Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10594 May 29, 1957
PONCIANO PRIMERO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS and SINFOROSO QUION, respondents.
Tereso Ma. Montoya for petitioner.
Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres, Nora G. Notratis
and Cayetano Santrico for respondent Court of Agrarian Relations.
Jesus M. Dator for respondent Sinforoso (Proso) Quion.
ENDENCIA, J.:
Petitioner Ponciano Primero is the owner of a riceland situated in the barrio of San Juan, municipality
of Gen. Trias, province of Cavite, containing an area of 27,837 square meters, with Torrens title
registered in the Registry of Deeds for the province of Cavite, while respondent Sinforoso Quion is his
tenant in said land. Desiring to lease said riceland to one Porfirio Potente for the purpose of raining
thereon ZACATE (a species of grass for horses' feed), on March 3, 1956, petitioner served a written
notice thereof to respondent and requested him to vacate the premises, but the latter refused to do so.
On March 7, 1956, the petitioner executed the contract of lease in favor of Porfirio Potente, but the
respondent still continued in the land thereby hindering its delivery to the lessee, hence the petitioner
filed with the Court of Agrarian Relations the petition under consideration to secure an order directing
the respondent to vacate the premises in question so that it may be delivered to the lessee. After
summons, the respondent filed his answer to the petition and on March 20, 19456, moved for the
dismissal of the petition on the ground (1) that it states no cause of action, the facts stated therein not
being constitutive of any of the causes for the dispossession of a tenant enumerated in section 50 of
Republic Act No. 1199; (2) that under section 49 of the same Act, no tenant could be dispossessed of
his holding except for any of the causes enumerated in section 50 of said Act, and (3) that under section
9 of the same Act, the lease of the land in question did not of itself extinguish the relationship between
the respondent as tenant and the petitioner as landowner. After due hearing, the motion was granted,
Executive Judge Guillermo S. Santos ruling as follows:
. . . that the petition states no cause of action — because petitioner seeks the dispossession or
respondent-tenant on a ground which is not one of the causes recognized by law. As a rule,
dispossession of a tenant in an agricultural land can only be allowed for any of the causes
enumerated in Sec. 50 of Rep. Act No. 1199. Lease of a holding to another person who will
convert it to a zacatal is not one of those grounds. Neither is the conversion of the holding into a
zacatal. The reason advanced by petitioner is without merit.
Thereupon, petitioner appealed from the order of dismissal, and in this instance claims (1) that he has
the right to disposses his tenant in case he leases his land for purposes of converting it into a
ZACATAL; (2) that the lessee Potente, as new landholder, his the right to employ a man of his choice
in the ZACATAL; and (3) that ZACATE (horses' feed) is not an agricultural produce within the
purview of Republic Act No. 1199.
Carefully considered, the question involved in this case is simply whether, under the facts stated in the
petition, the petitioner has right to secure from the Court of Agrarian Relations authority to eject the
respondent tenant from the riceland held in tenancy by him only because said land was leased to one
Porfirio Potente who will convert the same into a ZACATAL, and said respondent refused to vacate it
thereby hampering its delivery to the lessee.
The controlling law on the case are sections 9, 49 and 50 of Republic Act No. 1199, which read as
follows:
SEC. 9. Severance of Relationship. — The tenancy relationship is extinguished by the voluntary
surrender of the land by, or the death or incapacity of, the tenant, but his heirs or the members of
his immediate farm household may continue to work the land until the close of the agricultural
year. The expiration of the period of the contract as fixed by the parties, and the sale or
alienation of the land do not of themselves extinguish the relationship. In the latter case, the
purchaser or transferee shall assume the rights and obligations of the former-landholder in
relation to the tenant. In case of death of the landholder, his heirs or heirs shall likewise assume
his rights and obligations.
SEC. 49. Ejectment of Tenant. — Notwithstanding any agreement or provision of law as to the
period, in all cases where land devoted to any agricultural purpose is held under any system of
tenancy, the tenant shall not be dispossessed of his holdings except for any of the causes
hereinafter enumerated and only after the same has been proved before, and the dispossession is
authorized by, the court.
SEC. 50. Causes for the Dispossession of a Tenant. — Any of the following shall be a sufficient
cause for the dispossession of a tenant from his holdings:
(a) The bona fide intention of the landholder to cultivate the land himself personally or through
the employment of farm machinery and implements: . . . .
(b) When the tenant violates or fails to comply with any of the terms and conditions of the
contract or any of the provisions of this Act: Provided, however, That this subsection shall not
apply when the tenant has substantially complied with the contract or with the provisions of this
Act.
(c) The tenant's failure to pay the agreed rental or to deliver the landholder's share: Provided,
however, That this shall not apply when the tenant's failure is caused by a fortuitous event or
force majeure.
(d) When the tenant uses the land for a purpose other than that specified by agreement of the
parties.
(e) When a share-tenant fails to follow those proven farm practices which will contribute
towards the proper care of the land and increased agricultural production.
(f) When the tenant through negligence permits serious injury to the land which will impair its
productive capacity.
(g) Conviction by a competent court of a tenant or any member of his immediate family or farm
household of a crime against the landholder or a member of his immediate family.
Under the foregoing clear provisions of law, we find that the agrarian court committed no reversible
error when it dismissed the petition, firstly, because under the aforequoted section 9 of Rep. Act 1199,
the contract of lease entered into by the petitioner and Porfirio Potente did not of itself extinguish the
relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondent, and the lessee Potente
should assume the obligations of the former landholder, the herein petitioner, in relation to his tenant,
the herein respondent; secondly, because under section 49, a tenant cannot be dispossessed of his
holding except for any of the causes enumerated in said section 50, and certainly the lease of the land in
question to Potente is not one of those causes for the dispossession of a tenant enumerated in section 50
of the Tenancy Law quoted above. Consequently, we hold that under the provisions of law governing
the case, the petition under consideration is completely untenable, for once a tenancy relationship is
established, the tenant is entitled to security of tenure with right to continue working on and cultivating
the land until he is dispossessed of his holdings for just cause provided by law or the tenancy
relationship is legally terminated.
Petitioner contends, however, that sections 9 and 50 of Republic Act 1199 are unconstitutional and void
for they are against paragraph 1, section 1 of Article III — Bill of Rights of our Constitution. It is
argued that the petitioner has a perfect right to dispossess his tenant because he wants to lease his land
to a third person for the purpose of converting it into a ZACATAL and that "the lessee has a perfect
right to employ laborers of his own choice and to deny a lessee that right will be tantamount to a
deprivation of the right of the owner to lease his land for a better income, for no lessee will enter into a
contract of lease of a riceland to convert the same into a ZACATAL if he will be denied the freedom to
employ a tenant of his own choice." We find no merit in this contention The provisions of law assailed
as unconditional do not impair the right of the landowner to dispose or alienate his property nor
prohibit him to make such transfer or alienation; they only provide that in case of transfer or in case of
lease, as in the instant case, the tenancy relationship between the landowner and his tenant should be
preserved in order to insure the well-being of the tenant or protect him from being unjustly
dispossessed by the transferee or purchaser of the land; in other words, the purpose of the law in
question is to maintain the tenants in the peaceful possession and cultivation of the land from their
holdings. Republic Act 1199 is unquestionably a remedial legislation promulgated pursuant to the
social justice precepts of the Constitution and in the exercise of the police power of the State to
promote the common weal. It is a statute relating to public subjects within the domain of the general
legislative powers of the State and involving the public the public rights and public welfare of the
entire community affected by it. Republic Act 1199, like the previous tenancy laws enacted by our
lawmaking body, was passed by Congress in compliance with the constitutional mandates that "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all the people should be
the concern of the State" (Art. II, sec. 5) and that "the State shall regulate the relations between
landlord and tenant . . . in agriculture. . . ." (Art XIV, sec. 6).
As to the last question raised by the petitioner, to wit, whether the ZACATE is an agricultural product
as contemplated by Act 1199, we find unnecessary to discuss it in view of the foregoing conclusion we
arrived at, for the true question involved in the case is whether the lease of petitioner's land to Porfirio
Potente constitutes just cause for dispossessing the respondent of his holding on the land as tenant
thereof.
Wherefore, finding no error in the order appealed from the same is hereby affirmed with costs against
the petitioner-appellant.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A. Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and
Felix, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17649 July 31, 1963
ESTEBAN TAWATAO and LOURDES DEL ROSARIO, petitioners,
vs.
EUGENIO GARCIA, VIRGINIA DE VERA and HON. LEON P. DACAYO, Judge of the Court
of Agrarian Relations (First Regional District) Lingayen, Pangasinan, respondents.
Perfecto R. Bautista for petitioners.
Pepito R. Bautista and Vicente D. Millora for respondents Eugenio Garcia, et al.
Nostratis and Estrada for respondent Judge Leon P. Dacayo.
PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to annul judgment rendered by the Court of Agrarian Relations
Lingayen, Pangasinan, in CAR case No. 539-P-58, and for a writ of preliminary injunction, under
section 7 of Rule 67, Rules of Court, to preserve the status quo of the parties in relation to the litigated
matter pending these proceedings.
On 14 February 1958 Eugenio Garcia and Virginia de Vera filed a petition (Annex A) in the Court of
Agrarian Relations, First Regional District, Lingayen, Pangasinan alleging that since 1935 they have
been the tenants of parcel of nipa land containing an area of one-half hectare situated in the barrio Of
Camaley, municipality of Binmaley, province of Pangasinan, owned by the spouses Juliana Claudio and
Pablo Tawatao, residents of Muñoz, Nueva Ecija; that in 1950 they agreed to convert the nipa land into
a fishpond, the expenses for such conversion to be shared equally by both parties, as well as the
products of the fishpond; that for the construction of the fishpond the then petitioners, now
respondents, spent the sum of P830, P330 of which was their own money and P500, a loan from one
Lucio Ramirez; that after the construction of the fishpond Juliana Claudio and Pablo Tawatao failed
and refused to pay their share of P400 despite demands for payment; that up to February, 1955 they had
divided share and share alike bangus and other kinds of fishes caught in the fishpond; that in February
1955, for and in consideration of the sum of P700, Juliana Claudio and Pablo Tawatao leased for two
years the fishfond to Salvador Bautista of Camaley, Binmaley, Pangasinan, in spite of the objection by
the then petitioners, now respondents, who claimed that the lease would deprive them of their annual
share amounting to P350; that sometime in 1956 the owners of the fishpond donated it propter nuptias
to their children Esteban Tawatao and Lourdes del Rosario, the herein petitioners, who immediately
took possession thereof, introduced improvements and refused to restore possession thereof to then
petitioners, respondents herein, despite demands; and that as a result of their dispossession from the
fishpond they suffered losses and damages. The then petitioners prayed that they be reinstated as
tenants of the fishpond, be paid the amount of P400, the share of the former owners of the parcel of
nipa land in the expenses incurred in converting it into fishpond, P750 as their share in the products of
the fishpond for the years from 1955 to 1957, P300 as attorney's fees and incidental expenses and
P1,300 as moral, nominal and exemplary damages.
In their answer the herein petitioners, then respondents, and their co-respondents, predecessors-in-
interest, denied each and every material allegation of the petition (CAR case No. 539-P-58) and
claimed that in 1955 the then petitioners, now respondents, Garcia and De Vera left the fishpond; that
Juliana Claudio and Pablo Tawatao leased it to Salvador Bautista and after the termination of the lease
in 1956 donated it to their son Esteban Tawatao, herein petitioner, in consideration of his marriage to
Lourdes del Rosario. By way of counterclaim the then respondents claimed that the then petitioners
Garcia and De Vera failed and refused to render an accounting for the harvests in the agricultural years
1953-1955 amounting to P450; that to defend themselves against the complaint of the then petitioners
they paid P250 for attorney's fees; and that they suffered moral and exemplary damages in the sum of
P1,500.
Notwithstanding the notice of the date and time of hearing duly served upon and received by counsel of
the then respondents, their counsel failed to appear. Thereupon, the then petitioners moved to be
allowed to present their evidence and the motion was granted.
The evidence presented by the then petitioners substantially supports the allegations of their petition.
After trial, the Court of Agrarian Relations rendered judgment, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the respondents are hereby ordered to reinstate the petitioners as tenants in the
landholding-fishfond located (situated) at Bo. Camaley, Binmaley, Pangasinan, having an area
of one-half (1/2) hectare, more or less, and to maintain them in the peaceful possession and
cultivation of the same. The respondents are likewise ordered to pay to the petitioners the
amount of P1,200.00 as damages for unlawful dispossession and P300.00 yearly from 1959
until the petitioners are actually reinstated. (Annex B).
In their petition the herein petitioners contend that Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Republic Act
No. 2263, that governs the relations between landholders and tenants under both the share and
leasehold tenancies of agricultural lands for cultivation does not apply to fishponds, for in the latter
there is no cultivation of the land to speak of, and insist that section 42 of Republic Act No. 1199 and
section 7 of Republic Act No. 1267 do not apply to fishponds and residential lots but to agricultural
lands only subject to cultivation. Corollary to the issue of lack of jurisdiction, the herein petitioners also
maintain that the basis of the complaint or petition is not a contract of a share or leasehold tenancy but
at most is one of partnership under article 1767 of the Civil Code.
In their answer to the petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction, the herein respondents Garcia
and De Vera aver that their complaint is not predicated merely upon a contract of conversion of the nipa
land into fishpond and recovery of half of the amount spent for such conversion as agreed upon, but
one for reinstatement under section 21, Republic Act No. 1199, as tenants of the herein petitioners, and
damages arising from their unlawful dispossession from and of the fishpond; that it is correct that they
never entered into a contract of tenancy with the petitioners herein, but the fact is that there was an
implied tenancy relation between them from 1935 to 1955 which was disturbed when in 1955 the
fishpond was leased and in 1956 donated to the herein petitioners, a donation or transfer that cannot
deprive the respondent tenants of their right to continue as such. Only for causes enumerated by law
and only after the same shall have been proved before and the dispossession shall have been authorized
by the court may a tenant be dispossessed of his holding.1
The answer of the judge who presided over the respondent Court is to the same effect on the issue of
jurisdiction.1äwphï1.ñët
The point to determine in this case is, are the herein respondents Eugenio Garcia and Virginia de Vera
entitled to reinstatement in the fishpond under section 27 of Republic Act No. 1199, is amended by
Republic Act No. 2263, and damages?
The petitioners' argument that Republic Act No. 1199, as amended, applies only to agricultural lands fit
for cultivation and not to fishponds, because by nature the latter are not susceptible of cultivation, is
without merit, for section 46 of said Act, as amended, which partly provides that —
(c) The consideration for the use of sugar lands, fishponds, saltbeds and of lands devoted to the
raising of livestock shall be governed by stipulation between the parties.
is clear and need no interpretation. The law does not require actual cultivation of the land so that
disputes affecting tenancy relation involving a landholding fall under it. While the above section
provides that the consideration for the use of fishpond shall be governed by stipulation between the
parties, yet the same does not strip the Court of Agrarian Relations of its jurisdiction over tenancy
disputes involving such kind of landholding. Furthermore, this Court already has held that land in
which fish is produced is classified as agricultural land and that the words "real estate" include fisheries
as used in article 55 of the Hague Conventions of 1907.2 In this case involving, as it does, unlawful
dispossession of the respondent tenants from their fishpond holding upon no legal cause, as provided
for in sections 27, 49 and 50 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263, the
Court of Agrarian Relations has exclusive jurisdiction to order the reinstatement and payment of
damages for losses suffered by them, and for that reason the proceedings and the judgment rendered in
this case being in accordance with law are valid and binding.
The claim that because "they (herein petitioners) have been in actual possession of the land for a period
of two years prior to the filing of the complaint by the respondent spouses," "the respondent court has
no jurisdiction over the case," is without merit, because such jurisdiction over the subject matter does
not depend on whether or not at the time of the filing of the proper action there was a tenancy relation
between the parties. Neither does the bringing of the action three years after the respondent tenants had
been unlawfully dispossessed of the fishpond negate the existence of tenancy relation nor does it
constitute or amount to a waiver of the right to reinstatement, for Republic Act No. 1199, as amended,
does not provide for a prescriptive period within which to file a complaint for unlawful dispossession.
The writ prayed for is denied, with costs against the petitioners.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and
Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Labrador, J., took no part.
Footnotes
1Sections 27, 49 and 50 of Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263.
2Molina vs. Rafferty, 38 Phil. 167 and Banaag vs. Singson Encarnacion, 46 Off. Gaz. 4895.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14573 May 18, 1962
CONCEPCION FELICIANO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, ET AL., respondents.
Vicente R. Macasaet for petitioner.
Nora G. Nostratis for respondent Court of Agrarian Relations.
Meliton C. Parducho for respondent Amado Afable.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Concepcion Feliciano filed a petition before the Court of Agrarian Relations asking for authority to
dispossess her tenant Amado Afable of his holding situated in barrio Libtong, Meycauayan, Bulacan,
on the ground that (1) she desires to cultivate it personally under Section 50 (a), Republic Act No.
1199, and (2) said tenant failed to pay in full the agreed annual rental for the agricultural years 1951 to
1955.
The tenant, thru counsel, after admitting his tenancy relationship with petitioner, disclaimed knowledge
of the truth of the allegations contained in the petition.
After both parties had presented their evidence, the court, on September 8, 1958, rendered judgment
denying the petition. Petitioner was required to maintain her tenancy relationship with respondent and
to respect his peaceful possession of his landholding in accordance with law. Petitioner interposed the
present petition for review.
The issues posed by petitioner are:
(a) Whether a cultivation with aid of, or through, a son and son-in-law, complies with Section
50 (a), Republic Act No. 1199, as ground for dispossession of the tenant.
(b) Whether the petitioner has evidence to support her claim of non-payment of the rentals for
the years 1951 to 1954.
(c) Whether the finding that petitioner 'did not show that the "agreed" rental is legal and proper',
is supported by the evidence.
With regard to the first issue, it was proven that petitioner gave notice to her tenant that she intended to
work the land with the aid of her son Marcelino Feliciano and son-in-law Pastor Bervoso. She notified
her tenant of such intention on July 12, 1956. In another letter, dated February 26, 1957, she advised
him of her intention to get back the land for the reason that he was not complying with his obligation to
pay the rental agreed upon. And on March 18, 1957, she notified the court of her intention to personally
cultivate the land. The agrarian court found that petitioner complied with the law relative to the notice
requirement prior to the grant of authority to cultivate the land on the part of the owner, but reached the
conclusion that petitioner cannot avail of the right granted by law to get back the land for that purpose
because, according to the evidence, she will not be the one to personally cultivate the holding but will
deliver it to her son and son-in-law considering that she is already aged and sickly and is incapable to
do manual work. In the opinion of the agrarian court, to warrant authority to eject a tenant from his
landholding on the ground of personal cultivation it is indispensable that petitioner be capable of
farming the land but will only do so with the aid of her son or son-in-law, the same is contrary to the
spirit and purpose of a law.
We disagree with this view. While the law provides that the bona fide intention of the land holder to
cultivate the land personally, or thru the employment of farm machinery of implements, is a sufficient
cause for dispossession of a tenant from his holding, this provision should not be taken literally. A
landholder who owns a small parcel of land which is farmed by a tenant and desires to get it back
because he has a son who can do the farming for him comes within the spirit of this provision, provided
that he does not have any other property and the one to do the cultivation is a member of his family.
The idea is to give the landholder an opportunity to attend to the cultivation of his farm to improve his
financial condition. To hold otherwise would be to advance the fortune of an outsider to the detriment
of the member of his own family.
Moreover, considering the cohesion existing among the members of a Filipino family because of the
intimate spiritual ties that bind them one can hardly dispute that the work of one is the work of the rest.
This is the same philosophy we expressed in a case involving the desire of a wife-landholder to work
the land thru her husband even if she herself was not in a position to do the farming. We said, in
upholding the right of the wife to get back the landholding, that by the contract of marriage, a man and
a woman enter a joint life, acting, living and working as one. Upon marriage, the husband and the wife
become one single, moral, spiritual, and social being, not only for purposes of procreation, but also for
purposes of mutual help and protection. There is between them a full and complete community of
existence.1
The same community of life and of interest exist between the members of the same family. We can
even say that the spiritual tie is greater when it comes to the relation of a mother and a son. If a wife is
given the privilege of working a farmland thru her husband, no valid reason is seen why a mother
cannot be given the same privilege.1äwphï1.ñët
Moreover, the law allows a tenant to cultivate a piece of agricultural land held under a contract of
tenancy either personally or with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm
household (Republic Act No. 1199, Section 4, paragraph 3, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263).
Note that he is not even required to have said cultivation undertaken by immediate members of his
family, but only by his immediate farm household, who may or may not belong to the family. Surely,
no reason exists why the same right should be denied to the landowner himself. If the purpose of the
law is to establish the tenancy relation between landlord and tenant upon the principle of social justice,
and to afford adequate protection to the rights of both tenant and landholder (Section 2, Republic Act
No. 1199), the protective arm of the law must be extended equally to the tenant as well as to the
landlord.
Having reached the above conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Petitioner is hereby granted authority to
dispossess respondent in order that she may cultivate her landholding under Section 50 (a) of Republic
Act No. 1199. No costs.
Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1Saclolo, et al. v. Court of Agrarian Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-13274, January 30, 1960.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15192 October 24, 1960
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
TEOFILO RAMIREZ, ET AL., respondents.
Ramon B. de los Reyes for petitioner.
Jorito C. Peralta for respondent.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal taken by the Philippine National Bank from the decision of the Court of Agrarian Relations in
its Case No. 558-P-58.
The facts leading to the filing of the action in the Court below were found by said Court to be as
follows:
That since 1953 Agustin Pecio had been cultivating the two hectares of land in question located
at Bo. Capulaan, Balungao, Pangasinan, belonging to Jose Castillo y Refuerzo; that when the
Philippine National Bank became the administrator of the estate of the late Jose Castillo y
Refuerzo, its Trust Officer, through his representative, Atty. Jose Manalansan, executed
contracts of tenancy with the tenants of the hacienda; that for his purpose, Atty. Manalansan
went in 1955 to Balungao, Rosales, and Umingan, Pangasinan, to contact the tenants and he
stayed there for two months; that Atty. Manalansan met the tenants in the municipal building of
Balungao and there executed the tenancy contracts; that Atty. Manalansan did not know any of
the tenants then and so what he did was to rely on the information given to him by the tenants;
that one morning, while Atty. Manalansan was in front of the municipal building under the
 acacia tree, Teofilo Ramirez approached him and told him that he was the tenant in two parcels
of land located in Bos. Esmeralda and Capulaan, Bulangao; that Teodorico Dirije then filled in
the blank in the contract forms by typing the information dictated by Teofilo Ramirez; that the
finished contract of tenancy (Exhibit "A") was registered in the municipal treasurer's office of
Balungao on the same date of execution, June 25, 1955; that according to the contract, Ramirez
was to cultivate four hectares of land situated at Bos. Esmeralda and Capulaan, Balungao,
Pangasinan; that a few days thereafter Agustin Pecio appeared and reported to Atty. Manalansan
that he was the actual tenant in the landholding in Capulaan included in the contract of tenancy
executed by the Philippine National Bank and Teofilo Ramirez; that Atty. Manalansan then
referred the matter to the Chief of Police to bring them to the municipal mayor for conciliation;
that as a result a "katulagan" or agreement was entered into by and between Ramirez and Pecio;
that by virtue of the "katulagan" Ramirez cultivated one-hectare portion of the same agricultural
year 1955-1956; that Ramirez harvested 40 cavanes in said year, with the seeds, threshing and
harvesting expenses already deducted, while Pecio harvested 35 cavanes; and that after the
agricultural year 1955-1956 the entire two-hectare landholding in Capulaan was, by virtue of
the "katulagan" or agreement, delivered to Agustin Pecio who cultivated the same since then up
to the present time.
Later, Teofilo Ramirez filed the aforestated case against the Philippine National Bank in the Agrarian
Court, alleging that he had been illegally ousted from one-half of the land in question during the
agricultural year 1956-1957, and from the whole of it thereafter, and asking for reinstatement and for
the payment of the value of his unrealized shares of the harvest of the land during the period of his
dispossession, plus moral damages and attorney's fees. The bank answered, denying liability under the
complaint, and, with the authority of the court, brought in Agustin Pecio as third-party defendant, who
likewise denied any liability. The case was then tried, and on September 29, 1958, the Agrarian Court
rendered judgment, holding, on the basis of the above-quoted findings of fact, that although the tenancy
contract between the bank and Ramirez was executed through fraud and mispresentation on the part of
the latter, the "katulagan" or agreement Exhibit "1" between Ramirez and Agustin Pecio was an express
ratification by the latter of said tenancy contract and had the effect of a surrender by Pecio of his right
as tenant over one-half of the land in question and of constituting Ramirez as the tenant over such
portion, so that thereafter, he was entitled to security of tenure under section 49 of Republic Act No.
1199; whereupon, the bank was ordered to reinstate Ramirez to one-half of the land in question, and to
pay him damages of 12 cavanes of palay yearly from the agricultural year 1956-1957 until his
reinstatement. From this judgment, the bank as already stated in the first part of this decision, appealed.
The appeal should be sustained.
First of all, we agree with the petitioner bank that the lower court having found that third-party
defendant Agustin Pecio was the true tenant of the land in question and not respondent Ramirez, Pecio
is entitled to security of tenure under section 7, Republic Act No. 1199, and may not be dispossessed of
his landholding except for any of the causes enumerated in Section 19 of the same Act, and without the
cause having been proved before and the dispossession authorized by the Agrarian Court, in accordance
with section 49, same law. Consequently, the tenancy contract Exhibit "A" signed between the
petitioner bank and appellee Ramirez is illegal and void since it deprives Pecio of his tenure over the
land in question; and being a nullity, said contract did not create any tenancy relation between the bank
Ramirez, nor could the latter acquire any rights thereunder.
What is more, the Agrarian Court conclusively found that respondent Ramirez was guilty of fraud and
misrepresentation in the signing of the tenancy contract Exhibit "A", having falsely identified himself
to the representative of the bank as the tenant of the land in question, and it consent to said tenancy
contract. This contract is, consequently, not only void ab initio for being contrary to the law giving
Pecio, the true tenant, security of tenure, but also annullable or voidable on the part of the bank whose
consent thereto was given through fraud and mistake. Thus, the bank was justified refusing to
recognize said contract after it learned of Ramirez' deceitful act, and in giving the land to Pecio, the
lawful and true tenant. The Court below, in ordering the reinstatement of Ramirez, was, in effect,
legalizing his imposture. Such a decree is against morals and public policy and can not be allowed to
stand.
As for the "katulagan" or agreement (Exhibit "1") entered into by Pecio and Ramirez merely to settle
their dispute over the tenantry of the land in question that arose form the latter's fraud, the only effect
that could be given this agreement was, as stipulated therein by the parties, for Ramirez to share the
cultivation of the land in question equally with Pecio during the agricultural year 1955-1956.
Obviously, said agreement could not have created between Ramirez and the petitioner bank the
relationship of landlord and tenant so as to entitle the latter to the security of tenure guaranteed by
Republic Act No. 1199. Besides, the tenancy law, conceived as it was to redeem the tenant from the
onerous terms of his tenancy and uplift his social and financial status (Pineda vs. Pingul and C.I.R., 92
Phil., 89; 48 Off. Gaz. [9] 3901), can not be invoked to protect one who is not a true and lawful tenant
but who became so only through deceitful and insidious acts.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint dismissed, with costs against
respondent Teofilo Ramirez.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Gutierrez David and Paredes, JJ.,
concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-28280-81. November 28, 1969.]

GERONIMO DE LOS REYES, Petitioner, v. GREGORIO ESPINELI, RUPERTO

ALCANTARA, JORGE LOBREN, PEDRO AMANTE, MATEO GUTIERREZ, ISIDRO
RAMOS, SANTOS DANGUE, MIGUEL RAMOS, CORNELIO GARCIA, MARGARITO
BELARMINO, IRENEO BATRALO, SIMPLICIO CASTRO, VICENTE ANIVES, MIGUEL
HERNANDEZ, EUGENIO DALISAY, LEON LACSAMANA, and BELEN ALVAREZ,
Respondents.

Luis A. L. Javellana & Yolanda Q. Javellana for Petitioner.

Manuel A. Cordero for Respondents.

SYLLABUS
1. AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM; TENANCY; AGRICULTURAL TENANCY, DEFINED. —
Agricultural tenancy" is the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging
to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and
of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share
the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money. or
in both

2. D.; ID.; SHARE TENANCY, DEFINED. — "Share tenancy’’ exists whenever two persons agree on
a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his
labor, with either or both contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant
cultivating the land personally with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm
household, and the produce thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion
to their respective contributions.

3. ID.; ID.; SHARE TENANT, CONCEPT. — "Share tenant" is a person who, himself and with the
aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed
by another, with the latter’s consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the
landholder.

4. ID.; ID.; SHARE TENANCY CONTRACT, CHARACTERISTICS OF. — The characteristics of a

share tenancy contract are: (1) the parties are a landholder, who is a natural or juridical person and is
the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of agricultural land, and a tenant who, himself and
with the aid available from within his immediate farm household, cultivates the land which is the
subject-matter of the tenancy; (2) the subject-matter is agricultural land; (3) the purpose of the contract
is agricultural production; and (4) the cause or consideration is that the landholder and the share tenant
would divide the agricultural produce between themselves in proportion to their respective
contributions.

5. ID.; ID.; FARM WORKER, DEFINED. — "Any agricultural wage, salary or piece worker but is
not limited to a farm worker of a particular farm employer unless this Code explicitly states otherwise,
and any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a current
agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has not obtained a substantially equivalent and
regular employment . . ." cralaw virtua1aw library

6. ID.; ID.; BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN A FARM EMPLOYER-FARM WORKER

RELATIONSHIP AND AN AGRICULTURAL SHAREHOLD TENANCY RELATIONSHIP. —
Both, of course, are leases, but there the similarity ends. In the former, the lease is one of labor, with
the agricultural laborer as the lessor of his services, and the farm employer as the lessee thereof. In the
matter, it is the landowner who is the lessor, and the sharehold tenant is the lessee of agricultural land.
As lessee he has possession of the leased premises. But the relationship is more than a mere lease. It is
a special kind of lease, the law referring to it as a ‘’joint undertaking." For this reason, not only the
tenancy laws are applicable, but also, in a suppletory way, the law on leases, the customs of the place
and the civil code provisions on partnership. The share tenant works for that joint venture.’The
agricultural laborer works for the farm employer, and for his labor he receives a salary or wage,
regardless of whether the employer makes a profit. On the other hand, the share tenant participates in
the agricultural produce. His share is necessarily dependent on the amount of the harvest.

7. ID.; ID.; RIGHT DISTINGUISHED FROM CONTROL OF LANDHOLDER OVER ‘TENANT;

ENTITY VESTED WITH AUTHORITY TO RULE ON DISMISSALS. — Since the relationship
between farm employer and agricultural laborer is that of employer and employee, the decisive factor
is the control exercised by the former over the latter. On the other hand, the landholder has the "right
to require the tenant to follow those proven farm practices which have been found to contribute
towards increased agricultural production and to use fertilizer of the kind or kinds shown by proven
farm practices to be adapted to the requirements of the land." This is but the right of a partner to
protect his interest, not the control exercised by an employer. If landholder and tenant disagree as to
farm practices, the former may not dismiss the latter. It is the court that shall settle the conflict
according to the best interest of both parties.

8. ID.; ID.; "KASAMA," CONCEPT OF. — "Kasama" means tenant," not worker or laborer, which is
translated into our national language as "manggagawa."

9. ID.; ID.; SHARE TENANCY CONTRACT, HOW DETERMINED. — It is the principal features
and stipulations which determined the true essence of a contract. Considering then that the
respondents are duty bound to cultivate their respective holdings (of which they have possession), and
that they share in the harvest, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion must be upheld.

10. ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, INAPPLICABLE. — Petitioner having entered into a share
tenancy contract with the respondents, it certainly cannot be seriously claimed that the relationship of
landlord and tenant is unjustifiably being imposed on him without due process of law. It was the
petitioner himself who voluntarily entered into the relationship, and therefore, should shoulder the
consequences thereof, one of which is that the tenants must be given, as they are entitled to, a 30%
share in the produce.

DECISION

CASTRO, J.:

Petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 37689-R and C.A.-G.R.
No. 37690-R modifying that of the Court of Agrarian Relations in CAR cases 1185 and 1186.

The petitioner Geronimo de los Reyes is the owner of a 200-hectare coconut plantation located in
Calauan, Laguna. In 1958 his overseer ("katiwala") therein was Gonzalo Belarmino, who took into the
land the 17 respondents under an agreement that the latter were to receive 1/7 portion of every coconut
harvest. Sometime in October, 1962, the petitioner dismissed Belarmino, upon the suspicion that the
latter had been deceiving him, in connivance with respondents.

On March 2, 1963 Ruperto Alcantara, Et Al., and Gregorio Espineli (respondents here) filed separate
petitions (subsequently amended) against De los Reyes in the Court of Agrarian Relations, seeking the
delivery to them of the difference between the 1/7 share which the petitioner had been giving them
and the 30% share to which they, as share tenants, were allegedly entitled. Upon the finding that the
respondents were mere agricultural workers of the petitioner, the CAR ordered the latter to retain them
as such and to pay them the sum of P4,559.07 "which is the total of their unpaid shares of 1/7 of the
net coconut harvests for the period from September 13 to December 23, 1962 and February 25 to May
28, 1963," plus P500 as attorney’s fees. Upon respondents’ appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the
decision of the CAR, by declaring the respondents tenants of the petitioner and ordering the latter to
pay them "the difference between the one-seventh (1/7) share of the crops and the thirty (30%) per
cent provided for in the Tenancy Law from the year 1958 up to the filing of the petitions and so on; the
resulting amount for this purpose to be arrived at in a liquidation to be submitted, if and when this
judgment shall have become final and the record remanded to the lower court." cralaw virtua1aw library

Basically, the petitioner contends that (1) there existed no contractual relationship between him and
the respondents; (2) the respondents were not his tenants; and (3) the decision of the Court of Appeals
deprives him of his property without due process of law.

The respondents attempted to have the present appeal dismissed on the ground that it involves
questions of fact. If indeed the issues posed by the petitioner necessarily invite calibration of the entire
evidence, 1 then the appeal should be dismissed since issues only of law may be raised in an appeal
from the Court of Appeals to this Court. 2 It seems to us clear, however, that the petitioner accepts the
findings of fact made by the appellate court, but takes exception to the conclusions drawn therefrom.
Such being the case, the questions here tendered for resolution are purely of law. 3

At the outset, we must resolve the question of existence of a contract, the petitioner alleging, as he
does, that his consent, express or implied, had never been given. His position, simply stated, is that at
the time the respondents were taken into his land by Belarmino, the latter was a mere laborer and
therefore without the requisite authority to contract in his behalf, and it was only later that he was
promoted to the position of overseer. However, in his "Amended Complaint" of April 22, 1968, 4 the
petitioner prayed that "judgment be rendered . . . finding the defendants guilty of a breach of their
contractual obligation with the plaintiff," and in the body thereof he incorporated statements from
which it can plainly be seen that a contractual relationship existed between the parties.

Verily, there was and still is a contractual relationship between the petitioner and the respondents. In
our view the pith of the problem is, actually, whether the relationship is that of agricultural share
tenancy (as averred by the respondents) or that of farm employer and agricultural laborer (as asserted
by the petitioner). On a determination of this question depends the respective rights of the parties,
more particularly the proper assessment of the share of the respondents under the law.

Of fundamental relevance in this discussion are definitions of basic terms.

"Agricultural tenancy" is the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging
to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and
of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share
the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or
in both. 5 "Share tenancy" exists whenever two persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural
production wherein one party furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both
contributing any one or several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land personally
with the aid of labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce
thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in proportion to their respective
contributions. 6 And a "share tenant" is a person who, himself and with the aid available from within
his immediate farm household, cultivates the land belonging to or possessed by another, with the
latter’s consent, for purposes of production, sharing the produce with the landholder. 7

It is to be readily deduced from the foregoing definitions that aside from the usual essential requisites
of a contract, 8 the characteristics of a share tenancy contract are: (1) the parties are a landholder, who
is a natural or juridical person and is the owner, lessee, usufructuary or legal possessor of agricultural
land, 9 and a tenant who, himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm
household, cultivates the land which is the subject-matter of the tenancy; (2) the subject-matter is
agricultural land; (3) the purpose of the contract is agricultural production; and (4) the cause or
consideration is that the landholder and the share tenant would divide the agricultural produce
between themselves in proportion to their respective contributions.

While the Agricultural Tenancy Act did not define the term "agricultural laborer" or "agricultural
worker," the Agricultural Land Reform Code does. A "farm worker" is "any agricultural wage, salary
or piece worker but is not limited to a farm worker of a particular farm employer unless this Code
explicitly states otherwise, and any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, a current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who has not obtained a
substantially equivalent and regular employment." The term includes "farm laborer and/or farm
employees." 10 An "agricultural worker" is not a whit different from a "farm worker." cral aw virtua1aw library

From the definition of a "farm worker" thus fashioned, it is quite apparent that there should be an
employer-employee relationship between the "farm employer" 11 and the farm worker. In determining
the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the elements that are generally considered are the
following: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee; (2) the payment of wages; (3) the power
of dismissal; and (4) the employer’s power to control the employee’s conduct. It is this last element
that constitutes the most important index of the existence of relationship. 12

This is not to say that agricultural workers or farm laborers are industrial workers. Not by any means,
although they may both appear in the same establishment. The difference lies in the kind of work they
do. Those whose labor is devoted to purely agricultural work are agricultural laborers. All others are
industrial workers. 13 Nonetheless, they belong to the same class. Both are workers. Both are
employees.

We are here primarily interested in the basic differences between a farm employer-farm worker
relationship and an agricultural sharehold tenancy relationship. Both, of course, are leases, but there
the similarity ends. In the former, the lease is one of labor, with the agricultural laborer as the lessor of
his services, and the farm employer as the lessee thereof. 14 In the latter, it is the landowner who is the
lessor, and the sharehold tenant is the lessee of agricultural land. As lessee he has possession of the
leased premises. 15 But the relationship is more than a mere lease. It is a special kind of lease, the law
referring to it as a "joint undertaking." 16 For this reason, not only the tenancy laws are applicable, but
also, in a suppletory way, the law on leases, the customs of the place and the civil code provisions on
partnership. 17 The share tenant works for that joint venture. The agricultural laborer works for the
farm employer, and for his labor he receives a salary or wage, regardless of whether the employer
makes a profit. 18 On the other hand, the share tenant participates in the agricultural produce. His
share is necessarily dependent on the amount of the harvest.

Since the relationship between farm employer and agricultural laborer is that of employer and
employee, the decisive factor is the control exercised by the former over the latter. On the other hand,
the landholder has the "right to require the tenant to follow those proven farm practices which have
been found to contribute towards increased agricultural production and to use fertilizer of the kind or
kinds shown by proven farm practices to be adapted to the requirements of the land." This is but the
right of a partner to protect his interest, not the control exercised by an employer. If landholder and
tenant disagree as to farm practices, the former may not dismiss the latter. It is the court that shall
settle the conflict according to the best interests of both parties. 19
The record is devoid of evidentiary support for the notion that the respondents are farm laborers. They
do not observe set hours of work. The petitioner has not laid down regulations under which they are
supposed to do their work. The argument tendered is that they are guards. However, it does not appear
that they are under obligation to report for duty to the petitioner or his agent. They do not work in
shifts. Nor has the petitioner prescribed the manner by which the respondents were and are to perform
their duties as guards. We do not find here that degree of control and supervision evincive of an
employer-employee relationship. Furthermore, if the respondents are guards, then they are not
agricultural laborers, because the duties and functions of a guard are not agricultural in nature. 20 It is
the Industrial Court that has jurisdiction over any dispute that might arise between employer and
employee. Yet, the petitioner filed his complaint against the respondents in the Court of Agrarian
Relations.

We now proceed to determine if there are present here the salient characteristics of an agricultural
share tenancy contract. The subject matter is coconut land, which is considered agricultural land under
both the Agricultural Land Tenancy Act 21 and the Agricultural Land Reform Code. 22 The purpose of
the contract is the production of coconuts; the respondents would receive 1/7 of the harvest. The
petitioner is the landholder of the coconut plantation.

The crucial factors are that the tenant must have physical possession of the land for the purpose of
production 23 and he must personally cultivate the land. If the tenant does not cultivate the land
personally he cannot be considered a tenant even if he is so designated in the written agreement of the
parties. 24

"Cultivation" is not limited to the plowing and harrowing of the land. It includes the various phases of
farm labor described and provided by law, the maintenance, repair and weeding of dikes, paddies and
irrigation canals in the holding. Moreover, it covers attending to the care of the growing plants. 25
Where the parties agreed that they would "operate a citrus nursery upon the condition that they would
divide the budded citrus in the proportion of 1/3 share of respondents and 2/3 as share of petitioner,"
and that the "petitioner would furnish all the necessary seedlings and seeds, as well as the technical
know-how in the care, cultivation, budding and balling of the budded citrus, while respondents would
furnish the land necessary for the nursery, the farm labor that may be needed to plant and cultivate,
and all the chemicals, fertilizers, and bud tapes that may be necessary for such cultivation," then "the
tenancy agreement entered into between the parties has relation to the possession of agricultural land
to be devoted to the production of agricultural products thru the labor of one of the parties, and as such
comes within the purview of the term ‘agricultural tenancy’ as defined in section 3 of Republic Act
No. 1199 as amended." 26

In one instance, 27 the landholder claimed that his caretaker was not an agricultural tenant because he
"does not till or cultivate the land in order to grow the fruit bearing trees because they are already full
grown," and "he does not even do the actual gathering of the fruits" but "merely supervises the
gathering, and after deducting the expenses, he gives one-half of the fruits to plaintiff all in
consideration of his stay in the land." This Court’s answer was to the point: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Anyone who has had fruit trees in his yard will disagree with the above description of the
relationship. He knows the caretaker must water the trees, even fertilize them for better production,
uproot weeds and turn the soil, sometimes fumigate to eliminate plant pests, etc. Those chores
obviously mean ‘working or cultivating’ the land. Besides, it seems that defendant planted other crops,
[i.e., cultivated the lot] giving the landowner his corresponding share." cral aw virtua1aw library
The Court of Appeals made some essential findings of fact. The respondents were called "kasama."
They have plowing implements. The respondent Pedro Amante even used to have a carabao which he
subsequently exchanged for a horse. Almost all of the respondents have banana plantations on the
land. They live in the landholding. They are charge with the obligation to clean their respective
landholdings. Certain portions of the land are planted to palay.

These factual findings may not be reviewed by the Supreme Court. 28 Furthermore, the said facts are
supported by the testimony of the petitioner himself, who admitted that the respondents are his
"kasama," although he tried to minimize the effect of this admission by alleging that although called
"kasama," the respondents "do not perform the work of a "kasama" and that in Quezon the "kasama"
"plow the land, they plant rice, but here in Laguna, they do not do anything." The appellate court was
correct in concluding that "kasama" means "tenant," 29 not worker or laborer, which is translated into
our national language as "manggagawa." 30 Respecting farm implements, the petitioner admitted that
"they have the implements," but again he tried to minimize the significance of his statement by adding
that "they have not used it in the farm." However, the report of the CAR clerk of court, based on his
ocular inspection, pertinently states that he found "certain portions planted with palay." cralaw virtua1aw library

The petitioner cannot deny that the respondents were all living in the landholding and that "all of them
have banana plantation, small or big, "though he averred," not one single banana was given to me as
my share." cral aw virtua1aw library

We now come to the all-important question of whether the respondents have the duty to cultivate the
land in order that the trees would bear more coconuts. The petitioner’s answers on cross-examination
are quite revealing. Thus: jgc:chanrobl es.com.ph

"Q. Where these petitioners duty bound to do any cleaning or clearing of the underbrush within the
coconut land?

"A. These laborers clean the land from where . . . They are getting their food and subsistence.

"COURT: The question is that, are they duty bound to clean the landholding in question?

"A. To make my answer short, I say that the responsibility is to Gonzalo Belarmino, to him, because
he is the one who engaged them." cralaw virtua1aw library

x x x

"A. One, to guard the property and use their names as threat to people who might . . . have the
intention of stealing my coconuts, and two, to assist in the clearing of the land because that is the
responsibility of Gonzalo Belarmino. . . ." 31

Undeniably. the petitioner considers it one of the duties of the respondents to clear and clean the land.
Additionally, in his complaint the petitioner claimed that "the defendants have abandoned their posts
at the plaintiff’s plantation and have likewise failed and refused to comply with their contractual
obligation with the plaintiff to keep the areas respectively assigned to them clean and clear of
undergrowths and cogonal grass at all times, with the result that it is now impossible for the plaintiff to
harvest the mature coconuts as these would only be lost amid the undergrowth and cogonal which
have now grown to unreasonable heights, thereby causing further damage and prejudice to the
plaintiff." (Italics supplied).

The petitioner clearly expected the respondents to perform the duties of a tenant, especially, to
maintain the land clean and clear "at all times," which not only would facilitate harvesting but, more
importantly, would necessarily result in greater production. As found by the CAR clerk of court during
the ocular inspection.

"the planting of palay has a direct effect on the growing of the coconuts because in the places he found
planted with palay, the coconut trees displayed white leaves gray in color with plenty of nuts or fruits,
compared to the portion in the hacienda where we encountered cogon grasses, underbrushes and ipil-
ipil trees, there is a need for thorough cleaning, especially the ipil-ipil trees which are growing high
for years already in-between the rows of coconut trees." 32

Therefore, the parties to the contract understood, in sum and substance, that the respondents were to
"cultivate" the land. Whether the latter had been remiss in the performance of their contractual
obligations, does not affect the nature of the contract which the appellate court analyzed and found to
be that of share tenancy. It is the principal features and stipulations which determine the true essence
of a contract. 33 Considering then that the respondents are duty bound to cultivate their respective
holdings (of which they have possession), and that they share in the harvest, the Court of Appeals’
conclusion must be upheld. This, especially in the light of the facts that the respondents raise
secondary crops and have their homes in their respective holdings.

The petitioner having entered into a share tenancy contract with the respondents, it certainly cannot be
seriously claimed that the relationship of landlord and tenant is unjustifiably being imposed on him
without due process of law. It was the petitioner himself who voluntarily entered the relationship, and,
therefore, should shoulder the consequences thereof, one of which is that the tenants must be given, as
they are entitled to, a 30% share in the produce. 34

ACCORDINGLY, the decision appealed from is affirmed, at petitioner’s cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee and Barredo, JJ.,
concur.

Fernando, J., did not take part.

Endnotes:

1. Fortus v. Novero, L-22378, June 29, 1968; Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., Inc. v. Rich,
L-22068, June 30, 1969.

2. Municipality of Legaspi v. A. L. Ammen Trans. Co., Inc., L-22377, Nov. 29, 1968.

3. Where all the facts are stated in the decision and the issue is the correctness of the
conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law. (Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,
Inc. v. Rich, supra).
4. This "Amended Complaint" in annex B of the petitioner’s "Comment" (Re:
Respondents’ Constancia dated 2 October 1968) filed with this Court on November 5,
1968.

5. Section 3, R.A. 1199. According to section 6 of the same law, tenancy relationship is a
juridical tie which arises between a landholder and a tenant once they agree, expressly or
impliedly, to undertake jointly the cultivation of land belonging to the former, either under
the share tenancy or leasehold tenancy system, as a result of which relationship the tenant
acquires the right to continue working on and cultivating the land, until and unless he is
dispossessed of his holdings for any of the just causes enumerated in section 50 of the law
or the relationship is terminated on the authority of section 9 thereof.

6. Sec. 4, RA 1199. Sec. 166(25) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code recites that"
‘Share tenancy’ as used in this Code means the relationship which exists whenever two
persons agree on a joint undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party
furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both contributing any one or
several of the items of production, the tenant cultivating the land personally with the aid of
labor available from members of his immediate farm household, and the produce thereof
to be divided between the landholder and the tenant." The provision lacks only the phrase,
"in proportion to their respective contributions," to amount to an exact reproduction of the
definition of share tenancy in sec. 4, RA 99.

7. Sec. 5(a), RA 1199.

8. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur: (1) consent of the
contracting parties; (2) object certain which is the subject-matter of the contract; and (3)
cause of the obligation which is established. Art. 1318, Civil Code of the Philippines.

9. Sec. 5(b), RA 1199.

10. Sec. 166(15), Agricultural Land Reform Code.

11. Defined by sec. 166(14), id.

12. LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musician Guild, L-12582 & L-12598, Jan. 28, 1961;
Sterling Products International v. Sol, L-19187, Feb. 28, 1963; R.R. Sugay & Co. v. Reyes,
L-20451, Dec. 28, 1964; Quiño v. Muñoz, L-17222, Oct. 29, 1965; Allied Free Workers
Union v. Compañia Maritima, L-22051, L-22952, L-22971, Jan. 31, 1967; Republic v.
WCC, L-22650, April 28, 1967; Social Security System v. Court of Appeals, L-26146,
Oct. 31, 1969.

"Where the element of control is absent; where a person who works for another does so
more or less at his own pleasure and is not subject to definite hours or conditions of work,
and in turn is compensated according to the result of his efforts and not the amount
thereof,’ the relationship of employer and employee does not exist. (Investment Planning
Corporation of the Phil. v. SSS, L-19124, Nov. 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 932).

13. "The only issue We are called upon to determine in the instant proceedings is ‘whether
or not the Industrial Peace Act applies to agricultural workers,’ since there is no dispute
that the members of respondent Union are merely laborers in the different sugarcane
plantations of the petitioner.

"In the case of ‘Boy Scouts of the Philippines v. Julian Araos’, G.R. No. 10091, Jan. 28,
1958, We stated —

". . . For instance, there can be no question that under our Industrial Peace Act, the
Republic or any political division or subdivision, like a province or municipality, must and
should also be excluded from the definition of employer. Similarly, under the term
‘employee’ of our law, agricultural laborers or individuals employed in the domestic
service, like private or domestic drivers, housemaids, kitchen help, etc., should be
exempted.’

It is claimed, however, that the above is an obiter dictum.

"In a case, involving workers in a sugar central, We made a distinction between those
performing exclusively agricultural chores from those who are not. Thus, We said.

"Where petitioner is a highly mechanized industrial concern with the work of planting and
harvesting clearly distinguished from that of transporting the cane from the fields, first to a
switch and later to the mill, all its workers are to be considered industrial workers, except
those devoted to purely agricultural work.’ (Pampanga Sugar Mills v. Pasumil Workers
Union, L-7668, Feb. 29, 1956.).

It is, therefore, the nature of the work which classifies a worker as one falling under the
exemption as ‘agricultural laborers.’ The members of respondent Union are merely
agricultural laborers in petitioner’s haciendas, the principal work of which is planting and
harvesting sugar canes and other chores incidental to ordinary farming operations. They
are agricultural laborers." (Victorias Milling, Inc. v. CIR, L-17281, March 30, 1963, 7
SCRA 544-545). "The case of Victorias Milling Co. v. CIR and Free Visayan Workers,
G.R. No. 17281, decided on March 30, 1963, is particularly relevant, being almost on all
fours with the present case. There a union of laborers working in the sugar cane haciendas
of the Victorias Milling Co. had charged the company with unfair labor practice in the
Court of Industrial Relations. The latter’s jurisdiction was impugned before this Court, and
it was held that:
chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘The members of respondent Union are merely agricultural laborers in petitioner’s

haciendas, the principal work of which is planting and harvesting sugar cane and other
chores incidental to ordinary farming operations. They are agricultural workers, and in the
supposition that the milling company had committed unfair labor practice upon them, the
Court of Agrarian Relations has jurisdiction over the case.’" (Elizalde & Co., Inc. v. Allied
Workers Ass’n of the Phil., L-20792, May 31, 1965).

"The first issue leads Us to consider Our rulings in Pampanga Sugar Mills v. Pasumil
Workers’ Union and Victorias Milling Co. v. CIR, supra.

"In the Pasumil case, we held that where ‘petitioner is a highly mechanized industrial
concern with the work of planting and harvesting clearly distinguished from that of
transporting the cane from the fields, first to a switch and later to the mill . . . all its
workers are to be considered industrial workers, except those devoted to purely
agricultural work.’ (at p. 561) Reiterating this, We said in the Victorias case that it is ‘the
nature of the work which classifies a worker as one falling under the exemption [from the
coverage of RA 875] as agricultural laborers.’

"In a hacienda, there may therefore be both agricultural and industrial workers. Regarding
the former, exclusive jurisdiction has been given to the Court of Agrarian Relations. As to
the latter, exclusive jurisdiction has been placed in the Court of Industrial Relations." (Del
Rosario v. C.I.R, L-23133, July 13, 1967, 20 SCRA 652-653).

14. Arts. 1700-1712, Civil Code of the Philippines.

15. Latag v. Banog, L-20093, Jan. 31, 1966.

16. Sec. 4, RA 1199.

17. Art. 1684, Civil Code of the Philippines.

18. Noteworthy is the fact that the respondents in the case at bar receive not salaries or
wages, but a share of the produce.

19. Sec. 25(2), RA 1199.

20. The word "guard" comes from the Anglo-Saxon "weardian," to watch, the "gu" being
due to French influence. To guard in its largest sense comprehends both watching and
defending, that is, both preventing the attack and the resisting it when it is made. (18-A
Words and Phrases 697, citing Slyder v. Board of Comm’rs of Preble County, 12 NE2d
407, 408, 133 Ohio St. 146).

Property protection agency’s employees who were designated by agency as guards and
wore uniform and badges and carried guns, and who were ready to stand guard duty on
subscriber’s premises in the ordinary course of their work when occasion required, even
though they did not do so constantly, were "guards" within the provision of National Labor
Relations Act to the effect that Board shall not decide that any unit is appropriate for
bargaining purposes if it includes both guards and other employees. (Id. 698, citing NLRB
v. American Dist. Tel. Co. of PA, CA 3, 205 F2d 86, 90).

"Agrarian relations" does not include employment of security guards in agricultural

enterprise. (De Quito v. Lopez, L-27757, March 28, 1968).

21. Sec. 41, RA 1199.

"But since then, and more specifically on August 30, 1954, Republic Act 1199 entitled ‘An
Act to Govern the Relations between Landholders and Tenants of Agricultural Lands
(Leasehold and Share Tenancy)’ has been approved. This law governs the relations
between landlord and tenant in all kinds of agricultural lands. It repeals C.A. No. 461. The
provisions of the Act are made to apply to all kinds of agricultural lands, whatever may be
their nature or character, whether rice, sugar, corn or coconut, and all controversies
between landlord and tenant are placed within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations [now within the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations since the passage
of R.A. 1267 on June 14, 1956] so any controversies between landlord and tenant, or
owner and lessee falls under said court’s jurisdiction" (Mendoza v. Manguiat, 96 Phil.
310).

22. Agricultural land" means land devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop
lands, salt beds, fish ponds, idle land and abandoned land as defined in paragraphs 18 and
19 of this Section, respectively. (Sec. 166[1], RA 3844).

23. Sec. 3, RA 1199.

24. Si los recurrentes cultivasen personalmente el terreno ellos serian inquillinos o

aparceros — tenants — de Patalinghug; pero, segun los hechos admitidos en los escritos
obrantes en autos, los recurrentes no son aparceros, eran antes de la venta proprietarios y
despues contimuaron en la posesion del terreno como arrendatarios. Segun el articulo 3 de
la Ley No. 4054, tal como fue enmendada por la Ley de la Republic No. 34, aparcero es
‘todo labrador o bracero agricola que se compremete a trabajar y cultivar un terreno por
otro o la persona que facilita la mano de obra, con el consentimiento del propietario’ y, en
virtud de dicho trabajo, recibe una participacion fijada por la Ley de Aparecia, comos los
recurrentes no cultivan personalmente el terreno en question, no se les puede considerar
como aparceros, aunque en la escritura de venta con pacto de retro los vendedores se
llamen a si mismo impropiamente tenants." (Omega v. Solidum, 93 Phil. 460).

25. De Guzman v. Santos, L-16568, Nov. 30, 1962.

26. Almodiel v. Blanco, L-17508, July 30, 1962.

27. Marcelo v. De Leon, 105 Phil. 1175.

28. Marchan v. Mendoza, L-24471, Aug. 30, 1968; Villarica v. CA. L-19196 Nov. 29,
1968; Caguiat v. Torres, L-25481 Oct. 31, 1969.

29. English-Pilipino, Pilipino-English Vocabulary, page 146.

30. Id., page 45.

31. Court of Appeals decision, on pp. XIV-XV, appendix A, brief for the petitioner.

32. CA decision, p. IX, appendix A, brief for the petitioner.

33. Teodoro v. Macaraeg, L-20700, Feb. 27, 1969.

34. Sec. 41, RA 1199.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12902 July 29, 1959
CEFERINO MARCELO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
NAZARIO DE LEON, defendant-appellee.
Pedro D. Maldia and San Vicente and Jardiel for appellant.
Inciong and Bacalso for appellee.
BENGZON, J.:
The plaintiff has appealed from the order of judge Jose N. Leuterio of the Nueva Ecija court of first
instance, dismissing his complaint whereby he had asked that defendant be required to vacate a parcel
of land and to pay damages. The dismissal rested on two grounds, (a) the case pertained to the Court of
Agrarian Relations; and (b) as attorney-in-fact of the true owner of the land, the plaintiff had no right to
bring the action.
The record disclose that on February 4, 1957, Ceferino Marcelo, filed in the justice of the peace court
of San Antonio, Nueva Ecija, a complaint to recover possession of a lot of 2,000 square meters
belonging to Severino P. Marcelo (who had given him a full power-of-attorney) which was held by
defendant "on the understanding that one-half of all the products raised in the occupied area, would be
given" to the landowner. The complaint alleged that after plaintiff had assumed the administration of
Severino Marcelo's properties, defendant delivered the products corresponding to the owner; but when
in September 1956, plaintiff notified defendant that in addition to giving half of the produce, he would
have to pay a rental of two pesos per month, the latter refused, and continued refusing to pay such
additional charges. Wherefore, complainant prayed for judgment ordering defendant to leave the
premises and to pay damages and costs.
The defendant questioned the court's jurisdiction, arguing that the matter involved tenancy relations
falling within the authority of the Agrarian Court; he also challenged the capacity of plaintiff to sue. He
lost in the justice of the peace court; however, on appeal to the court of first instance, he raised the
same issues on a motion to dismiss, and then his views prevailed.
In this appeal, plaintiff insists he merely filed ejectment or detainer proceedings, which fall within the
justice of the peace court's jurisdiction. He claims the lot to be residential, and not agricultural. On this
point, His Honor noted that "the land covered by the title of plaintiff's principal covers an area of
59,646 square meters situated in the barrio of San Mariano, San Antonio, Nueva Ecija. This land
obviously is agricultural, and it is too much to presume that barrio folks would occupy an area of 2,000
square meters more or less of land for a residence. The cultivation of the land by the defendant and the
sharing of the products thereof with the owner of the land characterize the relationship between the
defendant and the plaintiff's principal as one of the landlord and tenant.
Indeed, from the allegations of the complaint, one could conclude that defendant had physical
possession of the land for the purpose of cultivating it and giving the owner a share in the crop. This
was agricultural tenancy of the kind called "share tenancy". In judging this relationship, the 2-pesos-a-
month-rental alleged in the complaint may be disregarded, because defendant never having agreed to
such imposition, it may not be held a part of the compensation payable for holding the land. The
circumstance that defendant built a dwelling on the agricultural lot does not ipso facto make it
residential — considering specially that the dwelling — photograph submitted with brief — does not
occupy more than 80 square meters occupied by him. In this connection, plaintiff argues as follows:
The defendant does not till or cultivate the land in order to grow the fruit bearing trees because
they are already full grown. He does not even do the actual gathering, and after deducting the
expenses, he gives one-half of the fruits to the plaintiff all in consideration of his stay in the
 land. He is not, therefore, a tenant within the meaning of that term as used in Republic Act. No.
1199 for "A tenant shall mean a person who, himself and with the aid available from within his
immediate farm household, cultivate the land for purposes of production . . ."
Anyone who had fruit trees in his yard, will disagree with the above description of the relationship. He
knows the caretaker must water the trees, even fertilize them for better production, uproot weeds and
turn the soil, sometimes fumigate to eliminate plants pests, etc. Those chores obviously mean "working
or cultivating" the land. Besides, it seems that defendant planted other crops, (i.e. cultivated the lot)
giving the landowner his corresponding share.
Now, the statutes provide that "All cases involving dispossession of a tenant by the landholder . . . shall
be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of such court as may now or hereafter be authorized by
law to take cognizance of tenancy relations and disputes". Sec. 2, Republic Act 1199); and the court
(Agrarian Relations) "shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to consider, investigate, decide and
settle all questions and matters involving all those relationships established by law which determine the
varying rights of persons in cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the
land". (Sec. 7, Republic Act 1267 as amended by Republic Act 1409.)
In Tumbagan vs. Vasquez, L-8719, July 17, 1956, we impliedly held that where a farmland occupies
agricultural land and erects a house thereon, the tenancy relationship continues subject to tenancy laws
— not to those governing leases.
In fact, the Agricultural Tenancy Law (Republic Act 1199) requires the landholder to give his tenant an
area wherein the latter may construct his dwelling (sec. 26), of course without thereby changing the
nature of their relationship, from landowner and tenant to lessor and lessee.
At any rate, this action must fail upon the second ground of defendant's motion to dismiss: the plaintiff
is a mere apoderado of the owner, Severino P. Marcelo.1 The rule is that every action must be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, (sec 2, Rule 3).
However, plaintiff quotes that part of sec. 1 of Rule 72, permitting "the legal representative" of any
landlord to bring an action of ejectment, and insists in his right now to litigate. Supposing that "legal
representative" as used in sec. 1, includes attorneys-in-fact, we find that plaintiff's power attached to
the complaint, authorizes him to sue for and in the name of Severino Marcelo, to "pursue any and all
kinds of suits and actions for me and in my name in the courts of the land". This action is not in the
name of plaintiff's principal.
For all the foregoing, the appealed order is affirmed with costs chargeable against appellant.
Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia and Barrera, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Arroyo vs. Granda, 18 Phil., 484; Hilario vs. La Congregacion, 27 Phil., 593.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20098 January 31, 1966
SILVERIO LATAG, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MARCELO BANOG, defendant-appellee.
Endaya, Caleasal and Delgado for the plaintiff-appellant.
Suanes, Barbosa and Atienza for the defendant-appellee.
ZALDIVAR, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Batangas dismissing the complaint in
its Civil Case No. 1263, on the ground that said court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.
On February 13, 1962 the plaintiff-appellant filed a complaint against the defendant-appellee alleging,
in substance: that the defendant is the absolute owner of two parcels of land situated in Barrio Quilib,
Rosario, Batangas; that on December 7, 1960, the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a written
contract whereby it was agreed that the former was to act as manager, cultivator and caretaker of the
two parcels of land owned by the latter, and of all the useful plants planted, and to be planted, on said
lands, with the understanding that all the products of the orange and the calamansi trees planted thereon
would be divided into three equal parts; two-thirds of which would be the share of the plaintiff and one-
third would be the share of the defendant, while the sharing in the other products like coffee, bananas,
mangoes, black pepper and others would be on the fifty-fifty basis; and it was further agreed that said
relationship and sharing would continue for a period of five years from December 7, 1960; that
pursuant to said agreement the plaintiff entered into the management, cultivation and care of the above-
mentioned properties, and had built a house costing P70.00 on one of the two parcels of land, that the
plaintiff had incurred actual expenses in the total amount of P2,286.80 aside from other miscellaneous
expenses for food and viand of his laborers; that on January 11, 1962, without any legal ground nor
justification whatsoever the defendant drove the plaintiff out of the lands and even destroyed the house
that the plaintiff had built thereon; that notwithstanding all efforts of the plaintiff to make the defendant
comply with his part of the agreement in their written contract, the defendant had adamantly refused.
The complaint prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff actual
damages in the amount of P2,656.80, unrealized profits in the amount that the court would fix after
hearing the evidence, moral damages in the amount of at least P5,000.00, exemplary damages in the
amount of at least P5,000.00, plus attorney's fees equivalent to 20% of the total amounts collected and
the costs of the suit. A copy of the written agreement in question was attached to the complaint as
Annex "A".
On March 2, 1962 the defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court
has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and that the complaint did not state a cause of action.
It is contended by the defendant that, based on the allegations in the complaint and as stated in the
written agreement which was attached to the complaint as Annex "A", a relationship of landlord and
tenant had existed between the plaintiff and the defendant—the plaintiff being the tenant and the
defendant being the landlord, and the complaint being one that seeks to secure a decision or settlement
of differences or disputes in connection with the relationship of landlord and tenant involving the
cultivation and use of agricultural land, it is the Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First
Instance that has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. The defendant points out that the complaint of
the plaintiff poses the question of whether the act of the defendant, as landlord, in dispossessing the
plaintiff, as tenant, of the two parcels of land was justified or not under the law.
On March 5, 1962, the plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss the complaint and at the
same time moved to amend the original complaint by striking out the words "cultivator" and
"cultivation" in paragraphs 3 & 4, of the original complaint, claiming that the one who drafted the
original complaint was not well versed in Tagalog such that the phrase "tagapamahala at tagapagalaga"
was translated into "manager, cultivator and caretaker" whereas that phrase "tagapamahala at
tagapagalaga" ought to be translated into English only as "manager and caretaker" without including
any statement about cultivation. In his opposition to the motion to dismiss the plaintiff contends that in
the contract, Annex A to the complaint, no tenancy relationship was agreed upon and the complaint was
intended to recover damages so that it is the court of general jurisdiction, which is the Court of First
Instance, and not the Court of Agrarian Relations, which is a court of limited jurisdiction, that has
competence to hear and decide the case.1äwphï1.ñët
On March 27, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Batangas, acting on the motion to dismiss the
complaint, issued an order dismissing the case. In its order of dismissal the court a quo stated:
This Court believes and so holds that the argument of the defendant is well-taken, and agrees
with him that the document, Annex "A", indicates the existence of tenancy relationship between
the plaintiff and the defendant, considering the ruling of our Supreme Court in the case of
Teodorico B. Santos vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G.R. No. L-17196, prom. Dec. 28,
1961, "that any matter that may pertain to the relation of tenant and landlord comes under the
Agricultural Tenancy and any controversy that may arise between them as an incident of their
Act (Republic Act No. 1199, as amended by Republic Act No. 2263) and any controversy that
may arise between them as an incident of their relationship comes under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations created by Republic Act. No. 1267. It was
created for enforcement of all laws and regulations governing the relation of capital and labor
on all agricultural lands under any system of cultivation (Section 1, Rep. Act No. 1267, as
amended by Republic Act No. 1409) and was given exclusive jurisdiction over the entire
Philippines to consider, disputes established by law which determine the varying rights of
persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land",
and so this Court believes and so declares that it has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issues of
the case at bar, falling as they do, according to the above citation under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
Before this Court, plaintiff-appellant insists that the contract (Annex A) does not establish any tenancy
relationship, or if it did, such relationship had already ceased inasmuch as he does not ask for
reinstatement as tenant. He claims that this case is a simple suit for damages which the Court of
Agrarian Relations cannot take cognizance of, it being a court of special and limited jurisdiction.
The contract (Annex A) contains the following pertinent stipulations:
Na si Silverio Latag, ganap sa gulang, Filipino, asawa ni Cipriana Alday at naninirahan sa
Tambo, Lipa City ay aking ginawang tagapamahala at tagapag-alaga sa naulit na lupa; na siya
rin ang mamomosession, mamamahala sa mga halamang nakatanim at itatanim sa lupang naulit
sa loob ng limang taon.
Na si Silverio Latag, ang mag-aalaga sa mga halaman ng lupang nabanggit; na ang lahat ng
kagastusang maaaring makamit o kailanganin sa pag-aalaga ay siyang lahat ang nakakaalam; at
walang PAKIALAM ang may-ari ng lupa.
Na ang kasunduan naming ito ay tatagal sa loob ng limang (5) taon simula ngayon; na ang
kasunduang ito ay nagpapatunay din na ang bahagi ay akong may-ari ng lupa ay sa ikatlo (1/3)
sa sinturis at kalamansing aanihin dito; at hati (50-50) parte sa bunga ng mga halamang
sumusunod, (1) kape; (2) saging; (3) mangga; (4) at paminta at sa mga ibang halamang itatanim
pa ng naulit na si Silverio Latag.
In the original complaint the plaintiff used the words "manager, cultivator and caretaker" of the two
parcels of land concerned, but on the excuse that the one who prepared the complaint was not well
versed in Tagalog, the complaint was subsequently amended whereby the word "cultivator" was deleted
in the allegations of the complaint. We note, however that in the contract, Annex "A" to the complaint,
it is clearly provided that the plaintiff would take care of the plants that are planted and those still to be
planted on the lands within a period of five years ("mamamahala sa mga halamang nakatanim at
itatanim sa lupang naulit sa loob ng limang taon").
This Court believes that the allegations of the complaint (even as amended) and the stipulations of the
contract (Annex A) unmistakably show that an agricultural tenancy of the kind called "share tenancy"
was established between the parties. It has been declared that "an agricultural tenancy classified as
`share tenancy' exists where a person has physical possession of another's land for the purpose of
cultivating it and giving the owner a share in the crop" (Marcelo vs. De Leon, L-12902, July 29, 1959).
This Court in the same case held:
x x x x He knows the caretaker must water the trees, even fertilize them for better production,
uproot weeds and turn the soil, sometimes fumigate to eliminate plant pests, etc. Those chores
obviously mean "working or cultivating" the land. x x x x
It may thus be stated that the "caretaker" of an agricultural land is also considered the "cultivator" of
the land.
As regards plaintiff-appellant's contention that the tenancy relationship, if any, had been terminated
because his claim was only for damages without reinstatement to his status as tenant, suffice it to say
that in the instant case the plaintiff-appellant's claim for damages was based on his having been
allegedly dispossessed unlawfully or unjustifiably by the defendant-appellee of the two parcels of land
under his care and management sometime on January 1, 1962. It is clear that the action relates to an
incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship which existed shortly before the filing of the
complaint on February 13, 1962. Under the circumstance, the Court of Agrarian Relations has the
original and exclusive jurisdiction over the case, even if the tenancy relationship no longer existed at
the time of the filing of the action. On this point this Court ruled as follows:
Indeed, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199, provides that "all cases involving the
dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party and/or the settlement and
disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landlord and tenant . . . shall be under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations." This jurisdiction does
not require the continuance of the relationship of landlord and
tenant — at the time of the dispute. The same may have arisen, and often times arise, precisely
from the previous termination of such relationship. If the same existed immediately, or shortly
before the controversy and the subject-matter thereof is whether or not said relationship has
been lawfully terminated, or if the dispute otherwise springs or originates from the relationship
of landlord and tenant, the litigation is cognizable only by the Court of Agrarian Relations, . . .
(Basilio vs. De Guzman, et al., L-12762, April 22, 1959).
On the point that the present case comes under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian
Relations even if the action is only for the recovery of damages based on the unlawful dispossession of
the tenant, this Court held:
Section 7, Republic Act No. 1267, as amended, vests in the Court of Agrarian Relations
exclusive and original jurisdiction to determine controversies arising from landlord-tenant
relationship. From this it may be inferred that it also has jurisdiction to hear and determine
actions for recovery of damages arising from the unlawful dismissal or dispossession of tenant
by the landlord, as provided in Act No. 4054 and Republic Act No. 1199, as amended. To hold
otherwise could result in multiplicity of suits and expensive litigations abhorred by the law . . . .
(Militar vs. Torcillero, et al., L-15065, April 28, 1961).
We hold, therefore, that the lower court did not commit error when it dismissed the complaint in the
present case.
Wherefore, the order of dismissal appealed from is affirmed, with costs against plaintiff-appellant.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal and
Bengzon, J.P., JJ., concur.
Sanchez, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29381 September 30, 1969
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS and PANTALEON BINGABING, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VALERIANO A. DEL VALLE, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Court of Agrarian
Relations and PAMPILO DOLTZ, respondents
Marcelino B. Bermudez for petitioners.
Nostratis and Estrada for respondent Judge V. A. Del Valle.
Abelardo Flores for respondent Pampilo Doltz.

SANCHEZ, J.:
The decisive issue to be resolved in this case is whether or not strips of land owned by Philippine
National Railways (PNR) which are on both sides of its railroad track, and are part of its right of way
for its railroad operations but temporarily leased, are agricultural lands within the purview of the
Agricultural Tenancy Act and the Agricultural Land Reform Code, such as would come within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations.
The facts of this particular case are these:
PNR, a government-owned corporation, is the registered owner of three (3) strips of land with a
uniform width of 30. meters adjoining one another longitudinally, the same being part of its railroad
right of way running from Manila to Legazpi. These strips of land lie within the municipalities of Oas
and Polangui, Province of Albay. At the center thereof is a track measuring ten (10) to twelve (12)
meters in width where railroad ties are placed and rails built for running locomotives. On both sides of
the track, or about (2) to five (5) meters away from the embarassment of the track, are telegraph and
telephone posts office (50) meters apart from each other, which maintain communication wires
necessary in the operation of PNR trains. PNR draws earth from these sides to fill up the railroad track
whenever it is destroyed by water during rainy days; and uses them as depository of railroad materials
for the repair of destroyed lines, posts, bridges during washouts, or other damaged parts of the line
occasioned by derailments or other calamities.
The portions of these lands not actually occupied by the railroad track had been a source of trouble.
People occupied them; they reap profits therefrom. Disputes among those desiring to occupy them
cropped up. It is on the face of all these that, with adequate provisions to safeguard railroad operations,
PNR adopted temporary rules and regulations, as follows: (a) the possession and enjoyment of the
property should be awarded to interested persons thru competitive public bidding; (b) the rental of the
premises is to be determined from the amount offered by the highest bidder; (e) the duration of the
lease shall be for a limited period, not to exceed three (3) years; (d) the lessee cannot sublease the
premises; (e) the lease contract is revocable at any time upon demand by the owner, whenever it needs
the same for its own use or for a more beneficial purpose; (f) the owner can enter the leased premises
during the period of the lease to make necessary repairs; and (g) the lessee shall not use the premises in
a manner prejudicial to the operation of the trains.
Sometime in 1963, PNR awarded the portions of the three strips of land aforementioned which are on
both sides of the track, after a competitive public bidding, to petitioner Pantaleon Bingabing for a
period of three (3) years and under conditions hereinbefore set forth. A civil law lease contract in
printed form was, on April 15, 1963, entered into by and between PNR and Bingabing. That contract
expressly stipulates that Bingabing was "to occupy and use the property ... temporarily for agriculture."
Consideration therefor was P130.00 per annum. Bingabing, however, failed to take possession because
respondent Pampilo Doltz was occupying the land, had a house thereon. Doltz claims to be a tenant of
previous awardees, and later, of Bingabing himself.
Sometime in March 1965, PNR and Bingabing filed suit against Doltz for recovery of possession of the
premises in the Court of First Instance of Albay. 1 They there averred that sometime in January 1963,
Doltz illegally entered the land, constructed a house thereon occupying about fifty (50) square meters,
and planted palay on the other portions thereof. They prayed that Doltz remove his house, vacate the
premises, restore possession to PNR or Bingabing, pay PNR P160 per annum as reasonable
compensation for the occupation of the premises from January 1963, and P2,000 as expenses of
litigation, pay Bingabing P500 annually from 1963, and shoulder the costs of suit.
Doltz' answer in that case averred inter alia that the had been a tenant on the property for over twenty
years; that he had been placed thereon by the deceased Pablo Gomba who leased the property from the
then Manila Railroad Company (now PNR); that he became the tenant of Demetrio de Vera, Gomba's
successor; that he is the tenant of Bingabing, having given the latter's share of 1/3 during the last two
harvests; and that the case is properly cognizable by the Court of Agrarian Relations. Upon the court's
request, Doltz and Bingabing agreed to temporarily liquidate the harvest on a sharing ratio of 70-30 in
Doltz' favor.
It has been suggested in the record that said case — Civil Case 3021 — was dismissed by the Court of
First Instance of Albay upon the ground that the subject matter of the action is tenancy; that petitioners
have appealed. That case, parenthetically, has not yet reached this Court.
While the aforesaid Civil Case 3021 was pending in the Albay court of first instance, Doltz registered
with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) a petition against Bingabing for security of tenure, the
adoption of a sharing ratio of 70-30 of the crops, and reliquidation of past harvests. This is the present
case — CAR Case 692, Albay '67, Court of Agrarian Relations, Ninth Regional District, Legazpi City,
Branch II, entitled "Pampilo Doltz, Petitioner, versus Pantaleon Bingabing, Respondent." PNR
intervened in the case. Petitioners herein there maintained the position that the premises in controversy
are not an agricultural land within the contemplation of the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act
1199) or the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844); that no tenancy relationship existed
between the parties; that CAR, therefore, lacked jurisdiction over the case; and that there is a pending
case between the same parties in another court involving the same subject matter and the same cause of
action.
After trial, the CAR promulgated its decision of June 10, 1968. It upheld its jurisdiction over the case,
maintained Doltz in the peaceful possession of the parcels of land as tenant on a 70-30 sharing ratio in
Doltz' favor, ordered Bingabing to pay Doltz P250 attorneys' fees and the costs, but dismissed the
latter's claim for reliquidation of past harvests for lack of substantial evidence. Petitioners' move to
reconsider the said decision failed. They now come to this Court. They specifically question CAR's
jurisdiction.
1. Is the land here involved in agricultural land within the meaning of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and
the Agricultural Land Reform Code?
According to Section 3 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, "[a]gricultural tenancy is the physical
possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for
the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm
household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a
price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both." 2 The term "agricultural land"
as understood by the Agricultural Land Reform Code is not as broad in meaning as it is known in the
constitutional sense. As interpreted in Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461, 471, the phrase
"agricultural land," constitutionally speaking, includes all lands that are neither mineral nor timber
lands and embraces within it wide sweep not only lands strictly agricultural or devoted to cultivation
for agricultural purposes but also commercial, industrial, residential lands and lands for other purposes.
On the other hand, by Section 166(1) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, " "[a]gricultural land"
means land devoted to any growth including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fishponds, idle
land and abandoned land as defined in paragraphs 18 and 19 of this section, respectively." 3
It is obvious then that under the law, the land here in controversy does not fit into the concept of
agricultural land. PNR cannot devote it to agriculture because by its own charter, Republic Act 4156,
PNR cannot engage in agriculture.
Indeed, the land — which adjoins the railroad track on both sides — is part of PNR's right of way. That
right of way is not limited to the particular space occupied by the roadbed or its main track. It also
includes the portions occupied by the telephone and telegraph posts. It extends to a width of 30 meters
which reasonably gives the train locomotive engineer a clear commanding view of the track and its
switches ahead of him.
The entire width is important to PNR's railroad operations. Which should not be hampered. And,
communication lines must not be disturbed. Buildings should not be constructed so close to the track.
Because, it is not so easy to prevent people from walking along the track; animals, too, may stray into
the area; obstructions there could be along the track itself which might cause derailment. All of these
could prevent the locomotive engineer from taking the necessary precautions on time to avert accidents
which may cause damage to the trains, injury to its passengers, and even loss of life.
Besides, the use of the strips of land on both sides of the track in railroad operation is inconsistent with
agricultural activities. The contract of lease authorizes the railroad company to enter upon the premises
to make repairs, place its materials on the land. It may even take soil from the land to fill up any part of
the railroad track destroyed by water during rainy days. What if PNR should decide to construct
another parallel track on the land leased? The occupant of the land cannot prevent or stop PNR from
doing any of these. Security of tenure so important in landlord-tenant relationship may not thus be
attained.
The foregoing are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from adopting the view that the disputed
land — in narrow strips — is agricultural land within the meaning of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and
the Agricultural Land Reform Code. By destination, it is not agricultural.
2. Nor may Pampilo Doltz be considered as a true and lawful tenant.
To be borne in mind is the fact that PNR executed with Pantaleon Bingabing a civil law lease contract,
not an agricultural lease.1awphîl.nèt This distinction is expressly recognized by the law. 4 That contract
is temporary, at best for a short term. It is revocable any time upon demand by PNR whenever it needs
the same for its own use or for a more beneficial purpose.
Even on the assumption that the land is agricultural, there is the circumstance that PNR prohibits the
sublease of the premises. PNR's lessees cannot give what they are not allowed to give. Any contract
then of sublease between Doltz, the supposed tenant, and Pablo Gomba or Demetrio de Vera, the
previous awardees, or even of Pantaleon Bingabing, the present awardee — without PNR's consent —
cannot bind the latter. No such consent was here given.
This ushers us to a principle shaped out by jurisprudence that the security of tenure guaranteed by our
tenancy law may be invoked only by tenants de jure, not by those who are not true and lawful tenants. 5
In Pabustan vs. De Guzman, L-12898, August 31, 1960, the tenant sublet the landholding to a third
person without the knowledge and consent of the landowner. In an ejectment suit brought by the
landowner against said third person in the CAR, this Court held that the CAR had no jurisdiction over
the case because no tenancy relationship existed between the parties, as the third person was, in reality,
an unlawful squatter or intruder. Correlating Pabustan to the present case, the lessee here had no power
to sublet. There is also thus no legally cognizable relationship of tenancy between the parties.
We, accordingly, rule that CAR does not have jurisdiction over the case at bar and the proceedings
below are thus null and void.
For the reasons given, the judgment of the Court of Agrarian Relations of June 10, 1968 in its Case
692, Albay '67, under review is hereby reversed, and said case is hereby dismissed.
Costs against private respondent Pampilo Doltz. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and Barredo
JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.
Footnotes
1CivilCase 3021, Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch II, entitled "Philippine National
Railways and Pantaleon Bingabing, Plaintiff versus Pampilo Doltz, Defendant."
2Emphasis supplied.
3Emphasis supplied. Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Section 166, Agricultural Land Reform Code,
provide:
"(18) "Idle lands" means land not devoted directly to any crop or to any definite
economic purpose for at least one year prior to the notice of expropriation except for
reasons other than force majeure or any other fortuitous event but used to be devoted or
is suitable to such crop or is contiguous to land devoted directly to any crop and does not
include land devoted permanently or regularly to other essential and more productive
purpose.
(19) "Abandoned lands" means lands devoted to any crop at least one year prior to the
notice of expropriation but which was not utilized by the owner for his benefit for the
past five years prior to such notice of expropriation."
4Section 166(2), Agricultural Land Reform Code reads: " "Agricultural lessee means a person
who, by himself and with the aid available from within his immediate farm household,
cultivates the land belonging to, or possessed by, another with the latter's consent for purposes
of production, for a price certain in money or in produce or both. It is distinguished from civil
law lessee as understood in the Civil Code of the Philippines."
5Dumlao vs. De Guzman (1961), 1 SCRA 144, 147; Lastimoza vs. Blanco (1961), 1 SCRA 231,
234.