Calalang-Parulan vs Calalang-Garcia

Facts:
In a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property, the
respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile and Carlito S.
Calalang asserted their ownership over a certain parcel of land against the
petitioners Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang. The said lot was
allegedly acquired by the respondents from their mother Encarnacion Silverio,
through succession as the latter’s compulsory heirs.

According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted 2

marriages during his lifetime. The first marriage was with their mother
Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of this marriage, their parents
acquired the abovementioned parcel of land from their maternal grandmother
Francis Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however,
their parents failed to register the same. On June 7, 1942, the first marriage was
dissolved with the death of Encarnacion Silverio.

On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira
B. Calalang who then gave birth to Nora B. Calalang Parulan and Roland Calalang.
According to the respondents, it was only during this time that Pedro Calalang
filed an application for free patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of
Lands.

On Feburary 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan. TCT 283321 was issued in the name of Nora B. Calalang-
Parulan. On December 27, 1989, Pedro Calalang died.

The respondents assailed the validity of the TCT arguing that the sale of the land
was voi because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consend of the respondents
who were co-owners of the same.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondents were deprived of their respective shares by
reason of the sale.

Ruling:
No. It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of
death. Article 777 of the New Civil Code provides that “the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. “In
Butte v Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we proclaimed the fundamental tenets of
succession:

The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor’s death is basic in

our Civil Code, and is supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of
the heir is determined as of the time the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime
is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is the inofficiousness
of the donation inter vivos (Art. 711). Similarly, the legacies of credit and
remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the
testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to
pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).

Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his
heirs acquired their respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso
shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the disputed property, the
rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang.
And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not
duly supported by valuable consideration (in effect an inofficious donation inter
vivos), the respondents have no right to question the sale of the disputed
property on the ground that their father deprived them of their respective
shares. Well to remember, fraud must be established by clear and convincing
evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.
The Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property must
therefore be dismissed.

Balus v. Balus
G.R. No. 168970, January 15, 2010
Petitioner Celestino and respondents Saturnino and Leonarda are the children of
the spouses Rufo and Sebastiana Balus. Sebastiana died on 6 September 1978. In
1979, Rufo mortgaged a parcel of land as security for a loan obtained from a
bank. When Rufo failed to pay the loan, the property was foreclosed and was
subsequently sold to the Bank as the sole bidder at a public auction held for that
purpose. The same was not redeemed within the period allowed by law. Hence, a
new title was issued in the name of the Bank. Rufo died on 6 July 1984. On 10
October, 1989, petitioner and respondents executed an Extrajudicial Settlement
of Estate adjudicating to each of the a specific one-third portion of the subject
property. Three years thereafter, respondents bought the subject property from
the Bank and a new title was issued in their name. Meanwhile, petitioner
continued possession of the subject lot. The respondents thus filed a complaint
for recovery of possession. However, petitioner alleged that respondents’ act of
buying back the property without notifying him inures to his benefit as co-owner
and that he is entitled to a one-third share of the property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the subject property forms part of the estate of petitioner
and respondents’ father

No. The court ruled that the subject property does not form part of the estate of
Rufo considering that ownership over the same was transferred to the bank
prior to the death of Rufo. Inheritance consists of existing property, as well as
accrued property, and transmissible rights and obligations at the time of death of
the decedent. Thus, since Rufo lost ownership over the subject property during
his lifetime, the same no longer forms part of his estate to which his heirs may
lay claim at the time of his death. Consequently, his children never inherited the
property. The Court further ruled that petitioner and respondents are not co-
owners of the subject property and there is no property to partition, as the
disputed lot never formed part of the estate of their deceased father.

Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, GR No. 139868 June 8, 2006

Facts: 2 American citizens have resided in the Philippines. They have an adopted
daughter. The wife died and left a will where she left her entire estate to her
husband. 2 years after the wife's death, the husband married a Candelaria. 4
years after, Richard died and left a will where he left his entire estate to
Candelaria except for some of his shares in a company which he left to his
adopted daughter. Audrey’s will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal. Inventory
was taken on their conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a
partition of the first wife's estate. The will was also admitted in a court in her
native land (Maryland).

Issue: Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law
where the property is situated

Ruling: Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the
property is situated. However, since the first wife is a foreign national, the
intrinsic validity of her will is governed by her national law. The national law of
the person who made the will shall regulate whose succession is in consideration
whatever the nature of the property and regardless of the country where the
property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife's properties may be found in
the Philipppines, however the successional rights over those properties are
governed by the national law of the testator.
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL. vs. MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-7188
August 9, 1954

Facts: Andres Enriquez, as one of the legatees in a document purporting to be

the last will and testament of Father Sancho Abadia, which was executed on
September 6, 1923, filed a petition for its probate. Some cousins and nephews of
the deceased, who would inherit his estate if he left no will, filed opposition. The
trial court ruled in favor of Enriquez, stating that even if the said document is a
holographic will, one which is not permitted by law at the time it was executed
and at the time of the testator’s death, such form of a will is already allowed at
the time of the hearing of the case since the new Civil Code is already enforced,
and that to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial
court is the controlling factor and may override any defect in form. Hence, this
petition.

Issue: Whether the reckoning period in deciding the validity of the holographic
will of Rev. Sanchio, the time of the hearing of the case shall be considered and
not the time of its execution

Held: No. The validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time
of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for
probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the
instrument was execute, as supported by Art. 795 of the new Civil Code. One
reason in support of the rule is that although the will operates upon and after the
death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate
among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time
the will is executed, and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a
completed act. When one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe
and follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death
he should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will
then inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should
be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested
rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the
Legislature cannot validate void wills. Hence, the trial court’s decision was
reversed.
BALTAZAR vs. LAXA | G.R. No. 174489 | April 11, 2012 | Del Castillo, J.:

FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and
testament in the Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the
house of retired Judge Limpin, was read to Paciencia twice. After which,
Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the
document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at
the end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2
and 4 thereof.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her
properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their
children Luna and Katherine. Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated
as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his
own mother.

Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia left for USA.
There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on Jan. 4, 1996. In
the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.

More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed
a petition with the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of
Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of Administration in his favor.

On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to

Lorenzo’s petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will
belong to Nicomeda Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia
had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo. Also, one of the petitioners, Rosie
Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of being “mangulyan” or forgetful
making her unfit for executing a will and that the execution of the will had been
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence.

Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in

Lorenzo’s favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such,
he being a citizen and resident of the USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of
Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.

RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when
Paciencia signed the will, she was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason or
strength of mind to have the testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA reversed the
decision of the RTC and granted the probate of the will. The petitioner went up to
SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently
established to warrant its allowance for probate.

HELD: Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful
compliance with the formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix,
Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all present and
evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical
requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses attested and
subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact,
even the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be
authentic although they question of her state of mind when she signed the same
as well as the voluntary nature of said act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the
execution of the will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with
the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make
a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will.
Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of the
NCC states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient
if the testator was able at the time of making the Will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act.”