G.R. No.
197676 property appraiser or assessor in any national government entity or local government unit,
February 4, 2014
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. and CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND
BUILDERS'ASSOCIATION, Petitioners,
vs.
PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE and
PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision 1 dated July 12, 2011 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42 denying the petition to declare as
unconstitutional Sections 28(a), 29 and 32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9646.
R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was signed
into law on June 29, 2009 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. It aims to professionalize the
real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and supervision
of real estate service practitioners (real estate brokers, appraisers, assessors, consultants and
salespersons) in the country. Prior to its enactment, real estate service practitioners were under
the supervision of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade
Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in the exercise of its consumer regulation
functions. Such authority is now transferred to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES) created under the
new law.
The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were promulgated on July 21,
2010 by the PRC and PRBRES under Resolution No. 02, Series of 2010.
On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber of
Real Estate and Builders’ Association (CREBA) instituted Civil Case No. 10-124776 in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 42. Petitioners sought to declare as void and
unconstitutional the following provisions of R.A. No. 9646:
SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the Practice of Real Estate Service. – The
provisions of this Act and its rules and regulations shall not apply to the following:
(a) Any person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform by himself/herself the acts
mentioned in Section 3 hereof with reference to his/her or its own property, except real estate
developers;
xxxx
SEC. 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service. – No person
shall practice or offer to practice real estate service in the Philippines or offer himself/herself as
real estate service practitioner, or use the title, word, letter, figure or any sign tending to convey
the impression that one is a real estate service practitioner, or advertise or indicate in any
manner whatsoever that one is qualified to practice the profession, or be appointed as real
unless he/she has satisfactorily passed the licensure examination given by the Board, except
as otherwise provided in this Act, a holder of a valid certificate of registration, and professional
identification card or a valid special/temporary permit duly issued to him/her by the Board and
the Commission, and in the case of real estate brokers and private appraisers, they have paid
the required bond as hereto provided.
xxxx
SEC. 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service. – (a) No partnership or corporation
shall engage in the business of real estate service unless it is duly registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and the persons authorized to act for the partnership or
corporation are all duly registered and licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants,
as the case may be. The partnership or corporation shall regularly submit a list of its real estate
service practitioners to the Commission and to the SEC as part of its annual reportorial
requirements. There shall at least be one (1) licensed real estate broker for every twenty (20)
accredited salespersons.
(b) Divisions or departments of partnerships and corporations engaged in marketing or selling
any real estate development project in the regular course of business must be headed by full-
time registered and licensed real estate brokers.
(c) Branch offices of real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants must be manned by a duly
licensed real estate broker, appraiser or consultant as the case may be.
In case of resignation or termination from employment of a real estate service practitioner, the
same shall be reported by the employer to the Board within a period not to exceed fifteen (15)
days from the date of effectivity of the resignation or termination.
Subject to the provisions of the Labor Code, a corporation or partnership may hire the services
of registered and licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants on commission basis
to perform real estate services and the latter shall be deemed independent contractors and not
employees of such corporations. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally infirm because (1) it violates Article VI,
Section 26 (1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates that "[e]very bill passed by
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof"; (2) it is
in direct conflict with Executive Order (E.O.) No. 648 which transferred the exclusive jurisdiction
of the National Housing Authority (NHA) to regulate the real estate trade and business to the
Human Settlements Commission, now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB),
which authority includes the issuance of license to sell of subdivision owners and developers
pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957; (3) it violates the due process clause as it
impinges on the real estate developers’ most basic ownership rights, the right to use and dispose
property, which is enshrined in Article 428 of the Civil Code; and (4) Section 28(a) of R.A. No.
9646 violates the equal protection clause as no substantial distinctions exist between real estate
developers and the exempted group mentioned since both are property owners dealing with
their own property.
Additionally, petitioners contended that the lofty goal of nurturing and developing a "corps of
technically competent, reasonable and respected professional real estate service practitioners"
is not served by curtailing the right of real estate developers to conduct their business of selling
properties. On the contrary, these restrictions would have disastrous effects on the real estate
industry as the additional cost of commissions would affect the pricing and affordability of real
estate packages. When that happens, petitioners claimed that the millions of jobs and billions in
revenues that the real estate industry generates for the government will be a thing of the past.
After a summary hearing, the trial court denied the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
On July 12, 2011, the trial court rendered its Decision 2 denying the petition. The trial court held
that the assailed provisions are relevant to the title of the law as they are intended to regulate
the practice of real estate service in the country by ensuring that those who engage in it shall
either be a licensed real estate broker, or under the latter’s supervision. It likewise found no real
discord between E.O. No. 648 and R.A. No. 9646 as the latter does not render nugatory the
license to sell granted by the HLURB to real estate developers, which license would still subsist.
The only difference is that by virtue of the new law, real estate developers will now be compelled
to hire the services of one licensed real estate broker for every twenty salespersons to guide
and supervise the coterie of salespersons under the employ of the real estate developers.
On the issue of due process, the trial court said that the questioned provisions do not preclude
property owners from using, enjoying, or disposing of their own property because they can still
develop and sell their properties except that they have to secure the services of a licensed real
estate broker who shall oversee the actions of the unlicensed real estate practitioners under
their employ. Since the subject provisions merely prescribe the requirements for the regulation
of the practice of real estate services, these are consistent with a valid exercise of the State’s
police power. The trial court further ruled that Section 28(a) does not violate the equal protection
clause because the exemption of real estate developers was anchored on reasonable
classification aimed at protecting the buying public from the rampant misrepresentations often
committed by unlicensed real estate practitioners, and to prevent unscrupulous and unethical
real estate practices from flourishing considering the large number of consumers in the regular
course of business compared to isolated sale transactions made by private individuals selling
their own property.
Hence, this appeal on the following questions of law:
1. Whether there is a justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to adjudicate;
2. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is unconstitutional for violating the "one title-one subject"
rule under Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution;
3. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is in conflict with PD 957, as amended by EO 648, with
respect to the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate real estate developers;
4. Whether Sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of [R.A. No. 9646], insofar as they affect the
rights of real estate developers, are unconstitutional for violating substantive due
process; and
5. Whether Section 28(a), which treats real estate developers differently from other
natural or juridical persons who directly perform acts of real estate service with
reference to their own property, is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause.3
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Justiciable Controversy
The Constitution4 requires as a condition precedent for the exercise of judicial power the
existence of an actual controversy between litigants. An actual case or controversy involves a
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible to judicial
resolution.5 The controversy must be justiciable – definite and concrete – touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests, which may be resolved by a court of law
through the application of a law.6 In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic
assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other; that is, it must
concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and
substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts.7 An actual case is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has a direct adverse
effect on the individual challenging it.8
There is no question here that petitioners who are real estate developers are entities directly
affected by the prohibition on performing acts constituting practice of real estate service without
first complying with the registration and licensing requirements for brokers and agents under
R.A. No. 9646. The possibility of criminal sanctions for disobeying the mandate of the new law
is likewise real. Asserting that the prohibition violates their rights as property owners to dispose
of their properties, petitioners challenged on constitutional grounds the implementation of R.A.
No. 9646 which the respondents defended as a valid legislation pursuant to the State’s police
power. The Court thus finds a justiciable controversy that calls for immediate resolution.
No Violation of One-Title One-Subject Rule
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution states:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.
In Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary,9 the Court explained the provision as follows:
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling
legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls
for all parts of an act relating to its subject finding expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so
narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the
subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the
general object which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and
means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be
set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.10 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court has previously ruled that the one-subject requirement under the Constitution is
satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter
expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject
and title.11 An act having a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number
of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or
foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing
for the method and means of carrying out the general object.12
It is also well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ
in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all
the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to
effect.13 Indeed, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of
the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation."14
R.A. No. 9646 is entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Real Estate Service in the
Philippines, Creating for the Purpose a Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other Purposes." Aside from provisions establishing a
regulatory system for the professionalization of the real estate service sector, the new law
extended its coverage to real estate developers with respect to their own properties. Henceforth,
real estate developers are prohibited from performing acts or transactions constituting real
estate service practice without first complying with registration and licensing requirements for
their business, brokers or agents, appraisers, consultants and salespersons.
Petitioners point out that since partnerships or corporations engaged in marketing or selling any
real estate development project in the regular course of business are now required to be headed
by full-time, registered and licensed real estate brokers, this requirement constitutes limitations
on the property rights and business prerogatives of real estate developers which are not all
reflected in the title of R.A. No. 9646. Neither are real estate developers, who are already
regulated under a different law, P.D. No. 957, included in the definition of real estate service
practitioners.
We hold that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the one-title, one-subject rule.
The primary objective of R.A. No. 9646 is expressed as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes the vital role of real estate service
practitioners in the social, political, economic development and progress of the country by
promoting the real estate market, stimulating economic activity and enhancing government
income from real property-based transactions. Hence, it shall develop and nurture through
proper and effective regulation and supervision a corps of technically competent, responsible
and respected professional real estate service practitioners whose standards of practice and
service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of the real estate industry.
We find that the inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the law’s primary goal of
developing "a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected professional real
estate service practitioners whose standards of practice and service shall be globally
competitive and will promote the growth of the real estate industry." Since the marketing aspect
of real estate development projects entails the performance of those acts and transactions
defined as real estate service practices under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 9646, it is logically
covered by the regulatory scheme to professionalize the entire real estate service sector.
No Conflict Between R.A. No. 9646 and P.D. No. 957, as amended by E.O. No. 648
Petitioners argue that the assailed provisions still cannot be sustained because they conflict with
P.D. No. 957 which decreed that the NHA shall have "exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real
estate trade and business." Such jurisdiction includes the authority to issue a license to sell to
real estate developers and to register real estate dealers, brokers or salesmen upon their
fulfillment of certain requirements under the law. By imposing limitations on real estate
developers’ property rights, petitioners contend that R.A. No. 9646 undermines the licenses to
sell issued by the NHA (now the HLURB) to real estate developers allowing them to sell
subdivision lots or condominium units directly to the public. Because the HLURB has been
divested of its exclusive jurisdiction over real estate developers, the result is an implied repeal
of P.D. No. 957 as amended by E.O. No. 648, which is not favored in law.
It is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. In
order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent
and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together.
The clearest case possible must be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn,
for inconsistency is never presumed. There must be a showing of repugnance clear and
convincing in character. The language used in the later statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that
standard does not suffice.15 Moreover, the failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates
that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws.16
There is nothing in R.A. No. 9646 that repeals any provision of P.D. No. 957, as amended by
E.O. No. 648. P.D. No. 957, otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’
Protective Decree,"17 vested the NHA with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade
and business in accordance with its provisions. It empowered the NHA to register, approve and
monitor real estate development projects and issue licenses to sell to real estate owners and
developers. It further granted the NHA the authority to register and issue/revoke licenses of
brokers, dealers and salesmen engaged in the selling of subdivision lots and condominium units.
E.O. No. 648, issued on February 7, 1981, reorganized the Human Settlements Regulatory
Commission (HSRC) and transferred the regulatory functions of the NHA under P.D. 957 to the
HSRC. Among these regulatory functions were the (1) regulation of the real estate trade and
business; (2) registration of subdivision lots and condominium projects; (3) issuance of license
to sell subdivision lots and condominium units in the registered units; (4) approval of
performance bond and the suspension of license to sell; (5) registration of dealers, brokers and
salesman engaged in the business of selling subdivision lots or condominium units; and (6)
revocation of registration of dealers, brokers and salesmen.18
E.O. No. 90, issued on December 17, 1986, renamed the HSRC as the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) and was designated as the regulatory body for housing and land
development under the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC). To
date, HLURB continues to carry out its mandate to register real estate brokers and salesmen
dealing in condominium, memorial parks and subdivision projects pursuant to Section 11 of P.D.
No. 957, which reads:
SECTION 11. Registration of Dealers, Brokers and Salesmen. – No real estate dealer, broker
or salesman shall engage in the business of selling subdivision lots or condominium units unless
he has registered himself with the Authority in accordance with the provisions of this section.
If the Authority shall find that the applicant is of good repute and has complied with the applicable
rules of the Authority, including the payment of the prescribed fee, he shall register such
applicant as a dealer, broker or salesman upon filing a bond, or other security in lieu thereof, in
such sum as may be fixed by the Authority conditioned upon his faithful compliance with the
provisions of this Decree: Provided, that the registration of a salesman shall cease upon the
termination of his employment with a dealer or broker.
Every registration under this section shall expire on the thirty-first day of December of each year.
Renewal of registration for the succeeding year shall be granted upon written application
therefore made not less than thirty nor more than sixty days before the first day of the ensuing
year and upon payment of the prescribed fee, without the necessity of filing further statements
or information, unless specifically required by the Authority. All applications filed beyond said
period shall be treated as original applications.
The names and addresses of all persons registered as dealers, brokers, or salesmen shall be
recorded in a Register of Brokers, Dealers and Salesmen kept in the Authority which shall be
open to public inspection.
On the other hand, Section 29 of R.A. No. 9646 requires as a condition precedent for all persons
who will engage in acts constituting real estate service, including advertising in any manner
one’s qualifications as a real estate service practitioner, compliance with licensure examination
and other registration requirements including the filing of a bond for real estate brokers and
private appraisers. While Section 11 of P.D. No. 957 imposes registration requirements for
dealers, brokers and salespersons engaged in the selling of subdivision lots and condominium
units, Section 29 of R.A. No. 9646 regulates all real estate service practitioners whether private
or government. While P.D. No. 957 seeks to supervise brokers and dealers who are engaged
in the sale of subdivision lots and condominium units, R.A. No. 9646 aims to regulate the real
estate service sector in general by professionalizing their ranks and raising the level of ethical
standards for licensed real estate professionals.
There is no conflict of jurisdiction because the HLURB supervises only those real estate service
practitioners engaged in the sale of subdivision lots and condominium projects, specifically for
violations of the provisions of P.D. No. 957, and not the entire real estate service sector which
is now under the regulatory powers of the PRBRES. HLURB’s supervision of brokers and
dealers to effectively implement the provisions of P.D. No. 957 does not foreclose regulation of
the real estate service as a profession. Real estate developers already regulated by the HLURB
are now further required to comply with the professional licensure requirements under R.A. No.
9646, as provided in Sections 28, 29 and 32. Plainly, there is no inconsistency or contradiction
in the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 and P.D. No. 957, as amended.
The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with other laws in a
way that will form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The legislature is presumed to have known
existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting laws. 19 Congress, therefore,
could not be presumed to have intended Sections 28, 29 and 32 of R.A. No. 9646 to run counter
to P.D. No. 957.
No Violation of Due Process
Petitioners contend that the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 are unduly oppressive and
infringe the constitutional rule against deprivation of property without due process of law. They
stress that real estate developers are now burdened by law to employ licensed real estate
brokers to sell, market and dispose of their properties. Despite having invested a lot of money,
time and resources in their projects, petitioners aver that real estate developers will still have
less control in managing their business and will be burdened with additional expenses.
The contention has no basis. There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their use
and enjoyment of property is caused by the implementation of R.A. No. 9646. If petitioners as
property owners feel burdened by the new requirement of engaging the services of only licensed
real estate professionals in the sale and marketing of their properties, such is an unavoidable
consequence of a reasonable regulatory measure.
Indeed, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade
has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power of the
State particularly when their conduct affects the execution of legitimate governmental functions,
the preservation of the State, public health and welfare and public morals.20 In any case, where
the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory
measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements
violate the due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of police power,
of regulating entry to the practice of various trades or professions.21
Here, the legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks of real estate
practitioners by increasing their competence and raising ethical standards as real property
transactions are "susceptible to manipulation and corruption, especially if they are in the hands
of unqualified persons working under an ineffective regulatory system." The new regulatory
regime aimed to fully tap the vast potential of the real estate sector for greater contribution to
our gross domestic income, and real estate practitioners "serve a vital role in spearheading the
continuous flow of capital, in boosting investor confidence, and in promoting overall national
progress."22
We thus find R.A. No. 9646 a valid exercise of the State’s police power. As we said in another
case challenging the constitutionality of a law granting discounts to senior citizens:
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain,
has general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has
been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all
exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and
circumstances, thus assuring the greatest benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as "the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, extending as it does to all the great
public needs." It is "[t]he power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain, and
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with
penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same."
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights
must bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due
process, must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on
the mere plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned
provision is invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged
confiscatory effect of the provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the
presumption of validity which every law has in its favor. 23 (Emphasis supplied.)
No Violation of Equal Protection Clause
Section 28 of R.A. No. 9646 exempts from its coverage natural and juridical persons dealing
with their own property, and other persons such as receivers, trustees or assignees in insolvency
or bankruptcy proceedings. However, real estate developers are specifically mentioned as an
exception from those enumerated therein. Petitioners argue that this provision violates the equal
protection clause because it unjustifiably treats real estate developers differently from those
exempted persons who also own properties and desire to sell them. They insist that no
substantial distinctions exist between ordinary property owners and real estate developers as
the latter, in fact, are more capable of entering into real estate transactions and do not need the
services of licensed real estate brokers.1âwphi1 They assail the RTC decision in citing the
reported fraudulent practices as basis for the exclusion of real estate developers from the
exempted group of persons under Section 28(a).
We sustain the trial court’s ruling that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the equal protection clause.
In Ichong v. Hernandez,24 the concept of equal protection was explained as follows:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege,
as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit
legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which
it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that
all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation
which applies only to those persons falling within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825).25
Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is
imperative that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a
reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.26 If classification is germane to the
purpose of the law, concerns all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future
conditions, the classification does not violate the equal protection guarantee.27
R.A. No. 9646 was intended to provide institutionalized government support for the development
of "a corps of highly respected, technically competent, and disciplined real estate service
practitioners, knowledgeable of internationally accepted standards and practice of the
profession."28 Real estate developers at present constitute a sector that hires or employs the
largest number of brokers, salespersons, appraisers and consultants due to the sheer number
of products (lots, houses and condominium units) they advertise and sell nationwide. As early
as in the ‘70s, there has been a proliferation of errant developers, operators or sellers who have
reneged on their representation and obligations to comply with government regulations such as
the provision and maintenance of subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water system and
other basic requirements. To protect the interest of home and lot buyers from fraudulent acts
and manipulations perpetrated by these unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and
operators, P.D. No. 957 was issued to strictly regulate housing and real estate development
projects. Hence, in approving R.A. No. 9646, the legislature rightfully recognized the necessity
of imposing the new licensure requirements to all real estate service practitioners, including and
more importantly, those real estate service practitioners working for real estate developers.
Unlike individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own property, real estate
developers sell lots, houses and condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a
business which is highly regulated by the State to ensure the health and safety of home and lot
buyers.
The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between ordinary property owners
exempted under Section 28(a) and real estate developers like petitioners, and the classification
enshrined in R.A. No. 9646 is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The Court thus
rules that R.A. No. 9646 is valid and constitutional.
Since every law is presumed valid, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only
by the clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when
such a conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge
of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.29
Indeed, "all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute,
alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may
work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived
which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases;
that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute;
and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation
should be adopted."30
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 12, 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 10-124776 is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking
to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal
case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as
Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known
as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990. 2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a
son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was
sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued
by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in
the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never
gave support to the son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu,
and since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a
business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan,
Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu
City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A.
No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner. 13 Respondent
submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-
affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution
recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states
that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of
Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive,
refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14)
year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted
bail.17 Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which
respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was
arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the
protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction
over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged. 20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which
states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case
DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty
is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s
obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so
makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines
who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order 25 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the
accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard
to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged
of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively
established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis child,
notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a parent to give such
support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima faciecase exists against the
accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite
the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in
Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a
ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with
this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that
petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of
law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of
the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby
judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the
RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari
before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of
Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal
is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third
mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. 29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or
not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and
whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to
do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law
concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions
punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The
inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by
this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing
the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only waste the time, effort and
resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case, considerations of efficiency and economy in
the administration of justice should prevail over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we
do not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative
that the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to
support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree
issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying
with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support. 32 Respondent also
added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial
support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New
Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 35 of
the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine
laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only
applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they
are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties. 36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since
the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he
is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give
support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. 37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code
of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are
governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when
staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son
altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of
and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands
does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or
after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already
enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized
to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved
is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as
our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the
obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is
presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign
land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality
principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent
does not completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree
was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the
aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is specifically stated, 46 which
was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states
that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable
by law, said law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and
SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the
jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find
applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public
policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our
jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
— petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function
of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental
principles of Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation
to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly
enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of
financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support
his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis, 49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her
marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis
added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s
son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
butnot limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due
her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x
xxx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support
or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered anact of violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of
public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory,
subject to the principle of public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is
indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with
petitioner is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged
against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired
upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there
is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability
has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No.
9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in
twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime
charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child
calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and
falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-
Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September
1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings
based on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the
latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and
in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good customs
and public policy."1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought
moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00,
in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The
transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner.2 The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung
paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin
ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon —
ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi
hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa
'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang
certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.
Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka
nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako.
Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own
merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong
hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —
ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba
makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka
puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga
magulang ko.
ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng
hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok
kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan
mo ako.
CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na.
Magsumbong ka.3
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping
the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize
wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes." An
information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted
herewith:
INFORMATION
The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act
No. 4200, committed as follows:
That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not
being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the
said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other
person.
Contrary to law.
Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.
MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal
Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A.
4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with
petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2)
the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a
person other than a participant to the communication.4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with
this Court, which forthwith referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the
First Division) of June 19, 1989.
On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision
declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:
[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1
of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that the
facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in
grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.5
Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which
respondent Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant
petition.
Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7 that the applicable provision of
Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties
to the conversation. She contends that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping
of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication. 8 In
relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be
alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A.
4200.9 Finally, petitioner agues that R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private
communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping
her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10
We disagree.
First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express
terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be
either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the
parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable,
or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept,
or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape
recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not
authorized by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the
party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons
unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any".
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to
a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of
the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's
conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal,
unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or communications taken either by the
parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".
Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy
would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not
made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not criminal cases that would
be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil cases or special
proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but
perhaps by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of
the parties prior, simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be
indicative of their intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your
Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?
Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.
Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense
but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?
Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations
taken without the authorization of all the parties.
Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?
Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the
observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him. It is not fair, it
is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the intention of the
parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the observations are being
recorded.
Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.
Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of
directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties
know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and observations are being made
should know that the observations are being recorded.
Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.
Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please
be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness
and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning, he makes damaging
statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain any more. But if you are
going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without him
knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being
recorded may be used against him, I think it is unfair.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)
Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as
now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under
Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is done secretly.
 Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the
communication between one person and another person — not between a speaker
and a public.
xxx xxx xxx
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)
xxx xxx xxx
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted
deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private
communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an
individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder
would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General
pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court: "Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as well
as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14
Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A.
4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes
the act of sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which
meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols
(as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or
non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely
to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and
private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any doubts about the legislative body's
meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that
the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada
in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:
It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from
their conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature
of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people
have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversationsare
often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the
expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The
right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been assured
by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our Constitution must
have recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must
have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the
unaudited, and free exchange of communication between individuals — free from
every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.17
In Gaanan vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone
wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a
private conversation without authorization did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone
extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated
therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused."20 The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and
circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute
itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications with the use
of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.
WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous
and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.
Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.
A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA June 16, 2015
Re: Letter· of Court of Appeals Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso for Entitlement to Longevity
Pay for His Services as Commission Member III of the National Labor Relations
Commission
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. 12-9-5-SC
Re: Computation of Longevity Pay of Court of Appeals Justice Angelita A. Gacutan
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. 13-02-07-SC
Re: Request of Court of Appeals Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando that Her
Services as MTC Judge and as COMELEC Commissioner be considered as Part of Her
Judicial Service and Included in the computation/adjustment of Her longevity pay
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
Prefatory Statement
The Consolidated Cases
and the Affected Parties
For the Court’s consideration are the following: (1) letter-request dated August 22, 2012, of
Court of Appeals ( CA) Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando;1 (2) letter-request
dated September 11, 2012, of CA Associate Justice Angelita A. Gacutan;2 and (3) motion for
reconsideration3 dated November 7, 2012, of CA Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. 4
The petitioners are all Justices of the Court of Appeals. Justices Veloso and Fernando claim
longevity pay for services rendered within and outside the Judiciary as part of their
compensation package . Justice Gacutan, who has recently retired, claims deficiency payment
of her longevity pay for the services she had rendered before she joined the Judiciary, as well
as a re-computation of her retirement pay to include the claimed longevity pay.
Interest in the outcome of these consolidated cases goes beyond that of the petitioners; some
incumbent justices and judges, before joining the Judiciary, also served in the Executive
Department and would like to see these previous services credited in the computation of their
longevity pay. Others who had also previously served with the Executive Department currently
enjoy longevity pay credit for their executive service; they would like to see their mistakenly
granted longevity pay credits maintained.
Thus, the Court’s decision on these consolidated cases, whether to find for or against the
petitioners, will likewise affect the interests of other judges and justices in similar
circumstance, including several members of this honorable court participating in these
matters.
Antecedents
A. Letter-Request of Justice Salazar-Fernando
In her letter dated August 22, 2012,5 Justice Salazar-Fernando requested that her services as
Judge of the Municipal Trial Court ( MTC) of Sta. Rita, Pampanga, from February 15, 1983 to
July 31, 1987, and as Commissioner of the Commission on Elections ( COMELEC ), from
February 14, 1992 to February 14, 1998, be considered as part of her judicial services "as in
the case of Hon. Bernar do P. Pardo, Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court."
Accordingly, Justice Salazar-Fernando requested that her longevity pay be adjusted "from the
current 10% to 20% of [her] basic salary effective May 25, 1999."
We referred this letter-request to Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Chief of the Office of Administrative
Services ( OAS ), for study and recommendation.
In her February 18, 2013 Memorandum,6 Atty. Candelaria recommended that Justice Salazar-
Fernando’s services as MTC Judge be credited as judicial service that can be added to her
present longevity pay. Atty. Candelaria, however, recommended the denial of Justice Salazar-
Fernando’srequest that her services at the COMELEC be also credited for her present
longevity pay. Nonetheless, she recommended that Justice Salazar-Fernando’s services in the
COMELEC be included in the computation of her longevity pay upon retirement "as in the case
of Justice Pardo."
B. Letter-Request of Justice Gacutan
In her letter7 dated September 11, 2012, Justice Gacutan requested that: (a) her services as
Commissioner IV of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) , from March 3, 1998 to
November5, 2009, be credited as judicial service for purposes of retirement; (b) she be given
a longevity pay equivalent to 10% of her basic salary; and (c) an adjustment of her salary,
allowances and benefits be made from the time she assumed as CA Justice on November 6,
2009. In the Court’s Resolution8 of November 13, 2012, we required the Fiscal Management
and Budget Office (FMBO ) to comment onJustice Gacutan’s letter. In her Comment of
January 4, 2013, Atty. Corazon G. Ferrer-Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief of Office of
the FMBO, recommended that: (1) Justice Gacutan’s request for the crediting of her services
as Commissioner IV of the NLRC as judicial service be granted, but only for purposes of her
retirement benefits, to take effect on her compulsory retirement on December 3, 2013;and (2)
Justice Gacutan’s request that her salary and allowances be adjusted retroactive from her
assumption of office in the CA on November 6, 2009, be denied. 9
C. Motion for Reconsideration of Justice Veloso
In his November 7, 2012 motion for reconsideration,10 Justice Veloso assailed the Court’s
October 23, 2012 Resolution11 that denied his request for the crediting of his services as
NLRC Commissioner as judicial service for purposes of adjusting his salary and benefits,
specifically his longevity pay.
Justice Veloso claimed that Republic Act No. (RA) 9347 which amended Article 216 of the
Labor Code should be applied retroactively since it is a curative statute. He maintained under
this view that he already had the rank of a CA Justice as NLRC Commissioner before he was
appointed to the appellate court on February 4, 2004.
We referred Justice Veloso’s motion for reconsideration to the FMBO for report and
recommendation in our Resolution of November 27, 2012.12
In her Report and Recommendation dated February 15, 2013,13 Atty. Ferrer-Flores
recommended that Justice Veloso’s motion for reconsideration be denied since the points he
raised were a rehash of his arguments in his July 30, 2012 letter-request.14
Our Rulings
I. Letter of Justice Salazar-Fernando in A.M. No. 13-02-07-SC
a. Services as MTC Judge
We grant the request of Justice Salazar-Fernando to credit as judicial service her previous
services as MTC Judge of Sta. Rita, Pampanga, as judicial service in the computation of her
longevity pay.
Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Bilang ( B.P. Blg.) 129 provides:
Section 42. Longevity pay. – A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic
pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of
continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary; Provided, That in no
case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is
added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank. [Italics supplied; emphasis and
underscoring ours]
We find it undisputed that Justice Salazar-Fernando served as MTC Judge from February 15,
1983 to July 31, 1987. This service constitutes continuous, efficient, and meritorious service
rendered in the Judiciary and, hence, should be included in the computation of her longevity
pay.
b. Service as COMELEC Commissioner
We deny, however, the inclusion of Justice Salazar-Fernando’s request to credit her services
as COMELEC Commissioner, from February 14, 1992 to February 14, 1998, as judicial
service for longevity pay purposes.
The only service recognized for purposes of longevity pay under Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is
service in the Judiciary, not service in any other branch of government. The CO MELEC is an
agency independent of the Judiciary; hence, service in this agency cannot be considered as
service rendered in the Judiciary.
We find Justice Salazar-Fernando’s invocation of the case of Justice Pardo, to support her
claim to longevity pay, misplaced.
b.1. Our Pardo Ruling
In In Re: Request of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo for Adjustment of His Longevity Pay, 15 we held
that the inclusion of Justice Pardo’s service in the COMELEC in the computation of his
longevity pay upon his retirement was predicated on the factual circumstances peculiar to him:
he was an incumbent CA Justice when he was appointed COMELEC Chairman, and was
appointed to the Supreme Court after his service with the COMELEC, without any interruption
in his service .
The Court ― based on its reading of Section 3 of B.P. Blg. 12916 ― did not consider his
intervening service in the COMELEC, an office outside the Judiciary, as a disruption of his
service in the Judiciary.
Notably, the Court in In Re: Justice Pardo liberally interpreted the phrase "the Court" in
Section 3 of BP 129 to mean the entire judiciary, not just the Court of Appeals. The provision
reads:
Any member who is reappointed to the Court after rendering service in any other position in
the government shall retain precedence to which he was entitled under his original
appointment, and his service in the Court shall, for all intents and purposes , be considered as
continuous and uninterrupted. (emphases supplied)
This provision was an amendment to Section 3 of BP 129 which, as originally worded, referred
only to the organization of the CA, the appointment process of its justices, and the means by
which seniority of rank is determined among the CA justices. Executive Order No. 33 added
this phrase, and hence Section 3 now reads as:
Sec. 3. Organization. There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall consist of a
Presiding Justice and fifty Associate Justices who shall be appointed by the President of the
Philippines. The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in hi s appointment, and the
Associate Justice shall have precedence according to the dates of their respective
appointments, or when the appointments of two or more of them shall bear the same date,
according to the order in which their appointments were issued by the President. Any member
w ho is reappointed to the Court after rendering in any other position in the government shall
retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment, and his service
in the Court shall, for all intents and purposes, be considered as continuous and uninterrupted.
Thus, had the Court given a more literal interpretation of the phrase added by EO No. 33,then
it would have interpreted its application to refer to an incumbent CA justice only. The phrase,
after all, had been added to Section 3 of BP 129, which referred to the organization of the CA.
Following this interpretation, Justice Pardo’s service in the COMELEC would not have been
appreciated in determining his longevity pay, as he was reappointed not to the CA, but to the
Supreme Court.
Instead, the Court, taking a more liberal approach, interpreted the phrase "the Court" to mean
the entire judiciary. It noted that the additional phrase in Section 3 used the generic word
"Court" instead of Court of Appeals, and that to apply the stricter application of interpreting
"Court" to mean "Court of Appeals" would "lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would
defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers."
Thus, following this more liberal approach, Justice Pardo’s one-time service outside of the
judiciary was considered part of his service in the judiciary for purposes of determining hi s
longevity pay. The same may be applied, for instance, to a trial court judge who rendered
service outside the judiciary and then returned to being a member of the bench.
Thus, the Court’s ruling in In Re: Justice Pardo is authority for expanding EO No. 33’s
amendment to Section 3 of BP 129 to all members of the judiciary.
b.2. The liberal Pardo ruling cannot and should not be extended to allow members of
the judiciary to leave and return more than once, without interrupting the continuity of
their service.
The next question to be asked, then, refers to the frequency by which members of the judiciary
may be able to serve in other branches of government without breaking their ‘continuo us and
uninterrupted’ service. Did the ruling in Justice Pardo’s case allow members of the judiciary to
leave for other branches of government numerous times, and still maintain continuous and
uninterrupted service in the judiciary? The answer to this question is a resounding no.
A critical aspect of Justice Pardo’s case was the absence of any gap in his service from the
time he was appointed as Caloocan City Judge in 1974, until he retired as an Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court in 2002. He occupied the positions of District Judge, Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Branch 34, Caloocan City, from May 3, 1974 to January 17, 1983;
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, Manila, from January 18, 1983 to March 29, 1993;
Associate Justice of the CA, from March 30, 1993 to February 16,
1995; Chairman, COMELEC, from February 17, 1995 to October 6, 1998; and Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court, from October 7, 1998 to February 10, 2002.
In these lights, Justice Pardo’s case has nothing to offer by way of jurisprudential precedent in
terms of determining whether Section 3 of BP 129 allows judges and justices to leave the
judiciary several times without breaking their continuous service. There was no occasion to
rule on this issue, as Justice Pardo left the judiciary only once, to serve in the COMELEC.
Proceeding from this conclusion, the next level of inquiry leads us to examine whether Section
3 of BP 129 allows multiple breaks in judicial office and considers these breaks as part of a
continuous and uninterrupted judicial service.
The amendment to Section 3, as worded and interpreted in In Re: Justice Pardo , refers to the
reappointment of a member of the judiciary after serving in another branch of government. The
judge shall retain the precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment, and
his judicial service shall be considered uninterrupted.
This service outside the judiciary, however, should only occur once, as in Justice Pardo’s
case. Section 3 refers to an original appointment , which is the first appointment by which a
lawyer becomes a member of the judiciary. As he progresses in the judiciary ― whether by
staying in his original post or by being appointed in other posts ― he acquires seniority, which
is especially applicable in determining his retirement and longevity pay. Once he leaves the
judiciary, however, his original appointment is cut off; hence, Section 3 can only refer to the
judge’s return to the judiciary as a "reappointment." He needs to get re-appointed back to the
judiciary, as he is no longer part of it.
Section 3 works to bridge the gap between the time the judge left his original appointment and
his reappointment to the judiciary, provided the gap in service was rendered in another branch
of government. Once reappointed to the judiciary, however, he can no longer avail of Section
3, as Section 3 speaks of an original appointment. A second reappointment, after another
service in a different government agency, would be succeeding the first reappointment, and
not the original appointment. Section 3 operates to bridge an original appointment with a
reappointment, and not to connect a reappointment with a second appointment. Had the latter
interpretation been the intent behind the law, then it should and would have made this
situation clearer.
Further, the application of Section 3 appears to be limited to service in a single position in
government outside of the judiciary. Section 3 speaks of "any other position in the
government," and thus uses a singular noun. After this single service, the judge or justice
invoking the application of Section 3 must have returned to the judiciary in order for his service
to be deemed uninterrupted.
Additionally, it must not be lost on us that we have already given Section 3 a liberal
interpretation in In Re: Justice Pardo. To top this exercise of liberality with another liberal
interpretation of the same provision, when the law is clear regarding its application, would
amount to judicial legislation that furthers the interests within our ranks.
To recapitulate, Section 3 applies to any judge or justice, who left the judiciary, served in a
single non-judicial governmental post, and returned to the judiciary. This was what happened
in the case of Justice Pardo, when after a long and continuous service in the judiciary, he left
to serve in the COMELEC and from there was subsequently appointed to the Supreme Court.
b.3. Justice Fernando is not entitled to her request even under the liberal Pardo ruling.
Justice Salazar-Fernando effectively asks us in her present case to give her the benefit of our
Pardo ruling although the attendant facts of her case differ from those of Justice Pardo’s and
do not approximate the factual situation that Section 3 requires.
In the first place, her record shows that her services in between her judicial services were not
continuous and uninterrupted.
We find that after Justice Salazar-Fernando’s stint as MTC Judge in July 1987, she was
named Chairman of the Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB)
where she served from August 1987 to February 13, 1992. During this period, she
concurrently held directorship posts at the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and at the Office
of Transport Cooperatives (OTC). In the later part of 1991,Justice Salazar-Fernando held the
position of Officer-in-Charge/Assistant Secretary of the Land Transportation Office.
It was only after Justice Salazar-Fernando’s stints at the LTFRB, LRTA, and OTC all non-
judicial offices that she was appointed as Commissioner of the COMELEC on February 14,
1992, and served in this capacity until February 15, 1998. Three (3) days later, or on February
18, 1998, she started to serve as a consultant in the COMELEC until October 6, 1998.
Parenthetically, her service as consultant is not a "position in government" that should be
considered a part of her government service as she did not occupy any specific position in
government. Moreover, it was only five (5) months after her COMELEC consultancy, or on
March 25, 1999, that Justice Salazar-Fernando was appointed as Associate Justice of the CA.
Thus, significant gaps in her judicial service intervened so that her situation did not comply
with the requirement in Section 3 that only a single non-judicial position should intervene in her
judicial service record.
Reduced to the bare essentials, the issue for us is whether we should apply with liberality a
ruling that had already been very liberally interpreted by this Court, under facts that do not
entitle Justice Fernando to recognition of continuous service under the requirements of
Section 3.
Our brief and direct answer is that we cannot and must not allow the crediting of Justice
Salazar Fernando’ s COMELEC service for longevity pay purposes. Acceding to her request
will constitute an outright judicial legislation that the Court cannot undertake under the
Constitution. As earlier noted, Justice Salazar-Fernando’s de tails do not at all approximate
the factual circumstances Section 3 of BP 129 that speaks of, nor the factual situation in In Re:
Justice Pardo.
If we had been liberal in the past and this liberal ruling is now cited, we should, at the very
least, not go beyond the facts under which our past liberality had been extended. If we further
read liberally a Court ruling that only came to being because of past liberality, we stand to hear
a re-echo of the charge that this Court selectively applies its liberality in favor of its own . (In
fact, a favorable ruling in these consolidated cases may already raise eyebrows and questions
as the Court will be ruling on matters that will directly affect some of its participating Members
.)
To sum up, Justice Salazar-Fernando’s services as COMELEC Commissioner cannot be
included in the computation of her longevity pay, now or upon her retirement .
II. Letter-Request of Justice Gacutan in A.M. No. 12-9-5-SC
a. Longevity Pay for Services as NLRC Commissioner
We deny Justice Gacutan’s request that her past services in the NLRC be recognized for
purposes of her longevity pay. She served as a Commissioner IV of the NLRC from March 3,
1998 to November 5, 2009, or for a period of eleven years and eight months.
Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is clear and explicit: a judge or justice should have rendered five
years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the Judiciary in order to qualify for a
monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay.
We point out that the NLRC is an agency attached to the Department of Labor and
Employment – an adjunct of the Executive Department – albeit for policy and program
coordination only. Under the circumstances, Justice Gacutan’s past service as NLRC
Commissioner cannot be credited as judicial service for longevity pay purposes since she did
not render such service while with the Judiciary.
b. NLRC Services Considered in Retirement Pay
Nonetheless, Justice Gacutan’s service as NLRC Commissioner is creditable as part of overall
government service for retirement purposes under RA 910, as amended. Section 1 of this law
provides:
Section 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals who has rendered
at least twenty years' service either in the judiciary or in any other branch of the Government,
or in both, (a) retires for having attained the age of seventy y ears, or (b) resigns by reason of
his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, he shall receive during the residue of his
natural life, in the manner hereinafter provided, the salary which he was receiving at the time
of his retirement or resignation. And when a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of
Appeals has attained the age of fifty-seven years and has rendered at least twenty years'
service in the Government, ten or more of which have been continuously rendered as such
Justice or as judge of a court of record, he shall be likewise entitled to retire and receive
during the residue of his natural life, in the manner also hereinafter prescribed, the salary
which he was then receiving. It is a condition of the pension provided for herein that no retiring
Justice during the time that he is receiving said pension shall appear as counsel before any
court in any civil case wherein the Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is
the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the Government is
accused of an offense committed in relation to his office, or collect any fee for his appearance
in any administrative proceedings to maintain an interest adverse to the Government, insular,
provincial or municipal, or to any of its legally constituted officers.
Considering the express wordings of RA 910, which include service "in all other branches of
the Government" as creditable service in the computation of the retirement benefits of a justice
or judge, Justice Gacutan’s service as NL RC Commissioner should be credited as part of her
government service for retirement purposes under RA 910, as amended.
III. Motion for Reconsideration of Justice Veloso in A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA
a. Background.
The chairman and members of the NLRC were entitled to receive an annual salary at least
equivalent to the allowances and benefits of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of
the CA, respectively, prior to the amendment of Article 216 of the Labor Code by RA 9347 .
Under RA 9347 (which took effect on August 26, 2006),17 NLRC commissioners were given
the equivalent rank of a CA Justice. The Labor Code, as now amended by Section 4 of RA
9347, reads:
Article 216. Salaries, Benefits and Emoluments. The Chairman and members of the
Commission shall have the same rank , receive an annual salary equivalent to, and be entitled
to the same allowances, retirement and benefits as those of the Presiding and Associate
Justices of the Court of Appeals, respectively. [italics supplied, emphasis ours]
In his present motion, Justice Veloso claims that RA 9347 should be given a retroactive
application. With the equivalent rank of a CA Justice from the time RA 9347 was amended, his
service as NLRC Commissioner should be considered as judicial service for purposes of his
longevity pay.
b. Our ruling and the reasons therefore
b.1. RA 9347 does not provide for retroactivity.
We disagree with Justice Veloso’s position and thus deny his motion.
First, nothing in the language of RA 9347 expressly indicates the intention to give it retroactive
effect. We emphasize that statutes, as a rule, apply prospectively, unless the legislative
intention to give them retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from
the language used.18 In "case of doubt, the doubt must be resolved against the retroactive
effect."19
Nor is retroactivity discernible, even by implication, from the provisions of RA 9347. It is not
implied from the law’s legislative intent, nor from the deliberations in Senate Bill No. 2035
(which became RA 9347).20
In Re: Request of Retired Deputy Court Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada for Automatic
Adjustment of His Retirement Benefits to Include Special Allowance Under R.A. 9227, 21 the
Court refused to extend the benefits provided by RA 9227 to official s of the Judiciary who
retired prior to the passage of this law. RA 9227 granted a special allowance to justices,
judges, and all other positions in the Judiciary with the equivalent rank of justices of the CA or
judges of the RTC. Since the position of Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) carries the same
rank as an Associate Justice of the CA,22 retired DCA Ponferrada asked for the inclusion of
the RA 9227 special allowance in his retirement pay.
The Court denied the request, noting that RA 9227 did not expressly provide for retroactivity
so that those who had retired at the time of its enactment would be covered. Although the
grant was extended to retired SC and CA justices, this was justified under Section 3-A of RA
910, as amended, which states:
SEC. 3-A. In case the salary of Justices of the Supreme Court or of the Court Appeals is
increased or decreased, salary shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be the salary or
the retirement pension which a Justice x x x who retired was receiving at the time of his
cessation in the office: Provided, That any benefits that have already accrued prior to such
increase or decrease shall not be affected thereby.23 [underscore ours]
According to the Court, parity in rank and salary does not automatically mean parity in
retirement benefits under Section 3-A of RA 910. Notably, the automatic adjustment of
retirement benefits was expressly extended by RA 910, as amended, but only to Justices of
the SC and the CA, not to judicial officials with the equivalent rank. Additionally, since he
retired prior to the passage of RA 9227, DCA Ponferrada could not even invoke the automatic
adjustment of his retirement pay under Section 3-A of RA No. 910, as amended, to support his
request.24
In the same way, RA 9347 was en acted into law only on July 27, 2006. Justice Veloso had,
by then (on February 4, 2004) left his post as NLRC Commissioner to assume the position of
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. In the absence of any clear intent to give RA 9347
any retroactive effect, Justice Veloso cannot validly claim that he held the rank of a CA justice
during his stint as NLRC Commissioner from 1989 to 2004.
b.2. RA 9347 is not a curative statute.
"A curative statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to validate legal proceedings,
instruments or acts of public authorities[,] which would otherwise be void for want of conformity
with certain existing legal requirements."25Simply put, curative laws are enacted to validate
acts done that otherwise would be invalid under existing laws.
RA 9347 is not a curative statute since it was not intended to supply deficiencies, abridge
superfluities in existing laws, or curb evils; the insertion of the word "rank" in Article 216 was
merely to emphasize the increase in salaries and benefits of the NLRC Commissioners and
labor arbiters.
b.3. Grant of Equivalent Rank is not Service in the Judiciary
At any rate, even if we recognize retroactivity as requested, the conferment of the rank of a CA
Justice to Justice Veloso during his tenure as NLRC Commissioner would not entitle him to
longevity pay.
Section 42 of B.P. Blg. 129 is clear: a judge or justice shall be paid a monthly longevity pay
equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay for each five years of continuous, efficient, and
meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary. Service in the NLRC, even with the rank of a CA
Justice, is not service with the Judiciary for purposes of longevity pay. Justice Veloso’s service
in the NLRC, however, m ay be credited as part of his government service for retirement
purposes under RA 910, as in the case of Justice Gacutan .
IV. General Discussions
With each of the consolidated petitions directly ruled upon, the following discussions are
submitted to expound on the conclusions reached and to generally comment on the issues the
Dissents raised.
At the core of the issues raised is the question: should the past service of incumbent justices
and judges, rendered at the Executive Department, be recognized under Section 42 of BP 129
( the longevity pay provision ) on the ground that their previous executive positions now carry
the rank, salary, and benefits of their counterparts in the Judiciary?
The law governing this issue is of course the longevity pay provision, heretofore
quoted,26 whose salient points are summarized below:
1. The longevity pay is a monthly pay equivalent to 5% of monthly basic pay;
2. Recipients are the Justices and Judges of courts;
3. For each five years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service;
4. The service is to be rendered in the Judiciary;
5. In no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge, after his longevity pay is
added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank.
What would otherwise be a simple stand-alone provision is complicated by subsequent laws
that grant the same ranks, salaries and benefits.
- "as those of" their counterpart judge or justice (for the National Prosecution Service),
or
- "as those of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court of Appeals (for
the National Labor Relations Commission), and
- the [ "rank, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and privileges"] as their
counterpart Justice or Judge (for the Office of the Solicitor General).
These new levels of rank and salary are essentially what the present petitioners and the
incumbent justices and judges cite as basis for the grant or increase of their longevity pay.
Another complicating factor involves the past rulings of this Court where past executive
service had been recognized, not only for retirement pay purposes, but for longevity pay
purposes upon retirement. Interestingly, no in-depth look appears to have been made in these
past rulings, although their results cannot be in doubt ― the Court recognized past executive
services for longevity pay purposes.
Interestingly, the Dissents, led by Justice De Castro, take a multi-pronged critique of the
ponencia generally chastising it for being overly strict in its reading of Section 42.
Among others, she posits that the ponencia disregards long established rulings of the Court on
longevity pay without a clear finding of the legal error made, and disregards as well the liberal
interpretation the Court has applied in these rulings; that the ponencia disregards too the
intent of the relevant laws (referring to the subsequent laws that grants ranks, salaries and
benefits similar to those of their counterparts in the Judiciary), the legal presumption of
legislative awareness, and consideration of prior laws and jurisprudence in enacting a statute;
and claims that the contemporaneous construction given by the Department of Justice and
other Executive branch officers, which disc loses a similar treatment of the longevity pay
provision of Section 42, de serves the court’s respect. Last but not the least, Justice De Castro
analyzes Section 42 and concludes that longevity pay is not a mere benefit but is a component
of the salary that should not be withheld from executive officers with the same rank, salary and
benefits as their counterparts in the Judiciary.
For his part, Justice Velasco essentially joins the Dissent of Justice De Castro and questions
the ponencia’s proposal to "freeze" the longevity pay grants for justices and judges who have
been credited with their past service in the Executive Department. He posits too that "what
matters is their receiving, for purposes of computing longevity pay, the salary of a Justice of
the CA at the time they served as NLRC Commissioners." If this is the case, Justice Veloso
claims they should be credited with their service with the NLRC for purposes of their longevity
pay.
Faced with these complications and dissents, the Court should not forget that our duty, first
and foremost, is to correctly interpret the law as written, not to stick to our past rulings at all
costs nor to consider our personal interests. In doing this, we must also be reminded that at
the center of the dispute is Section 42 of BP 129 – the provision on longevity pay that we must
consider with a fresh eye.
The consolidated cases, too, do not embody claims by executive officers against their own
Department for the enforcement of what the law involving their Department provides. These
cases involve claims by CA justices – members of the Judiciary – who look up to laws
involving the Executive Department to secure, maintain or increase the longevity pay that
provides benefit for judges and justices. Our primary focus, however, must be the
interpretation of our own law ― BP 129 and its Section 42.
A. Statutory Construction & Interpretation Perspectives
a. First rule of statutory construction: the plain meaning rule.
The primary rule in addressing any problem relating to the understanding or interpretation of a
law (in this case, the provision granting longevity pay) is to examine the law itself to see what it
plainly says. This is the plain meaning rule of statutory construction. 27
The first aspect that offers itself in the examination of the law is its title, which gives us a direct
indicator of the exact subject matter of the law. In the present cases, the law under which the
disputed longevity provision can be found is B.P. Blg. 129, An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefore and For Other Purposes (simplified as BP 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980).
This title alone already suggests that its provisions specifically relate to members of the
judiciary, unless an express contrary intent is made by the legislature. No such exception
clause is evident under the terms of BP 129 or in any of the other related laws (specifically, in
R. A. 9347, 9417, and 10071) discussed in this ponencia .
As discussed more extensively below, these other general laws do not specifically mention at
all the longevity provision under BP 129, a specific grant made only to the judges and justices
in the Judiciary.
Section 42 of this law has heretofore been quoted, but for convenience is again quoted below
–
Section 42. Longevity pay . – A monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic
pay shall be paid to the Justices and Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of
continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary ; Provided , That in no
case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is
added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank. [italics supplied; emphasis and
underscore ours ]
As written, the language and terms of this provision are very clear and unequivocal: longevity
pay is granted to a judge or justice (and to none other) who has rendered five years of
continuous, efficient and meritorious service in the Judiciary. The granted monthly longevity
pay is equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay.
The plain reading of Section 42 shows that longevity pay is not available even to a judicial
officer who is not a judge or justice. It is likewise not available, for greater reason, to an officer
in the Executive simply because he or she is not serving as a judge or justice. It cannot also
be available t o a judge or justice for past services he or she did not render within the Judiciary
as services rendered outside the Judiciary for purposes of longevity pay is not contemplated
by law.
Significantly, the Court has had occasion to speak about the purpose of longevity pay. In In
Re: Request of Justice Bernardo P. Pardo for Adjustment of His Longevity Pay, 28 the Court
categorically declared that the purpose of the law in granting longevity pay to judges and
justices is to recompense them for each five y ears of continuous, efficient, and meritorious
service rendered in the Judiciary; it is the long service in the Judiciary - from the lowest to the
highest court of the land – and not in any other branch of government, that is rewarded,29
In the case of the judge or justice now asking for the tacking of his/her past executive service,
the reason for the denial is simple and needs no intricate or complicated exercise in
interpretation: these past services were undertaken outside the Judiciary and are not the
services the law contemplates. The tacking, to put it bluntly, violates the clear purpose and
wording of Section 42 of BP 129.
To look at Section 42 from another perspective, if indeed (as some would argue) the intent is
to grant executive officers longevity pay pursuant to their respective grants of benefits similar
to that provided under Section 42 of BP 129, this presumed grant should be understood to be
limited to the executive officer’s continued, efficient and meritorious service in the Executive
Department, to be given while the executive officer is still with that department.
When the public officer with equivalent rank, salary and benefits transfers to the Judiciary , the
longevity pay to which he may have been entitled under the law applicable to his previous
Executive Department position, and which he may have been receiving because of his
continued service in that department, will simply have to be disregarded and discontinued.
At the point of transfer, Section 42 of BP 129 will now apply and operate, and will require five
(5) years of continued and efficient service in the Judiciary before it can start to be earned.
This application may sound hard and illiberal, but this is the logical consequence of the
combined effect of the Judiciary’s BP 129 longevity provision and the laws granting parity to
benefits applicable to the Judiciary.
To reiterate for emphasis, for a transferring public official, now a new justice or judge, to be
entitled to longevity pay under the terms of Section 42, he must first render continued, efficient
and meritorious service in the Judiciary for at least five years; his prior continued service in his
previous department will not and should not be counted.
b. The general laws that the Dissents cite cannot prevail over a specific law.
General laws (such as Republic Act Nos. [RA] 9347, 9417, and 10071) that generally grant the
same ranks, salaries and benefits to public officers in the Executive Department as those of
their specified counterparts in the Judiciary, cannot prevail over a special law such as BP 129
that specifically grants longevity pay solely to justices and judges who have rendered five (5)
years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious service rendered in the Judiciary.
A basic principle of statutory construction is that a special law prevails over a general law. 30 A
later enactment like RA 9347 and RA 10071 cannot override BP 129 because the latter, as a
special law, must prevail regardless of the dates of the enactment of these other laws. 31
As we held in Hon. Bagatsing v. Judge Ramirez, 32 a general provision must give way to a
particular provision. As a special provision on the grant of longevity pay, Section 42 of BP 129
governs and is controlling; to hold otherwise, as the dissent suggests, is to violate its clear
mandate.
Following the rule on general and special laws, the general laws granting the same salaries
and benefits cannot apply to the longevity pay provision that, by its specific and express terms,
is solely for the benefit of judges and justices who have shown loyal service to the Judiciary; it
is not for those who have been granted similar ranks, salaries and benefits as those of their
counterpart judges and justices. That they cannot be beneficiaries of longevity pay is clinched
by its purpose – the reward is intended for those with loyal service to the Judiciary.
c. Is there room for liberality in reading and interpreting Section 42?
As a general rule and contrary to the Dissent’s view, no room or occasion exists for any liberal
construction or interpretation; only the application of the letter of the law is required by basic
statutory construction principles.
We should not forget that liberality is not a magic wand that can ward off the clear terms and
import of express legal provisions; it has a place only when, between two positions that the
law can both accommodate, the Court chooses the more expansive or more generous option.
It has no place where no choice is available at all because the terms of the law are clear and
do not at all leave room for discretion.
In terms of the longevity pay’s purpose, liberality has no place where service is not to the
Judiciary, as the element of loyalty – the virtue that longevity pay rewards – is not at all
present.
We cannot overemphasize too that the policy of liberal construction cannot and should not be
to the point of engaging in judicial legislation – an act that the Constitution absolutely forbids
this Court to do. We may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute or
include, under its terms, situations that were not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. We
cannot rewrite the law to conform to what we think should be the law.
In the present case, where the law is clear, we should likewise be clear and decisive in its
application lest we be accused of favoritism or accommodating former colleagues, or
indirectly, ourselves, who will all inevitably retire from our judicial posts.
d. Administrative construction is merely advisory and is not binding upon the courts.
We take exception to the Dissent’s invocation of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction
to support its expansive reading of RA 9347 in relation with Section 42 of BP 129.
The Dissent conveniently fails to mention that contemporaneous constructions of
administrative or executive agencies are merely at best advisory and not binding on the
courts, for by the Constitution and the law, the courts are given the task of finally determining
what the law means.33
We do so under our authority to state what the law is34 and deference to an agency’s statutory
interpretation should be withheld whenever it conflicts with the language of the statute, as in
the present case.
In Peralta v. Civil Service Commission,35 the Court had occasion to state and held:
Administrative construction, if we may repeat, is not necessarily binding upon the courts.
Action of an administrative agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if
there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
clearly conflicting with either the letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
Thus, while the Executive possesses discretion in the implementation of laws, we should not
forget the reason for the Judiciary’s existence. We are the interpreters of the law and the
Constitution, not the Executive, and when a legal error exists, we must step in and intervene,
however long and hard the Executive’s previous implementation of the law had been.
e. The question of Judicial Legislation
Judicial legislation, in simplest terms, happens when the Court adds to what the law provides
and does so in the guise of interpretation, as the present dissents now want to do by seeking
to tack and to credit, for longevity pay purposes, the past services that justices and judges
rendered in the Executive Department.
In fact, in their discussions, the Dissents take the view that the ponencia has engaged in
judicial legislation because it restricts the concept of salary merely to the "basic pay."
This Resolution does, in fact, reflect the views imputed to it and it has not been shy or hesitant
from the very start in taking this position. But rather than being narrow and illiberal in doing
this, we believe that our position hews to the letter of the law so that our stance cannot be the
basis for the charge of judicial legislation.
Judicial legislation in fact transpires when the Court reads into the law an interpretation that
the four corners of that law cannot b ear. This expansive interpretation – i.e., that the term
"salary" under Section 42 includes longevity pay so that equivalency of "salary" translates to
the mandatory recognition of longevity pay – is unfortunately what the dissents espouse,
driven perhaps by thoughts of what the law ought to be.
What "ought to be" as a matter of policy is not within the jurisdiction of this Court to decide
upon. The Court eloquently spoke in Canet v. Mayor Decena about this judicial limit, albeit in
the context of discussing the maxim expression unius est exclusio alterius (literally, what is
expressed puts an end to what is implied). The Court said:36
In other words, it is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the oft-repeated
maxim expressio unius est exlusio alterius. Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare tacitum
– what is expressed puts an end to what is implied. The rule proceeds from the premise that
the legislative body would not have made specific enumerations in a statute, if it had the
intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
Even on the assumption that there is in fact a legislative gap caused by such an omission,
neither could the Court presume otherwise and supply the details thereof, because a
legislative lacuna cannot be filled by judicial fiat. Indeed, courts may not, in the guise of
interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and include therein situations not provided nor
intended by the lawmakers. An omission at the time of the enactment, whether careless or
calculated, cannot be judicially supplied however after later wisdom may recommend the
inclusion. Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to
supply what they think the legislature would have supplied if its attention has been called to
the omission.
Courts should not, by construction, revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the
legislature, nor rewrite the law to conform with what they think should be the law. Nor may
they interpret into the law a requirement which the law does not prescribe. Where a statute
contains no limitations in its operation or scope, courts should not engraft any. And where a
provision of law expressly limits its application to certain transactions, it cannot be extended to
other transactions by interpretation. To do any of such things would be to do violence to the
language of the law and to invade the legislative sphere. [emphases ours]
Applied to the present consolidated cases, we cannot go beyond the terms of Section 42 by
expanding its terms to what it does not include: when the law speaks of service "in the
Judiciary," it means what it says and cannot include service outside the Judiciary. To relate
this to the statutory construction rule discussed above give n the express and clear terms of
the law, the basic rule to apply is: "legislative intent is to be determined from the language
employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction." 37
B. The Grant of Rank, Benefits and their Implications
a. Judicial Rank and Executive Rank.
The grant of a "rank" equivalent to (or even "the same as" ) "those of the" grantee’s
counterpart judge or justice is a matter that has not been the subject of extensive
jurisprudential c overage. Hence, the subject of this Resolution proceeds on a path that so far
remains untrodden. The novelty of the issue posed need not deter us as the matters before us
call for resolution and should be written about if only to serve as guides for the future.
The Judiciary recognizes the ranks that the law accords to judges and justices. These judicial
ranks wholly pertain to the Judiciary as an independent, separate and co-equal branch of
government. Under our current constitutional set-up, no legislative or executive grant, fiat or
recognition of rank can make the grantee, who is not a judge or justice, a judicial officer,
without violating the constitutional principles of separation of powers and independence of the
Judiciary.
As a consequence, the grant of rank at the same level as the grantees’ counterpart judges or
justices is not and cannot be a conferment of "judicial rank" and does not thereby accord the
grantees recognition as members of the Judiciary. For incumbent judges and justices who had
previous government service outside the Judiciary , it follows that the grant of rank to them
under their old executive positions does not render their service in these previous positions
equivalent to and creditable as judicial service, unless Congress by law says otherwise and
only for purposes of entitlement to salaries and benefits.
To be sure, Congress can create and recognize ranks outside of the Judiciary that are
equivalent to the ranks it has created for the Judiciary, but again, this recognition doe s not
thereby create "judicial ranks" outside of the Judiciary, nor constitute the grantees of these
ranks as judges and justices. Technically, what Congress creates or grants are executive
ranks that are equivalent to judicial ranks.
Notably, even for those within the Judiciary itself, the recognition of "judicial rank" in favor of
those who are not justices or judges does not thereby make the grantee a justice or a judge
who is entitled to this formal title; the grantee may be entitled to the benefits of the rank but
he/she remains an administrative official in the Judiciary, separate and distinct from the
justices and judges who directly exercise judicial power, singly or collegially.
b. Commonalities and Divergence of Terms and Conditions of Government Service.
The principle of separation of powers between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
branches of government ordains that each of these three (3) great branches of government
has exclusive cognizance of, and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally
allocated sphere.38
Each branch cannot invade the domain of the others.39 This principle presupposes mutual
respect by and between the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial departments and entitles them
to be left alone to discharge their assigned duties as they see fit.40
We generally draw attention to this constitutional principle to emphasize that while all officials
in the three branches of government are government officials, vast differences may exist in the
terms and conditions of their government service; these are ultimately traceable to the
separation of power principle.
Government officials perform specifically assigned functions peculiar to their respective
departments and these functions justify their differing terms and conditions of government
service. In the context of the present consolidated cases, distinctions must necessarily exist
between one who is appointed to the position of a judge or justice, (which position carries law-
defined salaries, benefits, and conditions specific to judges and justices), and one who is
appointed to an executive position with the equivalent rank, salary or benefits of a justice or
judge in the Judiciary.
The extent to which those with equivalent executive and judicial ranks have commonalities or
diverge in their salaries and benefits is a matter that the Constitution leaves, within limits, to
the discretion of the Legislature as a matter of policy. What is important to recognize is the
legal reality that the divergence of salaries and benefits across government, even among
those with equivalent ranks, is not at all unusual because these positions belong to different
branches of government and undertake functions peculiar to their departments.
A convenient example to cite is the allowance benefit that members of the Office of the
Solicitor General are given as peculiarly their own – honoraria and allowances from client
departments, agencies and instrumentalities.41Members of the Judiciary do not enjoy these
same benefits.
On the part of the Judiciary, the disputed longevity pay also serves as a good example. By its
terms, longevity pay is peculiar to the Judiciary as discussed above. Significantly, in all the
cited laws that grant similarity of ranks, salaries, and benefits between executive officials and
their counterparts in the Judiciary, no mention at all is made of longevity pay and its enjoyment
outside the Judiciary. Longevity pay, of course, is not unique as a feature of judicial life that is
wholly the Judiciary’s own; there are other benefits that the Judiciary enjoys – by law, by rule
or by practice – that are not replicated in the executive agencies, in the same manner that
there are benefits in executive agencies that the Judiciary does not share.
In this sense, it approximates the absurd to claim that the grant of the "same" benefits to
executive officials with the "same" rank should encompass all the benefits that the comparator
judge or justice enjoys.
b.1. The Question of Fairness.
A tempting question to raise when comparisons are made across branches of government and
when equivalency of salaries and benefits comes into focus, is the essential fairness, or lack
of it, that results or should result.
The Judiciary, for example, may raise the point – if we are the comparators and all our
benefits should be enjoyed by the Solicitors, is there no resulting unfairness because no la w
grants the Judiciary the same privilege of enjoying the benefits that the Office of the Solicitor
General enjoys?
To be sure, unfairness may factually result, but this is not a matter for the Judiciary to examine
in the absence of a case where this factual issue is raised and is relevant. Nor is there any
indefensible inequality as a matter of law viewed from the prism of the legal measuring
standard ― the equal protection clause. Notably, the Judiciary and the Executive Department
belong to different branches of government whose roles and functions in government differ as
pointed out above. Thus, ground/s for distinctions may exist that render any seeming
unfairness not legally objectionable.
If the issue of unfairness will surface at all, this would transpire when the terms of the longevity
provision under BP 129 would be disregarded, i.e., if longevity pay would be recognized in
favor of the NLRC, the prosecutors and the solicitors under the terms of their respective laws,
when longevity pay – by the express terms fashioned out by Congress – should be granted
only to those who have served continuous, efficient, and meritorious service in the judiciary.
Similarly unfair would be the tacking of previous services outside of the Judiciary rendered by
judges and justices, incumbent or retired, for purposes of longevity pay under Section 42. Of
course, the main issue in this situation would be legality, but this situation, to our mind, is one
that is both illegal and unfair. Unfairness comes in because of the grant of what is not legally
due.
D. The Salary and Longevity Pay
a. The Applicable Law on Salary
An examination of BP 129 shows that its Section 41 treats of "salaries" of judges, while
Section 42 provides for longevity pay.
Under Section 41, the "salaries" or compensation (and allowances) that judges shall receive
shall be the amount that the President may authorize following the guidelines set fort h in
Letter of Implementation (LOI) No. 93, pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 985, as
amended by PD 1597.
PD 985, as amended by PD 1597, implemented a position classification and compensation
standardization scheme (Scheme) :
(1) under which positions are classified by occupational groups, series and classes
according to the similarities or differences in duties, responsibilities, and qualification
requirements; and
(2) by which the rates of pay for each of the positions and employee groups/classes
are determined according to the salary and wage schedules fixed by the Decree to be
uniformly app lied to all belonging to a particular position.
Under Section 4 of PD 985, this position classification and compensation standardization
scheme shall apply to all positions in the national government, that under PD 1597’s
amendment now includes the justices and judges in the Judiciary.
Section 11 of PD 985 provides for the "Salary Schedule " under the compensation system for
positions pa id on annual or monthly basis. The Schedule consists of twenty-eight grades with
each grade having eight prescribed steps. Each grade represents a level of work difficulty and
responsibility that distinguishes it from the other grades in the Schedule. Each class of position
in the Position Classification System is assigned a "salary grade" and determines the
position’s salary rate.42
Under the Scheme, every covered position receives a "salary" or compensation corresponding
to the position’s "salary grade" under the "Salary Schedule." Otherwise stated, all covered
positions or employees belonging to a particular "salary grade," regardless of the department,
bureau, office, etc., to which they belong, shall receive the same "salary rate," expressed as
annual, in pesos, as fixed under the "Salary Schedule" (subject to certain salary rate
increments for each step within each salary grade). In short, a particular "salary grade"
equates to a specific, fixed "salary rate."
Prior to its amendment by PD 1597, Section 4 of PD 985 exempted from the position
classification and compensation standardization scheme the following positions or group of
government officials and employees: (1) elected officers and those whose compensation is
fixed by the Constitution; (2) heads of executive departments and officials of equivalent rank:
(3) chiefs of diplomatic missions, ministers, and Foreign Service officers; (4) Justices and
Judges of the Judicial Department; (5) members of the armed forces; (6) heads and assistant
heads of GOCCs, including the senior management and technical positions; (7) heads of state
universities and colleges; (8) positions in the career executive service; and (9) provincial, city,
municipal and other local government officials and employees. The salaries or compensation
and allowances of these exempted positions are those to be authorized by the President.
Pursuant to PD 985’s mandate, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Letter of
Implementation (L OI 93) adopting an integrated compensation scheme for positions in the
Judiciary. In almost the same fashion as PD 985, Para graph 3.0 of LOI 93 enumerated the
various positions in the Judicial Component of the Judiciary, i.e., Justices and Judges of the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Court of Agrarian
Relations, the First and Second Level Courts, the Clerks of Court of the Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals, and the corresponding "salary rates" for each position, expressed as annual,
in pesos.
With PD 1597’s amendment, those previously exempted positions, i.e., Justices and Judges of
the Judicial Department, are now included in the coverage of Section 4 of PD 985. PD 985, as
amended by PD 1597, now limits the exemptions to elected officers; to those whose
compensation is fixed by the Constitution; and to local government officials and employees.
Note that Section 11 of PD 985, as amended by PD 1597, and even Paragraph 3.0 of LOI 93,
provided for fixed "salary rates" for each "salary grade" expressed as annual, in pesos. As
matters now stand, the "salary" or compensation that an employee or a position in the
government will receive is the prevailing "salary rate," fixed under the "Salary Schedule," that
corresponds to the employee or position’s "salary grade."
The "salary rate" as expressed in annual fixed rates, based on the "salary grade" referred to
under LOI 93 pursuant to PD 985, as amended by PD 1597 is the "salary" referred to in
Section 41 of BP 129, i.e., an amount or salary rate fixed as annual, in pesos, that is based on
the recipient’s salary grading.
b. Longevity Pay under Section 42.
Section 42 of BP 129 provides for the payment and the manner of computing longevity pay,
i.e., to be paid monthly, based on the recipient’s monthly basic pay at the rate of 5% for each
five years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service rendered in the judiciary. Note that
the amount of longevity pay to which a recipient shall be entitled is not a fixed amount, in
contrast with the "salary" under Section 41; it is a percentage of the recipient’s monthly basic
pay which, at the least, is equivalent to 5%.
Also, the payment of longevity pay is premised on a continued, efficient, and meritorious
service: (1) in the Judiciary; and (2) of at least five years. Long and continued service in the
Judiciary is the basis and reason for the payment of longevity pay; it rewards the loyal and
efficient service of the recipient in the Judiciary.
From these perspectives, longevity pay is both a branch specific (i.e., to the judges and
justices of the Judiciary) and conditional (i.e., due only upon the fulfillment of certain
conditions) grant. In negative terms, it is not an absolute grant that is easily transferrable to
other departments of government.
b.1. Salary and Longevity Pay compared.
In contrast with longevity pay, the "salary" under Section 41 entitles the official or employee to
its receipt from day one (or the first day of the first month) of his service. Its basis or reason for
payment is the actual performance of service or assigned duties, without regard to the months
or years the recipient has been rendering the service.
Note, too, that the service contemplated under Section 42 for entitlement to longevity pay is
service in the judiciary. This intent is clear not only from Section 42’s explicit use of the word
"judiciary" to qualify "service," but also from the title of the statute to which this specific
provision belongs, i.e., "The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980." In these lights, the "same
salary" that Article 216 of the Labor Code speaks of and to which the NLRC Commissioners
shall be entitled, should be read and understood as the salary under Section 41 or the "salary
rate," as provided under the "Salary Schedule" that corresponds to the "salary grade" of their
counterpart justice or judge. Other laws that grant other public officers in the executive
department with the "same salary" as their counterpart justice or judge (i.e., RA Nos. 9417 and
10071) should likewise be read and understood in this way.
b.2. Nature of Longevity Pay.
Based on these considerations, longevity pay should be treated as a benefit or an "add-on"
and not a part, let alone an integral component of "salary," contrary to the Dissents’ position.
This consequence necessarily results as "salary" and longevity pay: (1) are treated under
different sections of BP 129; (2) have different bases for determination or computation; and (3)
have different reasons for the payment or grant.
In addition, Section 42 of BP 129 does not categorically state that the monthly longevity pay
shall form part of the "salary" or is an integral or inseparable component of “salary.” Even the
most liberal interpretation of Section 42 does not reveal any intention to treat longevity pay in
this manner ― as part, or as an integral component, of “salary.”
On the contrary, Section 42 makes it clear that the "salary," which the Dissents submit serve
as basis of the "salary" of executive officers with the same rank of a justice or judge, is that
referred to or contemplated in Section 41.
b.3. Section 42 Analyzed.
Note in this regard that the last clause of Section 42 which states that: "in no case shall the
total salary of each Justice or Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added , exceed the
salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank."
The use of the term "total salary" under the first portion of Section 42’s last clause,
presupposes an addition of components, and should be understood to refer to the total
compensation received . This "total salary" is the "salary" (or the salary rate fixed under the
"Salary Schedule" as the recipient’s monthly compensation corresponding to his "salary
grade") plus the "add-on" longevity pay (or that portion or percentage of the "salary" as fixed
under the Salary Schedule) equivalent to at least 5% of the monthly salary.
In formula form, this should read –
Section 41 Salary + Section 42 Longevity Pay = Total Salary
Where:
Salary = monthly salary rate of position per the Salary Schedule
Longevity Pay = monthly salary rate x 5%.
That the word "total" was added to "salary" under the first portion of Section 42’s last clause, in
no way signifies that longevity pay is an integral part of the "salary" which a Justice or Judge
will receive each month by virtue of his position/rank/salary grade.
The word "total" was added simply to qualify "salary" (the recipient’s "salary" fixed under the
"Salary Schedule") plus any longevity pay to which he may be entitled. This treatment, to be
sure, does not make the longevity pay a part of the "salary."
In short, "total" simply modified "s alary," and in effect denotes that amount received or to be
received as total compensation, and distinguishes this resulting amount from the "salary"
received each month by virtue of the position/salary grade.
Note, too, the word "salary" under the last portion of Section 42’s last clause which is not
qualified or modified by the word "total," in contrast with the "total salary" under the first
portion.
The last portion states: the salary of the Justice or Judge next in rank: this "salary" of the
Justice or Judge next in rank should not be exceeded by the "total salary" (or total
compensation) of the recipient. The "salary" under the last phrase, when read together with
the "total salary" under the first phrase, shows that "salary" is distinct, and to be pa id
separately from longevity pay, so that the latter cannot be an integral part of "salary."
To sum up, the "same salary" to be received by the public officials in the Executive
Department, with the same rank of justice or judge, is the "salary" of the justice or judge under
Section 41. The "salary" referred to in Section 41, in turn, and as explained above, is the
"salary rate" fixed under the "Salary Schedule" corresponding to the position’s "salary grade."
Notably, Justice De Castro’s proposition that the term "salary" constitutes the basic monthly
salary plus the longevity pay when the Congress enacted RA Nos. 9417, 9347, and 10071 is
not reflected in any of the congressional deliberations. What the deliberations clearly reveal is
simply the intention to increase the "salaries" of the covered public officers in the Executive
Department to the level of the "salaries" received by or granted to their counterpart in the
Judiciary.
This "salary" cannot but refer to the fixed sum that the system of "salary rate," "Salary
Schedule," and "salary grade" speaks of. It cannot refer to the variable amount of "total salary"
that the dissent refers to, as the basis or comparator cannot be a variable amount that reflects
the seniority that a judge or justice has attained after years in the service.
Ironically, Justice De Castro’s cited case – Re Longevity pay of Justices of the
Sandiganbayan, appearing at page 42 of this ponencia – best illustrates how the "salary" and
"total salary" concepts operate.
E. The complete parity that the dissent advocates is a policy matter that Congress has not so
far expressed.
The legislative history and record of the laws (that grant the same ranks, salaries, and benefits
to officers in the Executive department equivalent to their specified counterparts in the
Judiciary) do not support the Dissent’s view that these laws grant full parity in rank, salaries,
and benefits or equal treatment between the executive officers/grantees and the comparator
judges and justices whose longevity pay arises from BP 129.
In fact, the legislative history and record of these statutes positively show that Congress has
not yet gone as far as the Dissents would want them to go―to recognize full parity that
includes the grant of longevity pay under BP 129 to executive officers in the Executive
Department.
As the discussions below will show, the Dissent, without delving deep into legislative history
and record of the statutes it cited as bases, took the easy route of resorting to hasty
generalizations to support its tenuous theory that these laws operate under the principle of "
equal in qualifications and equal in rank, equal in salaries and benefits received."
This interpretative route may be easy but is a very dangerous one in its implications, as
Congress has not in any way shown that it has intended officers with the same rank and
qualifications across government to receive equal pay and equal benefits.
For this kind of "equalization" to prevail, the government must be ready to embark on a
comparison, not only of rank and qualifications, but on the quantification of job content and
valuation of jobs of equal value, involving similar or allied activities undertaken across
government.
This is the requirement that the "equal pay for equal work" principle established in jurisdictions
with more advanced social legislation than the Philippines.43 To be sure, this is a serious
policy matter that, under the terms of the Constitution, is not for this Court but for Congress to
establish .
To fully support these contentions, we embark on a brief look into the laws that the Dissent
itself cited.
a. RA 934744 affecting the NLRC.
RA 9347 lapsed into law on July 27, 2006. This law was passed to address the then urgent
need to improve the administrative and operational efficiency of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), particularly its rate of disposition of pending cases and the reduction of
its ballooning backlog of labor cases.45 In dealing with these issues, Congress then focused on
measures that would encourage productivity and efficiency and boost the morale of NLRC
officials.
The congressional measures Congress passed included the increase in the number of
commissioner-members of the NLRC, the creation of positions for commission attorneys who
would assist the NLRC commissioners in deciding the labor cases, and a provision for
retirement benefits to NLRC commissioners and labor arbiters equivalent to the retirement
benefits of justices of the CA and judges of the RTCs, respectively.
In appreciating RA 9347, note that as early as Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, the
commissioners of the NLRC were already given the same salary and benefits as justices of
the CA . As the old Article 216 of the Labor Code provided, before the amendment:
Article 216. Salaries, benefits and other emoluments. The Chairman and members of the
Commission shall receive an annual salary at least equivalent to, and be entitled to the same
allowances and benefits as those of the Presiding Justice and Associate Justices of the Court
of Appeals, respectively. The Executive Labor Arbiters shall receive an annual salary at least
equivalent to that of an Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor and
Employment and shall be entitled to the same allowances and benefits as that of a Regional
Director of said Department. The Labor Arbiters shall receive an annual salary at least
equivalent to, and be entitled to the same allowances and benefits as that of an Assistant
Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment. In no case, however, shall the
provision of this Article result in the diminution of existing salaries, allowances and benefits of
the aforementioned officials. (As amended by Section 8, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21,
1989)46
This old provision did not include retirement benefits in its wording. Thus, as enumerated,
entitlement to equivalence was limited to salaries, allowances and benefits. To address the
perceived legislative gap, the amendatory RA 9347 expressly included the word retirement in
the enumeration. This grant applied to both commissioners and labor arbiters of the NLRC.
Aside from this observation, note too that the old Article 216 of the Labor Code did not give
labor arbiters the salary, allowances and benefits equivalent to those of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC ) judges. Apart from addressing the issue on retirement benefits, RA 9347 also
sought to deal with the then situation of labor arbiters in terms of their salaries and
emoluments.
Thus, the congressional intent in RA 9347 was to deal with two gaps in PD 442 with respect to
the salaries, benefits, and emoluments of the members of the NLRC.
The first was the grant of salaries and benefits to labor arbiters equivalent to those of RTC
judges, and the second was the express inclusion of the retirement benefits of the labor
arbiters and NLRC commissioners at the levels equivalent to those of RTC judges and CA
justices, respectively.
In the discussions and exchanges among the members of Congress – among them, the
explanatory note of Senator Ramon Revilla Jr. in Senate Bill No. 120447 and the sponsorship
speech of Senator Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada of Senate Bill No. 2035 (the senate bill that led to
RA 9347)48 – nowhere did they deal with the issue of longevity pay as a benefit that should be
accorded to labor arbiters and commissioners of the NLRC.
In this light, we believe that to make the hasty generalization that the word benefit as
enumerated in Article 216 of the Labor Code should include longevity pay would run counter to
the intention of the law. Note that had it been the intent of Congress to give the labor arbiters
and commissioners of the NLRC all the benefits enjoyed by the members of the Judiciary as
provided in BP 129 and in other laws specifically applicable to members of the Judiciary, then
it should not have amended Article 216 of the Labor Code by including "retirement benefits" in
the enumeration. Congress should have left the provision as it is since it already provides for
the general term benefit.
Parenthetically, retirement pay is a specific form of allowance under the general term benefits.
Congress had to include this item as an express benefit precisely because the use of the
general word benefit in the old Article 216 of the Labor Code did not include all the benefits
then being enjoyed by judges and justices of the Judiciary.
In providing for retirement benefits, Congress significantly did not simply state that the NLRC
shall enjoy the terms and benefits of judges and justices under their retirement law, RA 910,
where longevity pay is a special and specific provision. Congress contented itself with the
plain insertion of "retirement pay" and stopped there.
Thus, as matters now stand, NLRC officials retire under the retirement law applicable to
executive officials, with parity of the terms of this retirement law with those of their
counterparts in the Judiciary. Retirement benefits specific to the Judiciary, however, were not
and should not be interpreted to be wholly included.
b. RA 941749 affecting the OSG.
RA 9417 passed into law on March 30, 2007. As in the case of RA 9347, this law was passed
to address the plight of the members of the Office of the Solicitor General ( OSG ) by
upgrading their salaries and benefits to improve their efficiency as the Republic’s counsel.
In the sponsorship speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile regarding Senate Bill No. 2249, the
predecessor Senate Bill of RA 9417, Senator Enrile pointed out that the Senate’s Committee
on Justice and Human Rights, in crafting Senate Bill 2249, aimed to address the following
issues regarding the OSG:
1. Increase the number of staff of the OSG and upgrade their positions;
2. Increase the existing 15 legal divisions of the OSG to 30;
3. Provide health care services, insurance coverage and scholarship and other
benefits to all OSG employees subject to the availability of funds;
4. Grant franking privileges to the OSG;
5. Establish a provident fund within the OSG; and
6. Grant retirement benefits to qualified employees.50
As in the case of the NLRC, it must again be noted that this enumeration is specific with
respect to the benefits granted to members of the OSG: it particularly referred to the benefits
to be granted. Although Section 3 of RA 941751 provides that the Solicitor General shall have
the same qualifications for appointment, rank, prerogatives, salaries, allowances, benefits and
privileges as the Presiding Justice of the CA (and an Assistant Solicitor General as that of a
CA Associate Justice), RA 9417 still allocated express provisions for the other benefits to be
enjoyed by the members of the OSG. These provisions are the following:
Section 4- Compensation52
Section 5- Benefits and Privileges53
Section 6- Seminar and Other Professional Fees54
Section 7- Transportation Benefits55
Section 8- Other Benefits56
Section 10- Grant of Special Allowances57
Had Congress really intended to grant the benefit of longevity pay to the members of the OSG,
then it should have also included in the list of benefits granted under RA 9417 a provision
pertaining to longevity pay. This provision is glaringly missing and thus cannot be included via
this Court’s decision without running afoul of the rule that prohibits judicial legislation. Nor can
this Court recognize the past service rendered by a current judge or justice in the OSG for
purposes of longevity pay.
A closer examination of this law shows that what Congress did was to grant benefits that were
applicable to the type of service that the OSG provides.
For example, OSG lawyers are entitle d to honoraria and allowances from client departments,
agencies and instrumentalities of the Government.58
This benefit is only proper as the main function of the OSG is to act as the counsel of the
Government and its officers acting in their official capacity. On the other hand, this benefit is
not applicable to member s of the Judiciary as they do not act as advocates but rather as
impartial judges of the cases before them, for which they are not entitled to honoraria and
allowances on a per case basis.
Another indicator that should be considered from the congressional handling of RA 9417 is
that Congress did not intend to introduce a strict one-to-one correspondence between the
grant of the same salaries and benefits to members of the executive department and of the
Judiciary. The congressional approach apparently was for laws granting benefits to be of
specific application that pertains to the different departments according to their personnel’s
needs and activities. No equalization or standardization of benefits was ever intended on a
generalized or across-the-board basis.
F. The structure of the laws providing for the salaries and benefits of members of the
Judiciary, prosecutors, and public officers in the OSG and the NLRC further negate the
Dissent’s view that these laws intended equal treatment among them.
We cannot also agree with the Dissent’s position that the laws providing for the salaries and
benefits of members of the Judiciary, the prosecution service, the OSG solicitors , and the
members of the NLRC aim to provide equality among these public officers in their salaries and
benefits.
In terms of salaries, their rationalization has been addressed through Position Classification
and Compensation System of the government under PD 985, PD 1597 and LOI 93, heretofore
discussed. It is through the amendments of these legislative enactments that parity and equity
can both be achieved in government.
On the other hand, a look at the structure of the laws affecting the Judiciary, the prosecutors,
the OSG, and the NLRC shows that there could be no equal treatment among them. Notably,
under Section 16, par. 6 of RA 10071,59only the prosecutors would have an automatic
increase in salaries and benefits in case the salaries and benefits in the Judiciary increase.
This provision, by itself, shows that Congress did not intend full parity, because increases in
the salaries and benefits of prosecutors would not lead to an automatic increase in the salaries
and benefits of members of the Judiciary.
Extending our judicial lens even further, the laws increasing the salaries and benefits of
executive officers in the OSG and the NLRC do not also provide for an automatic increase
should there be increases in the salaries and benefits of the Judiciary; neither do these laws
increase the salaries and benefits of the members of the Judiciary should the salaries and
benefits of these public officers increase.
Had Congress really intended full parity between the Judiciary and other public officers in the
executive department, it would have provided for reciprocity in the automatic increase of
salaries, benefits and allowances, and the upgrading of the grades or levels of the
emoluments of these public officers.
Instead, the laws, as currently worded, allow for a situation where an increase in the salaries
and benefits of prosecutors would not result in the increase in the salaries of members of the
Judiciary, the OSG and NLRC. Thus, instead of equalization, the prosecutors (who were
merely granted a rank at par with their named counterparts in the Judiciary) would be in a
better position than the actual judges and justices themselves, in the absence of a similar
provision of law giving the same benefits to justices and judges in the event additional
emoluments would be given to these prosecutors.
The inevitable conclusion from all these is that Congress, in increasing the salaries and
benefits of these officers, merely used the salary levels and benefits in the Judiciary as a
yardstick to make their salaries and benefits comparable to fellow government employees
engaged in the administration of justice.
At the risk of endlessly belaboring a point, we cannot, without engaging in the prohibited act of
judicial legislation, construe that the Dissent’s cited laws fully intend and recognize full parity in
rank, salaries, benefits, and other emoluments among the public officers mentioned.
G. The Dissent’s cited cases of Santiago, Gancayco, Dela Fuente and Guevara-Salonga are
not controlling in the present case, as they are a strained and erroneous application of Section
42 of BP 129 that should be abandoned.
The dissent’s invocation of the cases of Judge Santiago and Justices Gancayco, Dela Fuente,
and Guevara-Salonga cannot be applied to the present case as they are erroneous
applications of Section 42 of BP 129 in relation with RA 910 or the Judiciary’s retirement law.
Nor can these cases be cited to support the position that these past rulings already
established that the past services in the Executive Department of incumbent and retired
justices and judges, should be given credit for purposes of longevity pa y under Section 42 of
BP 129.
a. The Guevarra-Salonga & Dela Fuente Cases
The grants of longevity pay to Justice Guevara-Salonga and Justice Dela Fuente, in particular,
were based on a misinterpretation and misunderstanding of the Judiciary’s retirement law ―
RA 910, read in relation to Section 42 of BP 129 ― and its interaction with RA 10071, which
granted prosecutors the same rank and benefits (including retirement benefits) of their
counterparts in the Judiciary.
Although RA 910 recognized, for purposes of retirement pay, past services in the Judiciary or
in any other branch of the Government, the longevity pay provision under Section 42 of BP
129 recognizes only services in the Judiciary in determining the longevity pay of 5% of the
basic salary (given for each five years of service) that is carried over into retirement from the
service.
In considering the longevity pay in the cases of Justices Guevarra-Salonga and Dela Fuente,
the Court mistakenly recognized their services as prosecutors to be services in the Judiciary,
because RA 1007160 granted prosecutors the same rank and benefits (including retirement
benefits) as their counterparts in the Judiciary.
The Court failed to fully appreciate that the longevity pay provision under RA 910, in relation
with Section 42 of BP 129, is unique to the Judiciary and can be enjoyed only for services
actually rendered, and by those who retired, in this branch of government. Thus, services at
the Department of Justice, i.e., outside of the Judiciary, should not have been recognized as
additional judicial service for purposes of longevity pay on retirement.
Notably, the Court did not comprehensively discuss in these cited rulings the nature of service
required for the longevity provision to apply, nor the purpose, reason and history of the
longevity pay provision under BP 129, for the Dissents to conclude that the Court already
treated the past service in the Executive Department to be equivalent to service in the
Judiciary.
As we earlier discussed, under our system of Government, the Judiciary is separate from,
serves a purpose and functions, and has powers, duties and prerogatives distinct from those
of the Executive Department. Hence, the Court, in these Resolutions, could not have regarded
service in the Executive as unqualifiedly equivalent to service in the Judiciary.
It should be considered, too, that an acceptance of past service in the Executive as service in
the Judiciary may have no basis. The qualification for the grant by the Judiciary should be its
determination that there had been continuous, efficient, and meritorious service. No such
determination can be done by the Judiciary if it will simply recognize longevity pay based
solely on service in a position under the Executive Department with rank, salaries, and
benefits equivalent to specified positions in the Judiciary.
To reiterate, for clarity and emphasis, if the Judiciary would recognize past service in the
Executive simply because of the equivalency of rank, salaries and benefits, the situation would
be legally problematic as it would have no way of knowing for itself if the grantee would qualify
(based on efficient and meritorious service) since the past service would be with the
Executive, not with the Judiciary. Of course, for this Court to simply recognize that past
executive service w ill be credited under Section 42 of BP 129 constitutes prohibited judicial
legislation for going beyond the requirement that service should be in the Judiciary.
b. The cited Sandiganbayan case.
Re: Longevity Pay of the Associate Justices of the Sandiganbayan (Sandiganbayan case) 61 is
a very interesting case that Justice De Castro uses as part of her argument on the liberal
stance the Court has taken on longevity pay.
Significantly, this case did not treat the longevity pay under Section 42 as an integral
component of the salary of the recipient, to be given to and applied in equal degree and force,
and under absolute circumstances to public officials in the Executive Department granted the
"same salary" as their counterpart in the Judiciary.
The Sandiganbayan ruling, in fact, does not apply to the factual situation of the present case; it
solely involves Justices of the Sandiganbayan ― members of the Judiciary. Note the following
pronouncement in that case:
x x x longevity pay once earned and enjoyed becomes a vested right and forms part of the
salary of the recipient thereof which may not be reduced despite the subsequent appointment
of a justice or judge next higher in rank who is not entitled to longevity pay for being new and
not having acquired any longevity in the government service. Furthermore, diminution or
decrease of the salary of an incumbent justice or judge is prohibited by Section 10 of Article X
of the Constitution; hence, such recipient continue to earn and receive addition l longevity pay
as may be warranted by subsequent services in the judiciary, because the purpose of the
Longevity Pay Law is to reward justices and judges for their long and dedicated service as
such. The provision of the law that the total salary of each justice or judge concerned, after
adding his longevity pay, should not exceed the salary plus longevity pay of the justice or
judge next higher in rank, refers only to the initial implementation of the law and does not
proscribe a justice or judge who is already entitled to longevity pay, from continuing to earn
and receive longevity pay for services rendered in the judiciary subsequent to such
implementation, by the mere accident of a newcomer being appointed to the position next
higher in rank.
These pronouncements reveal the Court’s recognition of a situation where a Justice or Judge
who has rendered service in the Judiciary for a considerable length of time and who will
receive a total compensation that far exceeds the "salary" that a newly appointed Justice or
Judge, who has not rendered any prior service in the Judiciary, will earn or receive based
simply on his "salary grade." The former, the "long-serving" Justice or Judge, will earn far
more than the latter, the "newly-serving" Justice or Judge, because of the "add-on" longevity
pay that he (the long-serving Justice or Judge) will receive for his continued long service in the
Judiciary, aside from the "salary" to which the latter (the newly-serving Justice or Judge) shall
only be entitled.
The Court realized this scenario as problematic and the obvious inequity it may bring if it were
to cons true strictly the words of Section 42. It is iniquitous for the "long-serving" Justice or
Judge if the "add-on" pay (longevity pay) that he earned under the law for his long and
dedicated service in the Judiciary would be reduced or eliminated altogether simply because
of a new Justice or Judge w ho will not be entitle d to any "add-on" pay for lack of the required
long and dedicated service in the Judiciary, and who will thus receive lesser total
compensation.
The Court met the case head on and declared that the limitation refers only to the "initial
implementation of the law and does not proscribe a justice or judge, who is already entitled to
longevity pay, from continuing to earn and receive longevity pay for services rendered in the
judiciary subsequent to such implementation, by the mere accident of a newcomer being
appointed to the position next higher in rank." This case assumes importance in the present
consolidated cases as it stresses the purpose of longevity pay as discussed and interpreted in
these pronouncements: " to reward justices and judges for their long and dedicated service as
such, " i.e., as justices or judges.
It highlights, too, that " salary" and the "longevity pay" are separate components of a judge’s or
justice’s total compensation , and that such total compensation can be variable because
seniority or years in the service is a factor taken into account.
Most importantly, this case is an example of the Court’s prompt decisive action to act with
liberality when such action is called for.
c. Moving On
Construing Section 42 as we do in this Resolution does not and will not negate the applicable
laws, contrary to Justice De Castro’s Dissent. Rather, the interpretation that the term "salary"
does not include longevity pay will rectify the error that the Court’s past rulings have created
on this subject.
To recapitulate, the Court’s prior rulings treated longevity pay as part of the "salary" – a ruling
that, as explained, runs counter to the express and implied intent of BP 129. They are
erroneous because they introduced and included in the definition and composition of "salary"
under Section 41 an element that the law did not intend to include, either expressly or
impliedly.
Hence, the most compelling reason now exists to abandon the above-cited cases: they were
clear and grossly erroneous application of the law. In jurisdictional terms, they involved an
interpretation not within the contemplation of words expressed by the statute; hence, they
were gravely abusive interpretation62 that did not and cannot confer any vested right protected
by the due process clause. The worst approach the Court can take now is to compound the
problem by perpetuating our past mistakes and simply burying our heads in the sand of past-
established rulings.
The first decisive move for the Court is to declare, as it hereby declares, the abandonment of
our rulings on longevity pay in the cases of Santiago, Gancayco, Dela Fuente, and Guevara-
Salonga and to strike them out of our ruling case law, without, however, withdrawing the
grants to those who have benefitted from the Court’s misplaced final rulings.
Along these lines, the Court also hereby expressly declares that it does not disavow the
longevity pay previously granted to the retired justices and judicial officials for services
rendered outside the Judiciary. They may continue enjoying their granted benefits as their
withdrawal now will be inequitable.
With the same objective, those still in the service who are now enjoying past longevity pay
grants due to past services outside the Judiciary, shall likewise continue with the grants
already made, but their grants will have to be frozen at their current levels until their services
outside the Judiciary are compensated for by their present and future judicial service.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we resolve to:
(1) NOT the Memorandum dated February 18, 2013 of Atty. Eden T. Candelaria and
the Report and Recommendation dated February 15, 2013 of Atty. Corazon G. Ferrer-
Flores;
(2) GRANT the request of Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando that her
services as Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Rita, Pampanga be included in
the computation of her longevity pay;
(3) DENY the request of Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Femando that her
services as COMELEC Commissioner be included in the computation of her longevity
pay;
(4) DENY the request of Associate Justice Angelita Gacutan that her services as
NLRC Commissioner be included in the computation. of her longevity pay from the
time she started her judicial service;
(5) DENY with finality the motion for reconsideration of Associate Justice Vicente S.E.
Veloso for lack of merit; and
(6) DIRECT the Clerk of this Court to proceed with the handling of granted longevity
pay benefits under Section 42 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, pursuant to the guidelines
and declarations outlined in the Moving On portion of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 82511 March 3, 1992
GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.
Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.
Gerardo S. Alansalon for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close association with Delfin
Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982, private respondent was employed by
Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also
employed by petitioner as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with
whom private respondent was allegedly very close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that company equipment and spare
parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the
investigation of the latter's activities. The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the
company's internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered into a
partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with Richard A. Yambao,
owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often
recommended by Saldivar. The report also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's
missing Fedders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authorization and also
connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner was recovered
only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against Saldivar. 1
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that Imelda Salazar violated
company reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the company's
interests. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between
Yambao and Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and
whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company placed private respondent
Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1) month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving
her thirty (30) days within which to, explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanations
three (3) days later or on October 12, 1984 private respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include illegal dismissal,
vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in
writing that effective November 8, 1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her)
inability to refute and disprove these findings. 2
After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985, ordered petitioner
company to reinstate private respondent to her former or equivalent position and to pay her full
backwages and other benefits she would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal.
Petitioner was also ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations, Commission in the questioned
resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the
reinstatement of private respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two (2) years and
deleted the award for moral damages. 4
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that the suspension and subsequent dismissal of private respondent were
illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two (2) years' backwages.
On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.
The inestigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict
with his position as technical operations manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action
on any employee closely, associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further
impelled by th.e discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment
private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances, preventive suspension
was the proper remedial recourse available to the company pending Salazar's investigation.
By itself, preventive suspension does, not signify that the company has adjudged the
employee guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary
measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property pending investigation any
alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee.5
Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated Salazar's right to due
process when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the fault, lay with private respondent
when she ignored petitioner's memorandum of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity
to present (her) side to the Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department
and filed her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to evaluate
her side of the controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive suspension, we hold that her
eventual separation from employment was not for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to "make whole" the victim
who has not merely lost her job which, under settled Jurisprudence, is a property right of which
a person is not to be deprived without due process, but also the compensation that should
have accrued to her during the period when she was unemployed?
Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:
Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when
authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
the Labor Code:
Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employments, the employer
shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause as
provided in the Labor Code or when authorized by existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall by entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to
backwages."7 (Emphasis supplied)
Before proceeding any furthers, it needs must be recalled that the present Constitution has
gone further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to
marginalized groups of society, including labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of several
articulate Commissioners of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that
a whole new Article emerged on Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other
things, to "protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth
and political power for the common good." 8 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it
leads the other areas of concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of
such topics as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Roform and Housing,
Health, Women, Role and Rights of Poople's Organizations and Human Rights. 9
The opening paragraphs on Labor states
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized
and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the
right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits is may be provided by law.10(Emphasis supplied)
Compare this with the sole.provision on Labor in the 1973 Constitution under the Article an
Declaration of Principles and State Policies that provides:
Sec. 9. The state shall afford protection to labor, promote full employment and
equality in employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex,
 race, or creed, and regulate the relations between workers and employers.
The State shall ensure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective
baegaining, security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The
State may provide for compulsory arbitration. 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the rights of labor which the
State is mandated to protect. But there is no gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers
of the present Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford the sector "full
protection," at least greater protection than heretofore accorded them, regardless of the
geographical location of the workers and whether they are organized or not.
It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who substantially
contributed to the present formulation of the protection to labor provision and proposed that
the same be incorporated in the Article on Social Justice and not just in the Article on
Declaration of Principles and State Policies "in the light of the special importance that we are
giving now to social justice and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social
justice in national development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor provisions in our Constitution
and the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the right of an employee not to be dismissed from
his job except for a just or authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater importance
under the 1987 Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the article on
Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been translated into law in the Labor Code.
Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the
aggrieved employee, or on the other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the
lawfulness or justness of his act of dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided in
Article 279 should find, application. Consonant with this liberalized stance vis-a-vis labor, the
legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 2,
1989 that amended said Article to remove any possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have
generated which watered down the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection." 13
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a
legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled
to reinstatement, but ay well, to full backwages." 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of
backwages is, in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost
her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, conditione
positions etc. from which one had been removed" 15 and in the latter, to give her back the
income lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to the past, would
perforce make her "whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when reinstatement has not
been forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee finds himself on the outside looking in.
Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement
under the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be
effected in view of the long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because of the realities
of the situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest; " 17 or that
reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best interests of the
parties involved; 19 or that the company would be prejudiced by the workers' continued
employment; 20 or that it will not serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts have
transpired which make execution on that score unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing
extent, due to the resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations"
or "irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22
In lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages and
separation pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24
In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the first place the wording of
the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . ." 25 Under the
principlesof statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must
be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning
rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a
statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it
differently. 26 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to:have used
words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the
statute.27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure. Neither does the provision admit of any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court,
there may be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should
be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing
strained relations between the employer and the employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned occupies a position where he
enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer; and that it is likely that if reinstated, an
atmosphere of antipathy and antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the
efficiency and productivity of the employee concerned.
A few examples, will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the above principles: where
the employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as such, enjoys the full trust and
confidence of top management; 28 or is the Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the
bank where he works; 29 or is an organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the
union's efforts to organize the workers in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a
warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose primary purpose is to facilitate and
maximize voluntary gifts. by foreign individuals and organizations to the Philippines; 31 or is a
manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwisey
reinstatement can never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered
between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature. 33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's right;
otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily separated from the service,
by merely paying his separation pay on the pretext that his relationship with his employer had
already become strained. 34
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as systems analyst is one
that may be characterized as a position of trust and confidence such that if reinstated, it may
well lead to strained relations between employer and employee. Hence, this does not
constitute an exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who has
been unlawfully dismissed.
On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by engaging in
transactions that may have created conflict of interest situations? Petitioner GMCR points out
that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits its employees from involving themselves with
any company that has business dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent
Salazar signed as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in
turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed. herself in an untenable
position as far as petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such a circumstance did not
create a conflict of interests situation. As a systems analyst, Salazar was very far removed
from operations involving the procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the
development of systems and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other words,
Salazar did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval and purchase of supplies and
company assets.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As
we have held countless times, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for
terminations it must rest an some basis which must be convincingly established. 35 An
employee who not be dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's
allegation that since Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed
reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its averment that
Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was probably true, do not pass this Court's
test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of disloyalty of an employee, neither should we
dismiss him on the basis of suspicion derived from speculative inferences.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would be most inequitous
because the bulk of the findings centered principally oh her friend's alleged thievery and
anomalous transactions as technical operations' support manager. Said report merely
insinuated that in view of Salazar's special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had
direct knowledge of Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private
respondent is wanting from the records.
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had already
resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the opportunity to refute
management's findings, the report remained obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence
obtained by petitioner dealt principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having
had a chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination should
have been carried out to ascertain whether or not there existed independent legal grounds to
hold Salatar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the
records, we find her to have been unlawfully dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National Labor Relations
Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to
REINSTATE private respondent Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her
salary for a period of two (2) years only.
This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., concurs in the result.
Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Padilla, JJ., took no part.
G.R. No. 109445 November 7, 1994
FELICITO BASBACIO, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON in his
capacity as Secretary of Justice, respondent.
Amparita S. Sta. Maria for petitioner.
MENDOZA, J.:
This case presents for determination the scope of the State's liability under Rep. Act No. 7309,
which among other things provides compensation for persons who are unjustly accused,
convicted and imprisoned but on appeal are acquitted and ordered released.
Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo Balderrama, were convicted of
frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and
the wounding of the latter's wife Florida and his son Tirso, at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu,
Albay, on the night of June 26, 1988. The motive for the killing was apparently a land dispute
between the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to
imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled.
Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner's appeal proceeded to judgment,
however, as the appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief.
On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision acquitting petitioner on the ground
that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He had been
pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion of Balderrama when the latter
barged into their hut and without warning started shooting, but the appellate court ruled that
because petitioner did nothing more, petitioner's presence at the scene of the crime was
insufficient to show conspiracy.
Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which
provides for the payment of compensation to "any person who was unjustly accused,
convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal."1 The
claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but the claim was
denied on the ground that while petitioner's presence at the scene of the killing was not
sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood
between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted
murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was "probably guilty."
On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board's ruling. Said the Secretary of
Justice in his resolution dated March 11, 1993:
It is believed therefore that the phrase "any person . . . unjustly accused,
convicted and imprisoned" in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to an
individual who was wrongly accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not
commit, thereby making him "a victim of unjust imprisonment." In the instant
case, however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be deemed such a victim since a
reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that his exculpation is not based
on his innocence, but upon, in effect, a finding of reasonable doubt.
Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309,
however, provides for review by certiorari of the decisions of the Secretary of Justice.
Nonetheless, in view of the importance of the question tendered, the Court resolved to treat
the petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent's ruling that to be able to recover under sec.
3(a) of the law the claimant must on appeal be found to be innocent of the crimes of which he
was convicted in the trial court. Through counsel he contends that the language of sec. 3(a) is
clear and does not call for interpretation. The "mere fact that the claimant was imprisoned for a
crime which he was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust in itself," he contends. To deny
his claim because he was not declared innocent would be to say that his imprisonment for two
years while his appeal was pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one
requirement for conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond reasonable doubt. If the
prosecution fails to present such proof, the presumption that the accused is innocent stands
and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he be declared innocent of the crime
before he can recover compensation for his imprisonment.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted
on appeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he was "unjustly convicted" by
the trial court. Such a reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner's professed canon of
construction that when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural
meaning. It leaves out of the provision in question the qualifying word "unjustly" so that the
provision would simply read: "The following may file claims for compensation before the
Board: (a) any person who was accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by
virtue of a judgment of acquittal."
But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be "unjustly accused, convicted [and] imprisoned." The
fact that his conviction is reversed and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the
previous conviction was "unjust." An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and
his conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons, be set aside. For example, he
may be acquitted not because he is innocent of the crime charged but because of reasonable
doubt, in which case he may be found civilly liable to the complainant, because while the
evidence against him does not satisfy the quantum of proof required for conviction, it may
nonetheless be sufficient to sustain a civil action for damages. 2 In one case the accused, an
alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the
offended parties who consented to have sex with him. Nonetheless the accused was ordered
to pay moral and exemplary damages and ordered deported.3 In such a case to pay the
accused compensation for having been "unjustly convicted" by the trial court would be utterly
inconsistent with his liability to the complainant. Yet to follow petitioner's theory such an
accused would be entitled to compensation under sec. 3(a).
The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been intended as evidence of
innocence of the accused but only to shift the burden of proof that he is guilty to the
prosecution. If "accusation is not synonymous with guilt,"4so is the presumption of innocence
not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that the accused is presumed to be innocent in order
to place on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
is guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is convicted that he has
been "unjustly convicted." As this Court held in a case:
Though we are acquitting the appellant for the crime of rape with homicide, we
emphasize that we are not ruling that he is innocent or blameless. It is only
the constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution
to build an airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of
unlawful conduct do not exist.5
To say then that an accused has been "unjustly convicted" has to do with the manner of his
conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be acquitted because he
did not commit the crime, but that does
not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an
"unjust conviction." If his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the
conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say
as does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the
innocence of the accused.
The phrase "unjustly convicted" has the same meaning as "knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment" in art. 204 of the Revised Penal Code. What this Court held in In re Rafael
C. Climaco 6 applies:
In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, it must be shown beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it
is contrary to law or is not supported by the evidence, and the same was
made with conscious and deliberate intent to do an injustice . . . .
To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust judgment by reason
of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown, according to
Groizard, that although he has acted without malice, he failed to observe in
the performance of his duty, that diligence, prudence and care which the law
is entitled to exact in the rendering of any public service. Negligence and
ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be
explained by a reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists in
the legal concept when it implies a manifest injustice, that is to say, such
injustice which cannot be explained by a reasonable interpretation, even
though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the
contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and
indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept.
Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused
is unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust accusation. The accused must have been
"unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is
important to note this because if from its inception the prosecution of the accused has been
wrongful, his conviction by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the
prosecution is not malicious any conviction even though based on less than the required
quantum of proof in criminal cases may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.
The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case in
court is not whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only whether "there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and the accused is probably
guilty thereof." Hence, an accusation which is based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust
accusation and a conviction based on such degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust
judgment but only an erroneous one. The remedy for such error is appeal.
In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that petitioner's conviction by the
trial court was wrongful or that it was the product of malice or gross ignorance or gross
negligence. To the contrary, the court had reason to believe that petitioner and his co-accused
were in league, because petitioner is the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was
petitioner who bore the victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and
his coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and forced their way into it.
The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because there was no proof that he
did or say anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court.
Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito Basbacio to
have committed any act at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having
said anything at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having committed
anything in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the crimes charged against
the defendants. It seems to be a frail and flimsy basis on which to conclude
that conspiracy existed between actual killer Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito
Basbacio to commit murder and two frustrated murders on that night of June
26, 1988. It may be asked: where was the coming together of the two
defendants to an agreement to commit the crimes of murder and frustrated
murder on two counts? Where was Basbacio's contribution to the commission
of the said crimes? Basbacio was — as the record shows — nothing but part
of the dark shadows of that night. . . .
One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy may be shown by concert of
action and other circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law? Why did they
apparently flee together? And what about the fact that there was bad blood between petitioner
and the victim Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer be passed upon in view of the
acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his claim that he had been unjustly
accused, convicted and imprisoned before he was released because of his acquittal on
appeal. We hold that in view of these circumstances respondent Secretary of Justice and the
Board of Claims did not commit a grave abuse of its discretion in disallowing petitioner's claim
for compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno,
Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
# Footnotes
1 The statute in pertinent parts provide:
Sec. 3. Who may File Claims. — The following may file claims for compensation
before the Board:
a) any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently
released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal;
b) any person who was unjustly detained and released without being charged;
c) any victim of arbitrary or illegal detention by the authorities as defined in the
Revised Penal Code under a final judgment of the court; and
d) any person who is a victim of violent crimes. For purposes of this Act, violent crimes
shall include rape and shall likewise refer to offenses committed with malice which
resulted in death or serious physical and/or psychological injuries, permanent
incapacity or disability, insanity, abortion, serious trauma, or committed with torture,
cruelty or barbarity.
Sec. 4. Award Ceiling. — For victims of unjust imprisonment or detention, the
compensation shall be based on the number of months of imprisonment or detention
and every fraction thereof shall be considered one month: Provided, however, That in
no case shall such compensation exceed One thousand pesos (P1,000.00) per
month.
In all other cases, the maximum amount for which the Board may approve a claim
shall not exceed Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) or the amount necessary to
reimburse the claimant the expenses incurred for hospitalization, medical treatment,
loss of wage, loss of support or other expenses directly related to the injury, whichever
is lower. This is without prejudice to the right of the claimant to seek other remedies
under existing laws.
2 The Civil Code provides in Art. 29: "When the accused in a criminal prosecution is
acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a
civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action
requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court
may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint
should be found to be malicious.
"If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the
court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be
inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground."
G.R. No. 109835 November 22, 1993
JMM PROMOTIONS & MANAGEMENT, INC., petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ULPIANO L. DE LOS
SANTOS, respondent.
Don P. Porciuncula for petitioner.
Eulogio Nones, Jr. for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The sole issue submitted in this case is the validity of the order of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission dated October 30, 1992, dismissing the petitioner's appeal from a
decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on the ground of failure to
post the required appeal bond.1
The respondent cited the second paragraph of Article 223 of the Labor Code as amended,
providing that:
In the case of a judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond
issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in
an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.
and Rule VI, Section 6 of the new Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended, reading as
follows:
Sec. 6. Bond — In case the decision of a Labor Arbiter involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of
a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited
by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the
monetary award.
The petitioner contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these
rules to decisions rendered by the POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in
the case of licensed recruiters for overseas employment because they are already required
under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules not only to pay a license fee of P30,000
but also to post a cash bond of P100,000 and a surety bond of P50,000, thus:
Upon approval of the application, the applicant shall pay a license fee of
P30,000. It shall also post a cash bond of P100,000 and surety bond of
P50,000 from a bonding company acceptable to the Administration and duly
accredited by the Insurance Commission. The bonds shall answer for all valid
and legal claims arising from violations of the conditions for the grant and use
of the license, and/or accreditation and contracts of employment. The bonds
shall likewise guarantee compliance with the provisions of the Code and its
implementing rules and regulations relating to recruitment and placement, the
Rules of the Administration and relevant issuances of the Department and all
liabilities which the Administration may impose. The surety bonds shall include
the condition that the notice to the principal is notice to the surety and that any
judgment against the principal in connection with matters falling under POEA's
jurisdiction shall be binding and conclusive on the surety. The surety bonds
shall be co-terminus with the validity period of license. (Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the petitioner claims it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000 with the
Philippine National Bank in compliance with Section 17, Rule II, Book II of the same Rule, "to
primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment
violations or money claims."
Required to comment, the Solicitor General sustains the appeal bond requirement but suggest
that the rules cited by the NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiters and not
of the POEA. Appeals from decisions of the POEA, he says, are governed by the following
provisions of Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules:
Sec. 5. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. The appeal shall be filed within
the reglementary period as provided in Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under
oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a
cash or surety bond as provided in Section 6 of this Rule; shall be
accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds
relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a
statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision
and/or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.
A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisites
aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for perfecting an appeal.
Sec. 6. Bond. In case the decision of the Administration involves a monetary
award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of
a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited
by the Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award.
(Emphasis supplied)
The question is, having posted the total bond of P150,000 and placed in escrow the amount of
P200,000 as required by the POEA Rules, was the petitioner still required to post an appeal
bond to perfect its appeal from a decision of the POEA to the NLRC?
It was.
The POEA Rules are clear. A reading thereof readily shows that in addition to the cash and
surety bonds and the escrow money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA. Obviously, the appeal
bond is intended to further insure the payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee
if it is eventually affirmed on appeal to the NLRC.
It is true that the cash and surety bonds and the money placed in escrow are supposed to
guarantee the payment of all valid and legal claims against the employer, but these claims are
not limited to monetary awards to employees whose contracts of employment have been
violated. The POEA can go against these bonds also for violations by the recruiter of the
conditions of its license, the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing rules, E.O. 247
(reorganizing POEA) and the POEA Rules, as well as the settlement of other liabilities the
recruiter may incur.
As for the escrow agreement, it was presumably intended to provide for a standing fund, as it
were, to be used only as a last resort and not to be reduced with the enforcement against it of
every claim of recruited workers that may be adjudged against the employer. This amount may
not even be enough to cover such claims and, even if it could initially, may eventually be
exhausted after satisfying other subsequent claims.
As it happens, the decision sought to be appealed grants a monetary award of about
P170,000 to the dismissed employee, the herein private respondent. The standby guarantees
required by the POEA Rules would be depleted if this award were to be enforced not against
the appeal bond but against the bonds and the escrow money, making them inadequate for
the satisfaction of the other obligations the recruiter may incur.
Indeed, it is possible for the monetary award in favor of the employee to exceed the amount of
P350,000, which is the sum of the bonds and escrow money required of the recruiter.
It is true that these standby guarantees are not imposed on local employers, as the petitioner
observes, but there is a simple explanation for this distinction. Overseas recruiters are subject
to more stringent requirement because of the special risks to which our workers abroad are
subjected by their foreign employers, against whom there is usually no direct or effective
recourse. The overseas recruiter is solidarily liable with a foreign employer. The bonds and the
escrow money are intended to insure more care on the part of the local agent in its choice of
the foreign principal to whom our overseas workers are to be sent.
It is a principle of legal hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute (or a set of rules as in this
case), care should be taken that every part thereof be given effect, on the theory that it was
enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions. Ut res
magis valeat quam pereat. 2 Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by
Section 6 of the aforementioned POEA Rule should be disregarded because of the earlier
bonds and escrow money it has posted. The petitioner would in effect nullify Section 6 as a
superfluity but we do not see any such redundancy; on the contrary, we find that Section 6
complements Section 4 and Section 17. The rule is that a construction that would render a
provision inoperative should be avoided; instead, apparently inconsistent provisions should be
reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and harmonious whole.
Accordingly, we hold that in addition to the monetary obligations of the overseas recruiter
prescribed in Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and the escrow agreement under
Section 17 of the same Rule, it is necessary to post the appeal bond required under Section 6,
Rule V, Book VII of the POEA Rules, as a condition for perfecting an appeal from a decision of
the POEA.
Every intendment of the law must be interpreted in favor of the working class, conformably to
the mandate of the Constitution. By sustaining rather than annulling the appeal bond as a
further protection to the claimant employee, this Court affirms once again its commitment to
the interest of labor.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Davide and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J, is on leave.
THIRD DIVISION
---------------------------------
G.R. No. 191894 July 15, 2015
DANILO A. DUNCANO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (2nd DIVISION), and HON. OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules) with prayer for issuance
of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order seeks to reverse and set aside the
August 18, 2009 Resolution1 and February 8, 2010 Order2 of respondent Sandiganbayan
Second Division in Criminal Case No. SB-09-CRM-0080, which denied petitioner's Motion to
Dismiss on the ground of la9k of jurisdiction.
The facts are plain and undisputed.
Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 6758.3 On March 24, 2009,4 the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the
Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section
11 of R.A. No. 6713,5 allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILODUNCANO y
ACIDO, a high ranking public officer, being the Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is under an obligation to
accomplish and submit declarations under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth and
financial and business interests, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to
disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year
2002, his financial and business interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and
Don Plus Trading of which he and his family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993
Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO
which are part of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Prior to his arraignment, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss With Prayer to Defer the Issuance
of Warrant of Arrest7before respondent Sandiganbayan Second Division. As the OSP alleged,
he admitted that he is a Regional Director with Salary Grade 26. Citing Inding v.
Sandiganbayan8 and Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.,9 he asserted that under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1606, as amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249,10 the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction to try and hear the case because he is an official of the
executive branch occupying the position of a Regional Director but with a compensation that is
classified as below Salary Grade 27.
In its Opposition,11 the OSP argued that a reading of Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the subject
law would clearly show that the qualification as to Salary Grade 27 and higher applies only to
officials of the executive branch other than the Regional Director and those specifically
enumerated. This is so since the term "Regional Director" and "higher" are separated by the
conjunction "and," which signifies that these two positions are different, apart and distinct,
words but are conjoined together "relating one to the other" to give effect to the purpose of the
law. The fact that the position of Regional Director was specifically mentioned without
indication as to its salary grade signifies the lawmakers’ intention that officials occupying such
position, regardless of salary grade, fall within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. This issue, it is claimed, was already resolved in Inding. Finally, the OSP
contended that the filing of the motion to dismiss is premature considering that the
Sandiganbayan has yet to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the accused.
Still not to be outdone, petitioner invoked the applicability of Cuyco v. Sandiganbayan 12 and
Organo v. Sandiganbayan13 in his rejoinder.
On August 18, 2009, the Sandiganbayan Second Division promulgated its Resolution,
disposing: WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES the instant
Motion to Dismiss for being devoid of merit. Let a Warrant of Arrest be therefore issued
against the accused.
SO ORDERED.14
The respondent court ruled that the position of Regional Director is one of those exceptions
where the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction even if such position is not Salary Grade 27. It was
opined that Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249 unequivocally provides that respondent court
has jurisdiction over officials of the executive branch of the government occupying the position
of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Salary Grade 27 and higher, of R.A.
No. 6758, including those officials who are expressly enumerated in subparagraphs (a) to (g).
In support of the ruling, this Court’s pronouncements in Indingand Binay v.
Sandiganbayan15 were cited.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied;16 Hence, this petition.
Instead of issuing a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, the Court
required respondents to file a comment on the petition without necessarily giving due course
thereto.17 Upon compliance of the OSP, a Rejoinder (supposedly a Reply) was filed by
petitioner.
At the heart of the controversy is the determination of whether, according to P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by Section 4 (A) (1) of R.A No. 8249, only Regional Directors with Salary Grade of
27 and higher, as classified under R.A. No. 6758, fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Arguing that he is not included among the public officials specifically
enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g) of the law and heavily relying as well on Cuyco,
petitioner insists that respondent court lacks jurisdiction over him, who is merely a Regional
Director with Salary Grade 26. On the contrary, the OSP maintains that a Regional Director,
irrespective of salary grade, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. We find merit in the petition.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973
Constitution.18 By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to
Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued P.D. No. 1486.19 The decree was later amended by P.D. No. 1606,20Section 20 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,21 P.D. No. 1860,22 and P.D. No. 1861.23
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in
Section 4, Article XI thereof.24 Aside from Executive Order Nos. 1425 and 14-a,26 and R.A.
7080,27 which expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further
modified by R.A. No. 7975,28 R.A. No. 8249,29 and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.30
For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which
states: SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
"A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at
the time of the commission of the offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan,
and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department
heads;
"(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors
in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade ‘27’ and up under
the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
"B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
"C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
x x x"
Based on the afore-quoted, those that fall within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
are: (1) officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27 or higher, and (2) officials
specifically enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades. 31 While
the first part of Section 4 (A) covers only officials of the executive branch with Salary Grade 27
and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may
not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.32
That the phrase "otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher" qualifies "regional director and
higher" is apparent from the Sponsorship Speech of Senator Raul S. Roco on Senate Bill Nos.
1353and 844, which eventually became R.A. Nos. 7975 and 8249, respectively:
As proposed by the Committee, the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction over the
cases assigned to it only in instances where one or more of the principal accused are officials
occupying the positions of regional director and higher or are otherwise classified as Grade 27
and higher by the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the offense. The
jurisdiction, therefore, refers to a certain grade upwards, which shall remain with the
Sandiganbayan.33 (Emphasis supplied)
To speed up trial in the Sandiganbayan, Republic Act No. 7975 was enacted for that Court to
concentrate on the "larger fish" and leave the "small fry" to the lower courts. This law became
effective on May 6, 1995 and it provided a two-pronged solution to the clogging of the dockets
of that court, to wit:
It divested the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over public officials whose salary grades were at
Grade "26" or lower, devolving thereby these cases to the lower courts, and retaining the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan only over public officials whose salary grades were at Grade
"27" or higher and over other specific public officials holding important positions in government
regardless of salary grade; x x x34 (Emphasis supplied)
The legislative intent is to allow the Sandiganbayan to devote its time and expertise to big-time
cases involving the so-called "big fishes" in the government rather than those accused who
are of limited means who stand trial for "petty crimes," the so-called "small fry," which, in turn,
helps the court decongest its dockets.35
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law. 36 In this
category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.37 The specific inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification
relating to "officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989."38 As ruled in Inding:
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is
occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be
properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the principal accused is occupying a
position lower than SG 27 and not among those specifically included in the enumeration in
Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials specifically included in
Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the
proper trial courts "where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding
to SG 27 or higher." By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule,
after all, in statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should not
be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a
harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of
a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought
which gives effect to the whole of the statute – its every word.39
Thus, to cite a few, We have held that a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, 40 a
department manager of the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation (Philhealth),41 a student
regent of the University of the Philippines,42 and a Head of the Legal Department and Chief of
the Documentation with corresponding ranks of Vice-Presidents and Assistant Vice-President
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-
RSBS)43 fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner is not an executive official with Salary Grade 27 or higher. Neither does he hold any
position particularly enumerated in Section 4 (A) (1) (a) to (g). As he correctly argues, his case
is, in fact, on all fours with Cuyco.1avvphi1Therein, the accused was the Regional Director of
the Land Transportation Office, Region IX, Zamboanga City, but at the time of the commission
of the crime in 1992, his position was classified as Director II with Salary Grade 26. 44It was
opined: Petitioner contends that at the time of the commission of the offense in 1992, he was
occupying the position of Director II, Salary Grade 26, hence, jurisdiction over the cases falls
with the Regional Trial Court.
We sustain petitioner's contention.
The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying
positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade "27" or higher, under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to
their office.
In ruling in favor of its jurisdiction, even though petitioner admittedly occupied the position of
Director II with Salary Grade "26" under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), the Sandiganbayan incurred in serious error of jurisdiction, and
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in suspending petitioner
from office, entitling petitioner to the reliefs prayed for.45
In the same way, a certification issued by the OIC – Assistant Chief, Personnel Division of the
BIR shows that, although petitioner is a Regional Director of the BIR, his position is classified
as Director II with Salary Grade 26.46
There is no merit in the OSP’s allegation that the petition was prematurely filed on the ground
that respondent court has not yet acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner. Records
disclose that when a warrant of arrest was issued by respondent court, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered and posted a cash bond on September 17, 2009.Also, he was arraigned on April
14, 2010,prior to the filing of the petition on April 30, 2010.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The
August 18, 2009 Resolution and February 8, 2010 Order of the Sandiganbayan Second
Division, which denied petitioner's Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, are
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 104712 May 6, 1992
MANUEL T. DE GUIA, in his capacity as Councilor of the Municipality of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition assailing the validity and the enforcement by
respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) of its RESOLUTION NO. 2313, adopting
rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one (1) legislative district and the
Sangguniang Bayan of municipalities in the Metro Manila Area for the preparation of the
Project of District Apportionment by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Election
Registrars (Annex "A", Petition), RESOLUTION NO. 2379, approving the Project of District
Apportionment submitted pursuant to Resolution No. 2313 (Annex "B", Petition), and
RESOLUTION UND. 92-010 holding that pars. (a), (b) and (c), and the first sentence of par.
(d), all of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, apply to the May 11, 1992 elections (Annex "C", Petition).
Petitioner Manuel T. De Guia is an incumbent Member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, having been elected in the January 1988 local
elections. He prays, more particularly, for reversal of the position of respondent insofar as it
affects the municipality of Parañaque and all the other municipalities in the Metro Manila Area.
He claims that the second proviso of par. (c), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, which requires the
apportionment into districts of said municipalities does not specify when the members of their
Sangguniang Bayan will be elected by district. He would consequently lean on par. (d) of Sec.
3, which immediately succeeds par. (c), to support his view that the elected members of these
municipalities mentioned in par. (c) should continue to be elected at large in the May 11, 1992
elections.
Paragraph (d) states that "[F]or purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective
members of the Sangguniang Panlunsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in
accordance with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they
shall be elected by district." Petitioner therefore insists that the elected members of the
Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque fall under this category so that they should continue to be
elected at large until the 1995 regular elections.
Before addressing the crux of the controversy, the Court observes that petitioner does not
allege that he is running for reelection, much less, that he is prejudiced by the election, by
district, in Parañaque. As such, he does
not appear to have a locus standi, a standing in law, personal or substantial interest. 1 He
does not also allege any legal right that has been violated by respondent. If for this alone,
petitioner does not appear to have any cause of action.
However, considering the importance of the issue involved, concerning as it does the political
exercise of qualified voters affected by the apportionment, and petitioner alleging abuse of
discretion and violation of the Constitution by respondent, We resolve to brush aside the
question of procedural infirmity, even as We perceive the petition to be one of declaratory
relief. We so held similarly through Mr. Justice Edgardo L. Paras in Osmeña v. Commission on
Elections. 2
Now on the meat of the dispute.
On November 18, 1991, Congress passed R.A. 7166, signed into law by the President on
November 26, 1991. It is "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and Local Elections and
for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes." At issue
in this case is the proper interpretation of Sec. 3 thereof which provides:
Sec. 3. Elections of Members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan. — The elective members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected as
follows:
(a) For provinces with two (2) or more legislative districts, the elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall be elected by legislative districts . . .
(b) For provinces with only one (1) legislative district, the Commission shall divide
them into two (2) districts for purposes of electing the members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan . . .
(c) The number and election of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and
Sangguniang Bayan in the Metro Manila Area, City of Cebu, City of Davao and any
other city with two (2) or more legislative districts shall continue to be governed by the
provisions of Sections 2 and 3 of Republic Act No. 6636 . . . Provided, further, That,
the Commission shall divide each of the municipalities in Metro Manila Area into two
(2) districts by barangay for purposes of representation in the Sangguniang Bayan
. . . . and,
(d) For purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in
accordance with existing laws. However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995,
they shall be elected by district . . . .
On November 20, 1991, respondent COMELEC, invoking authority of the Constitution, the
Omnibus Election Code, R.A. 6636, R.A. 6646 and R.A. 7166, 3 issued Resolution No. 2313
and the subsequent resolutions in question.
On February 20, 1992, in view of the perceived ambiguity in the meaning of par. (d),
particularly in relation to par. (c), Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, petitioner filed with COMELEC a Motion
for Clarification of its Resolution No. 2313 inquiring whether the members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Parañaque and the other municipalities of Metro Manila enumerated therein, which
are all single-district municipalities, would be elected by district in May 11, 1992 or in the 1995
regular elections.
Meanwhile, on March 3, 1992 COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2379 approving the
guidelines submitted by the Provincial Election Supervisors and Municipal Election Registrars
concerned pursuant to Resolution No. 2313, and stating therein its purpose in recommending
to Congress the districting/apportionment of Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
Bayan seats, i.e., to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992
synchronized elections. In this Project of Apportionment, Parañaque together with the other
twelve (12) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area was divided into two (2) districts with six (6)
elective councilors for each district.
On March 10, 1992, COMELEC resolved petitioner's Motion for Clarification by interpreting
Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, to mean that the election of elective members of the Sangguniang Bayan,
by district, of the thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area shall apply in the May
11, 1992 elections (Resolution UND. 92-010, prom. March 10, 1992). Petitioner says that he
received copy of Resolution UND. 92-010 on March 13, 1992.
On April 7, 1992, apparently not satisfied with this third Resolution of COMELEC, petitioner
filed the instant petition asserting that under par. (d), Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166 the elective
members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and the Sangguniang Bayan, for purposes of the
May 11, 1992 regular elections, shall be elected at large in accordance with existing laws. He
would include in this class of sanggunian members to be elected at large those of the
municipality of Parañaque.
Petitioner therefore imputes grave abuse of discretion to COMELEC in promulgating
Resolution No. 2313, Resolution No. 2379 and Resolution UND. 92-010 which clarifies,
contrary to his view, that the district apportionment of the municipalities in the Metro Manila
Area is applicable to the May 11, 1992 regular elections.
We have carefully examined pars. (a), (b), (c) and (d) of Sec. 3, R.A. 7166, and its precursor
bills on synchronized elections, Senate Bill No. 1861 and House Bill No. 34811, and We
realize the web of confusion generated by the seeming abstruseness in the language of the
law. Some framers of the law were even fazed at the empirical implications of some of its
provisions, particularly Sec. 3 thereof, and they admitted in fact that said provisions were
susceptible of varied interpretations, as borne by the sponsorship and explanatory speeches
now spread in the Journals of Congress. Hence, We can understand why petitioner would
interpret Sec. 3 as he would. But if we pursue his course, we may conclude in absurdity
because then there would have been no reason for R.A. 7166 to single out the single-district
provinces referred to in par. (b), and the municipalities in the Metro Manila Area mentioned in
the second proviso of par. (c), to be apportioned at once into two (2) districts each if the
members of their respective sanggunian after all would still be elected at large as they were in
the 1988 elections.
No law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. We must
therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has
oft been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely
expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact
the statute. If the statute needs construction, as it does in the present case, the most dominant
in that process is the purpose of the act. 4 Statutes should be construed in the light of the
object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, 5 and they should be given
such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits
intended. 6 A construction should be rejected that gives to the language used in a statute a
meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted, and that
tends to defeat the ends which are sought to be attained by the enactment. 7
The reason for the promulgation of R.A. 7166 is shown in the explanatory note of Senate Bill
No. 1861 which states in part:
This bill proposes to set the national and local elections for May 11, 1992, and provide
for the necessary implementing details. It also endorses reforms and measures to
ensure the conduct of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
Specifically, it seeks to: (1) Reduce the number of positions to be voted for by
providing therein that the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan be elected not at large, but by district . . . .
That respondent COMELEC is cognizant of this legislative intent of R.A. 7166 is
reflected in the "WHEREAS" clauses constituting the preamble to Resolution No.
2379. Thus —
 WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections, in order to reduce the number of
candidates to be voted for in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections recommended,
among others, to the Congress of the Philippines, the districting/apportionment of
sangguniang panlungsod and sangguniang bayan seats;
WHEREAS, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act 7166, and approved
by the President of the Philippines on November 26, 1991, adopting among others,
the recommendation of the Commission on Elections aforestated;
WHEREAS, pursuant to, and in implementation of Republic Act 7166, particularly
Section 3 thereof, the Commission promulgated Resolution No. 2313, directing the
Provincial Election Supervisors and Election Registrars concerned to submit, after
consultation, public hearings, and consensus-taking with the different sectors in the
community, the Project of District Apportionment of single legislative-district provinces
and municipalities in the Metro Manila area;
WHEREAS, the established criteria/guidelines in the determination of the district
apportionment are as follows: a. compactness, contiguity and adjacentness of
territory; b. apportionment shall be based on the 1990 census of population; c. no
municipality, in the case of provinces, and no barangay, in the case of cities and
municipalities, shall be fragmented or apportioned into different districts.
This avowed policy of having sanggunian members elected by district is also manifest from the
four corners of Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. 8 Thus, a careful analysis of the provisions of Sec. 3
shows that the purpose of districting/apportionment of the sanggunian seats is to reduce the
number of positions to be voted for in the May 11, 1992, synchronized elections and ensure
the efficiency of electoral process. Considering that the single-district provinces and the
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which are all single-districts, and under pars. (b) and
(c) have already been apportioned into two (2) districts, they will henceforth be electing the
members of their Sangguniang Panlalawigan and Sangguniang Bayan by district in the
coming May 11, 1992, elections, although under par. (d), the single-district cities and all the
municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area which are all likewise single-districts, will have to
continue electing at large the members of their Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang
Bayan as they have yet to be apportioned. But beginning the regular elections of 1995, they
will all have to be elected by district. By then, COMELEC would have had enough time to
apportion the single-district cities and the municipalities outside the Metro Manila Area.
As they now stand in relation to the districting/apportionment of local government units for
purposes of election under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166, it is clear that: (1) for provinces with two (2) or
more legislative districts contemplated in par. (a), they shall continue to be elected by district;
(2) for provinces with single legislative districts, as they have already been apportioned into
two (2) districts each under par. (b), they shall henceforth be elected likewise by district; (3) for
cities with two (2) or more legislative districts, e.g., the cities of Manila, Cebu and Davao, they
shall also continue to be elected by district under the first part of par. (c); and (4) for the
thirteen (13) municipalities in the Metro Manila Area, which have already been apportioned
into two (2) districts each under the second proviso of par. (c), they shall likewise be elected
by district in the regular elections of May 11, 1992.
Then, that should leave us the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the
Sangguniang Bayan of the municipalities outside Metro Manila, which remain single-districts
not having been ordered apportioned under Sec. 3 of R.A. 7166. They will have to continue to
be elected at large in the May 11, 1992, elections, although starting 1995 they shall all be
elected by district to effect the full implementation of the letter and spirit of R.A. 7166. That is
the true import of par. (d). Consequently, as We view it, where he stands, petitioner must fall.
WHEREFORE, finding no abuse of discretion, much less grave, on the part of respondent,
and for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-
Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 78687 January 31, 1989
ELENA SALENILLAS AND BERNARDINO SALENILLAS, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and HONORABLE RAYMUNDO SEVA, JUDGE OF
BRANCH 38 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CAMARINES NORTE and WILLIAM
GUERRA, respondents.
Jose L. Lapak for petitioners.
Jose T. Atienza for private respondent.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari which seeks the reversal and setting aside of the
decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 dismissing the petition for certiorari against Judge
Raymundo Seva of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Norte and the private respondent,
William Guerra, involves a pure question of law i.e., the coverage and application of Section
119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, known otherwise as the Public Land Act.
The facts are undisputed.
The property subject matter of the case was formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765, in favor of the spouses,
Florencia H. de Enciso and Miguel Enciso. The said original certificate of title was inscribed in
the Registration Book for the Province of Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961. On
February 28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the
property in favor of the petitioners, the spouses Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas for
a consideration of P900.00. Petitioner Elena Salenillas is a daughter of the Encisos. As a
result of the aforementioned sale, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register of
Deeds of Camarines Norte was issued in the name of the Salenillas, cancelling Original
Certificate of Title No. P-1248. On June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the property now
covered by T.C.T. No. T-8104 with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. The mortgage was
subsequently released on November 22, 1973 after the petitioners paid the amount of
P1,000.00. Later, or on December 4, 1975, the petitioners again mortgaged the property, this
time in favor of the Philippine National Bank Branch, Daet, Camarines Norte as security for a
loan of P2,500.00.
For failure of the petitioners to pay their loan, extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding, pursuant to
Act No. 3135, was instituted by the Philippine National Bank against the mortgage and the
property was sold at a public auction held on February 27, 1981. The private respondent,
William Guerra, emerged as the highest bidder in the said public auction and as a result
thereof a "Certificate of Sale" was issued to him by the Ex Officio Provincial Sheriff of
Camarines Norte. Ultimately, on July 12, 1983, a "Sheriff's Final Deed" was executed in favor
of the private respondent.
On August 17,1983, the Philippine National Bank filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Camarines Norte at Daet, a motion for a writ of possession. The public respondent, Judge
Raymundo Seva of the trial court, acting on the motion, issued on September 22, 1983 an
order for the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the private respondent. When the
deputy sheriff of Camarines Norte however, attempted on November 17, 1983, to place the
property in the possession of the private respondent, the petitioners refused to vacate and
surrender the possession of the same and instead offered to repurchase it under Section 119
of the Public Land Act. On August 15, 1984, another motion, this time for the issuance of an
alias writ of possession was filed by the private respondent with the trial court. The petitioners,
on August 31, 1984, opposed the private respondents' motion and instead made a formal offer
to repurchase the property. Notwithstanding the petitioners' opposition and formal offer, the
trial court judge on October 12, 1984 issued the alias writ of possession prayed for the private
respondent. The petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the order but their motion was
denied.
Undeterred by their initial setback, the petitioners elevated the case to the respondent Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari claiming that the respondent trial court judge acted
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order dated October 12, 1984 granting the writ of
possession, and the order dated October 22, 1984, denying their motion for reconsider
consideration.
In a resolution dated January 23, 1985, the respondent appellate court gave due course to the
petition; required the parties to submit simultaneous memoranda in support to their respective
positions; and restrained the trial court and the private respondent from executing,
implementing or otherwise giving effect to the assailed writ of possession until further orders
from the court. 3 However, in a decision promulgated on September 17, 1986, the respondent
Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit. According to the appellate court:
It must be noted that when the original owner, Florencia H. Enciso whose title,
OCT No. P-1248, was issued on August 9, 1961, executed a deed of absolute
sale on February 28, 1970 of the property covered by said title to spouses
Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas, the five year period to repurchase
the property provided for in Section 119 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as
amended could have already started. Prom this fact alone, the petition should
have been dismissed. However, granting that the transfer from parent to child
for a nominal sum may not be the "conveyance" contemplated by the law. We
will rule on the issue raised by the petitioners. 4
xxx xxx xxx
Applying the case of Monge, et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 5 the appellate court went on to hold that
the five-year period of the petitioners to repurchase under Section 119 of the Public Land Act
had already prescribed. The point of reckoning, ruled the respondent court in consonance
with Monge is from the date the petitioners mortgaged the property on December 4, 1973.
Thus, when the petitioners made their formal offer to repurchase on August 31, 1984, the
period had clearly expired.
In an effort to still overturn the decision, the petitioners moved for reconsideration. Their
motion apparently went for naught because on May 7, 1987, the respondent appellate court
resolved to deny the same. Hence, this petition.
Before us, the petitioners maintain that contrary to the rulings of the courts below, their right to
repurchase within five years under Section 119 of the Public Land Act has not yet prescribed.
To support their contention, the petitioners cite the cases of Paras vs. Court of
Appeals 6 and Manuel vs. Philippine National Bank, et al. 7
On the other side, the private respondent, in support of the appellate court's decision, states
that the sale of the contested property by the patentees to the petitioners disqualified the latter
from being legal heirs vis-a-vis the said property. As such, they (the petitioners) no longer
enjoy the right granted to heirs under the provisions of Section 119 of the Public Land Act. 8
In fine, what need be determined and resolved here are: whether or not the petitioners have
the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the Public Land Act; and
assuming the answer to the question is in the affirmative, whether or not their right to
repurchase had already prescribed.
We rule for the petitioners. They are granted by the law the right to repurchase their property
and their right to do so subsists.
Section 119 of the Public Land Act, as amended, provides in full:
Sec. 119. Every conveyance of land acquired under the free patent or
homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the
applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of five years from the date
of the conveyance.
From the foregoing legal provision, it is explicit that only three classes of persons are
bestowed the right to repurchase — the applicant-patentee, his widow, or other legal heirs.
Consequently, the contention of the private respondent sustained by the respondent appellate
court that the petitioners do not belong to any of those classes of repurchasers because they
acquired the property not through inheritance but by sale, has no legal basis. The petitioners-
spouses are the daughter and son-in-law of the Encisos, patentees of the contested property.
At the very least, petitioner Elena Salenillas, being a child of the Encisos, is a "legal heir" of
the latter. As such, and even on this score alone, she may therefore validly repurchase. This
must be so because Section 119 of the Public Land Act, in speaking of "legal heirs," makes no
distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos.
Moreover, to indorse the distinction made by the private respondent and the appellate court
would be to contravene the very purpose of Section 119 of the Public Land Act which is to give
the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for himself and his family the land that
the State had gratuitously given him as a reward for his labor in clearing and cultivating
it. 9 Considering that petitioner Salenillas is a daughter of the spouses Florencia H. Enciso and
Miguel Enciso, there is no gainsaying that allowing her (Elena) and her husband to repurchase
the property would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law. We have time and again said
that between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law
should prevail.
Guided by the same purpose of the law, and proceeding to the other issue here raised, we
rule that the five-year period for the petitioners to repurchase their property had not yet
prescribed.
The case of Monge et al. vs. Angeles, et al., 10 cited as authority by the respondent Court of
Appeals is inapplicable to the present controversy. The facts obtaining there are substantially
different from those in this case. In Monge the conveyance involved was a pacto de retro sale
and not a foreclosure sale. More importantly, the question raised there was whether the five-
year period provided for in Section 119 "should be counted from the date of the sale even if
the same is with an option to repurchase or from the date the ownership of the land has
become consolidated in favor of the purchaser because of the homesteader's failure to
redeem it. 11 It is therefore understandable why the Court ruled there as it did. A sale on pacto
de retro immediately vests title, ownership, and, generally possession over the property on the
vendee a retro, subject only to the right of the vendor a retro to repurchase within the
stipulated period. It is an absolute sale with a resolutory condition.
The cases 12 pointed to by the petitioner in support of their position, on the other hand, present
facts that are quite identical to those in the case at bar. Both cases involved properties the
titles over which were obtained either through homestead or free patent. These properties
were mortgaged to a bank as collateral for loans, and, upon failure of the owners to pay their
indebtedness, the mortgages were foreclosed. In both instances, the Court ruled that the five-
year period to. repurchase a homestead sold at public auction or foreclosure sale under Act
3135 begins on the day after the expiration of the period of redemption when the deed of
absolute sale is executed thereby formally transferring the property to the purchaser, and not
otherwise. Taking into account that the mortgage was foreclosed and the mortgaged property
sold at a public auction to the private respondent on February 27, 1981, with the "Sheriff's
Final Deed" issued on July 12, 1983, the two offers of the petitioners to repurchase the first on
November 17, 1983, and the second, formally, on August 31, 1984 were both made within the
prescribed five-year period.
Now, as regards the redemption price, applying Sec. 30 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of
Court, the petitioners should reimburse the private respondent the amount of the purchase
price at the public auction plus interest at the rate of one per centum per month up to
November 17, 1983, together with the amounts of assessments and taxes on the property that
the private respondent might have paid after purchase and interest on the last named amount
at the same rate as that on the purchase price. 13
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated September 17, 1986, and the
Resolution dated May 7, 1987 of the Court of Appeals, and the Orders dated September 22,
1983, October 12, 1984, and October 22, 1984 of the Regional Trial Court of Daet, Camarines
Norte, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another one ENTERED directing the
private respondent to reconvey the subject property and to execute the corresponding deed of
reconveyance therefor in favor of the petitioners upon the return to him by the latter of the
purchase price and the amounts, if any, of assessments or taxes he paid plus interest of one
(1%) per centum per month on both amounts up to November 17, 1983.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EN BANC
G.R. No. 93177 August 2, 1991
B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, B/GEN, MARIELO BLANDO, CAPT. DANILO PIZARRO,
CAPT. MANUEL ISON, COL. LUISITO SANCHEZ, etal, petitioners,
vs.
GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP, THE PTI INVESTIGATING PANEL
COMPOSED OF: COL. MANUEL S. MENDIOLA, COL. VIRTUD NORBERTO L. DAGZA
MAJ. FELIX V. BALDONADO and MAJ. ESTELITO L. PORNEA and GENERAL COURT-
MARTIAL NO. 14 COMPOSED OF: B/GEN. DEMETRIO CAMUA COL. HERMINIO A.
MENDOZA, COL. ERNESTO B. YU, COL. ROMEO ODI, COL. WILLY FLORENDO, COL.
DIONY A. VENTURA and CAPT. FRANCISCO T. MALLILLIN, respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
These four cases have been consolidated because they involve practically the same parties
and related issues arising from the same incident.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 and the private respondents in G.R. Nos.
95020 and 97454 are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines facing prosecution for
their alleged participation in the failed coup d' etat that took place on December 1 to 9, 1989.
The charges against them are violation of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in relation to Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).
In G.R. No. 93177, which is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, they are
questioning the conduct of the Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel constituted to investigate the
charges against them and the creation of the General Court Martial GCM convened to try
them.
In G.R. No. 96948, the petitioners, besides challenging the legality of GCM No. 14,
seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory challenge as granted by
Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408.
In G.R. No. 95020, the orders of the respondent judge of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City are assailed on certiorari on the ground that he has no jurisdiction over GCM No. 14 and
no authority either to set aside its ruling denying bail to the private respondents.
In G.R. No. 97454, certiorari is also sought against the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in a petition for habeas corpus directing the release of the private respondents.
Jurisdictional objections are likewise raised as in G.R. No. 95020.
I
Before the charges were referred to GCM No. 14, a Pre-Trial Investigation PTI Panel had
been constituted pursuant to Office Order No. 16 dated January 14, 1990, to investigate the
petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948. The PTI Panel issued a uniform subpoena dated
January 30, 1990, individually addressed to the petitioners, to wit:
You are hereby directed to appear in person before the undersigned Pre-Trial
Investigating Officers on 12 Feb 90 9:00 a.m. at Kiangan Hall, Camp Crame Quezon
City, then and there to submit your counter-affidavit and the affidavits of your
witnesses, if any, in the pre-trial investigation of the charge/charges against you for
violence of AWs _______________. DO NOT SUBMIT A MOTION TO DISMISS.
Failure to submit the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified
shall be deemed a waiver of your right to submit controverting evidence.
On the same date, the petitioners acknowledged receipt of a copy of the charge sheet, sworn
statements of witnesses, and death and medical certificates of victims of the rebellion.
At the first scheduled hearing, the petitioners challenged the proceedings on various grounds,
prompting the PTI Panel to grant them 10 days within which to file their objections in writing
This was done through a Motion for Summary Dismissal dated February 21, 1990.
In a resolution dated February 27,1990, the PTI Panel denied the motion and gave the
petitioners 5 days from notice to submit their respective counter-affidavits and the affidavits of
their witnesses.
On March 7, 1990, the petitioners verbally moved for reconsideration of the foregoing denial
and the PTI Panel gave them 7 days within which to reduce their motion to writing. This was
done on March 14,1990.
The petitioners now claim that there was no pre-trial investigation of the charges as mandated
by Article of War 71, which provides:
Art. 71. Charges Action upon. — Charges and specifications must be signed by a
person subject to military law, and under the oath either that he has personal
knowledge of, or has investigated, the matters set forth therein and that the same are
true in fact, to the best of his knowledge and belief.
No charge will be referred to a general court-martial for trial until after a thorough and
impartial investigation thereof shall have been made. This investigation will include
inquiries as to the truth of the matter set forth in said charges, form of charges, and
what disposition of the case should be made in the interest of justice and discipline. At
such investigation full opportunity shall be given to the accused to cross-examine
witnesses against him if they are available and to present anything he may desire in
his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigating officer shall
examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If the charges are forwarded
after such investigation, they shall be accompanied by a statement of the substance of
the testimony taken on both sides. (Emphasis supplied.)
They also allege that the initial hearing of the charges consisted merely of a roll call and that
no prosecution witnesses were presented to reaffirm their affidavits. while the motion for
summary dismissal was denied, the motion for reconsideration remains unresolved to date
and they have not been able to submit their counter-affidavits.
At the hearing of May 15, 1990, the petitioners in G.R. No. 96948 manifested that they were
exercising their right to raise peremptory challenges against the president and members of
GCM No.14. They invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled,
however, that peremptory challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.
In G.R. No. 95020, Ltc Jacinto Ligot applied for bail on June 5, 1990, but the application was
denied by GCM No.14. He thereupon filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for provisional liberty and a writ of preliminary
injunction. After considering the petition and the answer thereto filed by the president and
members of GCM No.14, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued an order granting provisional
liberty to Ligot.
On July 28, 1990, Ligot filed an urgent omnibus motion to enforce the order for his release and
to declare in contempt the commanding officer of the PC/INP Jail for disobey 'ng the said
order. He later also complained that Generals De Villa and Aguirre had refused to release him
"pending final resolution of the appeal to be taken" to this Court.
After hearing, the trial court reiterated its order for the provisional liberty of Ligot, as well as of
intervenors Ltc Franklin Brawner, Lt/Col. Arsenio Tecson and Maj. Alfredo Oliveros, and later
of additional intervenors Ltc Romelino Gojo and Capt. Manuel Ison.
On August 22, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment inter alia:
(a) Declaring, that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution granting the right to bail to
all persons with the defined exception is applicable and covers all military men facing
court-martial proceedings. Accordingly, the assailed orders of General Court- Martial
No. 14 denying bail to petitioner and intervenors on the mistaken assumption that bail
does not apply to military men facing court-martial proceedings on the ground that
there is no precedent, are hereby set aside and declared null and void. Respondent
General Court-Martial No. 14 is hereby directed to conduct proceedings on the
applications of bail of the petitioner, intervenors and which may as well include other
persons facing charges before General Court-Martial No. 14.
Pending the proceedings on the applications for bail before General Court-Martial No.
14, this Court reiterates its orders of release on the provisional liberty of petitioner
Jacinto Ligot as well as intervenors Franklin Brawner and Arsenio Tecson.
On February 18, 1991, the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 filed with this Court a
petition for habeas corpuson the ground that they were being detained in Camp Crame without
charges. The petition was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where it was
raffled to respondent Judge Antonio P. Solano. Finding after hearing that no formal charges
had been filed against the petitioners after more than a year after their arrest, the trial court
ordered their release.
II
The Court has examined the records of this case and rules as follows.
It appears that the petitioners in G.R. Nos. 93177 and 96948 were given several opportunities
to present their side at the pre-trial investigation, first at the scheduled hearing of February 12,
1990, and then again after the denial of their motion of February 21, 1990, when they were
given until March 7, 1990, to submit their counter-affidavits. On that date, they filed instead a
verbal motion for reconsideration which they were again asked to submit in writing. This they
did on March 13, 1990. The motion was in effect denied when the PTI Panel resolved to
recommend that the charges be referred to the General Court Martial for trial.
The said petitioners cannot now claim they have been denied due process because the
investigation was resolved against them owing to their own failure to submit their counter-
affidavits. They had been expressly warned In the subpoena sent them that "failure to submit
the aforementioned counter-affidavits on the date above specified shall be deemed a waiver of
(their) right to submit controverting evidence." They chose not to heed the warning. As their
motions appeared to be dilatory, the PTI Panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM
No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to submit their defense.
Due process is satisfied as long as the party is accorded an opportunity to be heard.1âwphi1 If
it is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited without violation of the Bill of Rights.
There was in our view substantial compliance with Article of War 71 by the PTI Panel.
Moreover, it is now settled that "even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not
deprive a general court- martial of jurisdiction." We so held in Arula v. Espino,1 thus:
xxx xxx xxx
But even a failure to conduct a pre-trial investigation does not deprive a general court-
martial of jurisdiction.
The better accepted concept of pre-trial investigation is that it is directory, not
mandatory, and in no way affects the jurisdiction of a court-martial. In Humphrey v.
Smith, 336 U.S. 695, 93 L ed 986 (1949), the Court said:
We do not think that the pre-trial investigation procedure by Article 70 (The
Philippine counter-part is article of war 71, Commonwealth Act 408) can
properly be construed as an indispensable pre-requisite to the exercise of the
Army General court martial jurisdiction.. The Article does serve important
functions in the administration of court-martial procedures and does provide
safeguards to an accused. Its language is clearly such that a defendant could
 object to trial in the absence of the required investigation. In that event the
court-martial could itself postpone trial pending the investigation. And the
military reviewing authorities could consider the same contention, reversing a
court- martial conviction where failure to comply with Article 70 has
substantially injured an accused. But we are not persuaded that Congress
intended to make otherwise valid court-martial judgments wholly void because
pre-trial investigations fall short of the standards prescribed by Article 70. That
Congress has not required analogous pre-trial procedure for Navy court-
martial is an indication that the investigatory plan was not intended to be
exalted to the jurisdictional level.
xxx xxx xxx
Shortly after enactment of Article 70 in 1920 the Judge Advocate General of
the Army did hold that where there had been no pre-trial investigation, court-
martial proceedings were void ab initio. But this holding has been expressly
repudiated in later holdings of the Judge Advocate General. This later
interpretation has been that the pre-trial requirements of Article 70 are
directory, not mandatory, and in no way effect the jurisdiction of a court-
martial. The War Department's interpretation was pointedly called to the
attention of Congress in 1947 after which Congress amended Article 70 but
left unchanged the language here under consideration. compensable pre-
requisite to the exercise of Army general court-martial jurisdiction
A trial before a general court-martial convened without any pretrial investigation under
article of war 71 would of course be altogether irregular but the court-martial might
nevertheless have jurisdiction. Significantly, this rule is similar to the one obtaining in
criminal procedure in the civil courts to the effect that absence of preliminary
investigation does not go into the jurisdiction of the court but merely to the regularity of
the proceedings.
As to what law should govern the conduct of the preliminary investigation, that issue was
resolved more than two years ago in Kapunan v. De Villa,2 where we declared:
The Court finds that, contrary to the contention of petitioners, there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of law as provided in the Articles of War and P.D.
No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911. The amended charge sheets, charging
petitioners and their co-respondents with mutiny and conduct unbecoming an officer,
were signed by Maj. Antonio Ruiz, a person subject to military law, after he had
investigated the matter through an evaluation of the pertinent records, including the
reports of respondent AFP Board of Officers, and was convinced of the truth of the
testimonies on record. The charge sheets were sworn to by Maj. Ruiz, the "accuser,"
in accordance with and in the manner provided under Art. 71 of the Articles of War.
Considering that P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, is only of suppletory
application, the fact that the charge sheets were not certified in the manner provided
under said decrees, i.e., that the officer administering the oath has personally
examined the affiant and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and
understood its affidavit, does not invalidate said charge sheets. Thereafter, a "pretrial
investigation" was conducted by respondent Maj. Baldonado, wherein, pursuant to
P.D. No. 77, as amended by P.D. No. 911, petitioners were subpoenaed and required
to file their counter-affidavit. However, instead of doing so, they filed an untitled
pleading seeking the dismissal of the charges against them. That petitioners were not
able to confront the witnesses against them was their own doing, for they never even
asked Maj. Baldonado to subpoena said witnesses so that they may be made to
answer clarificatory questions in accordance with P. D, No. 77, as amended by P.D.
No. 911.
The petitioners also allege that GCM No. 14 has not been constitute in accordance with Article
8 of the Articles of War because General Order No. M-6, which supposedly convened the
body, was not signed by Gen. Renato de Villa as Chief of Staff.
Article of War No. 8 reads:
Art. 8. General Courts-Martial. — The President of the Philippines, the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Chief of Constabulary and, when empowered
by the President, the commanding officer of a major command or task force, the
commanding officer of a division, the commanding officer of a military area, the
superintendent of the Military Academy, the commanding officer of a separate brigade
or body of troops may appoint general courts-martial; but when any such commander
is the accuser or the prosecutor of the person or persons to be tried, the court shall be
appointed by superior competent authority. ...
While it is true that General Order No. M-6 was not signed by Gen. De Villa, there is no doubt
that he authorized it because the order itself said it was issued "By Command of General De
Villa" and it has not been shown to be spurious. As observed by the Solicitor General, the
Summary Disposition Form showed that Gen. De Villa, as Chief of Staff, AFP, actually
constituted GCM No. 14 and appointed its president and members. It is significant that
General De Villa has not disauthorized or revoked or in any way disowned the said order, as
he would certainly have done if his authority had been improperly invoked. On the contrary, as
the principal respondent in G.R. No. 93177, he sustained General Order No. M 6 in the
Comment filed for him and the other respondents by the Solicitor General.
Coming now to the right to peremptory challenge, we note that this was originally provided for
under Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War), as amended by Rep. Act No. 242, on
June 12, 1948, to wit:
Art. 18. Challenges. — Members of general or special courts-martial may be
challenged by the accused or the trial judge advocate for cause stated to the court.
The court shall determine the relevancy and validity thereof, and shall not receive a
challenge to more than one member at a time. Challenges by the trial judge advocate
shall ordinarily be presented and decided before those by the accused are offered.
Each side shall be entitled to the peremptory challenge, but the law member of the
court shall not be challenged except for cause.
The history of peremptory challenge was traced in Martelino v. Alejandro,3 thus:
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a
handful of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and
naval academies who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete
dearth of officers learned in military law, its aside from the fact that the officer corps of
the developing army was numerically made equate for the demands of the strictly
military aspects of the national defense program. Because of these considerations it
was then felt that peremptory challenges should not in the meanwhile be permitted
and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be allowed. Thus Article 18
 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on September 14,
1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or reference to any
peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court- martial or by the
accused. After December 17,1958, when the Manual for Courts-Martial of the
Philippine Army became effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service of the
Philippine Army conducted a continuing and intensive program of training and
education in military law, encompassing the length and breadth of the Philippines.
This program was pursued until the outbreak of World War 11 in the Pacific on
December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the officer
corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large number,
and a great many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It was in these
environmental circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended on June 12,1948 to
entitle "each side" to one peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law
member of court shall not be challenged except for cause.
On September 27,1972, President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, empowering the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces to create military tribunals "to try and decide cases of military
personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them.
On November 7,1972, he promulgated P.D. No. 39 (Governing the Creation, Composition,
Jurisdiction, Procedure, and other matters relevant to military Tribunals). This decree
disallowed the peremptory challenge, thus:
No peremptory challenge shall be allowed. Challenges for cause may be entertained
to insure impartiality and good faith. Challenges shall immediately be heard and
determined by a majority of the members excluding the challenged member. A tie vote
does not disqualify the challenged member. A successfully challenged member shall
be immediately replaced.
On June 11, 1978, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 1498, or the National Security
Code, which was a compilation and codification of decrees, general orders, LOI and policies
intended "to meet the continuing threats to the existence, security and stability of the State."
The modified rule on challenges under P.D. No. 39 was embodied in this decree.
On January 17,1981, President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of
the state of martial law throughout the Philippines. The proclamation revoked General Order
No. 8 and declared the dissolution of the military tribunals created pursuant thereto upon final
determination of the cases pending therein.
P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement General Order No. 8 and the other general orders
mentioned therein. With the termination of martial law and the dissolution of the military
tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased
automatically.
It is a basic canon of statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law
itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex. This principle is also expressed in the
maxim ratio legis est anima: the reason of law is its soul.
Applying these rules, we hold that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge in L P.D.
No. 39 became ineffective when the apparatus of martial law was dismantled with the
issuance of Proclamation No. 2045, As a result, the old rule embodied in Article 18 of Com.
Act No. 408 was automatically revived and now again allows the right to peremptory
challenge.
We do not agree with the respondents in G.R. No. 96948 that the right to peremptory
challenge remains withdrawn under P.D. No. 39. To repeat for emphasis, this decree was
itself withdrawn when martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981. Indeed, even if not so
withdrawn, it could still be considered no longer operative, having been cast out under the new
dispensation as, in the words of the Freedom Constitution, one of the "iniquitous vestiges of
the previous regime.
The military tribunal was one of the most oppressive instruments of martial law. It is curious
that the present government should invoke the rules of that discredited body to justify its action
against the accused officers.
The Court realizes that the recognition of the right to peremptory challenge may be exploited
by a respondent in a court-martial trial to delay the proceedings and defer his deserved
Punishment. It is hoped that the accused officers in the cases at bar will not be so motivated.
At any rate, the wisdom of Com. Act No. 408, in the light of present circumstances, is a matter
addressed to the law-makers and not to this Court. The judiciary can only interpret and apply
the laws without regard to its own misgivings on their adverse effects. This is a problem only
the political departments can resolve.
The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454 question the propriety of the petition for
certiorari and mandamus and the petition for habeas corpus filed by the private respondents
with the Regional Trial Courts of Quezon City. It is argued that since the private respondents
are officers of the Armed Forces accused of violations of the Articles of War, the respondent
courts have no authority to order their release and otherwise interfere with the court-martial
proceedings.
The petitioners further contend that under Sec. 9(3) of BP 1 29, the Court of Appeals is vested
with "exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or
awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or
commissions." Rather irrelevantly, the petitioners also cite the case of Yang v. Court of
Appeals4 where this Court held that "appeals from the Professional Regulation Commission
are now exclusively cognizable by the Court of Appeals.
It should be noted that the aforecited provision and the case cited refer to ordinary appeals
and not to the remedies employed by the accused officers before the respondent courts.
In Martelino, we observed as follows:
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the
proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open
to consideration. The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction. But it is equally true that in
the exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse
of discretion — what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of
discretion" — as to give rise to a defect in their jurisdiction. This is precisely the point
at issue in this action suggested by its nature as one for certiorari and prohibition ... .
The Regional Trial Court has concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or mandamus against inferior courts
and other bodies and on petitions for habeas corpusand quo warranto.5 In the absence of a
law providing that the decisions, orders and ruling of a court-martial or the Office of the Chief
of Staff can be questioned only before the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, we hold
that the Regional Trial Court can exercise similar jurisdiction.
We find that the right to bail invoked by the private respondents in G.R. Nos. 95020 has
traditionally not been recognized and is not available in the military, as an exception to the
general rule embodied in the Bill of Rights. This much was suggested in Arula, where we
observed that "the right to a speedy trial is given more emphasis in the military where the right
to bail does not exist.
The justification for this exception was well explained by the Solicitor General as follows:
The unique structure of the military should be enough reason to exempt military men
from the constitutional coverage on the right to bail.
Aside from structural peculiarity, it is vital to note that mutinous soldiers operate within
the framework of democratic system, are allowed the fiduciary use of firearms by the
government for the discharge of their duties and responsibilities and are paid out of
revenues collected from the people. All other insurgent elements carry out their
activities outside of and against the existing political system.
xxx xxx xxx
National security considerations should also impress upon this Honorable Court that
release on bail of respondents constitutes a damaging precedent. Imagine a scenario
of say 1,000 putschists roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed
July 25,1990 Order were sustained, on "provisional" bail. The sheer number alone is
already discomforting. But, the truly disquieting thought is that they could freely
resume their heinous activity which could very well result in the overthrow of duly
constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and replace the same with a
system consonant with their own concept of government and justice.
The argument that denial from the military of the right to bail would violate the equal protection
clause is not acceptable. This guaranty requires equal treatment only of persons or things
similarly situated and does not apply where the subject of the treatment is substantially
different from others. The accused officers can complain if they are denied bail and other
members of the military are not. But they cannot say they have been discriminated against
because they are not allowed the same right that is extended to civilians.
On the contention of the private respondents in G.R. No. 97454 that they had not been
charged after more than one year from their arrest, our finding is that there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of due process and the right to a speedy trial.
The petition for habeas corpus was directly filed with this Court on February 18, 1991, and
was referred to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for raffle, hearing and decision. It was
heard on February 26, 1991, by the respondent court, where the petitioners submitted the
charge memorandum and specifications against the private respondents dated January 30,
1991. On February 12, 1991, pursuant to Office Order No. 31-91, the PTI panel was created
and initial investigation was scheduled on March 12, 1991 at 2:00 p.m. On March 20, 1991,
the private respondents received the copies of the charges, charge sheets and specifications
and were required to submit their counter-affidavits on or before April 11, 1991. There was
indeed a delay of more than one year in the investigation and preparation of the charges
against the private respondents. However, this was explained by the Solicitor General thus:
... The AFP Special Investigating Committee was able to complete it pre-charge
investigation only after one (1) year because hundreds of officers and thousands of
enlisted men were involved in the failed coup. All of them, as well as other witnesses,
had to be interviewed or investigated, and these inevitably took months to finish. The
pre-charge investigation was rendered doubly difficult by the fact that those involved
were dispersed and scattered throughout the Philippines. In some cases, command
units, such as the Scout Rangers, have already been disbanded. After the charges
were completed, the same still had to pass review and approval by the AFP Chief of
Staff.
While accepting this explanation, the Court nevertheless must reiterate the following
admonition:
This Court as protector of the rights of the people, must stress the point that if the
participation of petitioner in several coup attempts for which he is confined on orders
of Adjutant General Jorge Agcaoili cannot be established and no charges can be filed
against him or the existence of a prima facie case warranting trial before a military
commission is wanting, it behooves respondent then Major General Rodolfo Biazon
(now General) to release petitioner. Respondents must also be reminded that even if
a military officer is arrested pursuant to Article 70 of then Articles of War, indefinite
confinement is not sanctioned, as Article 71 thereof mandates that immediate steps
must be taken to try the person accused or to dissmiss the charge and release him.
Any officer who is responsible for unnecessary delay in investigating or carrying the
case to a final conclusion may even be punished as a court martial may direct.6
It should be noted, finally, that after the decision was rendered by Judge Solano on February
26, 1991, the government filed a notice of appeal ad cautelam and a motion for
reconsideration, the latter was ultimately denied, after hearing, on March 4, 1991. The 48-
hour period for appeal under Rule 41, Section 18, of the Rules of Court did not run until after
notice of such denial was received by the petitioners on March 12, 1991. Contrary to the
private respondents' contention, therefore, the decision had not yet become final and
executory when the special civil action in G.R. No. 97454 was filed with this Court on March
12, 1991.
III
Regarding the propriety of the petitions at bar, it is well to reiterate the following observations
of the Court in Arula:
The referral of charges to a court-martial involves the exercise of judgment and
discretion (AW 71). A petition for certiorari, in order to prosper, must be based on
jurisdictional grounds because, as long as the respondent acted with jurisdiction, any
error committed by him or it in the exercise thereof will amount to nothing more than
an error of judgment which may be reviewed or corrected only by appeal. Even an
abuse of discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of certiorari.
As in that case, we find that the respondents in G.R. No. 93177 have not acted with grave
abuse of discretion or without or in excess of jurisdiction to justify the intervention of the Court
and the reversal of the acts complained of by the petitioners. Such action is indicated,
however, in G.R. No. 96948, where we find that the right to peremptory challenge should not
have been denied, and in G.R. Nos. 95020 and 97454, where the private respondents should
not have been ordered released.
ACCORDINGLY, in G.R. No. 93177, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In G.R. No.
96948, the petition is GRANTED, and the respondents are DIRECTED to allow the petitioners
to exercise the right of peremptory challenge under Article 18 of the Articles of War. In G.R.
Nos. 95020 and 97454, the petitions are also GRANTED, and the orders of the respondent
courts for the release of the private respondents are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
I concur with the ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Cruz, but I dissent insofar
as he would deny bail to accused military personnel.
The Constitution explicitly grants the right to bail to "all persons" before conviction, with the
only exception of "those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong."1 The Charter also states that "[T]he right to bail shall not be
impaired even if the writ of habeas corpus is suspended."2 To deny the military officers here
concerned of the right to bail is to circumscribe the inclusive meaning of "all persons" — the
coverage of the right.
I believe that military officers fall within "persons".
The picture conjured up by the Solicitor General of "a scenario of say 1,000 putschists
roaming the streets of the Metropolis on bail, or if the assailed July 25, 1990 Order were
sustained, on "provisional" bail [t]he sheer number alone is already discomforting . . . [b]ut, the
truly disquieting thought is that they could freely resume their heinous activity which could very
well result in the overthrow of duly constituted authorities, including this Honorable Court, and
replace the same with a system consonant with their own concept of government and
justice."3 But would a scenario of 1,000 murderers or drug pushers roaming the streets of the
metropolis justify a denial of the right to bail? Would not that dark picture painted by the
Solicitor General be reproduced by 1,000 "equally dangerous" elements of society?
We gave bail Senator Enrile and General Brawner. I find no reason why the petitioners should
not be granted the same right.
The majority would point to tradition, supposed to be firmly settled, as an argument to deny
bail. I submit, however, that tradition is no argument. First, the Constitution does not say it.
Second, we are a government of laws, not tradition.
If there are precedents that attest to the contrary, I submit that a reexamination is in order.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992
LYDIA O. CHUA, petitioner,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and
THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683
was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary
separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to
reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the
Act, as follows:
Sec. 2. Coverage. — This Act shall cover all appointive officials and
employees of the National Government, including government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all
local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to
all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age,
who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government
service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the
coverage of this Act.
Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed
an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA)
which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to
one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. A recourse
by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results. 1 Her letter for
reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:
xxx xxx xxx
With due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of
RA 6683 does not conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law
merely requires that a government employee whether regular, temporary,
emergency, or casual, should have two consecutive years of government
service in order to be entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the
requirement. Persons who are not entitled are consultants, experts and
contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the law provides that the Department
of Budget and Management will shoulder a certain portion of the benefits to be
allotted to government corporations. Moreover, personnel of these NIA special
projects art entitled to the regular benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory
retirement and the like. There is no reason why we should not be entitled to
RA 6683.
xxx xxx xxx 2
Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) emphasized:
xxx xxx xxx
We regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of
Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require
an applicant to have two years of satisfactory service on the date of
separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be on a casual,
emergency, temporary or regular employment status as of December 2, 1988,
the date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate contractual
employees in the coverage.
Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your
separation from the service, is co-terminous with the NIA project which is
contractual in nature, this Commission shall sustain its original decision.
xxx xxx xxx3
In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action
for certiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683.
Her arguments:
 It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC
Circular Letter No. 89-1 requires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency,
temporary or regular employment status. Likewise, the provisions of Section
23 (sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, implementing
guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides:
"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following:
a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform
specific activities or services with a definite expected output: i.e. membership in
Task Force, Part-Time, Consultant/Employees.
b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of
the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC-INP).
c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be separated from the
service for optional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with
pension under R.A. No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, an
amended, or vice- versa.
d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the enactment of this law
and have received the corresponding benefits of that retirement/separation.
e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by mandatory
separation from the service under existing civil service laws, rules and regulations;
provided that if such officials and employees apply in writing within the prescriptive
period for the availment of the benefits herein authorized, shall be allowed only if
acquitted or cleared of all charges and their application accepted and approved by
the head of office concerned."
Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of
them. Ms. Chua is a full time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits
provided for by the Civil Service Commission. She held a permanent status as
Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to the Administrative Service. . . .
If casuals and emergency employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with
more reason that this petitioner who was holding a permanent status as Personnel
Assistant A and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous service in the
government should be similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic) purpose of the
law. 4
The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner's exclusion
from the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683, because:
1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the
Administrative Service in the head office of NIA (the service record was issued by the
Watershed Management and Erosion Control Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija).
The project, funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31 December 1988, after which
petitioner's position became functus officio.
2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA — her position is not included in its
regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is
inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on the other hand, retirement presupposes
employment for a long period. The most that a non-career personnel can expect upon the
expiration of his employment is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire
under the GSIS law.
3. Assuming arguendo that petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of tenure is
available only for the term of office (i.e., duration of project).
4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement
benefits but reorganization 5to streamline government functions. The application of the law
must be made consistent with the purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed
purpose of the law is to reorganize the government, it will not have any application to special
projects such as the WMECP which exists only for a short and definite period. This being the
nature of special projects, there is no necessity for offering its personnel early retirement
benefits just to induce voluntary separation as a step to reorganization. In fact, there is even
no need of reorganizing the WMECP considering its short and limited life-span. 6
5. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned or
controlled corporations with original charters and local government units.
Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the Court is
called upon to define the different classes of employees in the public sector (i.e. government
civil servants).
Who are regular employees? The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems
an employment regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are
usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent
definition can be found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975, which superseded
the Civil Service Act of 1965 — R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself
(Rep. Act No. 6683) merely includes such class of employees (regular employees) in its
coverage, unmindful that no such specie is employed in the public sector.
The appointment status of government employees in the career service is classified as
follows:
1. permanent — one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which
appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules
and Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof; 7
2. temporary — In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public
interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment should be issued to a person who meets all
the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil
service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months,
but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes
available. 8
The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes the Career Service as:
(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an
appropriate examination is required;
(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these
include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and
scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall
establish and maintain their own merit systems;
(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant
Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant
Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank
as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are
appointed by the President.
(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are
appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department
of Foreign Affairs;
(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain
a separate merit system;
(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing
governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service;
and
(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled. 9
The Non-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:
. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness
utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by
law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his
pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose
employment was made.
Included in the non-career service are:
1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;
2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the
pleasure of the President and their personal confidential staff(s);
3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and
their personal or confidential staff;
4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in
accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring
special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished
within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year and performs or
accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum
of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.
5. emergency and seasonal personnel. 10
There is another type of non-career employee:
Casual — where and when employment is not permanent but occasional,
unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v.
P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945)
Consider petitioner's record of service:
Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a
laborer holding emergency status with the NIA — Upper Pampanga River Project, R
& R Division. 11 From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research aide
with temporary status on the same project. On 1 September 1975 to 31 December
1976, she was with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on 1 January 1977 to 31
May 1980, she was with NIA — UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga River Integrated
Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA — W.M.E.C.P.
(Watershed Management & Erosion Control Project) retaining the status
of temporary employee. While with this project, her designation was changed to
personnel assistant on 5 November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the status
became permanent until the completion of the project on 31 December 1988. The
appointment paper 12attached to the OSG's comment lists her status as co-terminus
with the Project.
The employment status of personnel hired under foreign — assisted projects is considered co-
terminous, that is, they are considered employees for the duration of the project or until the
completion or cessation of said project (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June
1990).
Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefits regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive
years government service.
Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:
WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the
Civil Service Commission is charged with the function of determining
creditable services for retiring officers and employees of the national
government;
WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that
all previous services by an officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved
appointment to a position in the Civil Service are considered creditable
services, while Section 6 (a) thereof states that services rendered
on contractual, emergency or casual status are non-creditable services;
WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as
some contractual, emergency or casual employment are covered by contracts
or appointments duly approved by the Commission.
NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on
contractual, emergency or casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner
of payment therefor shall be considered as creditable for retirement purposes
subject to the following conditions: (emphasis provided)
1. These services are supported by approved appointments,
official records and/or other competent evidence.
Parties/agencies concerned shall submit the necessary proof
of said services;
2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to
June 22, 1984, the effectivity date of Executive Order No.
966; and
3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to
retirement are continuous and fulfill the service requirement
for retirement.
What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-
terminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career,
and temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSC letter of denial 13 characterized herein petitioner's
employment as co-terminous with the NIA project which in turn was contractual in nature. The
OSG says petitioner's status is co-terminous with the Project. CSC Memorandum Circular No.
11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status of a co-terminous employee —
(3) Co-terminous status shall be issued to a person whose entrance in the
service is characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that
which is subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.
The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the
following:
 a) co-terminous with the project — When the appointment is
co-existent with the duration of a particular project for which
purpose employment was made or subject to the availability
of funds for the same;
b) co-terminous with the appointing authority — when
appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing
authority.
c) co-terminous with the incumbent — when appointment is
co-existent with the appointee, in that after the resignation,
separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the
position shall be deemed automatically abolished; and
d) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a
period of 3 years" — the appointment is for a specific period
and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed
abolished.
It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what is
termed co-terminous is the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further,
in (c) the security of tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during his
incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is limited to a specific period.
A co-terminous employee is a non-career civil servant, like casual and emergency employees.
We see no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law
but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for
early retirement to regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees. But specifically
excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP.
It can be argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The legislature would not have
made a specific enumeration in a statute had not the intention been to restrict its meaning and
confine its terms and benefits to those expressly mentioned 14 or casus omissus pro omisso
habendus est — A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have
been omitted intentionally. 15 Yet adherence to these legal maxims can result in incongruities
and in a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The case of Fegurin, et al. v. NLRC, et al., 16 comes to mind where, workers belonging to a
work pool, hired and re-hired continuously from one project to another were considered non-
project-regular and permanent employees.
Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired and re-hired in four (4) successive projects during a span of
fifteen (15) years. Although no proof of the existence of a work pool can be assumed, her
service record cannot be disregarded.
Art. III, Sec. 1 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of
the laws."
. . . In Felwa vs. Salas, L-26511, Oct. 29, 1966, We ruled that the equal
protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and
does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; (2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. 17
Applying the criteria set forth above, the Early Retirement Law would violate the equal
protection clause were we to sustain respondents' submission that the benefits of said law are
to be denied a class of government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by
said law. The maxim of Expressio unius est exclusio alterius should not be the applicable
maxim in this case but the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that:
No statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its
application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular
situation. What is thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing
legislation may be inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future.
So-called gaps in the law develop as the law is enforced. One of the rules of
statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary
implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as much a
part thereof as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by
implication, to contain all such provisions as may be necessary to effectuate
its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers, privileges or
jurisdiction which it grants, including all such collateral and subsidiary
consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms. Ex
necessitate legis. And every statutory grant of power, right or privilege is
deemed to include all incidental power, right or privilege. This is so because
the greater includes the lesser, expressed in the Maxim, in eo plus sit, simper
inest et minus. 18
During the sponsorship speech of Congressman Dragon (re: Early Retirement Law), in
response to Congressman Dimaporo's interpellation on coverage of state university
employees who are extended appointments for one (1) year, renewable for two (2) or three (3)
years, 19 he explained:
This Bill covers only those who would like to go on early retirement and
voluntary separation. It is irrespective of the actual status or nature of the
appointment one received, but if he opts to retire under this, then he is
covered.
It will be noted that, presently Pending in Congress, is House Bill No. 33399 (a proposal to
extend the scope of the Early Retirement Law). Its wording supports the submission that Rep.
Act No. 6683 indeed overlooked a qualified group of civil servants. Sec. 3 of said House bill,
on coverage of early retirement, would provide:
Sec. 3. Coverage. — It will cover all employees of the national government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations, as well as the
personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act
shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual, emergency and contractual
employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2)
consecutive years government service as of the date of separation. The term
"contractual employees" as used in this Act does not include experts and
consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities
or services with definite expected output.
 Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including those
of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. (emphasis
supplied)
The objective of the Early Retirement or Voluntary Separation Law is to trim the bureaucracy,
hence, vacated positions are deemed abolished upon early/voluntary retirement of their
occupants. Will the inclusion of co-terminous personnel (like the petitioner) defeat such
objective? In their case, upon termination of the project and separation of the project
personnel from the service, the term of employment is considered expired, the officefunctus
officio. Casual, temporary and contractual personnel serve for shorter periods, and yet, they
only have to establish two (2) years of continuous service to qualify. This, incidentally, negates
the OSG's argument that co-terminous or project employment is inherently short-lived,
temporary and transient, whereas, retirement presupposes employment for a long period.
Here, violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution becomes glaring because
casuals are not even in the plantilla, and yet, they are entitled to the benefits of early
retirement. How can the objective of the Early Retirement Law of trimming the bureaucracy be
achieved by granting early retirement benefits to a group of employees (casual) without
plantilla positions? There would, in such a case, be no abolition of permanent positions or
streamlining of functions; it would merely be a removal of excess personnel; but the positions
remain, and future appointments can be made thereto.
Co-terminous or project personnel, on the other hand, who have rendered years of continuous
service should be included in the coverage of the Early Retirement Law, as long as they file
their application prior to the expiration of their term, and as long as they comply with CSC
regulations promulgated for such purpose. In this connection, Memorandum Circular No. 14,
Series of 1990 (5 March 1990) implementing Rep. Act No. 6850, 20 requires, as a condition to
qualify for the grant of eligibility, an aggregate or total of seven (7) years of government
service which need not be continuous, in the career or non-career service, whether appointive,
elective, casual, emergency, seasonal, contractual or co-terminous including military and
police service, as evaluated and confirmed by the Civil Service Commission. 21 A similar
regulation should be promulgated for the inclusion in Rep. Act No. 6683 of co-terminous
personnel who survive the test of time. This would be in keeping with the coverage of "all
social legislations enacted to promote the physical and mental well-being of public
servants"22 After all, co-terminous personnel, are also obligated to the government for GSIS
contributions, medicare and income tax payments, with the general disadvantage of
transience.
In fine, the Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and CSC of
petitioner's application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683 is unreasonable,
unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an application for voluntary retirement within
a reasonable period and she is entitled to the benefits of said law. While the application was
filed after expiration of her term, we can give allowance for the fact that she originally filed the
application on her own without the assistance of counsel. In the interest of substantial justice,
her application must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years
— the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in four (4)
successive governmental projects.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.
Let this case be remanded to the CSC-NIA for a favorable disposition of petitioner's
application for early retirement benefits under Rep. Act No. 6683, in accordance with the
pronouncements in this decision.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-37251 August 31, 1981
CITY OF MANILA and CITY TREASURER, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
JUDGE AMADOR E. GOMEZ of the Court of First Instance of Manila and ESSO
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents-appellees.
AQUINO, J.:
This case is about the legality of the additional one-half percent (½%) realty tax imposed by
the City of Manila.
Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, Republic Act No. 409, which took effect on June
18, 1949, fixes the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent (1-½ %).
On the other hand, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, Republic Act No. 5447,
which took effect on January 1, 1969, imposed "an annual additional tax of one per centum on
the assessed value of real property in addition to the real property tax regularly levied thereon
under existing laws" but "the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per
centrum.
That maximum limit gave the municipal board of Manila the Idea of fixing the realty tax at three
percent. So, by means of Ordinance No. 7125, approved by the city mayor on December 26,
1971 and effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, the board imposed an additional one-
half percent realty tax. The ordinance reads:
SECTION 1. An additional annual realty tax of one-half percent (1/2%), or in
short a total of three percent (3%) realty tax (1-½% pursuant to the Revised
Charter of Manila; 1% per Republic Act No. 5447; and ½% per this Ordinance)
on the assessed value ... is hereby levied and imposed.
Esso Philippines, Inc. paid under protest the sum of P16,092.69 as additional one-half percent
realty tax for the third quarter of 1972 on its land and machineries located in Manila.
On November 9, 1972, Esso filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
recovery of the said amount. It contended that the additional one-half percent tax is void
because it is not authorized by the city charter nor by any law (Civil Case No. 88827).
After hearing, the trial court declared the tax ordinance void and ordered the city treasurer of
Manila to refund to Esso the said tax. The City of Manila and its treasurer appealed to this
Court under Republic Act No. 5440 (which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of Court).
The only issue is the validity of the tax ordinance or the legality of the additional one-half
percent realty tax.
The petitioners in their manifestation of March 17, 1981 averred that the said tax ordinance is
still in force; that Ordinance No. 7566, which was enacted on September 10, 1974, imposed a
two percent tax on commercial real properties (like the real properties of Esso and that that
two percent tax plus the one percent tax under the Special Education Fund Law gives a total
of three percent realty tax on commercial properties.
Esso Philippines, Inc., now Petrophil Corporation, in its manifestation of March 2, 1981,
revealed that up to this time it has been paying the additional one-half percent tax and that
from 1975 to 1980 it paid the total sum of P4,206,240.71 as three percent tax on its real
properties.
In this connection, it is relevant to note that section 39(2) of the Real Property Tax Code,
Presidential Decree No. 464, which took effect on June 1, 1974, provides that a city council
may, by ordinance, impose a realty tax "of not less than one half of one percent but not more
than two percent of the assessed value of real property".
Section 41 of the said Code reaffirms the one percent tax on real property for the Special
Education Fund in addition to the basic two percent realty tax.
So, there is no question now that the additional one-half percent realty tax is valid under the
Real Property Tax Code. What is in controversy is the legality of the additional one-half
percent realty tax for the two-year period from the third quarter of 1972 up to the second
quarter of 1974.
We hold that the doctrine of implications in statutory construction sustains the City of Manila's
contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision in
section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law that "the total real property tax shall not exceed a
maximum of three per centum.
The doctrine of implications means that "that which is plainly implied in the language of a
statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed" (In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41,
45, 90; 82 C.J.S. 632, 73 Am Jur 2nd 404).
While the 1949 Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and a half percent, on the
other hand, the 1968 Special Education Fund Law definitively fixed three percent as
the maximum real property tax of which one percent would accrue to the Special Education
Fund.
The obvious implication is that an additional one-half percent tax could be imposed by
municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent the realty tax that would
accrue to a city or municipality.
And the fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specifically fixes the real property tax
at two percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty
tax proper. That was also the avowed intention of the questioned ordinance.
In invalidating the ordinance, the trial court upheld the view of Esso Philippines, Inc, that the
Special Education Fund Law refers to a contingency where the application of the additional
one percent realty tax would have the effect of raising the total realty tax to more than three
percent and that it cannot be construed as an authority to impose an additional realty tax
beyond the one percent fixed by the said law.
At first glance, that appears to be a specious or reasonable contention. But the fact remains
that the city charter fixed the realty tax at 1-½% and the later law, the Special Education Fund
Law, provides for three percent as the maximum realty tax of which one percent would be
earmarked for the education fund.
The unavoidable inference is that the later law authorized the imposition of an additional one-
half percent realty tax since the contingency referred to by the complaining taxpayer would not
arise in the City of Manila.
It is true, as contended by the taxpayer, that the power of a municipal corporation to levy a tax
should be expressly granted and should not be merely inferred. But in this case, the power to
impose a realty tax is not controverted. What is disputed is the amount thereof, whether one
and one-half percent only or two percent. (See sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 2264.)
As repeatedly observed, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, as confirmed by the
Real Property Tax Code, in prescribing a total realty tax of three percent impliedly authorizes
the augmentation by one-half percent of the pre-existing one and one- half percent realty tax.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is reversed and set aside. The complaint of Esso
Philippines, Inc. for recovery of the realty tax paid under protest is dismissed. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Fernandez and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Justice Abad Santos is on leave.
Justice Fernandez was designated to sit in the Second Division.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 14129 July 31, 1962
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan dismissing the information against the defendant.
The records show that the statement of the case and the facts, as recited in the brief of
plaintiff-appellant, is complete and accurate. The same is, consequently, here adopted, to wit:
In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First
Instance of that Province, defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by
said court resulted in the finding a probable cause that the crime charged as
committed by defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendant's plea of not
guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of
the peace the defendant is one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a
justice of the peace is within the purview Section 54. A second motion was filed by
defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals in
People vs. Macaraeg, (CA-G.R. No. 15613-R, 54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was
held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the answer of the
prosecution, the reply of the defense, and the opposition of the prosecution, the lower
court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in
the case cited by the defense.
Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this single question of law: Is a
justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee
of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force
and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any
influence in any manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled
thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.
Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not comprehended among the
officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. He submits the aforecited
section was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provided the
following:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no
officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any
election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.
When, therefore, section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "justice of the
peace," the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to exclude justices of the peace
from its operation.
The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted that under Section 449
of the Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge" was modified or qualified by the phrase
"of First instance", while under Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modification
exists. In other words, justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the
Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of
the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity
therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had
availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any
word or phrase and was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts
of First Instance, Judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial
Relations, and justices of the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes addressed as "judge" in this
jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public officer,
who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority (U.S. v. Clark, 25 Fed. Cas. 441,
422). According to Bouvier Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully appointed to
decide litigated questions according to law. In its most extensive sense the term includes all
officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices
of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts."
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify and clarify the above
conclusion.
The first election law in the Philippines was Act 1582 enacted by the Philippine Commission in
1907, and which was later amended by Act. Nos. 1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768. (Of these 4
amendments, however, only Act No. 1709 has a relation to the discussion of the instant case
as shall be shown later.) Act No. 1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later on
incorporated Chapter 18 of the Administrative Code. Under the Philippine Legislature, several
amendments were made through the passage of Acts Nos. 2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of
these last 3 amendments, only Act No. 3587 has pertinent to the case at bar as shall be seen
later.) During the time of the Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth
Act No. 23 and later on enacted Commonwealth Act No. 357, which was the law enforced until
June 1947, when the Revised Election Code was approved. Included as its basic provisions
are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666, 657. The present Code
was further amended by Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during the session of
Congress in 1960, amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our election
law, the following should be noted:
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:
No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections, nor shall he be eligible
during the time that he holds said public office to election at any municipal, provincial
or Assembly election, except for reelection to the position which he may be holding,
and no judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any
candidate or influence in any manner or take part in any municipal, provincial, or
Assembly election under the penalty of being deprived of his office and being
disqualified to hold any public office whatsoever for a term of 5 year: Provide,
however, That the foregoing provisions shall not be construe to deprive any person
otherwise qualified of the right to vote it any election." (Enacted January 9, 1907; Took
effect on January 15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:
. . . No judge of the First Instance, Justice of the peace provincial fiscal or officer or
employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any
candidate or influence in any manner to take part in any municipal provincial or
Assembly election. Any person violating the provisions of this section shall be
deprived of his office or employment and shall be disqualified to hold any public office
or employment whatever for a term of 5 years, Provided, however, that the foregoing
provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified of the right
to vote at any election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took effect on September 15,
1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the Administrative Code on March
10, 1917, the provisions in question read:
SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No judge of the First
Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no
officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or any Bureau or employee of the
classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any
election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote. (Emphasis
supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No. 3387. This Act reads:
SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election. — Any judge of the
First Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province, any
officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the police of any municipality,
or any officer or employee of any Bureau of the classified civil service, who aids any
candidate or violated in any manner the provisions of this section or takes part in any
election otherwise by exercising the right to vote, shall be punished by a fine of not
less than P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00, or by imprisonment for not less than 2
months nor more than 2 years, and in all cases by disqualification from public office
 and deprivation of the right of suffrage for a period of 5 years. (Approved December 3,
1927.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on August 22, 1938. This
law provided in Section 48:
SEC. 48. Active Interventation of Public Officers and Employees. — No justice, judge,
fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, the
Constabulary of the national, provincial, municipal or rural police, and no classified
civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, nor exert influence in any
manner in any election nor take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to
preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.
This last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised Election Code was
taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative development or history of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the first omission of the word "justice of the
peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code
as averred by defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that in the two instances when the
words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep. Act No. 180), the
word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not carry the qualification "of the First
Instance." In other words, whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First
Instance", the words "justice of the peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said
"judge," the words "justice of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would seem to justify the
conclusion that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No.
180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered
the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed congressional records
which might have offered some explanation of the discussion of Com. Act No. 357 which
legislation, as indicated above, has eliminated for the first time the words "justice of the
peace." Having been completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional
clarifications from these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from the
historical background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by reason hid equity.
Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers enumerated in Section
54 inasmuch as under that said section, the word "judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase
"of any province." The last mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice
of the peace since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality.
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the phrase "of any
province" necessarily removes justices of the peace from the enumeration for the reason that
they are municipal and not provincial officials, then the same thing may be said of the Justices
of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can there
be any doubt that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals are not included
in the prohibition? The more sensible and logical interpretation of the said phrase is that it
qualifies fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are generally known as provincial officers.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-
appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be
held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed,
justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally and deliberately exempted from
the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus omisus" can operate and
apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case under
consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of
the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political
activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just called "judges."
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case, defendant-appellee
cites authorities to the effect that the said rule, being restrictive in nature, has more particular
application to statutes that should be strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must
be strictly construed against the government since proceedings under it are criminal in nature
and the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted against the
state.
Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of penal statutes, defendant
asserts that the spirit of fair play and due process demand such strict construction in order to
give "fair warning of what the law intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the
common world will understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle v. U.S., 283 U.S. 25, L. Ed. 816).
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the mere fact that a case
is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or
thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons
already mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a substitution of
terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized
time and again by decisions of various courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 56.)
Thus, cases will frequently be found enunciating the principle that the intent of the legislature
will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215 U.S. 233). It is to be noted that a strict construction should
not be permitted to defeat the policy and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. v. U.S., 252
U.S. 159). The court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular
instance, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would
defeat the clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford, Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294).
A Federal District court in the U.S. has well said:
The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such construction of it as to
deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes must be construed in the sense
which best harmonizes with their intent and purpose. (U.S. v. Betteridge 43 F. Supp.
53, 56, cited in 3 Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)
As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language of criminal statutes,
frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes situations inconsistent with the
legislative plan (U.S. v. Katz, 271 U.S. 354; See also Ernest Brunchen, Interpretation of the
Written Law (1915) 25 Yale L.J. 129.)
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the purpose of the
statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of
the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old
statute, are now within its encompass. If such were the evident purpose, can the legislature
intend to eliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit? Certainly not. This point is fully
explained in the brief of the Solicitor General, to wit:
On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases "Judge of First
Instance" and justice of the peace", found in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative
Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof, the obvious intention was to include in the
scope of the term not just one class of judges but all judges, whether of first Instance
justices of the peace or special courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial
Relations. . . . .
The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace court, and to so
construe the law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in partisan political activities
would weaken rather than strengthen the judiciary. On the other hand, there are
cogent reasons found in the Revised Election Code itself why justices of the peace
should be prohibited from electioneering. Along with Justices of the appellate courts
and judges of the Court of First Instance, they are given authority and jurisdiction over
certain election cases (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-123). Justices of the peace are
authorized to hear and decided inclusion and exclusion cases, and if they are
permitted to campaign for candidates for an elective office the impartiality of their
decisions in election cases would be open to serious doubt. We do not believe that the
legislature had, in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, intended to create such
an unfortunate situation. (pp. 708, Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact that the administrative
or executive department has regarded justices of the peace within the purview of Section 54 of
the Revised Election Code.
In Tranquilino O. Calo, Jr. v. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Justice, etc. (G.R. No.
L-12601), this Court did not give due course to the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction against the respondents, for not setting aside, among others,
Administrative Order No. 237, dated March 31, 1957, of the President of the Philippines,
dismissing the petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note that
one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner was the fact that he was found guilty in
engaging in electioneering, contrary to the provisions of the Election Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No. 2676, which was filed on
January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under Section 56, justices of the peace are
already expressly included among the officers enjoined from active political participation. The
argument is that with the filing of the said House Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that
existing laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political activities.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed
amendment to Rep. Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to section 54 of said Rep. Act No.
180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was a proposed re-codification of the existing
election laws at the time that it was filed. Besides, the proposed amendment, until it has
become a law, cannot be considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the
motives, opinions, and the reasons expressed by the individual members of the legislature
even in debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in ascertaining the meaning of a
statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec. 213, pp. 375-376), a fortiori what weight can
We give to a mere draft of a bill.
On law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that justices of the peace
are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be rejected. To accept it is to render
ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace from participating in
partisan politics. They were prohibited under the old Election Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582
and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code.
Another which expressed the prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act No.
357.
Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of
"expressio unius, est exclusion alterius" in arriving at the conclusion that justices of the peace
are not covered by Section 54. Said the Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of
exclusion, otherwise known as expressio unius est exclusion alterius, it would not be beyond
reason to infer that there was an intention of omitting the term "justice of the peace from
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."
The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a justice of the peace
from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the
reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the
rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied. (Appellant's Brief,
p. 6.)
Where a statute appears on its face to limit the operation of its provisions to particular
persons or things by enumerating them, but no reason exists why other persons or
things not so enumerated should not have been included, and manifest injustice will
follow by not so including them, the maxim expressio unius est exclusion alterius,
should not be invoked. (Blevins v. Mullally 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.) .
FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set
aside and this case is remanded for trial on the merits.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33140 October 23, 1978
J. M. TUASON & CO., INC., JOSE M. TUASON, NICASIO A. TUASON, TERESA TUASON,
CELSO S. TUASON and SEVERO A. TUASON, petitioners,
vs.
HON. HERMINIO C. MARIANO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
MANUELA AQUIAL, MARIA AQUIAL, Spouses JOSE M. CORDOVA and SATURNINA C.
CORDOVA, respondents.
Sison Law Office and Senensio O. Ortile for petitioners.
Hill & Associates Law Office for respondents Aquials.
Antonio E. Pesigan for respondents Cordovas.
AQUINO, J.:
This is another litigation regarding the validity of the much controverted Original Certificate of
Title No. 735 covering the Santa Mesa and D Estates of the Tuason mayorazgo or Entail with
areas of 877 (879) and 1,625 hectares, respectively (Barrette vs. Tuason, 50 Phil. 888; Benin
case, infra).
On October 1, 1965, Manuela Aquial and Maria Aquial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal Pasig Branch X, wherein they prayed that they be declared
the owners of a parcel of land located at Balara, Marikina, Rizal (now Quezon City) and
bounded on the north by Sapang Mapalad, on the south by the land of Eladio, Tiburcio on the
east by Sapang Kolotkolotan, and on the west by Sapang Kuliat The land, which has an area
of three hundred eighty-three quiñones was allegedly acquired by their father by means of a
Spanish title issued to him on May 10, 1877 (Civil Case No. 8943).
They alleged that sometime in 1960, or after J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. had illegally entered
upon that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT
No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of
defendants Mariano, Teresa, Juan, Demetrio and Augusta all surnamed Tuason pursuant to a
decree issued on July 6. 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration.
They further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from OCT No. 735, were issued to
defendants J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., University of the Philippines and National Waterworks
and Sewerage Authority (Nawasa) which leased a portion of its land to defendant Capitol Golf
Club.
Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void
due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. They asked for damages.
Defendant J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior judgment. The plaintiffs opposed
that motion. The lower court denied it. The grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as
affirmative defenses in the answer of defendants Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. They
insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses.
On January 25, 1967, the spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova, who had
bought eleven hectares of the disputed land from the plaintiffs, were allowed to intervene in
the case.
On September 5, 1970, the lower court issued an order requiring the parties the Register of
Deeds of Rizal to produce in court on October 16, 1970 OCT No. 735 and certain transfer
certificates of title derived from that first or basic title. Later, the court required the production
in court of the plan of the land covered by OCT No. 735 allegedly for the purpose of
determining whether the lands claimed by the plaintiffs and the intervenors are included
therein.
On February 11, 1971, the Tuason and J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed the instant civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the
complaint and enjoined from proceeding in the said case. After the petitioners had filed the
proper bond, a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. Respondents Aquial and Cordova
answered the petition. The parties, except the Aquials, filed memoranda in lieu of oral
argument.
The issue is whether OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom can be questioned at this
late hour by respondents Aquial and Cordova. The supposed irregularities in the land
registration proceeding, which led to the issuance of the decree upon which OCT. No. 735
was based, are the same issues raised in Civil Cases Nos. 3621, 3622 and 3623 of the lower
court. The 1965 decision of Judge Eulogio Mencias in those cases, in validating OCT No. 735,
is annexed to the complaint of the Aquials. It is cited by them to support their support their
action and it might have encouraged them to ventilate their action in court.
On appeal to this Court, that decision was reversed and the validity of OCT No. 735 and the
titles derived therefrom was once more upheld. (Benin vs. Tuason, L-26127, Alcantara vs.
Tuason, L-26128 and Pili vs. Tuason, L-26129, all decided on June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 531).
The ruling in the Benin, Alcantara and Pili cases was applied in Mara, Inc. vs. Estrella, L-
40511, July 25, 1975, 65 SCRA 471. That ruling is simply a reiteration or confirmation of the
holding in the following cases directly or incidentally sustaining OCT No. 735: Bank of the P. I.
vs. Acuña, 59 Phil. 183; Tiburcio vs. PHHC, 106 Phil. 447; Galvez and Tiburcio vs. Tuason y
de la Paz, 119 Phil. 612; Alcantara vs. Tuason, 92 Phil. 796; Santiago vs. J. M. Tuason & Co.,
Inc. 110 Phil. 16; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Bolaños, 95 Phil. 106; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc.
vs. Santiago, 99 Phil. 615; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281; J. M.
Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Aguirre, 117 Phil. 110; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Macalindong, 116
Phil. 1227; J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc. vs. Magdangal, 114 Phil. 42; Varsity Hills, Inc. vs.
Navarro, L-30889, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 503, and People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation vs. Mencias, L-24114, August 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 1031.
Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere (follow past
precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) it becomes evident that respondents
Aquial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case No. 8943 without eroding the
long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.
It is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and
again, consuming the court's time and energies at the expense of other litigants: Interest rei
publicae ut finis sit litium." (Varsity Hills, Inc. vs. Navarro, supra).
Finding the petition for certiorari and prohibition to be meritorious, the trial court is directed to
dismiss Civil Case No. 8943 with prejudice and without costs. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion Jr., and Santos, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J, took no part.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 210164 August 18, 2015
ROMMEL C. ARNADO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORANTE CAPITAN, Respondents,
CONCURRING OPINION
SERENO, CJ:
In Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, 1 we emphasized the variable nature of a
person's citizenship, which cannot be determined with finality or become the basis of rules that
can be applied to any and all proceedings thereafter. We said:
Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative
case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again
and again as the occasion may demand. 2
In election contests, this pronouncement gains significance, as elective local officials are
constitutionally allowed to run and serve for three consecutive terms. 3 While citizenship is a
continuing requirement that must be possessed not only at the time of election or assumption
of office, but also during the entire tenure of the official,4 it is not a continuing disqualification to
run for and hold public office.5
As such, each case involving the question of an elective official's citizenship must be treated
anew in accordance with the surrounding relevant facts and applicable laws.
In this regard, I agree with some of the statements of J Brion in his Dissenting Opinion.
Indeed, the Court's ruling in Maquiling v. COMELEc6 went only so far as to determine whether
Rommel C. Arnado (Amado) was qualified to run for public office in the 2010 elections. It did
not operate as, nor was it intended to be, a final determination of Amado's citizenship that
would forever derail his career as a public official.
In Maquiling, we reiterated that natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country may qualify to run
for public office upon taking the Oath of Allegiance 7 and making a sworn renunciation of their
foreign citizenship.8 Arnado subjected his citizenship to attack when he continued to use his
United States (US) passport to travel in and out of the country despite previously renouncing
his US citizenship. The Court ruled that his use of his US passport nullified the effect of his
previous renunciation of US citizenship. While he did not lose his Philippine citizenship in the
process, he reverted to his status as a dual citizen and remained as such at the time that he
filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
the 2010 elections. Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those with dual
citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local position.
Considering that the Court had pinpointed the defect in Amado's oath of renunciation, the
simple act of taking the oath anew would have been enough compliance with the requirement
of the law.
The Decision found that from the time Amado used his US passport to travel in and out of the
country up to the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for the succeeding elections in 2013,
there had been no change in his circumstances. 9 He still had not made a sworn renunciation
of his US citizenship. Thus, the ruling in Maquiling still applies: that Arnado had dual
citizenship when he filed for his candidacy on 1 October 2012.
It did not matter that Maquiling was promulgated months after Arnado had filed for candidacy.
Since he was not totally unaware that the use of his US passport might have adverse
consequences on his candidacy for the 2013 elections, the Decision concludes that he should
have been prudent enough to remedy whatever defect there might have been in his
citizenship.10
Even J. Brion concedes that Amado could have been more circumspect in order to secure his
qualification to run for public office. 11 However, it is insisted that the members of this Court
should remove the present case from the shadow of Maquiling and arrive at its resolution
based merely on the attendant factual and legal considerations specific to it. 12
It cannot be denied that by virtue of its being a decision of the Court that joins the country's
body of laws as jurisprudence, Maquiling serves as a "legal consideration" in the resolution of
the present case. Maquiling' s application cannot be helped, especially since the Decision
therein hinged not only on relevant laws, but largely on the facts then presented before the
Court. Thus, while the legal conclusion in Maquiling was not a final determination of Amado's
citizenship - as it applied only for purposes of the 2010 elections - the facts on which its legal
conclusion was founded cannot be totally ignored.
A person's citizenship may be "threshed out again and again" 13 in every proceeding as long as
it becomes relevant and necessary. Except for some clearly unmeritorious cases, it is always
a good idea to decide on the merits, especially in election controversies in which the law is
sometimes placed at odds with the will of the people. At the same time, the Court puts a
premium on economy, and where previous declarations of one's citizenship become pertinent,
those cases may be used as a take-off point if only to emphasize the differences and
similarities, as well as the measures that were taken in the interim.
One point of contention between the Decision and the Dissenting Opinion is the finding that
Arnado used his US passport for his travels in and out of the country on 12 January 2010 and
23 March 2010.
One point of contention between the Decision and the Dissenting Opinion is the finding that
Arnado used his US passport for his travels in and out of the country on 12 January 2010 and
23 March 2010.
Maquiling indeed made a finding that Arnado used his US passport for travel on those dates.
In the Court Resolution dated 2 July 2013, we said:
Well-settled is the rule that findings of fact of administrative bodies will not be interfered with
by the courts in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of said agencies, or
unless the aforementioned findings are not supported by substantial evidence.1âwphi1 They
are accorded not only great respect but even finality, and are binding upon this Court, unless it
is shown that the administrative body had arbitrarily disregarded or misapprehended evidence
before it to such an extent as to compel a contrary conclusion had such evidence been
properly appreciated.
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that COMELEC First
Division found that Arnado used his U.S. Passport at least six times after he renounced his
American citizenship. This was debunked by the COMELEC En Banc, which found that
Arnado only used his U.S. passport four times, and which agreed with Amado's claim that he
only used his U.S. passport on those occasions because his Philippine passport was not yet
issued. The COMELEC En Banc argued that Amado was able to prove that he used his
Philippine passport for his travels on the following dates: 12 January 2010, 31 January 2010,
31 March 2010, 16 April 2010, 20 May 2010, and 4 June 2010.
None of these dates coincide with the two other dates indicated in the certification issued by
the Bureau of Immigration showing that on 21 January 2010 and on 23 March 2010, Arnado
arrived in the Philippines using his U.S. Passport No. 057782700 which also indicated therein
that his nationality is USA-American. Adding these two travel dates to the travel record
provided by the Bureau of Immigration showing that Arnado also presented his U.S. passport
four times (upon departure on 14 April 2009, upon arrival on 25 June 2009, upon departure on
29 July 2009 and upon arrival on 24 November 2009), these incidents sum up to six.
The COMELEC En Banc concluded that "the use of the US passport was because to his
knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to him for his use." This conclusion,
however, is not supported by the facts. Arnado claims that his Philippine passport was issued
on 18 June 2009. The records show that he continued to use his U.S. passport even after he
already received his Philippine passport. Arnado's travel records show that he presented his
U.S. passport on 24 November 2009, on 21 January 2010, and on 23 March 2010. These
facts were never refuted by Arnado.
Thus, the ruling of the COMELEC En Banc is based on a misapprehension of the facts that
the use of the U.S. passport was discontinued when Amado obtained his Philippine
passport.14 (Emphases supplied)
It is important to clarify that the certification from the Bureau of Immigration indicated that
Amado arrived in the country using his US passport on 12 January 2010 and 23 March
2010.15 The Court gave full credence to the certification, not only because it carried with it the
presumption of regularity, but more important, Arnado never bothered to refute the contents
thereof.
On the basis of this finding, the Court rejected the claim that Amado's use of his US passport
several times were mere isolated acts that were done only because he was not yet issued his
Philippine passport.16
To my mind, this is the turning point of Maquiling that regrettably still applies in this case: that
whatever professions of faith and allegiance to the Republic that Amado claims when his
citizenship is in question, the fact remains that during the instances that he used his US
passport despite having a Philippine passport in his possession, those same professions
became hollow. And, that up to the filing of Amado's Certificate of Candidacy for the 2013
elections, he failed to remedy the fatal blow that such repeated use of his US passport dealt
on his electoral qualifications.
I therefore concur with the DISMISSAL of the PETITION.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
DISSENTING OPINION
BRION, J.:
The present certiorari petition,1filed under Rule 64 in relation with Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, involves the disqualification of the present petitioner, Rommel C. Amado (Arnado), in
the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections (May 2013 Elections).
This case traces its roots to the earlier disqualification case [docketed as SPA No . .J0-109
(DC)] filed against Amado in relation with the May 10, 2010 Elections, that led to the Court's
decision in Maquiling v. Comelec disqualifying Arnado. 2To some extent, the present case is
factually linked to the earlier disqualification case.
As in Maquiling, Amado and his qualification to run for public office are at the center of the
present petition. Private re8pondent Florante Capitan seeks to strengthen the linkage with the
earlier Maquiling case by adopting the Maquiling positions and considering the present case
as a seamless continuation of Maquiling.
Despite some commonalities, the present disqualification case, however, is separate and
substantively distinct from the Maquiling disqualification case. The present case involves an
election period (2013) separate and distinct from the election period covered by the Maquiling
ruling (2010). The factual circumstances and consequent legal considerations also vary, as
will be explained below, so that the present case need not necessarily follow the governing
ruling in Maquiling.
Thus, at the outset, I invite the Court: to keep an open mind and remove any initial impression
that the present case is a re-run of Maquiling; to recognize that at some point, the present
case diverges from and must be viewed independently of Maquiling; and to resolve it from the
perspective solely of the attendant factual and legal considerations specific to it.
The Court must not also forget that this is an election case where the electorate has its own
separate interest to protect. This is an interest that the Court must not ignore when the issues
posed carry the potential of setting aside the electorate's expressed choice.
Notably, the present controversy involves .a candidate whose disqualification (to run for
elective office) has twice been sought based on the same cited facts and grounds, but who
nevertheless has twice been elected by a clear and overwhelming majority of the voters - in
the May 2010 and May 2013 Elections. In 2013, he garnered 84% of the votes of the people of
Kauswagan.
This clear and undeniably overwhelming voice of the electorate, to my mind, renders it
necessary for the Court to consider and apply deeper democratic principles. 3 The
circumstances of the present controversy call for this kind of consideration, particularly when
the electorate's already limited democratic decision making process runs the risk of being
negated for no clear and conclusive reason, as discussed below.
To disregard the electorate's voice once can perhaps be excused by invoking the rule of law;
to ignore the people's voice a second time can only be justified by clear reasons from this
Court that the people can readily understand.
I submit this Dissenting Opinion to object to the ponencia's conclusion that Arnado is
disqualified from running in the May 2013 Elections and that his proclamation as
elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, should now be set aside.
I specifically find the ponencia 's conclusions grossly erroneous and tainted with grave abuse
of discretion based on the following considerations:
(1) Amado became a "pure" Philippine citizen on April 3, 2009, after he took his oath
of allegiance and executed his affidavit of renunciation. That he was subsequently
deemed to have recanted his renunciation is unfortunate, but even the Maquiling
ruling recognizes that for some eleven (11) days (i.e., from April 3 to 14, 2009), he
was qualified to run for public office because he was a "pure" Filipino.
Arnado more than reconfirmed and regained this status and was qualified to run for
public office in the May 2013 Elections based on his persistent assertions of sole
allegiance to the Republic and his repeated renunciation of his US citizenship.
a. Separately from the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation that Maquiling
said Amado recanted, Arnado executed on May 9, 2013, another Affidavit of
Renunciation affirming the terms of his April 3, 2009 Affidavit and thus cured
any defect in his qualification to run in the May 2013 Elections.
(2) The legal consequences of the Maquiling ruling is limited to Arado's qualification
for public office in the May 2010 elections.
a. The intervening 2010 Maquiling disqualification ruling did not and could not
have invalidated Arnado's status as a "pure" Philippine citizen who was
qualified to run for public office after having complied with the RA No. 9225
requirements in the May 2013 Elections.
(3) The Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the May 9, 2013
Confirmation of the Oath of Affirmation was filed out of time.
a. The Comelec grossly failed to consider (i) the circumstances of the filing of
the October 1, 2012 Certificate of Candidacy (CoC), and (ii) the circumstances
and the dynamics between the 2010 Maquiling case and ruling, and the
present 2013 disqualification case, in terms of the retroactive application of
the Maquiling ruling.
 b. When Amado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 (for the 2013 Elections), the
prevailing Comelec en bane ruling [in its February 2, 2011 resolution in SPA
No. 10-109 (DC)] was that he was not disqualified to run for elective public
office; hence, Amado did not need to execute another affidavit of renunciation.
c. Based solely on the Maquiling Decision (that pertained to Arnado's
disqualification for the 2010 elections), the Comelec disqualified Arnado for
the May 2013 elections because his October 1, 2012 CoC was not supported
by any Affidavit of Renunciation (since Maquiling considered his April 3, 2009
Affidavit of Renunciation for the 2010 elections effectively recanted). This
Comelec ruling disregards the unusual consequences of the April 3, 2009
Affidavit and the unique circumstances under which the October 1, 2012 CoC
was filed.
d. Since the Comelec did not accept the Affidavit of Renunciation that Arnado
filed on May 9, 2013 (for the 2013 Elections) in the light of the 2010 Maquiling
ruling, he was placed in an impossible situation of being disqualified in 2013
for a ruling applicable to the 2010 elections, without being given the
opportunity to submit his compliance for the May 2013 elections.
e. Notably, his May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation, submitted to comply
with his May 2013 candidacy, was rejected because it should have been filed
on October 1, 2012 (i.e., when he filed his CoC for the May 2013 elections). If
the Maquiling ruling, made on April 16, 2013, was made to retroactively apply
to October 1, 2012, so should the opportunity to comply be similarly made
retroactive. To the extent he was denied this opportunity is grave abuse of
discretion.
(4) Af any rate, all doubts should be resolved in favour of Arnado's qualification:
a. Arnado' s unequivocal acts and show of allegiance to the Republic and
renunciation of other citizenships, taken together, should have resolved all
doubts in favor of his qualification;
b. the mandate of the people of Kauswagan that twice elected Amado as their
Mayor should be respected and upheld.
I. Roots of the Present Petition
A. Factual Background
For a· fuller understanding of the present disqualification case, I reiterate below the important
antecedent facts.
Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his Filipino citizenship after becoming a
naturalized citizen of the United States of America (US.) in 1985.
In 2003, Congress enacted Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003).4
Arnado opted to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA No. 9225 and soon filed
the required application before the Philippine Consul General in San Francisco, U.S.A. On
July 10, 2008, Arnado took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; the
Approval of his Citizenship retention and re-acquisition was issued on the same date.
On April 3, 2009, Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship
(interchangeably referred to, from here on, as April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation or 2009
express renunciation).
On April 14, 2009, Arnado left the country for the US using his US passport - US passport (No.
057782700) - which identified his nationality as "USA-American." He returned to the country
on June 25, 2009, using the same US passport. He again left for the US on July 29, 2009, and
returned to the country on November 24, 2009, still using his US passport.
Unknown to Amado, however, the Philippine Consulate General in San Francisco, USA, had
approved and issued in his favor a Philippine Passport (No. XX 3979162) on June 18,
2009.5 He only received this Philippine passport three months later.6
From then on, he used his Philippine passport in his travels on the following dates: December
11, 2009 (departure); January 12, 2010 (arrival); January 31, 2010 (departure); March 31,
2010 (arrival); April 11, 2010 (departure); April 16, 2010 (arrival); May 20, 2010 (departure);
and June 4, 2010 (arrival).7
B. The Maquiling Case and its Incidents
On November 30, 2009, Amado filed his CoC for the mayoralty post of Kauswagan, Lanao del
Norte, for the May 2010 Elections. On the same day, he executed another Affidavit of
Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance.8
Notably, this Affidavit of Renunciation came after his travel using an American passport.
Linog C. Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed with the Comelec a petition to disqualify
Amado and/or to cancel his CoC (2010 Disqualification case) on the ground that Arnado
remained a US citizen: he continued to use his US passport for entry to and exit from the
Philippines after executing the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. Balua's petition was
docketed as SPA No. 10-109 (DC).
Arnado was proclaimed the winning candidate in the May 2010 Elections.
In a resolution dated February 2, 2011, the Comelec En Banc ruled [in SPA No. 10-109 (DC))
that Arnado's use of his US passport, subsequent to his 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, did not
have the effect of reverting him to his status as a dual citizen. The Comelec En Banc found
believable and plausible Arnado's explanation that he continued to use his US passport
because he only knew of and received his Philippine passport three months after it was issued
on June 18, 2009. As soon as he received his Philippine passport, he used it in his
subsequent travels abroad.
The 2010 disqualification case eventually reached this Court via the petition for certiorari filed
by Maquiling; the case was. docketed as GR No. 195649 entitled Maquiling v. Comelec.
a. The Court's Maquiling Decision.
In its April 16, 2013 Decision, the Court annulled and set aside the Comelec En Banc 's
February 2, 2011 Resolution; disqualified Amado from running for the position of Mayor; and
declared Maquiling the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, in the May 2010
Elections. The Court ruled that by his subsequent use of his US passport, Arnado effectively
disavowed or recanted his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
In ruling on the case, the Court significantly acknowledged that:
i. The "act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino
citizenship, which he re-acquired by repatriation. By representing himself as
an American citizen, however, Amado voluntarily and effectively reverted to
his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took
place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using
his US passport. "
ii. "In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a
period of eleven days, or from April 3, 2009, until 14 April 2009, on which date
 he first used his American passport after renouncing his American
citizenship."10
C. The Present Disqualification Case
On October l, 2012, and while the Maquiling case was still pending before this Court (so that
the existing standing rule was the Comelec ruling that he was qualified to be a candidate),
Arnado filed his CoC11 for the same mayoralty post for the May 2013 Elections. Thus, Arnado
saw no need to undertake another Renunciation.
Respondent Florante Capitan also filed his CoC12 for the same position.
On April 16, 2013, the Court issued its Decision in Maquiling v. Comelec, disqualifying Arnado
for the May 2010 Elections.
Apparently in response to the Maquiling ruling, Arnado executed on May 9, 2013, an Oath of
Allegiance and Oath of Renunciation affirming the terms of his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation(herein referred to as 2013 Affidavit).13Arnado undertook the required acts as
soon as he was aware that they had to be done to perfect his May 2013 candidacy.
On May 10, 2013, Capitan filed a petition to disqualify14 Arnado from running for the
Kauswagan mayoralty post and/or to cancel his CoC (2013 Disqualification case) based on
the Court's Maquiling ruling. The case was docketed as SPA No. 13-309 (DC) and was raffled
to the Comelec
Second Division (Second Division).15
On May 14, 2013, during the pendency of the 2013 Disqualification case before. the Second
Division, Arnado was proclaimed the duly elected Mayor of Lanao del Norte in the May 2013
Elections.16
Capitan responded to the proclamation by filing a petition to nullify Arnado's proclamation,
arguing that pursuant to the Maquiling ruling (which declared Amado disqualified from running
for any local elective office), Arnado's proclamation was void and carried no legal effect.
In a resolution dated July 2, 2013, the Court denied Arnado's motion for reconsideration of the
April 16, 2013 Maquiling Decision.
II. The Proceedings before the Comelec
A. Comelec Second Division Ruling
In its resolution dated September 6, 2013, in SP A No. 13-309(DC), the Comelec Second
Division disqualified Amado from running in the May 2013 Elections.
The Second Division declared that at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, Arnado
still failed to comply with RA No. 9225's requirement of making a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship, as his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation
had been deemed withdrawn or recalled pursuant to Maquiling. His 2013 Affidavit did not
rectify this failure as this subsequent affidavit should have been executed on or before the
filing of his CoC on October 1, 2012
B. The Comelec En Banc Ruling
In its December 9, 2013 resolution, the Comelec En Banc fully affirmed the Second Division's
ruling; annulled Arnado's proclamation; and declared Capitan the duly elected mayor of
Kauswagan..
III. The Issues
The issues raised for the Court's consideration are:
A. Whether the Comelec En Banc and the Second Division violated procedural due
process and committed grave abuse of discretion in failing to dismiss the petitions
filed by Capitan for forum shopping and/or late filing;
B. Whether the Comelec En Banc violated due process and committed grave abuse of
discretion by allowing . Commissioner Elias Yusoph to review the decision he wrote
for the Second Division;
C. Whether the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in disenfranchising
84o/o of the voters ofKauswagan in the May 2013 elections; and
D. Whether the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying Arnado
who had fully complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 before the filing of his
CoC on October 1, 2012.
IV. Refutation of the Ponencia
A. Re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225; purposes and legaleffect of the
oath of allegiance and oath of renunciation
RA No. 9225 was enacted to allow natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine
citizenship through naturalization in a foreign country, to expeditiously re-acquire Philippine
citizenship. 17 It is a unique mode of re-acquiring Philippine citizenship and is a far departure
from the citizenship re-acquisition procedure under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 63,18 the law
in place before RA No. 9225 was enacted.
Under CA No. 63, Philippine citizenship may be re-acquired by: (1) naturalization; (2)
repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy, or Air Corps, or of a woman who has lost her
citizenship by reason of marriage to an alien after the termination of her marital status; and (3)
direct act of the National Assembly.19
Notably, re-acquisition of Philippine Citizenship under the first mode (i.e., by naturalization)
involves the more stringent procedure laid down in CA No. 473.20 The reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship under the second mode (i.e., by repatriation), on the other hand,
provides for an easier procedure as it requires only the taking of the oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry; it applies, however, only
to the specific group of persons enumerated therein.
Under the procedure currently in place under RA No. 9225, the re-acquisition of Philippine
citizenship requires only the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines in
a manner similar to the second mode under CA No. 63. But, RA No. 9225 provides for a
deeper effect by declaring it a State policy that under its terms "all Philippine citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship"21 under the
conditions provided therein.
The full implication of the effects of RA No. 9225 can fully be appreciated by considering
Section 3 of the law, which reads:
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"'I , solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme
authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion." [emphases supplied]
By its express terms, this oath is one of allegiance that recognizes the "supreme authority" of
the Philippines and the obligation to "maintain true faith and allegiance thereto."
These terms, while seemingly allowing dual citizenship for natural-born Filipino citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens in a foreign
country,22 carry the implicit effect of renouncing their foreign citizenship and allegiance
because of the renewed allegiance that is accorded to the supreme authority of the Republic. 23
In effect, the problem of dual allegiance created by dual citizenship is transferred from the
Philippines to the foreign country. Since the latest oath that the person takes is one of
allegiance to the Republic, whatever treatment the foreign country may have on his or her
status is a matter outside the concern and competence of the Philippine government!. 24
The congressional exchanges on dual citizenship and the potential problem of dual allegiance
(which under the Constitution is inimical to public interest), attest to this interpretation as these
exchanges reconciled the possession of dual citizenship and the dual allegiance that the
Constitution states to "be inimical to public interest."
Pursuing his point, Rep. Dilangalen noted that under the measure, two situations exist - the
retention of foreign citizenship, and the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In this case, he
observed that there are two citizenships and therefore, two allegiances. He pointed out that
under the Constitution, dual allegiance is inimical to public interest. He thereafter asked
whether with the creation of dual allegiance by reason of retention of foreign citizenship and
the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, there will now be a violation of the Constitution ....
Rep. Locsin underscored that the measure does not seek to address the constitutional
injunction on dual allegiance as inimical to public interest. He said that the proposed law aims
to facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by speedy means. However, he said that
in one sense, it addresses the problem of dual citizenship by requiring the taking of an oath.
He explained that the problem of dual citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the
foreign country because the latest oath that will be taken by the former Filipino is one of
allegiance to the Philippines and not to the United States, as the case may be. He added that
this is a matter which the Philippine government will have no concern and competence over.
Rep. Dilangalen asked why this will no longer be the country's concern, when dual allegiance
is involved.
Rep. Locsin clarified that this was precisely his objection to the original version of the bill,
which did not require an oath of allegiance. Since the measure now requires this oath, the
problem of dual allegiance is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign country concerned,
he explained.
Rep. Dilangalen asked whether in the particular case, the person did not denounce his foreign
citizenship and therefore still owes allegiance to the foreign government, and at the same
time, owes his allegiance to the Philippine government, such that there is now a case of dual
citizenship and dual allegiance.
Rep. Locsin clarified that by swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. However, he said that this is not a matter that he
wishes to address in Congress because he is not a member of a foreign parliament but a
Member of the House.
Rep. Locsin replied that it is imperative that those who have dual allegiance contrary to
national interest should be dealt with by law. However, he said that the dual allegiance
problem is not addressed in the bill. He then cited the Declaration of Policy in the bill which
states that "It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions of this Act." He stressed that what the bill does is recognize Philippine citizenship
but says nothing about the other citizenship.
Rep. Locsin further pointed out that the problem of dual allegiance is created wherein a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines takes an oath of allegiance to another country and in
that oath says that he abjures and absolutely renounces all allegiance to his country of origin
and swears allegiance to that foreign country. The original Bill had left it at this stage, he
explained. In the present measure, he clarified, a person is required to take an oath and the
last he utters is one of allegiance to the country. He then said that the problem of dual
allegiance is no longer the problem of the Philippines but of the other foreign country.
[emphases supplied]
Jurisprudence confirms this interpretation of RA No. 9225 in AASJS v. Hon.
Datumanong25 when the Court pointedly declared:
By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his
foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem
of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether OF not there is
dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was
not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225.26 [emphasis supplied]
The oath of allegiance taken under RA No. 9225 entitles a person to enjoy full civil and
political rights that include the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of the government. 27 He or she may now vote.
To be voted upon to an elective office, however, a natural-born Filipino citizen who has
implicitly renounced foreign allegiance when he or she swears allegiance to the Republic
under RA No. 9225 must still make his or her previous implicit renunciation "express." In the
words of the law, he must "make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship." [Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225]
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws, and at the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath; .... [emphases and
underscoring supplied]
The requirement of an express renunciation, however, does not negate the effect of, or make
any less real, the prior implicit renunciation of citizenship and allegiance made upon taking the
oath of allegiance. Thus, persons availing of RA No. 9225 do not renounce their foreign
citizenship for the first time by executing the Affidavit of renunciation that Section 5(2) of the
law requires; they have implicitly made this renunciation when they swore allegiance to the
supreme authority of the Republic.
What the oath of renunciation simply does is to make express what natural-born. Filipino
citizens have already implicitly renounced. The requirement of express renunciation highlights
the implication that it is not the exclusive means by which natural-born Filipino citizens may
renounce their foreign citizenship. In reality, the oath of renunciation is a requirement simply
for the purpose of running for elective public office, apparently to ensure that foreign
citizenship and mixed loyalties are kept out of the elective public service.
To paraphrase Japzon v. Comelec, 28 the oath of renunciation makes these natural-born
potential candidates for public office "pure" Philippine citizens 29 from the perspective of the
election laws.
In sum, the oath of allegiance not only allows these natural-born Filipinos to re-acquire
Philippine citizenship; thereby, they also implicitly renounce their citizenship and allegiance to
any and all foreign country as they assert allegiance to the "supreme authority of the
Philippines and xx x maintain true faith and allegiance thereto". The oath of renunciation, on
the other hand, complements their oath of allegiance through the express manifestation, for
purpose of running for public office, that the candidate is a "pure" Filipino.
B. Arnado's attainment, loss of "pure" Filipino citizen status, and subsequent Developments
Based on the above discussions, I find - as the ponencia and the majority in Maquiling did -
that Arnado became a "pure" Philippine citizen when he took his oath of allegiance to the
Philippines on July 10, 2008, and his oath of renunciation on April 3, 2009. 30 With his oath of
renunciation, he became solely a Filipino citizen with total allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
He could have, at that point, validly run for public office, except that subsequent to his
renunciation, he travelled using his U.S. passport - a development that the Maquiling ruling
unfortunately characterized as a recantation of his previous renunciation of American
citizenship.
Had the developments that transpired in Amado's political life simply stopped with his
candidacy in the May 2010 Elections, then the present case and its complications would have
been avoided. But as subsequent developments showed, a confluence of complicating factors
arose.
First, Arnado ran again for the same office in the May 2013 Elections, and events overlapped.
His disqualification case was not resolved with dispatch so that the period for the filing of the
CoC for the May 2013 Elections (in October 2012) was set while the present case was still
pending with this Court.
Second, at that time, the standing ruling was the Comelec en bane decision that Arnado was
not disqualified and had perfected the required submissions for his candidacy. No restraining
order or any other ruling from this Court intervened to prevent this Comelec ruling from being
the governing rule in the interim.
As a result, Amado saw no need to undertake remedial measures addressing the matters
complained about in the 2010 Maquiling disqualification case. But at that point, he had already
filed two oaths of renunciation - on April 3, 2009 and on November 30, 2009 - when he filed
his CoC for the May 2010 Elections.
Third, he did not submit any oath of renunciation together with his October 1, 2012 CoC since,
to his knowledge, he had complied with the requirements of RA No. 9225 and the Local
Government Code, and had attained "pure" Filipino citizen status. (That he did attain this
status based on the 2008 oath of allegiance and his 2009 affidavit of renunciation is in fact
confirmed by Maquiling, although his subsequent recantation intervened.)
Arnado's political world was overturned when the Court resolved the May 2010 disqualification
case on April 16, 2013, or a few days before the May 2013 elections. But Arnado did not fully
dwell on the past. While filing a motion for reconsideration of the Maquiling ruling, he also
acted on his October 1, 2012 CoC by executing and submitting, on May 9, 2013, an Oath of
Allegiance and Oath of Renunciation affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
Thus, from the perspective of the laws governing natural-born Filipinos who have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship and who wish to run for public office, Amado did not only comply with the
twin requirements of RA No. 9225 as of April 3, 2009; he even exceeded the requirements of
the law by asserting his oath of allegiance to the Republic four times, while also impliedly
renouncing any and all foreign citizenships for the same number of "times, and twice expressly
renouncing any and all other citizenships (with one express renunciation declared recanted by
Maquiling).
All these are material considerations that should be taken into account in resolving the present
case and are more fully discussed under separate headings below.
C. The Comelec gravely abused its
discretion in ruling that the May 9, 2013 Confirmation of Oath of
Affirmation was out of time.
After the promulgation of the Maquiling Decision disqualifying Amado for the May 2010
elections and relying solely on its terms, the Comelec disqualified Amado for the May 2013
elections because his October 1, 2012 CoC was not supported by any Affidavit of
Renunciation (since Maquiling considered his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation for the
May 2010 elections effectively recanted).
The Comelec ruling and its underlying reasons are, on their face, patently unreasonable since
they did not consider at all the surrounding circumstances of the filing of the October 1, 2012
CoC and the circumstances that led to the absence of any oath of renunciation after the
Maquiling ruling. The Comelec approach is in fact simplistic to the point of grave abuse of
discretion. Apparently, it considered that with the oath of renunciation·recanted and with no
oath filed with the October 1, 2012 CoC, then the CoC should be considered fatally deficient.
The ponencia 's reasoning also runs this way.
Subject to fuller discussions below, I submit that the Comelec missed out on at least three (3)
basic considerations.
First, at the time the October 1, 2012 CoC was filed, the prevailing ruling, although then
contested before the Court, was the Comelec en bane ruling that did not consider Arnado
disqualified. To reiterate, no intervening restraining order was issued by this Court addressing
this Comelec ruling. Hence, there was no immediate need, at the time of the CoC's filing, for a
replacement supporting oath of renunciation.
Second, since the Comelec did not accept Amado's May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation (for
the May 2013 Elections) in the light of the Maquiling 11Jling (affecting the May 2010
elections), he was placed in an impossible situation of being disqualified in the May 2013
Elections for a ruling applicable only to the May 2010 Elections, without being given the
opportunity to submit his compliance for the May 2013 Elections.
Third, along the same line of thought, Arnado's May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation,
submitted to comply with his May 2013 candidacy, was rejected because it should have been
filed on October 1, 2012 (i.e., when he filed his CoC for the May 2013 elections).
If the Maquiling ruling of April 16, 2013, which addressed the separate 2010 disqualification
case, was made to retroactively apply to October 1, 2012, in the separate 2013 disqualification
case, then a retroactive opportunity should also be given in the 2013 disqualification case to
comply with what retroactively applied in Maquiling.
To the extent that Arnado was denied the chance to submit a replacement ·oath of
renunciation in 2013, there was an unfair and abusive denial of opportunity equivalent to grave
abuse of discretion.
D. The Maquiling ruling is limited to Arnado 's qualification to run for publicoffice and only for
the purpose of the May 2010 elections
I submit that the ponencia 's ruling, insofar as it adopts the Maquiling ruling, is an overreach
that runs counter to the policy behind RA No. 9225.
I submit that the extent of the legal consequences of the Maquiling ruling affect solely Arnado
's qualification to run for public office and only for the purpose of the May 2010 elections.
These consequences should not be extended to situations outside of and not contemplated by
Maquiling.
The following reasons support my view:
First, the Maquiling ruling only considered the material facts surrounding the May 2010
Elections. The critical facts on which the Maquiling case turned dwelt with the travels of
Amado using his U.S. passport. These facts are not contested in the present case. Nor am I
contesting that for eleven days in April 2009, Amado was a "pure" Filipino, until a recantation
of his renunciation oath took place. These are settled and accepted facts.
The Maquiling ruling left out, because these are facts that it did not consider material for its
resolution (such as the overlaps in the filing of the October 1, 2012 CoC and the resolution of
Maquiling; the effect of Maquiling on the 2013 disqualification case; the oath of allegiance and
renunciation that accompanied the November 30, 2009 CoC for the May 2010 elections) or
because they were outside the scope of the relevant facts of Maquiling (such as the prevailing
Comelec en bane ruling on October 1, 2012 when Amado filed his CoC; the facts surrounding
the filing of the CoC on October 1, 2012; and the May 9, 2013 filing of the Oath of Allegiance
and Oath of Renunciation affirming his April 3; 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation).
From these perspectives, how can the 2010 Maquiling case be a seamless continuation of the
2013 disqualification case now before this Court?
Second, the implied renunciation of foreign citizenship that Amado made on several occasions
is different from and has distinct legal implications separate from the express renunciation he
made on April 3, 2009.
The implied renunciation of foreign citizenship proceeds from the oath of allegiance that
natural-born Filipino citizens take to re-acquire Philippine citizenship. This is patent from the
terms of the oath of allegiance and is a consequence of the resulting re-acquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
The express renunciation, in contrast, is an after-the-fact requirement that arises only if these
natural-born Filipino citizens choose to run for public office. The requirement of an express
renunciation of foreign citizenship arises only after they have re-acquired Philippine citizenship
for the exclusive purpose of qualifying them for elective public office.
Note in this regard that Maquiling declared as recanted only the express renunciation that
Arnado executed on April 3, 2009, not the implied renunciation that Amado made on several
occasions when he swore allegiance to the supreme authority of the Republic.
This Maquiling declaration and the distinction that it signifies are crucial: first, the implied
renunciation of foreign allegiance that Amado made on several occasions still stands as valid,
as Maquiling affected only his April 3, 2009 express renunciation; second, the implied
renunciation must be valid because it did not affect Amado's reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship; and third, Arnado's express renunciation was declared recanted solely for the
purpose of the May 2010 Elections, not for any and all other purposes.
In short, Maquiling did not declare Arnado 's renunciation of his US citizenship invalid for all
purposes; it certainly could not have done so as that case involved an election disqualification
case that challenged Amado's candidacy for the mayoralty post by reason of an alleged defect
in his qualification, i.e., Amado's isolated acts that, to the majority, effectively recanted his
express renunciation.
In ruling as it did, Maquiling did not and could not have gone beyond the confines of the
underlying election disqualification case and could not have ruled on Arnado 's Philippine
citizenship per se without exceeding the confines of the Court's jurisdiction.
Citizenship and its loss, acquisition, and re-acquisition are much broader concepts that cannot
definitively be affected by a Court ruling in an election disqualification case, even if the
disqualification case touches on the citizenship qualification of the candidate. Thus, I submit
that Maquiling invalidated Arnado 's renunciation oath solely for the purpose of his
qualification/or the May 2010 elections.
Third, Amado became a "pure" Philippine citizen as of April 3, 2009, a legal consequence that
Maquiling recognized and conceded as it declared that "he in fact did" comply with the "twin
requirements under RA No. 9225" for the purpose of election qualification.
What made the Court rule against Amado's qualification for the May 2010 Elections was the
finding of positive, albeit isolated, acts that effectively "disqualified him from running for an
elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991."
Otherwise stated, Amado, in the Maquiling sense, was indisputably already a "pure" Philippine
citizen as of April 3, 2009. He reverted to a dual citizen status (and only from the perspective
of the concerned foreign country) only on the date subsequent to April 3, 2009, and only by
virtue of the ruling that considered his use of his US passport on isolated occasions as a
"voluntar[y] and effective[] [act of] revert[ing] to [the] earlier status [of] a dual citizen."
To quote and highlight the majority's pronouncement on this point: "[s]uch reversion was not
retroactive as it took place the instant Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by
using his US passport. ,,31
Thus, even if only for qualification purposes, the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was a
valid and Court-recognized express declaration of Amado's renunciation of his US citizenship
that the Court cannot lightly disregard in the present disqualification case.
Fourth, even Maquiling did not perpetually and absolutely disqualify Arnado from running for
any elective public office, or from running in any elections as they declared that "[h]e is
disqualified xx from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 elections. "32
In other words, Maquiling declared Amado as disqualified from running only in the May 2010
Elections; they did not declare him as disqualified for any and all other elections, including the
May 2013 Elections.
E. Arnado's May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit, cured
any alleged defect in his qualification to run for public office during the May 2013 Elections
I take exception to the ponencia 's ruling that ignores Amado's May 9, 2013 Affidavit of
Renunciation simply because it was executed after Amado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012. I
submit that Arnado's May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation bears crucial significance to
Amado's qualification to run for the May 2013 Elections which the Court cannot and should not
lightly ignore.
Maquiling unequivocably held that by using an American passport, he effectively recanted his
express renunciation of his US citizenship.
Jurisprudence defines the act of recantation to mean to "withdraw or repudiate formally and
publicly;" "to renounce or withdraw prior statement." To "retract" means to "take back;" "to
retract an offer is to withdraw it before acceptance. "33
That Arnado took back his statement disavowing allegiance to the US government, however,
does not render invalid his status as a natural-born Filipino citizen; neither does it negate the
fact that he had impliedly renounced his US citizenship, and had subsequently made an
express renunciation of his US citizenship.
Granting that Amado's use of his US passport amounted to a withdrawal of the express
renunciation he made of his allegiance to the US, this withdrawal does not erase the fact that
he did make an express renunciation of his US citizenship.
To my mind, this express renunciation, even if recanted, may still be re-affirmed, ·in the same
way a statement already made and subsequently denied, can be re-confirmed. Thus, Arnado's
2013 Affidavit of Renunciation can validly re-affirm the 2009 express renunciation that the
Court held to have been recanted in Maquiling.
Note that in the May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation, Amado categorically stated that he
renounces his US citizenship, as well as any and all foreign citizenship; swears allegiance to
the Republic; and confirms the renunciation (of his US citizenship). he had previously made in
the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.
Note, likewise, that as explained above, the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation is a valid
and Court-confirmed oath that Amado had validly confirmed in his May 9, 2013 Affidavit. To
confirm means "to make firm: strengthen in a resolution, conviction, loyalty, position; to give
new assurance of the truth or validity; to state or imply the truth,"34and implies a prior existing
act.
Finally, note that the Maquiling ruling was issued after Amado took his oath of allegiance to
the Republic four times - on July 10, 2008, April 3, 2009 (when he executed the affidavit of
renunciation); November 30, 2009 (when he filed his CoC for the May 2010 Elections); and
October 1, 2012 (when he filed his CoC for the May 2013 Elections). It was also issued after
Arnado renounced his US citizenship expressly on April 3, 2009, and impliedly on four
occasions - on July 10, 2008; April 3, 2009; November 30, 2009; and October 1, 2012 - when
he swore allegiance to the supreme authority of the Republic.
In fact, in his October 1, 2012 CoC, Amado made the following oath:
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain
true faith and allegiance thereto. I will obey all laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities. I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental
reservation and purpose of evasion.
Taken together, all these facts undeniably show that Amado's May 9, 2013 Affidavit of
Renunciation was not entirely new, nor completely different and independent from the oath of
renunciation that Arnado took on April 3, 2009. Rather, it affirmed and revalidated the Court-
recognized renunciation oath that he had earlier taken.
Indisputably, Maquiling found that Amado's express renunciation had been validly made. This
express renunciation, having been disavowed, can be re-affirmed by subsequent acts -
through his May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation and through the statement in his October 1,
2012 CoC.
The statement in Amado's October 1, 2012 CoC, for instance, is substantially similar to the
oath of allegiance required in RA No. 9225. This oath not only recognizes Amado's Filipino
citizenship, but impliedly renounces his US citizenship. That he swore sole allegiance to the
Philippine Republic in his October 1, 2012 CoC in effect affirmed his express renunciation of
US citizenship; and thus dispenses with the need for another express renunciation.
Rather than an oath that should simply be brushed aside as the Comelec did, the May 9, 2013
Affidavit served: first, to repair his reverted dual citizen status as declared in Maquiling; and
second, to re-assert and emphasize his clear intent to renounce his US citizenship which he
had expressly done once and impliedly done four times.
In this sense, the May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation retroacted to April 3, 2009, and cured
any alleged defect in Amado's October 1, 2012 CoC. More importantly, it cured any defect that
the intervening Maquiling ruling introduced on Amado's qualification to run for public office
during the May 2013 Elections.
That Amado executed his May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation while Maquiling was still
under the Court's consideration (it was not confirmed on reconsideration until July 2, 2013) is
not without significance. While the May 9, 2013 Affidavit was filed for purposes of the present
disqualification case, it could have, had the Court been so inclined, considered as a factor in
ruling on Maquiling's reconsideration; but apparently it was not at all considered since
Amado's use of his US passport was the focal point of the controversy.
F. The intervening Maquiling ruling did not and could not have invalidated his
status as a "pure" Philippine citizen who was qualified to run and had filed a
valid CoC for the May 2013 Elections As the legal consequences of the Maquiling. ruling on
Amado's renunciation of his US citizenship did not extend beyond his qualification to run for
public office during the May 2010 elections; and that the May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation
cured any alleged defect in Amado's qualification to run for the May 2013 Elections, I submit
that the Maquiling ruling on April 16, 2013 did not affect and could not have affected Armado's
qualification to run for public office for the purpose of the May 2013 Elections.
Under the circumstances, Amado had effectively become a "pure" natural-born Philippine
citizen again on October 1, 2012, when he executed the retroactive and curative May 9, 2013
Affidavit of Renunciation, and which status continued well beyond the May 2013 Elections. In
this way, Arnado qualified for the position of Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, and filed
a valid CoC.
G. When Arnado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, the Comelec En Banc, in its February 2,
2011 Resolution in SPA No. 10-109(DC), declared him as qualified to run/or the elective office;
hence, Arnado did not need to executeanother Affidavit of Renunciatio nbecause of this
standing Comelec ruling
I likewise strongly object to the ponencia for faulting Amado for not executing another oath of
renunciation at the time of or prior to the filing of his CoC on October 1, . 2012, reasoning out
that as "early as 2010 x x x Amado has gotten wind that the use of his US passport might pose
a problem to his candidacy."
It should be remembered that in the February 2, 2011 Resolution in SP A No. 10-109(DC), the
Comelec En Banc declared Arnado as a "pure" Philippine citizen again, qualified to run for
elective public office. This Comelec ruling still stood and had not yet been overturned at the
time Arnado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for the May 2013 Elections. Arnado, therefore,
had every right and reason to rely on this Comelec ruling and to believe that he was not
disqualified to run in the May 2013 Elections.
I concede that, as the events have shown, he should, in retrospect, have exercised greater
care and have taken every. step to secure his qualification to run for public office. His failure,
however, should not and cannot affect his qualification which then stands and is authoritatively
affirmed by the Comelec.
Indeed "there is no law prohibiting him from executing an Affidavit of Renunciation every
election period" as the ponencia puts it. But, note that there is equally no law that requires him
to constantly and consistently· assert his renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
Neither is there any law that expressly or impliedly imposes on natural-born Filipino citizens
the obligation to constantly assert their allegiance to the Republic and perform positive acts to
assert this allegiance.
In fact, as the law stands, natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country need only to take
an oath of allegiance to the supreme authority of the Republic to re-acquire Philippine
citizenship as they are "deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship." Once they re-
acquire their Philippine citizenship after complying with these legal steps, they no longer need
to perform any positive act to assert Philippine citizenship or to elect citizenship.35
H. Arnado 's persistent assertions of his
allegiance to the Republic and
renunciation of his US citizenship more
than sufficiently proved his determined
resolve to profess allegiance only to the
Republic; these continuing assertions
should have resolved any doubt in favor
of his qualification
RA No. 9225 is a relatively new statutory enactment whose provisions have not been
exhaustively interpreted and ruled upon by this Court, through an appropriate case. In this
respect, I submit that in situations of doubt where the strict application of the equivocal letter of
the law would clearly and undoubtedly disregard the legislative intent, the Court must and
should tread lightly as it rules on the relatively uncharted area of application where RA No.
9225 overlaps with our elections laws.
The unique factual situation of this case presents such situation of doubt which the Court must
resolve in the light of the clear legislative intent, rather than from the strict application of the
equivocal letter of the law. I find that Amado's persistent assertion of his allegiance to the
Republic and renunciation of his US citizenship more than sufficiently prove his determined
resolve to profess allegiance only to the Republic and to none other.
I submit that the following considerations should not be missed.
At the time Amado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he had fully satisfied all of the
requirements of RA No. 9225 to run for elective public office: he has re-acquired Philippine
citizenship after having filed the Oath of Allegiance and secured the order of approval on July
10, 2008; he has also met all of the qualifications under the Constitution and the law for the
local elective office; and he has already executed an Affidavit of Renunciation on April 3, 2009.
Likewise, as of October 1, 2012, Amado had sworn allegiance to the Republic four times, i.e.,
on July 10, 2008; April 3, 2009; November 30, 2009; and October 1, 2012. He had also
renounced his US citizenship expressly on April 3, 2009, and impliedly thrice on July 10, 2008,
November 30, 2009, and October 1, 2012.
Additionally, on October 1, 2012, the Comelec en bane, via the February 2, 2011 resolution in
SPA No. 10-109(DC), had ruled in his favour, affirmed the existence and validity of his oath of
renunciation, and confirmed his continuing qualification for the elective post. At that time, the
February 2, 2011 Comelec ruling had not yet been reversed by this Court and stood as the
final and most recent ruling as regards his qualification to run for the local elective post. As it
had not yet been reversed, he clearly and rightfully had every reason to rely on this Comelec
ruling when he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012.
In these lights, Amado's allegiance to the supreme authority of the Republic and his
renunciation of any and all foreign allegiance, including those to the US government, cannot
be doubted. From the time he had re-acquired "pure" Philippine citizenship under the terms of
RA No. 9225, Arnado has persistently asserted these oaths even while the law does not
require him to do so.
In this situation, any doubt or ambiguity should be resolved in favor of his full Filipino
citizenship - with his qualification to run for the May 2013 Elections - since the thrust of RA No.
9225 is to encourage the return to Filipino citizenship of natural-born Filipinos who lost their
Philippine citizenship through their acquisition of foreign citizenship. 36 Note in this regard that
Amado consciously and voluntarily gave up a very much sought-after citizenship status in
favor of returning to full Filipino citizenship and of participating in Philippine governance. 37
I. Maquiling did not say that Arnado used his US passport again on January 12, 2010, and on
March 23, 2010
A minor matter, asserted by the ponencia, which should be corrected is the claim that Amado
"used his US passport on January 12, 2010, and on March 23, 2010, as found by this Court in
Maquiling."
I strongly object to this observation as the ponencia clearly misread Maquiling.
Nowhere in Maquiling did the Court make a finding that Arnado used his US passport again on
January 12, 2010, and March 23, 2010 - months after he had received his Philippine passport.
Rather, the alleged use by Arnado of his US passport on these dates was a mere assertion of
Balua, before the Comelec First Division in the Maquiling case; interestingly, Balua was no
longer a party when the case reached this Court. In fact, the Court in Maquiling, quoting a
portion of the Comelec En Banc decision, noted that on January 12, 2010, what Arnado used
was his Philippine passport, not his US passport.
J. Under the circumstances, the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion
In this Rule 64-Rule 65 petition, the Court's review is limited to the jurisdictional issue of
whether the Comelec acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
As a concept, grave abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is
not enough; it must be grave.
The Court's review power is also limited by the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the Comelec, supported by substantial evidence, shall
be final and non-reviewable. In this respect, the Court does not ordinarily review the Comelec'
s appreciation and evaluation of evidence as any misstep by the Comelec in this regard
generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
In exceptional situations, however, where the assailed judgment is based on misapprehension
or erroneous apprehension of facts or on the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in
deciding an issue38 -situations that are tainted with grave abuse of discretion - the Court is not
only obliged but has the constitutional duty to intervene. 39When grave abuse of discretion is
present, the resulting errors mutate from error of judgment to one of jurisdiction.
I find that, based on the reasons discussed above, the Comelec' s action in this case as it
disqualified Amado from running for the May 2013 Elections, was clearly tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
The Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when: first, it relied completely and
indiscriminately on the Maquiling ruling - the wrong and irrelevant, or at the very least,
incomplete - consideration in deciding the underlying disqualification case; and second, it did
not make its own finding of facts and evaluation of the evidence, independent of Maquiling,
and disregarded relevant facts and evidence subsequent to Maquiling - a clear
misapprehension of the facts. Note that the Comelec, both in the September 6, 2013, and
December 9, 2013 resolutions, quoted heavily portions of the Maquiling ruling and drew its
discussions and conclusion largely from Maquiling.
For these reasons, and under the circumstances of this case, I submit that the assailed
Comelec actions must be struck down for grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
K. At any rate, all doubts should beresolved in favor of Arnado 's
qualification: the mandate of the people of Kauswagan that twice elected Arnado
as their Mayor should be respected and upheld
giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the
very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote.43
Under the evidentiary and unique factual situation of this case, the alleged eligibility of Amado
is not antagonistic, patently or otherwise, to constitutional and legal principles such that giving
effect to the sovereign will would create prejudice to our democratic institutions.
Notably, the Office of the Sanggunianng Bayan, through Resolution No. 002-201444 dated
January 2, 2014, and the Liga ng Mga Barangay, through Resolution No. 001-201445 dated
January 2, 2014, expressed their continuing and overwhelming support for Amado,
notwithstanding the Comelec rulings disqualifying him from the May 2013 Elections, and
implores the Court to heed the Kauswagan people's voice under the principle vox populi, vox
dei.
Under the circumstances of this case, the ponencia 's action that resolves all doubts against
Amado's eligibility undoubtedly defeats the will of the Kauswagan electorate. 46 In ruling as it
does, the ponencia effectively disenfranchises an undoubtedly overwhelming majority of the
Kauswagan people as "[t]he rights of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution of
the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the
franchise."
47 The Court should respect and uphold the will of the electorate.

Independently of all these issues - of Amado's qualification to run for the May 2013 Elections For the above reasons, I vote to grant the petition.
and the intervention of the Maquiling ruling - the ARTURO D. BRION
Court cannot and should not now ignore the undeniable fact that the people of Kauswagan, Associate Justice
Lanao del Norte, have themselves responded to the situation of doubt that might have arisen
because of the factual link between the present disqualification case and the intervention of
the Maquiling ruling.
The people themselves made their own ruling when they elected Arnado as their mayor in the
two successive elections - the May 2010 and the May 2013 elections - despite the "foreigner"
label his rivals, even the ponencia, sought to continuously pin on him.
Arnado received an overwhelming 8,902 votes as against the meager 1,707 votes of his
opponent Capitan in the May 2013 Elections; in the May 2010 Elections, he received the
majority 5,952 of the total 11,309 votes cast. At this point, "even this Court should heed this
verdict by resolving all doubts regarding Arnado's eligibility in his favor.". This is not a novel
approach.40 To reiterate what Sinaca v. Mula41 teaches us:
[When] a candidate has received popular mandate, overwhelmingly and clearly expressed, all
possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the candidate's eligibility for to rule otherwise is
to defeat the will of the people. Above and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the
electorate should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail.
This, in essence, is the democracy we continue to hold sacred.
In the words of another leading case - Frivaldo v. Comelec42- the law and the courts,
including this Court, must give serious consideration to the popular will.
"In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular electoral choice, this Court
must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the will of
the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by those
who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently
antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby