Constitutional Law

Garces vs Estenzo
104 SCRA 510

Facts: Two resolutions of the Barangay Council of Valencia, Ormoc City were passed:
a. Resolution No. 5- Reviving the traditional socio-religious celebration every fifth of April. This
provided for the acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer and the construction of a waiting
shed. Funds for the said projects will be obtained through the selling of tickets and cash
donations.
b. Resolution No. 6- The chairman or hermano mayor of the fiesta would be the caretaker of the
image of San Vicente Ferrer and that the image would remain in his residence for one year and
until the election of his successor.
The image would be made available to the Catholic Church during the celebration of the saint’s
feast day. These resolutions have been ratified by 272 voters, and said projects were
implemented. The image was temporarily placed in the altar of the Catholic Church of the
barangay. However, after a mass, Father Sergio Marilao Osmeña refused to return the image to
the barangay council, as it was the church’s property since church funds were used in its
acquisition. Resolution No. 10 was passed for the authorization of hiring a lawyer for the replevin
case against the priest for the recovery of the image. Resolution No. 12 appointed Brgy. Captain
Veloso as a representative to the case. The priest, in his answer assailed the constitutionality of
the said resolutions. The priest with Andres Garces, a member of the Aglipayan Church,
contends that Sec. 8 Article IV1 and Sec 18(2) Article VIII) 2 of the constitution was violated.

Issue: Whether or Not any freedom of religion clause in the Constitution violated.

Held: No. As said by the Court this case is a petty quarrel over the custody of the image. The
image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio fiesta and not for the
purpose of favoring any religion nor interfering with religious matters or beliefs of the barrio
residents. Any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint(such as the
acquisition) is not illegal. Practically, the image was placed in a layman’s custody so that it could
easily be made available to any family desiring to borrow the image in connection with prayers
and novena. It was the council’s funds that were used to buy the image, therefore it is their
property. Right of the determination of custody is their right, and even if they decided to give it to
the Church, there is no violation of the Constitution, since private funds were used. Not every
government activity which involves the expenditure of public funds and which has some religious
tint is violative of the constitutional provisions regarding separation of church and state, freedom
of worship and banning the use of public money or property.
Constitutional Law

Villavicencio vs Lukban
39 Phil 778

Issue:

The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent
produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was
also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without
their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police,
took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and
knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were
signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia
Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case
saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the
city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They
could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they
could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not
safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the
parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.

Held:

The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus
100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief
executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen
and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend
his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint
and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court
and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has
inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has
illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why
the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law,
could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily
have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of
process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change
her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her
birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily
evaded.
Constitutional Law

Villar vs Technological Institute of the Philippines

135 SCRA 706

FACTS:
Petitioners Villar, Recitis, Barreto, Salcon, de Leon, Laxamana and Guilatco were all refused
enrollment at the Technological Institute of the Philippines (TIP) due to their exercise of their
constitutional right to freedom of assembly. As held in MALABANAN vs RAMENTO, petitioners
cannot be barred from enrollment for their exercise of their freedom of assembly. In opposition to
the petition filed by petitioners, respondent made reference to the academic records of
petitioners, invoking the constitutional provision on academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of
higher learning .Petitioners Barreto, de Leon, Jr. and Laxamana all obtained failing grades while
petitioners Villar, Salcon, Guilatco and Recitis met the requirements for retention in the said
institute, entitling them to the writs of certiorari and prohibition against TIP.
ISSUE:
1.Whether or not petitioners can be barred from enrollment for their exercise of their freedom of
assembly.
2.Whether or not TIP is under no obligation to admit the students with failing grades under the
constitutional provision on academic freedom regarded to institution of higher learning.
HELD:
1.NO. Petitioners have a valid cause for complaint if the exercise of the constitutional rights to
free speech and peaceable assembly was visited by their expulsion from respondent College.
2.YES. The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set
academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the
expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed
meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their
constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. If it does so, then there is a
legitimate grievance by the students thus prejudiced, their right to the equal protection clause
being disregarded. To that extent therefore, there is justification for excluding three of the
aforementioned petitioners because of their marked academic deficiency.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted to petitioners Venecio Villar, Inocencio F. Recitis,
Rufino G. Salcon, Jr. and Romeo Guilatco, Jr. to nullify the action taken by respondents in
violation of their constitutional rights. The writ of prohibition is likewise granted to such petitioners
to enjoin respondents from acts of surveillance, black-listing, suspension and refusal to allow
them to enroll in the coming academic year 1985-1986, if so minded. The petition is dismissed as
to Noverto Barreto, Edgardo de Leon, Jr. and Regloben Laxamana. No costs.
Constitutional Law

Tangonan v. Cruz Pano

137 SCRA 245 (1985)

F: Petitioner brought suit for mandamus to compel the Capitol Medical Center School of Nursing
to admit her for the academic year 1976-1977. She had been previously provisionally admitted
the previous school year, but she failed in Psychiatric Nursing. She tried to take the course again
in another school, but she was refused admission because she tried to bribe the dean of the
school. When she tried to re-enroll at the Capitol Medical Center, she was denied admission. She
brought the matter on certiorari. VV.

ISSUE: WON the school can be compelled by the court to re-admit petitioner. NO.

HELD: Any duty on the part of the school to enroll pet. is not merely a ministerial duty but one w/c
involves the exercise of discretion not compellable by Mandamus. Capitol was perfectly justified
in refusing to admit her, its refusal (being) sanctioned by the Manual of Regulations of Priv.
Schools w/c considers academic delinquency & violation of disciplinary regulations as valid
grounds for refusing enrollment of a student. Adapted.

Further, to grant relief to pet. would be doing violence to the academic freedom enjoyed by
Capitol enshrined under Act. XV sec. 8 (2) Consti. Academic freedom includes not only the
freedom of professionally qualified persons to inquire, discover, publish & teach the truth as they
see it in the field of their competence subject to no control or authority except of rational methods
by w/c truths and conclusions are sought and established in these disciplines, but also the right of
the school or college to decide for itself how best to attain them - the grant being to institutions of
higher learning - free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the over-riding
public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide spread of autonomy certainly extending to the
choice of students. Said constitutional provision is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in
a grudging fashion. That would be to frustrate its purpose and nullify its intent. VV.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED without pronouncement as to costs.

Constitutional Law

DECS vs San Diego

180 SCRA 730

Facts : The respondent failed to pass the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) 3 times and
he was denied admission to take the test for another time by the petitioner under its rule that a
student is allowed only to take the NMAT 3 times and after 3 consecutive failures a student shall
not be allowed to take NMAT the 4th time. Respondent invoke his constitutional rights on
academic freedom and quality education in his petition for mandamus before the court.
Respondent judge rendered decision citing the admission rule of the petitioner as an arbitrary
exercise of police power, depriving respondent of his right to pursue medical education thus this
petition for review before the higher court.

Issue : Whether or not the admission rule implemented by petitioner an arbitrary exercise of
police power.

Held : The court held that police power is validly exercised if:
(a) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require
the interference of the State, and
(b) the means employed are reasonably necessary to the attainment of the object sought to be
accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The proper exercise of the police power requires the concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful
method. The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police power.
It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to insure that the medical profession is not
infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may unwarily entrust their lives and health. The
method employed by the challenged regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose of the law nor is it
arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate the medical schools and
ultimately the medical profession from the intrusion of those not qualified to be doctors. The State
needs to implement decisive steps to regulate system of education by directing students to the
course where he is best suited through initial tests and evaluation. The decision of the respondent
judge was reversed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated January 13,
1989, is REVERSED, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.
Constitutional Law

Tablarin vs Gutierrez
152 SCRA 730

Facts:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school
year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the
public respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and
passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT as
scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of
preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition. The NMAT was conducted and
administered as previously scheduled.
Issue: Whether Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, offend against the
constitutional principle which forbids the undue delegation of legislative power, by failing to
establish the necessary standard to be followed by the delegate, the Board of Medical Education
Held: The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an
administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly
abstract. The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could
be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law,
clearly the legislative objective is public safety.
In this case, the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: “the
standardization and regulation of medical education” and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act,
the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with
the requirements of the non-delegation principle.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial
court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

Casibang vs Aquino
Constitutional Law

92 SCRA 642

FACTS: Yu was proclaimed on November 1971 as the elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan.
Casibang, his only rival, filed a protest against election on the grounds of rampant vote buying,
anomalies and irregularities and others. During the proceedings of this case, the 1973
Constitution came into effect. Respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of the
petitioner on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the
effectivity of the new Constitution and the new parliamentary form of government.
ISSUES: Whether Section 9, Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution rendered the protest moot and
academic; and Whether Section 2, Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the
revamp of the entire local government structure.
RULING: 1.) As stated in Santos vs. Castaneda, “the constitutional grant of privilege to continue
in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of persons who were incumbent officials or
employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect, cannot be fairly construed
as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be performing the
duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints
specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor
could have been the intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt
aside the statutory right of a candidate for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed
in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings beamed mainly at the proper
determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's right to the contested office.”
2.) Section 2 of Article XI does not stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a
political color. For simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a
local government code "which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its
Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government allocating among the
different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and providing for
their qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units" but "...
any change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY SET ASIDE
AND THE RESPONDENT COURT IS DIRECTED TO IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE
TRIAL AND DETERMINATION OF THE ELECTION PROTEST BEFORE IT ON THE MERITS.
THIS DECISION SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY UPON PROMULGATION HEREOF.
NO COSTS.
Constitutional Law

Tañada vs Cuenco
100 Phil 1101
After the 1955 national elections, the membership in the Senate was overwhelmingly occupied by
the Nacionalista Party. The lone opposition senator was Lorenzo Tañada who belonged to the
Citizen’s Party. Diosdado Macapagal on the other hand was a senatorial candidate who lost the
bid but was contesting it before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET). But prior to a decision the
SET would have to choose its members. It is provided that the SET should be composed of 9
members comprised of the following: 3 justices of the Supreme Court, 3 senators from the
majority party and 3 senators from the minority party. But since there is only one minority senator
the other two SET members supposed to come from the minority were filled in by the NP. Tañada
assailed this process before the Supreme Court. So did Macapagal because he deemed that if
the SET would be dominated by NP senators then he, as a member of the Liberalista Party will
not have any chance in his election contest. Senator Mariano Cuenco et al (members of the NP)
averred that the Supreme Court cannot take cognizance of the issue because it is a political
question. Cuenco argued that the power to choose the members of the SET is vested in the
Senate alone and the remedy for Tañada and Macapagal was not to raise the issue before
judicial courts but rather to leave it before the bar of public opinion.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue is a political question.
HELD: No. The SC took cognizance of the case and ruled that the issue is a justiciable question.
The term Political Question connotes what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of
policy. It refers to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon
the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In this case, the issue at bar is not a political question. The Supreme Court is not being asked by
Tañada to decide upon the official acts of Senate. The issue being raised by Tañada was whether
or not the elections of the 5 NP members to the SET are valid – which is a judicial question. Note
that the SET is a separate and independent body from the Senate which does not perform
legislative acts.
But how should the gridlock be resolved?
The nomination of the last two members (who would fill in the supposed seat of the minority
members) must not come from the majority party. In this case, the Chairman of the SET,
apparently already appointed members that would fill in the minority seats (even though those will
come from the majority party). This is still valid provided the majority members of the SET
(referring to those legally sitting) concurred with the Chairman. Besides, the SET may set its own
rules in situations like this provided such rules comply with the Constitution.

Sanidad vs COMELEC
Constitutional Law

73 SCRA 333

FACTS:
On September 27, 1976, Pablo Sanidad and Pablito Sanidad petitioned for prohibition with
preliminary injunction to enjoin COMELEC from holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect PD Nos. 991 and 1033, as well as
PD. 1031. Petitioners contend that the president has no power to propose amendments to the
new constitution, as such, the referendum plebiscite has no legal basis.

ISSUE:
1. Is the case at bar justiciable?
2. Does the president have authority to propose amendments to the Constitution?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed
sufficient and proper submission?

HELD:
The issue of whether the President can assume the power of a constituent assembly is a
justiciable question since it is not the wisdom but the constitutional authority of the president to
perform such act is in question. The president has the authority to propose amendments as the
governmental powers are generally concentrated to the president in times of crisis. The time for
deliberation of the referendum-plebiscite questions, 3 weeks, is not too short especially since the
questions are issues of the day and the people have been living with them since the proclamation
of martial law.

ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This
decision is immediately executory.
Constitutional Law

Abueva vs Wood
45 Phil 612

The parties:

Petitioners are members of the Independence Commission. The creation of the commission was
ratified and adopted by the Philippine Legislature on the 8th day of March, 1919. Twenty six of
the petitioners are members of the House of Representatives and four are members of the
Senate of the Philippine Islands and they all belong to the democratic party;

Respondents are Leonard Wood, the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, Manuel L.
Quezon and Manuel Roxas, Presidents of the Independence Commission. Sued as well are the
Acting Auditor, the Executive Secretary and the Secretary of the Independence Commission.

This is an original action commenced in the Supreme Court by the petitioners for the writ of
mandamus to compel the respondents to exhibit to the petitioners and to permit them to examine
all the vouchers and other documentary proofs in their possession, showing the disbursements
and expenditures made out of the funds of the Independence Commission.

FACTS:

By Act No. 2933 the Legislature of the Philippine Islands provided for a standing appropriation of
one million pesos(P1,000,000) per annum, payable out of any funds in the Insular Treasury, not
otherwise appropriated, to defray the expenses of the Independence Commission, including
publicity and all other expenses in connection with the performance of its duties; that said
appropriation shall be considered as included in the annual appropriation for the Senate and the
House of Representatives, at the rate of P500,000 for each house, although the appropriation act
hereafter approved may not make any specific appropriation for said purpose; with the proviso
that no part of said sum shall be set upon the books of the Insular Auditor until it shall be
necessary to make the payment or payments authorized by said act

Petitioners averred that as members of the Independence Commission they are legally obliged to
prevent the funds from being squandered, and to prevent any investments and illicit expenses in
open contravention of the purposes of the law. Petitioners have verbally and by writing requested
the respondents to permit them to examine the vouchers and other documentary proofs relating
to the expenditures and payments made out of the funds appropriated for the use of the
Independence Commission.
Constitutional Law

Respondents have denied and continue denying to permit the petitioners from examining said
vouchers and documentary proofs.

ISSUE: Can the Court compel the respondents to address the claims of the petitioners?

HELD:

Leonard Wood, as Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and head of the executive
department of the Philippine Government, is not subject to the control or supervision of the
courts.
Manuel L. Quezon and Manuel Roxas, as Chairman of the Independence Commission, are mere
agents of the Philippine Legislature and cannot be controlled or interfered with by the courts.
As for the auditor, the court has no jurisdiction of the subject of the action because section 24 of
the Jones Law provides that: “The administrative jurisdiction of the Auditor over accounts,
whether of funds or property, and all vouchers and records pertaining thereto, shall be exclusive”
The determination of whether the accounts of the expenses of the Commission of Independence
should be shown to the plaintiffs or not is a question of policy and administrative discretion, and is
therefore not justiciable.

Without a further discussion of the questions presented, we are of the opinion, and so decide,
that we are without authority or jurisdiction to grant the remedy prayed for; and the petition is
therefore hereby denied, without any finding as to costs. So ordered.