BARRETTO GONZALEZ v.
GONZALEZ – Manguera as their legal portion if said spouse had died intestate immediately after
FACTS:
- Plaintiff and defendant are citizens of the Philippine Islands and at present
residents of the City of Manila. They were married in the City of Manila on
January 19, 1919, and lived together as man and wife in the Philippine Islands
until the spring of 1926. They voluntarily separated and since that time have
not lived together as man and wife.
- Of this union four children (all minors) were born. Negotiations between the
parties continued for several months, whereupon it was mutually agreed to
allow the plaintiff Manuela Barreto for her support and that of her children,
P500/monthly; this amount to be increased in case of illness or necessity, and
the title of certain properties to be put in her name.
- Shortly after this agreement, defendant Augusto Gonzalez left the Islands and
betook himself to Reno, Nevada, and secured in that jurisdiction an absolute
divorce on the ground of desertion, which decree was dated November 28,
1927.
- Shortly thereafter the defendant moved to California and returned to these
Islands in August 1928, where he has since remained. On the same date that he
secured a divorce in Nevada, he went through the forms of marriage with
another citizen of these Islands and now has 3 children with her.
- Defendant, after his departure from these Islands, reduced the amount he had
agreed to pay monthly for the support of his wife and 4 minor children and has
not made the payments fixed in the Reno divorce as alimony.
- Plaintiff brought action in the CFI Manila requesting that the courts of the
Philippine Islands confirm and ratify the decree of divorce issued by the courts
of the State of Nevada, that section 9 of Act No. 2710, which reads as follows:
“The decree of divorce shall dissolve the community of property as soon
as such decree becomes final, but shall not dissolve the bonds of
matrimony until one year thereafter.
The bonds of matrimony shall not be considered as dissolved with
regard to the spouse who, having legitimate children, has not delivered
to each of them or to the guardian appointed by the court, within said
period of one year, the equivalent of what would have been due to them
1|C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – F E U J D 4 3 0 1
the dissolution of the community of property.”
be enforced, and that she and the defendant deliver to the guardian ad litem the
equivalent of what would have been due to their children as their legal portion
from the respective estates had their parents did intestate on November 28,
1927.
- It is also prayed that the community existing between plaintiff and defendant
be declared dissolved and the defendant be ordered to render an accounting
and to deliver to the plaintiff her share of the community property. The Court
of First Instance, after hearing, found against the defendant and granted
judgment as prayed for by the plaintiff and intervenors.
ISSUE: Whether or not any foreign divorce relating to citizens of the Philippine
Islands, will be recognized in this jurisdiction, except it be for a cause, and
under conditions for which the courts of Philippine Islands would grant a
divorce.
HELD: NO. The Reno divorce cannot be recognized in the Philippines. The
entire conduct of the parties from the time of their separation until the case
was submitted to this court, in which they all prayed that the Reno divorce be
ratified and confirmed, clearly indicates a purpose to circumvent the laws of the
Philippine Islands regarding divorce and to secure for themselves a change of
status for reasons and under conditions not authorized by our law. At all times
the matrimonial domicile of this couple has been within the Philippine Islands
and the residence acquired in the State of Nevada by the husband of the
purpose of securing a divorce was not a bona fide residence and did not confer
jurisdiction upon the Court of that State to dissolve the bonds if matrimony in
which he had entered in 1919.
- Pursuant to the Civil Code, “the laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity or persons, are binding upon Spaniards even
though they reside in a foreign country.” Thus, the personal relations
of Filipino citizens shall not be affected by decrees of foreign courts in a
manner that the State believes is contrary to public order and good morals. It is
the duty of the courts to apply the laws of divorce as written by the legislature if
they are constitutional. Courts have no right to say that such laws are too strict or too liberal.
DE LEON v. CA – Manzo
FACTS: Private respondent Jose Vicente De Leon and petitioner Sylvia
Lichauco De Leon were married and had a child named Susana but they later on
de facto separated due to irreconcilable marital differences. Sylvia left the
conjugal home and went to the United States where she obtained American
citizenship.
Sylvia filed with the Superior Court of California a petition for dissolution of
marriage against Jose Vicente. In the divorce proceedings, Sylvia also filed
claims for support and distribution of properties. It appears, however, that
since Jose Vicente was then a Philippine resident and did not have any assets in
the United States, Sylvia chose to hold in abeyance the divorce proceedings, and
in the meantime, concentrated her efforts to obtain some sort of property
settlements with Jose Vicente in the Philippines.
Thus, on March 16, 1977, Sylvia succeeded in entering into a Letter-Agreement
with her mother-in-law, private respondent Macaria De Leon wherein the latter
agreed to bind herself jointly and severally to answer for the following
undertakings of Jose Vincent:
In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of
relations between the undersigned and her lawfully wedded
husband, Jose Vicente de Leon, your son, agrees to give Sylvia:
(1) Ortigas Condominium; (2) Wack-Wack
Condominium; (3) two Ayala Alabang lots; (5) California
property; (6) P100,000; (7) $35,000; (8) Monthly
support; (9) Exclusive custody of minor daughter
This contract is intended to be applicable both in the Republic of
the Philippines and in the United States of America. It is agreed
that this will constitute an actionable document in both jurisdictions
and the parties herein waive their right to object to the use of this
document in the event a legal issue should arise relating to the validity
of this document. In the event of a dispute, this letter is subject to
interpretation under the laws of California, U.S.A.
On the same date, Macaria made cash payments to Sylvia in the amount of
P100,000 and $35,000.00 in compliance with her obligations as stipulated in
the Letter-Agreement.
Thereafter, the court approved the joint petition for judicial approval of
dissolution of the conjugal property of Sylvia and Jose.
2|C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – F E U J D 4 3 0 1
Sylvia then moved for the execution of the above-mentioned order. However,
Jose Vicente moved for a reconsideration of the order alleging that Sylvia made
a verbal reformation of the petition as there was no such agreement for the
payment of P4,500.00 monthly support to commence from the alleged date of
separation.
While the said motion for reconsideration was pending resolution, Macaria filed
with the trial court a motion for leave to intervene alleging that she is the
owner of the properties involved in the case. The motion was granted.
She assailed the validity and legality of the Letter-Agreement which had
for its purpose, according to her, the termination of marital relationship
between Sylvia and Jose Vicente.
The trial court ruled in favor of Macaria and declared the letter-agreement null
and void. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the dissolution of the conjugal
property of the spouses and ordered the distribution of the properties in
accordance with the agreement excluding the properties actually owned by
Macaria De Leon.
Sylvia appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals contending that the trial
court erred in finding that the cause or consideration of the Letter Agreement is
the termination of marital relations.
The respondent court affirmed the decision in toto. The motion for
reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: The only basis by which Sylvia may lay claim to the properties which are
the subject matter of the Letter Agreement, is the Letter-Agreement itself. The
main issue, therefore, is “Whether or not the Letter-Agreement is valid.”
HELD: No, the Letter-Agreement is invalid. Sylvia must return Macaria’s
properties.
The third paragraph of the Letter-Agreement reads:
“In consideration for a peaceful and amicable termination of
relations between the undersigned and her lawfully wedded
husband, Jose Vicente De Leon, your son, the following are agreed
upon:”
It is clear that the use of the word “relations” is ambiguous so it is necessarily
subject to interpretation. The intent of the whole agreement must be
interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may
result from all of them taken jointly.
Sylvia insists that the consideration for her execution of the Letter-Agreement
was the termination of property relations with her husband. On the other hand,
Macaria and Jose Vicente assert that the consideration was the termination of
marital relationship.
The Court agrees with the conclusion made by the lower court that with the
apparently ambiguous provisions regarding termination of “relations”, the
parties clearly contemplated not only the termination of property relationship
but likewise of marital relationship in its entirety.
Article 1306 of the New Civil Code provides that parties may stipulate terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient provided they are not contrary to
law, morals or public policy. Otherwise, the contract is void and inexistent from
the beginning.
But marriage is not a mere contract but a sacred social institution. Thus, Article
52 of the Civil Code provides that its nature, consequences and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulations.
From the foregoing provisions, the court held that the Letter-Agreement is
deemed null and void because it is premised on the termination of marital
relationship which is not only contrary to law but contrary to Filipino morals
and public policy.
Additionally, Article 191 of the Civil Code (dissolution of conjugal property)
contemplates properties belonging to the spouses and not those belonging to a
third party, who in this case, is Macaria. In the petition for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership, it was made to appear that the said properties are
conjugal in nature. However, Macaria was able to prove that the questioned
properties are owned by her. Neither Sylvia nor Jose Vicente adduced any
contrary evidence.
Sylvia then alleged that that since the nullity of the Letter-Agreement proceeds
from the unlawful consideration of Macaria, applying the pari delicto rule, she
should not be able to recover what she has given by reason of the Letter-
Agreement nor ask for the fulfillment of what has been promised her. On the
other hand, Macaria raises the defenses of intimidation (Sylvia threatened to
scandalize the family in court) and mistake (she was led to believe Sylvia
would and could eliminate her inheritance rights in accordance with California
law) which led her to execute the Letter-Agreement.
3|C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – F E U J D 4 3 0 1
The agreement shows that Sylvia was willing to consent to and pardon Jose
Vicente for possible crimes of adultery and/or concubinage if the subject
properties were transferred to her. There appears some truth to the
apprehensions of intervenor for in Sylvia’s testimony she confirms that Macaria
was worried that her son has already remarried and had a child.
The claim of Macaria that Sylvia threatened her to bring Jose Vicente to court
for support, to scandalize their family by baseless suits is obviously not the
intimidation referred to by law. Likewise, Macaria’s alleged mistake in having
signed the Letter-Agreement because of her belief that Sylvia will eliminate
inheritance rights from her and Jose Vicente, is not the mistake referred to in
Article 1331 of the Civil Code because such condition was but an incident of
the consideration of the “termination of marital relations.”
In the ultimate analysis, both parties acted in violation of the laws. However,
the pari delicto rule which refuses remedy to either party to an illegal
agreement and leaves them where they are, does not apply in this case.
Article 1414 of the Civil Code, which is an exception to the pari delicto rule, is
the proper law to be applied. It provides:
When money is paid or property delivered for an illegal purpose, the
contract may be repudiated by one of the parties before the
purpose has been accomplished, or before any damage has been
caused to a third person. In such case, the courts may, if the public
interest will thus be subserved, allow the party repudiating the
contract to recover the money or property.
Since the Letter-Agreement was repudiated before the purpose has been
accomplished, to adhere to the pari delicto rule in this case is to put a premium
to the circumvention of the laws. Positive relief should be granted to Macaria.
Justice would be served by allowing her to be placed in the position in which
she was before the transaction was entered into.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED.
HIX v. FLUEMER – Morales, C
FACTS: E. Randolph Hix was born in Union South Carolina where he lived with
his parent until his 15. He then moved to Rye, Westchester, New York. A year
after he was sent to University of Lehigh and to Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, leaving the latter before graduating to accept employment in
Edison Company where he work for three years. He then moved to Wheeling,
West Virginia to engage in general engineering business.
He was appointed as coal expert of the Philippine Government. Upon his arrival
in Manila, he met appellant Annie and get married in Shanghai, China. They
returned in Manila establishing their domicile. A son was born in Boston,
Massachusetts named Preston Randolph Hix. Appellant, had a medical
condition and was treated at the expense of her husband. When appellant
regained her healthy condition she lived apart from his husband by mutual
consent.
Appellant instituted a complaint against her husband compelling him to
provide adequate support to her and their child. The court ruled in favor of
Appellant. The office where E. Randolph Hix was working as coal expert was
abolished which prompted him to engage in private practice. However, he left
for West Virginia and left the business to Fluemer.
E. Randolph Hix filed for a divorce in Circuit Court of West Virginia that he, Hix,
freely, voluntarily, and adequately supported his wife and child, paying her the
sum of $175 per month; that he intended to reside permanently in the United
States, and that it was with such intention that he had returned to West
Virginia; that he and his wife had been living apart for three years, and that she
had rejected his offer of reconciliation. As the appellant was not a resident of
the State of West Virginia, she was summoned upon the complaint for divorce
by publication, and not having entered an appearance in the case, either
personally or by counsel within the term fixed, the Circuit Court of Randolph
County, West Virginia, rendered judgment against her in 1925 declaring her
marriage with the plaintiff dissolved. Having procured the divorce, E. Randolph
Hix returned to Manila in 1927, where he continued to live and engaged in
business up to the time of his death in the year 1929.
ISSUE: whether the Circuit Court of Randolph County in West Virginia acquired
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint for divorce filed by E .Randolph
Hix and to render a valid and binding judgment against the petitioner and
appellant, Annie Cousins Hix.
HELD: NO.
4|C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – F E U J D 4 3 0 1
One of the conditions for the validity of a decree of absolute divorce is that
the court granting it has acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter,
and to this end the plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith, and for the
length of time fixed by the law, in the state in which it was granted. E.
Randolph Hix was domiciled in the City of Manila where he lived apart
from his wife and child, by mutual consent, and here he had his business.
He removed to the State of West Virginia leaving his aforesaid wife and
child and his business behind, for the purpose of obtaining an absolute
divorce, which he did in 1925, returning in the year 1927 to reside in the
City of Manila, and continuing his business.
Although the opponent and appellee attempted to show that E. Randolph Hix
went to West Virginia with the intention of residing there permanently, as
allege in the complaint for divorce, such an intention was contradicted by the
fact that before leaving the City of Manila, he did not liquidate his business but
placed it under the management of said opponent, and once having obtained his
divorce, he returned to the City of Manila to take up his residence and to
continue his aforesaid business, and that his purpose in going to West Virginia
was to obtain a divorce.
Since E. Randolph Hix was not a bona fide resident of the State of West Virginia,
the divorce decree he obtained from the Circuit Court of Randolph County, is
null and void, said court having failed to acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
IN RE CHEONG BOO – Morales, I
DOCTRINE: A marriage alleged to have been contracted in China and proven
mainly by a so-called matrimonial letter, held not to be valid in the Philippines.
Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended to safeguard
society by legalizing prior marriages. Public policy should aid acts intended to
validate marriages and should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages.
FACTS:
 Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine
Islands, on August 5, 1919. He left property worth nearly P100,000.
He contracted 2 marriages one with Tan Dit and Mora Adong.
 His estate was claimed by two persons: Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged
that he was a legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo
 with Tan Dit in China in 1895 and Mora Adong who alleged that she
had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan,
Philippine Islands, and her daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian
Chay, and Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried.
 Judge of CFI Zamboanga - with reference to the allegations of Cheong
Seng Gee, that the proof1 did not sufficiently establish the Chinese
marriage, but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the
Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the
estate as a natural child.
With reference to the allegations2 of the Mora Adong and her
daughters Payang and Rosalia, the trial judge reached the conclusion
that the marriage between the Mora Adong and the deceased had
been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine
Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage; accordingly, the
daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The
order of the trial judge, following these conclusions, was that there
should be a partition of the property of the deceased Cheong Boo
between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia.
ISSUE: Is a marriage contracted in China and proven mainly by an alleged
matrimonial letter, valid in the Philippines?
Are the marriage performed in the Philippines according to the rites of the
Mohammedan religion valid?
1
Cheong Boo is said to have remained in China for one year and four months after his
marriage during which time there was born to him and his wife a child named Cheong
Seng Gee. Cheong Boo then left China for the Philippine Islands and sometime thereafter
took to himself a concubine Mora by whom he had two children. In 1910, Cheong Boo was
followed to the Philippines by Cheong Seng Gee who, as appears from documents
presented in evidence, was permitted to land in the Philippine Islands as the son of
Cheong Boo. The deceased, however, never returned to his native hearth and seems never
to have corresponded with his Chinese wife or to have had any further relations with her
except once when he sent her P10.
2 From the marriage day until the death of Cheong Boo, twenty-three years later, the
Chinaman and the Mora Adong cohabited as husband and wife. To them were born five
children, two of whom, Payang and Rosalia, are living. Both in his relations with Mora
Adong and with third persons during his lifetime, Cheong Boo treated Adong as his lawful
wife. He admitted this relationship in several private and public documents. Thus, when
different legal documents were executed, including decrees of registration, Cheong Boo
stated that he was married to the Mora Adong while as late as 1918, he gave written
consent to the marriage of his minor daughter, Payang.
5|C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – F E U J D 4 3 0 1
HELD:
1. No.
Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that "All
marriages contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by the
laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in
these Islands." To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this
comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the
Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is
then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing
evidence.
The Court applied the ruling in Sy Joc Lieng vs. Encarnacion Here, the courts of
the Philippines and the Supreme Court of the United States were called upon to
decide, as to the conflicting claims to the estate of a Chinese merchant, between
the descendants of an alleged Chinese marriage and the descendants of an
alleged Philippine marriage. The Supreme Courts of the Philippine Islands and
the United States united in holding that the Chinese marriage was not
adequately proved. The legal rule was stated by the United States Supreme
Court to be this: A Philippine marriage, followed by forty years of uninterrupted
marital life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the
husband and administration of his estate, though an alleged prior Chinese
marriage, "save upon proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a
moral conviction of the existence of such impediment." Another case in the
same category is that of Son Cui vs. Guepangco.
In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of
China in the Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As in
the Encarnacion case, there is lacking proof so clear, strong, and
unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the
alleged prior Chinese marriage. Substitute twenty-three years for forty
years and the two cases are the same.
2. YES.
Three sections of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) must be taken into
consideration:
Section V of the Marriage Law provides that "Marriage may be solemnized by
either a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, justice of the peace, or
priest or minister of the Gospel of any denomination . . ."
Marriage Law, No. VI, provides that "No particular form for the ceremony of
marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife."
Section IX of Marriage Law "No marriage heretofore solemnized before any
person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such
authority or on account of any informality, irregularity, or omission, if it was
celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority
and that they have been lawfully married."
The retrospective provisions of the Philippine Marriage Law undoubtedly were
inspired by the governmental policy in the United States, with regard to the
marriages of the Indians, the Quakers, and the Mormons. The basis of human
society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but, it is a new relation, an institution in
the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is
that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they
thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation
of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil
Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and
wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.:"Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio — Always presume marriage.
Section IX of the Marriage Law is in the nature of a curative provision intended
to safeguard society by legalizing prior marriages. We can see no substantial
reason for denying to the legislative power the right to remove impediments to
an effectual marriage. If the legislative power can declare what shall be valid
marriages, it can render valid, marriages which, when they took place, were
against the law. Public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriages and
should retard acts intended to invalidate marriages.
The courts can properly incline the scales of their decisions in favors of that
solution which will not effectively promote the public policy. That is the true
construction which will best carry legislative intention into effect. And here
the consequences, entailed in holding that the marriage of the Mora
Adong and the deceased Cheong Boo, in conformity with the
Mohammedan religion and Moro customs, was void, would be far reaching
in disastrous result. The last census shows that there are at least one
hundred fifty thousand Moros who have been married according to local
custom. We then have it within our power either to nullify or to validate
all of these marriages; either to make all of the children born of these
6|C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – F E U J D 4 3 0 1
unions bastards or to make them legitimate; either to proclaim
immorality or to sanction morality; either to block or to advance settled
governmental policy. Our duty is as obvious as the law is plain.
IN RE ESTATE OF WERTHMULLER – Nitro
DOCTRINE:
 For as long as the foreign court acquired jurisdiction, its decisions will
not be disturbed whether it was reached through an adversary
proceeding or by default.
 It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a
country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one
or both of them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a
divorce has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and
a divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition
elsewhere.
FACTS: Samuel Bischoff Werthmuller, a native of Switzerland, but for many
years a resident of Philippines, died testate in Iloilo on June 29, 1913. A few
days after his death, the will was offered for probate in CFI Iloilo and was
subsequently admitted.
1. His widow, Dona Ana Ramirez, was named executrix. According to the
will, the decedent’s estate was bequeathed to his widow, except for a
property in Thun, Switzerland, which was devised to the decedent’s
brothers and sisters
2. It appears that while the decedent had no children with Ramirez, he
ignored possible claims of two sets of children, both to his natural
daughter, Leona Castro
3. Based on the baptismal entry in Bacolod, Leona Castro was born on
April 11, 1875, her mother Felisa Castro and father “unknown.” On the
margin of this record, there is additional annotation (escritura or
public document) that she was recognized by Samuel Bischoff on June
22, 1877. Bischoff and his family raised Leona and he treated her as
his own.
4. Leona married Frederick von Kauffman in 1895 in Hong Kong. From
this marriage, 3 children were born: Elena, Federico and Ernesto
5. Subsequently, Leona went with Frederick to Thun, Switzerland, to
improve her health and live there for a few years. Later she informed
her husband that she wanted a separation. As such, Kauffman went to
Paris, France to obtain a divorce from his wife under French laws. A
divorce decree was then issued on Jan 5, 1905 in favor of Kauffman
against Leona, in default. Though the record shows that Leona was
 residing in Paris, there is no evidence that she had acquired
permanent domicile in that city
6. Leona later cohabited with her physician, Dr. Ernest Emil Mory (in
charge of the sanatorium in Switzerland) in London. They later
married in London in 1905. It appears that Mory had previously been
married to one Helena Wolpman but later divorced. Prior to Mory’s
marriage to Leona, they had a daughter Leontina Elizabeth. In 106,
they had Carmen Maria and in 1909, Esther. Leona died on Oct 6, 1910
7. Respondent Otto Gmur appeared as guardian of the 3 Mory claimants,
while Frederick von Kauffman appeared as the guardian of his 3
children
8. Both sets of children anchor their claim on the contention that Leona
was the recognized natural daughter of Samuel Bischoff, as a forced
heir, the claimants are entitled to 1/3 interest in Bischoff’s estate
9. On the other hand, Ramirez contended that Leona Castro had never
been recognized at all by the decedent during his lifetime
10. On the part of the Mory claimants, they argue that the marriage
between Leona and Kauffman was dissolved by the decree of divorce
granted by the Paris court in Jan 5, 1905 and that the subsequent
marriage between Leona and Mory was in all respects valid and the
children legitimate offspring of Leona
11. On the part of the Kauffman claimants, they insisted that the decree of
divorce was invalid and they alone are the legitimate offspring of
Leona who are entitled to participate in the division of the estate of
Bischoff
ISSUE: WON Leona is the recognized natural daughter of Samuel Bischoff?
HELD: Yes.
It is proved that prior to her marriage with Kauffman, Leona was in an
uninterrupted enjoyment of the de facto status of a natural child and was
treated as such by Bischoff and his kindred. The proof of tacit recognition is full
and complete.
From the memorandum made by Padre Ferrero in the record of birth as well as
in his testimony, it appears that Bischoff executed a notarized document
recognizing Leona as his daughter. While the note itself was not presented in
evidence, it was shown that diligent search was made to discover its
whereabouts but without avail. This was sufficient to justify the introduction of
secondary evidence concerning its contents; and the testimony of the priest
showed that the fact of recognition was therein stated. Furthermore, the
memorandum in the baptismal record itself constitutes original and
substantive proof of the facts therein.
7|C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – F E U J D 4 3 0 1
The recognition of Leona as Samuel Bischoff’s daughter occurred prior to the
Civil Code and consequently, her rights as derived from the recognition must be
determined under the law when it existed. Under the law, recognition could be
established by proof of acts on the part of the parent unequivocally recognizing
the status of his offspring. In other words, tacit recognition was sufficient.
ISSUE: WON Felisa Castro (Leona’s mother) was without legal impediment
HELD: Yes. There is no evidence to show that Felisa Castro was either a single
woman or widow at the time of Leona’s birth. In the absence of proof to the
contrary, however, it must be presumed that she was a single woman or a
widow.
The contrary presumption would be that Felisa was guilty of adultery cannot be
entertained. If such had been the case, the burden of proving it would have
been upon the persons impugning the recognition of the child by her father.
ISSUE: WON Leona stands to inherit from the estate of Samuel Bischoff
HELD: Yes. From the fact that Leona was an acknowledged natural daughter of
the decedent, it follows that had she survived him she would have been his
forced heir, he having died after the Civil Code took effect; and as such forced
heir, she would have been entitled to 1/3 of the inheritance.
ISSUE: WON the Kauffman claimants are entitled to participate in the division
of the estate
HELD: Yes. Since the Kauffman children were born during the marriage of
Leona and Kauffman, it follows that they are entitled to participate in the
inheritance which would have devolved upon their mother, if she had survived
the testator.
ISSUE: WON the divorce decree granted by the Paris court can be recognized in
the Philippines
HELD: No. The divorce decree in question cannot be recognized as valid in the
Philippines. The French tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for
the dissolution of a marriage contracted in the Philippines by a person
domiciled her; such marriage being indissoluble under the laws then prevailing
in this country.
The evidence shows that both Kauffman and Leona are domiciled in Iloilo,
Philippines and that their departure to Switzerland was for medical purpose,
and that Kauffman went to Paris in 1904 to obtain a divorce without an
intention to establish permanent residence in that city.
A court, where neither of the spouses is domiciled, and to which one or both of
them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no
jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by
such a court is not entitled to recognition elsewhere.
ISSUE: WON the Mory claimants are entitled to the estate
HELD: No. With regard to the Mory claimants, their rights principally depend
upon the effect to be given by this court to divorce degree granted to Kauffman
in Paris. If divorce decree is valid, the subsequent marriage of Leona and Mory
is also valid.
Since the divorce granted by the French court cannot be recognized, it follows
that the marriage between Mory and Leona in London could not legalize their
relations. The claims of the Mory children to participate in the estate of Bischoff
must be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated, and
acknowledged natural children.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the probate of a will upon the rights of forced heirs
who did not appear to contest the probate?
HELD: The rights of the forced heirs to their legitime are not divested by the
decree admitting a will to probate—this is regardless of the fact that no
provision has been made for them in the will, for the decree of probate is
conclusive only with regard to the due execution of the will.
Under Sec 753 Code of Civil Procedure, forced heirs cannot be prejudiced by the
failure of a testator to provide for them in his will; and regardless of the
intention of the testator to leave all his property to his wife, the will is
intrinsically invalid insofar as it would operate to cut off their rights.
DISPOSITIVE: The order allowing Leontina Mory to participate in the estate of
Samuel Bischoff is reversed; and instead the Kauffman children will be
admitted to share equally in 1/3 of the estate as provided in the decision of
Judge Powell dated Nov 14, 1916. In other respects, the decision of Judge
Mariano is affirmed.
TO ADD: ALSO RELEVANT
It is established by the great weight of authority that the court of a country in
which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both of them may
8|C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – F E U J D 4 3 0 1
resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has no jurisdiction to
determine their matrimonial status; and a divorce granted by such a court is
not entitled to recognition elsewhere. (See Note to Succession of Benton, 59
L.R.A. 143.) The voluntary appearance of the defendant before such a tribunal
does not invest the court with jurisdiction.
As the divorce granted by the French court must be ignored, it results that the
marriage of Doctor Mory and Leona Castro, celebrated in London in 1905, could
not legalize their relations; and the circumstance that they afterwards passed
for husband and wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legal
significance. The claims of the Mory children to participate in the estate of
Samuel Bischoff must therefore be rejected. The right to inherit is limited to
legitimate, legitimated, and acknowledged natural children. The children of
adulterous relations are wholly excluded. The word "descendants" as used in
Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted to include illegitimates born
of adulterous relations."
For as long as the foreign court acquired jurisdiction, its decisions will not be
disturbed whether it was reached through an adversary proceeding or by
default. In one case, Somportex v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp.," the court
rejected Philadelphia's contention that a default judgment rendered by the
English courts should not be extended hospitality by American courts. It ruled
that "(i)n the absence of fraud or collusion, a default judgment is as conclusive
as adjudication between the parties as when rendered after answer and
complete contest in open court.... The polestar is whether a reasonable method
of notification is employed and reasonable opportunity to be heard is afforded
to the person affected."
We are of the opinion that the decree of divorce upon which reliance is placed
by the representation of the Mory children cannot be recognized as valid in the
courts of the Philippine Islands. The French tribunal has no jurisdiction to
entertain ail action for the dissolution of a marriage contracted in these Islands
by persons domiciled here, such marriage being indissoluble under the laws
then prevailing in this country.
VANDEVERE v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION – Omnes
FACTS: On October 29, 1983, Ronald L. Vandever was shot and killed while
performing his duties as an employee of respondent Phoenix Newspapers.
Petitioner Cynthia K. Vandever's claim for compensation as decedent's widow
was denied by the Industrial Commission. Petitioner filed a timely request for
hearing protesting the denial of her claim. A formal hearing was held and her
claim was again denied in a decision dated November 16, 1984. The decision
denying benefits was affirmed pursuant to a request for review and petitioner
filed this special action.
The following facts regarding the relationship of petitioner and the decedent
are drawn from the record and the uncontroverted testimony given at the
administrative hearing. In 1976, decedent began working for respondent
Phoenix Newspapers in Ajo, Arizona. Petitioner moved to Arizona in 1973 and
obtained a divorce from a former spouse in March, 1976. She was introduced to
the decedent in April and immediately thereafter, the couple began living
together in the Phoenix area. The couple recited marriage vows to each other
during the course of a friend's wedding ceremony the following month, but
failed to obtain a license or otherwise comply with the formalities of a valid
marriage contracted within the state as set forth in A.R.S. § 25-111.1 Thereafter,
petitioner used the name of Vandever, gave birth to two children, and
continued to cohabit with the decedent.
In August, 1978, petitioner and the decedent traveled to Colorado for three
weeks with their seven-month old daughter Melissa in order to attend the
wedding of the decedent's nephew, Stephen Houser. Petitioner testified that
she and the decedent were introduced as Mr. and Mrs. Vandever and as
husband and wife to several people at the rehearsal dinner, wedding and
reception. Her testimony was corroborated by Stephen Houser, who testified
that he and his relatives introduced petitioner and the decedent as Ron and
Cindy Vandever. Houser further confirmed that his wedding album was signed
"Ronald, Cindy and Melissa Vandever" and that an article regarding his
wedding, published in a local newspaper, listed "Mr. & Mrs. Ronald Vandever
and Melissa of Ajo, Arizona" as guests in attendance. Houser testified that he
never really knew whether the petitioner and decedent were legally married
and did not press the issue.
After the wedding, petitioner and decedent stayed in the Houser apartment for
three weeks while the newlyweds were on their honeymoon. Petitioner
testified that during their stay decedent unsuccessfully sought employment in
the Grand Junction area. Finally, petitioner testified that at some point during
the three-week vacation the couple heard a radio broadcast on the subject of
Colorado common-law marriage and concluded that they were in fact married
under the laws of that state.
In January of 1979, decedent resigned from his Ajo, Arizona position with
respondent Phoenix Newspapers. The couple returned to Colorado for two
weeks where decedent again unsuccessfully attempted to obtain employment
in the Grand Junction area. Decedent and petitioner traveled on to New Mexico
for a month and a half, and finally settled in Wyoming for thirteen months. In
mid-1980, decedent accepted a position offered by the respondent Phoenix
9|C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – F E U J D 4 3 0 1
Newspapers in Casa Grande, and the couple returned to Arizona where they
resided until the decedent's untimely death in 1983.
ISSUE: WON petitioner established the existence of a valid Colorado common-
law marriage so as to be entitled to widow's death benefits under our workers'
compensation laws?
HELD: NO. By the statutes of Colorado, marriage is declared to be a civil
contract; and there is only one essential requirement to its validity, between
parties capable of contracting, viz. the consent of the parties." . Evidence of
cohabitation and repute, while not essential to the legality of the relationship, is
competent and in itself properly may be the basis for inferring consent to a
contract of marriage. Thus, if a contract or agreement cannot be shown, its
existence may be proven by, and presumed from, evidence of cohabitation and
general repute. It is necessary that there be evidence of both before a common-
law marriage will be presumed; proof of one alone is not sufficient to sustain
the presumption. . A presumption of marriage by cohabitation and repute can
only be established by evidence that is convincing and positive, id. at 29, or that
is clear, consistent and convincing.
`Cohabitation,' as here used, means something more than sexual intercourse ...
`It is not a sojourn, nor a habit of visiting, nor even a remaining with for a time.
None of these fall within the true idea of cohabitation as a fact presumptive of
marriage ... To cohabit is to live or dwell together, to have the same habitation;
so that, where one lives and dwells, there does the other live and dwell with
him ...' By `general reputation or repute' is meant the understanding among the
neighbors and acquaintances with whom the parties associate in their daily life
that they are living together as husband and wife, and not in meretricious
intercourse. `In its application to the fact of marriage, it is more than mere
hearsay. It involves, and is made up of, social conduct and recognition, giving
character to an admitted and unconcealed cohabitation.'
The only evidence tending to establish the existence of an actual agreement or
contract made in Colorado was the uncontradicted testimony of petitioner to
the effect that the parties mutually decided they were married after listening to
a radio broadcast. There is evidence in the record tending to cast doubt on the
credibility of petitioner as a witness. We have frequently stated that an
administrative law judge's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is
generally binding upon the reviewing court. Therefore, we find no error in the
administrative law judge's failure to find that petitioner's uncontradicted
testimony standing alone was sufficient to establish the existence of a contract.
Furthermore, we do not believe that the petitioner presented clear and positive
evidence of both cohabitation and general repute in Colorado so as to establish
a presumption that such an agreement existed. The only evidence presented as
to the couple's behavior in Colorado was the testimony of petitioner and
Stephen Houser regarding their behavior during the wedding, a single event.
This evidence was hardly "general and uniform" within the meaning of Peery,
and was not sufficiently clear and positive so as to raise a presumption of the
existence of reputation of marriage in the community under Colorado law.
[P]roof of a common-law marriage under modern cases requires evidence of a
course of conduct, of marital cohabitation. At the least, this would entail a stay
of some duration in the nondomiciliary state before evidence of the requisite
kind and amount could become available.
We therefore find that the administrative law judge could reasonably have
concluded that petitioner failed to carry her burden, and affirm the award of
the Commission denying widow's benefits under the workers' compensation
laws.
WONG v. VIVO – Probadora
DOCTRINE:
 Article 15 of our new Civil Code provides that laws relating to
family rights or to the status of persons are binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, even though living abroad, and it is well-known
that in 1929 in order that a marriage celebrated in the Philippines
may be valid it must be solemnized either by a judge of any court
inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a priest or
minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the
Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even if
we assume, therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto
Bias before a village leader is valid in China, the same is not one
of those authorized in our country.
 An alien woman is properly denied admission to the Philippines
where the only basis in support of her claim that she is the wife of a
Philippine citizen is a mass of oral and documentary evidence bereft
of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship.
FACTS:
 The Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding
petitioner (WONG WOO YIU) to be legally married to Perfecto Bias
and admitting her into the country as a non-quota immigrant. This
decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners However, the
same Board of Commissioners, but composed entirely of a new set of
members, rendered a new decision reversing that of the Board of
10 | C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – F E U J D 4 3 0 1
Special Inquiry No. 3 and ordering petitioner to be excluded from the
country.
 Petitioner filed a motion for new trial requesting an opportunity to
clarify certain points taken in the decision, but the same was denied
for lack of merit. Whereupon, on September 14, 1962, petitioner
initiated the instant petition for mandamus with preliminary
injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila which
incidentally was considered by it as a petition for certiorari.
 CFI- the court declared valid the decision rendered by the Board of
Special Inquiry No. 3 while it restrained respondents from excluding
petitioner from the country.
 Petitioners version: It appears that in the proceedings held before
the Board of Special Inquiry sometime in June, 1961, petitioner
declared that she came to the Philippines in 1961 for the first time
to join her husband Perfecto Bias to whom she was married in
Chingkang, China on January 15, 1929; that they had several children
all of whom are not in the Philippines; that their marriage was
celebrated by one Chua Tio, a village leader; that on June 28, 1961
the Board of Special Inquiry No. 3 rendered a decision finding, among
others, that petitioner is legally married to Perfecto Bias, a Filipino
Citizen, and admitted her into the country as a non-quota immigrant;
that this decision was affirmed by the Board of Commissioners of
which petitioner was duly notified by the Secretary of said Board in a
letter dated July 12, 1961; that in a motu proprio decision rendered by
the Board of Commissioners composed of a new set of members dated
June 28, 1962 the latter found that petitioners claim that she is the
lawful wife of Perfecto Bias was without basis in evidence as it was
bereft of substantial proof of husband-wife relationship;
 Boards version: that said Board further held that, it appearing that in
the entry proceedings of Perfecto Bias that he first visited China in
1935 and married petitioner in 1936, it could not possibly sustain
her claim that she married Perfecto Bias in 1929; that in an affidavit
dated August 9, 1962 Perfecto Bias claimed that he went to China in
1929, 1935 and 1941, although in his re-entry declaration he admitted
that he first went to China in 1935, then in 1937, then in 1939, and
lastly in 1941; and that Perfecto Bias in the same affidavit likewise
claimed that he first went to China when he was merely four
years old so that computed from his date of birth in 1908 it must
have been in 1912.
ISSUE: Whether or not WONG WOO YIU’s marriage to PERFECTO BLAS is valid
in the Philippines and her admission into the country is legal.
HELD: NO
The above comment cannot be disputed, it finding support in the
record. Indeed, not only is there no documentary evidence to support the
alleged marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Bias but the record is
punctured with so many inconsistencies which cannot but lead one to
doubt their veracity concerning the pretended marriage in China in 1929.
This claim cannot also be entertained under our law on family relations. Thus,
Article 15 of our new Civil Code provides that laws relating to family rights or
to the status of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad, and it is well-known that in 1929 in order that a marriage
celebrated in the Philippines may be valid it must be solemnized either by a
judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, a justice of the peace, or a
priest or minister of the gospel of any denomination duly registered in the
Philippine Library and Museum (Public Act 3412, Section 2). Even if we assume,
therefore, that the marriage of petitioner to Perfecto Bias before a village leader
is valid in China, the same is not one of those authorized in our country.
But it may be contended that under Section 4 of General orders No. 68,
as reproduced in Section 19 of Act No. 3613, which is now Article 71 of our new
Civil Code, a marriage contracted outside of the Philippines which is valid
under the law of the country in which it was celebrated is also valid in the
Philippines. But no validity can be given to this contention because no proof was
presented relative to the law of marriage in China. Such being the case, we
should apply the general rule that in the absence of proof of the law of a foreign
country it should be presumed that it is the same as our own. Since our law
only recognizes a marriage celebrated before any of the officers
mentioned therein, and a village Wong Woo Yiu vs. Vivo leader is not one
of them, it is clear that petitioners marriage, even if true, cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction.
YAO KEEv. SY-GONZALES – Que
Petitioners: Yao Kee, Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sy Chun Yen
Respondents: Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, Rodolfo Sy,
and Hon. Court of Appeals
FACTS:
Sy Kiat, deceased Chinese national left behind real and personal properties in
the Philippines.
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Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe, and Rodolfo Sy filed a
petition for the grant of letters of administration, alleging the following:
a. They are children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego
b. To their knowledge, Sy Kiat died intestate
c. They do not recognize Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation
of her children to him
d. They nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of
the intestate estate of the deceased
Yao Kee et al opposed the petition, alleging that:
a. Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy kiat whom he married on January 19,
1931 in China
b. The other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with
Yao Kee
c. Sze Sook Wah is the eldest and may become the administratrix of the
estate
The CFI ruled in favour of Yao Kee et al and declared that Sy-Gonzales et al are
acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Gillego.
The CA modified the decision of the CFI:
a. Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-
Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy acknowledged natural children of the
deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried woman with
whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for
many years
b. Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Mat with his
Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip, since the legality of the
alleged marriage of Sy Mat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to
be valid to the laws of the Chinese People's Republic of China (sic)
c. Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in
favor of Tomas Sy (Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of
the Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply to be valid and
accordingly, said property should be excluded from the estate of the
deceased Sy Kiat
 d. Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as
judicial administratrix of the estate of the deceased.
ISSUEs:
W/N the Philippine court can recognize the alleged marriage of Yao Kee to Sy
Kiat?
A. W/N Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were married?
Yao Kee proved through several testimonies that she and Sy Kiat were
married.
B. W/N said marriage is in accordance with Chinese law or custom?
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts,
uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory"
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil
Code which states that:
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were performed and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except bigamous, Polygamous, or incestuous
marriages, as determined by Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied.) ***
This law requires the following to be proven:
1. The existence of the foreign law as a question of fact
2. The alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of
Court. With respect to an unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45
states that:
SEC. 45. Unwritten law.—The oral testimony of witnesses,
skilled therein, is admissible as evidence of the unwritten law
of a foreign country, as are also printed and published books of
12 | C O N F L I C T O F L A W S – F E U J D 4 3 0 1
reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if
proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for
under Rule 132 section 25, thus:
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record.—An official record
or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be
evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record,
or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in
the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the
custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign
country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy
or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept
and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court ruled that Yao Kee et all did not present competent
evidence. The testimonies were self-serving and the individuals have
no showing that they are competent to testify. For failure to prove the
foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage
in accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee
and Sy Kiat cannot be recognized in Philippine jurisdiction.
On the necessity to prove Chinese law, the Court ruled that the
Philippines follows the principle that courts cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws unless they are alleged and proved as any other
fact.