Evidence Case Digests 2

Burden of Proof

Manongsong v. Estimo

How to refute a notarized document

FACTS: Spouses Agatona Guevarra ("Guevarra") and Ciriaco Lopez had six (6) children, particularly
Enriqueta Lopez-Jumaquio, the mother of respondents Emiliana Jumaquio Rodriguez and Felomena
Jumaquio Estimo ("Jumaquio sisters") and Vicente Lopez, the father of petitioner Milagros Lopez
Manongsong ("Manongsong").

Milagros and Carlito Manongsong ("petitioners") filed a Complaint6 on 19 June 1992, alleging that
Manongsong and respondents are the owners pro indiviso of the Property. Invoking Article 494 of the Civil
Code,7 petitioners prayed for the partition and award to them of an area equivalent to one-fifth (1/5) of the
Property or its prevailing market value, and for damages.

Petitioners alleged that Guevarra was the original owner of the Property. Upon Guevarra’s death, her children
inherited the Property. Each of the five children (because one of the children died without issue), including
Vicente Lopez, the father of Manongsong, was entitled to a fifth of the Property. As Vicente Lopez’ sole
surviving heir, Manongsong claims her father’s 1/5 share in the Property by right of representation.

Most of the respondent entered into a compromise agreement, however among the respondents, the
Jumaquio sisters and Leoncia Lopez – who each occupy 50 square meter portions of the Property – and
Joselito dela Cruz, did not sign the Agreement.10 However, only the Jumaquio sisters actively opposed
petitioners’ claim. The Jumaquio sisters contended that Justina Navarro ("Navarro"), supposedly the mother
of Guevarra, sold the Property to Guevarra’s daughter Enriqueta Lopez Jumaquio.

The Jumaquio sisters presented provincial Tax Declaration No. 91111 for the year 1949 in the sole name of
Navarro and a notarized (as certified by clerk of court) Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lupa between Navarro and
Jumaquio.

RTC decision: After trial on the merits, the trial court in its Decision14 of 10 April 1995 ruled in favor of
petitioners. The trial court held that the Kasulatan was void, even absent evidence attacking its validity.

The conveyance made by Justina Navarro is subject to nullity because the property conveyed had a conjugal
character. No positive evidence had been introduced that it was solely a paraphernal property. The name of
Justina Navarro’s spouse/husband was not mentioned and/or whether the husband was still alive at the time
the conveyance was made to Justina Navarro.

CA decision: Petitioners, in their appellee’s brief before the Court of Appeals, presented for the first time a
supposed photocopy of the death certificate16 of Guevarra, which stated that Guevarra’s mother was a
certain Juliana Gallardo. Petitioner also attached an affidavit17 from Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. attesting that he
knew Justina Navarro only by name and had never met her personally, although he had lived for some years
with Agatona Guevarra after his marriage with Rosario Lopez. On the basis of these documents, petitioners
assailed the genuineness and authenticity of the Kasulatan.
The Court of Appeals refused to take cognizance of the death certificate and affidavit presented by
petitioners on the ground that petitioners never formally offered these documents in evidence.

CA ruled that petitioners were bound by their admission: admitted before the trial court that Justina Navarro
and not Juliana Gallardo was the original owner of the subject property and was the mother of Agatona
Navarro

However, it is a settled rule that the party who invokes the presumption that all property of marriage belongs
to the conjugal partnership, must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the coveture is a condition sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of
conjugal ownership.

In this case, not a single iota of evidence was submitted to prove that the subject property was acquired by
Justina Navarro during her marriage.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners were able to contradict the deed of sale presented

RULING: NO, they were not able to contradict the deed of sale

Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a
civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes
out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert
plaintiff's prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases,
the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff
having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendant’s. The
concept of "preponderance of evidence" refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing,
that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of truth.

To trace the ownership of the Property, both contending parties presented tax declarations and the
testimonies of witnesses. However, the Jumaquio sisters also presented a notarized KASULATAN SA
BILIHAN NG LUPA which controverted petitioners’ claim of co-ownership.

The Kasulatan, being a document acknowledged before a notary public, is a public document and prima facie
evidence of its authenticity and due execution. To assail the authenticity and due execution of a notarized
document, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant.24 Otherwise the
authenticity and due execution of the document should be upheld.25 The trial court itself held that "(n)o
countervailing proof was adduced by plaintiffs to overcome or impugn the document’s legality or its
validity."26

Even if the Kasulatan was not notarized, it would be deemed an ancient document and thus still presumed to
be authentic. The Kasulatan is: (1) more than 30 years old, (2) found in the proper custody, and (3)
unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of suspicion. It appears, on its face, to be genuine.

As the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out, the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies
only when there is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of acquisition during the
marriage is an essential condition for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.28
There was no evidence presented to establish that Navarro acquired the Property during her marriage. There
is no basis for applying the presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to the present case. On the
contrary, Tax Declaration No. 911 showed that, as far back as in 1949, the Property was declared solely in
Navarro’s name.29 This tends to support the argument that the Property was not conjugal.

We likewise find no basis for the trial court’s declaration that the sale embodied in the Kasulatan deprived the
compulsory heirs of Guevarra of their legitimes. As opposed to a disposition inter vivos by lucrative or
gratuitous title, a valid sale for valuable consideration does not diminish the estate of the seller. When the
disposition is for valuable consideration, there is no diminution of the estate but merely a substitution of
values,30 that is, the property sold is replaced by the equivalent monetary consideration

Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of sale are: (1) consent or meeting of
the minds; (2) determinate subject matter and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent.31 The presence of
these elements is apparent on the face of the Kasulatan itself. The Property was sold in 1957 for ₱250.00

We find no error in the Court of Appeals’ refusal to give any probative value to the alleged birth certificate of
Guevarra and the affidavit of Benjamin dela Cruz, Sr. Petitioners belatedly attached these documents to their
appellee’s brief. Petitioners could easily have offered these documents during the proceedings before the trial
court. Instead, petitioners presented these documents for the first time on appeal without any explanation.
For reasons of their own, petitioners did not formally offer in evidence these documents before the trial court
as required by Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.

Philippine Trust Co. v. Gabinete

Proof alleging forgery

FACTS: Petitioner Philtrust, a domestic commercial banking corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws, filed a complaint on March 8, 2006 against Shangrila Realty Corporation, a domestic
corporation duly organized under Philippine laws, together with Elisa Tan and respondent Redentor
Gabinete alleging that petitioner granted Shangrila's application for a renewal of its bills discounting line in
the amount of Twenty Million Pesos (₱20,000,000.00) as shown by a letter-advice dated May 28, 1997 bearing
the conformity of Shangrila's duly-authorized representatives, Tan and respondent Gabinete.

Upon the maturity of the loan, Shangrila failed to pay Philtrust, rendering the entire principal loan, together
with accrued interest and other charges, due and demandable. Philtrust repeatedly demanded for payment,
but none of the respondents heeded the said demands.

Petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed it being the highest bidder. However, there was still a deficiency in the
amount because the totality of the loan is 50M inclusive of interest. This prompted petitioner to file a case for
recovery of sum of money. Defendant herein was declared in default and petitioner was not able to present
evidence ex parte, prompting for the dismissal of the case.

Motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner which was granted and a motion to lift the order of default
was approved by defendant.

In his Answer, respondent Gabinete alleged that he ceased to be connected with Shangrila as of 1995 and as
far as he knows, Shangrila never started doing business after it was incorporated in March 1994. He also
specifically denied under oath the genuineness and due execution of the confirmation letter dated May 28,
1997. According to him, his signature of conformity is a forgery and he has nothing to do with the loans.
Gabinete claimed that when he received a demand for payment from Philtrust, he immediately replied and
denied any participation in the transaction and informed Philtrust that his signature in the Continuing Surety
Agreement had been forged, expressing his willingness and readiness to cooperate with any investigation and
he did not receive further notices of demand from Philtrust and has no knowledge of the demands made on
his co-respondents.

Gabinete filed a motion praying that the court direct the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to conduct
an analysis of respondent Gabinete's signature appearing in the Continuing Suretyship Agreement which the
RTC granted in its Order dated March 11, 2009.

A senior document examiner of the NBI, Efren Flores, testified that he evaluated and made a comparative
examination of the submitted specimen and the document containing the questioned signature to determine
whether they were written by one and the same person and after a thorough examination, it was found that
the questioned signatures and the standard sample signatures were not written by one and the same person.

RTC decision: ruled in favour of Philtrust.

CA decision: RTC erred in not giving due weight to the findings of the NBI Document Examiner based on its
finding that the sample standard signatures submitted by respondent Gabinete to the NBI comprised only of
his full signature and not his shortened signature.

ISSUE: Whether CA was correct in reversing the decision of RTC

RULING: NO, CA was wrong in their decision

Due to the technicality of the procedure involved in the examination of forged documents, the expertise of
questioned document examiners is usually helpful. However, resort to questioned document examiners is not
mandatory and while probably useful, they are not indispensable in examining or comparing handwriting. A
finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts. Although such
testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment 011 the issue of authenticity of the
signatures under scrutiny. The judge cannot rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting expert.

In this case, the RTC judge was able to exercise his independent judgment in determining the authenticity or
genuineness of the signature in question, and not rely merely on the testimony of the NBI Document
Examiner. Needless to say, the RTC's Decision is more in depth in its analysis of the absence of forgery than
that of the CA's finding that forgery is present

Defendant, for his part, presented Mr. Efren Flores to prove that his signature appearing in the Suretyship
Agreement was forged. However, after his testimony went under a gruelling cross-examination, this Court
believes that it cannot give evidentiary weight to the findings of the document examiner.

As a matter of fact, even defendant himself admitted having used two sets of signatures in his transactions.
One shortened signature of "RGabinete" and one full signature of "RedentorGabinete." To prove this point,
defendant's signatures appearing on the Articles of Incorporation of Shangrila Realty showed that he used his
shortened signature in incorporating the same.
Thus, Philtrust is correct in claiming that the standard (sample) signatures that were submitted to the NBI
Questioned Documents Division could not be considered as sufficient standards for comparison with the
signature of defendant appearing on the Continuing Suretyship Agreement.

As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence, the
burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.26 One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that
which is offered in opposition to it.27 In this case, the respondent was not able to prove the fact that his
signature was forged.

It is also worthy to note that the document being contested has been notarized and thus, is considered a
public document. It has the presumption of regularity in its favor and to contradict all these, evidence must
be clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.28 As also borne in the records, the notary public
who notarized the Continuing Suretyship Agreement testified in court and confirmed that respondent signed
the said document in her presence.

Notarial documents executed with all the legal requisites under the safeguard of a notarial certificate is
evidence of a high character. To overcome its recitals, it is incumbent upon the party challenging it to prove
his claim with clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence. A notarial document,
guaranteed by public attestation in accordance with the law, must be sustained in full force and effect so long
as he who impugns it does not present strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on
account of some flaws or defects provided by law. Without that sort of evidence, the presumption of
regularity, the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with respect to its execution, as well
as the statements and the authenticity of the signatures thereon, stand.

Yap v. Lagtapon

Proof needed to rebut presumption of regularity

FACTS: On 9 October 1997, [respondent Lagtapon] instituted a civil suit against [petitioner Yap] for a sum
of money with the Regional Trial Court of Negros Occidental docketed as Civil Case No. 97-9991 and the
same was raffled off to the respondent court.

Summons was issued and as per return of service of summons dated 4 November 1997 prepared by the
process server of the respondent court in the person of Ray R. Precioso, he served on November 4, 1997 the
summons on [petitioner Yap] who, however, refused to acknowledge receipt thereof, thus, compelling him to
tender the same and left (sic) a copy thereof for her.

As no answer was filed, [respondent Lagtapon] filed a motion to declare [petitioner Yap] in default dated 16
December 1997. The said motion was granted by the respondent court in an order issued on 12 January 1998
declaring [petitioner Yap] in default and allowing [respondent Lagtapon] to present her evidence ex-parte on
9 February 1998.

Accordingly, [respondent Lagtapon] adduced evidence in her favor ex-parte. On 10 February 1998, the
respondent court issued an order admitting the documentary exhibits offered by [respondent Lagtapon].
On 12 February 1998, the respondent court rendered the challenged Decision in favor of [respondent
Lagtapon] and against [petitioner Yap]. Under date of 6 March 1998, [respondent Lagtapon] filed a motion
for execution which was favorably acted upon by the respondent court through an order of 21 May 1998.

The Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff for Negros Occidental issued a notice of sale on execution dated 25
September 2000 setting the auction sale of petitioner's property on 17 October 2000. The property of
petitioner that was put up for execution sale consists of a parcel of land identified as Lot 11, Block 2 of the
subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-91608 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-110467 situated at Herminia
Street, Villa Valderranm (sic), Barangay Mandalagan, Bacolod City.

On or about 11 October 2000, Joey de la Paz, to whom [petitioner Yap] mortgaged the same property,
informed her that when he asked his secretary to secure a copy of the title covering the property from the
Registry of Deeds of Bacolod City, it was found out that annotated on the title is a notice of embargo relative
to Civil Case No. 97-9991, that a notice of sale on execution had already been issued and that the said
property was scheduled to be sold at auction on 17 October 2000.

Immediately upon receiving such information, [petitioner Yap] proceeded to the Hall of Justice to verify the
truthfulness thereof. It was only then that she discovered that she was sued by [respondent Lagtapon] and a
judgment by default against her had long been issued.

With respect to the first address, petitioner Yap claimed that while she used to reside therein, she had already
moved out from the said address sometime in June 1997 and started leasing out the same on July 1998.11
Hence, the Summons could not have been served on her on November 4, 1997, as she had already vacated
from the said address by then.

Meanwhile, regarding the second address, petitioner Yap averred that she never resided at any such place. 12
Allegedly, at the time of the service of Summons, she was residing somewhere else, specifically in "Frankfurt
Street, Sunshine Valley Subdivision, Barangay Estefania, Bacolod City" (as compared to "Frankfurt Street,
Hesusa (sic) Heights, Bacolod City"), which she started leasing from June 1997 (upon vacating the first
address) until September 1999. 13

Simply put, petitioner Yap wholly denied the fact of service of Summons, as reflected in the Return of Service
dated November 4, 199714 accomplished by the RTC's process server, Roy R. Precioso

CA Decision: Denied the petition for annulment, affirming the decision of RTC

ISSUE: Whether CA erred in their decision of affirming RTC

RULING: NO, they did not erred in their decision

It is axiomatic that a public official enjoys the presumption of regularity in the discharge of one's official
duties and functions. 48 Here, in the absence of clear indicia of partiality or malice, the service of Summons
on petitioner Yap is perforce deemed regular and valid. Correspondingly, the Return of Service of Precioso as
process server of the RTC constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts set out that: the undersigned served a
copy of the complaint, its annexes as well as the Summons to the defendant Susan A. Yap, personally, but she
refused to sign said Summons despite the undersigned's explanation to her but nevertheless, the undersigned
tendered and leave (sic) a copy for her.
Hence, as far as the circumstances attendant to the service of Summons are concerned, the Court has the
right to rely on the factual representation of Precioso that service had indeed been made on petitioner Yap in
person.

To successfully overcome such presumption of regularity, case law demands that the evidence against it must
be clear and convincing; absent the requisite quantum of proof to the contrary, the presumption stands
deserving of faith and credit. 51 In this case, the burden of proof to discharge such presumption lay with
petitioner Yap.

This presumption of regularity accorded to Precioso' s Return of Service of Summons was, however,
according to Petitioner Yap, sufficiently rebutted by the following pieces of evidence:57

(i) Affidavits of her neighbors attesting to the fact that Yap had been residing in "Frankfurt Street,
Sunshine Valley Subdivision, Barangay Estefania, Bacolod City" beginning June 1997·58

(ii) Utility receipts bearing the name of her alleged landlord, Liberato Reyes; 59 and

In the first place, the records are bereft of any lease contract involving the residence in the Sunshine Valley
address. The Court affirms the following observations of the CA on this matter:

The said alleged fact was not established by petitioner to the Court's satisfaction. No contract of
lease covering her lease of the said place was given by petitioner. To prove the alleged lease, mere
affidavits of alleged neighbors of her in the said area were submitted

No affidavit from the supposed lessor was submitted. Petitioner put as an excuse her former lessor's
reluctance to get involved in the case. To the mind of the Court, the refusal of the said lessor to
execute an affidavit for the alleged term, only casts more doubt on petitioner's claim to this effect.

While it is true that the trial court cannot dictate what particular evidence the parties must present in order to
prove their respective cases, the fact remains that petitioner Yap is still bound to present clear and convincing
evidence to support her claims. Proceeding therefrom, the Court remains unconvinced that petitioner Yap
had not and could not have been served Summons as specifically detailed in the Return of Service.

As for the second evidence: However, examining the above documents, the Court finds them severely lacking
in establishing petitioner Yap's residence in the Sunshine Valley address. First of all, both receipts do not
indicate any address corresponding to the purported utility expenses incurred by petitioner Yap during the
alleged lease. In the same manner, no address was mentioned in the Letter dated February 16, 1998 - what the
Letter simply contained were vague statements regarding the collection of rentals.

Based on the said documents, it would be impossible for the Court to determine where petitioner Yap had
her residence at the time Summons was served on her person. Granting that there was indeed a lessor-lessee
relationship between petitioner Yap and Liberato Reyes, there is no showing that the property subject of the
lease was "Frankfurt Street, Sunshine Valley Subdivision, Barangay Estefania, Bacolod City" and no place
else. While it may be true that Liberato Reyes was a lessor of petitioner Yap, there is no way for this Court to
know which address the latter was occupying specifically, for it may very well be that Liberato Reyes had
other properties at the time the alleged lease was entered into. Moreover, that the handwritings thereon were
indeed those of Liberato Reyes was not even satisfactorily established.
 Conclusive Presumption

Datalift v. Belgravia Realty

Conclusive presumption provided by landlord-tenant relationship

FACTS: Sometime in 1987, PNR leased out the lot to Sampaguita Brokerage, Inc. (Sampaguita, hereafter),
pursuant to a written contract commencing on July 1, 1987 and terminating on June 30, 1990

Sampaguita thereafter entered into a special arrangement with its sister company, Belgravia Realty &
Development Corporation (Belgravia for short) whereby the latter would put up on the lot a warehouse for
its own use. True enough, Belgravia did put up a warehouse occupying an area of about 3,000 squaremeters
of the lot. However, instead of using the said warehouse for itself, Belgravia sublet it to petitioner Datalift,
represented by its president Jaime B. Aquino, pursuant to a 1-year written contract of lease

After the one year contract period expired, lessee Datalift continued in possession and enjoyment of the
leased warehouse, evidently by acquiesance of lessor Belgravia or by verbal understanding of the parties.
Because of the rental increase made by Belgravia, Datalift stopped paying its monthly rental for the
warehouse. Thereafter, Sampaguita addressed demand letters to Datalift asking the latter to pay its rental in
arrears in the amount of P4,120,000.00 and to vacate and surrender the warehouse in dispute. The demands
having proved futile, Belgravia and/or Sampaguita filed with the MeTC of Manila their complaint 2 for
ejectment against Datalift

MeTC decision ruled in favour of Sampaguita, ordering Datalift to vacate the premises. Affirmed by RTC and
CA

ISSUE: Whether Datalift should be ejected in the premises

RULING: YES, it should be ejected

There is no definite showing that the lease contract between PNR and Sampaguita Brokerage, Inc. had been
effectively terminated. As held by the court a quo: "(B)y PNR not taking a positive action to eject Sampaguita
from the leased premises up to the present, again, there is a tacit renewal of the lease contract between PNR
and Sampaguita.

The Rules of Court already sufficiently shields respondent Belgravia, as lessor, from being questioned by the
petitioners as lessees, regarding its title or better right of possession as lessor because having admitted the
existence of a lessor-lessee relationship, the petitioners are barred from assailing Belgravia's title of better
right of possession as their lessor.

Rule 131, Sec. 2(b): The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.

Conclusive presumptions have been defined as "inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it will
not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong." 7 As long as the lessor-lessee
relationship between the petitioners and Belgravia exists as in this case, the former, as lessees, cannot by any
proof, however strong, overturn the conclusive presumption that Belgravia has valid title to or better right of
possession to the subject leased premises than they have.
It was superfluous on the part of the MeTC to rule on the source or validity of Belgravia's title or right of
possession over the leased premises as against the petitioners as lessees in this case. If at all, Belgravia's title or
right of possession should only be taken cognizance of in a proper case between PNR and Belgravia, but not
in the present case. Any ruling which the court may render on this issue will, at the very least, be an obiter
dictum, if not outrightly ultra vires.

The apparent error made by the MeTC will, however, not affect the result of the judgment rendered in this
case. In fact, the application of the rule on conclusive presumption under the afore-quoted Section 2, Rule
131 strengthens the position of the MeTC that the petitioners may be validly ordered to vacate the leased
premises for nonpayment of rentals. Likewise, the logical consequence of the operation of this conclusive
presumption against the petitioners is that they will never have the personality to question whether an implied
new lease was created between PNR and the respondents, because so long as there is no showing that the
lessor-lessee relationship has terminated, the lessor’s title or better right of possession as against the lessee will
eternally be a non-issue in any proceeding before any court.

Preponderance of Evidence

Raymundo v. Lunaria

Proving a verbal agreement

FACTS: Sometime in May 1996, petitioners approached respondent Lunaria to help them find a buyer for
their property situated at Marilao, Bulacan with an area of 12,126 square meters for the amount of
₱60,630,000. Respondent Lunaria was promised a 5% agent’s commission in the event that he finds a buyer.
After respondents found a buyer, Cecilio Hipolito, an "Exclusive Authority to Sell"3 was executed embodying
the agreement made by the parties. After the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property4 was
registered in the Registry of Deeds, a copy thereof was given to the Far East Bank and Trust Co., which was
then holding in escrow the amount of ₱50,000,000 to be disbursed or paid against the total consideration or
price of the property.

On February 14, 1997, Ceferino G. Raymundo, one of the co-owners, advised respondents to go to the bank
to receive the amount of ₱1,196,000 as partial payment of their total commission. Also, respondents were
instructed to return after seven days to get the balance of the commission due them.

On February 21, 1997, respondents returned to the bank. However, the check covering the balance of their
commission was already given by the bank manager to Lourdes R. Raymundo, the representative of the
petitioners. Respondents tried to get the check from the petitioners, however, they were told that there is
nothing more due them by way of commission as they have already divided and distributed the balance of the
commissions among their nephews and nieces.

For their part, petitioners counter that there was a subsequent verbal agreement entered into by the parties
after the execution of the written agreement. Said verbal agreement provides that the 5% agent’s commission
shall be divided as follows: 2/5 for the agents, 2/5 for Lourdes Raymundo, and 1/5 for the buyer, Hipolito.
The share given to Lourdes Raymundo shall be in consideration for the help she would extend in the
processing of documents of sale of the property, the payment of the capital gains tax to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and in securing an order from the court. The 1/5 commission given to Hipolito, on the
other hand, will be used by him for the payment of realty taxes.
RTC decision: Ruled in favour of Lunaria. Affirmed by CA

ISSUE: Whether CA erred in applying parol evidence

RULING: NO, CA did not erred in applying the parol evidence rule

We rule for the respondents. To begin with, we agree with petitioners’ claim that the parol evidence rule does
not apply to the facts of this case. First, the parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the
terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, "at or before" the
execution of the parties’ written agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying
the purport of the written contract.10 Notably, the claimed verbal agreement was agreed upon not prior to
but "subsequent to" the written agreement. Second, the validity of the written agreement is not the matter
which is being put in issue here. What is questioned is the validity of the claim that a subsequent verbal
agreement was agreed upon by the parties after the execution of the written agreement which substantially
modified their earlier written agreement.

Nonetheless, even if we apply the parol evidence rule in this case, the evidence presented by the petitioners
fell short in proving that a subsequent verbal agreement was in fact entered into by the parties. We subscribe
to the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court that the evidence presented by petitioners did
not establish the existence of the alleged subsequent verbal agreement.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners were able to establish the existence of a verbal agreement

RULING: NO, they did not establish the verbal agreement

Petitioners’ abovecited allegation has no merit. By preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence as a
whole adduced by one side is superior to that of the other.12 It refers to the weight, credit and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight
of evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence". It is evidence which is more convincing to the
court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.13

Both the appellate court and trial court ruled that the evidence presented by the petitioners is not sufficient to
support their allegation that a subsequent verbal agreement was entered into by the parties. In fact, both
courts correctly observed that if Lourdes Raymundo was in reality offered the 2/5 share of the agent’s
commission for the purpose of assisting respondent Lunaria in the documentation requirement, then why did
the petitioners not present any written court order on her authority, tax receipt or sales document to support
her self-serving testimony? Moreover, even the worksheet allegedly reflecting the commission sharing was
unilaterally prepared by petitioner Lourdes Raymundo without any showing that respondents participated in
the preparation thereof or gave their assent thereto. Even the alleged payment of 1/5 of the commission to
the buyer to be used in the payment of the realty taxes cannot be given credence since the payment of realty
taxes is the obligation of the owners, and not the buyer. Lastly, if the said sharing agreement was entered into
pursuant to the wishes of the buyer, then he should have been presented as witness to corroborate the claim
of the petitioners. However, he was not.

Object Evidence

BPI v. Reyes
 Physical evidence backed up by testimonial evidence

FACTS: On December 7, 1990 at around 2:00 p.m., plaintiff Jesusa Reyes together with her daughter, Joan
Reyes, went to BPI Zapote Branch to open an ATM account, she being interested with the ongoing
promotions of BPI entitling every depositor with a deposit amounting to P2,000.00 to a ticket with a car as its
prize to be raffled every month.

She was accommodated, in lieu of the bank manager Mr. Nicasio, by Cicero Capati (Pats) who was an
employee of the bank and in charge of the new accounts. Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open
an ATM account for the amount of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be withdrawn from her exiting
savings account with BPI bank which is account no. 0233-2433-88 and the other P100,000.00 will be given by
her in cash.

Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip for P200,00.00 to be withdrawn from her
existing savings account with said bank and the plaintiff Jesusa Reyes believing in good faith that Capati
prepared the papers with the correct amount signed the same unaware of the mistakes in figures.

Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati returned to where the plaintiff was seating and
informed the latter that the withdrawable balance could not accommodate P200,000.00.

Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P100,000.00 only and then changed and correct the
figure two (2) into one (1) with her signature super-imposed thereto signifying the change, afterwhich the
amount of P100,000.00 in cash in two bundles containing 100 pieces of P500.00 peso bill were given to
Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing the same. Thereafter Capati prepared a deposit slip for P200,000.00
in the name of plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with the new account no. 0235-0767-48 and brought the same to the
teller's booth.

After a while, he returned and handed to the plaintiff her duplicate copy of her deposit to account no. 0235-
0767-48 reflecting the amount of P200,000.00 with receipt stamp showing December 7, as the date.

Jesusa Reyes noticed that the amount contained in the disputed account only contained 100,000php instead
of the 200,000 alleged. On February 6, 1991, plaintiff instructed Efren Luna, one of her employees, to update
her savings account passbook at the BPI with the folded deposit slip for P200,000.00 stapled at the outer
cover of said passbook. After presenting the passbook to be updated and when the same was returned, Luna
noticed that the deposit slip stapled at the cover was removed and validated at the back portion thereof.

She sent multiple demand letters requesting the bank to conduct an investigation and to resolve the problem.
The bank then replied that an investigation will be conducted and that Capati would be subjected to a lie
detector test to shed light into the anomaly which he passed with flying colors

Aggrieved, Mrs. Reyes filed a case against the bank. RTC ruled in favour of Reyes: RTC found that
petitioner's claim that respondent Jesusa deposited only P100,000.00 instead of P200,000.00 was hazy; that
what should control was the deposit slip issued by the bank to respondent, for there was no chance by which
respondent could write the amount of P200,000.00 without petitioner's employee noticing it and making the
necessary corrections; that it was deplorable to note that it was when respondent Jesusa's bankbook was
submitted to be updated after the lapse of several months when the alleged error claimed by petitioner was
corrected. Affirmed by CA
ISSUE: Whether BPI is liable to return the alleged 100,000 missing from the account of Reyes.

RULING: NO, BPI is not liable as they were able to establish their defence greater than the
allegation of Reyes

In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by preponderance of evidence,13
or that evidence which is of greater weight or is more convincing than that which is in opposition to it. It
does not mean absolute truth; rather, it means that the testimony of one side is more believable than that of
the other side, and that the probability of truth is on one side than on the other.

After a careful and close examination of the records and evidence presented by the parties, we find that
respondents failed to successfully prove by preponderance of evidence that respondent Jesusa made an initial
deposit of P200,000.00 in her Express Teller account.

Respondent Jesusa and her daughter Joan testified that at the outset, respondent Jesusa told Capati that she
was opening an Express Teller account for P200,000.00; that she was going to withdraw and transfer
P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new account, and that she had an additional P100,000.00 cash.
However, these assertions are not borne out by the other evidence presented. Notably, it is not refuted that
Capati prepared a withdrawal slip15 for P200,000.00. This is contrary to the claim of respondent Jesusa that
she instructed Capati to make a fund transfer of only P100,000.00 from her savings account to the Express
Teller account she was opening. Yet, respondent Jesusa signed the withdrawal slip. We find it strange that she
would sign the withdrawal slip if her intention in the first place was to withdraw only P100,000.00 from her
savings account and deposit P100,000.00 in cash with her.

Moreover, respondent Jesusa's claim that she signed the withdrawal slip without looking at the amount
indicated therein fails to convince us, for respondent Jesusa, as a businesswoman in the regular course of
business and taking ordinary care of her concerns,16 would make sure that she would check the amount
written on the withdrawal slip before affixing her signature. Significantly, we note that the space provided for
her signature is very near the space where the amount of P200,000.00 in words and figures are written; thus,
she could not have failed to notice that the amount of P200,000.00 was written instead of P100,000.00.

In explaining the entries in the teller's tape, Torneros testified that when she was processing respondent
Jesusa's withdrawal in the amount of P200,000.00, her computer rejected the transaction because there was a
discrepancy;21 thus, the word "BIG AMOUNT" appeared on the tape. "Big amount" means that the amount
was so big for her to approve,22 so she keyed in the amount again and overrode the transaction to be able to
process the withdrawal using an officer's override with the latter's approval.23 The letter "J" appears after
Figure 288 in the fourth column to show that she overrode the transaction. She then keyed again the amount
of P200,000.00 at 3 o'clock 13 minutes and 9 seconds; however, her computer rejected the transaction,
because the balance she keyed in based on respondent Jesusa's passbook was wrong;24 thus appeared the
phrase "balance error" on the tape, and the computer produced the balance of P229,257.64, and so she keyed
in the withdrawal of P200,000.00.25 Since it was a big amount, she again had to override it, so she could
process the amount. However, the withdrawal was again rejected for the reason "TOD, overdraft,"26 which
meant that the amount to be withdrawn was more than the balance, considering that there was a debited
amount of P30,935.16 reflected in respondent Jesusa's passbook, reducing the available balance to only
P198,322.48.27
Torneros then called Capati to her cage and told him of the insufficiency of respondent Jesusa's balance.28
Capati then motioned respondent Jesusa to the teller's cage; and when she was already in front of the teller's
cage, Torneros told her that she could not withdraw P200,000.00 because of overdraft; thus, respondent
Jesusa decided to just withdraw P100,000.00.29

This explains the alteration in the withdrawal slip with the superimposition of the figure "1" on the figure "2"
and the change of the word "two" to "one" to show that the withdrawn amount from respondent Jesusa's
savings account was only P100,000.00, and that respondent Jesusa herself signed the alterations.

The teller's tape showed that the withdrawal of the amount of P100,000.00 by fund transfer was resumed at 3
o'clock 17 minutes and 27 seconds; but since it was a big amount, there was a need to override it again, and
the withdrawal/fund transfer was completed. At 3 o'clock 18 minutes and 27 seconds, the amount of
P100,000.00 was deposited to respondent Jesusa's new Express Teller Account No. 235076748.

The teller's tape definitely establishes the fact of respondent Jesusa's original intention to withdraw the
amount of P200,000.00, and not P100,000.00 as she claims, from her savings account, to be transferred as her
initial deposit to her new Express Teller account, the insufficiency of her balance in her savings account, and
finally the fund transfer of the amount of P100,000.00 from her savings account to her new Express Teller
account. We give great evidentiary weight to the teller's tape, considering that it is inserted into the bank's
computer terminal, which records the teller's daily transactions in the ordinary course of business, and there is
no showing that the same had been purposely manipulated to prove petitioner's claim.

While the fact that the alteration in the original deposit slip was signed by Capati and not by respondent
Jesusa herself was a violation of the bank's policy requiring the depositor to sign the correction,37
nevertheless, we find that respondents failed to satisfactorily establish by preponderance of evidence that
indeed there was an additional cash of P100,000.00 deposited to the new Express Teller account.

People v. Malimit

The non-applicability of the right against self-incrimination on object evidences

FACTS: On April 15, 1991, around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, [Onofre] Malaki was attending to his store.
Malaki's houseboy Edilberto Batin, on the other hand, was busy cooking chicken for supper at the kitchen
located at the back of the store (TSN, June 19, 199 (sic), p. 14).

Soon thereafter, Florencio Rondon, a farmer, arrived at the store of Malaki. Rondon was to purchase
chemical for his rice farm

Meanwhile, Batin had just finished cooking and from the kitchen, he proceeded directly to the store to ask his
employer (Malaki) if supper is to be prepared. As Batin stepped inside the store, he was taken aback when he
saw appellant coming out of the store with a bolo (TSN, June 9, 1992, p. 14), while his boss, bathed in his
own blood, was sprawled on the floor "struggling for his life"

Rondon, who was outside and barely five (5) meters away from the store, also saw appellant Jose Malimit (or
"Manolo") rushing out through the front door of Malaki's store with a blood-stained bolo (TSN, May 22,
1992, p. 29). Aided by the illumination coming from a pressure lamp ("petromax") inside the store, Rondon
clearly recognized Malimit
After a brief conversation, both Batin and Rondon rushed to the nearby house of Malaki's brother-in-law
Eutiquio Beloy and informed Beloy of the tragic incident which befell Malaki. Batin, along with Beloy, went
back to the store. Inside, they saw the lifeless body of Malaki in a pool of blood lying prostrate at the floor.
Beloy readily noticed that the store's drawer was opened and ransacked and the wallet of Malaki was missing
from his pocket

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution’s evidence of the wallet of the deceased extracted from the accused
during custodial investigation is inadmissible

RULING: NO, it is not inadmissible as it does not come into operation of the right to self-
incrimination

The right against self-incrimination guaranteed under our fundamental law finds no application in this case.
This right, as put by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt vs. United States, 26 ". . . is a prohibition of the use of physical
or moral compulsion, to extort communications from him . . ." It is simply a prohibition against legal process to
extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of his guilt. 27 It does not apply to the instant case
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence. Wigmore,
discussing the question now before us in his treatise on evidence

If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control of his] own vocal
utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exercise, then, it would be possible for a guilty
person to shut himself up in his house, with all the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of
the law to employ in evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession and
compelling the surrender of the evidential articles — a clear reduction ad absurdum. In other words, it is not
merely compulsion that is the kernel of the privilege

These are the so-called "Miranda rights" so oftenly disregarded by our men in uniform. However, infractions
thereof render inadmissible only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial
investigation. The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise
excluded by law or rules, 29 is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation.
Concededly, appellant was not informed of his right to remain silent and to have his own counsel by the
investigating policemen during the custodial investigation. Neither did he execute a written waiver of these
rights in accordance with the constitutional prescriptions. Nevertheless, these constitutional short-cuts do not
affect the admissibility of Malaki's wallet, identification card, residence certificate and keys for the purpose of
establishing other facts relevant to the crime. Thus, the wallet is admissible to establish the fact that it was the
very wallet taken from Malaki on the night of the robbery. The identification card, residence certificate and
keys found inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet really belongs to
Malaki. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo that these pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the same will
not detract from appellant's culpability considering the existence of other evidence and circumstances
establishing appellant's identity and guilt as perpetrator of the crime charged.

ime and again, we ruled that there can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the
circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing
the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as the perpetrator of the crime. 30 In order that circumstantial
evidence may be sufficient to convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz., (a) there is
more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 31 In this
case, there were at least five (5) circumstances constituting an unbroken chain of events which by their
"concordant combination and cumulative effect", satisfy the requirements for the conviction of the appellant,
32 specifically: (1) appellant was seen by Rondon and Batin, whose credibilities were untarnished, holding a
bolo in his right hand and rushing out of Malaki's store seconds prior to their discovery of the crime; 33 (2)
Malaki sustained multiple stab wounds 34 and he died of "cardiac arrest, secondary to severe external
hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds", 35 (3) witness Elmer Ladica saw the appellant on August 6, 1991,
accompanied by some policemen, retrieve Malaki's wallet underneath a stone at the seashore in Barangay
Hingatungan; 36 (4) appellant himself admitted in his testimony that on August 6, 1991, he accompanied
several policemen to the seashore where he hid Malaki's wallet; 37 and (5) appellant's flight and his
subsequent disappearance from Hingatungan immediately after the incident.

Paraffin Test

People v. Buduhan

Paraffin test is not conclusive evidence

FACTS: On 24 July 1998, Cherry Rose was working as a guest relations officer at the RML Canteen, a
beerhouse and a videoke bar in Maddela, Quirino.22 At about 9:00 to 10:00 p.m., there were only two groups
of men inside the beerhouse.23 The group that went there first was that of the appellants,24 which was
composed of Robert Buduhan’s group. The second group was composed of Larry Erese and his companions
Gilbert Cortez (alias Abe) and Fernando Pera

At 10:40 p.m., while Cherry Rose was entertaining the group of Larry Erese, Robert approached them and
poked a gun at Larry.29 Immediately, the man wearing a blue T-shirt likewise approached Cherry Rose’s
Manager Romualde Almeron (alias Eddie), who was seated at the counter.30 The man in blue poked a gun at
Romualde and announced a hold-up.31 Larry then handed over his wristwatch to Robert. Instantaneously, all
four men from Robert’s group fired their guns at Larry and Romualde, which caused them to fall down.32
Abe and Nanding ran out of the RML Canteen when the shooting occurred, and Cherry Rose hid below the
table.

SPO1 Leo T. Saquing34 testified that on 24 July 1998, at 11:00 p.m., he and SPO4 Alex M. Gumayagay were
detailed as duty investigators at the Maddela Police Station when Eddie Ancheta, a fireman, reported to them
a shooting incident at the RML Canteen in Barangay Poblacion Norte, Maddela, Quirino. SPO1 Saquing and
SPO4 Gumayagay then proceeded to the said place. About 50 meters from the scene of the crime, they
encountered four male individuals who were running away therefrom.35 The policemen immediately halted
the men and asked them where they came from. When they could not respond properly and gave different
answers, the policemen apprehended them and brought them to the Maddela Police Station for questioning
and identification.36 Afterwards, the policemen went back to the RML Canteen to conduct an investigation
therein.

As for the accused, they all posited the defense the negative result of the paraffin test conducted, among
other things: Police Inspector Maria Leonora Chua-Camarao59 testified that she was the one who conducted
the examination proper of the paraffin casts taken from Robert Buduhan, Rudy Buduhan, Boyet Ginyang and
Boy Guinhicna. Police Inspector Chua-Camarao explained that the purpose of conducting a paraffin test was
to determine the presence of gunpowder residue in the hands of a person through extraction using paraffin
wax. The process involves two stages: first, the paraffin casting, in which the hands of the subject are covered
with paraffin wax to extract gunpowder residue; and second, the paraffin examination per se, which refers to
the actual chemical examination to determine whether or not gunpowder residue has indeed been extracted.
For the second stage, the method used is the diphenyl amine test, wherein the diphenyl amine agent is poured
on the paraffin casts of the subject’s hands. In this test, a positive result occurs when blue specks are
produced in the paraffin casts, which then indicates the presence of gunpowder residue. When no such
reaction takes place, the result is negative.

The findings and conclusion on the paraffin test that Police Inspector Chua-Camarao conducted were
contained in Physical Science Report No. C-25-9863 which yielded a negative result for all the four accused.
Nonetheless, the forensic chemist pointed out that the paraffin test is merely a corroborative evidence,
neither proving nor disproving that a person did indeed fire a gun. The positive or negative results of the test
can be influenced by certain factors, such as the wearing of gloves by the subject, perspiration of the hands,
wind direction, wind velocity, humidity, climate conditions, the length of the barrel of the firearm or the open
or closed trigger guard of the firearm.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution was able to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite
the negative yield of the paraffin test

RULING: YES, the prosecution was able to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Appellants likewise cannot rely on the negative findings of Police Inspector Chua-Camarao on the paraffin
tests conducted in order to exculpate themselves. The said witness herself promptly stated that paraffin test
results are merely corroborative of the major evidence offered by any party, and they are not conclusive with
respect to the issue of whether or not the subjects did indeed fire a gun. As previously mentioned, the
positive and negative results of the paraffin test can also be influenced by certain factors affecting the
conditions surrounding the use of the firearm, namely: the wearing of gloves by the subject, perspiration of
the hands, wind direction, wind velocity, humidity, climate conditions, the length of the barrel of the firearm
or the open or closed trigger guard of the firearm.

The defense of appellants of alibi is at best weak when faced with the positive identification of the appellants
by the prosecution’s principal witness. It is elemental that for alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and
place must be strictly met. This means that the accused must not only prove his presence at another place at
the time of the commission of the offense but he must also demonstrate that it would be physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime at that time.102 In the present case, there was absolutely
no claim of any fact that would show that it was well nigh impossible for appellants to be present at the locus
criminis. In fact, they all testified that they were going towards the vicinity of the area of the shooting incident
when the police apprehended them.

The testimonies of Robert Buduhan and Boyet Ginyang were also markedly inconsistent on the material date
as to when the witnesses in the shooting incident identified them. Robert Buduhan testified that the three
lady witnesses came to identify them at the municipal jail on the evening of 26 July 1998.103 However, in the
direct examination of Boyet Ginyang, he testified that said witnesses arrived on the morning of 25 July 1998.
This fact only tends to lend suspicion to their already weak alibi.

Section 13, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, on the matter of inconsistent statements by a witness,
is revealing: Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other times statements
inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the
times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such statements, and if so,
allowed to explain them. If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any
question is put to him concerning them.

In the present case, the statements made by Cherry Rose during the preliminary investigation with respect to
the identities of the accused were not related to her during the trial. Indeed, it is only during the appeal of this
case that appellants pointed out the supposed inconsistencies in Cherry Rose’s identification of the appellants
in order to destroy her credibility as a witness. No opportunity was ever afforded her to provide an
explanation. Without such explanation, whether plausible or not, we are left with no basis to evaluate and
assess her credibility, on the rationale that it is only when no reasonable explanation is given by a witness in
reconciling her conflicting declarations that she should be deemed impeached.90

In this regard, what the defense brought to Cherry Rose’s attention during the trial were her contradictory
statements about her romantic relationship with Larry Erese. As a result of this confrontation, Cherry Rose
changed her answer. We rule, however, that this inconsistency relates only to an insignificant aspect of the
case and does not involve a material fact in dispute.

Inasmuch as the above-stated mandatory procedural requirements were not complied with, the credibility of
Cherry Rose as a witness stands unimpeached. As found by the trial court, the testimony of Cherry Rose was
straightforward throughout. The appellants were not able to adduce any reason or motive for her to bear false
witness against them.

People v. Brecinio

Same same: Paraffin test is not conclusive

FACTS: Robinson Arbilo testified that, at around 5:00 p.m., on June 30, 1996, he was with inmates Sammy
Bolanos, Rafael Morales, Edwin Maceda, Filomeno Mapalad, Jr. and victim Alberto Pagtananan inside the
Pagsanjan municipal jail, cell no. 1, when appellant SPO1 Virgilio Brecinio, who was drunk, arrived. Appellant
entered their cell and asked for their names, and the reasons for their detention. After answering, each of
them received a blow in the stomach from the appellant for no apparent reason. Thereafter, appellant ordered
them to bring out all their belongings from their cell. While doing so, they were hit with whatever object the
former could get hold of.

Appellant proceeded to the comfort room and, as he emerged therefrom, he saw the victim Alberto
Pagtananan also coming out. Appellant confronted the victim and asked him where he came from. The
victim answered that he had just urinated. Apparently not believing him, appellant accused the victim of
"hiding" and "making a fool of him." The victim innocently replied "hindi naman po." Irritated by the
answer, appellant berated the victim and when the latter looked at him, he asked, "Ba’t ang sama mong
tumingin?" The victim did not reply. Appellant punched the victim in the stomach but still the latter said
nothing.

Appellant pulled out his .45 caliber pistol tucked on his right waist and fired it twice in succession. The first
shot was directed upward; the second downward. The inmates inside the cell were all cowering in fear and
were huddled together in one corner of the bed, covering their ears. Witness Arbilo who was merely one-and-
a-half meters in front of the appellant then saw the latter aim his gun at the victim and fire the third shot,
hitting the victim in the stomach. Seeing the victim lying prostrate on the ground, the inmates lifted and laid
him on the bed. At that juncture, appellant, who was standing in front of the inmates, reholstered his gun on
his waist and ordered them to get water for the victim. SPO1 Bayani Montessur then arrived and ordered the
victim to be brought to a nearby hospital but the latter was declared dead on arrival.

Contrary to the prosecution’s version, appellant claimed that the shooting was accidental. He declared that he
had just gone out of the comfort room and was about to tuck his .45 caliber pistol in its holster on his waist
when he slipped on the wet floor, causing the gun to drop and fire. After picking up the gun, Eric Garcia, an
inmate, called his attention to the fact that one of the inmates had been hit. He immediately went to the
detention cell and saw the victim, Alberto Pagtananan, lying down with a wound in his stomach. He called
Filomeno Mapalad Jr. and ordered him to bring the victim to the hospital. He was not able to go with the
group as he was immediately placed under arrest.

NBI forensic chemist Emilia Andro-Rosaldes was also presented by the defense to testify on the result of the
paraffin examination conducted on the appellant on July 2, 1996, two days after the alleged shooting incident.
She testified that it was Mrs. Gemma Orbeta who made the paraffin cast on the appellant and her only
participation was the examination of the paraffin cast taken from the appellant. According to her, there are
four factors that can affect the presence of gun powder residue in the hands of a person who fires a gun,
namely, the length of the barrel of the gun, the wind velocity, the direction of the shot(s) and the type and
caliber of ammunition. She also declared that the application of paraffin wax to make the paraffin cast can
remove gunpowder residue. She did not know whether paraffin wax had been applied on the hands of the
appellant before the paraffin cast was made.

ISSUE: Whether the guilt of the accused was established beyond reasonable doubt despite the
negative result of the paraffin test

RULING: YES, the guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt

Likewise, while the paraffin test was negative, such fact alone did not ipso facto prove that the appellant was
innocent. Time and again, we have held that a negative paraffin result is not conclusive proof that a person
has not fired a gun. Stated otherwise, it is possible to fire a gun and yet be negative for nitrates, as when the
culprit is wearing gloves or he washes his hands afterwards.17 Since appellant submitted himself for paraffin
testing only two days after the shooting, it was likely he had already washed his hands thoroughly, thus
removing all traces of nitrates therefrom.

We reiterate the familiar and well-entrenched rule that the factual findings of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses deserve great weight, given the clear advantage of the trial judge (an opportunity not available to
the appellate court) in the appreciation of testimonial evidence. The trial judge personally hears the witnesses
and observes their deportment and manner of testifying. Although the rule admits of certain exceptions, we
find no reason to hold otherwise in the present case.13

As found by the trial court – and we agree – both prosecution witnesses were credible. They gave a steadfast
and credible narration of what they witnessed in a manner reflective of a candid and unrehearsed testimony.
Robinson Arbilo, who stood only one-and-a-half meters in front of the assailant, was very direct, clear and
spontaneous in describing how the appellant shot the victim.

In this connection, the defense never showed that Mapalad was motivated by any ill-motive in implicating the
appellant in the crime. When there is no evidence of improper motive on the part of the prosecution witness
to testify falsely against an accused or implicate him in the commission of a crime, the logical conclusion is
that no such improper motive exists and the testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.
 Photograph as Evidence

Sison v. People

How to admit photographs as evidence

FACTS: The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by
the Marcos loyalists. Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District,
arrived and asked the leaders for their permit. No permit could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres thereupon
gave them ten minutes to disperse. The loyalist leaders asked for thirty minutes but this was refused. The
police then pushed the crowd, and used tear gas and truncheons to disperse them. The loyalists scampered
away but some of them fought back and threw stones at the police. Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria
Orosa Street and the situation later stabilized.

At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the Luneta. A
commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the
color of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his yellow shirt.2 He then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being
chased by a group of persons shouting "Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!" The man in the yellow t-shirt was
Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and
mauled him. Salcedo tried to extricate himself from the group but they again pounced on him and pummelled
him with fist blows and kicks hitting him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an
electrician at the Luneta, rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he could extricate
Salcedo from them. But the maulers pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists.
Somebody gave Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. They backed off for a
while and Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from
behind Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed
Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was already fallen.3 Salcedo tried to stand but accused
Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of his head and ear.4 Accused Nilo Pacadar punched Salcedo on his nape,
shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan. Patayin!"5 Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the latter lunged at the victim
again. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he once more fell. Banculo
saw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he tried to stand, Sison
repeatedly boxed him.6 Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the victim but did not notice what he did.

Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the blood from his face. He sat on
some cement steps8 and then tried to flee towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal Monument
but accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the process

The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both local and foreign. The
press took pictures and a video of the event which became front-page news the following day, capturing
national and international attention. This prompted President Aquino to order the Capital Regional
Command and the Western Police District to investigate the incident. A reward of ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) was put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, for persons who could give
information leading to the arrest of the killers.11 Several persons, including Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato
Banculo, cooperated with the police, and on the basis of their identification, several persons, including the
accused, were apprehended and investigated.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the victim and offered
their respective alibis. Accused Joselito Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the photographs presented
by the prosecution12 because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house in Quezon City.13 Gerry Neri claimed
that he was at the Luneta Theater at the time of the incident. 14 Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer,
was allegedly at his office near the Luneta waiting for some pictures to be developed at that time. 15 He
claimed to be afflicted with hernia impairing his mobility; he cannot run normally nor do things forcefully. 16
Richard de los Santos admits he was at the Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting Salcedo. 17
He said that he merely watched the mauling which explains why his face appeared in some of the
photographs. 18 Unlike the other accused, Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member of
the Ako'y Pilipino Movement and that he attended the rally on that fateful day. According to him, he saw
Salcedo being mauled and like Richard de los Santos, merely viewed the incident. 19 His face was in the
pictures because he shouted to the maulers to stop hitting Salcedo. 20 Joel Tan also testified that he tried to
pacify the maulers because he pitied Salcedo. The maulers however ignored him.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution was able to established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt despite
the failure of the prosecution to present the photographer of the pictures used to authenticate it

RULING: YES, the prosecution was able to established their guilt beyond reasonable doubt

Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was being mauled at the Luneta —
starting from a grassy portion to the pavement at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas Boulevard, 41 — as
he was being chased by his assailants 42 and as he sat pleading with his assailants. 43 Exhibits "W", "W-1" to
"W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and the mauling published in local newspapers and magazines such as the
Philippine Star, 44 Mr. and Ms. Magazine, 45 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 46 and the Malaya. 47 The
admissibility of these photographs is being questioned by appellants for lack of proper identification by the
person or persons who took the same.

The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. 48
The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, 49
and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime. 50 The
photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. 51 The correctness
of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima facie, either by the
testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the court can admit it
subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. 52 Photographs, therefore, can be identified by the photographer
or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and accuracy. 53

This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants,
through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification. 54
However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas, counsel for accused Joselito
Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48" to prove that his clients were not in any of the
pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. 55 The photographs were
adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And at this
hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other accused per understanding with their respective counsels,
including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the photographs to
cross-examine all the accused who took the witness stand. 56 No objection was made by counsel for any of
the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a continuing objection to
their admissibility. 57

The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the person
who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these photographs by some of
the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the exactness and accuracy
thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident was affirmed when
appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves therein and gave reasons
for their presence thereat. 58

An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only three of the appellants,
namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in various belligerent poses
lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. 59 Appellant Romeo Sison appears only once and he, although
afflicted with hernia is shown merely running after the victim. 60Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not
identified in any of the pictures. The absence of the two appellants in the photographs does not exculpate
them. The photographs did not capture the entire sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments
thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and Tamayo hitting Salcedo, they were unequivocally
identified by Sumilang and Banculo Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball
identification.

Jose v. CA

Photographic evidence and testimonial evidence

FACTS: On February 22, 1985, at around six o'clock in the morning, Bus 203, then driven by petitioner
Armando Jose, collided with a red Ford Escort driven by John Macarubo on MacArthur Highway, in
Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Bus 203 was bound for Muntinlupa, Rizal, while the Ford Escort was
headed towards Malanday, Valenzuela on the opposite lane. As a result of the collision, the left side of the
Ford Escort's hood was severely damaged while its driver, John Macarubo, and its lone passenger, private
respondent Rommel Abraham, were seriously injured. The driver and conductress of Bus 203 rushed
Macarubo and Abraham to the nearby Fatima Hospital where Macarubo lapsed into a coma. Despite surgery,
Macarubo failed to recover and died five days later. Abraham survived, but he became blind on the left eye
which had to be removed. In addition, he sustained a fracture on the forehead and multiple lacerations on the
face, which caused him to be hospitalized for a week.

On July 17, 1986, the spouses Jose and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of the deceased John Macarubo, filed
their own suit for damages in the same trial court, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 2428-V-86, against
MCL alone. On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party complaint against Juanita Macarubo, registered
owner of the Ford Escort on the theory that John Macarubo was negligent and that he was the "authorized
driver" of Juanita Macarubo. The latter, in turn, filed a counterclaim for damages against MCL for the damage
to her car.

In Civil Case No. 2206-V-85, the Court heard the testimonies that during the night previous to the accident
of February 22, 1985 at 6:15 a.m., Rommel Abraham and John Macarubo were at a party. There was
therefore, no sleep for them, notwithstanding testimony to the contrary and the service of drinks cannot be
totally discounted. After the party at 11 p.m., while both Rommel and John were enroute home to Valenzuela
from La Loma, the car encountered mechanical trouble and had to be repaired as its cross-joint was detached.
The defect of a cross-joint is not minor and repair thereof would as testified to by Rommel lasted up to early
dawn and the car started to run only after five o'clock in the morning. With lack of sleep, the strains of a party
still on their bodies, and the attention to the repair coupled with the wait until the car was ready to run, are
potentials in a driver for possible accident. The accident happened at 6:15 a.m. when the physical and mental
condition of the driver John Macarubo was as expected not too fit for the driving as he could not anymore
control the car. The desire to be home quick for the much needed sleep could have prompted him to
overtake the preceding vehicle.

Indeed the pictures taken of the two vehicles (Exh. 1, 2 and 3) will clearly show that the MCL bus was at its
proper lane and not in an overtaking position while the car driven by John Macarubo was positioned in a
diagonal manner and crossed the line of the MCL, which is an indication of an overtaking act. If it were the
bus that was overtaking at the time, the car would have been thrown farther away from the point of the
impact.

RTC ruled in favour of MCL but was reversed by CA: that the trial court erred in relying on photographs
(Exhs. 1-3) which had been taken an hour after the collision as within that span of time, the positions of the
vehicles could have been changed; (3) that the photographs do not show that the Ford Escort was overtaking
another vehicle when the accident happened and that John Macarubo, its driver, was negligent

ISSUE: Whether CA erred in reversing the finding RTC

RULING: YES, CA erred in their decision

In this case, the positions of the two vehicles, as shown in the photographs (Exhs. 1 to 3) taken by MCL line
inspector Jesus Custodio about an hour and fifteen minutes after the collision, disputes Abraham's self-
serving testimony that the two vehicles collided because Bus 203 invaded the lane of the Ford Escort and
clearly shows that the case is exactly the opposite of what he claimed happened. Contrary to Abraham's
testimony, the photographs show quite clearly that Bus 203 was in its proper lane and that it was the Ford
Escort which usurped a portion of the opposite lane. The three photographs show the Ford Escort
positioned diagonally on the highway, with its two front wheels occupying Bus 203's lane. As shown by the
photograph marked Exhibit 3, the portion of MacArthur Highway where the collision took place is marked
by a groove which serves as the center line separating the right from the left lanes. The photograph shows
that the left side of Bus 203 is about a few feet from the center line and that the bus is positioned parallel
thereto. This negates the claim that Bus 203 was overtaking another vehicle and, in so doing, encroached on
the opposite lane occupied by the Ford Escort.

Indeed, Bus 203 could not have been overtaking another vehicle when the collision happened. It was filled
with passengers,8 and it was considerably heavier and larger than the Ford Escort. If it was overtaking
another vehicle, it necessarily had to accelerate. The acceleration of its speed and its heavy load would have
greatly increased its momentum so that the impact of the collision would have thrown the smaller and lighter
Ford Escort to a considerable distance from the point of impact. Exhibit 1, however, shows that the Ford
Escort's smashed hood was only about one or two meters from Bus 203's damaged left front. If there had
been a great impact, such as would be the case if Bus 203 had been running at a high speed, the two vehicles
should have ended up far from each other.

The appellate court refused to give credence to the physical evidence on the ground that the photographs
were taken an hour after the collision and that within such span of time the bus could have been moved
because there was no showing that the driver left the scene of the accident. This is not correct. Constancia
Gerolada, Bus 203's conductress, testified that, immediately after the collision, she and bus driver, petitioner
Armando Jose, took the injured driver and passenger of the Ford Escort to the Fatima Hospital.12 This fact
is not disputed by private respondents.

Rommel Abraham mentioned in his appellant's brief in the appellate court a sketch of the scene of the
accident allegedly prepared by one Patrolman Kalale, which shows Bus 203 to be occupying the Ford Escort's
lane. However, the records of this case do not show that such a sketch was ever presented in evidence in the
trial court or that Patrolman Kalale was ever presented as a witness to testify on the sketch allegedly prepared
by him. Under Rule 132, §3 of the Rules on Evidence, courts cannot consider any evidence unless formally
offered by a party.

Chain of Custody

People v. Miranba

Illustrative case of chain of custody in drug cases

FACTS: The prosecution's evidence established that after a surveillance conducted outside appellant's house
located in Barangay Ibaba West, Calapan City, it was confirmed that she was engaged in the illegal sale of
shabu. Thus, at 12:00 noon of May 6, 2005, the police formed a buy-bust team designating PO2 Mariel D.
Rodil (PO2 Rodil) to act as the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Noel Buhay (SPO1 Buhay) and PO2 Ritchie Chan (PO2
Chan) as the arresting officers and the other team members as back up. Marked and given to PO2 Rodil were
four (4) one hundred peso bills. At 2:00 p.m., the buy-bust team arrived in Barangay Ibaba West and PO2
Rodil proceeded to appellant's house, while the rest of the team hid somewhere near appellant's house. PO2
Rodil saw appellant outside her house and after a brief conversation, told her that she was buying shabu
worth P400.00. Appellant then went inside her house and upon her return, handed to PO2 Rodil one (1)
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. After PO2 Rodil gave appellant the marked
money as payment, she then made a missed call to PO2 Chan's cell phone as a pre-arranged signal. SPO1
Buhay and PO2 Chan effected appellant's arrest. PO2 Chan got the marked money from appellant, while
PO2 Rodil held on to the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. The team then informed Arnel
Almazan, Barangay Councilor of Barangay Ibaba West, about the operation and they all brought appellant to
the Calapan Police Station.2

Both the inventory of the seized item and the taking of appellant's photos were made at the police station.
PO2 Rodil marked the seized item and submitted the same for laboratory examination on the same day.3 The
Forensic Chemist, Police Inspector Rhea Fe DC Alviar (PI Alviar) confirmed the specimen submitted
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).

ISSUE: Whether there was full compliance with the chain of custody

RULING: YES, there was full compliance

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled
chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and signature of
the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such transfer of custody
were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

In this case, we find that the prosecution was able to establish the crucial links in the chain of custody of the
seized sachet of shabu. After PO2 Rodil received the plastic sachet of white crystalline substance from
appellant, she was in possession of the shabu up to the time appellant was brought to the police station for
investigation. With the buy-bust team and appellant at the police station were the Kill Droga Provincial
President, Nicanor Ocampo, Sr. and Barangay Councilor Almazan. PO2 Rodil made an inventory11 of the
seized item which was attested by Ocampo. She also marked the seized item with her initials "MDR".12
Appellant's photos were also taken pointing to the plastic sachet.13

PO2 Rodil prepared and signed the request14 for laboratory examination and brought the letter request and
the seized item to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office-4B Mimiropa, Suqui, Calapan City for qualitative
analysis. The specimen was received at the laboratory at 5:00 p.m. of the same day.15 PI Alviar examined the
white crystalline substance contained in a heat-sealed plastic transparent plastic sachet with marking "MDR"
on the same right and issued Chemistry Report No. D-025-05 wherein she stated that the specimen was
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu).16 The staple-sealed brown envelope with
markings D-025-05 RFDCA (PI Alviar's initials), which contained one rectangular transparent plastic sachet
sealed with masking tape with the same marking, was offered in evidence and identified in court by PI
Alviar.17

There is no doubt that the sachet of shabu, which was bought and confiscated from appellant, brought to the
police station, and was submitted to the crime laboratory for a qualitative examination, was the very same
shabu presented and identified in court. The police had sufficiently preserved the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized item, thus, complying with the prescribed procedure in the custody and control of the
confiscated drugs.

People v. Radang

Illustrative case of how a gap in the chain of custody would generally warrant acquittal

FACTS: On August 25, 2003, at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a confidential informant reported to
SPO4 Menardo Araneta [SPO4 Araneta], Chief of the Intelligence Division of the Culianan Police Station4
[at Zamboanga City], that a certain "Ismael Salim" was engaged in selling shabu at Barangay Talabaan near the
Muslim [c]emetery [in that city.

To verify the report, SPO4 Araneta instructed the said informant to [monitor] the area. After the informant
confim1ed that the said Ismael Salim was indeed selling illegal drugs in the reported area, SPO4 Araneta
formed a buy-bust team composed of SPO1 Enriquez, SPO1 Eduardo N. Rodriguez (SPO1 Rodriguez),
SPO1 Roberto A. Santiago (SPO1 Santiago) and PO2 Rodolfo Dagalea Tan (PO2 Tan). It was then agreed
that SPO1 Santiago would act as poseur buyer with SPO1 Rodriguez as back-up. For the purpose, SPO4
Araneta gave SPO1 Santiago a [₱100] bill bearing Serial No. M419145 as marked money [to be used] in the
buy-bust operation.

SPO1 Santiago then [walked] towards appellant and [told] the latter that he [wanted] to buy shabu; to this
appellant replied "how much?" SPO1 Santiago answered that he [wanted to buy ₱100.00 worth of the shabu,
and gave appellant] the ₱100.00 marked money; [whereupon appellant] took from his left pocket one plastic
sachet containing a white crystalline substance [which he] handed over to SPO1 Santiago.

Upon seeing the exchange, SPO1 Rodriguez, who was positioned [some 10] meters away, rushed in and
arrested appellant[.] SPO1 Rodriguez made a precautionary search of appellant's body for any concealed
weapon[, and found none]. Instead, SPO1 Rodriguez found, tucked inside [appellant's left front pocket the
₱100.00] marked money and two (2) more plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance wrapped in a
golden cigarette paper.

The police officers then brought appellant to the Culianan Police Station [in Zamboanga City] with SPO1
Santiago keeping personal custody of the items confiscated from [him]. At the [police] station, the plastic
sachet containing white crystalline substance subject of the buy-bust operation, the two (2) plastic sachets also
containing white crystalline substance[, and the ₱100.00] marked money bearing Serial No. M419145
recovered from appellant's left pocket, were respectively turned over by SPO1 Santiago and SPO1 Rodriguez
to the Desk Officer, PO3 Floro Napalcruz [PO3 Napalcruz], who likewise turned [these over] to the Duty
Investigator, [PO2 Tan]. PO2 Tan then placed his initial "RDT" on the items recovered from appellant.

PO2 Tan also prepared a request to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory 9, [at] Zamboanga City for
laboratory examination of the plastic sachet containing the white crystalline substance subject of the sale
between appellant and SPO1 Santiago, and the other two (2) plastic sachet[s] found inside appellant's pocket
by SPO1 Rodriguez.

ISSUE: Whether the chain of custody is complete and unbroken warranting the guilt of the accused

RULING: NO, there was a significant gap in the chain of custody hence warrants the acquittal of
the accused due to reasonable doubt of the corpus delicti of the crime

In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug seized from the accused
constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of utmost importance that the integrity and identity of
the seized drugs must be shown to have been duly preserved. "The chain of custody rule performs this
function as it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."

Malilin v. People: It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit
would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the
witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.

People v. Gonzales: The first stage in the chain of custody rule is the marking of the dangerous drugs or related
items. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the apprehending officer or
the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or other identifying signs, should be made in the presence of the
apprehended violator immediately upon arrest. The importance of the prompt marking cannot be denied,
because succeeding handlers of dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. Also, the
marking operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or related items from other material from the
moment they are confiscated until they are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby
forestalling switching, planting or contamination of evidence.

The testimony of SPO l Rodriguez on the chain of custody of the seized drugs leaves much to be desired. It
is evident that there was a break in the very first link of the chain when he failed to mark the sachet'3 of
shabu immediately upon seizing them from the appellant. According to SPO1 Rodriguez, after finding
sachets of shabu in appellant's possession, he turned the drugs over to the desk officer. SPO1 Rodriguez did
not even explain why he failed to mark or why he could not have marked the seized items immediately upon
confiscation. Allegedly, the desk officer, after receiving the seized items from SPO1 Rodriguez, in turn
handed them over to PO2 Tan. Notably, this desk officer was not presented in court thereby creating another
break in the chain of custody. Again, no explanation was offered for the non-presentation of the desk officer
or why he himself did not mark the seized items. It was only upon receipt by PO2 Tan, allegedly from the
desk officer, of the seized chugs that the same were marked at the police station. This means that from the
time the drugs were seized from appellant until the time PO2 Tan marked the same, there was already a
significant gap in the chain of custody. Because of this gap, there is no certainty that the sachets of drugs
presented as evidence in the trial court were the same drugs found in appellant's possession.

SPO1 Santiago, the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, was presented to corroborate the testimony of
SPO1 Rodriguez. However, his testimony likewise showed that the arresting officers did not mark the seized
drugs immediately after the arrest and in the presence of the appellant. Similarly, no explanation was given for
the lapse.

It is clear from the above that SPO1 Rodriguez and SPO1 Santiago did not mark the seized drugs
immediately after they were confiscated from appellant. No explanations were given why markings were not
immediately made. At this stage in the chain, there was already a significant break such that there can be no
assurance against switching, planting, or contamination. The Court has previously held that, "failure to mark
the drugs immediately after they were seized from the accused casts doubt on the prosecution evidence
warranting an acquittal on reasonable doubt."19

Both arresting officers testified that they turned over the sachets of shabu to a desk officer in the person of
PO3 Napalcruz at the police station. Notably, PO3 Napalcruz was not presented in court to testify on the
circumstances surrounding the alleged receipt of the seized drugs. This failure to present PO3 Napalcruz is
another fatal defect in an already broken chain of custody. Every person who takes possession of seized drugs
must show how it was handled and preserved while in his or her custody to prevent any switching or
replacement.

After PO3 Napalcruz, the seized drugs were then turned over to PO2 Tan. It was only at this point that
marking was done on the seized drugs.

Aside from the failure to mark the seized drugs immediately upon arrest, the arresting officers also failed to
show that the marking of the seized drugs was done in the presence of the appellant. This requirement must
not be brushed aside as a mere technicality. It must be shown that the marking was done in the presence of
the accused to assure that the identity and integrity of the drugs were properly preserved. Failure to comply
with this requirement is fatal to the prosecution's case.
The requirements of making an inventory and taking of photographs of the seized drugs were likewise
omitted without offering an explanation for its non-compliance. This break in the chain tainted the integrity
of the seized drugs presented in court; the very identity of the seized drugs became highly questionable.

People v. Doria and Carlos

Illustrative case on the gaps in each chain of custody

FACTS: Evidence of the prosecution tended to show that, for a couple of weeks, the agents of the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), Region 3, conducted surveillance and casing operations relative to the
information they received that a certain alias "Buddy" and alias "Mel" were trafficking dried marijuana in TB
Pavilion, Marisol Subdivision, Barangay Ninoy Aquino, Angeles City. On September 29, 2002, the Chief of
PDEA formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation. The team was composed of four (4) police officers,
namely, Sergeant Juanito dela Cruz (Sergeant dela Cruz), as team leader; and PO2 Corpuz, SPO1 Licu and
PO2 Javiar, as members. PO2 Corpuz was designated as the poseur-buyer while SPO1 Licu was assigned as
his back-up.

The team proceeded to the target place at around 8:00 o’clock in the evening. Upon arriving, PO2 Corpuz
together with the informant went to the house of Dahil which was within the TB Pavillon compound. When
PO2 Corpuz and the informant were in front of the house, they met Dahil and Castro. The informant then
introduced PO2 Corpuz as the buyer of marijuana. Dahil asked PO2 Corpuz how much would he be buying
and the latter answered that he would buy ₱200.00 worth of marijuana. At this juncture, Dahil took out from
his pocket six (6) plastic sachets of marijuana and handed them to PO2 Corpuz. After checking the items,
PO2 Corpuz handed two (2) ₱100.00 marked bills to Castro.

Immediately thereafter, PO2 Cruz took off his cap to signal that the sale had been consummated. The rest of
the buy-bust team then rushed to their location and arrested Castro and Dahil. PO2 Corpuz frisked Dahil and
recovered from his possession another five (5) plastic sachets containing marijuana while SPO1 Licu searched
the person of Castro and confiscated from him one (1) brick of suspected marijuana.

ISSUE: Whether the chain of custody was sufficiently followed

RULING, NO, the whole chain was broken

The presentation of the dangerous drugs as evidence in court is material if not indispensable in every
prosecution for the illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs. As such, the identity of the dangerous
drugs should be established beyond doubt by showing that the items offered in court were the same
substances bought during the buy-bust operation. This rigorous requirement, known under R.A. No. 9165 as
the chain of custody, performs the function of ensuring that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of
the evidence are removed.

First link: Marking of the Drugs Recovered from the Accused by the Apprehending Officer : Crucial in proving the chain
of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after they have been seized
from the accused. "Marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her
initials and signature on the items seized. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link;
hence, it is vital that the seized contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked
evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the
accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting
or contamination of evidence.35

It must be noted that marking is not found in R.A. No. 9165 and is different from the inventory-taking and
photography under Section 21 of the said law. Long before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165, however, this
Court had consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs would cast
reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.36

In the present case, PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Licu claimed that they had placed their initials on the seized
items. They, however, gave little information on how they actually did the marking. It is clear, nonetheless,
that the marking was not immediately done at the place of seizure, and the markings were only placed at the
police station based on the testimony of PO2 Corpuz

Second Link: Turnover of the Seized Drugs by the Apprehending Officer to the Investigating Officer: The second link in the
chain of custody is the transfer of the seized drugs by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer.
Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a supervising officer, who will
then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing.42 This is a necessary step in the chain of
custody because it will be the investigating officer who shall conduct the proper investigation and prepare the
necessary documents for the developing criminal case. Certainly, the investigating officer must have
possession of the illegal drugs to properly prepare the required documents.

The investigator in this case was a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin.43 Surprisingly, there was no testimony from
the witnesses as to the turnover of the seized items to SPO4 Jamisolamin. It is highly improbable for an
investigator in a drug-related case to effectively perform his work without having custody of the seized items.
Again, the case of the prosecution is forcing this Court to resort to guesswork as to whether PO2 Corpuz and
SPO1 Licu gave the seized drugs to SPO4 Jamisolamin as the investigating officer or they had custody of the
marijuana all night while SPO4 Jamisolamin was conducting his investigation on the same items.

Third Link: Turnover by the Investigating Officer of the Illegal Drugs to the Forensic Chemist: From the investigating
officer, the illegal drug is delivered to the forensic chemist. Once the seized drugs arrive at the forensic
laboratory, it will be the laboratory technician who will test and verify the nature of the substance. In this
case, it was only during his cross-examination that PO2 Corpuz provided some information on the delivery
of the seized drugs to Camp Olivas

As can be gleaned from the testimony of PO2 Corpuz, very little detail was offered on how the seized
marijuana was handled and transferred from the PDEA Office in Angeles City to the crime laboratory in
Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga. PO2 Corpuz kept possession of the seized drugs overnight without
giving details on the safekeeping of the items. The most palpable deficiency of the testimony would be the
lack of information as to who received the subject drugs in Camp Olivas.

Engr. Ma. Luisa Gundran, the forensic chemist who conducted the tests on the subject drugs, did not appear
in court despite the numerous subpoenas sent to her.46 Instead, the prosecution and the defense agreed to
stipulate on the essential points of her proffered testimony. Regrettably, the stipulated testimony of the
forensic chemist failed to shed light as to who received the subject drugs in Camp Olivas. One of the
stipulations was "that said forensic chemist conducted an examination on the substance of the letter-request
with qualification that said request was not subscribed or under oath and that forensic chemist has no
personal knowledge as from whom and where said substance was taken."47 This bolsters the fact that the
forensic chemist had no knowledge as to who received the seized marijuana at the crime laboratory.

Fourth Link: Turnover of the Marked Illegal Drug Seized by the Forensic Chemist to the Court.: The last link involves the
submission of the seized drugs by the forensic chemist to the court when presented as evidence in the
criminal case. No testimonial or documentary evidence was given whatsoever as to how the drugs were kept
while in the custody of the forensic chemist until it was transferred to the court. The forensic chemist should
have personally testified on the safekeeping of the drugs but the parties resorted to a general stipulation of
her testimony. Although several subpoenae were sent to the forensic chemist, only a brown envelope
containing the seized drugs arrived in court.49 Sadly, instead of focusing on the essential links in the chain of
custody, the prosecutor propounded questions concerning the location of the misplaced marked money,
which was not even indispensable in the criminal case.

The case of People v. Gutierrez50 also had inadequate stipulations as to the testimony of the forensic
chemist. No explanation was given regarding the custody of the seized drug in the interim - from the time it
was turned over to the investigator up to its turnover for laboratory examination. The records of the said case
did not show what happened to the allegedly seized shabu between the turnover by the investigator to the
chemist and its presentation in court. Thus, since there was no showing that precautions were taken to ensure
that there was no change in the condition of that object and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to
have possession thereof, the accused therein was likewise acquitted.

People v. Dela Cruz

Failure to provide for the two exempting circumstance in strict non-adherance to chain of custody

FACTS: Prosecution evidence shows that on 12 September 2002, the Office of the Station Drugs
Enforcement Unit (SDEU), Mandaluyong City received information that appellant, alias "Boy Tigre," of No.
73, Dela Cruz Street, Barangay Old Zaniga, Mandaluyong City was engaging in the trade of illegal drugs. A
team composed of Peregrino, Boyles, Drilon and Resuello was dispatched to conduct a buy-bust operation in
the area at around 2:00 p.m. of the same day. Peregrino, Boyles, and Drilon positioned themselves at a nearby
area while Resuello, the designated poseur-buyer, approached appellant described as a long-haired, medium
built, not-so-tall male, sporting a moustache and frequently seen wearing short pants. 6 At the time, appellant
was standing outside of their gate and kept on glancing from side to side. 7 Resuello then told appellant that
he wanted to buy shabu. Dela Cruz looked surprised prompting Resuello to repeat what he had said and
handed him the ₱100 bill with Serial No. XY 588120. Appellant, in turn, handed him a plastic sachet
containing the white crystalline substance. At which point, Resuello executed the pre-arranged signal and
Peregrino immediately rushed to the scene.

Peregrino, identifying himself as a policeman, held appellant and informed him of his constitutional rights.
Peregrino then recovered the buy-bust money from appellant. Subsequently, appellant was brought to
SDECU for investigation. Thereat, Peregrino placed his initials (BP) on the plastic sachet containing the
white crystalline substance before sending it to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory for chemical
examination. The sachet was later tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

Peregrino also testified that appellant had not been tested for the presence of fluorescent powder; neither was
a drug examination conducted on him. After the arrest, Peregrino narrated that his office made a report on
the matter which was forwarded to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Forensic Chemist
Perdido testified that the plastic sachet was found to contain methamphetamine hydrochloride. He, however,
admitted that he examined the specimen and had made the markings on the same without the presence of
appellant.

Defense’s version: 12 September 2002, at around 1:00 to 2:00 p.m., he was in his house watching television with
his wife when he heard a knock at the door. Outside, he came upon two men looking for "Boy Tigre." After
admitting that it was he they were looking for, he was told that the barangay captain needed him. He went
with the two men to see the barangay captain. Thereat, the barangay captain asked whether he knew of
anyone engaged in large-scale drug pushing. Appellant replied in the negative and in response, the barangay
captain stated that there was nothing more he (the barangay captain) can do. At first, his wife accompanied
him there but he later asked her to go home and raise the money Bismonte had allegedly demanded from him
in exchange for his freedom. When appellant’s wife failed to return as she had given birth, a case for violation
of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was filed against him.

Found guilty by RTC and affirmed in toto by CA

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution was able to follow the chain of custody

RULING: NO, they did not follow the rules, hence warranting acquittal

In prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following must be proven: (1) that the transaction or
sale took place; (2) the corpus delicti or the illicit drug was presented as evidence; and (3) that the buyer and
seller were identified.

IRR of the provision provides: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that
non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and
invalid such seizures of and custody over said items;

In the case at bar, the Court finds that the arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the guidelines
prescribed by the law regarding the custody and control of the seized drugs despite its mandatory terms.
While there was testimony regarding the marking of the seized items at the police station, there was no
mention whether the same had been done in the presence of appellant or his representatives. There was
likewise no mention that any representative from the media, DOJ or any elected official had been present
during the inventory or that any of these people had been required to sign the copies of the inventory.
Neither does it appear on record that the team photographed the contraband in accordance with law.

According to the proviso of the IRR of Section 21(a) of R.A. No. 9165, non-compliance with the procedure
shall not render void and invalid the seizure of and custody of the drugs only when: (1) such non-compliance
was under justifiable grounds; and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending team. Clearly, there must be proof that these two (2) requirements were met
before any such non-compliance may be said to fall within the scope of the proviso. Significantly, not only
does the present case lack the most basic or elementary attempt at compliance with the law and its
implementing rules; it fails as well to provide any justificatory ground showing that the integrity of the
evidence had all along been preserved. 31
Failing to prove entitlement to the application of the proviso, the arresting officers’ non-compliance with the
procedure laid down by R.A No. 9156 is not excused. This inexcusable non-compliance effectively invalidates
their seizure of and custody over the seized drugs, thus, compromising the identity and integrity of the same.
We resolve the doubt in the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti in favor of appellant 32 as every fact
necessary to constitute the crime must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 33 Considering that
the prosecution failed to present the required quantum of evidence, appellant’s acquittal is in order.

DNA Evidence

People v. Vallejo

DNA evidence in the crime of Rape

FACTS: The victim's mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, testified that at around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July
10, 1999, she sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy Diolola to their neighbor's house in Pilapil, Ligtong I,
Rosario, Cavite, so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of accused-appellant, could help Daisy with her lessons. She
was wearing pink short pants and a white sleeveless shirt. An hour later, Daisy came back with accused-
appellant. When Ma. Nida woke up at about 5:30 o'clock after an afternoon nap, she noticed that Daisy was
not yet home. She started looking for her daughter and proceeded to the house of Aimee, Daisy's tutor.
Aimee's mother told Ma. Nida that Daisy was not there and that Aimee was not able to help Daisy with her
lessons because Aimee was not feeling well as she had her menstrual period. Ma. Nida looked for Daisy in her
brother's and sister's houses, but she was not there, either. At about 7:00 o'clock that evening, Ma. Nida went
back to her neighbor's house, and there saw accused-appellant, who told her that Daisy had gone to her
classmate's house to borrow a book. But, when Ma. Nida went there, she was told that Daisy had not been
there. Ma. Nida went to the dike and was told that they saw Daisy playing at about 3:30 o'clock in the
afternoon. Jessiemin Mataverde also told Ma. Nida that Daisy was playing in front of her house that
afternoon and even watched television in her house, but that Daisy later left with accused-appellant.

Then, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of June 11, 1999, she was informed that the dead body of her
daughter was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the "compuerta" by a certain Freddie
Quinto. The body was already in the barangay hall when Ma. Nida saw her daughter. Daisy was wearing her
pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck.

Then, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning of June 11, 1999, she was informed that the dead body of her
daughter was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the "compuerta" by a certain Freddie
Quinto. The body was already in the barangay hall when Ma. Nida saw her daughter. Daisy was wearing her
pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck.

Charito Yepes, another neighbor of Ma. Nida, also testified. She said they met accused-appellant Gerrico
Vallejo near the seashore and noticed that he was uneasy and looked troubled. Charito said that accused-
appellant did not even greet them, which was unusual. She also testified that accused-appellant's shorts and
shirt (sando) were wet, but his face and hair were not

Based on the statements of Jessiemin Mataverde and Charito Paras-Yepes, the policemen went to the house
of accused-appellant at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 11, 1999 and recovered the white
basketball shirt, with the name Samartino and No. 13 printed at the back, and the violet basketball shorts,
with the number 9 printed on it, worn by accused-appellant the day before. The shirt and shorts, which were
bloodstained, were turned over to the NBI for laboratory examination.
Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that on July 12, 1999, he took blood samples from
accused-appellant in his office for laboratory examination to determine his blood type. Likewise, the
basketball shorts and shirt worn by accused-appellant on the day the victim was missing and the victim's
clothing were turned over to the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI by PO1 Amoranto of the Rosario,
Cavite police for the purpose of determining the presence of human blood and its groups

The results of the examinations conducted by Pet Byron T. Buan showed accused-appellant to belong to
Group "O". The following specimens: (1) one (1) white no. 13 athletic basketball shirt, with patches
"Grizzlies" in front and "SAMARTINO" at the back; (2) one (1) violet no. 9 athletic basketball short pants;
(3) one (1) white small "Hello Kitty" T-shirt with reddish brown stains; (4) one (1) "cut" pink short pants with
reddish brown stains; (5) one (1) "cut" dirty white small panty with reddish brown stains, were all positive for
the presence of human blood showing the reactions of Group "A".

At the instance of City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu of Cavite City, NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan took
buccal swabs and hair samples from accused-appellant, as well as buccal swabs and hair samples from the
parents of the victim, namely, Ma. Nida Diolola and Arnulfo Diolola. The samples were submitted to the
DNA Laboratory of the NBI for examination.

Aida Viloria-Magsipoc, Forensic Chemist of the NBI, conducted DNA tests on the specimens collected by
Dr. Vertido. She testified that the vaginal swabs of the victim taken by Dr. Vertido during the autopsy
contained the DNA profiles of accused-appellant and the victim

The mayor said he immediately proceeded to the municipal jail, where accused-appellant was detained, and
talked to the latter. Accused-appellant at first denied having anything to do with the killing and rape of the
child. The mayor said he told accused-appellant that he could not help him if he did not tell the truth. At that
point, accused-appellant started crying and told the mayor that he killed the victim by strangling her.
Accused-appellant claimed that he was under the influence of drugs. The mayor asked accused-appellant if he
wanted to have the services of Atty. Lupo Leyva, a resident of Rosario, as his lawyer. When accused-appellant
said he did, Mayor Abutan fetched Atty. Leyva from his house and took him to the police station about 11:00
o'clock that evening. Atty. Leyva said he advised him to tell the truth. PO2 Garcia, the investigator, informed
accused-appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to be assisted by counsel and warned him
that any answer he gave could and might be used against him in a court of law. PO2 Garcia asked questions
from accused-appellant, who gave his answers in the presence of Atty. Leyva. After the statement was taken,
Atty. Leyva and accused-appellant read it and afterwards signed it. Atty. Leyva testified that he did not see or
notice any indication that accused-appellant had been maltreated by the police.

Defense version: At 9:00 o'clock in the morning of July 11, 1999, barangay officials fetched accused-appellant
from his house and took him to the barangay hall, where he was asked about the disappearance of Daisy. He
claimed that he did not know anything about it. Accused-appellant was allowed to go home, but, at 11:00
o'clock that morning, policemen came and invited him to the police headquarters for questioning. His mother
went with him to the police station. There, accused-appellant was asked whether he had something to do with
the rape and killing of Daisy. He denied knowledge of the crime.

At 4:00 o'clock that afternoon, accused-appellant accompanied the police to his house to get the basketball
shorts and shirt he was wearing the day before, which were placed together with other dirty clothes at the
back of their house. According to accused-appellant, the police forced him to admit that he had raped and
killed Daisy and that he admitted having committed the crime to stop them from beating him up. Accused-
appellant claimed the police even burned his penis with a lighted cigarette and pricked it with a needle.

RTC Decision: Found him guilty for the crime of rape

ISSUE: Whether his guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt

RULING: YES, his guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt

An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence is
presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime.21 In
rape with homicide, the evidence against an accused is more often than not circumstantial. This is because the
nature of the crime, where only the victim and the rapist would have been present at the time of its
commission, makes the prosecution of the offense particularly difficult since the victim could no longer
testify against the perpetrator. Resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable and to demand direct evidence
proving the modality of the offense and the identity of the perpetrator is unreasonable.

In the case at bar, the following circumstantial evidence establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
accused-appellant:

1. The victim went to Aimee Vallejo's house, where accused-appellant was residing, at 1:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of July 10, 1999, for tutoring.
2. At around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant and Daisy went together to the latter's
house to get a book from which the former could copy Daisy's school project. After getting the
book, they proceeded to accused-appellant's residence.
3. From accused-appellant's house, Daisy then went to the house of Jessiemin Mataverde where she
watched television. Accused-appellant thereafter arrived and whispered something to Daisy, and the
latter went with him towards the "compuerta."
4. At about 4:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the spouses Iluminado and Charito Yepes saw accused-
appellant coming out of the "compuerta," with his clothes, basketball shorts, and t-shirt wet,
although his face and hair were not. According to these witnesses, he looked pale, uneasy, and
troubled (balisa). He kept looking around and did not even greet them as was his custom to do so.
5. The fishing boat which accused-appellant used as a bomber (a boat for catching fish with
dynamite) was docked by the seashore.
6. A little before 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Jessiemin Mataverde also saw accused-appellant
buying a Marlboro cigarette from a store. Jessiemen also noticed that accused-appellant's clothes
were wet but not his face nor his hair.
7. By 5:30 o'clock in the afternoon, as Ma. Nida Diolola looked for her daughter, she was told by
accused-appellant that Daisy had gone to her classmate Rosario's house. The information proved to
be false.
8. Daisy's body was found tied to an aroma tree at the part of the river near the "compuerta."
9. During the initial investigation, accused-appellant had scratches on his feet similar to those caused
by the thorns of an aroma tree.
10. The clothes which accused-appellant wore the day before were bloodstained. The bloodstains on
accused-appellant's clothes and on Daisy's clothes were found positive of human blood type "A."
11. Accused-appellant has blood type "O."
 12. The vaginal swabs from Daisy's body contained her DNA profile as well as that of accused-
appellant.

The examination conducted by Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan of both accused-appellant's and the
victim's clothing yielded bloodstains of the same blood type "A".24 Even if there was no direct determination
as to what blood type the victim had, it can reasonably be inferred that the victim was blood type "A" since
she sustained contused abrasions all over her body which would necessarily produce the bloodstains on her
clothing

There is no showing, however, that accused-appellant was coerced or forced into producing the garments.
Indeed, that the accused-appellant voluntarily brought out the clothes sought by the police becomes more
convincing when considered together with his confessions. A consented warrantless search is an exception to
the proscription in Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution. As we have held, the consent of the owner of
the house to the search effectively removes any badge of illegality.

The DNA analysis conducted by NBI Forensic Chemist Aida Viloria-Magsipoc is also questioned by accused-
appellant. He argues that the prosecution failed to show that all the samples submitted for DNA testing were
not contaminated, considering that these specimens were already soaked in smirchy waters before they were
submitted to the laboratory.

DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for
identical twins, each person's DNA profile is distinct and unique.29

When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim's body for
the suspect's DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference
sample taken from the suspect and the victim.30

The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and
the reference sample.31 The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their
profile.32 The test may yield three possible results:

1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources (exclusion).
This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;
2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar
DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation,
contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then be
repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or
3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion).33 In such a
case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance
of the Similarity.34

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among others things,
the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination
of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and
procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the
tests.
In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of accused-appellant, the smears
taken from the victim as well as the strands of hair and nails taken from her tested negative for the presence
of human DNA

Thus, it is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination, and not the possibility that the
samples had been contaminated, which accounted for the negative results of their examination. But the
vaginal swabs taken from the victim yielded positive for the presence of human DNA. Upon analysis by the
experts, they showed the DNA profile of accused-appellant

In re alleged violation of Miranda Rights: There are two kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions treated in this
constitutional provision: (1) coerced confessions, the product of third degree methods such as torture, force,
violence, threat, and intimidation, which are dealt with in paragraph 2 of Section 12, and (2) uncounselled
statements, given without the benefit of Miranda warnings, which are the subject of paragraph 1 of the same
section.38

Accused-appellant argues that the oral confessions given to Mayor Abutan of Rosario, Cavite and to NBI
Forensic Biologist should be deemed inadmissible for being violative of his constitutional rights as these were
made by one already under custodial investigation to persons in authority without the presence of counsel.

Clearly, accused-appellant cannot now claim that he was not apprised of the consequences of the statements
he was to make as well as the written confessions he was to execute. Neither can he question the
qualifications of Atty. Lupo Leyva who acted as his counsel during the investigation. To be an effective
counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded to his client. The presence of a
lawyer is not intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it
was adopted in our Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false. Indeed, counsel should not prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth.43

Indeed, accused-appellant admitted that he was first asked whether he wanted the services of Atty. Leyva
before the latter acted as his defense counsel.44 And counsel who is provided by the investigators is deemed
engaged by the accused where the latter never raised any objection against the former's appointment during
the course of the investigation but, on the contrary, thereafter subscribed to the veracity of his statement
before the swearing officer.45 Contrary to the assertions of accused-appellant, Atty. Leyva was not the
municipal attorney of Rosario, Cavite but only a legal adviser of Mayor Renato Abutan

In re extrajudicial confessions: The admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of accused-appellant is also

attacked on the ground that these were extracted from him by means of torture, beatings, and threats to his
life. The bare assertions of maltreatment by the police authorities in extracting confessions from the accused
are not sufficient. The standing rule is that "where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion, or
duress nor violence on their person; where they failed to complain to the officer who administered their
oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for
maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies; and where they did not have
themselves examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim," all these will be considered as
indicating voluntariness.53 Indeed, extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary, and, in the
absence of conclusive evidence showing that the declarant's consent in executing the same has been vitiated,
the confession will be sustained.
 People v. Yatar

Illustrative case for the use of DNA evidence in the crime of rape

FACTS: Kathylyn was left alone in the house.4 Later, at 10:00 a.m., Anita Wania and fifteen year old Beverly
Deneng stopped by the house of Isabel. They saw appellant at the back of the house. They went inside the
house through the back door of the kitchen to have a drink of water. Anita asked appellant what he was
doing there, and he replied that he was getting lumber to bring to the house of his mother. At 12:30 p.m.,
while Judilyn was on her way home from Nagbitayan, she saw appellant descend the ladder from the second
floor of the house of Isabel Dawang and run towards the back of the house.

In the evening of the same day, Isabel Dawang arrived home and found that the lights in her house were off.
She called out for her granddaughter, Kathylyn Uba. The door to the ground floor was open. She noticed that
the water container she asked Kathylyn to fill up earlier that day was still empty. She went up the ladder to the
second floor of the house to see if Kathylyn was upstairs. She found that the door was tied with a rope, so
she went down to get a knife. While she groped in the dark, she felt a lifeless body that was cold and rigid.9

Isabel moved her hand throughout the entire body. She found out that it was the naked body of her
granddaughter, Kathylyn. She called for help. Judilyn and her husband arrived. Isabel was given a flashlight by
Judilyn. She focused the beam and saw Kathylyn sprawled on the floor naked, with her intestines protruding
out of her stomach. Meanwhile, neighbors had arrived to offer assistance.

Accused was invited to the police office and placed under custody. Dr. Bartolo discovered the presence of
semen in the vaginal canal of the victim. During his testimony, Dr. Bartolo stated that the introduction of
semen into the vaginal canal could only be done through sexual intercourse with the victim.21 In addition, it
is apparent from the pictures submitted by the prosecution that the sexual violation of the victim was
manifested by a bruise and some swelling in her right forearm indicating resistance to the appellant’s assault
on her virtue.

ISSUE: Whether his guilt is established beyond reasonable doubt

RULING: YES, his guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt

DNA is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all living organisms.23 A person’s DNA is the
same in each cell and it does not change throughout a person’s lifetime; the DNA in a person’s blood is the
same as the DNA found in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin
tissue, and vaginal and rectal cells.24 Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human genetic
structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of identical twins.25

DNA print or identification technology has been advanced as a uniquely effective means to link a suspect to a
crime, or to exonerate a wrongly accused suspect, where biological evidence has been left. For purposes of
criminal investigation, DNA identification is a fertile source of both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence. It
can assist immensely in effecting a more accurate account of the crime committed, efficiently facilitating the
conviction of the guilty, securing the acquittal of the innocent, and ensuring the proper administration of
justice in every case.

DNA evidence collected from a crime scene can link a suspect to a crime or eliminate one from suspicion in
the same principle as fingerprints are used.26 Incidents involving sexual assault would leave biological
evidence such as hair, skin tissue, semen, blood, or saliva which can be left on the victim’s body or at the
crime scene. Hair and fiber from clothing, carpets, bedding, or furniture could also be transferred to the
victim’s body during the assault.27 Forensic DNA evidence is helpful in proving that there was physical
contact between an assailant and a victim. If properly collected from the victim, crime scene or assailant,
DNA can be compared with known samples to place the suspect at the scene of the crime

In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the prosecution as an expert
witness on DNA print or identification techniques.30 Based on Dr. de Ungria’s testimony, it was determined
that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination.31
The blood sample taken from the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19,
TH01 7/8, DHFRP2 9/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victim’s
vaginal canal.32 Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the blood sample
given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.

In Daubert v. Merrell Dow,33 it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles
could be used as long as it was relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion
over which testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific
techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.

Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to induce belief in its
existence or non-existence.34 Applying the Daubert test to the case at bar, the DNA evidence obtained
through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and
reliable since it is reasonably based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.

In an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the appellant contends that the blood sample taken from him as
well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right to remain silent as well as his right against self-
incrimination under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution.

This contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion.37 The right against self- incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting from the
lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an
incrimination but as part of object evidence.

Appellant further argues that the DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against him are unconstitutional
on the ground that resort thereto is tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law.

This argument is specious. No ex-post facto law is involved in the case at bar. The science of DNA typing
involves the admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence obtained under the Rules of Court.
Whereas an ex-post facto law refers primarily to a question of law, DNA profiling requires a factual
determination of the probative weight of the evidence presented.

Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Diaz

Application for DNA Testing in filiation cases

FACTS: As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got
acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was already
married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by
Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.5

From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together at Fairlane
Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.

From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at
the Central Luzon Doctors’ Hospital, Tarlac City.

Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all
the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joanne’s needs – recognizing the
child as his.

In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne,
falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.

Rogelio, despite Jinky’s remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to give support
for the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the heretofore adverted
complaint.

He was in default for failure to answer however he was able to acquire a reversal of the default by filing a
motion for new trial whereby he was able to adduce evidence.

RTC decision ruled that Ong is the father: Since it was duly established that plaintiff’s mother Jinky Diaz was
married at the time of the birth of Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of
the spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code). The child is still presumed
legitimate even if the mother may have declared against her legitimacy

It was established by evidence that the husband is a Japanese national and that he was living outside of the
country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes home only once a year. Both evidence of the parties
proved that the husband was outside the country and no evidence was shown that he ever arrived in the
country in the year 1997 preceding the birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.

While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a relationship with another man before she met the
defendant, there is no evidence that she also had sexual relations with other men on or about the conception
of Joanne Rodjin.

The defendant admitted having been the one who shouldered the hospital bills representing the expenses in
connection with the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence of admission that he is the real father of plaintiff.
Defendant also admitted that even when he stopped going out with Jinky, he and Jinky used to go to motels
even after 1996. Defendant also admitted that on some instances, he still used to see Jinky after the birth of
Joanne Rodjin. Defendant was even the one who fetched Jinky after she gave birth to Joanne.

During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Rogelio’s counsel filed a manifestation informing
the Court that Rogelio died on 21 February 2005; hence, a Notice of Substitution was filed by said counsel
praying that Rogelio be substituted in the case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong,14 which motion was
accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals.
However, CA ordered that the case be remanded back to trial court to conduct DNA Testing. This was
opposed by the estate of Ong

ISSUE: Whether CA was correct in remanding back the case to trial court for DNA Testing

RULING: YES, CA was correct in their decision

Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated
with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The burden of proving
paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child.

There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about by the parties to the
present petition. But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new technology, it
can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor,
through DNA testing.

Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner questions the appropriateness of
the order by the Court of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTC for DNA testing given that
petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is no
longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged impossibility of complying with the
order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioner’s argument is without
basis especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence28 allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu
proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus:

SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. – The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio
or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such
order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:

(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation
for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the
proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the
accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application
of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.

As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a person’s body,
even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other
body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.29

Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be available,
may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of obtaining an
appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.