A VIA TION

T ROU BLESH OOTING

COMMERCIAL AVIATION
INCIDENTS & ACCIDENTS
PHOTO BY GEORGE ROCHA
OVER ROCKY MOUNTAINS
43.000 FEET
LAS VEGAS TO WICHITA
THOSE THREE TINY WHITE SPOTS
ABOVE HORIZON LINE WERE FLIGHTS
COMING FROM NORTH TO SOUTH.
THEY CROSSED AHEAD OF US LATER.

SÁBADO, 12 DE MAIO DE 2012

Why are passengers ignoring the rules?

"Ladies and gentlemen, we will begin our safety briefing video momentarily. We would
appreciate your attention to this important information. Use of portable electronic devices is
not permitted during taxi, takeoff, and landing. Your crew will let you know when we reach an
altitude where you can begin using an approved electronic device."

Except you. You're sitting by a window, across the aisle from the teenager plugged into his
Gameboy with earphones, shoots down another space alien; the business travellers on the
airplane continue to tap on their laptop computers, oblivious to the loudspeaker; a couple
sharing a portable CD player daydream to their favourite opera. Eventually, prompted by flight
attendants making a final check down the aisles, they all grudgingly turn off what are being
called portable electronic devices (PEDs), and somehow the flight attendant fails to notice that
your computer is still running. "Good," you think, "I am right in the middle of drafting this
presentation. At least I can finish one more slide. It's a silly rule, anyway. My computer is
shielded, I'm sure any avionics are shielded, and the aluminium skin of the aircraft is a shield as
well. My computer won't do any harm."
Maybe not. Maybe not your computer, in this seat, on this particular airliner, on this flight. But
can a computer or other PED, in the right place, on the right airplane, seriously affect the
airplane's instrumentation or communications? You bet.

Smartphones, tablet computers and other mobile devices communicate through a variety of
wireless technologies, including Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, GPS and cellular phone links. These radio
signals can potentially interfere with a commercial aircraft's electronic systems during flight. To
address this concern, mobile device manufacturers developed an airplane mode that turns off
the wireless signals but allows the mobile device to be used for approved activities during air
travel.
Airline passengers have carried portable electronic devices (PED) aboard commercial aircraft
for use during flight since the 1950s. In May 1961, the U.S. Government formally recognized,
with Civilian Aviation Regulation (CAR) 91.19,1 the potential safety hazard posed to commercial
flights from radio frequency (RF) interference. The regulation prohibited the operation of
portable frequency-modulated (FM) radio receivers when the very high-frequency omni-
directional range (VOR) receiver was being used for navigation purposes because of concerns
about possible emissions from the FM radio’s internal oscillators.

Guilt by radiation

What is going on here? The culprit is electromagnetic emissions from the PEDs, which interfere
with avionics systems, most commonly radio navigation and communications. Co-conspirators
are the aluminium air-frame, which can act as a shield, a resonant cavity, or a phased array, and
the sensitivities of the avionics. The radiation from the devices can couple to the avionics
through the antennas, the wiring, or directly into the receiver. According to some experts,
avionics should bear some of the responsibility for eliminating the interference problem.
Systems should be designed to better withstand interference from PEDs.

Airplane Mode Limitations

 You cannot receive or place calls on your mobile device when airplane mode is
activated. You cannot receive or send text messages or access the Internet. You can use
the mobile device to watch videos stored on the device, play downloaded games, listen
to music and view and create documents.

Some aircraft operators are repurposing the dedicated air-to-ground frequencies formerly used
by seat-back, in-flight phone service to bring the Internet to travelers. These restricted
frequencies do not interfere with aircraft avionics. Ask a crew member about the availability of
this service.
Frequency bands used by cellphones and navigation systems

Cellular Stands Out: The wideband signal on the right side of the graph is a CDMA signal (CDMA
channel 466). The narrowband signal on the left is likely either an analog or a TDMA signal. The
wideband signal's weaker appearance is due in part to the settings of the measuring
equipment.

Several different mobile phone technologies are used in the United States. The two principal
frequency bands are the cellular band, 824 to 849 megahertz, which uses a combination of
analog and digital technologies, and the PCS (Personal Communications Services) band, 1850 to
1910 MHz, which is all digital. The more dominant cellular technologies are code-division
multiple access (CDMA), used by carriers like Verizon and Sprint; Global System for Mobile
Communication (GSM), used by Cingular and T-Mobile; and time-division multiple access
(TDMA), used by older Cingular base stations and several other carriers.

Other frequency ranges are increasingly being used for cellular service, such as Integrated
Digital Enhanced Network (iDEN), in the 806 to 821 MHz frequency range, a technology made
popular by the push-to-talk service of Nextel, formerly an independent network but now part of
Sprint. Sprint is also the best-known PCS operator. The technologies that transmit in the cellular
and PCS bands accounted for more than 75 percent of the mobile phone service in the United
States at the time of the study, so this in-flight monitoring concentrated on these frequency
bands.

For the cellular and PCS frequency bands, given the monitoring parameters were selected, we
couldn't conclusively identify the technologies underlying the signals we detected. However,
the FCC [Federal Communications Commission]permits only cellular telephones to operate in
these frequency bands and restricts emissions from unintentional radiators. The recorded
power levels are also evidence that the signals are due to cellphone use: an unintentional PED
radiator operating at the maximum allowable emission level would show up as being at least 70
decibels below that of an onboard cellular signal.

Our research shows clearly that, in violation of FCC and FAA rules, calls are regularly made from
commercial aircraft. Results from our analysis imply that calls from on board scheduled
commercial aircraft in the eastern United States occur at a rate of one to four per flight. In
addition, we saw other signals that suggest that at least one passenger neglects to turn off his
or her cellphone on most flights.

In 2001, with the assistance of a travel agent, we conducted a small survey of frequent flyers.
As it turns out, passengers are unaware of the reasons for current PED policies, and they doubt
that there are any serious safety risks. As a result, they admit to using prohibited devices and
also to using permitted PEDs at prohibited flight phases, that is, during takeoff and landing.

Of the cockpit instruments that can be interfered with by RF emissions from portable devices,
the most problematic might be those used for navigation. To understand what's at stake, we
need to first note the variety of different technologies used today for aircraft navigation. The
most common are the VHF omnidirectional range system and the instrument landing system,
both of which operate near 100 MHz, and GPS, which operates between 1200 and 1600 MHz.
PEDs have the potential to interfere with each of them, but the most serious concern has to be
for GPS receivers, which are becoming key navigational aids these days--particularly when
clouds or other weather problems make it impossible for pilots to see runways.

GPS-certified landing approaches are now widely used in general aviation. Though most
airliners presently use instrument landing systems, use of GPS technology will increase
significantly over the next few years. There are three times as many GPS-certified approaches
as instrument landing system approaches in the United States.
Investigation of specific instances of suspected PED interference

Some sample cases are included here to illustrate the variety of potential PED events.

 In March 2004, acting on a number of reports from general aviation pilots that Samsung
SPH-N300 cellphones had caused their GPS receivers to lose satellite lock, NASA issued a
technical memorandum that described emissions from this popular phone. It reported
that there were emissions in the GPS band capable of causing interference. Disturbingly,
though, they were low enough to comply with FCC emissions standards.

 A passenger laptop computer was reported to cause autopilot disconnects during cruise.
Boeing purchased the computer from the passenger and performed a laboratory
emission scan from 150 kHz to 1 GHz. The emissions exceeded the Boeing emission
standard limits for airplane equipment at various frequency ranges up to 300 MHz.
Boeing participated with the operator on two flight tests with the actual PED, using the
same airplane and flight conditions, in an attempt to duplicate the problem.

 Over a period of eight months, Boeing received five reports on interference with various
navigation equipment (uncommanded rolls, displays blanking, flight management
computer [FMC]/ autopilot/standby altimeter inoperative, and autopilot disconnects)
caused by passenger operation of a popular handheld electronic game device. In one of
these cases, the flight crew confirmed the interference by turning the unit on and off to
observe the correlation. The same unit was used on another flight and on a different
airplane, but the event could not be duplicated. Boeing purchased two of the actual
suspect units through the airline and tested them in the laboratory, along with three off-
the-shelf units. It was determined that these suspect units had emission profiles similar
to the off-the-shelf units and that the levels from these devices were below airplane
equipment emission limits.

 A passenger’s palmtop computer was reported to cause the airplane to initiate a

shallow bank turn. One minute after turning the PED off, the airplane returned to "on
course." When the unit was brought to the flight deck, the flight crew noticed a strong
correlation by turning the unit back on and watching the anomaly return, then turning
the unit off and watching the anomaly stop. Boeing was not able to purchase the actual
PED, but contacted the PED manufacturer and purchased the same model. Boeing
laboratory emission testing revealed that the unit exceeded Boeing airplane equipment
emission levels by up to 37 dB by demonstrating energy levels in the frequency range of
150 to 700 kHz. In the Boeing navigation laboratory the unit was placed next to the
FMCs, control display unit, and integrated display unit, but the reported anomaly could
not be duplicated.

 Cell phone tests and analysis

Boeing conducted a laboratory and airplane test with 16 cell phones typical of those
 carried by passengers, to determine the emission characteristics of these intentionally
transmitting PEDs. The laboratory results indicated that the phones not only produce
emissions at the operating frequency, but also produce other emissions that fall within
airplane communication/navigation frequency bands (automatic direction finder, high
frequency, very high frequency [VHF] omni range/locator, and VHF communications and
instrument landing system [ILS]). Emissions at the operating frequency were as high as
60 dB over the airplane equipment emission limits, but the other emissions were
generally within airplane equipment emission limits. One concern about these other
emissions from cell phones is that they may interfere with the operation of an airplane
communication or navigation system if the levels are high enough.

Five critical navigation frequency bands were selected to be monitored:

Very High-Frequency Omni-Directional Range (VOR) and Instrument Landing System (ILS)
Localizer (LOC), 108-118 MHz;

1. ILS Glide Slope (GS), 329-335 MHz;

2. Distance Measuring Equipment (DME) and
3. Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System (TCAS), 960-1215 MHz; and

4. Global Positioning System (GPS), 1227.5 and 1575.42 MHz.

There were four frequency ranges identified as likely to experience emissions from passenger
electronics use:

1. cellular uplink, 824-849 MHz;

2. Personal Communications System (PCS) uplink, 1.85-1.91 GHz; and

3. industrial, scientific, and medical (ISM), 902-928 MHz and 2.4-2.485 MHz.
 4. Limited monitoring was conducted in the ILS GS, GPS L2 (1227.5 MHz), and DME and
TCAS bands.

Measurements were made on 38 flights over the period September 23 through November 19,
2003. All flights were revenue flights except for one maintenance flight with no passengers
onboard. All flights were on Boeing 737 model aircraft except for one flight on an Airbus 320.
Two airlines participated in the flight study with 29 flights on one airline and 9 flights on the
other. A third airline assisted in validating instrumentation operation and measurement
methodology. All flights occurred along the east coast, and flight durations were between 40
minutes and 2 hours. The passenger load factors were between 25% and 100%.

The research effort collected a total of 7534 spectrum traces representing over 51 hours of
data. There were 1493 traces collected at the gate, 1596 traces collected during taxi, and 4445
traces collected in flight. The traces collected in flight represent over 32 hours of data.

This study provided the first reported characterization of the RF environment in the cabins of
commercial airline flights. Key conclusions are as follows:
a. Cellular telephone calls were observed in all phases of flight at a rate conservatively
estimated to be approximately one call per flight, and onboard cellular telephone activity is
appreciable.

b. Considerable onboard RF activity was observed in the GPS L1 (1575.42 MHz) band, some of
which appeared to have field strengths that, under appropriate circumstances, could result in
interference with aircraft GPS equipment.

c. Elevated broadband noise was observed on many occasions in the VOR/ILS band, and at least
some of these observations appear to be unique to specific aircraft.

d. While spectral measurements gave no indication of passengers using wireless devices other
than cellular phones during takeoff, such use was observed during approach well after the
portable electronic devices-prohibited cabin announcement.

Sinais de Faixa Estreita na Potência da Faixa Celular Recebida Versus Altitude

Global Positioning System Operation and Vulnerability

The GPS is made up of 24 satellites in approximately 11.5-hour orbits. The satellites transmit
signals on two L-band frequencies, 1227.5 and 1575.42 MHz, designated L2 and L1,
respectively. The primary role of signals in the L2 frequency is to allow corrections for errors
introduced by variations in ionospheric propagation. Simply put, the L1 transmits information
to provide navigation and the L2 transmits information that improves accuracy.

Continuous Wave Interference Sources

A CW interference signal can prevent or disrupt a GPS receiver’s ability to generate a valid
navigation solution. Early assessments found that narrow- and wide-band CW interference
affected GPS performance [29]. As expected, signals closer to the GPS center frequency caused
greater interruption. There was a 16 dB variation in susceptibility between the receivers tested.
The initial assessments were performed on C/A code receivers.

REFERENCES.
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34. Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
Airline Transport Pilot and Flight Instructor
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