G.R. No.

207992 August 11, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ROBERTO HOLGADO Y DELA CRUZ AND ANTONIO MISAREZ Y ZARAGA, Accused-appellants.

Facts:

Accused-appellants Roberto Holgado y Dela Cruz (Holgado) and Antonio Misarez y Zaraga (Misarez) were
charged in an information dated January 19, 2007.Following their arrest, Holgado and Misarez were
charged for violating Sections 5 (sale of dangerous drugs), in view of the plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance supposedly sold by Holgado to PO1 Aure. The charges for violations of Sections
11(possession of dangerous drugs) and 12(possession of drug paraphernalia) of Republic Act No. 9165,
were in view of the items supposedly seized in enforcing the search warrant.

After trial, the Pasig City Regional Trial Court, Branch 154 found Holgado and Misarez guilty of illegal saleof
dangerous drugs (i.e., violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165). They were acquitted of the charges
pertaining to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 as the drugs supposedly seized were not introduced in
evidence; and the charges relating to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165 asthe paraphernalia to which
PO2 Castulo testified to in court were different from those indicated in the inventory supposedly made when
the search warrant was enforced.Holgado and Misarez were sentencedto suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a penalty of P1million.

On March 4, 2013, Holgado and Misarez filed their notice of appeal.

On December 27, 2013, Holgado and Misarez filed their joint supplemental brief where they assailed the
supposed lack of compliance with the requirements set by the chain of custody of seized drugs and drug
paraphernalia as provided by Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.

Issue:

Whether or not Holgado’s and Misarez’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 9165 was established?

Held:

No. It was stated in People v. Morales, that:In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the
presentation in court of the corpus delictior the illicit drug as evidence.

Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore, ensures the integrity
of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the
nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items
seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure;
and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession
of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating,
or tampering of evidence in any manner.

After a closer look, the Court finds that the linkages in the chain of custody of the subject item were not
clearly established. As can be gleaned from his fore quoted testimony, PO1 Collado failed to provide
informative details on how the subject shabu was handled immediately after the seizure. He just claimed
that the item was handed to him by the accused in the course of the transaction and, thereafter, he handed
it to the investigator.

There is no evidence either on how the item was stored, preserved, labeled, and recorded. PO1 Collado
could not even providethe court with the name of the investigator. He admitted that he was not present
when it was delivered to the crime laboratory.

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the obvious
evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot
be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the context
of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure
in the performance thereof. In light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong
when they relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.

It is true that Section 21(1), as amended, now includes a proviso to the effect that "noncompliance of (sic)
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures and custody over said items." However, the prosecution has not shown that when the buy-bust
operation was allegedly conducted on January 17, 2007 and the sachet was supposedly seized and
marked, there were "justifiable grounds" for dispensing with compliance with Section 21. Rather, it merely
insisted on its self-serving assertion that the integrity of the seized sachet has nevertheless been,
supposedly, preserved.

While the miniscule amount of narcotics seized is by itself not a ground for acquittal, this circumstance
underscores the need for more exacting compliance with Section 21.

The events of January 17, 2007 should be taken and appreciated as a whole even as they gave rise to four
(4) distinct criminal cases which were separately docketed. The reasons for acquitting accused-appellants
for the charges of violating Sections 11 and 12 seriously cast doubt, not only on accused-appellants’ own
guilt, but more so on the soundness and reliability of the measures taken and procedures followed by the
police operatives. These circumstances cast a heavy shadow on the integrity of the operation and the police
operatives themselves.

G.R. No. 190569 April 25, 2012

P/INSP. ARIEL S. ARTILLERO, Petitioner,

vs.
ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, Overall Deputy Ombudsman, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman;
BERNABE D. DUSABAN, Provincial Prosecutor, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo;
EDITO AGUILLON, Brgy. Capt., Brgy. Lanjagan, Ajuy, Iloilo, Respondents.

Facts:

This case pertains to the criminal charge filed by Private Inspector Ariel S. Artillero (petitioner) against
Barangay Captain EditoAguillon (Aguillon) for violation of Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1866 1 as amended
by Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8249.

According to petitioner, althoughAguillon was able to present his Firearm License Card, he was not able to
present a Permit to Carry Firearm Outside Residence (PTCFOR).
 In a Resolutiondated 10 September 2008, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo City recommended
the dismissal of the case for insufficiency of evidence.Petitioner claims that he never received a copy of
this Resolution.

Thereafter,Provincial Prosecutorforwarded to the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman the Resolution

recommending the approval thereof.

The Office of the Ombudsman, approved the recommendation of Provincial ProsecutorDusaban to dismiss
the case. It ruled that the evidence on record proved that Aguillon did not commit the crime of illegal
possession of firearm since he has a license for his rifle.

On 22 June 2009, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR) of the 17 February 2009 Resolution,
but it was denied. Thus, he filed the present Petition for Certiorari via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Issue:

1. Whether or not petitioner was denied his right to due process when he was not given a copy of Aguillon’s
Counter-affidavit, the Asst. Prosecutor’s 10 September 2008 Resolution, and the 17 February 2009
Resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman.

2. Whether or not the public respondents’ actof dismissing the criminal Complaint against Aguillon, based
solely on insufficiency of evidence, was contrary to the provisions of P.D. 1866 and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations (IRR)?

Held:

No. A complainant in a preliminary investigation does not have a vested right to file a Reply—this right
should be granted to him by law. There is no provision in Rule 112 of the Rules of Court that gives the
Complainant or requires the prosecutor to observe the right to file a Reply to the accused’s counter-affidavit.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard. "What the law prohibits is not the absence
of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard." We have said that
where a party has been given a chance to be heard with respect to the latter’s motion for reconsideration
there is sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process.

At this point, this Court finds it important to stress that even though the filing of the MR cured whatever
procedural defect may have been present in this case, this does not change the fact that Provincial
Prosecutor Dusaban had the duty to send petitioner a copy of Aguillon’s Counter-affidavit. Section 3(c),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, grants a complainant this right, and the Provincial
Prosecutor has the duty to observe the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in the cases
presented before it. That the requirements of due process are deemed complied with in the present case
because of the filing of an MR by Complainant was simply a fortunate turn of events for the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor.

It is true therefore, that, as petitioner claims, a barangay captain is not one of those authorized to carry
firearms outside their residences unless armed with the appropriate PTCFOR (Permit to Carry Firearm
Outside Resident).

However, we find merit in respondents’ contention that the authority of Aguillon to carry his firearm outside
his residence was not based on the IRR or the guidelines of P.D. 1866 but, rather, was rooted in the
authority given to him by Local Government Code (LGC).
In People v. Monton, Section 88(3) of Batas PambansaBilang 337(B.P. 337), the LGC of 1983, which
reads:In the performance of his peace and order functions, the punong barangay shall be entitled to
possess and carry the necessary firearms within his territorial jurisdiction subject to existing rules and
regulations on the possession and carrying of firearms.

The Court hereby rules that respondent Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in finding that there was no probable cause to hold respondent Aguillon for trial.

Even the IRR of P.D. 1866 was modified by Section 389 (b) of the LGC as the latter provision already
existed when Congress enacted the LGC.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee, versus JOSELITO ORJE y BORCE, Accused-Appellant.

G.R. No. 189579September 12, 2011

The Facts

That on or about the 1st day of September, 2005, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named
accused, being then the father, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force
and intimidation have sexual intercourse with one [AAA], his own daughter, a minor 16 years old, inside
their residence located at [XXX], this City, against her will and without consent, thereby degrading or
demeaning the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said offended party as a human being.

AAA executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay (hereinafter referred to also as affidavit of desistance), in which
she expressed her desire to desist from pursuing the sham case against her father. As she explained while
testifying, that the rape incidents never happened. AAA pointed to her aunt, CCC, as having compelled
her to falsely accuse her father to get back at him for leaving the family when AAA was barely nine years
old. AAA also testified being mad at the appellant for the slap she got after arriving home late one rainy
night.

Issue:

Whether or not the prosecution has established accused-appellants guilt beyond the reasonable doubt.

Whether or not the court is correct in giving credence to AAAs positive testimony the first time around
notwithstanding her retraction of her previous testimonies and the allegations contained in her affidavit
of desistance.

Held:

In determining whether the elements of rape have been established by the prosecution, courts
recognize that conviction or acquittal depends almost always entirely on the credibility of the victim’s
testimony, the crime being ordinarily perpetrated in seclusion and only the participants can testify as to
its occurrence.

Courts look with disfavor on affidavits of desistance and/or retraction. In People v. Bation, it
was ruled that: “[A]n affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress the
accused’s defenses, not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be
other circumstances which, when coupled with the retraction or desistance, create doubts
as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by the
judge.

Accused-appellant cannot plausibly bank on AAAs affidavit of desistance, complemented

by her testimony for the defense, as an exonerating vehicle for his dastardly act. Other than the retraction
or desistance affidavit, nothing in the records would show any other circumstance of substance accepted
by the trial court that would becloud the veracity of AAAs earlier inculpating testimony.

As long as the complaining witness musters the test of credibility and consistency, her testimony
deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be discarded. And if such testimony is clear and credible to
establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction of rape based on it may lie even if she
subsequently retracted her earlier testimony.

G.R. No. 207992 August 11, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs.

ROBERTO HOLGADO Y DELA CRUZ AND ANTONIO MISAREZ Y ZARAGA, Accused-appellants.

Facts:

Accused-appellants Roberto Holgado y Dela Cruz (Holgado) and Antonio Misarez y Zaraga (Misarez) were
charged in an information dated January 19, 2007.Following their arrest, Holgado and Misarez were
charged for violating Sections 5 (sale of dangerous drugs), in view of the plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance supposedly sold by Holgado to PO1 Aure. The charges for violations of Sections
11(possession of dangerous drugs) and 12(possession of drug paraphernalia) of Republic Act No. 9165,
were in view of the items supposedly seized in enforcing the search warrant.

After trial, the Pasig City Regional Trial Court, Branch 154 found Holgado and Misarez guilty of illegal saleof
dangerous drugs (i.e., violating Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165). They were acquitted of the charges
pertaining to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 as the drugs supposedly seized were not introduced in
evidence; and the charges relating to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165 asthe paraphernalia to which
PO2 Castulo testified to in court were different from those indicated in the inventory supposedly made when
the search warrant was enforced.Holgado and Misarez were sentencedto suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a penalty of P1million.

On March 4, 2013, Holgado and Misarez filed their notice of appeal.

On December 27, 2013, Holgado and Misarez filed their joint supplemental brief where they assailed the
supposed lack of compliance with the requirements set by the chain of custody of seized drugs and drug
paraphernalia as provided by Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
Issue:

Whether or not Holgado’s and Misarez’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violating Section 5 of Republic
Act No. 9165 was established?

Held:

No. It was stated in People v. Morales, that:In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the
presentation in court of the corpus delictior the illicit drug as evidence.

Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore, ensures the integrity
of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the
nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or items
seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly causing their seizure;
and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession
of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating,
or tampering of evidence in any manner.

After a closer look, the Court finds that the linkages in the chain of custody of the subject item were not
clearly established. As can be gleaned from his fore quoted testimony, PO1 Collado failed to provide
informative details on how the subject shabu was handled immediately after the seizure. He just claimed
that the item was handed to him by the accused in the course of the transaction and, thereafter, he handed
it to the investigator.

There is no evidence either on how the item was stored, preserved, labeled, and recorded. PO1 Collado
could not even providethe court with the name of the investigator. He admitted that he was not present
when it was delivered to the crime laboratory.

Given the flagrant procedural lapses the police committed in handling the seized shabu and the obvious
evidentiary gaps in the chain of its custody, a presumption of regularity in the performance of duties cannot
be made in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is made in the context
of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure
in the performance thereof. In light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts were obviously wrong
when they relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty.

It is true that Section 21(1), as amended, now includes a proviso to the effect that "noncompliance of (sic)
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures and custody over said items." However, the prosecution has not shown that when the buy-bust
operation was allegedly conducted on January 17, 2007 and the sachet was supposedly seized and
marked, there were "justifiable grounds" for dispensing with compliance with Section 21. Rather, it merely
insisted on its self-serving assertion that the integrity of the seized sachet has nevertheless been,
supposedly, preserved.

While the miniscule amount of narcotics seized is by itself not a ground for acquittal, this circumstance
underscores the need for more exacting compliance with Section 21.

The events of January 17, 2007 should be taken and appreciated as a whole even as they gave rise to four
(4) distinct criminal cases which were separately docketed. The reasons for acquitting accused-appellants
for the charges of violating Sections 11 and 12 seriously cast doubt, not only on accused-appellants’ own
guilt, but more so on the soundness and reliability of the measures taken and procedures followed by the
police operatives. These circumstances cast a heavy shadow on the integrity of the operation and the police
operatives themselves.