Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 166357 September 19, 2011

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

A finding of psychological incapacity must be supported by well-established facts. It is the plaintiff’s burden to convince the court of the
existence of these facts.

Before the Court is a Petition for Review1 of the Court of Appeals’ (CA) May 27, 2004 Decision2 and December 15, 2004 Resolution3 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64240, which reversed the trial court’s declaration of nullity of the herein parties’ marriage. The fallo of the assailed
Decision reads:

WHEREFORE¸the appeal is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision is SET ASIDE and VACATED while the petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.4

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Valerio E. Kalaw (Tyrone) and respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez (Malyn) met in 1973. They maintained a relationship and
eventually married in Hong Kong on November 4, 1976. They had four children, Valerio (Rio), Maria Eva (Ria), Ramon Miguel (Miggy or
Mickey), and Jaime Teodoro (Jay).

Shortly after the birth of their youngest son, Tyrone had an extramarital affair with Jocelyn Quejano (Jocelyn), who gave birth to a son in
March 1983.5

In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home (the house of her Kalaw in-laws) and her four children with Tyrone.6Meanwhile, Tyrone
started living with Jocelyn, who bore him three more children.7

In 1990, Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. He left his four children from his marriage with Malyn in
a rented house in Valle Verde with only a househelp and a driver. 8 The househelp would just call Malyn to take care of the children
whenever any of them got sick. Also, in accordance with their custody agreement, the children stayed with Malyn on weekends. 9

In 1994, the two elder children, Rio and Ria, asked for Malyn’s permission to go to Japan for a one-week vacation. Malyn acceded only
to learn later that Tyrone brought the children to the US. 10 After just one year, Ria returned to the Philippines and chose to live with
Malyn.

Meanwhile, Tyrone and Jocelyn’s family returned to the Philippines and resumed physical custody of the two younger children, Miggy
and Jay. According to Malyn, from that time on, the children refused to go to her house on weekends because of alleged weekend
plans with their father.11

Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage

On July 6, 1994, nine years since the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on Article 36 of the Family Code.12 He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and comply with the
essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He further claimed that her psychological incapacity was
manifested by her immaturity and irresponsibility towards Tyrone and their children during their co-habitation, as shown by Malyn’s
following acts:

1. she left the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all night;

2. she left the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following day; and

3. she committed adultery on June 9, 1985, which act Tyrone discovered in flagrante delicto. 13

During trial,14 Tyrone narrated the circumstances of Malyn’s alleged infidelity. According to him, on June 9, 1985, he and his brother-in-
law, Ronald Fernandez (Malyn’s brother), proceeded to Hyatt Hotel and learned that Malyn was occupying a room with a certain Benjie
Guevarra (Benjie). When he proceeded to the said room, he saw Benjie and Malyn inside. 15 At rebuttal, Tyrone elaborated that Benjie
was wearing only a towel around his waist, while Malyn was lying in bed in her underwear. After an exchange of words, he agreed not
to charge Malyn with adultery when the latter agreed to relinquish all her marital and parental rights. 16 They put their agreement in
writing before Atty. Jose Palarca.

Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to
testify on Malyn’s psychological incapacity.

Dr. Gates explained on the stand that the factual allegations regarding Malyn’s behavior – her sexual infidelity, habitual mahjong
playing, and her frequent nights-out with friends – may reflect a narcissistic personality disorder (NPD).17 NPD is present when a person
is obsessed to meet her wants and needs in utter disregard of her significant others. 18 Malyn’s NPD is manifest in her utter neglect of
her duties as a mother.19

Dr. Gates reported that Malyn’s personality disorder "may have been evident even prior to her marriage" because it is rooted in her
family background and upbringing, which the psychologist gathered to be materially deprived and without a proper maternal role
model.20

Dr. Gates based her diagnosis on the facts revealed by her interviews with Tyrone, Trinidad Kalaw (Tyrone’s sister-in-law), and the son
Miggy. She also read the transcript of Tyrone’s court testimony. 21

Fr. Healy corroborated Dr. Gates’ assessment. He concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
duties.22 He explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This role allegedly inflated
Malyn’s ego to the point that her needs became priority, while her kids’ and husband’s needs became secondary. Malyn is so self-
absorbed that she is incapable of prioritizing her family’s needs.

Fr. Healy clarified that playing mahjong and spending time with friends are not disorders by themselves. They only constitute
psychological incapacity whenever inordinate amounts of time are spent on these activities to the detriment of one’s familial duties.23 Fr.
Healy characterized Malyn’s psychological incapacity as grave and incurable. 24

He based his opinion on his interview with Tyrone, the trial transcripts, as well as the report of Dr. Natividad Dayan (Dr. Dayan), Malyn’s
expert witness.25 He clarified that he did not verify the truthfulness of the factual allegations regarding Malyn’s "habits" because he
believed it is the court’s duty to do so.26 Instead, he formed his opinion on the assumption that the factual allegations are indeed true.

Malyn’s version

Malyn denied being psychologically incapacitated. 27 While she admitted playing mahjong, she denied playing as frequently as Tyrone
alleged. She maintained that she did so only two to three times a week and always between 1 p.m. to 6 p.m. only. 28 And in those
instances, she always had Tyrone’s permission and would often bring the children and their respective yayas with her. 29 She
maintained that she did not neglect her duties as mother and wife.

Malyn admitted leaving the conjugal home in May 1985. She, however, explained that she did so only to escape her physically abusive
husband.30 On the day she left, Tyrone, who preferred to keep Malyn a housewife, was upset that Malyn was preparing to go to work.
He called up the security guards and instructed them not to let Malyn out of the house. Tyrone then placed cigarette ashes on Malyn’s
head and proceeded to lock the bedroom doors. Fearing another beating, Malyn rushed out of their bedroom and into her mother-in-
law’s room. She blurted that Tyrone would beat her up again so her mother-in-law gave her ₱300 to leave the house.31 She never
returned to their conjugal home.

Malyn explained that she applied for work, against Tyrone’s wishes, because she wanted to be self-sufficient. Her resolve came from
her discovery that Tyrone had a son by Jocelyn and had secretly gone to the US with Jocelyn. 32

Malyn denied the allegation of adultery. She maintained that Benjie only booked a room at the Hyatt Hotel for her because she was so
drunk after partying with friends. She admitted finding her brother Ronald and Tyrone at the door of the Hyatt Hotel room, but
maintained being fully clothed at that time.33 Malyn insisted that she wrote the letter relinquishing all her spousal and parental rights
under duress.34

After the Hyatt Hotel incident, Malyn only saw her children by surreptitiously visiting them in school. She later obtained partial custody of
the children as an incident to the legal separation action filed by Tyrone against her (which action was subsequently dismissed for lack
of interest).

As an affirmative defense, Malyn maintained that it was Tyrone who was suffering from psychological incapacity, as manifested by his
drug dependence, habitual drinking, womanizing, and physical violence. 35 Malyn presented Dr. Dayan a clinical psychologist, as her
expert witness.

Dr. Dayan interviewed Tyrone, Malyn, Miggy/Mickey, Jay, and Ria for her psychological evaluation of the spouses. The factual
narrations culled from these interviews reveal that Tyrone found Malyn a "lousy" mother because of her mahjong habit, 36 while Malyn
was fed up with Tyrone’s sexual infidelity, drug habit, and physical abuse.37 Dr. Dayan determined that both Tyrone and Malyn were
behaviorally immature. They encountered problems because of their personality differences, which ultimately led to the demise of their
marriage. Her diagnostic impressions are summarized below:

The marriage of Tyrone and Malyn was a mistake from the very beginning. Both of them were not truly ready for marriage even after
two years of living together and having a child. When Malyn first met Tyrone who showered her with gifts, flowers, and affection she
resisted his overtures. She made it clear that she could ‘take him or leave him.’ But the minute she started to care, she became a
different person – clingy and immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in
his life. She became relationship-dependent. It appears that her style then was when she begins to care for a man, she puts all her
energy into him and loses focus on herself. This imbalance between thinking and feeling was overwhelming to Tyrone who admitted
that the thought of commitment scared him. Tyrone admitted that when he was in his younger years, he was often out seeking other
women. His interest in them was not necessarily for sex, just for fun – dancing, drinking, or simply flirting.

Both of them seem behaviorally immature. For some time, Malyn adapted to her husband who was a moody man with short temper and
unresolved issues with parents and siblings. He was a distancer, concerned more about his work and friends tha[n] he was about
spending time with his family. Because of Malyn’s and Tyrone’s backgrounds (both came from families with high conflicts) they
experienced turmoil and chaos in their marriage. The conflicts they had struggled to avoid suddenly galloped out of control Their
individual personalities broke through, precipitating the demise of their marriage. 38

Dr. Dayan likewise wrote in her psychological evaluation report that Malyn exhibited significant, but not severe, dependency,
narcissism, and compulsiveness.39

On the stand, the psychologist elaborated that while Malyn had relationship problems with Tyrone, she appeared to have a good
relationship with her kids.40 As for Tyrone, he has commitment issues which prevent him from committing himself to his duties as a
husband. He is unable to remain faithful to Malyn and is psychologically incapacitated to perform this duty.41

Children’s version

The children all stated that both their parents took care of them, provided for their needs, and loved them. Rio testified that they would
accompany their mother to White Plains on days that she played mahjong with her friends. None of them reported being neglected or
feeling abandoned.

The two elder kids remembered the fights between their parents but it was only Ria who admitted actually witnessing physical abuse
inflicted on her mother.42 The two elder kids also recalled that, after the separation, their mother would visit them only in school.43

The children recalled living in Valle Verde with only the househelp and driver during the time that their dad was abroad. 44 While they did
not live with their mother while they were housed in Valle Verde, the kids were in agreement that their mother took care of them on
weekends and would see to their needs. They had a common recollection that the househelp would call their mother to come and take
care of them in Valle Verde whenever any of them was sick. 45

Other witnesses

Dr. Cornelio Banaag, Tyrone’s attending psychiatrist at the Manila Sanitarium, testified that, for the duration of Tyrone’s confinement,
the couple appeared happy and the wife was commendable for the support she gave to her spouse. 46 He likewise testified that Tyrone
tested negative for drugs and was not a drug dependent. 47

Malyn’s brother, Ronald Fernandez, confirmed Tyrone’s allegation that they found Malyn with Benjie in the Hyatt hotel room. Contrary
to Tyrone’s version, he testified that neither he nor Tyrone entered the room, but stayed in the hallway. He likewise did not recall seeing
Benjie or Malyn half-naked.48

Tyrone then presented Mario Calma (Mario), who was allegedly part of Malyn’s group of friends. He stated on the stand that they would
go on nights-out as a group and Malyn would meet with a male musician-friend afterwards.49

Social worker

The trial court ordered the court social worker, Jocelyn V. Arre (Arre), to conduct a social case study on the parties as well as the minor
children. Arre interviewed the parties Tyrone and Malyn; the minor children Miggy/Mickey and Jay; Tyrone’s live-in partner,
Jocelyn;50 and Tyrone and Malyn’s only daughter, Ria. While both parents are financially stable and have positive relationships with
their children, she recommended that the custody of the minor children be awarded to Malyn. Based on the interviews of family
members themselves, Malyn was shown to be more available to the children and to exercise better supervision and care. The social
worker commended the fact that even after Malyn left the conjugal home in 1985, she made efforts to visit her children clandestinely in
their respective schools. And while she was only granted weekend custody of the children, it appeared that she made efforts to
personally attend to their needs and to devote time with them.51

On the contrary, Tyrone, who had custody of the children since the couple’s de facto separation, simply left the children for several
years with only a maid and a driver to care for them while he lived with his second family abroad. 52 The social worker found that Tyrone
tended to prioritize his second family to the detriment of his children with Malyn. Given this history during the formative years of the
children, the social worker did not find Tyrone a reliable parent to whom custody of adolescents may be awarded.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court53

After summarizing the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court concluded that both parties are psychologically incapacitated
to perform the essential marital obligations under the Family Code. The court’s Decision is encapsulated in this paragraph:

From the evidence, it appears that parties are both suffering from psychological incapacity to perform their essential marital obligations
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The parties entered into a marriage without as much as understanding what it entails. They failed
to commit themselves to its essential obligations: the conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the
procreation and education of their children to become responsible individuals. Parties’ psychological incapacity is grave, and serious
such that both are incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage. The incapacity has been clinically established and
was found to be pervasive, grave and incurable. 54

The trial court then declared the parties’ marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. 55

Ruling of the Court of Appeals56

Malyn appealed the trial court’s Decision to the CA.1âwphi1 The CA reversed the trial court’s ruling because it is not supported by the
facts on record. Both parties’ allegations and incriminations against each other do not support a finding of psychological incapacity. The
parties’ faults tend only to picture their immaturity and irresponsibility in performing their marital and familial obligations. At most, there
may be sufficient grounds for a legal separation. 57Moreover, the psychological report submitted by petitioner’s expert witness, Dr.
Gates, does not explain how the diagnosis of NPD came to be drawn from the sources. It failed to satisfy the legal and jurisprudential
requirements for the declaration of nullity of marriage.58

Tyrone filed a motion for reconsideration59 but the same was denied on December 15, 2004.60

Petitioner’s arguments

Petitioner Tyrone argues that the CA erred in disregarding the factual findings of the trial court, which is the court that is in the best
position to appreciate the evidence. He opines that he has presented preponderant evidence to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations, to wit:

a) the expert witnesses, Dr. Gates and Fr. Healy, proved on the stand that respondent’s egocentric attitude, immaturity, self-obsession
and self-centeredness were manifestations of respondent’s NPD;61

b) these expert witnesses proved that respondent’s NPD is grave and incurable and prevents her from performing her essential martial
obligations;62 and

c) that respondent’s NPD existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage because it is rooted in her upbringing, family
background, and socialite lifestyle prior to her marriage. 63

Petitioner stresses that even respondent insisted that their marriage is void because of psychological incapacity, albeit on petitioner’s
part.64

Respondent’s arguments

Respondent maintains that Tyrone failed to discharge his burden of proving her alleged psychological incapacity. 65She argues that the
testimonies of her children and the findings of the court social worker to the effect that she was a good, loving, and attentive mother are
sufficient to rebut Tyrone’s allegation that she was negligent and irresponsible.66

She assails Dr. Gates’s report as one-sided and lacking in depth. Dr. Gates did not interview her, their common children, or even
Jocelyn. Moreover, her report failed to state that Malyn’s alleged psychological incapacity was grave and incurable. 67 Fr. Healy’s
testimony, on the other hand, was based only on Tyrone’s version of the facts.68

Malyn reiterates the appellate court’s ruling that the trial court Decision is intrinsically defective for failing to support its conclusion of
psychological incapacity with factual findings.

Almost four years after filing her memorandum, respondent apparently had a change of heart and filed a Manifestation with Motion for
Leave to Withdraw Comment and Memorandum.69 She manifested that she was no longer disputing the possibility that their marriage
may really be void on the basis of Tyrone’s psychological incapacity. She then asked the Court to dispose of the case with justice.70 Her
manifestation and motion were noted by the Court in its January 20, 2010 Resolution. 71

Issue

Whether petitioner has sufficiently proved that respondent suffers from psychological incapacity

Our Ruling

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court’s Decision for lack of legal and factual
basis.

A petition for declaration of nullity of marriage is governed by Article 36 of the Family Code which provides:

ART. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.

Psychological incapacity is the downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations. 72 The
burden of proving psychological incapacity is on the plaintiff.73 The plaintiff must prove that the incapacitated party, based on his or her
actions or behavior, suffers a serious psychological disorder that completely disables him or her from understanding and discharging
the essential obligations of the marital state. The psychological problem must be grave, must have existed at the time of marriage, and
must be incurable.74

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the
testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of
these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s
experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with
friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly
to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the
form of NPD.

But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually
proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent
admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother
and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to
three times a week and always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children
corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not present
any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he
intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The
least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children
were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating
frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.

Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and
obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent
partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that
respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming
arguendo that petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual
infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal
separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no
basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite
conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and
performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary,
they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent
made real efforts to see and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever
that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the
second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic shortcomings to Malyn’s actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no
error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely summarized
the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the
credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its
legal conclusion of psychological incapacity.

What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of
themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity
that voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004
Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015

VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

BERSAMIN, J.:

In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,1 the Court dismissed the complaint for declaration of nullity of the marriage of the
parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:

The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court's Decision for lack of legal and factual
basis.

xxxx

In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological incapacity. He presented the
testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of
these witnesses were premised on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s
experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to the beauty parlor, going out with
friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly
to the detriment of quality and quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the
form of NPD.

But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of his experts, were not actually
proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these allegations of the petitioner.

For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their children as a result. Respondent
admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother
and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to
three times a week and always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The children
corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she played mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not present
any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he
intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-playing. The
least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children
were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating
frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.

Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor, going out with friends, and
obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons orher frequent
partying with friends. Petitioner presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that
respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be dating other men. Even assuming
arguendothat petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual
infidelity cannot, by itself, be equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per seis a ground for legal
separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.

Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as constitutive of NPD, there is no
basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite
conclusion. A fair assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of appreciating and
performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they were neglected by their mother. On the contrary,
they narrated that she took care of them, was around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent
made real efforts tosee and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no testimony whatsoever
that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the
second elementary level despite having tutors, there is nothing to link their academic short comings to Malyn’s actions.

After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of psychological incapacity. There is no
error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there was psychological incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely summarized
the allegations, testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of these allegations, the
credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its
legal conclusionof psychological incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have constrained them from dedicating the best of
themselves to each other and to their children. There may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity
that voids a marriage.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004 Decision and its December 15, 2004
Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.2

In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second look into what constitutes psychological
incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported by the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find
that the respondent, if not both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to perform their respective essential marital obligation.

Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the term
psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code
Revision Committee that had drafted the Family Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the
Family Code Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the provision "with less
specificity than expected" in order to have the law "allow some resiliency in its application." 4 Illustrative of the "less specificity than
expected" has been the omission by the Family Code Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would
have limited the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the Committee desired that the
courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and the decisions of church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been
taken from the Canon Law.5

On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals, 6 the deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee
and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious that the term
psychological incapacity as used in Article 36 of the Family Code"has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity, and like circumstances,"
and could not be taken and construed independently of "but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage."
Thus correlated:-

x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so
expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological
incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does not
evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is implicit
under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to
be "legitimate."7

In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some guidelines for the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code, as follows:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family,
recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the
whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological — not physical, althoughits manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations
he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must
be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness
was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity
must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature."

Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — whatis decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.9

The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance practically condemned the petitions for
declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article 36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and
applied given the clear intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some resiliency
in its application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations, but according to its own facts" in recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the
field of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court." 10

In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage, the courts, which are
concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology, must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform
themselves on the matter, and thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for the
malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.11

II

The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a party’s psychological incapacity should be final
and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly
and manifestly erroneous.12 In every situation where the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the facts and evidence
presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from substituting its own judgment. 13 It is not enough reason to ignore
the findings and evaluation by the trial court and substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the
Family Code regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the constitutional mandate for
the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution14 only relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accordedto a
marriage that is null and void ab initio, because such a marriage has no legal existence.15

In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend and promote the sanctity of marriage as
an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is thereby made all the more strong and solid.

Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position to view and
examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. 16 The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the
evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates,a psychologist, and Fr.
Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely based on the petitioner’s version of the events.

After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert opinions a merely generalized
consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage.
Instead, we hold that said experts sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the
standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses because they were largely
drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the
petitioner’s factual premises.17

Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioner’s testimony, as well as on her interviews of the petitioner, his
sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to
disregard the findings on that basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into consideration other factors extant in the records,
including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the issue from the side of the respondent herself. Moreover, it is already
settled that the courts must accord weight to expert testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the
declaration of the nullityof marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, "despite having the primary task
and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the
psychological and mental temperaments of the parties." 18

The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly determine the issue of
psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the petitioner). Consequently, the lack of personal examination and interview of
the person diagnosed with personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the experts. The Court has
stressed in Marcos v. Marcos19 that there is no requirement for one to bedeclared psychologically incapacitated to be personally
examined by a physician, because what is important is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological
incapacity. Hence, "if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to." 20

Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the
psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts
existed in the record, the expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other evidence
on the causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be considered as conjectural or speculative and
without any probative value only in the absence of other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such
circumstances would not constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence. 22 This is so, considering that any ruling that
brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias should be eschewed if it was clear that her
psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties’ upbringing and psychodynamics. 23 In that context, Dr. Gates’ expertopinion
should be considered not in isolation but along with the other evidence presented here.

Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was expectedto compare the expert findings and
opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondent’s own witness, and those of Dr. Gates.

In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had "compulsive and dependent tendencies" to the
extent of being "relationship dependent." Based from the respondent’s psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:

In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in her ways. Although she likes to be around
people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of her affections.
Intimacy may be quite difficult for her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to minimize opportunities for rejection. To others,
Malyne may appear, critical and demanding in her ways. She can be assertive when opinions contrary to those of her own are
expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a dependent person. At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that others will abandon her. Malyne,
who always felt a bit lonely, placed an enormous value on having significant others would depend on most times.

xxxx

But the minute she started to care, she became a different person— clingy and immature, doubting his love, constantly demanding
reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She became relationship-dependent.25

Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory test 26 conducted on the respondent,
observing that the respondent obtained high scores on dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness, to wit:

Atty. Bretania

Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?

A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round and there are several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw
obtained very high score and these are on the score of dependency, narcissism and compulsion.

Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?

A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it will be considered as acceptable.

Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?

A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is 84.27

It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to the effect that the respondent had
been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as with AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly testified:

ATTY. GONONG

Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology terms. So, more or less, could you please tell
me in more layman’s terms how you arrived at your findings that the respondent is self-centered or narcissistic?

A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood background, her fatherdied in a vehicular accident
when she was in her teens and thereafter she was prompted to look for a job to partly assume the breadwinner’s role in her family. I
gathered that paternal grandmother partly took care of her and her siblings against the fact that her own mother was unable to carry out
her respective duties and responsibilities towards Elena Fernandez and her siblings considering that the husband died prematurely.
And there was an indication that Elena Fernandez on several occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot blame her for being
negligent as a mother because she herself never experienced the care and affection of her own mother herself. So, there is a
precedent in her background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate a particular script, we call it in psychology a script, the
tendency to repeat somekind of experience or the lack of care, let’s say some kind of deprivation, there is a tendency to sustain it even
on to your own life when you have your own family. I did interview the son because I was not satisfied with what I gathered from both
Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a young son at the age of fourteen already expressed the he could not see, according to the
child, the sincerity of maternal care on the part of Elena and that he preferred to live with the father actually.

Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is self-centered and narcissistic?

A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and she is still insearch of this. In her several
boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend to another. There is this need for attention, this need for love on other
people.

Q : And that led you to conclude?

A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting her duty as a wife and as a mother.28

The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance
that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her
conclusion is founded.29 Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value of the findings of the expert witnesses vis-à-vis the
other evidence available.

The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the Manila Archdiocese and Matrimonial
Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee. Regarding Father Healy’s expert testimony, we have once declared
that judicial understanding of psychological incapacity could be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of
each case, by current trends in psychological and even by canonical thought, and by experience. 30 It is prudent for us to do so because
the concept of psychological incapacity adopted under Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon Law.

Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondent’s level of immaturity and irresponsibility with regard to her own
children and to her husband constituted psychological incapacity, testifying thusly:

ATTY. MADRID

Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not psychologically incapacitated. On the facts as you read it based on
the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what can you say to that claim of respondent?

A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her immaturity and traumatic irresponsibility with regards to her
own children.

Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not psychologically incapacitated is not true?

A : Yes. It should be rejected.

Q : Why do you say so?

A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been manifested running through their life made
a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility because her family was dysfunctional and then her being a model in her early life and
being the bread winner of the family put her in an unusual position of prominence and then begun to inflate her own ego and she begun
to concentrate her own beauty and that became an obsession and that led to her few responsibility of subordinating to her children to
this lifestyle that she had embraced.

Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about the impact on the relationship of the respondent with
her husband?
A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her husband and toher children. She had her own
priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and associating with friends. They were the priorities of her life.

Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?

A : Secondary.

Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?

A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage which everybody takes for granted. The concentration
on the husband and the children before everything else would be subordinated to the marriage withher. It’s the other way around.

Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in her life.

Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?

A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in Roman history.

Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?

A : It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear friend as in the case of Narcissus, the myth, and then that
became known in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and
protecting it, then it becomes the top priority in her life.

xxxx

Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you consider this narcissism afflicting respondent, it is grave,
slight or ….?

A : I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that causes serious obligations which she has ignored and
not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.

Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting respondent was already existing at the time or marriage or even
thereafter?

xxxx

A : When you get married you don’t develop narcissism or psychological incapacity. You bring with you into the marriage and then it
becomes manifested because in marriage you accept these responsibilities. And now you show that you don’t accept them and you are
not capable of fulfilling them and you don’t care about them.

Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?

A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family was depended [sic] upon her and she was a model at
Hyatt and then Rustan’s, it began to inflate her ego so much that this became the top priority in her life. It’s her lifestyle.

Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after the marriage?

A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage because she was neglecting such fundamental
obligations.

Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable, this narcissism that you mentioned?

A : Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her family background situation. Say, almost for sure would
be incurable now.

Q : What specific background are you referring to?

A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her beauty was so important to give in her job and money and
influence and so on. But this is a very unusual situation for a young girl and her position in the family was exalted in a very very unusual
manner and therefore she had that pressure on her and in her accepting the pressure, in going along with it and putting it in top
priority.31

Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healy’s opinions and findings commanded respect. The
contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the judicial determination of the parties’ psychological incapacity was
substantive and instructive. He could thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady that would warrant the nullity of
marriage, and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court an analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric to the courts as
psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly disregard his opinions and findings. Appreciating them together with those of Dr.
Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more the cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:32
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead,
must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.

Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:

Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became increasingly important in such cases.
Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked togive
professional opinions about a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to
be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.

The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition of new grounds for annulment, but
rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the
expertise to provide the all-important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.

During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to that of a covenant. The result of this
was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage
could necessarily give valid consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitmentare now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.

Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to sexual anomalies but to all kinds
ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage.
For marriage . . . is not merely cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for hetero sexual acts, but is, in its totality
the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have
refined the meaning of psychological or psychic capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as
meaning the capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct person; that the spouses
must be `other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity
for interpersonal relationship because marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations ofmarriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of this interpersonal relationship. A
serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the
essential marital obligations. The marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.

Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital relationship:

"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage
partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with
the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc."

Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure of a marriage:

"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best intentions of the parties. Among the
psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its
fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual
choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of reasonable expectations.

xxxx

The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a case for an annulment on any other
terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.

As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the
parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating
on the parties' incapacity to assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised(lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was entered into civil divorce and breakup of
the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to carry out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was
entered into."

Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a party's
psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no
requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totalityof
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like,
between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-
depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.33

Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly applying the standards set in Molina, 34 the courts should
consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the provision should be interpreted, as so
intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:

xxxx

Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia of then Associate Justice (later
Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in the result" and another three--including, as aforesaid, Justice
Romero--took pains to compose their individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts. In the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own
judgment for that of the trial court."

Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid standards, without too much regard for the
law's clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as "courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided
by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."

In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of
psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds,
and was sensitive to the OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The unintended
consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic
personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far
fromwhat was intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it. Wittingly or
unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists
and the like, tocontinuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account
of the personality disorders of the said individuals.

The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there are ample safeguards against this
contingency, among which is the intervention by the State, through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties
and/or fabrication of evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse, child abuse,
domestic violence and incestuous rape.

In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court isnot demolishing the foundation of families,
but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who
cannot comply with or assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that the infliction
of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psycho sexual anomaly are manifestations
of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let itbe noted that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is
void from the very beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a decent burial to a
stillborn marriage.

xxxx

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply declare that, as aptly stated by
Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition
of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own facts. And, to repeat
for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals. 35

III

In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:

Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties
as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was
only two to three times a week and always withthe permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home. The
children corroborated this, saying that theywere with their mother when she played mahjong in their relatives home.Petitioner did not
present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family.
While he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s mahjong-
playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these
two children were in second grade. This was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged
debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven. 36 (Emphasis supplied)

The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of the presence or absence of
psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of
parenthood at the time she made her marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known
that bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other
vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted on her family life, particularly on her
very young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw 37– the parties’ eldest son – in his
deposition, whereby the son confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had been hooked on playing mahjong, viz:

ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parent’s separation, do you remember any habit or activity or practice which your mother
engaged in, before the separation?

WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I can’t remember.

xxxx

ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do you remember?

WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I can’t, I can’t…

ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?

WITNESS : Really long cuz’we would go to my aunt’s house in White Plains and I think we would get there by lunch then leave, we fall
asleep. I think it was like one in the morning. ATTY. PISON: You, you went there? She brought you?

WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.

ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?

WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess she’d go out by herself.38

The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to her neglect of parental duties,
but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling
on every occasion of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was the observation of Father Healy himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and
Dr. Dayan both explained that the current psychological state of the respondent had been rooted on her own childhood experience.

The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development. This disregard violated her duty as a
parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:

Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their unemancipated children, parental
authority and responsibility shall includethe caring for and rearing of such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the
development of their moral, mental and physical character and well-being.

Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated children or wards the
following rights and duties:

(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for their
upbringing in keeping with their means;

(2) x x x x

(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and
thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;

(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;

(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with others,
protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;

(6) x x x x

(7) x x x x

(8) x x x x

(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)

The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC to the effect that both the petitioner
and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated, and thus could not assume the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC
would not have found so without the allegation to that effect by the respondent in her answer, 39 whereby she averred that it was not she
but the petitioner who had suffered from psychological incapacity.

The allegation of the petitioner’spsychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:
ATTY. BRETAÑA:

Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?

A : Yes, sir.

Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally immature?

A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already some of those short temper of the petitioner but she
was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and even the time that they were together, that they were living in, she also had
noticed some of his psychological deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because she is also dependent and she was one who
determined to make the relationship work, she was denying even those kinds of problems that she had seen.

Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to conclude that Mr. Kalaw was
behaviorally immature?

A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable then. He was not really thinking of marriage except that
his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he had to marry her. And even that time he was not also a monogamous person.

Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on the petitioner? A : I think so, Sir.

Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to you that in his younger years he was often
out seeking other women. I’m referring specifically to page 18. He also admitted to you that the thought of commitment scared him, the
petitioner. Now, given these admissions by petitioner to you, my questions is, is it possible for such a person to enter into marriage
despite this fear of commitment and given his admission that he was a womanizer? Is it possible for this person to stop his womanizing
ways during the marriage?

A : Sir, it’s difficult.

Q : It would be difficult for that person?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?

A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.

Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage with the respondent?

A : Yes, Sir.

Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar as his psychological capacity to perform his duties
as a husband is concerned?

A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully committed to the role of husband to Malyn.

Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the petitioner was psychologically incapacitated to perform
his duty as a husband. You only said that the petitioner was behaviorally immature and that the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I
asked [sic] you that question again and request you to answer that directly?

A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40

Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the respondent, as the defendant spouse,
could establish the psychological incapacity of her husband because she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are justified in
declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who
imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological
incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage
has to be deemed null and void.

More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must have already accepted and come to terms
with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in the eyes of the law, was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted
so much damage not only to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater injustice should we
insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and then force them and their children to endure some more damage. This was the very
same injustice that Justice Romero decried in her erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals: 41
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive interpretation of the law and compel the
petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to
exist.

Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today.1âwphi1 It is not, in effect, directly or
indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman
or women with emerging problems of illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the
companionship and conjugal love which he has sought from her and towhich he is legally entitled?

I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but I submit that we should not
constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by
declaring his marriage a nullity by reason of his wife’s psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation. In this case,
the marriage never existed from the beginning because the respondent was afflicted with psychological incapacity at and prior to the
time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should not hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage between the parties.

To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our society does not preclude striking down a
marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life," thus:

Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying
petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state that "[t]he State
recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the
State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the institution of marriage.

But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a social institution and the foundation of
the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities
to protect it, based on whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that such legislative
enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the case, it also falls on the legislature to put into
operation the constitutional provisions that protect marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the
enactment of the Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the
limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal separation.
While it may appear that the judicial denial of a petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect
marriage, such action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained decree of what marriage
is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into
account in resolving a petition for declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection of marriage. Given
the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation,
there is a corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages
under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons
who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.42 (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on
September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the
petitioner and the respondent on November 4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties
pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those enumerated in the Civil Code) to
assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been
swamped with various petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted the
meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals, still many judges and lawyers find
difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless expressive of
his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the
present case, finds the need to lay down specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code.

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993 Decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991 decision of the Regional Trial Court of La
Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the
ground of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.

The Facts

This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at
the San Agustin Church4 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
"immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time with his peers and friends on whom
he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their
finances, resulting in frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job in Manila, and
since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result
of which their relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents
in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them; that Reynaldo had
thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential marital obligations and was a highly immature and
habitually quarrel some individual who thought of himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to
have their marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.

In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her
group of friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and (3)
Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.

During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:

1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St. Augustine, Manila;

2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born on July 29, 1986;

3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;

4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.

Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora
Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and
Medical Center. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of petitioner was denied by the Court of
Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the present recourse.

The Issue

In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and incorrect interpretation of the phrase
'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the
case," adding that the appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world which is
anathema to our culture."

In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial court's findings "that the marriage between
the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code
Revision Committee (hereinafter referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and family
rights. . . ." It concluded that:

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad range of mental and behavioral conduct on the
part of one spouse indicative of how he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other spouse, as well
as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and
considered as a whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very objectives of marriage, then there is
enough reason to leave the spouses to their individual fates.

In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We
find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and conclusions thus made.

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity,
explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in
their psychological nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that "psychological incapacity should
refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that (t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been
to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage
is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of
Manila,7Justice Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability."

On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect spoken of is an incapacity. It
appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere
showing of "irreconciliable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not enough to
prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor physical) illness.

The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along with each other. There had been
no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed
no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8

COURT

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q There is no hope for the marriage?

A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.

Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit with other
parties?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?

A Yes, Your Honor.

The Court has no more questions.

In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of psychological incapacity existing at
the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of
"thoughtfulness and gentleness" on Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's temporary blindness to the faults
and blemishes of the beloved.

During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-vis existing law and jurisprudence.
In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the
Court decided to invite two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the National
Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code
Revision Committee. The Court takes this occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions
during the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.

From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the
Family Code are hereby handed down for the guidance of the bench and the bar:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and
our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.

The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes the permanence,
inviolability and solidarity

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must
be psychological — not physical. although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court
that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he
was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given
here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and
clinical psychologists.

(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but
the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity
must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of
marriage.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to
causes of psychological nature. 14

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it
stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal.
Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious
interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from
each other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court.
The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such ruling becomes even more cogent
with the use of the foregoing guidelines.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to
Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.

SO ORDERED.
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 203284 November 14, 2016

NICOLAS S. MATUDAN, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARILYN** B. MATUDAN, Respondents.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1seeks to set aside the January 31, 2012 Decision 2 and August 23, 2012 Resolution3 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) denying the Petition in CA·G.R. CV No. 95392 and the Motion for Reconsideration, 4 thus affirming the December 18,
2009 Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827.

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Nicolas S, Matudan (petitioner) and respondent Marilyn B. Matudan (Marilyn) were married in Laoang, Northern Samar on
October 26, 1976. They had four children.

In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad. From then on, petitioner and the children lost contact with her; she had not been seen nor heard
from again.

Twenty-three years later, or on June 20, 2008, petitioner filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, 6docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-08-62827 with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 94. Petitioner alleged that before, during, and after his marriage to Marilyn, the
latter was psychologically incapable of fulfilling her obligations as a wife and mother; that she consistently neglected and failed to
provide petitioner and her children with the necessary emotional and financial care, support, and sustenance, and even so after leaving
for work abroad; that based on expert evaluation conducted by Clinical Psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), Marilyn's psychological
incapacity is grave, permanent, and incurable; that petitioner's consent to the marriage was obtained by Marilyn through
misrepresentation as she concealed her condition from him; and that Marilyn is "not ready for a lasting and pennanent commitment like
marriage"7 as she "never (gave) him and their children financial and emotional support x x x and for being selfish through their six (6)
years of cohabitation;"8 that Marilyn became "so despicably irresponsible as she has not shown love and care upon her husband, x x x
and that she cannot properly and morally take on the responsibility of a loving and caring wife x x x." 9

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the Petition.

The Quezon City Office of the City Prosecutor having determined that there is no collusion between the parties, proceedings were
conducted in due course. However, trial proceeded in Marilyn's absence.

Apart from the testimonies of the petitioner, his daughter Maricel B. Matudan (Maricel), and Dr. Tayag, the following documents were
submitted in evidence:

1. Petitioner's Judicial Affidavit10 (Exhibit "A") which was adopted as his testimony on direct examination;

2. The Judicial Aftidavit11 of Maricel (Exhibit "D"), which was adopted as part of her testimony on direct examination;

3. The Sworn Affidavit12 of Dr. Tayag (Exhibit "B"), which was considered part of her testimony on direct examination;

4. Dr. Tayag's evaluation report entitled "A Report on the Psychological Condition of NICOLAS T. MATUDAN, the petitioner for Nullity
of Marriage against respondent MARILYN BORJA-MATUDAN''13(Exhibit "C"); and

5. Other relevant evidence, such as petitioner's marriage contract/certificate and respective birth certificates of his children, and a
Letter/Notice, with Registry Return Receipt, sent by Dr. Tayag to Marilyn requesting evaluation/interview relative to petitioner's desire to
file a petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage (Exhibits "E" to "G").

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On December 18, 2009, the RTC issued its Decision 14 dismissing the Petition in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 on the ground that
petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity. It held, thus:

Petitioner, his daughter Maricel Matudan and psychologist Nedy L. Tayag testified. Petitioner offered in evidence Exhibits "A" to ''G"
which were admitted by the Court.
The State and the respondent did not present any evidence.

From the testimonial and documentary evidence of the petitioner, the Court gathered the following:

Petitioner and respondent were roamed on October 26, 1976 x x x. They begot four (4) children x x x. Petitioner and respondent lived
together with their children. On June 25, 1985, petitioner asked respondent [sic] for permission to work and left the conjugal dwelling.
Since then she was never heard of [sic]. Respondent never communicated with the petitioner and her children. Petitioner inquired from
the relatives of the respondent but they did not tell him her whereabouts.

In his Affidavit which was considered as his direct testimony, petitioner claimed that respondent failed to perform her duties as a wife to
him. Respondent never gave petitioner and their children financial and emotional support, love and care during their cohabitation. She
was irresponsible, immature and exhibited irrational behavior towards petitioner and their children. She was self-centered, had no
remorse and involved herself in activities defying social and moral ethics.

On cross-examination, petitioner testified that he and the respondent had a happy married life and they never had a fight. The only
reason why he filed this case was because respondent abandoned him and their children.

Maricel Matudan was only two (2) years old when respondent left them. She corroborated the testimony of the petitioner that since
respondent left the conjugal dwelling she never provided financial support to the family and never communicated with them.

Nedy L. Tayag, Psychologist, testified on the 'Report on the Psychological Condition of Nicolas Matudan' which she prepared (Exhibit
"C''). She subjected petitioner to psychological test and interview. She likewise interviewed Maricel Matudan. She came up with the
findings that petitioner is suffering from Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder and respondent has Narcissistic Personality Disorder
with Antisocial Traits. The features of petitioner's disorder are the following: negativistic attitude, passive resistance, lacks the ability to
assert his opinions and has great difficulty expressing his feelings.

The root cause of his personality condition can be attributed to his being an abandoned child. At a young age, his parents separated
and he was left in the custody of his paternal grandmother. He lacked a support system and felt rejected. He developed a strong need
for nurturance, love and attention and that he would do anything to attain such.

As for respondent, the manifestation of her disorder are as follows: Preoccupation with pursuing matters that would make her happy;
has a high sense of self-importance; wants to have her way and disregards her husband's opinions; lacks empathy; wants to have a
good life.

Her personality condition is rooted on her unhealthy familial environment. She came from an impoverished family. Her parents were
more pre-occupied with finding ways to make ends meet to such extent that they failed to give adequate attention and emotional
support to their children.

Ms. Tayag further testified that the psychological condition of the parties are grave and characterized by juridical antecedence as the
same already existed before they got married, their disorders having been in existence since their childhood years are permanent and
severe.

The sole issue to be resolved is whether x x x respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations under
Article 36 of the Family Code.

Article 36 of the Family Code as amended, states:

'A marriage contracted by any party who at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapicity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.'

Article 68 of the same Code provides:

'The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support.'

In the case of Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, January 4, 1995, G.R. No. 112019, the Honorable Supreme Court held:

'Justice Alicia Sempio Dy, in her commentaries on the Family Code cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso a former
Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila x x x, who opines that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it must be incurable or even if
it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.

For psychological incapacity however to be appreciated, the same must be serious, grave and 'so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.' x x x.

In the case of Santos, it was also held that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.'
It must be emphasized that the cause of action of petitioner is the alleged psychological incapacity of the respondent. During the pre-
trial, the sole issue raised is whether or not respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital obligations under Article
36 of the Family Code. The alleged personality disorder of the petitioner is clearly not an issue in this case.

Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds that the totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner has not established the requisites
of gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. Again, it must be emphasized that this petition was filed on the ground of the
psychological incapacity of respondent and not the petitioner.

Respondent is said to be suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder with antisocial traits. The salient features of her disorder were
enumerated by Nedy Tayag in her report as follows: pre-occupation with pursuing matters that would make her happy; has a high
sense of self-importance; wants to have her way and disregards her husband's opinions; lacks empathy; wants to have a good life. Her
personality disorder is considered permanent, grave and incurable. It has its root cause in her unhealthy familial environment during her
early developmental years.

In petitions for declaration of marriage (sic), the testimony of the petitioner as to the physical manifestation of the psychological
incapacity is of utmost importance. Unfortunately, petitioner's testimony particularly his affidavit which was considered as his direct
examination contained only general statements on the supposed manifestations of respondent's incapacity. Respondent was described
therein as irresponsible, immature, self -centered, lacks remorse, got involved with activities defying social and moral ethics. Petitioner
however miserably failed to expound on these allegations. In fact during his cross-examination, he even contradicted the allegations in
his petition and affidavit. He clearly stated that he had a happy marital relationship with the respondent and never had a fight with her
(TSN, December 5, 2008, page 8).

Petitioner harped on the abandonment of respondent. He even admitted that this the [sic] only reason why he wants their marriage
dissolved (TSN, December 5, 2008, page 9). Abandonment of spouse however is not psychological incapacity. It is only a ground for
legal separation.

Petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage are sui generis, the allegations therein must be supported by clear and convincing
evidence that would warrant the dissolution of the marriage bond. Absent such proof, the Court will uphold the validity of the marriage
for 'the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bond.' (Sevilla v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006).

In a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage is on the petitioner.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.

SO ORDERED.15

Petitioner moved to reconsider, 16 but in a May 12, 2010 Order,17 the RTC held its ground reiterating its pronouncement that petitioner
failed to demonstrate Marilyn's psychological incapacity, and that the petition is anchored merely on Marilyn's abandonment of the
marriage and family, which by itself is not equivalent to psychological incapacity.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-G.R CV No. 95392. However, in its assailed January 31, 2012 Decision, the
CA instead affirmed the RTC judgment, declaring thus:

Petitioner-appellant asserts that the ETC should not have denied the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to Marilyn x x x.
He maintains that, contrary to the conclusion reached by the trial court, he was able to establish by the quantum of evidence required,
the claimed psychological incapacity of his wife.

The argument of Nicolas R. Matudan fails to persuade Us.

Verily, instead or substantiating the alleged psychological incapacity his wife, petitioner-appellant revealed during his cross examination
that it was actually his wife's act of abandoning the family that led him to seek the nullification of their marriage. In fact, during his cross-
examination, he readily admitted that they were happily married and that they never engaged in bickering with each other.

xxxx

Q: But how would you describe your marital relations [sic]? Were there moments that you were happy with your wife?

A: Yes, ma' am, that is why we begot four children.

COURT

And so, you so you [sic] had a happy married life then?

FISCAL

I would presume that you had a happy married life, how come your wife just left you like that? Do you have any idea why your wife just
left you like that?
A: She did not communicate with us to tell her whereabouts.

Q: Did you ever have a fight with your wife?

A: None, ma'am.

xxxx

COURT

All right, you stated in this Affidavit that you are filing this case for the declaration of nullity of marriage because of the psychological
incapacity of your wife, what do you mean by that?

WITNESS

'Pinabayaan lang kmning pamilya niya, hindi naman niya sinasabi kung saan siya hahanapin.' She did not inform us of her
whereabouts.

COURT

Is that the only reason why you want your marriage with her dissolved?

WITNESS

Yes, your honor.

As correctly observed by the RTC, abandonment by a spouse, by itself, however, does not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that such abandonment is a manifestation of a disordered personality
which makes the spouse concerned completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state.

Indeed, the term 'psychological incapacity' to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. Psychological incapacity must refer to no less
than a mental not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must
be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage.

In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Rorodel Glaviano Molina, the following definitive guidelines were laid down in resolving petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage, based on Article 36 of the Family Code:

(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff: Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.

(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.

(3) Tue incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the marriage,

(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage.

(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and
wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children.

(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or
decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.

These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements established in Santos v. Court of Appeals that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. These requisites must be strictly complied with, as the grant
of a petition for nu1lity of marriage based on psychological incapacity must be confined only to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.

Using the above standards, We find the totality of the petitioner-appellant's evidence insufficient to prove that the respondent-appellee
is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of her as a wife.

Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment and finding of the clinical psychologist cannot be relied upon to
substantiate the petitioner-appellant's theory of the psychological incapacity of his wife.
It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the proceedings below. The clinical psychologist's evaluation of the respondent-
appellee's condition was based mainly on the information supplied by her husband, the petitioner, and to some extent from their
daughter, Maricel. It is noteworthy, however, that Maricel was only around two (2) years of age at the time the respondent left and
therefore cannot be expected to know her mother well. Also, Maricel would not have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36
case because she could not have been there when the spouses were married and could not have been expected to know what was
happening between her parents until long after her birth. On the other hand; as the petitioning spouse, Nicolas' description of Marilyn's
nature would certainly be biased, and a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided description can hardly be considered as
credible. The ruling in Jocelyn Suazo v.Angelita Suazo, et al., is illuminating on this score:

We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion evidence - the psychologist's testimony and the
psychological evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist evaluated Angelito's
psychological condition only in an indirect manner - she derived all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias
for her cause cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon, the
court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set of
standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a
conclusive diagnosis of a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.

xxxx

From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist, using meager information coming from a directly interested party, could
not have secured a complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion or diagnosis of Angelita's
psychological condition. While the report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyn's psychological condition, this is not
true for Angelito's. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination
required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological report that the
Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that psychological incapacity exists.

In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward Rumbaua, it was similarly declared that '[t]o make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different
from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.'

At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical psychologist on the psychological condition of the respondent-appellee to be
insufficient to warrant the conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that prevented Marilyn from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. In said report, Dr. Tayag merely concluded that Marilyn suffers from Narcissistic Personality Disorder with
antisocial traits on the basis of what she perceives as manifestations of the same. The report neither explained the incapacitating
nature of the alleged disorder, nor showed that the respondent-appellee was really incapable of fulfilling her duties due to some
incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature.

xxxx

Dr. Tayag's testimony during her cross-examination as well as her statements in the Sworn Affidavit are no different.

When asked to explain the personality disorder of Marilyn, Dr. Tayag simply replied:

Q: On her case you assessed her as, likewise, suffering from a personality disorder characterized by Narcissistic Personality Disorder
with Anti-Social Trait. Will you please tell to the Court what do you mean by that personality disorder?

A: In layman's term, once you are being labeled as a narcissistic [sic], this is a person whose preoccupation are all toward his own self
satisfaction both materially or emotionally at the expense of somebody. They have what you called [sic] strong sense of entitlement
thinking that she can get away whatever [sic] she wants to in pursuit of her own satisfaction at the expense of somebody. And this is
what happened to the respondent. She gave more consideration to her own satisfaction material wise at the expense of social
embarrassment of the children because of what happened to her.

On the other hand, in her Sworn Affidavit, Dr. Tayag stated:

7. Without a doubt, Marilyn is suffering from a form of personality disorder that rooted [sic] the downfall of their marriage. As based on
the DSM-IV, respondent's behavioral disposition fits with individuals with NARCISSISTIC PERSONALITY DISORDER with Anti-social
traits, as characterized by her disregard for and violation of the rights of others as well as her failure to conform to social norms with
respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts that are clearly immoral and socially despised. Such is also
depicted through his [sic] deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying and conning methods she used upon others in order to achieve
personal profit or pleasure. In addition, her consistent irresponsibility, as indicated by her repeated failure to sustain consistent work
behavior or honor financial obligations and her lack of remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt,
mistreated, or stolen from another. x x x. And such condition is considered to [sic] grave, severe, long lasting and incurable by any
treatment available.

Accordingly, even if We assume that Marilyn is really afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits, in the
absence of any showing that the same actually incapacitated her from fulfilling her essential marital obligations, such disorder cannot
be a valid basis for declaring Nicolas' marriage to Marilyn as null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code. To be sure,
jurisprudence has declared that not every psychological illness/disorder/condition is a ground for declaring the marriage a nullity under
Article 36. '[T]he meaning of 'psychological incapacity' [is confined] to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.'
All told, We find that no reversible error was committed by the trial court in rendering its assailed Decision:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, in Civil
Case No. Q-08-62827, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.18 (Citations omitted)

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed August 23, 2012 Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Hence, the instant
Petition.

In a November 19, 2014 Resolution,19 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition.

Issue

Petitioner mainly questions the CA's appreciation of the case, insisting that he was able to prove Marilyn's psychological
incapacity.1âwphi1

Petitioner's Arguments

In his Petition and Reply,20 petitioner argues that contrary to the CA's findings, he was able to prove Marilyn's psychological incapacity
which is rooted in Dr. Tayag's diagnosis that she was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which existed even before their
marriage, and continued to subsist thereafter; that her illness is grave, serious, incurable, and permanent as to render her incapable of
assuming her marriage obligations; that the nullification of his marriage to Marilyn is not an affront to the institutions of marriage and
family, but will actually protect the sanctity thereof because in effect, it will discourage individuals with psychological disorders that
prevent them from assuming marital obligations from remaining in the sacred bond; 21 that the issue of whether psychological incapacity
exists as a ground to nullify one's marriage is a legal question; and that the totality of his evidence and Marilyn's failure to refute the
same despite due notice demonstrate that he is entitled to a declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity.

Respondent's Arguments

In its Comment22 praying for denial, the Republic argues that the Petition calls for an evaluation of facts, thus violating the rule that a
petition for review on certiorari should be confined to legal questions. Citing Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris,23which decrees as follows-

Tue issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more
than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not
the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination. It is a
well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save
for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary
to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts, which are unavailing in the instant case. (Citations omitted)

the State argues that the instant case should be dismissed instead.

The public respondent adds that allegations and proof of irresponsibility, immaturity, selfishness, indifference, and abandonment of the
family do not automatically justify a conclusion of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code; that the intent of the law
is to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders - existing at the time of the
marriage - clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage, and depriving the
spouse of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the marital bond he/she is about to assume; that petitioner failed to show how
each of Marilyn's claimed negative traits affected her ability to perform her essential marital obligations; that the supposed psychological
evaluation of Marilyn was in fact based on the one-sided, self-serving, and biased information supplied by petitioner and Maricel - which
renders the same unreliable and without credibility; that petitioner's real reason for seeking nullification is Marilyn's abandonment of the
family; and that all in all, petitioner failed to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability of Marilyn's claimed psychological
incapacity.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

The landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals24taught us that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. Thus, the incapacity "must be grave or serious such that the
party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating
the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise,
the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved." 25 In this connection, the burden of proving psychological incapacity is on
the petitioner, pursuant to Republic v. Court of Appeals,26or the Molina case.

The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the
psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the psychological incapacity based strictly
on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be established
by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the existence of the
psychological incapacity. 27
Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 on the ground that the totality of petitioner's
evidence failed to sufficiently prove that Marilyn was psychologically unfit to enter marriage - in short, while petitioner professed
psychological incapacity, he could not establish its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.

The Court agrees.

Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of his judicial affidavit and testimony; the judicial affidavits and testimonies of his daughter Maricel
and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's psychological evaluation report on the psychological condition both petitioner and Marilyn. The
supposed evaluation of Marilyn's psychological condition was based solely on petitioner's account, since Marilyn did not participate in
the proceedings.

Indeed, "[w]hat is important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the party's psychological condition." 28 "[T]he
complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the
celebration of the marriage."29 Petitioner's judicial affidavit and testimony during trial, however, fail to show gravity and juridical
antecedence. While he complained that Marilyn lacked a sense of guilt and was involved in "activities defying social and moral
ethics,"30 and that she was, among others, irrational, irresponsible, immature, and self-centered, he nonetheless failed to sufficiently
and particularly elaborate on these allegations, particularly the degree of Marilyn's claimed irresponsibility, immaturity, or selfishness.
This is compounded by the fact that petitioner contradicted his own claims by testifying that he and Marilyn were happily married and
never had a fight, which is why they begot four children; and the only reason for his filing Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 was Marilyn's
complete abandonment of the marriage and family when she left to work abroad.

'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less than a mental--
not merely physical - incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, among others, include
their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. 31

If any, petitioner's accusations against Marilyn are untrue, at the very least. At most, they fail to sufficiently establish the degree of
Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity.

On the other hand, Maricel cannot be of help either. She was only two years old when Marilyn left the family. Growing up, she may
have seen the effects of Marilyn's abandonment - such as the lack of emotional and financial support; but she could not have any idea
of her mother's claimed psychological incapacity, as well as the nature, history, and gravity thereof.

Just as well, Dr. Tayag's supposed expert findings regarding Marilyn's psychological condition were not based on actual tests or
interviews conducted upon Marilyn herself; they are based on the personal accounts of petitioner. This fact gave more significance and
importance to petitioner's other pieces of evidence, which could have compensated for the deficiency in the expert opinion which
resulted from its being based solely on petitioner's one-sided account. But since these other pieces of evidence could not be relied
upon, Dr. Tayag's testimony and report must fail as well. In one decided case with a similar factual backdrop and involving the very
same expert witness, this Court held:

It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each other for more or less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The foregoing
established fact shows that living together as spouses under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace's departure from their home in
2006 indicates either a refusal or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her obligation to live with her husband.

Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to present more
convincing evidence to prove the gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability of the former's condition. Glenn, however, failed in this
respect. Glenn's testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenn's statements
are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both referred to MaryGrace's traits and acts, which she exhibited during the
marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the antecedence of Mary Grace's alleged incapacity. Glenn even testified that, six months
before they got married, they saw each other almost everyday. Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring and well[-] educated person" in Mary
Grace.

Anent Dr. Tayag's assessment of Mary Grace's condition, the Court finds the same as unfounded. Rumbaua provides some guidelines
on how the courts should evaluate the testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for the declaration of nullity of
marriage, viz.:

We' cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about the respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the information
fed to her by only one side - the petitioner - whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While this circumstance alone does
not disqualify the psychologist for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions deserve the application of a more rigid and
stringent set of standards in the manner we discussed above. For, effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from the prism
of a third party account; she did not actually hear, see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have reacted and responded to
the doctor's probes.

Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to be a self-
centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who 'believes that the world revolves around him'; and who 'used love as a . . .
deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence [petitioner] extended towards him.' x x x
We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a psychological
incapacity existed that prevented the respondent from complying with the essential obligations of marriage. It failed to identify the root
cause of the respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it
explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his duties due to
some incapacity of a psychological, not physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr. Tayag's conclusion in her Report
--i.e., that the respondent suffered 'Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave
and incurable' -is an unfounded statement, not a necessary inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of the
respondent. While the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess her own
psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the respondent's condition. To make conclusions and
generalizations on the respondent's psychological condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different
from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence. 32

Finally, the identical rulings of the trial and appellate courts should be given due respect and finality. This Court is not a trier of facts.

The issue of whether or not psychological inq1pacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends crucially, more
than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not
the function of the Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual determination. It is a
well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save
for the most compelling and cogent reasons x x x.33

With the foregoing disquisition, there is no need to resolve the other issues raised. They have become irrelevant.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The January 31, 2012 Decision and August 23, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 95392 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.

TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled waters. Laws are seemingly
inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of the unseen hand of Him who created all things.

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
(Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision
of the trial court to respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision November 29, 1994
and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated February 14, 1995.

The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of Appeals 1 its decision are as follows:

From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:

Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . . Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their
Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")

After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they went and proceeded to the house of
defendant's mother.

There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their married life.

It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or having
sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep .
There was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on the second, third and fourth nights.

In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during their first week as husband and wife, they
went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the
defendant to join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no sexual intercourse between
them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the
living room. They slept together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989. But during this
period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts
nor did he see hers.

Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General
Hospital, on January 20, 1989.

The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin, while that of her husband's examination
was kept confidential up to this time. While no medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband
which was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he never
did.

The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She said, that she had observed
the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant
married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country and to publicly maintain the appearance of
a normal man.

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault
lies with his wife.

But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that
he has no defect on his part and he is physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and if
there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that, according to him, if either one of them has some
incapabilities, there is no certainty that this will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science.

The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual
contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with
his wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims,
that he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.

There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid
that she will be forced to return the pieces of jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their
marriage.

The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young and there is still a chance to overcome
their differences.

The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding
out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof, Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there
is no evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")

The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has an erection and he found out that from the
original size of two (2) inches, or five (5) centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr.
Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full length. But, still is capable of further
erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.

In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties and that the evidence is not fabricated."2

After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into by the plaintiff with the defendant on May
22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de
Vera. Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City. Let another copy be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Manila.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between the parties without making any findings of
fact.

II

in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is a psychological incapacity inasmuch as
proof thereof is totally absent.

III

in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity of both.

IV

in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court without fully satisfying itself that there was no
collusion between them.

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the burden of proving the allegations in
her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no
other basis for the court's conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate marriage
and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial court on the admissions and confessions of
the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in
actions for annulment of marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved. 3

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the
adverse party's pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to prevent is annulment of marriage without
trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before
the trial court and was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby
presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be came incumbent upon petitioner to present his
side. He admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse
between them.

To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil Code provides that no judgment
annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the
Rules of Court prohibit such annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).

The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled. This only shows that there is no
collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with
each other, he must have been only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:

The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation of facts. The issue of whether or not the
appellant is psychologically incapacitated to discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary
and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations with his wife after almost ten months of
cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to
consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this Court clearly demonstrates an
'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See
Santos vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995). 4

Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private
respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to
make "a categorical finding about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal which
may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such
as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March
15, 1989, in a short span of 10 months.

First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who between petitioner and private
respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them.
At any rate, since the action to declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated, the
question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.

Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is suffering from phychological
incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal
may not be psychological but physical disorder as stated above.

We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or asked her what is ailing her, and why
she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record
to show that he had tried to find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his doctor's
Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is
not psychological but perhaps physical disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.

If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is
senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless
and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with
his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.6

Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity or wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill
the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not want carnal intercourse with him does not
inspire belief. Since he was not physically impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988
to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for
not having asserted his right seven though she balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330).
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant did not go to court and seek the
declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated
by her husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to believe that she would expose her
private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest
her marital status.

We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual
act, which is not phychological incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months of
cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual act with his wife whom he professes to love
very dearly, and who has not posed any insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation, and
of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge the basic marital covenants within the
contemplation of the Family Code.7

While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68,
Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal
mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs. Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is
an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so because an ungiven self is an
unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and
oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.

It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a shared feeling which between
husband and wife must be experienced not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a long way
in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with
love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social
institution.

This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and
unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate court.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 29, 1994 is hereby
AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.