hasno resemblance at allwiththatof 1869... cor-
ruptionhas increasedvery swiftly... Probityhas disappeared from businessactivi-
ties... Bureaucrats stilloppressas beforebuttheynowstealmorethanever.Thepolice
sharethe valuablesstolenby thieves.Civilguardsact evenworse;theyrob and then
assassinate theirvictims.'G6mez,La cuestidn deCuba,pp. 57-58.
157 Ibid.,pp. i3, 31;La Unidn Constitucional,
i6 March I889,pressclippingin BNJM,C.M.
Morales, vol. 2, no. 31.
15s8Ram6n Meza, Mi tio el empleado(Madrid, 1993), pp. 90, 104, 107 (1st ed. Barcelona, 1887).
SeealsoCiriloVillaverde,
Cecilia o,laLomadelAngel
Valdis, 1992; Ist ed.Havana,
(Madrid,
I839; NewYork,I88i);NicolisHeredia,Unhombre denegodos
(Matanzas,I883).
 Bureaucratic in Nineteenth-Century
Corruption Cuba 507
book, subsequently republished several times in Spanish and English,159as an
ideological response to a satiricalbook on Cuban way of life authored by the
Spanish-born Francisco Moreno.'6o Cabrera'smain goal was to demonstrate
Cuban's high level of 'civilized' virtue and honesty in contrast to the low
morals and corruption of Spanish-born people in Cuba. Moreno had
mocked and denigrated Cuban customs (especially African-inspired danc-
ing), politicians, intellectuals, press and creole men and women in general.
He also denounced the different means of colonial bureaucratic corruption
for which there were terms such as chocolate, manganillaand filtracidn.Cabrera
reacted indignantly in defence of Cuban values, intellectual life, inhabitants,
and, especially, Autonomist authors and idealised Cuban women.161
By the time of the Second War for Independence (1895-8) the issue of
administrativecorruption in Cuba, recognised as a serious problem by creole
reformist and Spanish-born critics alike, was embraced vehemently by exiled
separatist propaganda in the United States. Cabrera,renouncing his Auton-
omist affiliation,travelled to New York where he edited the separatistjournal
Cubay Amirica. In this journal Cabrera published inflammatory cartoons
by one of the most important Cuban cartoon artists, Ricardo de la Torriente
(I869-1934), who ridiculed the predatory spoils of corrupt Spaniards in
Cuba and celebrated the growing interventionist policies toward the Cuban
question by the US government (see Figure 2).162
Despite creole assertions of the honest character of Cuban-born leaders,
the fledgling Cuban Republic, established in 1902, inherited serious bureau-
cratic corruption. The word 'goat' (chivo),signifying a dirty deal or cheating,
became an iconic fixture in the post-independence political lexicon and
satiric press and cartoons.163 Republican administrative corruption was per-
vasive and taken for granted as part of the system's implicit rules.164The
reformed educational system, for example, showed early signs of corrupt
politicisation and centralisation.165

159Raimundo Cuba
Cabrera, y susjueces
(rectif/caciones
oportunas)
(Havana,1887).Subsequent
editions (1889, 1891, 1895, I896) includeadditionalinformationand illustrations.
160Francisco
Moreno,Cubaysugente.(Apuntespara lahistoria)
(Madrid,
1887).
161Moreno,Cubaysugente, pp. 57,149-1 5;Cabrera, p. 134.Forthelexicon
Cubaysusjueces,
of colonialcorruption, see FernandoOrtiz,Nuevocataurodecubanismos(Havana,I985),
p. 211. See alsothe ideologiseddebatebetweencreoleandSpanish-born authorsover
thecausesof prostitution in Cuba:G6mez,CuestidndeCuba,p. 58; Cespedes, Prostitudcin
enHabana,pp. 73, 77, 91, 1o1; PedroGiralt,El amor
y laprostitudcin, a unlibrodel
replica
Dr. Cispedes
(Havana,1889), pp. 14-15, 39-
162 On Torriente,seeAdelaida de delaRepuiblica
Juan,Caricatura (Havana,198i).
163Ortiz,Nuevocatauro,
pp. 205-10.
164LouisPerez,Cuba:BetweenReformandRevolution
(NewYork,i995),pp. 217- 8.
165 Alfonso Quiroz, 'La reforma educacional en Cuba, I898-1909: cambio y continuidad,' in
John Coatsworth
and RafaelHernindez(eds.),Culturas
encontradas:
Cubay losEstados
Unidos(Havana,2001I),pp. 113-26.
5o8 AlfonsoW.Quiroz

Fig. z. Spainsuffers dueto embegglement,

fromindigestion contraband,
theft,monopoly, andthe
contracts,
budget. Thebarrelorcuba representing
Cubais broken.UncleSamis readytoprovideaforcefulremedy
bearing thenameof General Stewartgoodford, the US Ministerin Spain.Thechild-kingAlfonsoXIII
watches. 'She ate plenty when the barrelcould still hold'. By Ricardo dela Torriente.
In Cacar-
ajicara,New York,vol.I, no.s (9 Oct.1897),p. ;. Publicaciones Coleccidn
Periodicas, Cubana, BNJM.

Some authors have argued that US military occupation, economic pen-

etration, and their legacies had a corruptive influence in Cuba.166 They
cite a corruption scandal in the US-administered Cuban post office and
166
Jos'
Cant6nNavarroet al.,La neocolonia. y crisis.Desde 1899hastas84o(Havana,
Organiadcidn
1998); Jorge Ibarra, Cuba: 1898-i92r. Partidos
politicosy clasessociales(Havana, 99 2);
RolandoRodriguez,Lafo?/adeunanacion(Havana,1998), vol. 2.
 Bureaucratic in Nineteenth-Century
Corruption Cuba 509

improprietiesin the Havananavalarsenal.167 Othershave argued,following

the lead of writerCarlosLoveira,that colonial corruptionsurvivedthanks
to fraudulentlyenrichedSpanish-bornbusinessmenwho remainedin Cuba
after independence, former Autonomist politicians who sold out, and
cheatingformerseparatistmilitaryleaders.168Loveira'stheses on the origins
of republicancorruptionis partlycorroboratedby widespreadunlawfuland
criminalactivitiesamong separatistfighters(mambises) describedby former
slaveEstebanMontejoin his editedmemoirs.169
Spaceand focus does not allow a full analysisof the causesof persistent
corruptionafter 1898-1902. Ample evidence exists on corruptionamong
militaristicand authoritarianformer separatistleaders and officers who
benefited as war veterans,US occupationappointees,and local chieftains
such as Jose Miguel G6mez, Mario GarciaMenocal,Alfredo Zayas, and
Domingo Mendez Capote. Similarto their colonial loyalist counterparts,
these separatistveteransexpected substantialindividualrewardsfor risking
their lives for Cubanindependence.170Veteransexpresseddisillusionment
with the outcome of the war, foreignoccupation,and havingto leave active
servicewithoutmajorcompensation.Discontentpersisteddespitethe specu-
lative and scandalouspaymentreceivedby some veteransfrom borrowed
publicfunds.171 The educatedcivilianleadershipwas dangerouslyweakened
and dividedafterthe war of independence.172In the absenceof a dominant

167
On the embezzlementof approximately$ioo,ooo by two US officialsin chargeof the
Cubanpost office, and theirswift punishment,see Thomas, Cuba,pp. 445-6. On labour
and administrative troublesin Havana'sarsenal,see Jose de Moray Saavedrato Miximo
G6mez, ANC, Fondos Personales,ArchivoMiximo G6mez, leg. 21, no. 2896.
168 CarlosLoveira,Generalesy (Havana,I972; 1sted. Havana,I920); see also Francisco
doctores
Suirez y Cepero to Miximo G6mez, Guines 4 April I899, ANC, Fondos Personales,
ArchivoMiximo G6mez, leg. 21, no. 2893A.
169 EstebanMontejo,Biografia deuncimarrn,ed. by MiguelBarnet(Havana,1996).
170Loveirawroteof the characterEl Nene, a separatistveteran,'En vez de ennoblecersecon
ser veterano,se ha envilecido.Porqueha explotadosu veteranismoparamantenervivos
los vicios de la colonia.Ademis, sobre todas las cosas, es un burro'.Loveira,Generalesy
p. 340. See also Jose M. Hernindez, Cubaandthe UnitedStates:Intervention
doctores, and
Militarism,I868-19} (Austin, 1993).
171Juan Veloso to Miximo G6mez, Remedios 25 April i899. ANC, Fondos Personales,
ArchivoMiximo G6mez, leg. 21, no. 2900A;FranciscoSuirez to G6mez, Giiines4 April
I899, ibid.,No. z893A;JesuisRabiand SaturninoLarato Jose Mir6,Baire21 June i900,
ibid.,No. 2925; also Jose Miguel G6mez (GobernadorCivil de Santa Clara)to Carlos
Roloff,SantaClara28 abrili900, ANC, ArchivoRoloff,leg. i, no. 343 (2). On speculative
corruptionin paymentsto armyveterans,see Thomas, Cuba,p. 471.
172 FernandoOrtiz,'La irresponsabilidad del pueblocubano',in Ortiz,Entrecubanos. Psicologia
(Havana,1987),pp. 26-28, a collectionof articleswrittenin 1906-8. Ortizwrotein
tropical
1919, 'El mis gravepeligrode Cubaes la inculturade sus clasesdirigentes,mis aun que la
corrupci6n.Si fuesen verdaderamentecultas no serian corrompidas',Ortiz, 'La crisis
politica cubana,sus causasy sus remedios',in OrbitadeFernando Orti, ed. by Julio Le
Riverend(Havana,1973), P. i 12.
51o AlfonsoW 1Quiroz
civil societyand strongdemocraticinstitutions,ambitiousveteranchieftains
appearto havebeen the maininheritorsof the unofficialandillegallegacyof
corruptionthat continuedto distortthe institutionalstructureof twentieth-
centuryCuba.

Conclusion
This analysishas detecteda deteriorationof colonialadministrative integrity
after the mid-I8zos. Efforts to keep Cuba a Spanishpossession, without
effectivelyabolishingthe slave tradeand conceding furthereconomic and
politicalreforms to the creole elite, implied higher levels of bureaucratic
corruption.Increasedcolonial corruptionwas a consequenceof the sys-
tematicweakeningand,at times,violent destructionof the local institutional
bases of Cuban autonomythrough discrimination,racialchecks, war, ex-
propriation,and exile. Corruptionengulfedthe top as well as the rankand
file of the colonialadministration,most significantlyduringthe Ten Years'
War.Despite some isolatedofficialeffortsto curtailcorruption,higherlevels
of corruptionhad overbearingcosts for colonial subjects and the insuf-
ficientlyreformedcolonialsystemin termsof lost revenues,mountingdebt,
inefficiency,and erodinglegitimacy.
The loss of colonialrevenuesdue to bureaucraticcorruptionbecamean
implicityet substantialcost of the decliningSpanishempire.Relativeratios
of administrativecorruption(as indicatorsof real levels of corruption)in
Cubavariedfrom an alarminglyhigh level of 5o per cent of annualbudgets
in 1868-78 to a seriouslevel of zo per cent of annualbudgetsin 1880-90.
However,the level of publicperceptionof corruption,indicatedby increased
press coverage,was higherin the 1880-90 period. In the I88os and I89os
Cuban civil society had to sustain the increasingfinancialburden of the
public debt, generatedin part by administrativecorruption,and had to en-
dure a biasedand abusiveinstitutionalbase that limitedeconomic develop-
mentin the island.This mountingfinancial,institutionalandlegitimacycosts
of corruptioncontributedsignificantlyto the demiseof Spanishcolonialrule
in Cuba.
The detailedstudy of Cuban colonial corruptionduringthe nineteenth
centuryillustrateshow corruptioncan thriveunderweak and flawedinsti-
tutionalbases that benefit privilegedinterestsand pressuregroups. Rather
than constitutinga culturalconstant,corruptionfluctuatesunder changing
institutionalcircumstances,socio-politicaltension,repressionandwar,when
the costs and benefitsof engagingin corruptactivityvarysignificantly.Par-
ticular connections among and between different pressure groups weakened
or reinforced rules and property rights. Colonial reform in the I880s and
I89os was only partial, and it came too late due to the delaying pressure of
 Bureaucratic inNineteenth-Century
Corruption Cuba 511
narrowinterestsof privilegedcolonialbusinessmen,financiers,and despotic
administrators. These colonialistinterests- as JeremyBenthamhad already
warned Spanish constitutionallegislatorsduring the liberal interlude of
1820-3 - had a 'corruptiveinfluence' favouringonly 'the rulingfew' and
workingagainsta more representativeconstitutionalform of government
and efficienteconomyin Spainitself.173
A product of weak or flawed institutional bases, corruption can
also contributeto furtherweakeninstitutions.If corruptionis bred by un-
democraticregimes and is left unchecked long enough, unofficialrules
produceunintended,damagingconsequencesfor civil society. Such an ex-
treme situationwas reachedin Cubaduringthe Ten Years'War.At those
criticaljuncturesgradualtransformationand reformare considerablymore
difficult.It is not sufficientto reformthe systemto curbcorruptionalthough
that is an importantstep, as shown by the politicallymotivated British
economicalreformsin responseto allegationsof Old Corruptionin the early
nineteenthcentury.174 Entrenchedinterestsresistanddeflectthe efficiencyof
reforms,making necessaryto applystrictlythe law and prosecutecorrupt
it
publicadministrators and theirnetworks.
Colonialauthoritiesin Cubaand Spainlackedthe decisionand local bu-
reaucraticsupport to reduce widespreadcorruptionsignificantlydespite
honest effortsby a few captaingenerals(Valdez,Pezuela,Salamanca)and
other authorities.Since the 82zos senior Spanish authoritiesdepended
heavilyon corruptmedium-and lower-rankingofficialsto securecontrolof
the island.Detection, prosecution,and punishmentof corruptpublic ser-
vants becamelax and inefficacious.Emboldenedloyalistofficialsexpecting
corruptrewardschargeda costlybill for theirservicesthroughlost revenues
and chronicdebt. This unintended,implicitcost of empirein Cubaproved
exceedinglyexpensive for Spain and bore heavilyon the shouldersof the
Cuban colonial subjects.Bureaucraticcorruptionnot only contributedto
the demise of Spanishdominion in Cuba,it also left a costly legacy after
1898.

173 JeremyBentham,Colonies, Law:Rid Yourselves

andConstitutional
Commerce, and
of Ultramaria
onSpainandSpanish
OtherWritings America,ed. by PhilipSchofield(Oxford, 1995), pp. 24,
47, 85-6, 197-276.
174 Philip Harling,TheWaningof 'Old Corruption': Reformin Britain,
ThePoliticsof Economical
i779-si46 (Oxford, 1996), pp. 6-7.