MARTIN CENTINO VS. HON.

VICTORIA VILLALON PERNILLOS

G.R. NO. 113092, SEPTEMBER 1, 1994

Facts:

The officers of a civic organization known as Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng

Tikay launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay,
Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner and Vicente Yco approached Judge Adoracion Angeles and
solicited from her a contribution of P1500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was
made without a permit from the Department of Social Services and Development.

As a consequence, based on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information was

filed against the petitioner and his group, for violation of PD No. 1654, or the Solicitation
Permit Law in the Municipal Trial Court of Malolos. Petitioners contended that PD No.
1654 only covers solicitations made for a charitable or public welfare purpose, but not
those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of chapel. This was denied
by the trial court and the motion for reconsideration met the same fate.

On Dec. 29, 1992, the court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and sentencing them to pay a fine of P200. Nevertheless, the court
recommended that they be pardoned on the basis that they acted in good faith. They
appealed to RTC, however, Vicento Yco withdraws his appeal and the case proceeded
only with petitioner. On Mat 21, 1993, respondent judge affirmed the decision of the
lower court but modified the penalty, allegedly because of the perversity of the act
committed which caused damage and prejudice to the complainant by sentencing the
petitioner to suffer an imprisonment of 6 months and a fine of P1000.

Hence, the appeal.

Issue:

WON the phrase “charitable purposes” should be construed in its broadest sense
so as to include a religious purpose

Held:

PD No. 1564 provides as follows:

“Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or

recieve contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit
from the Regional Offices of the DSSD as provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan.
Upon the filing of the written application for a permit in the form prescribed by the said
department, the Regional Director or his duly authorized representative may in his
discretion, issue a permanent or temporary permit or disapprove the application. In the
interest of the public, he may in his discretion renew or revoke any permit issued under
Act 4075.”

To subsume the religious purpose of the solicitation within the concept of

charitable purposes which under the PD No. 1654 requires a prior permit from the DSSD,
under a pain of penal liability in the absence thereof, would be prejudicial to petitioner.
Accordingly, the term “charitable” should be strictly construed so as to exclude
solicitations for “religious purposes”. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine
all penal legislations that such interpretations
underlying virtually
should be adopted as would favour the accused.
The purpose of strict construction is to provide a precise definition of forbidden
acts. The word “charitable” is a matter of description rather than of precise, and each
case involving a determination of that which is charitable must be decided on its own
particular facts and circumstances. The law does not operate in vacuo nor should its
applicability be determined by circumstances in the abstract.

PEOPLE VS. LADJAALAM Y MILAPIL

G.R. NOS. 136149-51, SEPTEMBER 19, 2000

Facts:
Appellant Ladjaalam was charged and convicted by the Regional trial Court of
Zamboanga City of the crime of Direct Assault with Multiple Attempted Homicide for
firing on unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who were about to enter his house to
serve a search warrant. Under the same circumstance, he was likewise charged and
convicted for the crime Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition penalized under PD
1866, as amended by Republic Act No. 8294.

Issue:
WON appellant can be convicted of Illegal Possession of Firearm under RA 8294
when he used said firearm in the commission in the crime.

Held:
RA 8294 shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any
crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if
the “other crime” is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely
an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. Since the direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held
liable for illegal possession of firearms.

Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favour of the

accused. Accordingly, appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offense of
illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with attempted homicide. Moreover,
since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal
possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.

The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession of
firearms, provided that “no other crime was committed by the person arrested.” If the
intention of the law were to refer only to homicide and murder, it should have expressly
said so. Verily, where the law does not distinguish, neither should we.

RA No. 8294 penalizes simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that the
person arrested committed “no other crime”. Furthermore, if the person is held liable for
murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms is an aggravating circumstance, but
not a separate offense. Hence, where an accused was convicted of direct assault with
multiple attempted homicide for firing an unlicensed M-14 rifle at several policemen who
were about to serve a search warrant, he cannot be held guilty of the separate offense of
illegal possession of firearms. Neither can such unlawful act be considered to have
aggravated the direct assault.