RELEVANT EXTRACTS OF JUDGMENTS

A. Construction of the contract agreement is within the jurisdiction of

the learned arbitrator

1. Pure Helium India Pvt. Ltd. v. Oil and Natural Gas Commission
2003 8 SCC 593

26. In Khardah Company Ltd. (supra), this Court held : …….

It is in the ultimate analysis a question of construction of the
contract. And again it is well established that in construing a
contract it would be legitimate to take into account surrounding
circumstances...."

27. Construction of the contract agreement, therefore, was within the

jurisdiction of the learned arbitrators having regard to the wide
nature, scope and ambit of the arbitration agreement and they cannot,
thus, be said to have misdirected themselves in passing the award by
taking into consideration the conduct of the parties as also the
circumstantial evidence.”

2. National Highways Authority of India v. JSC Centrodorstroy , (2016)

12 SCC 592
“13. Having considered rival submissions, we are of the view that
the assessment made by the Arbitral Tribunal in the instant case as
affirmed by the High Court was definitely within its jurisdiction. It
has consistently been laid down by this Court that construction of
the terms of a contract is primarily for an arbitrator or Arbitral
Tribunal to decide and unless the arbitrator or Arbitral Tribunal
construes the contract in such a way that no fair minded or reasonable
person could do, no interference by Court is called for. Viewed thus,
we do not see any reason or justification to interfere i n the matter.
The view that the increase in rates of service tax in respect of bank
guarantee and insurance premium is directly relatable to terms of the

1
 contract and performance under the contract is certainly a possible
view.”

(National Highways Authori ty of India v. ITD. Cementation India

Limited, (2015) 14 SCC 21 is relied upon in the above judgment)

B. Role of court and grounds for interference under Section 34

3. McDermott International Inc.V.Burn Standard Co. Ltd. and Ors.

(2006)11SCC181

A….- Held, the 1996 Act makes provision for the supervisory role of
courts and for the review of the arbitral award only to ensure fairness
– This supervisory role is to be kept at a minimum level and interference
is envisaged only in cases of fraud or bia s, violation of natural justice,
etc. – Interference on ground of “patent illegality” is permissible only
if the same goes to the root of the matter, and a public policy violation
should be so unfair and unreasonable as to shock the conscience of the
court.

112. It is trite that the terms of the contract can be express or implied.
The conduct of the parties would also be a relevant factor in the matter
of construction of a contract. The construction of the contract
agreement, is within the jurisdiction of the arbitrators having regard
to the wide nature, scope and ambit of the arbitration agreement and
they cannot, be said to have misdirected themselves in passing the
award by taking into consideration the conduct of the parties. It is also
trite that correspondences exchanged by the parties are required to be
taken into consideration for the purpose of construction of a contract.

4. Harish Chandra & Co. v. State of U.P. , (2016) 9 SCC 478 : 2016
SCC OnLine SC 915 at page 485

“23. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Allied

Constructions [State of U.P. v. Allied Constructions, (2003) 7 SCC
3 9 6] , w h i l e e x a m i n i n g t h e s c o p e o f S e c t i o n 3 0 h e l d a s u n d e r : ( S C C
p. 398, para 4)

2
 “4. … The award is a speaking one. The arbitrator has assigned
sufficient and cogent reasons in support thereof. Interpretation of
a contract, it is trite, is a matter for the arbitrator to determine
(see Sudarsan Trading Co. v. State of Kerala[Sudarsan Trading
C o . v . S t a t e o f K e r a l a , ( 1 9 8 9 ) 2 S C C 3 8] ) . S e c t i o n 3 0 o f t h e
Arbitration Act, 1940 providing for setting aside an award is
restrictive in its operation. Unless one or the other condition
contained in Section 30 is satisfied, an award cannot be set aside.
The arbitrator is a Judge chosen by the parties and his d ecision
is final. The court is precluded from reappraising the evidence.
Even in a case where the award contains reasons, the interference
herewith would still be not available within the jurisdiction of the
court unless, of course, the reasons are totally perverse or the
judgment is based on a wrong proposition of law. An error
apparent on the face of the records would not imply closer
scrutiny of the merits of documents and materials on record. Once
it is found that the view of the arbitrator is a plausib le one, the
court will refrain itself from interfering….”
………..
26. The grounds such as inadequacy of reasons in support of an award,
error committed by the arbitrator on facts, alternate and/or more
plausible view could be taken then what is taken by the arbitrator,
improper appreciation of evidence done by the arbitrator in recording
any finding, etc. are not the grounds on which any award much less a
reasoned award can be set aside. In other words, none of these
grounds can be made the foundation for set ting aside the award
because they do not fall within the four corners of any of the three
sub-clauses of Section 30 of the 1940 Act.”

C. Courts shall not interfere merely because another view may be

possible in construing the contract in a different manner

5. H. P. State Electricity Himachal Pradesh State Electricity Board

V.R.J. Shah and Company (1999)4SCC214

25. From the aforesaid decision of this Court. and the last one in
particular. it is clear that when the arbitrator is required to construe
a contract then merely because another view may be possible the court
would not be justified in construing the contract in a different manner

3
 and then to set aside the award by observing that the arbitrator has
exceeded the jurisdiction in making the award.

D. Principle of Business efficacy

6. Satya Jain (D) Thr. L.Rs. and Ors. V. Anis Ahmed Rushdie (D)
Thr. L.Rs. and Ors. (2013) 8 SCC 131

A.….- Held, principles of business efficacy can be invoked to

ascertain intended meaning of parties only when terms of agre ement/
contract are ambiguous or are not clear -
(Part of head note)

“33. The principle of business efficacy is normally invoked to read a

term in an agreement or contract so as to achieve the result or the
consequence intended by the Parties acting as pr udent businessmen.
Business efficacy means the power to produce intended results. The
classic test of business efficacy was proposed by Lord Justice Bowen
i n T h e M o o r c o c k [ 8] . T h i s t e s t r e q u i r e s t h a t a t e r m c a n o n l y b e i m p l i e d
if it is necessary to give bus iness efficacy to the contract to avoid
such a failure of consideration that the Parties cannot as reasonable
businessmen have intended. But only the most limited term should
then be implied – the bare minimum to achieve this goal. If the
contract makes business sense without the term, the courts will not
imply the same. The following passage from the opinion of L.J. Bowen
in the Moorcock (supra) sums up the position:
“xxxxxxxxx In business transactions such as this, what the law desires
to effect by the implication is to give such business efficacy to the
transaction as must have been intended at all events by both Parties
who are business men; not to impose on one side all the perils of the
transaction, or to emancipate one side from all the chances of fai lure,
but to make each party promise in law as much, at all events, as it
must have been in the contemplation of both Parties that he should
be responsible for in respect of those perils or chances.”

34. Though in an entirely different context, this court in United India

Insurance Company Limited vs. Manubhai Dharamasinhbhai Gajera

4
 and others had considered the circumstances when reading an
unexpressed term in an agreement would be justified on the basis that
such a term was always and obviously intended b y and between the
Parties thereto. Certain observations in this regard expressed by
Courts in some foreign jurisdictions were noticed by this court in
para 51 of the report. As the same may have application to the present
case it would be useful to notice the said observations:
“Prima facie that which in any contract is left to be implied and need
not be expressed is something so obvious that it goes without saying;
so that, if, while the Parties were making their bargain, an officious
bystander, were to suggest some express provision for it in their
agreement, they would testily suppress him with a common ‘Oh, of
course! Shirlaw v. Southern Foundries (1926) Ltd. (1939) 2 All ER
113 (CA)
-----------------------------------------------------------------
-----------------
An expressed term can be implied if and only if the court finds that
the Parties must have intended that term to form part of their
contract: it is not enough for the court to find that such a term would
have been adopted by the Parties a s reasonable men if it had been
suggested to them: it must have been a term that went without saying,
a term necessary to give business efficacy to the contract, a term
which, although tacit, formed part of the contract which the Parties
made for themselve s. Trollope and Colls Ltd. v. North West
Metropolitan Regl. Hospital Board (1973) 2 All ER 260 (HL)”
35. The business efficacy test, therefore, should be applied only in
cases where the term that is sought to be read as implied is such
which could have been clearly intended by the Parties at the time of
making of the agreement.”
(Award Internal Page 60 -61 Paragraph 184)

7. Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics Inc. V. Aventis Pharma Limited

(2010) 2 Bom. C. R. 317

39… (203) A summary of helpful principles, drawn largely from the

words of Longmore L.J., in (Absalom(on behalf Lloyd’s Syndicate 957)
Vs. TCRU ltd.)5, 2005 EWCA Civ 1586 at (7): 2006 (1) ALL. E. r.
(Comm) 375 at (7):2006 (2) Lloyd’s Rep 129, and based upon
submissions to me by Counsel, which I had appr oved, in the recent case
of (Reilly Vs. National Insurance * Guarantee Corporation Ltd.)6, 2008

5
 EWHC 722 (Comm) at (13) : 2008(2) All. E. R. (Comm) 612 at (13), was
again the subject matter of agreement, and I repeat and incorporate it:

‘(a) Ordinary Meaning: there is a presumption that the words to be

construed should be construed in their ordinary and popular sense,
since the parties to contract must be taken to have intended, as
reasonable men, to use words and phrases in their commonly understood
and accepted sense. (See also para (7)(i), (iii) in the judgment of
longmoreL.J. and in particular: “ the object of the inquiry is not
necessarily to probe the ‘real’ intention of the parties, but to ascertain
what the language they used in the document would s ignify to a properly
informed observer.”

(b) Businesslike Interpretation: It is an accepted canon of construction

that a commercial document, such as an insurance policy, should be
construed in accordance with sound commercial principles and good
business sense, ao that its provisions reveive a fair sensible
application. See also the words of Lord Diplock in (Antaios Cia
Navieras SA Vs. Salen Rederierna AB, The Antarios)7, 1985 AC 191 at
201 cited at (7)(iv) by Longmore LJ: If a “detailed semantic and
syntactical analysis of words in a commercial contract is going to lead
to a conclusion that flouts business common sense, it must be made to
yield to business common sense.”

(c) Commercial Object: The commercial object or function of the clause

in question and its relationship to the contract as a whole will be
relevant in resolving any ambiguity in the wording.

(d) Construction to avoid unreasonable results: If the wording of a

clause is ambiguous, and one reading produces a fairer results than the
alternative, the reasonable interpretation should be adopted. It is to
be presumed that the parties, as reasonable men, ‘would have intended
to include reasonable stipulation in their contract.

8. Nabha Power Ltd. V. Punjab State Power Corporation Ltd. (Pspcl)

2017 SCC OnLine SC 1239

REFERENCE: PARA 34 TO 51.

6
E. Brief Order is concluded contract:

9. Dresser Dresser Rand S.A.V.BINDAL Agro Chem Ltd. and K.G.

Khosla Compressors Ltd. (2006)1SCC751

40. It is no doubt true that a Letter of Intent may be construed as a

letter of acceptance if such intention is evident from its terms. It is not
uncommon in contracts involving detailed procedure, in order to save
time, to issue a letter of intent communi cating the acceptance of the
offer and asking the contractor to start the work with a stipulation that
the detailed contract would be drawn up later. If such a letter is issued
to the contractor, though it may be termed as a Letter of Intent, it may
amount to acceptance of the offer resulting in a concluded contract
between the parties. But the question whether the letter of intent is
merely an expression of an intention to place an order in future or
whether is a final acceptance of the offer thereby leadi ng to a contract,
is a matter that has to be decided with reference to the terms of the
letter. Chitty on Contracts (Para 2.115 in Volume 1 - 28th Edition)
observes that where parties to a transaction exchanged letters of intent,
the terms of such letters m ay, of course, negative contractual intention;
but, on the other hand, where the language does not negative
contractual intention, it is open to the courts to hold the parties are
bound by the document; and the courts will, in particular, be inclined
to do so where the parties have acted on the document for a long period
of time or have expended considerable sums of money in reliance on it.
Be that as it may.

10. ONGC PETRO ADDITIONS LTD. v. DAELIM INDUSTRIAL

COMPANY LTD., KOREA (2015)5 SCALE 645

4… A perusal of clause 8.0 of the ‘notification of award’, extracted

hereinabove, reveals, that M/s Daelim Industrial Company Limited,
Korea, was required to sign a formal contract with OpaL within 30
days, from the date of issue of ‘notification of award’ would
constitute a binding contract between the applicant and the non -
applicant, and that, the terms and conditions expressed in the bidding
documents, would also constitute the conditions of the contract.

7
 Furthermore, clause 8.0 also finalized the date of commence ment of
activities under the contract, as the date of issuance of the
‘notification of award’

F. Correspondences exchanged by the parties are required to be taken

into consideration for the purpose of construction of a contract

11. D.D. Sharma V.Union of India (UOI) (2004)5SCC325

24. It is also trite that correspondences exchanged by the parties are

required to be taken into consideration for the purpose of construction
of a contract. Interpretation of a contract is a matter for the
Arbitrator to determine, even if it gives rise to determination of a
question of law.

G. Words of a document are ambiguous, they shall be construed against

the party who prepared the document

12. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pushpalaya Printers 2004 (3)
SCC 694

“Where the words of a document are ambiguous, they shall be construed

against the party who prepared the document. This rule applies to
contracts of insurance and Clause 5 of the insurance policy even after
reading the entire policy in the present case should be construed
against the insurer”

13. G. Ramachandra Reddy v. Union of India

(2009) 6 SCC 414

26. A contract would warrant construction if the terms thereof are

vague and ambiguous.

Interpretation of commercial contracts (Award Internal page 60 -75

Paragraph 180-206)

H. Necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in support of its

decision (Decision to impose LD by Petitioner )

8
 14. Kranti Associates Private Limited V. Masood Ahmed Khan And
Others (2010)9 SCC 496

12. The necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in support

of its decision came up for consideration before this Court in several
cases. Initially this Court recognized a sort of demarcation between
administrative orders and quasi -judicial orders but with the passage
of time the distinction between the two got blurred and thinned out
and virtually reached a vanishing point in the judgment of this Court
in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India.

14.The expression “speaking order” was first coined by Lord

Chancellor Earl Carins in a rather strange context. The Lord
Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of the writ of certiorari,
referred to orders with errors on the face of the record and pointed
out that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking order. (See
pp. 1878-97. Vol. 4, Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of the Report).

15.This Court always opined that the face of an order passed by a

qausi-judicial authority or even an administrative authority or even
an administrative authority affecting the rights of parties, must
speak. It must not be like the “inscrutable face of a sphinx.”

I. Arbitrator to consider the demeanor of a witness examined in his

presence:

15. R. K. Bhandari V. Satish Jassal

(2008)2 ARB LR 513

14… The Learned arbitrator, therefore, drew an adverse inference

against the petitioner. The Learned arbitrator also comments on the
demeanor of the witness examined before him. I cannot accept the
submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that an arbitrator
cannot be influenced by the demeanor of a witness examined in his
presence.

J. State or an instrumentality of the state is the party of the contract,

it has an obligation in law to act fairly, justly and reasonably

9
16. ABL International Ltd. And Another V. Export Credit Gurantee
Corporation of India Ltd. And Others (2004)3 SCC 553

23. It is clear from the above observations of the Court, once the
State or an instrumentality of the state is the party of the contract, it
has an obligation in law to act fairly, justly and reasonably which is
requirement of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, if
by the impugned repudiation of the claim of the appellant the first
respondent as an instrumentality of the State has acted in
contravention of the above said requirement of Article 14, then we
have no hesitation in holding that a writ court can issue suitable
directions to set right the arbitrary actions of the first respondent.

17. National Highway Authority of India (“NHAI”) Vs. M/s. BSC -

RBM-PATI Joint Venture 2018 SCC OnLine Del 6780

“73. A Final Word:

74. Before parting with this judgment, we are constrained to note
that, in case after case, we find that factual findings, in re spect of
which the learned Arbitral Tribunal is the final authority, are being
successively challenged, under Section 34 and thereafter, under
Section 37 of the Act. This has effectively reduced the exercise of
arbitration to the civil trial, and petitions under Sections 34 and 37
of the Act to first appeals and second appeals. In fact, while second
appeals under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, would
lie only on questions of law, we find that arbitral awards are being
challenged, even on fact s, under Section 37 of the Act. Despite wealth
of judicial authority on this point, and repeated disapproval voiced
by the Supreme Court and as well as several High Courts including
this Court thereon, it is almost invariably seen that every award
passed by the arbitrator/Arbitral Tribunal, especially, where the
awards are commercial in nature, are challenged, first before the
Single Judge and thereafter before the Division Bench merely because
the “aggrieved party” possess the financial wherewithal to do s o. It
is a matter of concern that the majority of such challenges are by
public sector undertakings, the appellant before us being one of the
main contributors thereto. Such attempts contribute, in a great deal
to the menace of “docket explosion”, which pl agues our Courts and

10
 consumes valuable time which could be used for settling more
important disputes. We unhesitatingly deprecate this practice.”

K. when a contractor is granted an initial extension, then on a subsequent grant

of extension (i.e. 2nd extension), no penalty can be imposed for any delay that
caused the first application for extension

18. Hydel Construction Ltd v HP State Electricity Board, AIR 2000

HP 19,

“50. One more submission made on behalf of the Board by their

learned counsel is that the learned single Judge has erred in law in
not discussing or determining the objections of the Board in respect
of the Award whereby its counter claims for liquidated damages by
way of penalty in terms of Clause 2 of the contract and also for loss
of revenue were disallowed.

It is correct that the learned single Judge has not decided this
Objection of the Board, may be for any reason, but after examining it,
we find that the counter claims have rightly not been awarded by the
Arbitrators. In its co unter claim
Part-1, the Board has claimed penalty of Rs. 41,29.350.50 purporting
to be in terms of Clause 2 of the contract agreement and interest
thereon at the rate of 18% per annum from 1 -11 -1988 till the date of
actual payment and in Part II it has claimed an amount of Rs.
3,70,20,000/by way of loss of net revenue, additional cost to the Board
on account of escalation of prices and loss of interest on the blocked
up capital restricted to a period of 9 months only out of the extended
period of 51 mont hs and 21 days and also interest thereon @ 18% per
annum from 1-1-1988 till the date of actual payment. These two
counter claims are inter-linked with the question of extension of time
from 11-4-1985 till the work was actually completed on 31 -7-1989 i.e.
51 months and 21 days after the stipulated date of completion on 10 -
4-1985. It is not in dispute that "provisional extensions" were granted
from time to time up to 30 -6-1989 by the Superintending Engineer by
which date the work was completed. No doubt, in these letters the
extension was qualified as provisional subject to the right of the Board
"to recover liquidated damages" in accordance with the provisions of
Clause 2 of the contract agreement and also subject to the time being
the essence of the agreemen t. The completion certificate was also

11
issued provisionally, without prejudice to the rights of the Board to
recover liquidated damages in accordance with the provisions of the
Contract Agreement by the Executive Engineer, Bhaba Construction
Division No. 4, HPSEB, Bhabanagar on 31-10-1989 certifying that the
contracted work has been completed to his general satisfaction.
Thereafter, the claimants by their letter dated 31 -10 1990 (Ex. C-22(6)
before the Arbitrators) represented to the Chairman of the Board to
finally settle all their pending claims and also to ratify the provisional
extensions granted to them by the Superintending Engineer from 30 -
9-1987 to 31-7-1989.

This letter was replied to by the Chief Engineer (P & M) of the Board
on 21-2-1991 (Ex. C-20 before the Arbitrators) informing the
claimants that their claims were not tenable, hence rejected and also
that the case relating to extension of time was under consideration of
the Board and the decision thereon will be communicated shortly but
after the claimants invoked the arbitration Clause 25 of the Contract
Agreement, by their letter dated 4 -3-1991 (Ex. C-14 (36), before the
Arbitrators), the Board informed them by its letter dated 8 -10-1991
that "keeping in view the fact that the Contractor has already gone
into arbitration in the case". It rejected the proposal to extend the
time up to 31-7-1989. Considering these facts and circumstances on
record in the light of Clauses 2, 5, 12 and 29A of the Contract
Agreement, the Arbitrators came to the conclusion that:-

"........ The expression 'provisional' has not been defined in the

Contract. According to the Webster's III new International
Dictionary, the word 'provisional' means "suitable in existing
situation, but subject to change or nullification". In the light
of this meaning, the word 'provisionally' used in the order
granting extension of time would mean that the extension was
granted to suit the existing situation and it could have been
subsequently changed or nullified by the Chief Engineer bef ore
the expiration of the extended time. It is common sense that
once the extended time has expired, there is no scope left for
making any change in or nullification of the extension already
granted. It was after more than two years from the date of
completion of the work that the Board, by its letters dated 8-
10-1991 (Ex. C -21) refused to ratify the extension (C-21) of
time granted by the S. E. from 30 -9-1987 to 31-7-1989 that too
for the lame reason that "the contractor has already gone in
arbitration in the case." This reason in our opinion, is
extraneous and non-germane to the purport of Clause 5 for
extension of time. In these circumstances, the refusal of the
Board to ratify the extension of up to 31-7-1989 granted by the

12
 Superintending Engineer and ta citly approved by the Chief
Engineer, is not only unjustified but is also, invalid and
inoperative in law.

It is relevant to note that in all the letters granting 'provisional'

extensions, a proviso has been inserted to the effect that
"notwithstanding provisional extension hereby granted time is and
shall continue to be the essence of the said Agreement". This language
cannot be construed to mean that the time as originally postulated in
the Contract Agreement was of the essence of the agreement. It can
only be interpreted to mean that the time as extended was the essence
of the Contract. In other words, if the contractor failed to complete
the work within the extended time, he will be exposed to the liability
for breach of contract. Otherwise the extensi on clause would be
rendered to be illusory. Therefore, once the time is extended with
mutual consent of the parties, it is not the time as originally
stipulated in the contract, but it is the time as extended which is of
the essence of the contract. The co unsel for both the sides have relied
on Hudson's Building and Engineering Contracts (Tenth Edition),
Chapter II dealing with PENALTIES AND LIQUIDATED DAMAGES -
- the Heading "Extension of time". We have gone through the relevant
portions of this heading. The statement at page 638 under sub -
heading "Generally" that the "power of granting extensions of time
for delays, when acted upon, fixes a new date for completion and the
obligation of the builder is then complete by that date "is pertinent."
Then at page 644; under the sub-heading the "Effect of Unqualified
Certificate" it is stated that "in each case the contractual provisions
must be carefully examined". Applying this statement of law to the
facts of the case, the extensions granted by the S. E. having been
acted upon, the last date of extension viz. 31-7-1989 was fixed as the
new date for completion of the work and the obligation of the
contractor was then to complete the work by that date. That the
contractor did. We have carefully examined the relevan t provisions
of the Contract, particularly the provisions of Clause 5 and we are
of the opinion that there is no delay in execution of the work, as
postulated by Clause 2. Hence the counter claim based on 'delay' falls
being unsustainable."

51. The Arbitrators have relied upon the Judgment of the Supreme
Court in Hind Construction Contractors v. State of Maharashtra AIR
1979 SC 720 to come to the conclusion that time of two years was
never intended by the parties to be the essence of the contract and
the time as extended up to 31 -7-1989 was the essence of the contract,
till which date the work was completed. In the aforesaid case.
Tulzapurkar, J. said that the question whether or not "time was of the

13
essence of the contract would essentially be a ques tion of the
intention of the parties to be gathered from the terms of the contract."
It is further observed that: (at page 725)
"....... even where the parties have expressly provided that time
is of the essence of the contract such a stipulation will hav e to
be read along with other provisions of the Contract and such
other provisions may, on construction of the Contract, exclude
the inference that the completion of the work by a particular
date was intended to be fundamental, for instance. If the
contract were to include clauses providing for extension of time
in certain contingencies or for payment of fine or penalty for
every day or week the work undertaken remains unfinished on
the expiry of the time provided in the contract such clauses
would be construed as rendering ineffective the express
provisions relating to the time being of the essence of contract."

52. By holding that there was no delay on the part of the claimants,
as they have completed the work within the time extended, the counte r
claims for penalty compensation and loss of net revenue was not
maintainable. It is also held by the Arbitrators that despite reserving
the right to claim liquidated damages in terms of Clause 2 of the
Contract, this right was never exercised by the Boar d till written
statement was filed before the Arbitrator which shows that the
counterclaims were after thought. Above all for the compensation for
loss of revenue, the Board has not produced any evidence on record
that the other components of the project e xecuted by the other
agencies were completed prior to the completion of the work by the
claimants and, therefore, the Board could not generate electricity or
suffered in any other manner for the alleged delay in execution of the
component of the project entrusted to the claimants.”
(Emphasis supplied)

Filed by :

[MAKARAND D. ADKAR]
Advocate for the Respondent
232, M.C. Setalwad Lawyers Chamber
Supreme Court, New Delhi -110001

14
New Delhi
Filed on :

15