Electronically FILED by Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles on 01/18/2019 07:18 PM Sherri R.

Carter, Executive Officer/Clerk of Court, by M. Soto,Deputy Clerk

1 APALLA U. CHOPRA (S.B. #163207)

achopra@omm.com
2 MOLLY M. LENS (S.B. #283867)
mlens@omm.com
3 ZACHARY L. DEKEL (S.B. #310593)
zdekel@omm.com
4 O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
1999 Avenue of the Stars
5 Los Angeles, California 90067-6035
Telephone: (310) 553-6700
6 Facsimile: (310)246-6779

7 Attorneys for Defendants Twentieth Century Fox Film

Corporation and Twentieth Century Fox Television
8
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
9
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, CENTRAL DISTRICT
10 YOUNGJOO HWANG, an individual, Case No. BC699005
11 Plaintiff, Assignedfor all purposes to Hon. Holly J.
Fujie (Dept. 56)
12 v.
[PUBLICALLY FILED REDACTED
13 FRED SAVAGE, an individual; COPY]
TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM
14 CORP., a business entity of unknown form; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX
15 TELEVISION, a business entity of unknown AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
form; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, DEFENDANTS TWENTIETH
16 CENTURY FOX FILM
Defendants. CORPORATION AND TWENTIETH
17 CENTURY FOX TELEVISION’S
18 MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
19
Compl.: March 21, 2018
20 Second Am. Compl.: Sept. 18, 2018
Trial Date: May 6, 2019
21
Hearing Date: April 5, 2019
22 Time: 8:30 a.m.

23 Reservation ID: 180829344466

24 [Filed concurrently with Notice of

Motion and Motion for Summary
25 Judgment; Separate Statement of
Undisputed Material Fact; Declaration
26 ofMolly Lens; [Proposed] Order;
Request for Judicial Notice;
27 [Proposed] Order Re: Request for
Judicial Notice]
28

FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

 1 TABLE OF CONTENTS

2 Page

3 I. Introduction.................................................................................................................................... 6

4 II. Procedural History....................................................................................................................... 7

5 III. Background and Undisputed Facts.......................................................................................... 8

6 A. Plaintiffs Employment On “The Grinder.”........................................................................... 8

7 B. Plaintiffs History Of Emotional Distress.............................................................................. 10

8 IV. Legal Argument.......................................................................................................................11

9 A. Plaintiff Cannot Establish The Elements Of Her Section 51.7 Claim................................ 12

10 1. Plaintiff Cannot Establish That Mr. Savage Struck Plaintiffs Arm Because She Is A
Woman.......................................................................................................................................... 12
11
a. There Is No Direct Evidence Of Mr. Savage’s Alleged Gender Animus................ 13
12
b. Plaintiffs Circumstantial Evidence Is Insufficient To Establish That Mr. Savage’s
13 Conduct Was Motivated By Plaintiffs Gender..................................................................... 15

14 (1) Plaintiffs Subjective Belief Cannot Defeat Summary Judgment.........................15

15 (2) Whether Mr. Savage Acted Rudely Toward Other Women Is Not Relevant...... 15

16 (3) Even If Plaintiff s Testimony Regarding Other Women’s Experiences With Mr.
Savage Were Relevant, It Is Insufficient To Defeat Summary Judgment......................17
17
2. Plaintiff Cannot Establish That She Has Suffered Harm.................................................19
18
3. Plaintiff Cannot Establish That Mr. Savage’s Alleged Conduct Caused Her Harm..... 20
19
a. Plaintiff Cannot Establish Causation Due To Her Delay In Seeking Treatment.....21
20
b. Plaintiff Cannot Establish Causation Because She Suffered The Same Symptoms,
21 But Worse, Prior To Working On “The Grinder.”................................................................ 22

22 B. Plaintiff Cannot Establish The Elements Of Her Civil Conspiracy Claim.........................23

23 V. Conclusion.................................................................................................................................... 24

24

25

26

27

28

2
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

2 Page(s)

3 Cases

4 Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co.,

25 Cal. 4th 826 (2001)................................................................................................................... 11
5
All Towing Servs. LLC v. City of Orange,
6 220 Cal. App. 4th 946 (2013)........................................................................................................ 18

7 Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd.,

7 Cal. 4th 503 (1994)..................................................................................................................... 24
8
Austin B. v. Escondido Union Sch. Dist.,
9 149 Cal. App. 4th 860 (2007).....................................................................................12, 14, 17, 21

10 Barefield v. Chevron,
1997 WL 9888 (N.D. Cal.)............................................................................................................ 23
11
Berg v. First State Ins. Co.,
12 915 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1990).......................................................................................................... 20

13 Branco v. Credit Collection Servs. Inc.,

2011 WL 3684503 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011)..............................................................................20
14
Cozzi v. Cty. of Marin,
15 787 F. Supp. 2d 1047 (N.D. Cal. 2011)..................................................................................13, 18

16 D C. v. Harvard-Westlake Sch.,
176 Cal. App. 4th 836 (2009)........................................................................................................ 12
17
Doe v. City of Chula Vista,
18 196 F.R.D. 562 (S.D. Cal. 1999)............................................................................................. 21, 23

19 Dominguez -Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t,

424 F.3d 1027 (9th Cir. 2005).................................................................................................. 13, 14
20
Drottz v. Park Electrochemical Corp,
21 2013 WL 6157858 (D. Ariz. Nov. 25, 2013)................................................................................ 18

22 E.E.O.C. v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, Alaska,

422 F.3d 840 (9th Cir. 2005).................................................................................................... 13, 15
23
Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins. Co.,
24 lOCal. App. 3d 376 (1970)............................................................................................................ 20

25 Gabrielle A. v. Cty. of Orange,

10 Cal. App. 5th 1268 (2017), as modified (Apr. 18, 2017)................................................. 12, 13
26
Gherman v. Colburn,
27 72 Cal. App. 3d 544 (1977)............................................................................................................ 15

28

3
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
2 Page(s)

3 Girard v. Ball,
125 Cal. App. 3d 772 (1981)......................................................................................................... 22
4
Golden v. Local 55 of Intern. Ass ’n of Firefighters,
5 633 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1980)................................................................................................. 13

6 Gomez v. City of Fremont,

730 F. Supp. 2d 1056 (N.D. Cal. 2010)........................................................................................15
7
Gaz v. Bechtel Nat'l Inc.,
8 24 Cal. th 317, 358 (2000)............................................................................................................ 13

9 Hatai v. Department of Transportation,

214 Cal. App. 4th 1287 (2015)..................................................................................................... 16
10
Holdgrafer v. Unocal Corp.,
11 160 Cal. App. 4th 907 (2008)....................................................................................................... 16

12 Howard v. Raytheon Co.,

2011 WL 13177257 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2011)........................................................................... 18
13
Kelley v. The Conco Companies,
14 196 Cal. App. 4th 191 (2011)................................................................................................. 17,21

15 King v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,

152 Cal. App. 4th 426 (2007)....................................................................................................... 15
16
Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television Prods.,
17 38 Cal. 4th 264 (2006)................................................................................................................... 18

18 McCoy v. Pacific Maritime Association,

216 Cal. App. 4th 283 (2013)....................................................................................................... 16
19
Morgan v. Regents ofUniv. of Cal.,
20 88 Cal. App. 4th 52 (2000)..................................................................................................... 13, 15

21 Network Appliance Inc v. Sun Microsystems Inc,

2009 WL 10690379 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2009)........................................................................... 23
22
Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp.,
23 113 F. 3d 912 (9th Cir. 1996)........................................................................................................ 13

24 Orloff v. Los Angeles Turf Club,

36 Cal. 2d 734 (1951).................................................................................................................... 18
25
People v. Harris,
26 60 Cal. App. 4th 727(1998)......................................................................................................... 17

27 People v. Lamer,
110 Cal. App. 4th 1463 (2003)..................................................................................................... 15
28

4
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)
2 Page(s)

3 Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,

6 Cal. 4th 965 (1993)..................................................................................................................... 19
4
Ramirez v. AvalonBay Communities, Inc.,
5 2015 WL 5675866 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2015)............................................................................ 15

6 Rio Linda Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court,

52 Cal. App. 4th 732 (1997)......................................................................................................... 18
7
Roe v. California Dep ’t of Developmental Servs.,
8 2017 WL 2311303 (N.D. Cal. May 26, 2017)............................................................................. 12

9 Slatkin v. Univ. of Redlands,

88 Cal. App. 4th 1147 (2001)....................................................................................................... 14
10
Strong v. Lynch,
11 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011), aff d sub nom. Strong v. Merrill Lynch, 470 F. App’x 672 (9th Cir.
2012).................................................................................................................................................14
12
Tan Jay Internat., Ltd. v. Canadian Indent Co.,
13 198 Cal. App. 3d 695 (1988)......................................................................................................... 19

14 Twaite v. Allstate Ins. Co.,

216 Cal. App. 3d 239 (1989)......................................................................................................... 20
15
Uriell v. Regents of Univ. of California,
16 234 Cal. App. 4th 735 (2015)....................................................................................................... 23

17 Venegas v. Cty. of Los Angeles,

32 Cal. 4th 820 (2004)...................................................................................................................... 6
18
Wong v. Jing,
19 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354 (2010)...................................................................................................... 20

20 Yul Chu v. Mississippi State Univ.,

997 F. Supp. 2d 467 (N.D. Miss.), aff d, 592 F. App’x 260 (5th Cir. 2014)............................. 14
21
Statutes
22
Cal. Civ. Code §51.7...........................................................................................................................15
23
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c, subd. (c)..............................................................................................10
24
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c, subd. (p)(2)...................................................................................10, 11
25
Other Authorities
26
BAJI Instr.—Civ. 14.65, Damages—Aggravation of Preexisting Condition................................. 22
27
Restatement (First) of Torts § 431).................................................................................................... 22
28

5
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 I. INTRODUCTION

2 Just two causes of action remain at issue against Fox: Count 3 for violation of Civil Code

3 section 51.7 and Count 8 for Civil Conspiracy. Both are based on a single event—that, on one

4 occasion, Fred Savage allegedly hit plaintiffs arm with an open hand on the set of “The Grinder.”

5 To prevail on each claim, plaintiff must establish that Mr. Savage committed gender-based

6 violence against her. See Venegas v. Cty. ofLos Angeles, 32 Cal. 4th 820, 845 (2004) (Baxter, J.

7 concurring) (“The Legislature’s focused effort to combat discriminatory and pernicious conduct

8 often referred to as hate crimes began with the 1976 enactment of Civil Code section 51.7 ....”).

9 Specifically, plaintiff must establish that (a) Mr. Savage violently hit her because she is a woman;

10 (b) she suffered legally cognizable harm; and (c) she suffered that harm because Mr. Savage

11 violently struck her arm. Plaintiff cannot establish any of these elements.

12 First, plaintiff certainly has no direct evidence, such as sexist statements, indicating that

13 Mr. Savage hit her because she is a woman. Nor does she have any circumstantial evidence that

14 Mr. Savage hit her because she is a woman. Rather, she tries to support her conclusory gender-

15 animus claim through her testimony that she saw Mr. Savage “yell” at another women once and

16 that she’s “heard” Mr. Savage has treated other women poorly. But plaintiff cannot create an

17 issue of fact on her gender-violence claim through such dissimilar conduct (and certainly cannot

18 do so through inadmissible hearsay).

19 Second, plaintiff admits that she suffered no financial injury due to the alleged striking.

20 She further admits that she did not suffer any physical harm. The only alleged harm that she

21 attributes to Mr. Savage is emotional distress. However, plaintiffs claimed emotional injuries—

22 e.g., loss of sleep and anxiety—are not legally cognizable as matter of law.

23 Third, plaintiff fails to establish that her alleged emotional injury was caused by Mr.

24 Savage. I \ .* - , ■ ± ‘ ‘

25

26

27

28 Put simply, plaintiff has no evidence establishing that her alleged

6
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 emotional distress symptoms resulted from Mr. Savage’s conduct.

2 Because plaintiff cannot satisfy the basic elements of any of her claims, summary

3 judgment is appropriate.

4 II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

5 Plaintiff initiated this action on March 21, 2018. Her original complaint asserted 14

6 causes of action against defendants. Pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section

7 430.41, defendants informed plaintiff that they intended to demur as to all of plaintiffs claims, as

8 each claim suffered fatal infirmities. Rather than oppose the demurrer, plaintiff chose to amend

9 her complaint and voluntarily dismissed five of her claims, including her assault and battery

10 claims (against Mr. Savage) as well as three of her four claims under the California Fair

11 Employment and Housing Act (against Fox and Mr. Savage).

12 Plaintiffs May 15, 2018 First Amended Complaint asserted nine causes of action for: (1)

13 violation of Civil Code section 52.4; (2) violation of Civil Code section 52.1; (3) violation of

14 Civil Code section 51.7; (4) failure to prevent discrimination and harassment in violation of

15 FEHA; (5) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; (6) intentional infliction of emotional

16 distress; (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (8) civil conspiracy; and (9) violation of

17 Business and Professions Code section 17200. Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. A, First

18 Amended Complaint (hereinafter, “FAC”).

19 On June 19, 2018, defendants demurred to the entirety of the FAC. On August 29, 2018,

20 the Court sustained defendants’ demurrers, in part, with leave to amend. See August 29, 2018

21 Order on Defendants’ Demurrer. Specifically, the Court sustained Fox’s demurrer as to Counts 4,

22 6, 7, 8, and 9 and Mr. Savage’s demurrer as to Counts 1, 2, 3, 7, 8, and 9. Id. With respect to

23 plaintiffs Civil Code claims (Counts 1, 2, and 3), the Court held that the challenged conduct did

24 not “appear to be related to gender.” Id. at 7-8. Accordingly, “[ajbsent clearer allegations” that

25 Mr. Savage’s conduct “was due to [plaintiffs] gender,” the Court ruled that plaintiff had failed to

26 sufficiently plead any of her claims under the Civil Code. Id}1

27
1 This motion does not address the Court’s rationale for sustaining defendants’ demurrers as to
28
plaintiffs previously dismissed claims not currently before the Court.

7
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 On September 18, 2018, plaintiff filed her Second Amended Complaint. RJN, Ex. B,

2 Second Amended Complaint (hereinafter, “SAC”). In the SAC, plaintiff reasserted all nine

3 counts contained in her FAC. On October 31, 2018, defendants demurred to the entirety of

4 plaintiffs SAC. On December 13, 2018, the Court sustained defendants’ demurrers in part. See

5 December 13, 2018 Order on Defendants’ Demurrer to SAC. Specifically, the Court sustained

6 defendants’ demurrers with prejudice as to Count 1 against Fox and as to Counts 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, and

7 9 against Fox and Mr. Savage. Id. While the Court ultimately overruled defendants’ demurrers

8 as to Counts 1,3, and 8, the Court noted there was “no question" that these counts were “on the

9 cusp” of dismissal. See Declaration of Molly Lens (“Lens Decl.”), Ex. 14, 12/12/18 Tr. of Oral

10 Argument on Defendants’ Demurrer to SAC.

11 With this motion, Fox seeks dismissal of Count 3 for violation of Civil Code section 51.7

12 and Count 8 for civil conspiracy, i.e. the only two claims remaining against Fox.

13 III. BACKGROUND AND UNDISPUTED FACTS

14 A. Plaintiffs Employment On “The Grinder.”

15 Plaintiff worked as a costumer on “The Grinder” from August to October 2015. Lens

16 Deck, Ex. 3, Plaintiffs Resp. to Fox’s First Set of Form Interrogatories—General at 5. Plaintiff

17 testified that, while employed as a costumer on “The Grinder,” she approached Mr. Savage to

18 dust something off his shoulder during the filming of one episode. Hwang. Dep. at 235:8-236:12.

19 Plaintiff testified that she told Mr. Savage that he had “something on his shoulder.” Id. at 237:20-

20 238:3.2 Plaintiff claims that, while Mr. Savage yelled at her, he struck her arm three times with

21 his open hand. Id. at 238:6-9; see also id. at 242:17-21 (testifying that Mr. Savage did not punch

22 plaintiff). Plaintiff concedes that she has suffered no lasting physical effects as a result of Mr.

23 Savage’s alleged conduct. Id. at 245:7-11. In fact, plaintiff testified that she could not recall

24 which of her arms Mr. Savage purportedly struck, id. at 242:5-9, which hand Mr. Savage

25 purportedly struck her with, id. at 242:15-16, whether Mr. Savage left a mark or bruise on her

26 arm, id. at 243:11-15, 243:24-244:2, or whether she felt pain the evening after Mr. Savage

27

28 2 True and correct copies of relevant excerpts of the deposition of plaintiff Youngjoo Hwang are
attached as Exhibit 1 to the Declaration of Molly Lens filed concurrently herewith.

8
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 allegedly struck her or the next day, id. at 244:25-245:6.

2 This is the only claimed act supporting Counts 3 and 8. Id. at 199:17-200:6; see also SAC

3 f 54 (alleging that “Savage committed a violent act against Plaintiff.”).3 While plaintiff alleges

4 that “a substantial motivating reason for [Mr.] Savage’s conduct was Plaintiffs gender,” see SAC

5 TI 55, she does not have any facts that support that allegation. Indeed, plaintiff admits that Mr.

6 Savage did not make any comments that referenced her gender during this alleged incident. See

7 id. at 237:7-245:11. Furthermore, Plaintiff concedes that she cannot recall any instance during

8 her employment in which Mr. Savage referred to her (or anyone else on “The Grinder” for that

9 matter) using gender-based slurs or other sexist language. Id. at 128:19-130:8. Nor can plaintiff

10 recall any instance in which she “saw [Mr. Savage] act in a sexually inappropriate way.” Hwang

11 Dep., at 309:18-310:4.

12 Indeed, even though plaintiff admits that Mr. Savage regularly worked with many other

13 women on “The Grinder,” see Hwang Dep. at 395:2-396:7, plaintiff herself admits that she only

14 saw Mr. Savage allegedly act inappropriately towards one other women (Ms. Knighton) on two

15 occasions. See Hwang Dep. at 87:16-22 (testifying that she saw Mr. Savage yell “at least twice”

16 at Staci Knighton, a production assistant on the show). Plaintiff, however, could not testify what

17 Mr. Savage said to this woman, when or where these incidents occurred, what episode was being

18 filmed when these incidents purportedly occurred, or what happened immediately prior to each of

19 these incidents. Id. at 87:23-91:10. Plaintiffs only other purported evidence that Mr. Savage

20 harbored gender-related bias is that she supposedly “heard” from others that Mr. Savage

21 mistreated them (but not physically) or had a reputation for disliking women. Id. at 119:19-23,

22 178:1-6; Hwang Dep. 407:20-408:15.4

23 It is undisputed that plaintiff has no evidence of Mr. Savage acting violently, much less

24 threatening violence, as to any other women either on “The Grinder” or at any point in his life.

25

26
3 All emphases added unless noted otherwise.
27
4 As noted below, this evidence is inadmissible for two different reasons: (1) it is not sufficiently
28 similar to the alleged violent conduct at issue; and (2) aside from Ms. Knighton, it is hearsay. See
supra § IV.A.l.b.

9
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 B. Plaintiff’s History Of Emotional Distress.

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

10
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1

10

11

12

13

14

15

16 IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT

17 “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to

18 cut through the parties’ pleadings in order to determine whether ... trial is in fact necessary to

19 resolve their dispute.” Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co., 25 Cal. 4th 826, 843 (2001). A motion for

20 summary judgment will be granted when the moving party establishes that “there is no triable

21 issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

22 law.” Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 437c, subd. (c). A defendant moving for summary judgment has the

23 initial burden to show that “one or more elements of the cause of action, even if not separately

24 pleaded, cannot be established.” Id. at subd. (p)(2). Plaintiff then must “show that a triable issue

25 of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.” Id. The

26 plaintiff “may not rely upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings to show that a triable

27 issue of material fact exists as to that cause of action . ...” Id.

28

11
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 A. Plaintiff Cannot Establish The Elements Of Her Section 51.7 Claim.

2 Plaintiff seeks to hold Fox vicariously liable for Mr. Savage’s alleged conduct under

3 Count 3. To succeed, plaintiff must establish the following elements: “That [Mr. Savage]

4 threatened or committed violent acts against [her]; That a motivating reason for [Mr. Savage’s]

5 conduct was [his] perception of [plaintiffs gender]; That [plaintiff] was harmed; and That [Mr.

6 Savage’s] conduct was a substantial factor in causing [plaintiff] harm.” Austin B. v. Escondido

7 Union Sch. Dist., 149 Cal. App. 4th 860, 880-81 (2007) (citations and quotations omitted).

8 Section 51.7 does not create liability for ordinary conduct; rather, Section 51.7 “provide[s] a civil

9 remedy for hate crimes.” D.C. v. Harvard-Westlake Sch., 176 Cal. App. 4th 836, 844 (2009); see

10 also Roe v. California Dep’t of Developmental Servs. ,2017 WL 2311303 at *9 (N.D. Cal. May

11 26, 2017) (plaintiff stated claim under Section 51.7 based on “[Repeated sexual assault over the

12 course of nearly two years, and rape”).

13 Here, plaintiff cannot establish at least three elements of her Section 51.7 claim—namely,

14 that a “motivating reason” for Mr. Savage’s alleged conduct was her gender, that she suffered a

15 legally cognizable harm, or, even assuming plaintiff did suffer a legally cognizable harm, that Mr.

16 Savage’s conduct was a “substantial factor” in causing her alleged harm.5

17 1. Plaintiff Cannot Establish That Mr. Savage Struck Plaintiffs Arm Because
She Is A Woman.
18
“Under [Section 51.7], a plaintiff must establish the defendant threatened or committed
19
violent acts against the plaintiff or their property, and a motivating reason for doing so was a
20
prohibited discriminatory motive.” Gabrielle A. v. Cty. of Orange, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1268, 1291
21
(2017), as modified (Apr. 18, 2017), review denied (July 12, 2017)). There are only two avenues
22
by which plaintiff can establish that Mr. Savage’s conduct was motivated by her gender: (1) she
23
can provide direct evidence of discrimination—i.e., remarks by Mr. Savage that were “overtly
24

25
5 Fox also disputes that Mr. Savage touched plaintiffs arm, much less that he did so “violently.”
26 See, e.g., Hwang Dep. at 240:19-241:5 (testifying that, despite Mr. Savage purportedly striking
plaintiff in the middle of a crowded set, plaintiff could not “identify anyone that [she was] aware
27 of observing that incident”). For the purposes of this motion, however, the Court need not decide
whether Mr. Savage committed the claimed “violent act,” as plaintiffs claims fail on multiple
28 independent grounds.

12
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 sex- or gender-specific in content”; or (2) she can provide circumstantial evidence of Mr.

2 Savage’s treatment of other employees. E.E.O.C. v. Nat'l Educ. Ass’n, Alaska, 422 F.3d 840, 844

3 (9th Cir. 2005).6 *Plaintiff

* * * * *cannot
13 establish that Mr. Savage’s conduct was motivated by her

4 gender under either approach.

5 a. There Is No Direct Evidence Of Mr. Savage’s Alleged Gender Animus.

6 “Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact [of discriminatory animus]

7 without inference or presumption.” Morgan v. Regents ofUniv. of Cal., 88 Cal. App. 4th 52, 67

8 (2000). It “typically consists of clearly sexist, racist, or similarly discriminatory statements or

9 actions by the [defendant].” Dominguez Curry v. Nevada Transp. Dep’t, 424 F.3d 1027, 1038

10 (9th Cir. 2005) (quotations, citations, and internal brackets omitted). Even explicit conduct that

11 could be construed as discriminatory does not constitute direct evidence of discriminatory

12 animus. See, e.g., Nidds v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F. 3d 912, 918-19 (9th Cir. 1996)

13 (concluding that a reference to older individuals as “old timers” was ambiguous and failed to rise

14 to the level of direct evidence); Cozzi v. Cty. ofMarin, 787 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1059 (N.D. Cal.

15 2011) (employer’s comment about wanting “fresh faces” “insufficient to provide direct evidence

16 of [age] discrimination”).

17 Here, plaintiff concedes that none of Mr. Savage’s alleged conduct even referenced her

18 gender—let alone that it was “clearly” discriminatory based on her gender. Plaintiff admits that

19 Mr. Savage did not make any comments that referenced her gender when Mr. Savage allegedly

20 hit her arm. See Hwang Dep. at 237:7-245:11. Plaintiff also admits that she could not recall Mr.

21 Savage ever referring to her, or anyone else, using gender-based slurs. Hwang Dep. at 128:19-

22
6 A plaintiff asserting a Section 51.7, like a plaintiff asserting a harassment or disparate treatment
23 claim under Title VII and FEHA, must establish that the challenged conduct was motivated by
prohibited animus. Compare Gabrielle A. v. Cnty. of Orange, 10 Cal. App. 5th 1268, 1291 (2017)
24 (“Under the Ralph Act, a plaintiff must establish the defendant threatened or committed violent
25 acts against the plaintiff or their property, and a motivating reason for doing so was a prohibited
discriminatory motive”) with Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l Inc., 24 Cal. 4th 317, 358 (2000) (explaining
26 that, in a disparate-treatment case under FEHA, “the ultimate issue is simply whether the employer
acted with a motive to discriminate illegally.”) (emphasis in original); Golden v. Local 55 ofIntern.
27 Ass’n of Firefighters, 633 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1980) (“Title VII requires proof of intent... In
other words, motivation and intent are the ultimate issue—whether the presumptively valid reasons
28
for (the) rejection were in fact a cover up for a [] discriminatory decision.”).

13
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 130:8. Plaintiff further conceded that she could not recall Mr. Savage ever making a “sexually

2 inappropriate” comment to her, attempting to “touch [her] in a sexually inappropriate way,” or

3 “act[ing] in a sexually inappropriate way to anybody else” on “The Grinder.” Hwang Dep. at

4 309:18-310:4. In fact, plaintiff could not testify to a single instance in which Mr. Savage so much

5 as referenced her gender. See Strong v. Lynch, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2011), aff d sub nom.

6 Strong v. Merrill Lynch, 470 F. App’x 672 (9th Cir. 2012) (granting summary judgment on racial

7 harassment claim where “Plaintiff testified that, in his experience, the [alleged harassers] never

8 used racial slurs or made any comments about his or any other person’s race”).

9 To the contrary, plaintiff testified that Mr. Savage’s allegedly gender-motivated conduct

10 consisted exclusively of gender-neutral statements and gestures. See, e.g., Hwang Dep. at

11 105:13-23 (testifying that Mr. Savage would “roll his eyes” and “shoot [plaintiff] .. . dirt[y]

12 lookfs]”); id. at 115:21-116:9 (testifying that Mr. Savage “yelled ‘no’ at [plaintiff]” in response to

13 a question); id. at 116:19-20 (testifying that “a big part of how [Mr. Savage] treated [plaintiff]

14 was ... the way he stared at [plaintiff]”); Hwang Dep. Vol. 2 at 313:7-9 (testifying that “a lot” of

15 Mr. Savage’s conduct consisted of “very subtle” and “passive aggressive” behavior that plaintiff

16 “can’t really .. . explain ... in words”). As a matter of law, such conduct cannot be construed as

17 “clearly” discriminatory. See Dominguez-Curry, 424 F. 3d, at 1038; see also Yul Chu v.

18 Mississippi State Univ., 997 F. Supp. 2d 467, 473 (N.D. Miss.), aff d, 592 F. App’x 260 (5th Cir.

19 2014) (“gestures” did not constitute direct evidence of discrimination where they did “not clearly

20 relate to Plaintiffs national origin”). Moreover, plaintiff testified that Mr. Savage stated he did

21 not like plaintiff or being around her. See, e.g., Hwang Dep. 105:12-106:5. Far from constituting

22 direct evidence of discrimination, a personal dislike or grudge is a “legitimate, non discriminatory

23 reason” for challenged conduct. See Slatkin v. Univ. of Redlands, 88 Cal. App. 4th 1147, 1157

24 (2001) (granting summary judgment on claim for religious discrimination where plaintiff was

25 denied tenure as a result of “lingering resentment” by colleagues). In short, evidence that Mr.

26 Savage did not like plaintiff is not evidence that Mr. Savage acted in that manner because

27 plaintiff was a woman. See Austin B., 149 Cal. App. 4th at 881 (affirming nonsuit on plaintiffs’

28 section 51.7 claim where defendants conduct was intimidating and coercive and directed towards

14
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 disabled minors, but there was no evidence that “[defendant’s] motivation in allegedly abusing

2 [plaintiffs] was the fact that they were disabled children”) (emphasis in original).

3 b. Plaintiffs Circumstantial Evidence Is Insufficient To Establish That

Mr. Savage’s Conduct Was Motivated By Plaintiffs Gender.
4

5 Because plaintiff has no direct evidence of Mr. Savage’s alleged gender bias, for her claim

6 to survive, plaintiff must establish circumstantial evidence demonstrating that Mr. Savage

7 harbored discriminatory animus towards women. Cf. Nat 7 Educ. ^55 ’n, Alaska, 422 F. 3d at 844.

8 Circumstantial evidence of discriminatory animus “must be specific and substantial in order to

9 create a triable issue with respect to whether the [defendant] intended to discriminate on an

10 improper basis.” Morgan, 88 Cal. App. 4th at 69.

11 As explained below, plaintiff has no specific and substantial circumstances to support her

12 claim that Mr. Savage’s conduct was motivated by her gender.

13 (1) Plaintiffs Subjective Belief Cannot Defeat Summary Judgment.

14 Plaintiff testified that she “think[s] that [Mr. Savage] sought out women.” Hwang Dep. at

15 178:18-19. The law is clear, however, that a plaintiff cannot defeat summary judgment based on

16 their subjective belief that a defendant’s conduct was motivated by improper bias. See King v.

17 United Parcel Serv., Inc., 152 Cal. App. 4th 426, 433 (2007) (“[P]laintiff s subjective beliefs in

18 [a] . . . discrimination case do not create a genuine issue of fact”); Gomez v. City ofFremont, 730

19 F. Supp. 2d 1056, 1069 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (granting summary judgment on Section 51.7 claim

20 because the plaintiff “had only a subjective belief, and not any evidence, that [the defendants]

21 were motived by his ethnicity”).7

22 (2) Whether Mr. Savage Acted Rudely Toward Other Women Is Not
Relevant.
23
Other than her irrelevant subjective belief, plaintiff seeks to rely on character evidence—
24
that is, other women’s experiences with Mr. Savage—to prove that Mr. Savage hit her arm
25
because she is female. Specifically, plaintiff testified that she personally witnessed Mr. Savage
26
7 Additionally, plaintiffs belief that Mr. Savage “sought” her out and struck her because she is a
27
woman is inadmissible speculation. See, e.g., Gherman v. Colburn, 72 Cal. App. 3d 544, 582
28 (1977); People v. Lamer, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1463, 1470 (2003); Ramirez v. AvalonBay
Communities, Inc., 2015 WL 5675866, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2015).

15
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 yell at one other female employee on “The Grinder” and “heard” from other women that Mr.

2 Savage had acted rudely towards them. See supra § III.A. Moreover, even if true, plaintiffs

3 evidence of Mr. Savage acting rudely towards other women cannot create a triable issue of

4 material fact on Count 3—which alleges that Mr. Savage acted violently towards plaintiff because

5 of her gender.

6 “While [character] evidence may be admissible to prove some fact other than disposition,

7 such as intent. . . the hallmark of admissibility on any of these grounds is similitude of the prior

8 and present conduct.'’’ See Holdgrafer v. Unocal Corp., 160 Cal. App. 4th 907, 928-29 (2008).

9 Thus, evidence of a defendant’s conduct towards other individuals is only relevant to the extent

10 that conduct is similar in nature to the conduct at issue. For example, in McCoy v. Pacific

11 Maritime Association, the court held that only evidence that the defendant had retaliated against

12 other employees was relevant to prove that the defendant had unlawfully retaliated against the

13 plaintiff. 216 Cal. App. 4th 283, 297-98 (2013). By contrast, the court held that evidence of

14 different conduct (specifically, discrimination and harassment against other employees) was

15 “irrelevant to the sole remaining cause of action, unlawful retaliation.” Id. at 296. Similarly, in

16 Hatai v. Department of Transportation, the court affirmed the exclusion of “evidence of

17 discrimination against employees outside of [the plaintiffs] protected class” because plaintiff was

18 “only entitled ... to present evidence that other employees ... had been subjected to similar

19 discrimination." 214 Cal. App. 4th 1287 (2015).

20 Fatally, plaintiff offers no similar conduct by Mr. Savage. Indeed, plaintiff offers no

21 evidence whatsoever that Mr. Savage ever acted violently (or threatened violence) toward any

22 other female employees on “The Grinder”—or, for that matter, that he has ever acted violently (or

23 threatened violence) toward any other woman at any point in his life. To the contrary, plaintiff

24 simply offers her testimony that she saw Mr. Savage yell at one other woman twice and that she

25 has “heard” that he acted rudely towards other women. See Hwang Dep. Vol. 1 at 87:16-22,

26 119:19-23, 178:1-6; Hwang Dep. 407:20-408:15. But Section 51.7 does not apply to rude

27 conduct; it applies only to violent conduct and threats thereof. See Cal. Civ. Code § 51.7 (“All

28 persons within the jurisdiction of this state have the right to be free from any violence, or

16
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 intimidation by threat of violence, committed against their persons or property ... on account of

2 [a protected characteristic]”). Plaintiff cannot prove Mr. Savage’s purported intent under Section

3 51.7 through dissimilar acts, which would not even constitute a violation of Section 51.7. Put

4 simply, Mr. Savage’s alleged rude conduct towards other women is not relevant to the only

5 inquiry before the Court—whether Mr. Savage violently struck plaintiffs arm because she is a

6 woman. See supra § IV.A.l.; see also People v. Harris, 60 Cal. App. 4th 727, 738-740 (1998)

7 (explaining that there must be a “degree of similarity” to make character evidence admissible

8 under Section 1101).

9 (3) Even If Plaintiff s Testimony Regarding Other Women’s

Experiences With Mr. Savage Were Relevant, It Is Insufficient To
10 Defeat Summary Judgment.
11 Even if the Court were to consider plaintiffs testimony about broader conduct involving

12 Mr. Savage and other female employees on “The Grinder,” which it should not, the record would

13 still be insufficient to create a triable issue that Mr. Savage struck plaintiff because she is a

14 woman.

15 First, plaintiff cannot create a triable issue that Mr. Savage struck her arm because of her

16 gender through her testimony that she saw Mr. Savage yell at one other woman “at least twice”

17 on “The Grinder.” See Hwang Dep. 87:16-22. As an initial matter, there is no evidence that Mr.

18 Savage yelled at Ms. Knighton because she is a woman, much less any facts from which such

19 conclusion could be drawn. Indeed, plaintiff testified that she could not even recall what Mr.

20 Savage said to Ms. Knighton, what happened immediately prior to each of these incidents, or

21 when or where these incidents occurred. See Hwang Dep. at 87:13-91:10; see also See Austin B.,

22 149 Cal. App. 4th at 881 (affirming nonsuit on plaintiffs’ section 51.7 claim where defendants

23 conduct was intimidating and coercive and directed towards disabled minors, but there was no

24 evidence that “[defendant’s] motivation in allegedly abusing [plaintiffs] was the fact that they

25 were disabled children”); Kelley v. The Conco Companies, 196 Cal. App. 4th 191,207 (2011)

26 (“What matters, however, is not whether the two sexes are treated differently in the workplace,

27 but whether one of the sex[es] is treated adversely to the other sex in the workplace because of

28 their sex.”); Cozzi, 787 F. Supp. 2d at 1070 (affirming summary judgment in favor of employer

17
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 on age discrimination claim where plaintiff testified their supervisor was “rude, demanding, and

2 hostile, and that she communicated in a negative manner,” but “could not recall any specifics”

3 indicating improper bias); Drottz v. Park Electrochemical Corp, 2013 WL 6157858 at *11 (D.

4 Ariz. Nov. 25, 2013) (“non-specific descriptions of [defendant’s] tone, raised voice, or yelling”

5 insufficient to show that conduct was “based on Plaintiffs sex”); Lyle v. Warner Bros. Television

6 Prods., 38 Cal. 4th 264, 290-91 (2006) (noting that “[t]he missing context [was] especially

7 significant” in evaluating whether defendant created a sex-based hostile work environment where

8 defendant allegedly used “a term that was [not] necessarily misogynistic”).8

9 Second, plaintiffs testimony regarding what other women have allegedly told her about

10 their experiences with or impression of Mr. Savage is likewise insufficient to show that Mr.

11 Savage hit plaintiff because she is a woman. After all, this testimony constitutes inadmissible

12 hearsay, which as a matter of black letter law cannot create a triable issue of material fact. See

13 Howard v. Raytheon Co., 2011 WL 13177257, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 28, 2011) (noting that

14 evidence of discriminatory acts towards similarly situated individuals may be excluded where

15 offered “through inadmissible hearsay testimony” as opposed to direct testimony by individuals

16 who were allegedly discriminated against); Rio Linda Unified Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court, 52

17 Cal. App. 4th 732, 741 (1997) (directing trial court to enter summary judgment for defendants

18 because, after “disregarding . . . inadmissible hearsay” from parties’ depositions, there was no

19 evidence to support plaintiffs claims); All Towing Servs. LLC v. City of Orange, 220 Cal. App.

20 4th 946, 960 (2013) (“[I]t is axiomatic that the party opposing summary judgment must produce

21 admissible evidence raising a triable issue of fact. This requirement is black letter law.”)

22 (citations and quotations omitted); Orloffv. Los Angeles Turf Club, 36 Cal. 2d 734, 739 (1951)

23 (reputation evidence was “incompetent as hearsay” where party was simply repeating testimony

24

25

26
8 If anything, the fact that plaintiff admits that she only witnessed Mr. Savage allegedly treat
27 one other woman unprofessionally during her employment on “The Grinder’ - when many
women worked alongside him - demonstrates the absurdity of plaintiffs claims that Mr. Savage
28 is a “woman hater.” See Hwang Dep. at 177:22-178:6.

18
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 of others after '‘inquiring ... as to the defendant’s reputation.”).9 And, regardless, vague

2 assertions that Mr. Savage treated female employees differently are not sufficient to show that he

3 treated them differently because of their sex. See supra 17-18. Plaintiff has no evidence that is

4 the case.

5 2. Plaintiff Cannot Establish That She Has Suffered Harm.

6 To succeed on her Section 51.7 claim, plaintiff must also establish that she was harmed.

7 Austin B., 149 Cal. App. 4th at 881. Plaintiff has admitted in verified discovery responses that

8 she does not “attribute any loss of income, benefits, or earning capacity” to defendants’ alleged

9 conduct. See Lens Decl., Ex. 5, Plaintiffs Resp. to Fox’s First Set of Form Interrogatories—

10 Employment, at 5; Lens Decl., Ex. 3, Plaintiffs Resp. to Fox’s First Set of Form

11 Interrogatories—General, at 8. Moreover, plaintiff confirmed during her deposition that she did

12 not suffer any “lasting . . . physical effects” as a result of Mr. Savage allegedly striking her arm.

13 See Hwang Dep. at 245:7-11. In fact, plaintiff testified that she could not recall whether Mr.

14 Savage even left a mark or a bruise on her arm. See id. at 243:11-245:6; see also id., at 243:19-23

15 (testifying that she could not recall taking any medications, including pain relievers, following the

16 incident). Rather, the only harm that plaintiff attributes to the alleged striking is emotional

17 distress. See Lens Deck, Ex. 7, Plaintiffs Resp. to Fox’s Second Set of Form Interrogatories—

18 General, at 5.

19 A plaintiff may only recover for emotional distress that is “serious,” meaning that “a

20 reasonable [person], normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental

21 stress engendered by the circumstances of the case.” Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 6

22 Cal. 4th 965, 989 n.12 (1993) (citations and quotations omitted). “[T]he law [, however,] does

23 not compensate emotional injuries which are trivial or transitory, as contrasted to substantial or

24 enduring.” Tan Jay lnternat., Ltd. v. Canadian Indem. Co., 198 Cal. App. 3d 695, 708 (1988).

25

26

27 9 Plaintiff has admitted that she does not even know the names of many of the individuals discussed
in the SAC. See Lens Deck, Ex. 11, Plaintiffs Resp. to Fox’s First Set of Special Interrogatories
28 at 5.

19
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1

9 [ _____________ msee a^so Branco v. Credit Collection Servs. Inc.,

10 2011 WL 3684503, at *11-12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (claimed emotional distress was

11 “transitory in nature” where plaintiff had not “seen any medical professionals as a result of his

12 alleged aliments and [did not] take any medications, prescription or over-the-counter”).

13 Courts in California regularly find that symptoms such as these are not sufficiently

14 “serious” to support a claim of emotional distress. For example, in Wong v. Jing, the Court of

15 Appeals found that summary judgment for defendant was appropriate where the plaintiff testified

16 that defendant’s conduct was “very emotionally upsetting” and “caused [her] to lose sleep, have

17 stomach upset and generalized anxiety.” 189 Cal. App. 4th 1354, 1377 (2010). Likewise, in

18 Berg v. First State Ins. Co., the court found that the “evidence [was] not sufficient to demonstrate

19 a severe and enduring emotional injury” where plaintiff testified she had suffered “substantial

20 anxiety” and “loss of. . . peace of mind.” 915 F.2d 460, 466 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Twaite v.

21 Allstate Ins. Co., 216 Cal. App. 3d 239, 257 (1989) (to be compensable emotional distress

22 damages must be “substantial or enduring” and not “trivial or transitory”); Fletcher v. W. Nat 7

23 Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal. App. 3d 376, 397 (1970) (“[S]ome degree of transient and trivial emotional

24 distress is a part of the price of living among people.”). So, too, plaintiffs claim of alleged

25 emotional injury fails.

26 3. Plaintiff Cannot Establish That Mr. Savage’s Alleged Conduct Caused Her
Harm.
27
In addition to showing that Mr. Savage struck her arm because of her gender, and that she
28

20
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 was harmed as a result, plaintiff must also establish that Mr. Savage’s conduct was a “substantial

2 factor” in causing such harm. See Austin B., 149 Cal. App. 4th at 880-81. It is the “plaintiffs

3 burden to prove that the [defendant’s conduct] proximately caused” her emotional distress and it

4 is not sufficient to show that defendants’ conduct “could have been a factor.” Doe v. City of

5 Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. 562, 568 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (citations and quotations omitted). Plaintiff

6 cannot demonstrate the requisite causal link between Mr. Savage’s alleged conduct and her

7 claimed emotional injuries for two independent reasons.

8 a. Plaintiff Cannot Establish Causation Due To Her Delay In Seeking

Treatment.
9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24
196 Cal. App. 4th at 216 (2011) (affirming summary adjudication because plaintiff could not
25
“causally attribute his severe emotional distress” to his supervisor’s alleged sexual harassment
26
where he waited “over a year” before seeking treatment); Girard v. Ball, 125 Cal. App. 3d 772,
27
788 (1981) (affirming summary judgment on IIED claim where plaintiff “sought no medical
28

21
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 treatment for his condition”).

2 b. Plaintiff Cannot Establish Causation Because She Suffered The Same

Symptoms, But Worse, Prior To Working On “The Grinder.”
3
Plaintiffs own testimony refutes her claim that Mr. Savage’s conduct was a substantial
4

10

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13

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16

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19

20

21

22

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27

28

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FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1

5 On this record, plaintiff cannot demonstrate that Mr. Savage’s conduct was a factor in

6 causing her emotional distress—much less that it was a substantial one, as she must. See

7 Barefield v. Chevron, 1997 WL 9888 (N.D. Cal.) (plaintiffs in a racial discrimination action could

8 not recover for emotional distress caused by plaintiffs’ family and personal conflicts and not

9 defendant’s conduct); City of Chula Vista, 196 F.R.D. at 568 (evidence that defendant’s conduct

10 “could have been a factor” in causing emotional distress insufficient to establish causation); see

11 also Network Appliance Inc v. Sun Microsystems Inc, 2009 WL 10690379, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Nov.

12 17, 2009) (“[C]onduct is a legal cause of harm to another if [it] is a substantial factor in bringing

13 about the harm, not merely one of many events ‘but for’ which the harm would not have

14 occurred.”) (citing Restatement (First) of Torts § 431); BAJI Instr.—Civ.14.65, Damages—

15 Aggravation of Preexisting Condition (“A person who has a condition or disability at the time of

16 an injury is not entitled to recover damages therefor.”); Uriell v. Regents ofUniv. of California,

17 234 Cal. App. 4th 735, 746 (2015) (“If the evidence presented on causation leaves the matter one

18 of pure speculation or conjecture, or the probabilities are at best evenly balanced, it becomes the

19 duty of the court to direct a verdict for the defendant.”).

20 B. Plaintiff Cannot Establish The Elements Of Her Civil Conspiracy Claim.

21 Count 8 alleges that Fox and Mr. Savage conspired to violate Civil Code section 51.7.10

22 In the absence of an actionable “wrongful act,” a plaintiff cannot assert a claim for civil

23 conspiracy. See, e.g., Applied Equip. Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd., 1 Cal. 4th 503, 511

24 (1994) (“Standing alone, a conspiracy does no harm and engenders no tort liability. It must be

25 activated by the commission of an actual tort.”). Accordingly, because plaintiff cannot establish

26 the elements of her claim under Section 51.7, her civil conspiracy claim necessarily fails as well.

27

28 10 The Court has already determined that Fox cannot be liable under Count 1. See December 12,
2018 Order on Defendants’ Demurrer to Plaintiffs SAC, at 6.

23
FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
 1 V. CONCLUSION

2 For the foregoing reasons, Fox respectfully requests that the Court grants its motion for

3 summary judgment in its entirety.

4
Dated: January 18, 2019 O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP
5

6
Molly M. L
7 Attorneys for Defendants
Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation and
8 Twentieth Century Fox Television

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FOX’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT