Cayetano vs.

Monsod 201 SCRA 210 September 1991

Cayetano vs. Monsod

201 SCRA 210

September 1991

Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
posses required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The
1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on Elections
composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines
and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However,
a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.

Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice of law is not limited
to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers
incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation
services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of
a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment,
and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience.

The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s past work experience as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the
position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is DISMISSED.

Today is Friday, February 22, 2019

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's
decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding -
elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a
college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an
appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique to serve
the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting in the
conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An
attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing
counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's
Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23,
193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or corporations as to
their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law
or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so
engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with
court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high
degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and
complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order,
can be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A.
139,144). (Emphasis ours)

The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions
of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does exacts
knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their profession, and
he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney at law within the
meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training
and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally,
to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice
of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of
the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among others, the
qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from
the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or
Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar
does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the
lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then
they are qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up
on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members
of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law
practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?

MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal
work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the Commission on Audit.
And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the
Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less than ten years of auditing practice, or
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although
many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary
Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual or
organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often called "sole
practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners.
Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of
the firm are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled
"associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the
practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p.
593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice
of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v.
Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an
uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire
practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role
colors much of both the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the
late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise:
"Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts.
The members of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies
today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both
litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely
desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the
diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be avoided
where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different
legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested parties. Even the increasing numbers
of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a
narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly
different one such as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who
specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to have mastered the full range of
traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that
the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important ways, at least
theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of these special roles, the most
prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the
way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of
corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a
departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice.
Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various legal-policy
decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in corporation law is indispensable
to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of the nature
and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate of information
accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly
"model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of significant
conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the consequences of given courses
of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have prompted the use of
sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic
computing equipment. Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of
the policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test
projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends of the law,
the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized attention in the
philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to legal research
has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can be
improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various approaches for
handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now have some
appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are currently engaged in
similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an astute
attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step in securing and
maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is
the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the tycoons and magnates of business
and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a corporate
lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary with the size and type of
the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to private law firms.
Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His
areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax laws research, acting out as
corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including
the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business of the
corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming involved in
management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not understanding
how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to someone who needs to
see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more
closely involved in the running of the business.

Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some
large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter the international law field.
After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working
in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most
cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international
practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-
educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a good lawyer is one
who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking
of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code and the Securities
Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights
into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an introduction to usable
disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the
organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise
known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the corporate counsel's total
learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate
lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that the firms he provides
counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The
salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities
but with each other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly changing. The
modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases participating in the
organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These
trends are complicated as corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there are lessons to be
learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between
governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group
within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and temporary
groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction
such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders,
promoting team achievements within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of
team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of
corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective managerial procedures
and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new managerial
thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the role of feedback
loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems — physical,
economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics
principles more accessible to managers — including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In
the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of litigation, aid in negotiation
settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties and
mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective negotiation
support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture
may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas of
consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the general
counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is concerned with
minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time when
transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm to which
legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic and
organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment. The practice
and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy
work.

Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the last
decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear responsibility for
key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations, managing improved
 relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating
new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate activities. And even if the
corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very
least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p.
4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of financial
law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law
territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk
opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a
letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination
because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen
and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%.
He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been
paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father.
During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica
and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal,
economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as
chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered
services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General (1986)
and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for
NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as
former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian
reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide
Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) (
Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
 In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately constituted to
meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the Borrower concerned,
there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an
official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan
Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan
transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into five (5)
fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and
(5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from performing the
tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies as key factors in
maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development
Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States
Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the Abidjan
World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). (
Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise
in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer
may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement.
Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully
drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate
technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions which
determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the contract. A good
agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the recourse open to
either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a
devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence
to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle
and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers
in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth
Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and
taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work
experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a
lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required
by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified
 who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal requirements are
satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service
Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another person is more
qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To
do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2)
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the Philippines, upon submission by the
Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent appointment; and (4)
acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission
on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three Members shall hold
office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without reappointment.
Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law is the
traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the practice of law,
which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps
practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive
years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of
law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the
practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law
practice by "traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is
being defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the
law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight
of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is
different from the acts of persons practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground
that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an action or petition be brought
against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the
incumbent President?
We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined
that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of
such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is
clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise
of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court reverse the
Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The answer is
likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved)
for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches
away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was
beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly
replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not
the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.

Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that there
has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due
assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently
merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore
vote to DENY the petition.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the
respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin
respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional
qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all
parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition
then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed
qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional requirement of
"practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be
resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of
COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C),
Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial
resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been
"engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met
and complied with.

What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of
knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively,
habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in
the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an
accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or
attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several
factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque,
8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with
the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102
Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as
a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging
for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's
Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert
and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R.
356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience
is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3

The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the
constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior
to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did
perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the
practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions
or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must
be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the activeand continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of
COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such
position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain points on
which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination
has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from
resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that
body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choosebetween two
claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not
be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see
no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that
he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.

Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition
of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as
embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice
of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance
adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become
involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he interprets and
applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and
regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is
not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed
when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the
laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed
engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy
Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts ... in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be
too global to be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if
he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely)
connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching
ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice
of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which
areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he
has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an
attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he
lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with
non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these
capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many
other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the
petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office would be
settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these
5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he
did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of
official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the
decision.

There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on
Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission
errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness.
Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management,
educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the
Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for
even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an
activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court
and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a
business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the
law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the
bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows
that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of
one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with
intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the
latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced
law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then
his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the
University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American Department;
Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine
Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member
 9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the lawenough attention
or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in
its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that
legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.

The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use
of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian
reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and
customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or
apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor,
barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these
people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been
"a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services rendered
out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and
conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77
N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901,
and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law.
"Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation
when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773,
776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer,
they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he
ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He
answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the
parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more
than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several
parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what
was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in
the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have
done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in
connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes
and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his
services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an
agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal
 proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly
styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an
attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or
attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in
such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his
client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to
the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly
compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by
Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to
practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a
profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis
supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case
of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

xxx xxx xxx

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of
practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque,
8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with
the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102
Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v.
Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal
knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission
to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on
the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be
likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as
doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated
business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our
ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess the
background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator,
Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The
Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

Separate Opinions

NARVASA, J., concurring:

I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras, albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that there
has been an adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission on Appointments-that the appointment of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his stated qualifications and after due
assessment thereof, be confirmed-was attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and consequently
merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore
vote to DENY the petition.

Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the
respondents to comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to enjoin
respondent Monsod from assuming the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his constitutional
qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all
parties concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition
then in relation to established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent Monsod did not possess the needed
qualification, that is, he had not engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.

After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even more convinced that the constitutional requirement of
"practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.

The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be
resolved in this petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a majority of the membership of
COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." (Art. IX(C),
Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial
resolution. As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and
inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."

The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been
"engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met
and complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of
knowledge as distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated or customary
action.1 To "practice" law, or any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively,
habitually, repeatedly or customarily.

Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in
the "practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an
accountant. In the same way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or
attorney of a Legal Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law.

As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs- Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42
LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).

It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several
factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:

1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer (People vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Ney Bosque,
8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with
the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102
Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v.
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864).

2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as
a service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra). Hence, charging
for services such as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's
Stockyards State Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is to that extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v. Gilbert
and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for
them in matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R.
356-359)

3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience
is within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)

4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law presupposes the existence of lawyer-client
relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but involves no
attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the
constitutional qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

The following relevant questions may be asked:

1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to the practice of law?

2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?

3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior
to his appointment as COMELEC Chairman?

Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did
perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.

While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the
practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions
or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of law, there must
be a continuity, or a succession of acts. As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:4

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in
the activeand continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of
COMELEC Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment to such
position.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I must dissent just the same. There are certain points on
which I must differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.

To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination
has been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a political question that we are barred from
resolving. Determination of the appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not the discretion of that
body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion would still be subject to our review.

In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the discretion of the appointing authority to choosebetween two
claimants to the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was that kind of discretion that we said could not
be reviewed.

If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted by this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see
no reason why we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the Commission on Appointments.

Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that
he has been found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason is that what we would be examining is not
the wisdom of his election but whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition
of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as
embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice
of law as long as his activities involve the application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance
adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become
involved in litigation."

The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main occupation is another business and he interprets and
applies some law only as an incident of such business. That covers every company organized under the Corporation Code and
regulated by the SEC under P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is hardly any activity that is
not affected by some law or government regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again going by the
definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed
when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as these acts involve his knowledge and application of the
laws regulating such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main source of livelihood, he would still be deemed
engaged in the practice of law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and regulations of the Energy
Regulatory Board.

The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law as the "performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing. The decision goes on to say that "because
lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be
too global to be workable."

The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if
he does not earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even if only remotely)
connected with some law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching
ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions.

The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice
of law for ten years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been engaged in business and finance, in which
areas he has distinguished himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer. The plain fact is that he
has occupied the various positions listed in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman and not as an
attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he
lobbied in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and the Constitutional Commission (together with
non-lawyers like farmers and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not proved that his activities in these
capacities extended over the prescribed 10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently qualified for many
other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.

I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr. Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the
petition.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:

When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as a qualification for public office would be
settled one way or another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.

Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these
5 leaving his vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stating that he
did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one of
official leave with no instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations and the
decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on
Appointments whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons appointed to high office. Even if the Commission
errs, we have no power to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or whimsically and arbitrariness.
Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency in management,
educational background, experience in international banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity and
competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us is compliance with a specific requirement written into the
Constitution.

Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for
even one year. He is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational limits.

A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an
activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of law.

Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court
and all lower courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main occupation is selling real estate, managing a
business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm with no active involvement in the
law, whether in Government or private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they happened to pass the
bar examinations?

The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows
that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or
extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something which is the result of
one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out with
intent and attention during the ten-year period.

I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the
latter has not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced
law except for an alleged one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in his father's law firm. Even then
his law practice must have been extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D. degrees in Economics at the
University of Pennsylvania during that period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a member of the Bar
there?

The professional life of the respondent follows:

1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar examinations in 1961 consist of the following:

1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of Pennsylvania

2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry Department; Operations, Latin American Department;
Division Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance Corporation

3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies, i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine
Petroleum Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation

4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital Development Corporation and affiliated companies

5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer

6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive Officer

 7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member

8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December 1989 Coup Attempt — Member

9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the following companies:

a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.

b. Dataprep, Philippines

c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.

d. Semirara Coal Corporation

e. CBL Timber Corporation

Member of the Board of the Following:

a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines

b. First Philippine Energy Corporation

c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation

d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation

e. Graphic Atelier

f. Manila Electric Company

g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.

h. Philippine Electric Corporation

i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises

j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation

k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation

l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)

There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that respondent Monsod has given the lawenough attention
or a certain degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity and candor the claim of having engaged in
its practice for at least ten years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him. Instead of giving receiving that
legal advice of legal services, he was the oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use
of legal knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry, civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian
reform, etc. where such knowledge would be helpful.

I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and
customary well-defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, follow, or
apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor,
barangay captain, teacher, policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And yet, can these
people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice of law?

The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been
"a member of the Philippine bar for at least ten years."

Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:

The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in connection with litigation but also services rendered
out of court, and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or
knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of which, under the facts and
conditions involved, must be carefully determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill. 282, 77
N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901,
and cases cited.

It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or definition of what constitutes the practice of law.
"Practicing law" has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at law according to the laws and
customs of our courts, is the giving of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or corporation
when the giving of such advice or rendition of such service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901. (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773,
776)

For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer,
they should also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he
ever prepared contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was not the procuring agent. He
answered: "Very seldom." In answer to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts for the
parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more
than half a dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall making the statement to several
parties that he had prepared contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't recall exactly what
was said." When asked if he did not remember saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties therefor in instances where he was not the broker in
the deal, he answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice." Pressed further for an answer as to his
practice in preparing contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he finally answered: "I have
done about everything that is on the books as far as real estate is concerned."

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in
connection with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes
 and the like. There is no doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years and has charged for his
services in that connection. ... (People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)

xxx xxx xxx

... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated or employed by another to act in his stead; an
agent; more especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act for suitors or defendants in legal
proceedings. Strictly, these professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional agents are properly
styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an
attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law. Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or
attorney at law, says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to prosecute and defend actions in
such court on the retainer of clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to the court and to his
client; (2) to manage the business of his client with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to
the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him as such. ... His rights are to be justly
compensated for his services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb "practice," as defined by
Webster, means 'to do or perform frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession of acts, as, to
practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as a
profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,' etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis
supplied)

In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case
of People v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):

xxx xxx xxx

... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services. ... . (at p. 112)

It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of
practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:

l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644) such as when one
sends a circular announcing the establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S. v. Noy Bosque,
8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with
the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102
Phil. 968).

Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v.
Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87 Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)

xxx xxx xxx

While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal
knowledge is incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the denomination of practice of law. Admission
to the practice of law was not required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-Finding Commission on
the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member may be
likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as
doing business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also should be active and continuous. Isolated
business transactions or occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context of doing business. This was our
ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of the Constitutional Commission may possess the
background, competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as President, Vice-President, Senator,
Congressman or Governor but the Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten (10) years for the position of COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that office. The
Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of
respondent Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

Footnotes

1 Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary.

2 14 SCRA 109

3 Commission on Appointments' Memorandum dated 25 June 1991 RE: WHAT CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF
LAW, pp. 6-7.

4 14 SCRA 109.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Friday, February 22, 2019

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC September 1, 2009

SPECIAL RULES OF COURT ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on the Rules on Alternative Dispute Resolution
submitting for this Court’s consideration and approval the proposed Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution, the
Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.

This Rule shall take effect on October 30, 2009 following its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.

September 1, 2009.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

SPECIAL RULES OF COURT ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

PART I
GENERAL PROVISIONS AND POLICIES

RULE 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Rule 1.1. Subject matter and governing rules.-The Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution (the "Special ADR
Rules") shall apply to and govern the following cases:
 a. Relief on the issue of Existence, Validity, or Enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement;

b. Referral to Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR");

c. Interim Measures of Protection;

d. Appointment of Arbitrator;

e. Challenge to Appointment of Arbitrator;

f. Termination of Mandate of Arbitrator;

g. Assistance in Taking Evidence;

h. Confirmation, Correction or Vacation of Award in Domestic Arbitration;

i. Recognition and Enforcement or Setting Aside of an Award in International Commercial Arbitration;

j. Recognition and Enforcement of a Foreign Arbitral Award;

k. Confidentiality/Protective Orders; and

l. Deposit and Enforcement of Mediated Settlement Agreements.

Rule 1.2. Nature of the proceedings.-All proceedings under the Special ADR Rules are special proceedings.

Rule 1.3. Summary proceedings in certain cases.-The proceedings in the following instances are summary in nature and shall be
governed by this provision:

a. Judicial Relief Involving the Issue of Existence, Validity or Enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement;

b. Referral to ADR;

c. Interim Measures of Protection;

d. Appointment of Arbitrator;

e. Challenge to Appointment of Arbitrator;

f. Termination of Mandate of Arbitrator;

g. Assistance in Taking Evidence;

h. Confidentiality/Protective Orders; and

i. Deposit and Enforcement of Mediated Settlement Agreements.

(A) Service and filing of petition in summary proceedings.-The petitioner shall serve, either by personal service or courier, a copy
of the petition upon the respondent before the filing thereof. Proof of service shall be attached to the petition filed in court.

For personal service, proof of service of the petition consists of the affidavit of the person who effected service, stating the time,
place and manner of the service on the respondent. For service by courier, proof of service consists of the signed courier proof of
delivery. If service is refused or has failed, the affidavit or delivery receipt must state the circumstances of the attempted service
and refusal or failure thereof.

(B) Notice.-Except for cases involving Referral to ADR and Confidentiality/Protective Orders made through motions, the court
shall, if it finds the petition sufficient in form and substance, send notice to the parties directing them to appear at a particular time
and date for the hearing thereof which shall be set no later than five (5) days from the lapse of the period for filing the opposition
or comment. The notice to the respondent shall contain a statement allowing him to file a comment or opposition to the petition
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice.

The motion filed pursuant to the rules on Referral to ADR or Confidentiality/Protective Orders shall be set for hearing by the
movant and contain a notice of hearing that complies with the requirements under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on motions.

(C) Summary hearing. - In all cases, as far as practicable, the summary hearing shall be conducted in one (1) day and only for
purposes of clarifying facts.

Except in cases involving Referral to ADR or Confidentiality/Protective Orders made through motions, it shall be the court that
sets the petition for hearing within five (5) days from the lapse of the period for filing the opposition or comment.

(D) Resolution. - The court shall resolve the matter within a period of thirty (30) days from the day of the hearing.

Rule 1.4. Verification and submissions. -Any pleading, motion, opposition, comment, defense or claim filed under the Special
ADR Rules by the proper party shall be supported by verified statements that the affiant has read the same and that the factual
allegations therein are true and correct of his own personal knowledge or based on authentic records and shall contain as
annexes the supporting documents.

The annexes to the pleading, motion, opposition, comment, defense or claim filed by the proper party may include a legal brief,
duly verified by the lawyer submitting it, stating the pertinent facts, the applicable law and jurisprudence to justify the necessity for
the court to rule upon the issue raised.

Rule 1.5. Certification Against Forum Shopping. - A Certification Against Forum Shopping is one made under oath made by the
petitioner or movant: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any
court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if
there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter
learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to
the court wherein his aforementioned petition or motion has been filed.

A Certification Against Forum Shopping shall be appended to all initiatory pleadings except a Motion to Refer the Dispute to
Alternative Dispute Resolution.

Rule 1.6. Prohibited submissions. - The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be allowed in the cases governed by
the Special ADR Rules and shall not be accepted for filing by the Clerk of Court:

a. Motion to dismiss;

b. Motion for bill of particulars;

 c. Motion for new trial or for reopening of trial;

d. Petition for relief from judgment;

e. Motion for extension, except in cases where an ex-parte temporary order of protection has been issued;

f. Rejoinder to reply;

g. Motion to declare a party in default; and

h. Any other pleading specifically disallowed under any provision of the Special ADR Rules.

The court shall motu proprio order a pleading/motion that it has determined to be dilatory in nature be expunged from the
records.

Rule 1.7. Computation of time. - In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the Special ADR Rules, or by order of
the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be
excluded and the date of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday, or
a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.

Should an act be done which effectively interrupts the running of the period, the allowable period after such interruption shall start
to run on the day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof.

The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be excluded from the computation of the period.

Rule 1.8. Service and filing of pleadings, motions and other papers in non-summary proceedings. - The initiatory pleadings shall
be filed directly with the court. The court will then cause the initiatory pleading to be served upon the respondent by personal
service or courier. Where an action is already pending, pleadings, motions and other papers shall be filed and/or served by the
concerned party by personal service or courier. Where courier services are not available, resort to registered mail is allowed.

(A) Proof of filing. - The filing of a pleading shall be proved by its existence in the record of the case. If it is not in the record, but
is claimed to have been filed personally, the filing shall be proved by the written or stamped acknowledgment of its filing by the
clerk of court on a copy of the same; if filed by courier, by the proof of delivery from the courier company.

(B) Proof of service. - Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission by the party served, or the official return of the
server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is
by courier, proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the proper person, stating facts showing that the document was deposited
with the courier company in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party at his office, if known, otherwise at his residence,
with postage fully pre-paid, and with instructions to the courier to immediately provide proof of delivery.

(C) Filing and service by electronic means and proof thereof. - Filing and service of pleadings by electronic transmission may be
allowed by agreement of the parties approved by the court. If the filing or service of a pleading or motion was done by electronic
transmission, proof of filing and service shall be made in accordance with the Rules on Electronic Evidence.

Rule 1.9. No summons. - In cases covered by the Special ADR Rules, a court acquires authority to act on the petition or motion
upon proof of jurisdictional facts, i.e., that the respondent was furnished a copy of the petition and the notice of hearing.

(A) Proof of service. - A proof of service of the petition and notice of hearing upon respondent shall be made in writing by the
server and shall set forth the manner, place and date of service.
(B) Burden of proof. - The burden of showing that a copy of the petition and the notice of hearing were served on the respondent
rests on the petitioner.

The technical rules on service of summons do not apply to the proceedings under the Special ADR Rules. In instances where the
respondent, whether a natural or a juridical person, was not personally served with a copy of the petition and notice of hearing in
the proceedings contemplated in the first paragraph of Rule 1.3 (B), or the motion in proceedings contemplated in the second
paragraph of Rule 1.3 (B), the method of service resorted to must be such as to reasonably ensure receipt thereof by the
respondent to satisfy the requirement of due process.

Rule 1.10. Contents of petition/motion. - The initiatory pleading in the form of a verified petition or motion, in the appropriate case
where court proceedings have already commenced, shall include the names of the parties, their addresses, the necessary
allegations supporting the petition and the relief(s) sought.

Rule 1.11. Definition. - The following terms shall have the following meanings:

a. "ADR Laws" refers to the whole body of ADR laws in the Philippines.

b. "Appointing Authority" shall mean the person or institution named in the arbitration agreement as the
appointing authority; or the regular arbitration institution under whose rule the arbitration is agreed to be
conducted. Where the parties have agreed to submit their dispute to institutional arbitration rules, and unless they
have agreed to a different procedure, they shall be deemed to have agreed to procedure under such arbitration
rules for the selection and appointment of arbitrators. In ad hoc arbitration, the default appointment of arbitrators
shall be made by the National President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or his duly authorized
representative.

c. "Authenticate" means to sign, execute or use a symbol, or encrypt a record in whole or in part, intended to
identify the authenticating party and to adopt, accept or establish the authenticity of a record or term.

d. "Foreign Arbitral Award" is one made in a country other than the Philippines.

e. "Legal Brief" is a written legal argument submitted to a court, outlining the facts derived from the factual
statements in the witness’s statements of fact and citing the legal authorities relied upon by a party in a case
submitted in connection with petitions, counter-petitions (i.e., petitions to vacate or to set aside and/or to
correct/modify in opposition to petitions to confirm or to recognize and enforce, or petitions to confirm or to
recognize and enforce in opposition to petitions to vacate or set aside and/or correct/modify), motions, evidentiary
issues and other matters that arise during the course of a case. The legal brief shall state the applicable law and
the relevant jurisprudence and the legal arguments in support of a party’s position in the case.

f. "Verification" shall mean a certification under oath by a party or a person who has authority to act for a party
that he has read the pleading/motion, and that he certifies to the truth of the facts stated therein on the basis of
his own personal knowledge or authentic documents in his possession. When made by a lawyer, verification shall
mean a statement under oath by a lawyer signing a pleading/motion for delivery to the Court or to the parties that
he personally prepared the pleading/motion, that there is sufficient factual basis for the statements of fact stated
therein, that there is sufficient basis in the facts and the law to support the prayer for relief therein, and that the
pleading/motion is filed in good faith and is not interposed for delay.

Rule 1.12. Applicability of Part II on Specific Court Relief. - Part II of the Special ADR Rules on Specific Court Relief, insofar as it
refers to arbitration, shall also be applicable to other forms of ADR.
Rule 1.13. Spirit and intent of the Special ADR Rules. – In situations where no specific rule is provided under the Special ADR
Rules, the court shall resolve such matter summarily and be guided by the spirit and intent of the Special ADR Rules and the
ADR Laws.

RULE 2: STATEMENT OF POLICIES

Rule 2.1. General policies. - It is the policy of the State to actively promote the use of various modes of ADR and to respect party
autonomy or the freedom of the parties to make their own arrangements in the resolution of disputes with the greatest
cooperation of and the least intervention from the courts. To this end, the objectives of the Special ADR Rules are to encourage
and promote the use of ADR, particularly arbitration and mediation, as an important means to achieve speedy and efficient
resolution of disputes, impartial justice, curb a litigious culture and to de-clog court dockets.

The court shall exercise the power of judicial review as provided by these Special ADR Rules. Courts shall intervene only in the
cases allowed by law or these Special ADR Rules.

Rule 2.2. Policy on arbitration.- (A) Where the parties have agreed to submit their dispute to arbitration, courts shall refer the
parties to arbitration pursuant to Republic Act No. 9285 bearing in mind that such arbitration agreement is the law between the
parties and that they are expected to abide by it in good faith. Further, the courts shall not refuse to refer parties to arbitration for
reasons including, but not limited to, the following:

a. The referral tends to oust a court of its jurisdiction;

b. The court is in a better position to resolve the dispute subject of arbitration;

c. The referral would result in multiplicity of suits;

d. The arbitration proceeding has not commenced;

e. The place of arbitration is in a foreign country;

f. One or more of the issues are legal and one or more of the arbitrators are not lawyers;

g. One or more of the arbitrators are not Philippine nationals; or

h. One or more of the arbitrators are alleged not to possess the required qualification under the arbitration
agreement or law.

(B) Where court intervention is allowed under ADR Laws or the Special ADR Rules, courts shall not refuse to grant relief, as
provided herein, for any of the following reasons:

a. Prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, the court finds that the principal action is the subject of an
arbitration agreement; or

b. The principal action is already pending before an arbitral tribunal.

The Special ADR Rules recognize the principle of competence-competence, which means that the arbitral tribunal may initially
rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement or any
condition precedent to the filing of a request for arbitration.
The Special ADR Rules recognize the principle of separability of the arbitration clause, which means that said clause shall be
treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract of which it forms part. A decision that the contract is null
and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the arbitration clause.

Rule 2.3. Rules governing arbitral proceedings. - The parties are free to agree on the procedure to be followed in the conduct of
arbitral proceedings. Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may conduct arbitration in the manner it considers appropriate.

Rule 2.4. Policy implementing competence-competence principle. - The arbitral tribunal shall be accorded the first opportunity or
competence to rule on the issue of whether or not it has the competence or jurisdiction to decide a dispute submitted to it for
decision, including any objection with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. When a court is asked to
rule upon issue/s affecting the competence or jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in a dispute brought before it, either before or after
the arbitral tribunal is constituted, the court must exercise judicial restraint and defer to the competence or jurisdiction of the
arbitral tribunal by allowing the arbitral tribunal the first opportunity to rule upon such issues.

Where the court is asked to make a determination of whether the arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable
of being performed, under this policy of judicial restraint, the court must make no more than a prima facie determination of that
issue.

Unless the court, pursuant to such prima facie determination, concludes that the arbitration agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed, the court must suspend the action before it and refer the parties to arbitration
pursuant to the arbitration agreement.

Rule 2.5. Policy on mediation. - The Special ADR Rules do not apply to Court-Annexed Mediation, which shall be governed by
issuances of the Supreme Court.

Where the parties have agreed to submit their dispute to mediation, a court before which that dispute was brought shall suspend
the proceedings and direct the parties to submit their dispute to private mediation. If the parties subsequently agree, however,
they may opt to have their dispute settled through Court-Annexed Mediation.

Rule 2.6. Policy on Arbitration-Mediation or Mediation-Arbitration. - No arbitrator shall act as a mediator in any proceeding in
which he is acting as arbitrator; and all negotiations towards settlement of the dispute must take place without the presence of
that arbitrator. Conversely, no mediator shall act as arbitrator in any proceeding in which he acted as mediator.

Rule 2.7. Conversion of a settlement agreement to an arbitral award. - Where the parties to mediation have agreed in the written
settlement agreement that the mediator shall become the sole arbitrator for the dispute or that the settlement agreement shall
become an arbitral award, the sole arbitrator shall issue the settlement agreement as an arbitral award, which shall be subject to
enforcement under the law.

PART II
SPECIFIC COURT RELIEF

RULE 3: JUDICIAL RELIEF INVOLVING THE ISSUE OF EXISTENCE, VALIDITY AND ENFORCEABILITY OF THE
ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

Rule 3.1. When judicial relief is available. - The judicial relief provided in Rule 3, whether resorted to before or after
commencement of arbitration, shall apply only when the place of arbitration is in the Philippines.

A. Judicial Relief before Commencement of Arbitration

Rule 3.2. Who may file petition. - Any party to an arbitration agreement may petition the appropriate court to determine any
question concerning the existence, validity and enforceability of such arbitration agreement serving a copy thereof on the
respondent in accordance with Rule 1.4 (A).

Rule 3.3. When the petition may be filed. - The petition for judicial determination of the existence, validity and/or enforceability of
an arbitration agreement may be filed at any time prior to the commencement of arbitration.

Despite the pendency of the petition provided herein, arbitral proceedings may nevertheless be commenced and continue to the
rendition of an award, while the issue is pending before the court.

Rule 3.4. Venue. - A petition questioning the existence, validity and enforceability of an arbitration agreement may be filed before
the Regional Trial Court of the place where any of the petitioners or respondents has his principal place of business or residence.

Rule 3.5. Grounds. - A petition may be granted only if it is shown that the arbitration agreement is, under the applicable law,
invalid, void, unenforceable or inexistent.

Rule 3.6. Contents of petition. - The verified petition shall state the following:

a. The facts showing that the persons named as petitioner or respondent have legal capacity to sue or be sued;

b. The nature and substance of the dispute between the parties;

c. The grounds and the circumstances relied upon by the petitioner to establish his position; and

d. The relief/s sought.

Apart from other submissions, the petitioner must attach to the petition an authentic copy of the arbitration agreement.

Rule 3.7. Comment/Opposition.-The comment/opposition of the respondent must be filed within fifteen (15) days from service of
the petition.

Rule 3.8. Court action. - In resolving the petition, the court must exercise judicial restraint in accordance with the policy set forth
in Rule 2.4, deferring to the competence or jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to rule on its competence or jurisdiction.

Rule 3.9. No forum shopping. - A petition for judicial relief under this Rule may not be commenced when the existence, validity or
enforceability of an arbitration agreement has been raised as one of the issues in a prior action before the same or another court.

Rule 3.10. Application for interim relief. - If the petitioner also applies for an interim measure of protection, he must also comply
with the requirements of the Special ADR Rules for the application for an interim measure of protection.

Rule 3.11. Relief against court action. - Where there is a prima facie determination upholding the arbitration agreement.-A prima
facie determination by the court upholding the existence, validity or enforceability of an arbitration agreement shall not be subject
to a motion for reconsideration, appeal or certiorari.

Such prima facie determination will not, however, prejudice the right of any party to raise the issue of the existence, validity and
enforceability of the arbitration agreement before the arbitral tribunal or the court in an action to vacate or set aside the arbitral
award. In the latter case, the court’s review of the arbitral tribunal’s ruling upholding the existence, validity or enforceability of the
arbitration agreement shall no longer be limited to a mere prima facie determination of such issue or issues as prescribed in this
Rule, but shall be a full review of such issue or issues with due regard, however, to the standard for review for arbitral awards
prescribed in these Special ADR Rules.

B. Judicial Relief after Arbitration Commences

Rule 3.12. Who may file petition. - Any party to arbitration may petition the appropriate court for judicial relief from the ruling of
the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary question upholding or declining its jurisdiction. Should the ruling of the arbitral tribunal
declining its jurisdiction be reversed by the court, the parties shall be free to replace the arbitrators or any one of them in
accordance with the rules that were applicable for the appointment of arbitrator sought to be replaced.

Rule 3.13. When petition may be filed. - The petition may be filed within thirty (30) days after having received notice of that ruling
by the arbitral tribunal.

Rule 3.14. Venue. - The petition may be filed before the Regional Trial Court of the place where arbitration is taking place, or
where any of the petitioners or respondents has his principal place of business or residence.

Rule 3.15. Grounds. - The petition may be granted when the court finds that the arbitration agreement is invalid, inexistent or
unenforceable as a result of which the arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.

Rule 3.16. Contents of petition. - The petition shall state the following:

a. The facts showing that the person named as petitioner or respondent has legal capacity to sue or be sued;

b. The nature and substance of the dispute between the parties;

c. The grounds and the circumstances relied upon by the petitioner; and

d. The relief/s sought.

In addition to the submissions, the petitioner shall attach to the petition a copy of the request for arbitration and the ruling of the
arbitral tribunal.

The arbitrators shall be impleaded as nominal parties to the case and shall be notified of the progress of the case.

Rule 3.17. Comment/Opposition. - The comment/opposition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from service of the petition.

Rule 3.18. Court action. - (A) Period for resolving the petition.- The court shall render judgment on the basis of the pleadings filed
and the evidence, if any, submitted by the parties, within thirty (30) days from the time the petition is submitted for resolution.

(B) No injunction of arbitration proceedings. - The court shall not enjoin the arbitration proceedings during the pendency of the
petition.

Judicial recourse to the court shall not prevent the arbitral tribunal from continuing the proceedings and rendering its award.

(C) When dismissal of petition is appropriate. - The court shall dismiss the petition if it fails to comply with Rule 3.16 above; or if
upon consideration of the grounds alleged and the legal briefs submitted by the parties, the petition does not appear to be prima
facie meritorious.

Rule 3.19. Relief against court action. - The aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration of the order of the court. The
decision of the court shall, however, not be subject to appeal. The ruling of the court affirming the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction
shall not be subject to a petition for certiorari. The ruling of the court that the arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction may be the
subject of a petition for certiorari.

Rule 3.20. Where no petition is allowed. - Where the arbitral tribunal defers its ruling on preliminary question regarding its
jurisdiction until its final award, the aggrieved party cannot seek judicial relief to question the deferral and must await the final
arbitral award before seeking appropriate judicial recourse.

A ruling by the arbitral tribunal deferring resolution on the issue of its jurisdiction until final award, shall not be subject to a motion
for reconsideration, appeal or a petition for certiorari.

Rule 3.21. Rendition of arbitral award before court decision on petition from arbitral tribunal’s preliminary ruling on jurisdiction. - If
the arbitral tribunal renders a final arbitral award and the Court has not rendered a decision on the petition from the arbitral
tribunal’s preliminary ruling affirming its jurisdiction, that petition shall become ipso facto moot and academic and shall be
dismissed by the Regional Trial Court. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the aggrieved party to raise the
same issue in a timely petition to vacate or set aside the award.

Rule 3.22. Arbitral tribunal a nominal party. - The arbitral tribunal is only a nominal party. The court shall not require the arbitral
tribunal to submit any pleadings or written submissions but may consider the same should the latter participate in the
proceedings, but only as nominal parties thereto.

RULE 4: REFERRAL TO ADR

Rule 4.1. Who makes the request. - A party to a pending action filed in violation of the arbitration agreement, whether contained
in an arbitration clause or in a submission agreement, may request the court to refer the parties to arbitration in accordance with
such agreement.

Rule 4.2. When to make request. - (A) Where the arbitration agreement exists before the action is filed. - The request for referral
shall be made not later than the pre-trial conference. After the pre-trial conference, the court will only act upon the request for
referral if it is made with the agreement of all parties to the case.

(B) Submission agreement. - If there is no existing arbitration agreement at the time the case is filed but the parties subsequently
enter into an arbitration agreement, they may request the court to refer their dispute to arbitration at any time during the
proceedings.

Rule 4.3. Contents of request. - The request for referral shall be in the form of a motion, which shall state that the dispute is
covered by an arbitration agreement.

Apart from other submissions, the movant shall attach to his motion an authentic copy of the arbitration agreement.

The request shall contain a notice of hearing addressed to all parties specifying the date and time when it would be heard. The
party making the request shall serve it upon the respondent to give him the opportunity to file a comment or opposition as
provided in the immediately succeeding Rule before the hearing.

Rule 4.4. Comment/Opposition. - The comment/opposition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from service of the petition. The
comment/opposition should show that: (a) there is no agreement to refer the dispute to arbitration; and/or (b) the agreement is
null and void; and/or (c) the subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement or resolution by arbitration in accordance
with Section 6 of the ADR Act.

Rule 4.5. Court action. - After hearing, the court shall stay the action and, considering the statement of policy embodied in Rule
2.4, above, refer the parties to arbitration if it finds prima facie, based on the pleadings and supporting documents submitted by
the parties, that there is an arbitration agreement and that the subject-matter of the dispute is capable of settlement or resolution
by arbitration in accordance with Section 6 of the ADR Act. Otherwise, the court shall continue with the judicial proceedings.

Rule 4.6. No reconsideration, appeal or certiorari. - An order referring the dispute to arbitration shall be immediately executory
and shall not be subject to a motion for reconsideration, appeal or petition for certiorari.

An order denying the request to refer the dispute to arbitration shall not be subject to an appeal, but may be the subject of a
motion for reconsideration and/or a petition for certiorari.

Rule 4.7. Multiple actions and parties. - The court shall not decline to refer some or all of the parties to arbitration for any of the
following reasons:

a. Not all of the disputes subject of the civil action may be referred to arbitration;

b. Not all of the parties to the civil action are bound by the arbitration agreement and referral to arbitration would
result in multiplicity of suits;

c. The issues raised in the civil action could be speedily and efficiently resolved in its entirety by the court rather
than in arbitration;

d. Referral to arbitration does not appear to be the most prudent action; or

e. The stay of the action would prejudice the rights of the parties to the civil action who are not bound by the
arbitration agreement.

The court may, however, issue an order directing the inclusion in arbitration of those parties who are not bound by the arbitration
agreement but who agree to such inclusion provided those originally bound by it do not object to their inclusion.

Rule 4.8. Arbitration to proceed.- Despite the pendency of the action referred to in Rule 4.1, above, arbitral proceedings may
nevertheless be commenced or continued, and an award may be made, while the action is pending before the court.

RULE 5: INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION

Rule 5.1. Who may ask for interim measures of protection. - A party to an arbitration agreement may petition the court for interim
measures of protection.

Rule 5.2. When to petition. - A petition for an interim measure of protection may be made (a) before arbitration is commenced,
(b) after arbitration is commenced, but before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, or (c) after the constitution of the arbitral
tribunal and at any time during arbitral proceedings but, at this stage, only to the extent that the arbitral tribunal has no power to
act or is unable to act effectively.

Rule 5.3. Venue. - A petition for an interim measure of protection may be filed with the Regional Trial Court, which has
jurisdiction over any of the following places:

a. Where the principal place of business of any of the parties to arbitration is located;

b. Where any of the parties who are individuals resides;

 c. Where any of the acts sought to be enjoined are being performed, threatened to be performed or not being
performed; or

d. Where the real property subject of arbitration, or a portion thereof is situated.

Rule 5.4. Grounds. - The following grounds, while not limiting the reasons for the court to grant an interim measure of protection,
indicate the nature of the reasons that the court shall consider in granting the relief:

a. The need to prevent irreparable loss or injury;

b. The need to provide security for the performance of any obligation;

c. The need to produce or preserve evidence; or

d. The need to compel any other appropriate act or omission.

Rule 5.5. Contents of the petition. - The verified petition must state the following:

a. The fact that there is an arbitration agreement;

b. The fact that the arbitral tribunal has not been constituted, or if constituted, is unable to act or would be unable
to act effectively;

c. A detailed description of the appropriate relief sought;

d. The grounds relied on for the allowance of the petition

Apart from other submissions, the petitioner must attach to his petition an authentic copy of the arbitration agreement.

Rule 5.6. Type of interim measure of protection that a court may grant.- The following, among others, are the interim measures of
protection that a court may grant:

a. Preliminary injunction directed against a party to arbitration;

b. Preliminary attachment against property or garnishment of funds in the custody of a bank or a third person;

c. Appointment of a receiver;

d. Detention, preservation, delivery or inspection of property; or,

e. Assistance in the enforcement of an interim measure of protection granted by the arbitral tribunal, which the
latter cannot enforce effectively.

Rule 5.7. Dispensing with prior notice in certain cases. - Prior notice to the other party may be dispensed with when the petitioner
alleges in the petition that there is an urgent need to either (a) preserve property, (b) prevent the respondent from disposing of, or
concealing, the property, or (c) prevent the relief prayed for from becoming illusory because of prior notice, and the court finds
that the reason/s given by the petitioner are meritorious.
Rule 5.8. Comment/Opposition. - The comment/opposition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from service of the petition. The
opposition or comment should state the reasons why the interim measure of protection should not be granted.

Rule 5.9. Court action. - After hearing the petition, the court shall balance the relative interests of the parties and inconveniences
that may be caused, and on that basis resolve the matter within thirty (30) days from (a) submission of the opposition, or (b) upon
lapse of the period to file the same, or (c) from termination of the hearing that the court may set only if there is a need for
clarification or further argument.

If the other parties fail to file their opposition on or before the day of the hearing, the court shall motu proprio render judgment
only on the basis of the allegations in the petition that are substantiated by supporting documents and limited to what is prayed
for therein.

In cases where, based solely on the petition, the court finds that there is an urgent need to either (a) preserve property, (b)
prevent the respondent from disposing of, or concealing, the property, or (c) prevent the relief prayed for from becoming illusory
because of prior notice, it shall issue an immediately executory temporary order of protection and require the petitioner, within
five (5) days from receipt of that order, to post a bond to answer for any damage that respondent may suffer as a result of its
order. The ex-parte temporary order of protection shall be valid only for a period of twenty (20) days from the service on the party
required to comply with the order. Within that period, the court shall:

a. Furnish the respondent a copy of the petition and a notice requiring him to comment thereon on or before the
day the petition will be heard; and

b. Notify the parties that the petition shall be heard on a day specified in the notice, which must not be beyond the
twenty (20) day period of the effectivity of the ex-parte order.

The respondent has the option of having the temporary order of protection lifted by posting an appropriate counter-bond as
determined by the court.

If the respondent requests the court for an extension of the period to file his opposition or comment or to reset the hearing to a
later date, and such request is granted, the court shall extend the period of validity of the ex-partetemporary order of protection
for no more than twenty days from expiration of the original period.

After notice and hearing, the court may either grant or deny the petition for an interim measure of protection. The order granting
or denying any application for interim measure of protection in aid of arbitration must indicate that it is issued without prejudice to
subsequent grant, modification, amendment, revision or revocation by an arbitral tribunal.

Rule 5.10. Relief against court action. - If respondent was given an opportunity to be heard on a petition for an interim measure
of protection, any order by the court shall be immediately executory, but may be the subject of a motion for reconsideration
and/or appeal or, if warranted, a petition for certiorari.

Rule 5.11. Duty of the court to refer back. - The court shall not deny an application for assistance in implementing or enforcing an
interim measure of protection ordered by an arbitral tribunal on any or all of the following grounds:

a. The arbitral tribunal granted the interim relief ex parte; or

b. The party opposing the application found new material evidence, which the arbitral tribunal had not considered
in granting in the application, and which, if considered, may produce a different result; or

c. The measure of protection ordered by the arbitral tribunal amends, revokes, modifies or is inconsistent with an
earlier measure of protection issued by the court.
If it finds that there is sufficient merit in the opposition to the application based on letter (b) above, the court shall refer the matter
back to the arbitral tribunal for appropriate determination.

Rule 5.12. Security. - The order granting an interim measure of protection may be conditioned upon the provision of security,
performance of an act, or omission thereof, specified in the order.

The Court may not change or increase or decrease the security ordered by the arbitral tribunal.

Rule 5.13. Modification, amendment, revision or revocation of court’s previously issued interim measure of protection. - Any court
order granting or denying interim measure/s of protection is issued without prejudice to subsequent grant, modification,
amendment, revision or revocation by the arbitral tribunal as may be warranted.

An interim measure of protection issued by the arbitral tribunal shall, upon its issuance be deemed to have ipso jure modified,
amended, revised or revoked an interim measure of protection previously issued by the court to the extent that it is inconsistent
with the subsequent interim measure of protection issued by the arbitral tribunal.

Rule 5.14. Conflict or inconsistency between interim measure of protection issued by the court and by the arbitral tribunal. - Any
question involving a conflict or inconsistency between an interim measure of protection issued by the court and by the arbitral
tribunal shall be immediately referred by the court to the arbitral tribunal which shall have the authority to decide such question.

Rule 5.15. Court to defer action on petition for an interim measure of protection when informed of constitution of the arbitral
tribunal. - The court shall defer action on any pending petition for an interim measure of protection filed by a party to an
arbitration agreement arising from or in connection with a dispute thereunder upon being informed that an arbitral tribunal has
been constituted pursuant to such agreement. The court may act upon such petition only if it is established by the petitioner that
the arbitral tribunal has no power to act on any such interim measure of protection or is unable to act thereon effectively.

Rule 5.16. Court assistance should arbitral tribunal be unable to effectively enforce interim measure of protection. - The court
shall assist in the enforcement of an interim measure of protection issued by the arbitral tribunal which it is unable to effectively
enforce.

RULE 6: APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS

Rule 6.1. When the court may act as Appointing Authority. - The court shall act as Appointing Authority only in the following
instances:

a. Where any of the parties in an institutional arbitration failed or refused to appoint an arbitrator or when the
parties have failed to reach an agreement on the sole arbitrator (in an arbitration before a sole arbitrator) or when
the two designated arbitrators have failed to reach an agreement on the third or presiding arbitrator (in an
arbitration before a panel of three arbitrators), and the institution under whose rules arbitration is to be conducted
fails or is unable to perform its duty as appointing authority within a reasonable time from receipt of the request
for appointment;

b. In all instances where arbitration is ad hoc and the parties failed to provide a method for appointing or replacing
an arbitrator, or substitute arbitrator, or the method agreed upon is ineffective, and the National President of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) or his duly authorized representative fails or refuses to act within such
period as may be allowed under the pertinent rules of the IBP or within such period as may be agreed upon by
the parties, or in the absence thereof, within thirty (30) days from receipt of such request for appointment;

c. Where the parties agreed that their dispute shall be resolved by three arbitrators but no method of appointing
those arbitrators has been agreed upon, each party shall appoint one arbitrator and the two arbitrators thus
appointed shall appoint a third arbitrator. If a party fails to appoint his arbitrator within thirty (30) days of receipt of
 a request to do so from the other party, or if the two arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator within a
reasonable time from their appointment, the appointment shall be made by the Appointing Authority. If the latter
fails or refuses to act or appoint an arbitrator within a reasonable time from receipt of the request to do so, any
party or the appointed arbitrator/s may request the court to appoint an arbitrator or the third arbitrator as the case
may be.

Rule 6.2. Who may request for appointment. - Any party to an arbitration may request the court to act as an Appointing Authority
in the instances specified in Rule 6.1 above.

Rule 6.3. Venue. - The petition for appointment of arbitrator may be filed, at the option of the petitioner, in the Regional Trial
Court (a) where the principal place of business of any of the parties is located, (b) if any of the parties are individuals, where
those individuals reside, or (c) in the National Capital Region.

Rule 6.4. Contents of the petition. -The petition shall state the following:

a. The general nature of the dispute;

b. If the parties agreed on an appointment procedure, a description of that procedure with reference to the
agreement where such may be found;

c. The number of arbitrators agreed upon or the absence of any agreement as to the number of arbitrators;

d. The special qualifications that the arbitrator/s must possess, if any, that were agreed upon by the parties;

e. The fact that the Appointing Authority, without justifiable cause, has failed or refused to act as such within the
time prescribed or in the absence thereof, within a reasonable time, from the date a request is made; and

f. The petitioner is not the cause of the delay in, or failure of, the appointment of the arbitrator.

Apart from other submissions, the petitioner must attach to the petition (a) an authentic copy of the arbitration agreement, and (b)
proof that the Appointing Authority has been notified of the filing of the petition for appointment with the court.

Rule 6.5. Comment/Opposition. - The comment/opposition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from service of the petition.

Rule 6.6. Submission of list of arbitrators. - The court may, at its option, also require each party to submit a list of not less than
three (3) proposed arbitrators together with their curriculum vitae.

Rule 6.7. Court action. - After hearing, if the court finds merit in the petition, it shall appoint an arbitrator; otherwise, it shall
dismiss the petition.

In making the appointment, the court shall have regard to such considerations as are likely to secure the appointment of an
independent and impartial arbitrator.

At any time after the petition is filed and before the court makes an appointment, it shall also dismiss the petition upon being
informed that the Appointing Authority has already made the appointment.

Rule 6.8. Forum shopping prohibited. - When there is a pending petition in another court to declare the arbitration agreement
inexistent, invalid, unenforceable, on account of which the respondent failed or refused to participate in the selection and
appointment of a sole arbitrator or to appoint a party-nominated arbitrator, the petition filed under this rule shall be dismissed.
Rule 6.9. Relief against court action. - If the court appoints an arbitrator, the order appointing an arbitrator shall be immediately
executory and shall not be the subject of a motion for reconsideration, appeal or certiorari. An order of the court denying the
petition for appointment of an arbitrator may, however, be the subject of a motion for reconsideration, appeal or certiorari.

RULE 7: CHALLENGE TO APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATOR

Rule 7.1. Who may challenge. - Any of the parties to an arbitration may challenge an arbitrator.

Rule 7.2. When challenge may be raised in court. - When an arbitrator is challenged before the arbitral tribunal under the
procedure agreed upon by the parties or under the procedure provided for in Article 13 (2) of the Model Law and the challenge is
not successful, the aggrieved party may request the Appointing Authority to rule on the challenge, and it is only when such
Appointing Authority fails or refuses to act on the challenge within such period as may be allowed under the applicable rule or in
the absence thereof, within thirty (30) days from receipt of the request, that the aggrieved party may renew the challenge in court.

Rule 7.3. Venue. - The challenge shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court (a) where the principal place of business of any of
the parties is located, (b) if any of the parties are individuals, where those individuals reside, or (c) in the National Capital Region.

Rule 7.4. Grounds. - An arbitrator may be challenged on any of the grounds for challenge provided for in Republic Act No. 9285
and its implementing rules, Republic Act No. 876 or the Model Law. The nationality or professional qualification of an arbitrator is
not a ground to challenge an arbitrator unless the parties have specified in their arbitration agreement a nationality and/or
professional qualification for appointment as arbitrator.

Rule 7.5. Contents of the petition. - The petition shall state the following:

a. The name/s of the arbitrator/s challenged and his/their address;

b. The grounds for the challenge;

c. The facts showing that the ground for the challenge has been expressly or impliedly rejected by the challenged
arbitrator/s; and

d. The facts showing that the Appointing Authority failed or refused to act on the challenge.

The court shall dismiss the petition motu proprio unless it is clearly alleged therein that the Appointing Authority charged with
deciding the challenge, after the resolution of the arbitral tribunal rejecting the challenge is raised or contested before such
Appointing Authority, failed or refused to act on the challenge within thirty (30) days from receipt of the request or within such
longer period as may apply or as may have been agreed upon by the parties.

Rule 7.6. Comment/Opposition. - The challenged arbitrator or other parties may file a comment or opposition within fifteen (15)
days from service of the petition.

Rule 7.7. Court action. - After hearing, the court shall remove the challenged arbitrator if it finds merit in the petition; otherwise, it
shall dismiss the petition.

The court shall allow the challenged arbitrator who subsequently agrees to accept the challenge to withdraw as arbitrator.

The court shall accept the challenge and remove the arbitrator in the following cases:
 a. The party or parties who named and appointed the challenged arbitrator agree to the challenge and withdraw
the appointment.

b. The other arbitrators in the arbitral tribunal agree to the removal of the challenged arbitrator; and

c. The challenged arbitrator fails or refuses to submit his comment on the petition or the brief of legal arguments
as directed by the court, or in such comment or legal brief, he fails to object to his removal following the
challenge.

The court shall decide the challenge on the basis of evidence submitted by the parties.

The court will decide the challenge on the basis of the evidence submitted by the parties in the following instances:

a. The other arbitrators in the arbitral tribunal agree to the removal of the challenged arbitrator; and

b. If the challenged arbitrator fails or refuses to submit his comment on the petition or the brief of legal arguments
as directed by the court, or in such comment or brief of legal arguments, he fails to object to his removal following
the challenge.

Rule 7.8. No motion for reconsideration, appeal or certiorari. - Any order of the court resolving the petition shall be immediately
executory and shall not be the subject of a motion for reconsideration, appeal, or certiorari.

Rule 7.9. Reimbursement of expenses and reasonable compensation to challenged arbitrator. - Unless the bad faith of the
challenged arbitrator is established with reasonable certainty by concealing or failing to disclose a ground for his disqualification,
the challenged arbitrator shall be entitled to reimbursement of all reasonable expenses he may have incurred in attending to the
arbitration and to a reasonable compensation for his work on the arbitration. Such expenses include, but shall not be limited to,
transportation and hotel expenses, if any. A reasonable compensation shall be paid to the challenged arbitrator on the basis of
the length of time he has devoted to the arbitration and taking into consideration his stature and reputation as an arbitrator. The
request for reimbursement of expenses and for payment of a reasonable compensation shall be filed in the same case and in the
court where the petition to replace the challenged arbitrator was filed. The court, in determining the amount of the award to the
challenged arbitrator, shall receive evidence of expenses to be reimbursed, which may consist of air tickets, hotel bills and
expenses, and inland transportation. The court shall direct the challenging party to pay the amount of the award to the court for
the account of the challenged arbitrator, in default of which the court may issue a writ of execution to enforce the award.

RULE 8: TERMINATION OF THE MANDATE OF ARBITRATOR

Rule 8.1. Who may request termination and on what grounds.- Any of the parties to an arbitration may request for the termination
of the mandate of an arbitrator where an arbitrator becomes de jure or de facto unable to perform his function or for other
reasons fails to act without undue delay and that arbitrator, upon request of any party, fails or refuses to withdraw from his office.

Rule 8.2. When to request. - If an arbitrator refuses to withdraw from his office, and subsequently, the Appointing Authority fails
or refuses to decide on the termination of the mandate of that arbitrator within such period as may be allowed under the
applicable rule or, in the absence thereof, within thirty (30) days from the time the request is brought before him, any party may
file with the court a petition to terminate the mandate of that arbitrator.

Rule 8.3. Venue. - A petition to terminate the mandate of an arbitrator may, at that petitioner’s option, be filed with the Regional
Trial Court (a) where the principal place of business of any of the parties is located, (b) where any of the parties who are
individuals resides, or (c) in the National Capital Region.

Rule 8.4. Contents of the petition. - The petition shall state the following:
 a. The name of the arbitrator whose mandate is sought to be terminated;

b. The ground/s for termination;

c. The fact that one or all of the parties had requested the arbitrator to withdraw but he failed or refused to do so;

d. The fact that one or all of the parties requested the Appointing Authority to act on the request for the
termination of the mandate of the arbitrator and failure or inability of the Appointing Authority to act within thirty
(30) days from the request of a party or parties or within such period as may have been agreed upon by the
parties or allowed under the applicable rule.

The petitioner shall further allege that one or all of the parties had requested the arbitrator to withdraw but he failed or refused to
do so.

Rule 8.5. Comment/Opposition. - The comment/opposition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from service of the petition.

Rule 8.6. Court action. - After hearing, if the court finds merit in the petition, it shall terminate the mandate of the arbitrator who
refuses to withdraw from his office; otherwise, it shall dismiss the petition.

Rule 8.7. No motion for reconsideration or appeal. - Any order of the court resolving the petition shall be immediately executory
and shall not be subject of a motion for reconsideration, appeal or petition for certiorari.

Rule 8.8. Appointment of substitute arbitrator. - Where the mandate of an arbitrator is terminated, or he withdraws from office for
any other reason, or because of his mandate is revoked by agreement of the parties or is terminated for any other reason, a
substitute arbitrator shall be appointed according to the rules that were applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator being
replaced.

RULE 9: ASSISTANCE IN TAKING EVIDENCE

Rule 9.1. Who may request assistance. - Any party to an arbitration, whether domestic or foreign, may request the court to
provide assistance in taking evidence.

Rule 9.2. When assistance may be sought. - Assistance may be sought at any time during the course of the arbitral proceedings
when the need arises.

Rule 9.3. Venue. - A petition for assistance in taking evidence may, at the option of the petitioner, be filed with Regional Trial
Court where (a) arbitration proceedings are taking place, (b) the witnesses reside or may be found, or (c) where the evidence
may be found.

Rule 9.4. Ground. - The court may grant or execute the request for assistance in taking evidence within its competence and
according to the rules of evidence.

Rule 9.5. Type of assistance. - A party requiring assistance in the taking of evidence may petition the court to direct any person,
including a representative of a corporation, association, partnership or other entity (other than a party to the ADR proceedings or
its officers) found in the Philippines, for any of the following:

a. To comply with a subpoena ad testificandum and/or subpoena duces tecum;

 b. To appear as a witness before an officer for the taking of his deposition upon oral examination or by written
interrogatories;

c. To allow the physical examination of the condition of persons, or the inspection of things or premises and,
when appropriate, to allow the recording and/or documentation of condition of persons, things or premises (i.e.,
photographs, video and other means of recording/documentation);

d. To allow the examination and copying of documents; and

e. To perform any similar acts.

Rule 9.6. Contents of the petition. - The petition must state the following:

a. The fact that there is an ongoing arbitration proceeding even if such proceeding could not continue due to
some legal impediments;

b. The arbitral tribunal ordered the taking of evidence or the party desires to present evidence to the arbitral
tribunal;

c. Materiality or relevance of the evidence to be taken; and

d. The names and addresses of the intended witness/es, place where the evidence may be found, the place
where the premises to be inspected are located or the place where the acts required are to be done.

Rule 9.7. Comment/Opposition. - The comment/opposition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from service of the petition.

Rule 9.8. Court action. - If the evidence sought is not privileged, and is material and relevant, the court shall grant the assistance
in taking evidence requested and shall order petitioner to pay costs attendant to such assistance.

Rule 9.9. Relief against court action. - The order granting assistance in taking evidence shall be immediately executory and not
subject to reconsideration or appeal. If the court declines to grant assistance in taking evidence, the petitioner may file a motion
for reconsideration or appeal.

Rule 9.10. Perpetuation of testimony before the arbitral tribunal is constituted. - At anytime before arbitration is commenced or
before the arbitral tribunal is constituted, any person who desires to perpetuate his testimony or that of another person may do so
in accordance with Rule 24 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 9.11. Consequence of disobedience. - The court may impose the appropriate sanction on any person who disobeys its
order to testify when required or perform any act required of him.

RULE 10: CONFIDENTIALITY/PROTECTIVE ORDERS

Rule 10.1. Who may request confidentiality. - A party, counsel or witness who disclosed or who was compelled to disclose
information relative to the subject of ADR under circumstances that would create a reasonable expectation, on behalf of the
source, that the information shall be kept confidential has the right to prevent such information from being further disclosed
without the express written consent of the source or the party who made the disclosure.

Rule 10.2. When request made. - A party may request a protective order at anytime there is a need to enforce the confidentiality
of the information obtained, or to be obtained, in ADR proceedings.
Rule 10.3. Venue. - A petition for a protective order may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where that order would be
implemented.

If there is a pending court proceeding in which the information obtained in an ADR proceeding is required to be divulged or is
being divulged, the party seeking to enforce the confidentiality of the information may file a motion with the court where the
proceedings are pending to enjoin the confidential information from being divulged or to suppress confidential information.

Rule 10.4. Grounds. - A protective order may be granted only if it is shown that the applicant would be materially prejudiced by
an unauthorized disclosure of the information obtained, or to be obtained, during an ADR proceeding.

Rule 10.5. Contents of the motion or petition. - The petition or motion must state the following:

a. That the information sought to be protected was obtained, or would be obtained, during an ADR proceeding;

b. The applicant would be materially prejudiced by the disclosure of that information;

c. The person or persons who are being asked to divulge the confidential information participated in an ADR
proceedings; and

d. The time, date and place when the ADR proceedings took place.

Apart from the other submissions, the movant must set the motion for hearing and contain a notice of hearing in accordance with
Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 10.6. Notice. - Notice of a request for a protective order made through a motion shall be made to the opposing parties in
accordance with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 10.7. Comment/Opposition. - The comment/opposition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from service of the petition. The
opposition or comment may be accompanied by written proof that (a) the information is not confidential, (b) the information was
not obtained during an ADR proceeding, (c) there was a waiver of confidentiality, or (d) the petitioner/movant is precluded from
asserting confidentiality.

Rule 10.8. Court action. - If the court finds the petition or motion meritorious, it shall issue an order enjoining a person or persons
from divulging confidential information.

In resolving the petition or motion, the courts shall be guided by the following principles applicable to all ADR proceedings:
Confidential information shall not be subject to discovery and shall be inadmissible in any adversarial proceeding, whether
judicial or quasi judicial. However, evidence or information that is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery does not become
inadmissible or protected from discovery solely by reason of its use therein.

For mediation proceedings, the court shall be further guided by the following principles:

a. Information obtained through mediation shall be privileged and confidential.

b. A party, a mediator, or a nonparty participant may refuse to disclose and may prevent any other person from
disclosing a mediation communication.

c. In such an adversarial proceeding, the following persons involved or previously involved in a mediation may not
be compelled to disclose confidential information obtained during the mediation: (1) the parties to the dispute; (2)
the mediator or mediators; (3) the counsel for the parties: (4) the nonparty participants; (5) any persons hired or
 engaged in connection with the mediation as secretary, stenographer; clerk or assistant; and (6) any other person
who obtains or possesses confidential information by reason of his/ her profession.

d. The protection of the ADR Laws shall continue to apply even if a mediator is found to have failed to act
impartially.

e. A mediator may not be called to testify to provide information gathered in mediation. A mediator who is
wrongfully subpoenaed shall be reimbursed the full cost of his attorney fees and related expenses.

Rule 10.9. Relief against court action. - The order enjoining a person or persons from divulging confidential information shall be
immediately executory and may not be enjoined while the order is being questioned with the appellate courts.

If the court declines to enjoin a person or persons from divulging confidential information, the petitioner may file a motion for
reconsideration or appeal.

Rule 10.10. Consequence of disobedience. - Any person who disobeys the order of the court to cease from divulging confidential
information shall be imposed the proper sanction by the court.

RULE 11: CONFIRMATION, CORRECTION OR VACATION OF AWARD IN DOMESTIC ARBITRATION

Rule 11.1. Who may request confirmation, correction or vacation. - Any party to a domestic arbitration may petition the court to
confirm, correct or vacate a domestic arbitral award.

Rule 11.2. When to request confirmation, correction/modification or vacation. -

(A) Confirmation. - At any time after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt by the petitioner of the arbitral award, he may
petition the court to confirm that award.

(B) Correction/Modification. - Not later than thirty (30) days from receipt of the arbitral award, a party may petition the court to
correct/modify that award.

(C) Vacation. - Not later than thirty (30) days from receipt of the arbitral award, a party may petition the court to vacate that
award.

(D) A petition to vacate the arbitral award may be filed, in opposition to a petition to confirm the arbitral award, not later than thirty
(30) days from receipt of the award by the petitioner. A petition to vacate the arbitral award filed beyond the reglementary period
shall be dismissed.

(E) A petition to confirm the arbitral award may be filed, in opposition to a petition to vacate the arbitral award, at any time after
the petition to vacate such arbitral award is filed. The dismissal of the petition to vacate the arbitral award for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period shall not result in the dismissal of the petition for the confirmation of such arbitral award.

(F) The filing of a petition to confirm an arbitral award shall not authorize the filing of a belated petition to vacate or set aside such
award in opposition thereto.

(G) A petition to correct an arbitral award may be included as part of a petition to confirm the arbitral award or as a petition to
confirm that award.
Rule 11.3. Venue. - The petition for confirmation, correction/modification or vacation of a domestic arbitral award may be filed
with Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place in which one of the parties is doing business, where any of the parties
reside or where arbitration proceedings were conducted.

Rule 11.4. Grounds. - (A) To vacate an arbitral award. - The arbitral award may be vacated on the following grounds:

a. The arbitral award was procured through corruption, fraud or other undue means;

b. There was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitral tribunal or any of its members;

c. The arbitral tribunal was guilty of misconduct or any form of misbehavior that has materially prejudiced the
rights of any party such as refusing to postpone a hearing upon sufficient cause shown or to hear evidence
pertinent and material to the controversy;

d. One or more of the arbitrators was disqualified to act as such under the law and willfully refrained from
disclosing such disqualification; or

e. The arbitral tribunal exceeded its powers, or so imperfectly executed them, such that a complete, final and
definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made.

The award may also be vacated on any or all of the following grounds:

a. The arbitration agreement did not exist, or is invalid for any ground for the revocation of a contract or is
otherwise unenforceable; or

b. A party to arbitration is a minor or a person judicially declared to be incompetent.

The petition to vacate an arbitral award on the ground that the party to arbitration is a minor or a person judicially declared to be
incompetent shall be filed only on behalf of the minor or incompetent and shall allege that (a) the other party to arbitration had
knowingly entered into a submission or agreement with such minor or incompetent, or (b) the submission to arbitration was made
by a guardian or guardian ad litem who was not authorized to do so by a competent court.

In deciding the petition to vacate the arbitral award, the court shall disregard any other ground than those enumerated above.

(B) To correct/modify an arbitral award. - The Court may correct/modify or order the arbitral tribunal to correct/modify the arbitral
award in the following cases:

a. Where there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the description of any person,
thing or property referred to in the award;

b. Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, not affecting the merits of the
decision upon the matter submitted;

c. Where the arbitrators have omitted to resolve an issue submitted to them for resolution; or

d. Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy, and if it had been a
commissioner’s report, the defect could have been amended or disregarded by the Court.
Rule 11.5. Form of petition. - An application to vacate an arbitral award shall be in the form of a petition to vacate or as a petition
to vacate in opposition to a petition to confirm the same award.

An application to correct/modify an arbitral award may be included in a petition to confirm an arbitral award or in a petition to
vacate in opposition to confirm the same award.

When a petition to confirm an arbitral award is pending before a court, the party seeking to vacate or correct/modify said award
may only apply for those reliefs through a petition to vacate or correct/modify the award in opposition to the petition to confirm the
award provided that such petition to vacate or correct/modify is filed within thirty (30) days from his receipt of the award. A
petition to vacate or correct/modify an arbitral award filed in another court or in a separate case before the same court shall be
dismissed, upon appropriate motion, as a violation of the rule against forum-shopping.

When a petition to vacate or correct/modify an arbitral award is pending before a court, the party seeking to confirm said award
may only apply for that relief through a petition to confirm the same award in opposition to the petition to vacate or correct/modify
the award. A petition to confirm or correct/modify an arbitral award filed as separate proceeding in another court or in a different
case before the same court shall be dismissed, upon appropriate motion, as a violation of the rule against forum shopping.

As an alternative to the dismissal of a second petition for confirmation, vacation or correction/modification of an arbitral award
filed in violation of the non-forum shopping rule, the court or courts concerned may allow the consolidation of the two proceedings
in one court and in one case.

Where the petition to confirm the award and petition to vacate or correct/modify were simultaneously filed by the parties in the
same court or in different courts in the Philippines, upon motion of either party, the court may order the consolidation of the two
cases before either court.

In all instances, the petition must be verified by a person who has knowledge of the jurisdictional facts.

Rule 11.6. Contents of petition. - The petition must state the following:

a. The addresses of the parties and any change thereof;

b. The jurisdictional issues raised by a party during arbitration proceedings;

c. The grounds relied upon by the parties in seeking the vacation of the arbitral award whether the petition is a
petition for the vacation or setting aside of the arbitral award or a petition in opposition to a petition to confirm the
award; and

d. A statement of the date of receipt of the arbitral award and the circumstances under which it was received by
the petitioner.

Apart from other submissions, the petitioner must attach to the petition the following:

a. An authentic copy of the arbitration agreement;

b. An authentic copy of the arbitral award;

c. A certification against forum shopping executed by the applicant in accordance with Section 5 of Rule 7 of the
Rules of Court; and
 d. An authentic copy or authentic copies of the appointment of an arbitral tribunal.

Rule 11.7. Notice. - Upon finding that the petition filed under this Rule is sufficient both in form and in substance, the Court shall
cause notice and a copy of the petition to be delivered to the respondent allowing him to file a comment or opposition thereto
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the petition. In lieu of an opposition, the respondent may file a petition in opposition to the
petition.

The petitioner may within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the petition in opposition thereto file a reply.

Rule 11.8. Hearing. - If the Court finds from the petition or petition in opposition thereto that there are issues of fact, it shall
require the parties, within a period of not more than fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order, to simultaneously submit the
affidavits of all of their witnesses and reply affidavits within ten (10) days from receipt of the affidavits to be replied to. There shall
be attached to the affidavits or reply affidavits documents relied upon in support of the statements of fact in such affidavits or
reply affidavits.

If the petition or the petition in opposition thereto is one for vacation of an arbitral award, the interested party in arbitration may
oppose the petition or the petition in opposition thereto for the reason that the grounds cited in the petition or the petition in
opposition thereto, assuming them to be true, do not affect the merits of the case and may be cured or remedied. Moreover, the
interested party may request the court to suspend the proceedings for vacation for a period of time and to direct the arbitral
tribunal to reopen and conduct a new hearing and take such other action as will eliminate the grounds for vacation of the award.
The opposition shall be supported by a brief of legal arguments to show the existence of a sufficient legal basis for the
opposition.

If the ground of the petition to vacate an arbitral award is that the arbitration agreement did not exist, is invalid or otherwise
unenforceable, and an earlier petition for judicial relief under Rule 3 had been filed, a copy of such petition and of the decision or
final order of the court shall be attached thereto. But if the ground was raised before the arbitral tribunal in a motion to dismiss
filed not later than the submission of its answer, and the arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of its own jurisdiction as a preliminary
question which was appealed by a party to the Regional Trial Court, a copy of the order, ruling or preliminary award or decision of
the arbitral tribunal, the appeal therefrom to the Court and the order or decision of the Court shall all be attached to the petition.

If the ground of the petition is that the petitioner is an infant or a person judicially declared to be incompetent, there shall be
attached to the petition certified copies of documents showing such fact. In addition, the petitioner shall show that even if the
submission or arbitration agreement was entered into by a guardian or guardian ad litem, the latter was not authorized by a
competent court to sign such the submission or arbitration agreement.

If on the basis of the petition, the opposition, the affidavits and reply affidavits of the parties, the court finds that there is a need to
conduct an oral hearing, the court shall set the case for hearing. This case shall have preference over other cases before the
court, except criminal cases. During the hearing, the affidavits of witnesses shall take the place of their direct testimonies and
they shall immediately be subject to cross-examination thereon. The Court shall have full control over the proceedings in order to
ensure that the case is heard without undue delay.

Rule 11.9. Court action. - Unless a ground to vacate an arbitral award under Rule 11.5 above is fully established, the court shall
confirm the award.

An arbitral award shall enjoy the presumption that it was made and released in due course of arbitration and is subject to
confirmation by the court

In resolving the petition or petition in opposition thereto in accordance with these Special ADR Rules, the court shall either
confirm or vacate the arbitral award. The court shall not disturb the arbitral tribunal’s determination of facts and/or interpretation
of law.
In a petition to vacate an award or in petition to vacate an award in opposition to a petition to confirm the award, the petitioner
may simultaneously apply with the Court to refer the case back to the same arbitral tribunal for the purpose of making a new or
revised award or to direct a new hearing, or in the appropriate case, order the new hearing before a new arbitral tribunal, the
members of which shall be chosen in the manner provided in the arbitration agreement or submission, or the law. In the latter
case, any provision limiting the time in which the arbitral tribunal may make a decision shall be deemed applicable to the new
arbitral tribunal.

In referring the case back to the arbitral tribunal or to a new arbitral tribunal pursuant to Rule 24 of Republic Act No. 876, the
court may not direct it to revise its award in a particular way, or to revise its findings of fact or conclusions of law or otherwise
encroach upon the independence of an arbitral tribunal in the making of a final award.

RULE 12: RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OR SETTING ASIDE OF AN INTERNATIONALCOMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION AWARD

Rule 12.1. Who may request recognition and enforcement or setting aside. - Any party to an international commercial arbitration
in the Philippines may petition the proper court to recognize and enforce or set aside an arbitral award.

Rule 12.2. When to file petition. - (A) Petition to recognize and enforce. - The petition for enforcement and recognition of an
arbitral award may be filed anytime from receipt of the award. If, however, a timely petition to set aside an arbitral award is filed,
the opposing party must file therein and in opposition thereto the petition for recognition and enforcement of the same award
within the period for filing an opposition.

(B) Petition to set aside. - The petition to set aside an arbitral award may only be filed within three (3) months from the time the
petitioner receives a copy thereof. If a timely request is made with the arbitral tribunal for correction, interpretation or additional
award, the three (3) month period shall be counted from the time the petitioner receives the resolution by the arbitral tribunal of
that request.

A petition to set aside can no longer be filed after the lapse of the three (3) month period. The dismissal of a petition to set aside
an arbitral award for being time-barred shall not automatically result in the approval of the petition filed therein and in opposition
thereto for recognition and enforcement of the same award. Failure to file a petition to set aside shall preclude a party from
raising grounds to resist enforcement of the award.

Rule 12.3. Venue. - A petition to recognize and enforce or set aside an arbitral award may, at the option of the petitioner, be filed
with the Regional Trial Court: (a) where arbitration proceedings were conducted; (b) where any of the assets to be attached or
levied upon is located; (c) where the act to be enjoined will be or is being performed; (d) where any of the parties to arbitration
resides or has its place of business; or (e) in the National Capital Judicial Region.

Rule 12.4. Grounds to set aside or resist enforcement. - The court may set aside or refuse the enforcement of the arbitral award
only if:

a. The party making the application furnishes proof that:

(i). A party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity, or the said agreement is not valid
under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereof, under Philippine law;
or

(ii). The party making the application to set aside or resist enforcement was not given proper notice of the
appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or

(iii). The award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission
to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration;
 provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so
submitted, only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration
may be set aside or only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to
arbitration may be enforced; or

(iv). The composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict with a provision of Philippine law from
which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with Philippine law;

b. The court finds that:

(i). The subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of the
Philippines; or

(ii). The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to public policy.

In deciding the petition, the Court shall disregard any other ground to set aside or enforce the arbitral award other than those
enumerated above.

The petition to set-aside or a pleading resisting the enforcement of an arbitral award on the ground that a party was a minor or an
incompetent shall be filed only on behalf of the minor or incompetent and shall allege that (a) the other party to arbitration had
knowingly entered into a submission or agreement with such minor or incompetent, or (b) the submission to arbitration was made
by a guardian or guardian ad litem who was not authorized to do so by a competent court.

Rule 12.5. Exclusive recourse against arbitral award. - Recourse to a court against an arbitral award shall be made only through
a petition to set aside the arbitral award and on grounds prescribed by the law that governs international commercial arbitration.
Any other recourse from the arbitral award, such as by appeal or petition for review or petition for certiorari or otherwise, shall be
dismissed by the court.

Rule 12.6. Form. - The application to recognize and enforce or set aside an arbitral award, whether made through a petition to
recognize and enforce or to set aside or as a petition to set aside the award in opposition thereto, or through a petition to set
aside or petition to recognize and enforce in opposition thereto, shall be verified by a person who has personal knowledge of the
facts stated therein.

When a petition to recognize and enforce an arbitral award is pending, the application to set it aside, if not yet time-barred, shall
be made through a petition to set aside the same award in the same proceedings.

When a timely petition to set aside an arbitral award is filed, the opposing party may file a petition for recognition and
enforcement of the same award in opposition thereto.

Rule 12.7. Contents of petition. - (A) Petition to recognize and enforce. - The petition to recognize and enforce or petition to set
aside in opposition thereto, or petition to set aside or petition to recognize and enforce in opposition thereto, shall state the
following:

a. The addresses of record, or any change thereof, of the parties to arbitration;

b. A statement that the arbitration agreement or submission exists;

c. The names of the arbitrators and proof of their appointment;

 d. A statement that an arbitral award was issued and when the petitioner received it; and

e. The relief sought.

Apart from other submissions, the petitioner shall attach to the petition the following:

a. An authentic copy of the arbitration agreement;

b. An authentic copy of the arbitral award;

c. A verification and certification against forum shopping executed by the applicant in accordance with Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court; and

d. An authentic copy or authentic copies of the appointment of an arbitral tribunal.

(B) Petition to set aside. - The petition to set aside or petition to set aside in opposition to a petition to recognize and enforce an
arbitral award in international commercial arbitration shall have the same contents as a petition to recognize and enforce or
petition to recognize and enforce in opposition to a petition to set aside an arbitral award. In addition, the said petitions should
state the grounds relied upon to set it aside.

Further, if the ground of the petition to set aside is that the petitioner is a minor or found incompetent by a court, there shall be
attached to the petition certified copies of documents showing such fact. In addition, the petitioner shall show that even if the
submission or arbitration agreement was entered into by a guardian or guardian ad litem, the latter was not authorized by a
competent court to sign such the submission or arbitration agreement.

In either case, if another court was previously requested to resolve and/or has resolved, on appeal, the arbitral tribunal’s
preliminary determination in favor of its own jurisdiction, the petitioner shall apprise the court before which the petition to
recognize and enforce or set aside is pending of the status of the appeal or its resolution.

Rule 12.8. Notice. - Upon finding that the petition filed under this Rule is sufficient both in form and in substance, the court shall
cause notice and a copy of the petition to be delivered to the respondent directing him to file an opposition thereto within fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the petition. In lieu of an opposition, the respondent may file a petition to set aside in opposition to a
petition to recognize and enforce, or a petition to recognize and enforce in opposition to a petition to set aside.

The petitioner may within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the petition to set aside in opposition to a petition to recognize and
enforce, or from receipt of the petition to recognize and enforce in opposition to a petition to set aside, file a reply.

Rule 12.9. Submission of documents. - If the court finds that the issue between the parties is mainly one of law, the parties may
be required to submit briefs of legal arguments, not more than fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order, sufficiently discussing
the legal issues and the legal basis for the relief prayed for by each of them.

If the court finds from the petition or petition in opposition thereto that there are issues of fact relating to the ground(s) relied upon
for the court to set aside, it shall require the parties within a period of not more than fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order
simultaneously to submit the affidavits of all of their witnesses and reply affidavits within ten (10) days from receipt of the
affidavits to be replied to. There shall be attached to the affidavits or reply affidavits, all documents relied upon in support of the
statements of fact in such affidavits or reply affidavits.

Rule 12.10. Hearing. - If on the basis of the petition, the opposition, the affidavits and reply affidavits of the parties, the court finds
that there is a need to conduct an oral hearing, the court shall set the case for hearing. This case shall have preference over
other cases before the court, except criminal cases. During the hearing, the affidavits of witnesses shall take the place of their
direct testimonies and they shall immediately be subject to cross-examination thereon. The court shall have full control over the
proceedings in order to ensure that the case is heard without undue delay.

Rule 12.11. Suspension of proceedings to set aside. - The court when asked to set aside an arbitral award may, where
appropriate and upon request by a party, suspend the proceedings for a period of time determined by it to give the arbitral
tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or to take such other action as in the arbitral tribunal’s opinion will
eliminate the grounds for setting aside. The court, in referring the case back to the arbitral tribunal may not direct it to revise its
award in a particular way, or to revise its findings of fact or conclusions of law or otherwise encroach upon the independence of
an arbitral tribunal in the making of a final award.

The court when asked to set aside an arbitral award may also, when the preliminary ruling of an arbitral tribunal affirming its
jurisdiction to act on the matter before it had been appealed by the party aggrieved by such preliminary ruling to the court,
suspend the proceedings to set aside to await the ruling of the court on such pending appeal or, in the alternative, consolidate
the proceedings to set aside with the earlier appeal.

Rule 12.12. Presumption in favor of confirmation. - It is presumed that an arbitral award was made and released in due course
and is subject to enforcement by the court, unless the adverse party is able to establish a ground for setting aside or not
enforcing an arbitral award.

Rule 12.13. Judgment of the court. - Unless a ground to set aside an arbitral award under Rule 12.4 above is fully established,
the court shall dismiss the petition. If, in the same proceedings, there is a petition to recognize and enforce the arbitral award filed
in opposition to the petition to set aside, the court shall recognize and enforce the award.

In resolving the petition or petition in opposition thereto in accordance with the Special ADR Rules, the court shall either set aside
or enforce the arbitral award. The court shall not disturb the arbitral tribunal’s determination of facts and/or interpretation of law.

Rule 12.14. Costs. - Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties in writing, at the time the case is submitted to the court for
decision, the party praying for recognition and enforcement or setting aside of an arbitral award shall submit a statement under
oath confirming the costs he has incurred only in the proceedings for such recognition and enforcement or setting aside. The
costs shall include the attorney’s fees the party has paid or is committed to pay to his counsel of record.

The prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of costs, which shall include reasonable attorney’s fees of the prevailing party
against the unsuccessful party. The court shall determine the reasonableness of the claim for attorney’s fees.

RULE 13: RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF A FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARD

Rule 13.1. Who may request recognition and enforcement. - Any party to a foreign arbitration may petition the court to recognize
and enforce a foreign arbitral award.

Rule 13.2. When to petition. - At any time after receipt of a foreign arbitral award, any party to arbitration may petition the proper
Regional Trial Court to recognize and enforce such award.

Rule 13.3. Venue. - The petition to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award shall be filed, at the option of the petitioner,
with the Regional Trial Court (a) where the assets to be attached or levied upon is located, (b) where the act to be enjoined is
being performed, (c) in the principal place of business in the Philippines of any of the parties, (d) if any of the parties is an
individual, where any of those individuals resides, or (e) in the National Capital Judicial Region.

Rule 13.4. Governing law and grounds to refuse recognition and enforcement. - The recognition and enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award shall be governed by the 1958 New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards (the "New York Convention") and this Rule. The court may, upon grounds of comity and reciprocity, recognize and
enforce a foreign arbitral award made in a country that is not a signatory to the New York Convention as if it were a Convention
Award.

A Philippine court shall not set aside a foreign arbitral award but may refuse it recognition and enforcement on any or all of the
following grounds:

a. The party making the application to refuse recognition and enforcement of the award furnishes proof that:

(i). A party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity; or the said agreement is not valid
under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing any indication thereof, under the law of the
country where the award was made; or

(ii). The party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of
the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his case; or

(iii). The award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission
to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration;
provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so
submitted, only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration
may be set aside; or

(iv). The composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the
agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, was not in accordance with the law of the country
where arbitration took place; or

(v). The award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or suspended by a court
of the country in which that award was made; or

b. The court finds that:

(i). The subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement or resolution by arbitration under
Philippine law; or

(ii). The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to public policy.

The court shall disregard any ground for opposing the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award other than those
enumerated above.

Rule 13.5. Contents of petition. - The petition shall state the following:

a. The addresses of the parties to arbitration;

b. In the absence of any indication in the award, the country where the arbitral award was made and whether
such country is a signatory to the New York Convention; and

c. The relief sought.

Apart from other submissions, the petition shall have attached to it the following:
 a. An authentic copy of the arbitration agreement; and

b. An authentic copy of the arbitral award.

If the foreign arbitral award or agreement to arbitrate or submission is not made in English, the petitioner shall also attach to the
petition a translation of these documents into English. The translation shall be certified by an official or sworn translator or by a
diplomatic or consular agent.

Rule 13.6. Notice and opposition. - Upon finding that the petition filed under this Rule is sufficient both in form and in substance,
the court shall cause notice and a copy of the petition to be delivered to the respondent allowing him to file an opposition thereto
within thirty (30) days from receipt of the notice and petition.

Rule 13.7. Opposition. - The opposition shall be verified by a person who has personal knowledge of the facts stated therein.

Rule 13.8. Submissions. - If the court finds that the issue between the parties is mainly one of law, the parties may be required to
submit briefs of legal arguments, not more than thirty (30) days from receipt of the order, sufficiently discussing the legal issues
and the legal bases for the relief prayed for by each other.

If, from a review of the petition or opposition, there are issues of fact relating to the ground/s relied upon for the court to refuse
enforcement, the court shall, motu proprio or upon request of any party, require the parties to simultaneously submit the affidavits
of all of their witnesses within a period of not less than fifteen (15) days nor more than thirty (30) days from receipt of the order.
The court may, upon the request of any party, allow the submission of reply affidavits within a period of not less than fifteen (15)
days nor more than thirty (30) days from receipt of the order granting said request. There shall be attached to the affidavits or
reply affidavits all documents relied upon in support of the statements of fact in such affidavits or reply affidavits.

Rule 13.9. Hearing. - The court shall set the case for hearing if on the basis of the foregoing submissions there is a need to do
so. The court shall give due priority to hearings on petitions under this Rule. During the hearing, the affidavits of witnesses shall
take the place of their direct testimonies and they shall immediately be subject to cross-examination. The court shall have full
control over the proceedings in order to ensure that the case is heard without undue delay.

Rule 13.10. Adjournment/deferment of decision on enforcement of award. - The court before which a petition to recognize and
enforce a foreign arbitral award is pending, may adjourn or defer rendering a decision thereon if, in the meantime, an application
for the setting aside or suspension of the award has been made with a competent authority in the country where the award was
made. Upon application of the petitioner, the court may also require the other party to give suitable security.

Rule 13.11. Court action. - It is presumed that a foreign arbitral award was made and released in due course of arbitration and is
subject to enforcement by the court.

The court shall recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award unless a ground to refuse recognition or enforcement of the foreign
arbitral award under this rule is fully established.

The decision of the court recognizing and enforcing a foreign arbitral award is immediately executory.

In resolving the petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award in accordance with these Special ADR Rules,
the court shall either [a] recognize and/or enforce or [b] refuse to recognize and enforce the arbitral award. The court shall not
disturb the arbitral tribunal’s determination of facts and/or interpretation of law.

Rule 13.12. Recognition and enforcement of non-convention award. - The court shall, only upon grounds provided by these
Special ADR Rules, recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award made in a country not a signatory to the New York
Convention when such country extends comity and reciprocity to awards made in the Philippines. If that country does not extend
comity and reciprocity to awards made in the Philippines, the court may nevertheless treat such award as a foreign judgment
enforceable as such under Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court.

PART III
PROVISIONS SPECIFIC TO MEDIATION

RULE 14: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Rule 14.1. Application of the rules on arbitration. - Whenever applicable and appropriate, the pertinent rules on arbitration shall
be applied in proceedings before the court relative to a dispute subject to mediation.

RULE 15: DEPOSIT AND ENFORCEMENT OF MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS

Rule 15.1. Who makes a deposit. - Any party to a mediation that is not court-annexed may deposit with the court the written
settlement agreement, which resulted from that mediation.

Rule 15.2. When deposit is made. - At any time after an agreement is reached, the written settlement agreement may be
deposited.

Rule 15.3. Venue. - The written settlement agreement may be jointly deposited by the parties or deposited by one party with prior
notice to the other party/ies with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (a) where the principal place of business in the
Philippines of any of the parties is located; (b) if any of the parties is an individual, where any of those individuals resides; or (c) in
the National Capital Judicial Region.

Rule 15.4. Registry Book. - The Clerk of Court of each Regional Trial Court shall keep a Registry Book that shall chronologically
list or enroll all the mediated settlement agreements/settlement awards that are deposited with the court as well as the names
and address of the parties thereto and the date of enrollment and shall issue a Certificate of Deposit to the party that made the
deposit.

Rule 15.5. Enforcement of mediated settlement agreement. - Any of the parties to a mediated settlement agreement, which was
deposited with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, may, upon breach thereof, file a verified petition with the same court
to enforce said agreement.

Rule 15.6. Contents of petition. - The verified petition shall:

a. Name and designate, as petitioner or respondent, all parties to the mediated settlement agreement and those
who may be affected by it;

b. State the following:

(i). The addresses of the petitioner and respondents; and

(ii). The ultimate facts that would show that the adverse party has defaulted to perform its obligation under
said agreement; and

c. Have attached to it the following:

(i). An authentic copy of the mediated settlement agreement; and

 (ii). Certificate of Deposit showing that the mediated settlement agreement was deposited with the Clerk
of Court.

Rule 15.7. Opposition. - The adverse party may file an opposition, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice or service of the
petition, by submitting written proof of compliance with the mediated settlement agreement or such other affirmative or negative
defenses it may have.

Rule 15.8. Court action. - After a summary hearing, if the court finds that the agreement is a valid mediated settlement
agreement, that there is no merit in any of the affirmative or negative defenses raised, and the respondent has breached that
agreement, in whole or in part, the court shall order the enforcement thereof; otherwise, it shall dismiss the petition.

PART IV
PROVISIONS SPECIFIC TO CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION

RULE 16: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Rule 16.1. Application of the rules on arbitration. - Whenever applicable and appropriate, the rules on arbitration shall be applied
in proceedings before the court relative to a dispute subject to construction arbitration.

RULE 17: REFERRAL TO CIAC

Rule 17.1. Dismissal of action. - A Regional Trial Court before which a construction dispute is filed shall, upon becoming aware
that the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement, motu proprio or upon motion made not later than the pre-trial, dismiss
the case and refer the parties to arbitration to be conducted by the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), unless
all parties to arbitration, assisted by their respective counsel, submit to the court a written agreement making the court, rather
than the CIAC, the body that would exclusively resolve the dispute.

Rule 17.2. Form and contents of motion. - The request for dismissal of the civil action and referral to arbitration shall be through a
verified motion that shall (a) contain a statement showing that the dispute is a construction dispute; and (b) be accompanied by
proof of the existence of the arbitration agreement.

If the arbitration agreement or other document evidencing the existence of that agreement is already part of the record, those
documents need not be submitted to the court provided that the movant has cited in the motion particular references to the
records where those documents may be found.

The motion shall also contain a notice of hearing addressed to all parties and shall specify the date and time when the motion will
be heard, which must not be later than fifteen (15) days after the filing of the motion. The movant shall ensure receipt by all
parties of the motion at least three days before the date of the hearing.

Rule 17.3. Opposition. - Upon receipt of the motion to refer the dispute to arbitration by CIAC, the other party may file an
opposition to the motion on or before the day such motion is to be heard. The opposition shall clearly set forth the reasons why
the court should not dismiss the case.

Rule 17.4. Hearing. - The court shall hear the motion only once and for the purpose of clarifying relevant factual and legal issues.

Rule 17.5. Court action. - If the other parties fail to file their opposition on or before the day of the hearing, the court shall motu
proprio resolve the motion only on the basis of the facts alleged in the motion.
After hearing, the court shall dismiss the civil action and refer the parties to arbitration if it finds, based on the pleadings and
supporting documents submitted by the parties, that there is a valid and enforceable arbitration agreement involving a
construction dispute. Otherwise, the court shall proceed to hear the case.

All doubts shall be resolved in favor of the existence of a construction dispute and the arbitration agreement.

Rule 17.6. Referral immediately executory. - An order dismissing the case and referring the dispute to arbitration by CIAC shall
be immediately executory.

Rule 17.7. Multiple actions and parties. - The court shall not decline to dismiss the civil action and make a referral to arbitration
by CIAC for any of the following reasons:

a. Not all of the disputes subject of the civil action may be referred to arbitration;

b. Not all of the parties to the civil action are bound by the arbitration agreement and referral to arbitration would
result in multiplicity of suits;

c. The issues raised in the civil action could be speedily and efficiently resolved in its entirety by the Court rather
than in arbitration;

d. Referral to arbitration does not appear to be the most prudent action; or

e. Dismissal of the civil action would prejudice the rights of the parties to the civil action who are not bound by the
arbitration agreement.

The court may, however, issue an order directing the inclusion in arbitration of those parties who are bound by the arbitration
agreement directly or by reference thereto pursuant to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 9285.

Furthermore, the court shall issue an order directing the case to proceed with respect to the parties not bound by the arbitration
agreement.

Rule 17.8. Referral - If the parties manifest that they have agreed to submit all or part of their dispute pending with the court to
arbitration by CIAC, the court shall refer them to CIAC for arbitration.

PART V
PROVISIONS SPECIFIC TO OTHER FORMS OF ADR

RULE 18: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Rule 18.1. Applicability of rules to other forms of ADR. - This rule governs the procedure for matters brought before the court
involving the following forms of ADR:

a. Early neutral evaluation;

b. Neutral evaluation;

c. Mini-trial;

d. Mediation-arbitration;
 e. A combination thereof; or

f. Any other ADR form.

Rule 18.2. Applicability of the rules on mediation. - If the other ADR form/process is more akin to mediation (i.e., the neutral third
party merely assists the parties in reaching a voluntary agreement), the herein rules on mediation shall apply.

Rule 18.3. Applicability of rules on arbitration.-If the other ADR form/process is more akin to arbitration (i.e., the neutral third
party has the power to make a binding resolution of the dispute), the herein rules on arbitration shall apply.

Rule 18.4. Referral. - If a dispute is already before a court, either party may before and during pre-trial, file a motion for the court
to refer the parties to other ADR forms/processes. At any time during court proceedings, even after pre-trial, the parties may
jointly move for suspension of the action pursuant to Article 2030 of the Civil Code of the Philippines where the possibility of
compromise is shown.

Rule 18.5. Submission of settlement agreement. - Either party may submit to the court, before which the case is pending, any
settlement agreement following a neutral or an early neutral evaluation, mini-trial or mediation-arbitration.

PART VI
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, APPEAL AND CERTIORARI

RULE 19: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, APPEAL AND CERTIORARI

A. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Rule 19.1. Motion for reconsideration, when allowed. - A party may ask the Regional Trial to reconsider its ruling on the following:

a. That the arbitration agreement is inexistent, invalid or unenforceable pursuant to Rule 3.10 (B);

b. Upholding or reversing the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3.19;

c. Denying a request to refer the parties to arbitration;

d. Granting or denying a party an interim measure of protection;

e. Denying a petition for the appointment of an arbitrator;

f. Refusing to grant assistance in taking evidence;

g. Enjoining or refusing to enjoin a person from divulging confidential information;

h. Confirming, vacating or correcting a domestic arbitral award;

i. Suspending the proceedings to set aside an international commercial arbitral award and referring the case back
to the arbitral tribunal;

j. Setting aside an international commercial arbitral award;

 k. Dismissing the petition to set aside an international commercial arbitral award, even if the court does not
recognize and/or enforce the same;

l. Recognizing and/or enforcing, or dismissing a petition to recognize and/or enforce an international commercial
arbitral award;

m. Declining a request for assistance in taking evidence;

n. Adjourning or deferring a ruling on a petition to set aside, recognize and/or enforce an international commercial
arbitral award;

o. Recognizing and/or enforcing a foreign arbitral award, or refusing recognition and/or enforcement of the same;
and

p. Granting or dismissing a petition to enforce a deposited mediated settlement agreement.

No motion for reconsideration shall be allowed from the following rulings of the Regional Trial Court:

a. A prima facie determination upholding the existence, validity or enforceability of an arbitration agreement
pursuant to Rule 3.1 (A);

b. An order referring the dispute to arbitration;

c. An order appointing an arbitrator;

d. Any ruling on the challenge to the appointment of an arbitrator;

e. Any order resolving the issue of the termination of the mandate of an arbitrator; and

f. An order granting assistance in taking evidence.

Rule 19.2. When to move for reconsideration. - A motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Regional Trial Court within a
non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the questioned ruling or order.

Rule 19.3. Contents and notice. - The motion shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor and shall be filed
with the court and served upon the other party or parties.

Rule 19.4. Opposition or comment. - Upon receipt of the motion for reconsideration, the other party or parties shall have a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days to file his opposition or comment.

Rule 19.5. Resolution of motion. - A motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
opposition or comment or upon the expiration of the period to file such opposition or comment.

Rule 19.6. No second motion for reconsideration. - No party shall be allowed a second motion for reconsideration.

B. GENERAL PROVISIONS ON APPEAL AND CERTIORARI

Rule 19.7. No appeal or certiorari on the merits of an arbitral award. - An agreement to refer a dispute to arbitration shall mean
that the arbitral award shall be final and binding. Consequently, a party to an arbitration is precluded from filing an appeal or a
petition for certiorari questioning the merits of an arbitral award.

Rule 19.8. Subject matter and governing rules. - The remedy of an appeal through a petition for review or the remedy of a special
civil action of certiorari from a decision of the Regional Trial Court made under the Special ADR Rules shall be allowed in the
instances, and instituted only in the manner, provided under this Rule.

Rule 19.9. Prohibited alternative remedies. - Where the remedies of appeal and certiorari are specifically made available to a
party under the Special ADR Rules, recourse to one remedy shall preclude recourse to the other.

Rule 19.10. Rule on judicial review on arbitration in the Philippines. - As a general rule, the court can only vacate or set aside the
decision of an arbitral tribunal upon a clear showing that the award suffers from any of the infirmities or grounds for vacating an
arbitral award under Section 24 of Republic Act No. 876 or under Rule 34 of the Model Law in a domestic arbitration, or for
setting aside an award in an international arbitration under Article 34 of the Model Law, or for such other grounds provided under
these Special Rules.

If the Regional Trial Court is asked to set aside an arbitral award in a domestic or international arbitration on any ground other
than those provided in the Special ADR Rules, the court shall entertain such ground for the setting aside or non-recognition of the
arbitral award only if the same amounts to a violation of public policy.

The court shall not set aside or vacate the award of the arbitral tribunal merely on the ground that the arbitral tribunal committed
errors of fact, or of law, or of fact and law, as the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the arbitral tribunal.

Rule 19.11. Rule on judicial review of foreign arbitral award. - The court can deny recognition and enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award only upon the grounds provided in Article V of the New York Convention, but shall have no power to vacate or set
aside a foreign arbitral award.

C. APPEALS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

Rule 19.12. Appeal to the Court of Appeals. - An appeal to the Court of Appeals through a petition for review under this Special
Rule shall only be allowed from the following final orders of the Regional Trial Court:

a. Granting or denying an interim measure of protection;

b. Denying a petition for appointment of an arbitrator;

c. Denying a petition for assistance in taking evidence;

d. Enjoining or refusing to enjoin a person from divulging confidential information;

e. Confirming, vacating or correcting/modifying a domestic arbitral award;

f. Setting aside an international commercial arbitration award;

g. Dismissing the petition to set aside an international commercial arbitration award even if the court does not
decide to recognize or enforce such award;

h. Recognizing and/or enforcing an international commercial arbitration award;

 i. Dismissing a petition to enforce an international commercial arbitration award;

j. Recognizing and/or enforcing a foreign arbitral award;

k. Refusing recognition and/or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award;

l. Granting or dismissing a petition to enforce a deposited mediated settlement agreement; and

m. Reversing the ruling of the arbitral tribunal upholding its jurisdiction.

Rule 19.13. Where to appeal. - An appeal under this Rule shall be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the
manner herein provided.

Rule 19.14. When to appeal. - The petition for review shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision of the
Regional Trial Court or the denial of the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Rule 19.15. How appeal taken. - Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with the
Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse party and on the Regional Trial Court. The original copy
of the petition intended for the Court of Appeals shall be marked original by the petitioner.

Upon the filing of the petition and unless otherwise prescribed by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk of
court of the Court of Appeals docketing fees and other lawful fees of P3,500.00 and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs.

Exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of Appeals upon
a verified motion setting forth valid grounds therefor. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the
docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen days from the notice of the denial.

Rule 19.16. Contents of the Petition. - The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without
impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondent, (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and issues
involved and the grounds relied upon for the review, (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true
copy of the decision or resolution of the Regional Trial Court appealed from, together with certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers, and (d) contain a sworn certification against forum
shopping as provided in the Rules of Court. The petition shall state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the
period fixed herein.

Rule 19.17. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. - The court shall dismiss the petition if it fails to comply with the
foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the
petition, the contents and the documents, which should accompany the petition.

Rule 19.18. Action on the petition. - The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a
motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice, or dismiss the petition if it finds, upon consideration of the grounds alleged
and the legal briefs submitted by the parties, that the petition does not appear to be prima facie meritorious.

Rule 19.19. Contents of Comment. - The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice in seven (7) legible copies and
accompanied by clearly legible certified true copies of such material portions of the record referred to therein together with other
supporting papers. The comment shall (a) point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioner’s statement of facts and issues,
and (b) state the reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner, and
proof of such service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.

Rule 19.20. Due course. - If upon the filing of a comment or such other pleading or documents as may be required or allowed by
the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of the period for the filing thereof, and on the basis of the petition or the records, the
Court of Appeals finds prima facie that the Regional Trial Court has committed an error that would warrant reversal or
modification of the judgment, final order, or resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to the petition; otherwise, it
shall dismiss the same.

Rule 19.21. Transmittal of records. - Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has been given due course, the Court of
Appeals may require the court or agency concerned to transmit the original or a legible certified true copy of the entire record of
the proceeding under review. The record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The
Court of Appeals may require or permit subsequent correction of or addition to the record.

Rule 19.22. Effect of appeal. - The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be reviewed
unless the Court of Appeals directs otherwise upon such terms as it may deem just.

Rule 19.23. Submission for decision. - If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals may set the case for oral
argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be deemed
submitted for decision upon the filing of the last pleading or memorandum required by the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals shall render judgment within sixty (60) days from the time the case is submitted for decision.

Rule 19.24. Subject of appeal restricted in certain instance. - If the decision of the Regional Trial Court refusing to recognize
and/or enforce, vacating and/or setting aside an arbitral award is premised on a finding of fact, the Court of Appeals may inquire
only into such fact to determine the existence or non-existence of the specific ground under the arbitration laws of the Philippines
relied upon by the Regional Trial Court to refuse to recognize and/or enforce, vacate and/or set aside an award. Any such inquiry
into a question of fact shall not be resorted to for the purpose of substituting the court’s judgment for that of the arbitral tribunal as
regards the latter’s ruling on the merits of the controversy.

Rule 19.25. Party appealing decision of court confirming arbitral award required to post bond. - The Court of Appeals shall within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the petition require the party appealing from the decision or a final order of the Regional Trial
Court, either confirming or enforcing an arbitral award, or denying a petition to set aside or vacate the arbitral award to post a
bond executed in favor of the prevailing party equal to the amount of the award.

Failure of the petitioner to post such bond shall be a ground for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition.

D. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI

Rule 19.26. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. - When the Regional Trial Court, in making a ruling under the Special ADR Rules,
has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a party may file a special civil action
for certiorari to annul or set aside a ruling of the Regional Trial Court.

A special civil action for certiorari may be filed against the following orders of the court.

a. Holding that the arbitration agreement is inexistent, invalid or unenforceable;

b. Reversing the arbitral tribunal’s preliminary determination upholding its jurisdiction;

c. Denying the request to refer the dispute to arbitration;

d. Granting or refusing an interim relief;

e. Denying a petition for the appointment of an arbitrator;

 f. Confirming, vacating or correcting a domestic arbitral award;

g. Suspending the proceedings to set aside an international commercial arbitral award and referring the case
back to the arbitral tribunal;

h. Allowing a party to enforce an international commercial arbitral award pending appeal;

i. Adjourning or deferring a ruling on whether to set aside, recognize and or enforce an international commercial
arbitral award;

j. Allowing a party to enforce a foreign arbitral award pending appeal; and

k. Denying a petition for assistance in taking evidence.

Rule 19.27. Form. - The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the questioned judgment, order or resolution of
the Regional Trial Court, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping as provided in the Rules of Court.

Upon the filing of the petition and unless otherwise prescribed by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner shall pay to the clerk of
court of the Court of Appeals docketing fees and other lawful fees of P3,500.00 and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs.
Exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of Appeals upon
a verified motion setting forth valid grounds therefor. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the
docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen days from the notice of the denial.

Rule 19.28. When to file petition. - The petition must be filed with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment, order or resolution sought to be annulled or set aside. No extension of time to file the petition shall be allowed.

Rule 19.29. Arbitral tribunal a nominal party in the petition. - The arbitral tribunal shall only be a nominal party in the petition for
certiorari. As nominal party, the arbitral tribunal shall not be required to submit any pleadings or written submissions to the court.
The arbitral tribunal or an arbitrator may, however, submit such pleadings or written submissions if the same serves the interest
of justice.

In petitions relating to the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, the arbitral tribunal shall not be included even
as a nominal party. However, the tribunal may be notified of the proceedings and furnished with court processes.

Rule 19.30. Court to dismiss petition. - The court shall dismiss the petition if it fails to comply with Rules 19.27 and 19.28 above,
or upon consideration of the ground alleged and the legal briefs submitted by the parties, the petition does not appear to be prima
facie meritorious.

Rule 19.31. Order to comment. - If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify such process, the Court of Appeals
shall immediately issue an order requiring the respondent or respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible
period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof. Such order shall be served on the respondents in such manner as the
court may direct, together with a copy of the petition and any annexes thereto.

Rule 19.32. Arbitration may continue despite petition for certiorari. - A petition for certiorari to the court from the action of the
appointing authority or the arbitral tribunal allowed under this Rule shall not prevent the arbitral tribunal from continuing the
proceedings and rendering its award. Should the arbitral tribunal continue with the proceedings, the arbitral proceedings and any
award rendered therein will be subject to the final outcome of the pending petition for certiorari.
Rule 19.33. Prohibition against injunctions. - The Court of Appeals shall not, during the pendency of the proceedings before it,
prohibit or enjoin the commencement of arbitration, the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, or the continuation of arbitration.

Rule 19.34. Proceedings after comment is filed. - After the comment is filed, or the time for the filing thereof has expired, the
court shall render judgment granting the relief prayed for or to which the petitioner is entitled, or denying the same, within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days.

Rule 19.35. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. - A certified copy of the judgment rendered in accordance with the
last preceding section shall be served upon the Regional Trial Court concerned in such manner as the Court of Appeals may
direct, and disobedience thereto shall be punished as contempt.

E. APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT

Rule 19.36. Review discretionary. - A review by the Supreme Court is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion, which
will be granted only for serious and compelling reasons resulting in grave prejudice to the aggrieved party. The following, while
neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the serious and compelling, and necessarily, restrictive
nature of the grounds that will warrant the exercise of the Supreme Court’s discretionary powers, when the Court of Appeals:

a. Failed to apply the applicable standard or test for judicial review prescribed in these Special ADR Rules in
arriving at its decision resulting in substantial prejudice to the aggrieved party;

b. Erred in upholding a final order or decision despite the lack of jurisdiction of the court that rendered such final
order or decision;

c. Failed to apply any provision, principle, policy or rule contained in these Special ADR Rules resulting in
substantial prejudice to the aggrieved party; and

d. Committed an error so egregious and harmful to a party as to amount to an undeniable excess of jurisdiction.

The mere fact that the petitioner disagrees with the Court of Appeals’ determination of questions of fact, of law or both questions
of fact and law, shall not warrant the exercise of the Supreme Court’s discretionary power. The error imputed to the Court of
Appeals must be grounded upon any of the above prescribed grounds for review or be closely analogous thereto.

A mere general allegation that the Court of Appeals has committed serious and substantial error or that it has acted with grave
abuse of discretion resulting in substantial prejudice to the petitioner without indicating with specificity the nature of such error or
abuse of discretion and the serious prejudice suffered by the petitioner on account thereof, shall constitute sufficient ground for
the Supreme Court to dismiss outright the petition.

Rule 19.37. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or
resolution of the Court of Appeals issued pursuant to these Special ADR Rules may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition
for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.

Rule 19.38. Time for filing; extension. - The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order
or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice
of the judgment.

On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the
expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only
within which to file the petition.
Rule 19.39. Docket and other lawful fees; proof of service of petition. - Unless he has theretofore done so or unless the Supreme
Court orders otherwise, the petitioner shall pay docket and other lawful fees to the clerk of court of the Supreme Court of
P3,500.00 and deposit the amount of P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition. Proof of service of a copy thereof
on the lower court concerned and on the adverse party shall be submitted together with the petition.

Rule 19.40. Contents of petition. - The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original copy intended for the court
being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full name of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse
party as respondent, without impleading the lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the
material dates showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when a motion for
new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was received; (c) set forth concisely a
statement of the matters involved, and the reasons or arguments relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be accompanied
by a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of
court of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the record as would
support the petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping.

Rule 19.41. Dismissal or denial of petition. - The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of
and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

The Supreme Court may on its own initiative deny the petition on the ground that the appeal is without merit, or is prosecuted
manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too insubstantial to require consideration.

Rule 19.42. Due course; elevation of records. - If the petition is given due course, the Supreme Court may require the elevation
of the complete record of the case or specified parts thereof within fifteen (15) days from notice.

PART VII
FINAL PROVISIONS

RULE 20: FILING AND DEPOSIT FEES

Rule 20.1. Filing fee in petitions or counter-petitions to confirm or enforce, vacate or set aside arbitral award or for the
enforcement of a mediated settlement agreement. - The filing fee for filing a petition to confirm or enforce, vacate or set aside an
arbitral award in a domestic arbitration or in an international commercial arbitration, or enforce a mediated settlement agreement
shall be as follows:

PhP 10,000.00 - if the award does not exceed PhP 1,000,000.00

PhP 20,000.00 - if the award does not exceed PhP 20,000,000.00

PhP 30,000.00 - if the award does not exceed PhP 50,000,000.00

PhP 40,000.00 - if the award does not exceed PhP 100,000,000.00

PhP 50,000.00 - if the award exceeds PhP 100,000,000.00

The minimal filing fee payable in "all other actions not involving property" shall be paid by the petitioner seeking to
enforce foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention in the Philippines.
Rule 20.2. Filing fee for action to enforce as a counter-petition. - A petition to enforce an arbitral award in a domestic arbitration
or in an international commercial arbitration submitted as a petition to enforce and/or recognize an award in opposition to a timely
petition to vacate or set aside the arbitral award shall require the payment of the filing fees prescribed in Rule 20.1 above.

Rule 20.3. Deposit fee for mediated settlement agreements. - Any party to a mediated settlement agreement who deposits it with
the clerk of court shall pay a deposit fee of P500.00.

Rule 20.4. Filing fee for other proceedings. - The filing fee for the filing of any other proceedings, including applications for interim
relief, as authorized under these Special Rules not covered under any of the foregoing provisions, shall be P10,000.00.

RULE 21: COSTS

Rule 21.1. Costs. - The costs of the ADR proceedings shall be borne by the parties equally unless otherwise agreed upon or
directed by the arbitrator or arbitral tribunal.

Rule 21.2. On the dismissal of a petition against a ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary question upholding its jurisdiction.
- If the Regional Trial Court dismisses the petition against the ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary question upholding its
jurisdiction, it shall also order the petitioner to pay the respondent all reasonable costs and expenses incurred in opposing the
petition. "Costs" shall include reasonable attorney’s fees. The court shall award costs upon application of the respondent after the
petition is denied and the court finds, based on proof submitted by respondent, that the amount of costs incurred is reasonable.

Rule 21.3. On recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. - At the time the case is submitted to the court for
decision, the party praying for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award shall submit a statement under oath
confirming the costs he has incurred only in the proceedings in the Philippines for such recognition and enforcement or setting-
aside. The costs shall include attorney’s fees the party has paid or is committed to pay to his counsel of record.

The prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of costs which shall include the reasonable attorney’s fees of the prevailing
party against the unsuccessful party. The court shall determine the reasonableness of the claim for attorney’s fees.

Rule 21.4. Costs. - At the time the case is submitted to the court for decision, the party praying for confirmation or vacation of an
arbitral award shall submit a statement under oath confirming the costs he has incurred only in the proceedings for confirmation
or vacation of an arbitral award. The costs shall include the attorney’s fees the party has paid or is committed to pay to his
counsel of record.

The prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of costs with respect to the proceedings before the court, which shall include
the reasonable attorney’s fees of the prevailing party against the unsuccessful party. The court shall determine the
reasonableness of the claim for attorney’s fees.

Rule 21.5. Bill of Costs. - Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties in writing, at the time the case is submitted to the court for
decision, the party praying for recognition and enforcement or for setting aside an arbitral award shall submit a statement under
oath confirming the costs he has incurred only in the proceedings for such recognition and enforcement or setting-aside. The
costs shall include attorney’s fees the party has paid or is committed to pay to his counsel of record.

The prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of costs, which shall include reasonable attorney’s fees of the prevailing party
against the unsuccessful party. The court shall determine the reasonableness of the claim for attorney’s fees.

Rule 21.6. Government’s exemption from payment of fees. - The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
are exempt from paying legal fees provided in these Special ADR Rules. Local governments and government controlled
corporation with or with or without independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees.
 RULE 22: APPLICABILITY OF THE RULES OF COURT

Rule 22.1. Applicability of Rules of Court. - The provisions of the Rules of Court that are applicable to the proceedings
enumerated in Rule 1.1 of these Special ADR Rules have either been included and incorporated in these Special ADR Rules or
specifically referred to herein.

In connection with the above proceedings, the Rules of Evidence shall be liberally construed to achieve the objectives of the
Special ADR Rules.

RULE 23: SEPARABILITY

Rule 23.1. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any part of the Special ADR Rules shall be held unconstitutional or invalid,
other Rules or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby, shall continue to be in full force and effect.

RULE 24: TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

Rule 24.1. Transitory Provision. - Considering its procedural character, the Special ADR Rules shall be applicable to all pending
arbitration, mediation or other ADR forms covered by the ADR Act, unless the parties agree otherwise. The Special ADR Rules,
however, may not prejudice or impair vested rights in accordance with law.

RULE 25: ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Rule 25.1. Applicability of the Special ADR Rules to Online Dispute Resolution. - Whenever applicable and appropriate, the
Special ADR Rules shall govern the procedure for matters brought before the court involving Online Dispute Resolution.

Rule 25.2. Scope of Online Dispute Resolution. - Online Dispute Resolution shall refer to all electronic forms of ADR including
the use of the internet and other web or computed based technologies for facilitating ADR.

RULE 26: EFFECTIVITY

Rule 26.1. Effectivity. - The Special ADR Rules shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation.

RULE A: GUIDELINES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF ISSUES RELATED TO ARBITRATION OF LOANS SECURED BY
COLLATERAL

Rule A.1. Applicability of an arbitration agreement in a contract of loan applies to the accessory contract securing the loan. - An
arbitration agreement in a contract of loan extends to and covers the accessory contract securing the loan such as a pledge or a
mortgage executed by the borrower in favor of the lender under that contract of loan.

Rule A.2. Foreclosure of pledge or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage not precluded by arbitration. - The commencement of
the arbitral proceeding under the contract of loan containing an arbitration agreement shall not preclude the lender from availing
himself of the right to obtain satisfaction of the loan under the accessory contract by foreclosure of the thing pledged or by extra-
judicial foreclosure of the collateral under the real estate mortgage in accordance with Act No. 3135.

The lender may likewise institute foreclosure proceedings against the collateral securing the loan prior to the commencement of
the arbitral proceeding.
By agreeing to refer any dispute under the contract of loan to arbitration, the lender who is secured by an accessory contract of
real estate mortgage shall be deemed to have waived his right to obtain satisfaction of the loan by judicial foreclosure.

Rule A.3. Remedy of the borrower against an action taken by the lender against the collateral before the constitution of the
arbitral tribunal. - The borrower providing security for the payment of his loan who is aggrieved by the action taken by the lender
against the collateral securing the loan may, if such action against the collateral is taken before the arbitral tribunal is constituted,
apply with the appropriate court for interim relief against any such action of the lender. Such interim relief may be obtained only in
a special proceeding for that purpose, against the action taken by the lender against the collateral, pending the constitution of the
arbitral tribunal. Any determination made by the court in that special proceeding pertaining to the merits of the controversy,
including the right of the lender to proceed against the collateral, shall be only provisional in nature.

After the arbitral tribunal is constituted, the court shall stay its proceedings and defer to the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal over
the entire controversy including any question regarding the right of the lender to proceed against the collateral.

Rule A.4. Remedy of borrower against action taken by the lender against the collateral after the arbitral tribunal has been
constituted. - After the arbitral tribunal is constituted, the borrower providing security for the payment of his loan who is aggrieved
by the action taken by the lender against the collateral securing the loan may apply to the arbitral tribunal for relief, including a
claim for damages, against such action of the lender. An application to the court may also be made by the borrower against any
action taken by the lender against the collateral securing the loan but only if the arbitral tribunal cannot act effectively to prevent
an irreparable injury to the rights of such borrower during the pendency of the arbitral proceeding.

An arbitration agreement in a contract of loan precludes the borrower therein providing security for the loan from filing and/or
proceeding with any action in court to prevent the lender from foreclosing the pledge or extra-judicially foreclosing the mortgage.
If any such action is filed in court, the lender shall have the right provided in the Special ADR Rules to have such action stayed
on account of the arbitration agreement.

Rule A.5. Relief that may be granted by the arbitral tribunal. - The arbitral tribunal, in aid of the arbitral proceeding before it, may
upon submission of adequate security, suspend or enjoin the lender from proceeding against the collateral securing the loan
pending final determination by the arbitral tribunal of the dispute brought to it for decision under such contract of loan.

The arbitral tribunal shall have the authority to resolve the issue of the validity of the foreclosure of the thing pledged or of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the collateral under the real estate mortgage if the same has not yet been foreclosed or confirm the
validity of such foreclosure if made before the rendition of the arbitral award and had not been enjoined.

Rule A.6. Arbitration involving a third-party provider of security. - An arbitration agreement contained in a contract of loan
between the lender and the borrower extends to and covers an accessory contract securing the loan, such as a pledge,
mortgage, guaranty or suretyship, executed by a person other than the borrower only if such third-party securing the loan has
agreed in the accessory contract, either directly or by reference, to be bound by such arbitration agreement.

Unless otherwise expressly agreed upon by the third-party securing the loan, his agreement to be bound by the arbitration
agreement in the contract of loan shall pertain to disputes arising from or in connection with the relationship between the lender
and the borrower as well as the relationship between the lender and such third-party including the right of the lender to proceed
against the collateral securing the loan, but shall exclude disputes pertaining to the relationship exclusively between the borrower
and the provider of security such as that involving a claim by the provider of security for indemnification against the borrower.

In this multi-party arbitration among the lender, the borrower and the third party securing the loan, the parties may agree to
submit to arbitration before a sole arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators to be appointed either by an Appointing Authority
designated by the parties in the arbitration agreement or by a default Appointing Authority under the law.

In default of an agreement on the manner of appointing arbitrators or of constituting the arbitral tribunal in such multi-party
arbitration, the dispute shall be resolved by a panel of three arbitrators to be designated by the Appointing Authority under the
law. But even in default of an agreement on the manner of appointing an arbitrator or constituting an arbitral tribunal in a multi-
party arbitration, if the borrower and the third party securing the loan agree to designate a common arbitrator, arbitration shall be
decided by a panel of three arbitrators: one to be designated by the lender; the other to be designated jointly by the borrower and
the provider of security who have agreed to designate the same arbitrator; and a third arbitrator who shall serve as the
chairperson of the arbitral panel to be designated by the two party-designated arbitrators.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CHAPTER 2
ARBITRATIONS

Art. 2042. The same persons who may enter into a compromise may submit their controversies to
one or more arbitrators for decision. (1820a)

Art. 2043. The provisions of the preceding Chapter upon compromises shall also be applicable to
arbitrations. (1821a)

Art. 2044. Any stipulation that the arbitrators' award or decision shall be final, is valid, without
prejudice to Articles 2038, 2039, and 2040. (n)

Art. 2045. Any clause giving one of the parties power to choose more arbitrators than the other is
void and of no effect. (n)

Art. 2046. The appointment of arbitrators and the procedure for arbitration shall be governed by
the provisions of such rules of court as the Supreme Court shall promulgate. (n)

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 876

AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE THE MAKING OF ARBITRATION AND SUBMISSION AGREEMENTS,

TO PROVIDE FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS AND THE PROCEDURE FOR
ARBITRATION IN CIVIL CONTROVERSIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The Arbitration Law."

Section 2. Persons and matters subject to arbitration. - Two or more persons or parties may submit
to the arbitration of one or more arbitrators any controversy existing between them at the time of the
submission and which may be the subject of an action, or the parties to any contract may in such
contract agree to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising between them. Such
submission or contract shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist
at law for the revocation of any contract.

Such submission or contract may include question arising out of valuations, appraisals or other
controversies which may be collateral, incidental, precedent or subsequent to any issue between the
parties.

A controversy cannot be arbitrated where one of the parties to the controversy is an infant, or a
person judicially declared to be incompetent, unless the appropriate court having jurisdiction approve
a petition for permission to submit such controversy to arbitration made by the general guardian or
guardian ad litem of the infant or of the incompetent.
But where a person capable of entering into a submission or contract has knowingly entered into the
same with a person incapable of so doing, the objection on the ground of incapacity can be taken
only in behalf of the person so incapacitated.

Section 3. Controversies or cases not subject to the provisions of this Act. - This Act shall not apply
to controversies and to cases which are subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations
or which have been submitted to it as provided by Commonwealth Act Numbered One hundred and
three, as amended.

Section 4. Form of arbitration agreement. - A contract to arbitrate a controversy thereafter arising

between the parties, as well as a submission to arbitrate an existing controversy shall be in writing
and subscribed by the party sought to be charged, or by his lawful agent.

The making of a contract or submission for arbitration described in section two hereof, providing for
arbitration of any controversy, shall be deemed a consent of the parties to the jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance of the province or city where any of the parties resides, to enforce such
contract or submission.

Section 5. Preliminary procedure. - An arbitration shall be instituted by:

(a) In the case of a contract to arbitrate future controversies by the service by either party
upon the other of a demand for arbitration in accordance with the contract. Such demand
shall be set forth the nature of the controversy, the amount involved, if any, and the relief
sought, together with a true copy of the contract providing for arbitration. The demand shall
be served upon any party either in person or by registered mail. In the event that the contract
between the parties provides for the appointment of a single arbitrator, the demand shall be
set forth a specific time within which the parties shall agree upon such arbitrator. If the
contract between the parties provides for the appointment of three arbitrators, one to be
selected by each party, the demand shall name the arbitrator appointed by the party making
the demand; and shall require that the party upon whom the demand is made shall within
fifteen days after receipt thereof advise in writing the party making such demand of the name
of the person appointed by the second party; such notice shall require that the two arbitrators
so appointed must agree upon the third arbitrator within ten days from the date of such
notice.

(b) In the event that one party defaults in answering the demand, the aggrieved party may
file with the Clerk of the Court of First Instance having jurisdiction over the parties, a copy of
the demand for arbitration under the contract to arbitrate, with a notice that the original
demand was sent by registered mail or delivered in person to the party against whom the
claim is asserted. Such demand shall set forth the nature of the controversy, the amount
involved, if any, and the relief sought, and shall be accompanied by a true copy of the
contract providing for arbitration.

(c) In the case of the submission of an existing controversy by the filing with the Clerk of the
Court of First Instance having jurisdiction, of the submission agreement, setting forth the
nature of the controversy, and the amount involved, if any. Such submission may be filed by
any party and shall be duly executed by both parties.

(d) In the event that one party neglects, fails or refuses to arbitrate under a submission
agreement, the aggrieved party shall follow the procedure prescribed in subparagraphs (a)
and (b) of this section.
Section 6. Hearing by court. - A party aggrieved by the failure, neglect or refusal of another to
perform under an agreement in writing providing for arbitration may petition the court for an order
directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. Five days
notice in writing of the hearing of such application shall be served either personally or by registered
mail upon the party in default. The court shall hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the
making of the agreement or such failure to comply therewith is not in issue, shall make an order
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement. If the
making of the agreement or default be in issue the court shall proceed to summarily hear such issue.
If the finding be that no agreement in writing providing for arbitration was made, or that there is no
default in the proceeding thereunder, the proceeding shall be dismissed. If the finding be that a
written provision for arbitration was made and there is a default in proceeding thereunder, an order
shall be made summarily directing the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the
terms thereof.

The court shall decide all motions, petitions or applications filed under the provisions of this Act,
within ten days after such motions, petitions, or applications have been heard by it.

Section 7. Stay of civil action. - If any suit or proceeding be brought upon an issue arising out of an
agreement providing for the arbitration thereof, the court in which such suit or proceeding is pending,
upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or proceeding is referable to arbitration, shall
stay the action or proceeding until an arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the
agreement: Provided, That the applicant, for the stay is not in default in proceeding with such
arbitration.

Section 8. Appointment of arbitrators. - If, in the contract for arbitration or in the submission
described in section two, provision is made for a method of naming or appointing an arbitrator or
arbitrators, such method shall be followed; but if no method be provided therein the Court of First
Instance shall designate an arbitrator or arbitrators.

The Court of First Instance shall appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators, as the case may be, in the
following instances:

(a) If the parties to the contract or submission are unable to agree upon a single arbitrator; or

(b) If an arbitrator appointed by the parties is unwilling or unable to serve, and his successor
has not been appointed in the manner in which he was appointed; or

(c) If either party to the contract fails or refuses to name his arbitrator within fifteen days after
receipt of the demand for arbitration; or

(d) If the arbitrators appointed by each party to the contract, or appointed by one party to the
contract and by the proper Court, shall fail to agree upon or to select the third arbitrator.

(e) The court shall, in its discretion appoint one or three arbitrators, according to the
importance of the controversy involved in any of the preceding cases in which the agreement
is silent as to the number of arbitrators.

(f) Arbitrators appointed under this section shall either accept or decline their appointments
within seven days of the receipt of their appointments. In case of declination or the failure of
an arbitrator or arbitrators to duly accept their appointments the parties or the court, as the
case may be, shall proceed to appoint a substitute or substitutes for the arbitrator or
arbitrators who decline or failed to accept his or their appointments.
Section 9. Appointment of additional arbitrators. - Where a submission or contract provides that two
or more arbitrators therein designated or to be thereafter appointed by the parties, may select or
appoint a person as an additional arbitrator, the selection or appointment must be in writing. Such
additional arbitrator must sit with the original arbitrators upon the hearing.

Section 10. Qualifications of arbitrators. - Any person appointed to serve as an arbitrator must be of
legal age, in full-enjoyment of his civil rights and know how to read and write. No person appointed
to served as an arbitrator shall be related by blood or marriage within the sixth degree to either party
to the controversy. No person shall serve as an arbitrator in any proceeding if he has or has had
financial, fiduciary or other interest in the controversy or cause to be decided or in the result of the
proceeding, or has any personal bias, which might prejudice the right of any party to a fair and
impartial award.

No party shall select as an arbitrator any person to act as his champion or to advocate his cause.

If, after appointment but before or during hearing, a person appointed to serve as an arbitrator shall
discover any circumstances likely to create a presumption of bias, or which he believes might
disqualify him as an impartial arbitrator, the arbitrator shall immediately disclose such information to
the parties. Thereafter the parties may agree in writing:

(a) to waive the presumptive disqualifying circumstances; or

(b) to declare the office of such arbitrator vacant. Any such vacancy shall be filled in the
same manner as the original appointment was made.

Section 11. Challenge of arbitrators. - The arbitrators may be challenged only for the reasons
mentioned in the preceding section which may have arisen after the arbitration agreement or were
unknown at the time of arbitration.

The challenge shall be made before them.

If they do not yield to the challenge, the challenging party may renew the challenge before the Court
of First Instance of the province or city in which the challenged arbitrator, or, any of them, if there be
more than one, resides. While the challenging incident is discussed before the court, the hearing or
arbitration shall be suspended, and it shall be continued immediately after the court has delivered an
order on the challenging incident.

Section 12. Procedure by arbitrators. - Subject to the terms of the submission or contract, if any are
specified therein, are arbitrators selected as prescribed herein must, within five days after
appointment if the parties to the controversy reside within the same city or province, or within fifteen
days after appointment if the parties reside in different provinces, set a time and place for the
hearing of the matters submitted to them, and must cause notice thereof to be given to each of the
parties. The hearing can be postponed or adjourned by the arbitrators only by agreement of the
parties; otherwise, adjournment may be ordered by the arbitrators upon their own motion only at the
hearing and for good and sufficient cause. No adjournment shall extend the hearing beyond the day
fixed in the submission or contract for rendering the award, unless the time so fixed is extended by
the written agreement of the parties to the submission or contract or their attorneys, or unless the
parties have continued with the arbitration without objection to such adjournment.

The hearing may proceed in the absence of any party who, after due notice, fails to be present at
such hearing or fails to obtain an adjournment thereof. An award shall not be made solely on the
default of a party. The arbitrators shall require the other party to submit such evidence as they may
require for making an award.

No one other than a party to said arbitration, or a person in the regular employ of such party duly
authorized in writing by said party, or a practicing attorney-at-law, shall be permitted by the
arbitrators to represent before him or them any party to the arbitration. Any party desiring to be
represented by counsel shall notify the other party or parties of such intention at least five days prior
to the hearing.

The arbitrators shall arrange for the taking of a stenographic record of the testimony when such a
record is requested by one or more parties, and when payment of the cost thereof is assumed by
such party or parties.

Persons having a direct interest in the controversy which is the subject of arbitration shall have the
right to attend any hearing; but the attendance of any other person shall be at the discretion of the
arbitrators.

Section 13. Oath of arbitrators. - Before hearing any testimony, arbitrators must be sworn, by any
officer authorized by law to administer an oath, faithfully and fairly to hear and examine the matters
in controversy and to make a just award according to the best of their ability and understanding.
Arbitrators shall have the power to administer the oaths to all witnesses requiring them to tell the
whole truth and nothing but the truth in any testimony which they may give in any arbitration hearing.
This oath shall be required of every witness before any of his testimony is heard.

Section 14. Subpoena and subpoena duces tecum. - Arbitrators shall have the power to require any
person to attend a hearing as a witness. They shall have the power to subpoena witnesses and
documents when the relevancy of the testimony and the materiality thereof has been demonstrated
to the arbitrators. Arbitrators may also require the retirement of any witness during the testimony of
any other witness. All of the arbitrators appointed in any controversy must attend all the hearings in
that matter and hear all the allegations and proofs of the parties; but an award by the majority of
them is valid unless the concurrence of all of them is expressly required in the submission or
contract to arbitrate. The arbitrator or arbitrators shall have the power at any time, before rendering
the award, without prejudice to the rights of any party to petition the court to take measures to
safeguard and/or conserve any matter which is the subject of the dispute in arbitration.

Section 15. Hearing by arbitrators. - Arbitrators may, at the commencement of the hearing, ask both
parties for brief statements of the issues in controversy and/or an agreed statement of facts.
Thereafter the parties may offer such evidence as they desire, and shall produce such additional
evidence as the arbitrators shall require or deem necessary to an understanding and determination
of the dispute. The arbitrators shall be the sole judge of the relevancy and materiality of the evidence
offered or produced, and shall not be bound to conform to the Rules of Court pertaining to evidence.
Arbitrators shall receive as exhibits in evidence any document which the parties may wish to submit
and the exhibits shall be properly identified at the time of submission. All exhibits shall remain in the
custody of the Clerk of Court during the course of the arbitration and shall be returned to the parties
at the time the award is made. The arbitrators may make an ocular inspection of any matter or
premises which are in dispute, but such inspection shall be made only in the presence of all parties
to the arbitration, unless any party who shall have received notice thereof fails to appear, in which
event such inspection shall be made in the absence of such party.

Section 16. Briefs. - At the close of the hearings, the arbitrators shall specifically inquire of all parties
whether they have any further proof or witnesses to present; upon the receipt of a negative reply
from all parties, the arbitrators shall declare the hearing closed unless the parties have signified an
intention to file briefs. Then the hearing shall be closed by the arbitrations after the receipt of briefs
and/or reply briefs. Definite time limit for the filing of such briefs must be fixed by the arbitrators at
the close of the hearing. Briefs may filed by the parties within fifteen days after the close of the oral
hearings; the reply briefs, if any, shall be filed within five days following such fifteen-day period.

Section 17. Reopening of hearing. - The hearing may be reopened by the arbitrators on their own
motion or upon the request of any party, upon good cause, shown at any time before the award is
rendered. When hearings are thus reopened the effective date for the closing of the hearings shall
be the date of the closing of the reopened hearing.

Section 18. Proceeding in lieu of hearing. - The parties to a submission or contract to arbitrate may,
by written agreement, submit their dispute to arbitration by other than oral hearing. The parties may
submit an agreed statement of facts. They may also submit their respective contentions to the duly
appointed arbitrators in writing; this shall include a statement of facts, together with all documentary
proof. Parties may also submit a written argument. Each party shall provide all other parties to the
dispute with a copy of all statements and documents submitted to the arbitrators. Each party shall
have an opportunity to reply in writing to any other party's statements and proofs; but if such party
fails to do so within seven days after receipt of such statements and proofs, he shall be deemed to
have waived his right to reply. Upon the delivery to the arbitrators of all statements and documents,
together with any reply statements, the arbitrators shall declare the proceedings in lieu of hearing
closed.

Section 19. Time for rendering award. - Unless the parties shall have stipulated by written
agreement the time within which the arbitrators must render their award, the written award of the
arbitrators shall be rendered within thirty days after the closing of the hearings or if the oral hearings
shall have been waived, within thirty days after the arbitrators shall have declared such proceedings
in lieu of hearing closed. This period may be extended by mutual consent of the parties. alf-itc

Section 20. Form and contents of award. - The award must be made in writing and signed and
acknowledged by a majority of the arbitrators, if more than one; and by the sole arbitrator, if there is
only one. Each party shall be furnished with a copy of the award. The arbitrators in their award may
grant any remedy or relief which they deem just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement
of the parties, which shall include, but not be limited to, the specific performance of a contract.

In the event that the parties to an arbitration have, during the course of such arbitration, settled their
dispute, they may request of the arbitrators that such settlement be embodied in an award which
shall be signed by the arbitrators. No arbitrator shall act as a mediator in any proceeding in which he
is acting as arbitrator; and all negotiations towards settlement of the dispute must take place without
the presence of the arbitrators.

The arbitrators shall have the power to decide only those matters which have been submitted to
them. The terms of the award shall be confined to such disputes.

The arbitrators shall have the power to assess in their award the expenses of any party against
another party, when such assessment shall be deemed necessary.

Section 21. Fees of arbitration. - The fees of the arbitrators shall be fifty pesos per day unless the
parties agree otherwise in writing prior to the arbitration.

Section 22. Arbitration deemed a special proceeding. - Arbitration under a contract or submission
shall be deemed a special proceeding, of which the court specified in the contract or submission, or
if none be specified, the Court of First Instance for the province or city in which one of the parties
resides or is doing business, or in which the arbitration was held, shall have jurisdiction. Any
application to the court, or a judge thereof, hereunder shall be made in manner provided for the
making and hearing of motions, except as otherwise herein expressly provided.

Section 23. Confirmation of award. - At any time within one month after the award is made, any
party to the controversy which was arbitrated may apply to the court having jurisdiction, as provided
in section twenty-eight, for an order confirming the award; and thereupon the court must grant such
order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected, as prescribed herein. Notice of such
motion must be served upon the adverse party or his attorney as prescribed by law for the service of
such notice upon an attorney in action in the same court.

Section 24. Grounds for vacating award. - In any one of the following cases, the court must make an
order vacating the award upon the petition of any party to the controversy when such party proves
affirmatively that in the arbitration proceedings:

(a) The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; or

(b) That there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators or any of them; or

(c) That the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing upon
sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the
controversy; that one or more of the arbitrators was disqualified to act as such under section
nine hereof, and wilfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or

(d) That the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them, that a
mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made.

Where an award is vacated, the court, in its discretion, may direct a new hearing either before the
same arbitrators or before a new arbitrator or arbitrators to be chosen in the manner provided in the
submission or contract for the selection of the original arbitrator or arbitrators, and any provision
limiting the time in which the arbitrators may make a decision shall be deemed applicable to the new
arbitration and to commence from the date of the court's order.

Where the court vacates an award, costs, not exceeding fifty pesos and disbursements may be
awarded to the prevailing party and the payment thereof may be enforced in like manner as the
payment of costs upon the motion in an action.

Section 25. Grounds for modifying or correcting award. - In any one of the following cases, the court
must make an order modifying or correcting the award, upon the application of any party to the
controversy which was arbitrated:

(a) Where there was an evident miscalculation of figures, or an evident mistake in the
description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; or

(b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, not affecting
the merits of the decision upon the matter submitted; or

(c) Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy, and if it had been a commissioner's report, the defect could have been
amended or disregarded by the court.
The order may modify and correct the award so as to effect the intent thereof and promote justice
between the parties.

Section 26. Motion to vacate, modify or correct award: when made. - Notice of a motion to vacate,
modify or correct the award must be served upon the adverse party or his counsel within thirty days
after award is filed or delivered, as prescribed by law for the service upon an attorney in an action.

Section 27. Judgment. - Upon the granting of an order confirming, modifying or correcting an award,
judgment may be entered in conformity therewith in the court wherein said application was filed.
Costs of the application and the proceedings subsequent thereto may be awarded by the court in its
discretion. If awarded, the amount thereof must be included in the judgment.

Section 28. Papers to accompany motion to confirm, modify, correct, or vacate award. - The party
moving for an order confirming, modifying, correcting, or vacating an award, shall at the time that
such motion is filed with the court for the entry of judgment thereon also file the following papers with
the Clerk of Court;

(a) The submission, or contract to arbitrate; the appointment of the arbitrator or arbitrators;
and each written extension of the time, if any, within which to make the award.

(b) A verified of the award.

(c) Each notice, affidavit, or other paper used upon the application to confirm, modify, correct
or vacate such award, and a copy of each of the court upon such application.

The judgment shall be docketed as if it were rendered in an action.

The judgment so entered shall have the same force and effect in all respects, as, and be subject to
all the provisions relating to, a judgment in an action; and it may be enforced as if it had been
rendered in the court in which it is entered.

Section 29. Appeals. - An appeal may be taken from an order made in a proceeding under this Act,
or from a judgment entered upon an award through certiorari proceedings, but such appeals shall be
limited to questions of law. The proceedings upon such an appeal, including the judgment thereon
shall be governed by the Rules of Court in so far as they are applicable.

Section 30. Death of party. - Where a party dies after making a submission or a contract to arbitrate
as prescribed in this Act, the proceedings may be begun or continued upon the application of, or
notice to, his executor or administrator, or temporary administrator of his estate. In any such case,
the court may issue an order extending the time within which notice of a motion to confirm, vacate,
modify or correct an award must be served. Upon confirming an award, where a party has died since
it was filed or delivered, the court must enter judgment in the name of the original party; and the
proceedings thereupon are the same as where a party dies after a verdict.

Section 31. Repealing clause. - The provisions of chapters one and two, Title XIV, of the Civil Code
shall remain in force. All other laws and parts of laws inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed.
If any provision of this Act shall be held invalid the remainder that shall not be affected thereby.

Section 32. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect six months after its approval.

Approved: June 19, 1953

-------------

GARCIA VS DRILON (2013)

4 Feb 2018

JESUS C. GARCIA vs. THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, RTC,
Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, et.al.

[G.R. No. 179267; June 25, 2013] Constitutional Law| Equal Protection Clause
Background of the case:
In 2004, Congress enacted RA No. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children”. It defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their
children (VAWC) perpetrated by women’s intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or
any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a
common child.

FACTS:
Rosalie Jaype-Garcia filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children for a Temporary
Protection Order against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be
a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of
marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children
and of financial support. The husband now, assails the constitutionality of RA 9262 as being
violative of the equal protection clause.

ISSUE:
Whether there is a violation of equal protection clause.

HELD:
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. R.A. 9262 is based on a valid
classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection
clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends
its protection.

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as
the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed “against a woman with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral
word “person” who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses
even lesbian relationships.
R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by
favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection. The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are
more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice
McIntyre succinctly states, “the accommodation of differences … is the essence of true
equality.”

Read full article here.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013

JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41,
Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children,
namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93
percent of a total population of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the
admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and
gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against
Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that,
for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and
violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate
partners such as their husbands and live-in partners."3

Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress
enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for
Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4

R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and
their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or
any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common
child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the
commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of barangay
officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and
other local government officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.

A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of
the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial power to
barangay officials.

The Factual Antecedents

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her
minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C.
Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with
threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.7

Private respondent's claims

Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven
years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the
natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years
old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8

Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her
husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling,
and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray,
and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and even when she was
already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her
to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of
some men, at one point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed.9

Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's
Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when
private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help about
his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was
just using the woman because of their accounts with the bank.10

Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and
emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms
and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit
private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his
ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent to his paramour and whom
he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When
private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the
latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's
sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of
his cruelty to private respondent.11

All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On
December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was found by
her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital.
Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered
to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private respondent has been undergoing
therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications.12

When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file
charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the manager's job.
He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even
told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private respondent
should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not
sired a child with her.13

Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her
children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously warned her that if
she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.14

Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the
President of three corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros
Trading Corporation – of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the
absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly
salary of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation. Household
expenses amounting to not less than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent
through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the
bills for utilities.15

On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill
Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands of
pesos from the corporations.16 After private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner
forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the
corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an
accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17

Action of the RTC of Bacolod City

Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24, 2006
effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering
that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable
notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act
No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent
herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.

After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the
Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be
assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March
2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her children from her
when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.

b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and
driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where
the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.

c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner,
directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children,
mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation
rights to the children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.

d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and
ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the Provincial
Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be
ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.

e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house
for them, and educational and medical expenses.

f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.

g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received
from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as
President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2
April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by the
Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of
Indirect Contempt of Court.

h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and
considering the financial resources of the Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner
sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO
KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.

On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended
TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included the following additional provisions:

i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan
Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental.

j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque, the
continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go to Manila.

k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient
sureties.

l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1)
comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the
TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to
its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the
bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.

Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him
visitation rights to his children.

On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following
modifications prayed for by private respondent:

a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of
Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours
from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
Indirect Contempt of Court;

b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal
house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to
remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after the
petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove things
from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and
other things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.

d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and
Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from receipt of
the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of
Court;

e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of
Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;

f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon
presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23

Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with
the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children, private respondent
filed another application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter

alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter
was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex
Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private
respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys,
Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to
kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On
another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened
her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint
against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."

Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at the
conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private respondent. This
came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her
children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the
maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola.27

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:

Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:

1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts

of violence against the offended party;

2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating

in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;

3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents,
from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers,
her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros,
laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other
household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the
subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the
three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall not contact the schools of the children
directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees
directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will
be rendered nugatory;

4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to
the Court;

5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00

for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from
March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;

6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and
Php25,000.00;

7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a
Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles,
respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J
Bros Tading;

8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the
conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in
 which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent
have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville
Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which
the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an
interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT
Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;

9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a
copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow the transfer,
sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to any person, entity or
corporation without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her
signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that
her signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to
defraud her or the conjugal partnership of gains.

In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another
ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO
should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation,30 however, that he
has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court
directed in its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion.
Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO
dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:

xxxx

x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary
Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and
continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders,
and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.

After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required
comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it would only be an
"exercise in futility."33

Proceedings before the CA

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a
petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary
restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due
process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil
case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO) against
the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition for failure
of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case,
which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity

of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the
trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that –

The Issues

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE
ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND
THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE
LAW.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT

R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262
RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE
POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.

V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID
AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL
POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38

The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A.
9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.

As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if
not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial
court, it will not be considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law
in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40

In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City,
petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to
tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."41

We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.

At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family
courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against
women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the
branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of several key cities
identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides
that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction
over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:

SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law. In the
absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the
complainant. (Emphasis supplied)

Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority
as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal,
special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency.44 It is
settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority being
embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding
laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law."46The Constitution vests the power of
judicial review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or
executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this
Court, but in all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution
contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of
any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where
such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in
part as follows:

SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court
may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.

xxxx

Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have
been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection order before the
RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this
Court.

Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays
down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not
an answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he
himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why
a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate
civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim
and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot
likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a
defending party may have against an opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any
claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject
matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein.51Finally, a third-party complaint is a
claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action
for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.52As
pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a
cause of action that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint.
Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the
right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the validity of
which is being attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid
cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.

That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred
petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the constitutionality of a
statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section
25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues,
among others, viz:

SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may
issue an order containing the following:

(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;

(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;

(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;

(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of
affidavits; and

(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day,
to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the temporary protection
order issued. (Emphasis supplied)

To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when
necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection order
issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30)
days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed
temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the parties. With the private
respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues,
without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary
procedure.

In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with
prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may
have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted
an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of
a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by the trial
court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of
the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively
hindered the case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and summary manner.

As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a
time,56 should not be enjoined.

The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a
litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United
States declared, thus:

Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their
separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if such statutes
are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good
faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be
unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its
extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations
omitted)

The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the
merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte so as to
protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders
will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.

Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel
issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have, time and again,
discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in
view of private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the
challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.

Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.

Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child
abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is not
enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became R.A. 9262,
reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi
Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure"62 – an amalgamation of
two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate
Relationships Act"63 – providing protection to "all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at
the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and
abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same
measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:

Wednesday, December 10, 2003

Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have
expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic violence
apart from against women as well as other members of the household, including children or the
husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the
main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a
relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind
of observation?

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR"
Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. But
plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the
family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This includes the
men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with the family.65

xxx

Wednesday, January 14, 2004

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. x x x

Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women
and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I have is that we
would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.

Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.

As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.

I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.

Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong.
However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the domestic
environment.

As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity
to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade, of battery and
abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the
women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr.
President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that
the men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree with this
representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter
how empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the domestic
environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to
the Filipino woman.

xxxx

The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?

Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because
the family members have been included in this proposed measure since the other members of the
family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the
intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that
in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized and that children are almost always
the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to
other family members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for
instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused children. The same law is
inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.

I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing
that they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However, we should also
recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to
evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.

Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the
basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between men and women in
our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband
and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.

While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a
critical input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports
groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.

Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.

Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be
removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on women alone. That
will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the
distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined
to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.

I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will
propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. President.
xxxx

Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?

xxxx

Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.

The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.

Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished
proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas
malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi
iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.

So, if I may propose an amendment –

The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.

Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is
not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-
year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find
out about these things.

Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update that.
It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.

SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS

Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but
not the children.

Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.

The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.

Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.

Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment, as
amended, is approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of
Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress
has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice may be
perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by
the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the
necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We only step in when there is a violation
of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.

R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.

Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early
case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:

The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected
alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It
guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are
different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does
not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.

The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law,
as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying
that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is
required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply
equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the
classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably
arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)

Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid
classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal protection
clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection.

I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.

The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than
men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all
make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly
states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality."70

A. Unequal power relationship between men and women

According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and
Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the
unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence".
Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and
take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers, men's companions and supporters,
and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over
women. With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's
expression of controlling women to retain power.71

The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution
48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating
that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men
and women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the
prevention of the full advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial
social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men."72

Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based
violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during the
Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent
portions of which are quoted hereunder:

History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of a
family was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under his control. I quote the
early studies:

Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule of
men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically and
intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the
authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.

The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she
endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented towards
the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.

English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone
has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and that one was the
husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to
limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb,
which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.

In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict
corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given more importance
than preventing violence to women.

The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English common
law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to strike down the
common law right of a husband to beat his wife:

The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her,
spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now
acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the
husband can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance
leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of alcoholism as
the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their
husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette movements,
expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to own
property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.

The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze.
They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less than the United
States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:

In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of
severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that nearly one of every
eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical Association]
views these figures as "marked underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages
women from reporting them, and because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those who do not
speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is
conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of
partner violence is probably double the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women
per year."

Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically
assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the United
States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents
involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often
present as well.

Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of
abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of women, is also
common.

Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no
superior alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to their
husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's abuser
can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all
homicide victims in the United States are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide
victims are killed by their male partners.

Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.

In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United
States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all human
beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also
adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World conferences on the
role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing.
The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these women's
movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to
recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law
of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of
the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No.
9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"

victims of violence.

At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against women
and children show that –

x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total
cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of
4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult
circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year
2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx
(T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003.
Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of
these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and
live-in partners.73

Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence

against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under R.A.
9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:

Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*

Reported 200 200 200 200 200 200

2010 2011
Cases 4 5 6 7 8 9

Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832

Incestuous
38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23
Rape

Attempted
194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201
Rape

Acts of
Lasciviousne 580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
ss

Physical 3,55 2,33 1,89 1,50 1,30 1,49

2,018 1,588
Injuries 3 5 2 5 7 8
 Sexual
53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
Harassment

1,26 2,38 3,59 5,28

RA 9262 218 924 9,974 9,021
9 7 9 5

Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213

Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15

Concubinag
121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128
e

RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62

Abduction
/Kidnapping 16 34 23 28 18 25 22
29

Unjust
90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
Vexation

6,27 5,37 4,88 5,72 6,90 9,48 15,10 12,94

Total
1 4 1 9 5 5 4 8

*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)

On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against
men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, because many
men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had
ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the
smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic violence; and women constituted 89%
of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic violence.75Statistics in Canada
show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other
way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence from their spouses are
much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to
experience sexual assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse
are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or emotional abuse.76

While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the
Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles
to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-
drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was
challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited to
owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals, although not utilized, but
similarly pass through the same streets.

The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-
vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible and
their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a
menace to the health of the community."77 The mere fact that the legislative classification may result
in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons
or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby
rendered invalid.78

C. Gender bias and prejudices

From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against women
are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by then United
States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress'
authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He stressed that the widespread
gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic
violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" – first at the hands of the offender and then of the
legal system.79

Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that
"(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the
parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the
latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or
reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring and often
serious nature of domestic violence."80

Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.

In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct
Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the
complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner"
and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila
even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by "insatiable greed" and of
absconding with the contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack
of gender sensitivity.

The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and
prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures
focused on women does not discriminate against men.82Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A.
9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves
scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all
appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with
a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are
based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for
men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the
character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the development
of a distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges."85

II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.

The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as
follows:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and
children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect
the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.

Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and
children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the
provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August
5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on
October 6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with
men before the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of equality of men and
women.88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two
protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.

III. The classification is not limited to existing

conditions only, and apply equally to all members

Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women and
their children are threatened by violence and abuse.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3
thereof defines VAWC as:

x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former
wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without
the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or
suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her
child. It includes, but is not limited to:
 a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as
a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically
attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent
acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the
conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by
force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or
coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional
suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to
property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes
causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of
the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive
injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent
which includes, but is not limited to the following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any

legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the
other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in
Article 73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use
and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal
money or properties.

It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to
research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here are
also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the
argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference
between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.

There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in
his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide adequate contrast
between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that
persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at
its meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92that phrases like "depriving or
threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or
common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so
vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld –
not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather
than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly
delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its
wordings or detailed in its provisions.93

There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the
culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word
"person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian
relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be related or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of
Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be
proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-
Tan's husband) had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient
financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in
repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.

R.A. 9262 is not violative of the

due process clause of the Constitution.

Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections
afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated
allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property,
guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an
inkling of what happened."95

A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their
children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96

"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is
afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to
safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or
household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing
acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It also enables the court to award
temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction
by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."97

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein. Since
"time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"99 the court is
authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or
property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the order is
necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent
such violence, which is about to recur.100

There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The
victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach her witnesses'
affidavits to the petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process.
Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing because the
time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of
his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing
experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing were
required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public
interests,103among which is protection of women and children from violence and threats to their
personal safety and security.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that
notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5) days
from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30)
days from service on the respondent.104

Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition within five
(5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall
likewise be indicated on the notice.105

The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the
affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should
not be issued.106

It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be
apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his side. Thus, the
fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment
and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of
an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does
not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial
of procedural due process.107

It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte
Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise,
on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation
rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days
(5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not
to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently
forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time,
and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can show sufficient cause
therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due
process of law.

Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the
residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued
to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.108

The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that
this is so. It states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some or
all of the following reliefs:

xxxx

(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of
ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the offended party, or
permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects
from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to
the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his things and escort him from the
residence;

xxxx

Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence,
regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such removal and
exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the private
respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?

The non-referral of a VAWC case

to a mediator is justified.

Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation
and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to "protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."109

Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof
to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311
of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows:110

This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an
order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining positions
voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject
for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the
victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order of protection
is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person
against whom the protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)

There is no undue delegation of

judicial power to barangay officials.

Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the
Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be established
by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection
orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:

SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection
Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator
to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who
1âwphi1

receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing
after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to
act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay
Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an
attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the
issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of
an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the
same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.

The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong
Barangay.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as
the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into practical
operation and enforcing their due observance."113

As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a)
causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her
child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in
pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to
"maintain public order in the barangay."114

We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of
certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and
the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers."115

In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding
"whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused
is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that
an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur that
would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor
is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a
BPO.

We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law
enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and abuse, it would
be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are
nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is
consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.

Conclusion

Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear
conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in
such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity
must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and
convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality
of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal
executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the
legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with
 full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare
of the majority.

We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against
domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against the violence of
law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for
equality but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be,
sustained.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

Expanded coverage of Court-Annexed

Mediation (CAM) and Judicial Dispute
Resolution (JDR): A Law Review

I. Background

II. Mediation

1. Concept
2. Philippine Mediation Mechanism
3. Alternative Dispute Resolution

II. CAM and JDR as an Alternative Dispute Resolution

1. Definition
2. Cases that are subjected to CAM and JDR
3. Rules and Procedure
4. Sanctions
5. Cases that are not subjected to CAM and JDR

IV. Possible Effects of the Expanded Coverage

1. Addressing Court Docket Congestion

2. Speedy Disposition of Cases

I. Background

The Judicial Branch of the Philippine government plays an indispensable role in the
stabilization of the society. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government. [1] The Supreme Court’s role is to interpret the
Constitution and limit the powers of the other branches of government. The Supreme
Court’s power to do this is its power of judicial review, where it determines which laws
and policies are constitutional, or allowable, and which are not.

Under the Supreme Court, there are also the so-called “Lower Courts” which includes
Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts,
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, Shari’a District Courts, and Shari’a Circuit
Courts.[2] These courts adhere with the Supreme Court’s decisions to be applied as a
ruling to the similar cases in the lower courts. One of the functions of the lower courts is
to impose its proper court administration in order to have an efficient judicial system.
An efficient judicial system includes; effective administration of justice, proper
disposition of judgment, speedy disposition of cases and etc.

Speedy disposition of cases is beneficial both for the plaintiff and defendant in terms of
having the right justice they deserve in the particular cases that they are involved and it
will also sought to address the number one issue of the courts which is the clogging of
the court dockets because of the numerous cases from the previous court proceedings.
The Supreme Court now has formulated a lot of solutions in this number one problem in
the lower courts. One of the solutions was to expand the coverage of court-annexed
mediation (CAM) and judicial dispute resolution (JDR) “Guidelines”.[3]

II. Mediation

Philippine Mediation Mechanism

Many Philippine indigenous tribes and communities already had their specific dispute
resolution mechanisms based on local legal systems and practices, primarily by bringing
a dispute before an elder or chieftain for resolution. However, colonization by Spain
from the 16th century onwards reduced these indigenous dispute resolution
mechanisms to mere customs and traditions, and as such they were replaced by Western
legal concepts, particularly Spanish civil law and later Anglo-American common
law.[4]Over time, the Philippines developed a vast and complex legal system where legal
disputes are settled in courts, through the adversarial system of litigation. This led to the
perennial problem of clogged court dockets, which causes delays in the resolution of
disputes and contributes to dissatisfaction in the settlement of issues through the courts.
The Civil Code, promulgated in 1949, has a chapter on compromises, although it does
not specifically refer to compromises entered into after mediation. The Arbitration Law
(RA 876), promulgated in 1953, provides for domestic arbitration as an ADR method
but does not provide for other ADR methods such as mediation. But, in 1978,
Presidential Decree No. 1508 established a local or community dispute settlement
system, known as the Katarungang Pambarangay of amicably settling disputes at the
barangay level (ie, smallest local government unit), primarily through mediation,
conciliation or arbitration before the Barangay chairman or conciliation panels. The
Katarungang Pambarangay Law was recognized under the subsequent Local
Government Codes, promulgated in 1983 and 1991.[5] However, it was not until the
passage of the ADR Law in 2004 that most forms of present ADR methods, including
mediation, whether voluntary or court-annexed, were recognized and statutorily
defined.

Alternative Dispute Resolution

Mediation is an effective way of resolving disputes without the need to go to court. It
involves an independent third party – a mediator – who helps both sides come to an
agreement. Such is often used to describe a wide variety of dispute resolution
mechanisms that are short of, or alternative to, full-scale court processes. The term can
refer to everything from facilitated settlement negotiations in which disputants are
encouraged to negotiate directly with each other prior to some other legal process, to
arbitration systems or mini trials that look and feel very much like a courtroom process.
Processes designed to manage community tension or facilitate community development
issues can also be included within the rubric of ADR. ADR systems may be generally
categorized as negotiation, conciliation/mediation, or arbitration systems. Negotiation
systems create a structure to encourage and facilitate direct negotiation between parties
to a dispute, without the intervention of a third party.

The Philippine Congress passed Republic Act No. 9285 or the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Act of 2004 (the ADR Law), which, inter alia, prescribes rules governing
voluntary mediation, whether ad hoc or institutional, other than court annexed. On the
other hand, for court-annexed mediation, the Philippine Supreme Court – pursuant to
article VIII, section 5 of the Philippine Constitution, which authorizes the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules for the enforcement of constitutional rights, which rules shall
provide for simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases –
issued AM No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA, providing guidelines for the mediation process
through the court annexed mediation (CAM) program in the trial courts up to the
appeals court level (the Revised Guidelines). The ADR Law treats information obtained
through voluntary mediation as generally privileged and confidential; however, the
guarantee of confidentiality may be waived by the mediation parties. Moreover, the ADR
Law provides that an agreement to submit a dispute to mediation by an institution shall
include an agreement to be bound by the internal mediation and administrative policies
of such institution, and that an agreement to submit a dispute to mediation under
institutional mediation rules shall be deemed to include an agreement to have such rules
govern the mediation of the dispute and for the mediator, the parties, their respective
counsel, and non-party participants to abide by such rules. In case of conflict between
the institutional mediation rules and the provisions of the ADR Law, however, the latter
shall prevail. Furthermore, the ADR Law prohibits a mediator from making a report,
assessment, evaluation, recommendation, finding, or other communication regarding a
mediation to a court or agency or other authority that may make a ruling on a dispute
that is the subject of a mediation, except (i) where the mediation occurred or has
terminated, or where a settlement was reached; or (ii) as regards known facts that a
reasonable individual would consider likely to affect the impartiality of the mediator,
including a financial or personal interest in the outcome of the mediation and any
existing or past relationship with a party or foreseeable participant in the mediation.
The ADR Law also grants parties the freedom to agree on the place of mediation; failing
such agreement, the place of mediation shall be any place convenient and appropriate to
all parties.
 III. CAM and JDR as an Alternative Dispute Resolution

Court-Annex Mediation

It is a voluntary process conducted under the auspices of the court by referring the
parties to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) Unit for the settlement of their
dispute, assisted by a Mediator accredited by the Supreme Court. [6]

An amicable settlement will extinguish the dispute between the parties and upon
reaching an agreement, the PMC will not further refer it to the courts for the JDR.

Cases that are subjected to CAM

The following cases shall be referred to CAM:

1. All civil cases, except those which by law may not be compromised (Article 2035, New
Civil Code);
2. Special proceedings for the settlement of estates;
3. The civil aspect of Quasi-Offenses under Title 14 of the Revised Penal Code;
4. The civil aspect of criminal cases where the imposable penalty does not exceed six years
imprisonment and the offended party is a private person; and
5. The civil aspect of theft (not qualified theft), estafa (not syndicated or large scale estafa),
and libel.

Rules and Procedure

1. After the last pleading has been filed, the judge shall issue an order requiring the parties
to forthwith appear before the concerned Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) Unit staff
to start the process for the settlement of their dispute through mediation. On the same
date, the court shall give to the PMC a copy of the Order for mediation.
2. Individual parties are required to personally appear for mediation. In the event they
cannot do so, they can send their representatives who must be fully authorized to
appear, negotiate and enter into a compromise, through a Special Power of Attorney.
3. Corporations, partnerships, or other juridical entities shall be represented by a ranking
corporate officer fully authorized by a Board Resolution to offer, negotiate, accept,
 decide and enter into a compromise agreement, without need of further approval by or
notification to the authorizing party.
4. The Order issued shall include a clear warning that sanctions may be imposed upon a
party for 12 failure to comply therewith, in accordance with the Section below on
sanctions.
5. On the date set in the Order, the parties shall proceed to select a mutually acceptable
mediator from among the list of accredited mediators. If no agreement is reached, the
PMC Unit Staff shall, in the presence of the parties and the Mediators, choose by lot the
one who will mediate the dispute from among the Mediators inside the Unit, ensuring a
fair and equal distribution of cases: Provided, however, that in exceptional
circumstances where special qualifications are required of the mediator, the parties shall
be given an opportunity to select from the entire list of accredited mediators.
6. The Mediator shall be considered an officer of the court while performing his duties as
such or in connection therewith.
7. The concerned Mediator shall forthwith start the mediation process, unless the parties
and mediator agree to reset the initial mediation conference, which shall not be later
than five (5) days from the original date.
8. At the initial conference, the Mediator shall explain to both parties the mediation
process, stressing the benefits of an early settlement of their dispute based on serving
their mutual interests, rather than the legal positions taken by them.
9. With the consent of both parties, the Mediator may hold separate caucuses with each
party to 13 determine their respective real interests in the dispute. Thereafter, another
joint conference may be held to consider various options that may resolve the dispute
through reciprocal concessions and on terms that are mutually beneficial to both the
parties.
10. The Mediator shall not record in any manner the proceedings of the joint conferences or
of the separate caucuses. No transcript or minutes of mediation proceedings shall be
taken. If personal notes are taken for guidance, the notes shall be shredded and
destroyed. Should such record exists, they shall not be admissible as evidence in any
other proceedings.
11. If no settlement has been reached at the end of the period given, the case must be
returned to the referring judge.

Sanctions

The court, upon recommendation of the Mediator, may impose sanctions upon a party
who fails to appear before the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) Unit as directed by
the referring judge, or upon any person who engages in abusive conduct during
mediation proceedings, as provided for in the Rules of Court as part of the Pre-Trial and
other issuances of the Supreme Court, including, but not limited to censure, reprimand,
contempt, requiring the absent party to reimburse the appearing party his costs,
 including attorney’s fees for that day up to treble such costs, payable on or before the
date of the re-scheduled setting. Sanctions may also be imposed by the referring judge
upon his own initiative or upon motion of the interested party.

This refers to a process whereby the judge (called the JDR Judge) employs conciliation,
mediation or early neutral evaluation in order to settle a case at the pre-trial stage. In
the event the JDR fails, then another judge (called the trial judge) shall proceed to hear
and decide the case.

Judicial Dispute Resolution

This refers to a process whereby the judge (called the JDR Judge) employs conciliation,
mediation or early neutral evaluation in order to settle a case at the pre-trial stage. In
the event the JDR fails, then another judge (called the trial judge) shall proceed to hear
and decide the case.

Cases that are subjected to JDR

The following cases shall be referred to JDR by Judges in areas declared as JDR sites:

1. All cases which were not successfully settled in CAM;

2. All appealed cases from the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the First Level Courts:
3. Over civil cases and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, under Section 33,
paragraph (1) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980;
4. Over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer under Section 33, paragraph (2) of
the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980;
5. Over civil cases involving title to or possession of real property or an interest therein
under Section 33, paragraph (3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980; and
6. Over a habeas corpus case decided by the judge of the first level court, in the absence of
all the Regional Trial Court judges in the province or city, that are brought up on appeal
from the special jurisdiction granted to the first level courts under Section 35 of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.

Rules and Procedure

Judicial proceedings shall be divided into two stages: (1) from the filing of a complaint
to the conduct of CAM and JDR during the pre-trial stage, and (2) pre-trial proper to
trial and judgment. The judge to whom the case has been originally raffled, who shall be
called the JDR Judge, shall preside over the first stage.

The judge, who shall be called the trial judge, shall preside over the second stage. At the
initial stage of the pre-trial conference, the JDR judge briefs the parties and counsels of
the CAM and JDR processes. Thereafter, he issues an Order of Referral of the case to
CAM and directs the parties and their counsels to proceed to the PMCU bringing with
them a copy of the Order of Referral.

The JDR judge shall include in said Order, or in another Order, the pre-setting of the
case for JDR not earlier than forty-five (45) days from the time the parties first 17
personally appear at the PMCU so that JDR will be conducted immediately if the parties
do not settle at CAM. All incidents or motions filed during the first stage shall be dealt
with by the JDR judge. If JDR is not conducted because of the failure of the parties to
appear, the JDR judge may impose the appropriate sanctions and shall continue with
the proceedings of the case. If the parties do not settle their dispute at CAM, the parties
and their counsels shall appear at the preset date before the JDR judge, who will then
conduct the JDR process as mediator, neutral evaluator and/or conciliator in order to
actively assist and facilitate negotiations among the parties for them to settle their
dispute.

As mediator and conciliator, the judge facilitates the settlement discussions between the
parties and tries to reconcile their differences. As a neutral evaluator, the judge assesses
the relative strengths and weaknesses of each party’s case and makes a non-binding and
impartial evaluation of the chances of each party’s success in the case. On the basis of
such neutral evaluation, the judge persuades the parties to a fair and mutually
acceptable settlement of their dispute. The JDR judge shall not preside over the trial of
the case15 when the parties did not settle their dispute at JDR.

Sanctions

A party who fails to appear on the date set for JDR conference, may forthwith be
imposed the appropriate sanction 22 as provided in Rule 18 of the Revised Rules of
Court and relevant issuances of the Supreme Court including, but not limited to censure,
reprimand, contempt, and requiring the absent party to reimburse the appearing party
his costs, including attorney’s fees for that day up to treble such costs, payable on or
before the date of the re-scheduled setting. Sanctions may be imposed by the JDR judge
upon motion of the appearing party or motu proprio.
 Upon justifiable cause duly proved in the hearing of the motion to reconsider filed by
the absent party, the sanctions imposed may be lifted, set aside or modified in the sound
discretion of the JDR judge. A representative who appears on behalf of an individual or
corporate party without the required authorization by special power of attorney or board
resolution, respectively, may similarly be imposed appropriate sanctions.

Cases that are not subjected to CAM and JDR

The following cases shall not be referred to CAM and JDR:

1. Civil cases which by law cannot be compromised, as follows:

 The civil status of persons;
 The validity of a marriage or a legal separation;
 Any ground for legal separation;
 Future support;
 The jurisdiction of courts; and
 Future legitime.
2. Civil aspect of non-mediatable criminal cases;
3. Petitions for Habeas Corpus;
4. All cases under Republic Act No. 9262 (Violence against Women and Children); and
5. Cases with pending application for Restraining Orders/Preliminary Injunctions.

However, in cases covered in numbers 1, 4 and 5 where the parties inform the court that
they have agreed to undergo mediation on some aspects thereof, e.g., custody of minor
children, separation of property, or support pendente lite, the court shall refer them to
mediation.

IV. Possible Effects of the Expanded Coverage

Addressing Court Docket Congestion

Court Docket Congestion is one of the most predominant issues in the

administration of Courts in the Philippines as it affects the functions of the judicial
system. Such mechanisms are being brought upon to resolve this issue such as the
implementation of the Judicial Affidavit Rule which shortens the period in presenting
the testimonies of the witnesses in the Court proceedings. Likewise, a mechanism was
discovered to effectively lessen the court docket congestion as the Court-Annex
Mediation and Judicial Dispute Resolution was devise by the Supreme Court of the
Philippines and its administrative bodies. Upon these mechanisms, Courts can lessen
their dockets which can be helpful for all the people. On January 11, 2011 an expanded
coverage of the CAM and JDR through A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA was issued and it is
indeed a great solution to expand its jurisdiction for cases that can be mediatable for the
parties to come up with a compromise agreement that can dispose the case immediately.
The possible outcome of this expanded coverage can definitely lessen or declog court
dockets.

Speedy Disposition of Cases

It is a must for the Judges to impose Speedy Disposition of Cases such as stated in OCA-
Circular-No.-101-2017, whereas, criminal cases are subjected to continuous trial of the
Courts and hereby announced that all are for compliance of the rules and procedures for
Speedy Disposition of Cases. The expanded coverage of CAM and JDR imposes the
possibility of having this kind of privilege as it will provide the right justice the parties
deserved and also lead to declog court dockets. This is also serves as a fundamental right
to the citizens of the Philippines so that it must be granted to those parties involved in a
respective case.

[1] Sec. 1, Art. 8 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution

[2] Lower Courts in the Philippines. Retrieved from http://www.chanrobles.com

[3] The Guidelines were issued through Resolution A.M. No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA .

[4] Maria Roda Cisnero, Indigenous Modes of Dispute Resolution and Indigenous
Justice Systems.

[5] Retrieved from http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/PIN.

[6] AM No. 11-1-6-SC-PHILJA

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
A.M. No. 07-11-08-SC September 1, 2009

SPECIAL RULES OF COURT ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Acting on the recommendation of the Chairperson of the Sub-Committee on the Rules on Alternative
Dispute Resolution submitting for this Court’s consideration and approval the proposed Special
Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute Resolution, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.

This Rule shall take effect on October 30, 2009 following its publication in three (3) newspapers of
general circulation.

September 1, 2009.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

SPECIAL RULES OF COURT ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

PART I
GENERAL PROVISIONS AND POLICIES

RULE 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Rule 1.1. Subject matter and governing rules.-The Special Rules of Court on Alternative Dispute
Resolution (the "Special ADR Rules") shall apply to and govern the following cases:
 a. Relief on the issue of Existence, Validity, or Enforceability of the Arbitration Agreement;

b. Referral to Alternative Dispute Resolution ("ADR");

c. Interim Measures of Protection;

d. Appointment of Arbitrator;

e. Challenge to Appointment of Arbitrator;

f. Termination of Mandate of Arbitrator;

g. Assistance in Taking Evidence;

h. Confirmation, Correction or Vacation of Award in Domestic Arbitration;

i. Recognition and Enforcement or Setting Aside of an Award in International Commercial

Arbitration;

j. Recognition and Enforcement of a Foreign Arbitral Award;

k. Confidentiality/Protective Orders; and

l. Deposit and Enforcement of Mediated Settlement Agreements.

Rule 1.2. Nature of the proceedings.-All proceedings under the Special ADR Rules are special
proceedings.

Rule 1.3. Summary proceedings in certain cases.-The proceedings in the following instances are
summary in nature and shall be governed by this provision:

a. Judicial Relief Involving the Issue of Existence, Validity or Enforceability of the Arbitration
Agreement;

b. Referral to ADR;

c. Interim Measures of Protection;

d. Appointment of Arbitrator;

e. Challenge to Appointment of Arbitrator;

f. Termination of Mandate of Arbitrator;

g. Assistance in Taking Evidence;

h. Confidentiality/Protective Orders; and

i. Deposit and Enforcement of Mediated Settlement Agreements.

(A) Service and filing of petition in summary proceedings.-The petitioner shall serve, either by
personal service or courier, a copy of the petition upon the respondent before the filing thereof. Proof
of service shall be attached to the petition filed in court.

For personal service, proof of service of the petition consists of the affidavit of the person who
effected service, stating the time, place and manner of the service on the respondent. For service by
courier, proof of service consists of the signed courier proof of delivery. If service is refused or has
failed, the affidavit or delivery receipt must state the circumstances of the attempted service and
refusal or failure thereof.

(B) Notice.-Except for cases involving Referral to ADR and Confidentiality/Protective Orders made
through motions, the court shall, if it finds the petition sufficient in form and substance, send notice to
the parties directing them to appear at a particular time and date for the hearing thereof which shall
be set no later than five (5) days from the lapse of the period for filing the opposition or comment.
The notice to the respondent shall contain a statement allowing him to file a comment or opposition
to the petition within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice.

The motion filed pursuant to the rules on Referral to ADR or Confidentiality/Protective Orders shall
be set for hearing by the movant and contain a notice of hearing that complies with the requirements
under Rule 15 of the Rules of Court on motions.

(C) Summary hearing. - In all cases, as far as practicable, the summary hearing shall be conducted
in one (1) day and only for purposes of clarifying facts.

Except in cases involving Referral to ADR or Confidentiality/Protective Orders made through

motions, it shall be the court that sets the petition for hearing within five (5) days from the lapse of
the period for filing the opposition or comment.

(D) Resolution. - The court shall resolve the matter within a period of thirty (30) days from the day of
the hearing.

Rule 1.4. Verification and submissions. -Any pleading, motion, opposition, comment, defense or
claim filed under the Special ADR Rules by the proper party shall be supported by verified
statements that the affiant has read the same and that the factual allegations therein are true and
correct of his own personal knowledge or based on authentic records and shall contain as annexes
the supporting documents.

The annexes to the pleading, motion, opposition, comment, defense or claim filed by the proper
party may include a legal brief, duly verified by the lawyer submitting it, stating the pertinent facts,
the applicable law and jurisprudence to justify the necessity for the court to rule upon the issue
raised.

Rule 1.5. Certification Against Forum Shopping. - A Certification Against Forum Shopping is one
made under oath made by the petitioner or movant: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any
action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and,
to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such
other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall
report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein his aforementioned petition or
motion has been filed.
A Certification Against Forum Shopping shall be appended to all initiatory pleadings except a Motion
to Refer the Dispute to Alternative Dispute Resolution.

Rule 1.6. Prohibited submissions. - The following pleadings, motions, or petitions shall not be
allowed in the cases governed by the Special ADR Rules and shall not be accepted for filing by the
Clerk of Court:

a. Motion to dismiss;

b. Motion for bill of particulars;

c. Motion for new trial or for reopening of trial;

d. Petition for relief from judgment;

e. Motion for extension, except in cases where an ex-parte temporary order of protection has
been issued;

f. Rejoinder to reply;

g. Motion to declare a party in default; and

h. Any other pleading specifically disallowed under any provision of the Special ADR Rules.

The court shall motu proprio order a pleading/motion that it has determined to be dilatory in nature
be expunged from the records.

Rule 1.7. Computation of time. - In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by the
Special ADR Rules, or by order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event
from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date of
performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday, a Sunday,
or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next working day.

Should an act be done which effectively interrupts the running of the period, the allowable period
after such interruption shall start to run on the day after notice of the cessation of the cause thereof.

The day of the act that caused the interruption shall be excluded from the computation of the period.

Rule 1.8. Service and filing of pleadings, motions and other papers in non-summary proceedings. -
The initiatory pleadings shall be filed directly with the court. The court will then cause the initiatory
pleading to be served upon the respondent by personal service or courier. Where an action is
already pending, pleadings, motions and other papers shall be filed and/or served by the concerned
party by personal service or courier. Where courier services are not available, resort to registered
mail is allowed.

(A) Proof of filing. - The filing of a pleading shall be proved by its existence in the record of the case.
If it is not in the record, but is claimed to have been filed personally, the filing shall be proved by the
written or stamped acknowledgment of its filing by the clerk of court on a copy of the same; if filed by
courier, by the proof of delivery from the courier company.
(B) Proof of service. - Proof of personal service shall consist of a written admission by the party
served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full
statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by courier, proof thereof shall
consist of an affidavit of the proper person, stating facts showing that the document was deposited
with the courier company in a sealed envelope, plainly addressed to the party at his office, if known,
otherwise at his residence, with postage fully pre-paid, and with instructions to the courier to
immediately provide proof of delivery.

(C) Filing and service by electronic means and proof thereof. - Filing and service of pleadings by
electronic transmission may be allowed by agreement of the parties approved by the court. If the
filing or service of a pleading or motion was done by electronic transmission, proof of filing and
service shall be made in accordance with the Rules on Electronic Evidence.

Rule 1.9. No summons. - In cases covered by the Special ADR Rules, a court acquires authority to
act on the petition or motion upon proof of jurisdictional facts, i.e., that the respondent was furnished
a copy of the petition and the notice of hearing.

(A) Proof of service. - A proof of service of the petition and notice of hearing upon respondent shall
be made in writing by the server and shall set forth the manner, place and date of service.

(B) Burden of proof. - The burden of showing that a copy of the petition and the notice of hearing
were served on the respondent rests on the petitioner.

The technical rules on service of summons do not apply to the proceedings under the Special ADR
Rules. In instances where the respondent, whether a natural or a juridical person, was not personally
served with a copy of the petition and notice of hearing in the proceedings contemplated in the first
paragraph of Rule 1.3 (B), or the motion in proceedings contemplated in the second paragraph of
Rule 1.3 (B), the method of service resorted to must be such as to reasonably ensure receipt thereof
by the respondent to satisfy the requirement of due process.

Rule 1.10. Contents of petition/motion. - The initiatory pleading in the form of a verified petition or
motion, in the appropriate case where court proceedings have already commenced, shall include the
names of the parties, their addresses, the necessary allegations supporting the petition and the
relief(s) sought.

Rule 1.11. Definition. - The following terms shall have the following meanings:

a. "ADR Laws" refers to the whole body of ADR laws in the Philippines.

b. "Appointing Authority" shall mean the person or institution named in the arbitration
agreement as the appointing authority; or the regular arbitration institution under whose rule
the arbitration is agreed to be conducted. Where the parties have agreed to submit their
dispute to institutional arbitration rules, and unless they have agreed to a different procedure,
they shall be deemed to have agreed to procedure under such arbitration rules for the
selection and appointment of arbitrators. In ad hoc arbitration, the default appointment of
arbitrators shall be made by the National President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines or
his duly authorized representative.

c. "Authenticate" means to sign, execute or use a symbol, or encrypt a record in whole or in

part, intended to identify the authenticating party and to adopt, accept or establish the
authenticity of a record or term.
 d. "Foreign Arbitral Award" is one made in a country other than the Philippines.

e. "Legal Brief" is a written legal argument submitted to a court, outlining the facts derived
from the factual statements in the witness’s statements of fact and citing the legal authorities
relied upon by a party in a case submitted in connection with petitions, counter-petitions (i.e.,
petitions to vacate or to set aside and/or to correct/modify in opposition to petitions to confirm
or to recognize and enforce, or petitions to confirm or to recognize and enforce in opposition
to petitions to vacate or set aside and/or correct/modify), motions, evidentiary issues and
other matters that arise during the course of a case. The legal brief shall state the applicable
law and the relevant jurisprudence and the legal arguments in support of a party’s position in
the case.

f. "Verification" shall mean a certification under oath by a party or a person who has authority
to act for a party that he has read the pleading/motion, and that he certifies to the truth of the
facts stated therein on the basis of his own personal knowledge or authentic documents in
his possession. When made by a lawyer, verification shall mean a statement under oath by a
lawyer signing a pleading/motion for delivery to the Court or to the parties that he personally
prepared the pleading/motion, that there is sufficient factual basis for the statements of fact
stated therein, that there is sufficient basis in the facts and the law to support the prayer for
relief therein, and that the pleading/motion is filed in good faith and is not interposed for
delay.

Rule 1.12. Applicability of Part II on Specific Court Relief. - Part II of the Special ADR Rules on
Specific Court Relief, insofar as it refers to arbitration, shall also be applicable to other forms of ADR.

Rule 1.13. Spirit and intent of the Special ADR Rules. – In situations where no specific rule is
provided under the Special ADR Rules, the court shall resolve such matter summarily and be guided
by the spirit and intent of the Special ADR Rules and the ADR Laws.

RULE 2: STATEMENT OF POLICIES

Rule 2.1. General policies. - It is the policy of the State to actively promote the use of various modes
of ADR and to respect party autonomy or the freedom of the parties to make their own arrangements
in the resolution of disputes with the greatest cooperation of and the least intervention from the
courts. To this end, the objectives of the Special ADR Rules are to encourage and promote the use
of ADR, particularly arbitration and mediation, as an important means to achieve speedy and
efficient resolution of disputes, impartial justice, curb a litigious culture and to de-clog court dockets.

The court shall exercise the power of judicial review as provided by these Special ADR Rules.
Courts shall intervene only in the cases allowed by law or these Special ADR Rules.

Rule 2.2. Policy on arbitration.- (A) Where the parties have agreed to submit their dispute to
arbitration, courts shall refer the parties to arbitration pursuant to Republic Act No. 9285 bearing in
mind that such arbitration agreement is the law between the parties and that they are expected to
abide by it in good faith. Further, the courts shall not refuse to refer parties to arbitration for reasons
including, but not limited to, the following:

a. The referral tends to oust a court of its jurisdiction;

b. The court is in a better position to resolve the dispute subject of arbitration;

 c. The referral would result in multiplicity of suits;

d. The arbitration proceeding has not commenced;

e. The place of arbitration is in a foreign country;

f. One or more of the issues are legal and one or more of the arbitrators are not lawyers;

g. One or more of the arbitrators are not Philippine nationals; or

h. One or more of the arbitrators are alleged not to possess the required qualification under
the arbitration agreement or law.

(B) Where court intervention is allowed under ADR Laws or the Special ADR Rules, courts shall not
refuse to grant relief, as provided herein, for any of the following reasons:

a. Prior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal, the court finds that the principal action is the
subject of an arbitration agreement; or

b. The principal action is already pending before an arbitral tribunal.

The Special ADR Rules recognize the principle of competence-competence, which means that the
arbitral tribunal may initially rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to the
existence or validity of the arbitration agreement or any condition precedent to the filing of a request
for arbitration.

The Special ADR Rules recognize the principle of separability of the arbitration clause, which means
that said clause shall be treated as an agreement independent of the other terms of the contract of
which it forms part. A decision that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity
of the arbitration clause.

Rule 2.3. Rules governing arbitral proceedings. - The parties are free to agree on the procedure to
be followed in the conduct of arbitral proceedings. Failing such agreement, the arbitral tribunal may
conduct arbitration in the manner it considers appropriate.

Rule 2.4. Policy implementing competence-competence principle. - The arbitral tribunal shall be
accorded the first opportunity or competence to rule on the issue of whether or not it has the
competence or jurisdiction to decide a dispute submitted to it for decision, including any objection
with respect to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. When a court is asked to rule
upon issue/s affecting the competence or jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal in a dispute brought
before it, either before or after the arbitral tribunal is constituted, the court must exercise judicial
restraint and defer to the competence or jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal by allowing the arbitral
tribunal the first opportunity to rule upon such issues.

Where the court is asked to make a determination of whether the arbitration agreement is null and
void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, under this policy of judicial restraint, the court
must make no more than a prima facie determination of that issue.

Unless the court, pursuant to such prima facie determination, concludes that the arbitration
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, the court must suspend the
action before it and refer the parties to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement.
Rule 2.5. Policy on mediation. - The Special ADR Rules do not apply to Court-Annexed Mediation,
which shall be governed by issuances of the Supreme Court.

Where the parties have agreed to submit their dispute to mediation, a court before which that dispute
was brought shall suspend the proceedings and direct the parties to submit their dispute to private
mediation. If the parties subsequently agree, however, they may opt to have their dispute settled
through Court-Annexed Mediation.

Rule 2.6. Policy on Arbitration-Mediation or Mediation-Arbitration. - No arbitrator shall act as a

mediator in any proceeding in which he is acting as arbitrator; and all negotiations towards
settlement of the dispute must take place without the presence of that arbitrator. Conversely, no
mediator shall act as arbitrator in any proceeding in which he acted as mediator.

Rule 2.7. Conversion of a settlement agreement to an arbitral award. - Where the parties to
mediation have agreed in the written settlement agreement that the mediator shall become the sole
arbitrator for the dispute or that the settlement agreement shall become an arbitral award, the sole
arbitrator shall issue the settlement agreement as an arbitral award, which shall be subject to
enforcement under the law.

PART II
SPECIFIC COURT RELIEF

RULE 3: JUDICIAL RELIEF INVOLVING THE ISSUE OF EXISTENCE, VALIDITY AND

ENFORCEABILITY OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT

Rule 3.1. When judicial relief is available. - The judicial relief provided in Rule 3, whether resorted to
before or after commencement of arbitration, shall apply only when the place of arbitration is in the
Philippines.

A. Judicial Relief before Commencement of Arbitration

Rule 3.2. Who may file petition. - Any party to an arbitration agreement may petition the appropriate
court to determine any question concerning the existence, validity and enforceability of such
arbitration agreement serving a copy thereof on the respondent in accordance with Rule 1.4 (A).

Rule 3.3. When the petition may be filed. - The petition for judicial determination of the existence,
validity and/or enforceability of an arbitration agreement may be filed at any time prior to the
commencement of arbitration.

Despite the pendency of the petition provided herein, arbitral proceedings may nevertheless be
commenced and continue to the rendition of an award, while the issue is pending before the court.

Rule 3.4. Venue. - A petition questioning the existence, validity and enforceability of an arbitration
agreement may be filed before the Regional Trial Court of the place where any of the petitioners or
respondents has his principal place of business or residence.

Rule 3.5. Grounds. - A petition may be granted only if it is shown that the arbitration agreement is,
under the applicable law, invalid, void, unenforceable or inexistent.

Rule 3.6. Contents of petition. - The verified petition shall state the following:
 a. The facts showing that the persons named as petitioner or respondent have legal capacity
to sue or be sued;

b. The nature and substance of the dispute between the parties;

c. The grounds and the circumstances relied upon by the petitioner to establish his position;
and

d. The relief/s sought.

Apart from other submissions, the petitioner must attach to the petition an authentic copy of the
arbitration agreement.

Rule 3.7. Comment/Opposition.-The comment/opposition of the respondent must be filed within

fifteen (15) days from service of the petition.

Rule 3.8. Court action. - In resolving the petition, the court must exercise judicial restraint in
accordance with the policy set forth in Rule 2.4, deferring to the competence or jurisdiction of the
arbitral tribunal to rule on its competence or jurisdiction.

Rule 3.9. No forum shopping. - A petition for judicial relief under this Rule may not be commenced
when the existence, validity or enforceability of an arbitration agreement has been raised as one of
the issues in a prior action before the same or another court.

Rule 3.10. Application for interim relief. - If the petitioner also applies for an interim measure of
protection, he must also comply with the requirements of the Special ADR Rules for the application
for an interim measure of protection.

Rule 3.11. Relief against court action. - Where there is a prima facie determination upholding the
arbitration agreement.-A prima facie determination by the court upholding the existence, validity or
enforceability of an arbitration agreement shall not be subject to a motion for reconsideration, appeal
or certiorari.

Such prima facie determination will not, however, prejudice the right of any party to raise the issue of
the existence, validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreement before the arbitral tribunal or
the court in an action to vacate or set aside the arbitral award. In the latter case, the court’s review of
the arbitral tribunal’s ruling upholding the existence, validity or enforceability of the arbitration
agreement shall no longer be limited to a mere prima facie determination of such issue or issues as
prescribed in this Rule, but shall be a full review of such issue or issues with due regard, however, to
the standard for review for arbitral awards prescribed in these Special ADR Rules.

B. Judicial Relief after Arbitration Commences

Rule 3.12. Who may file petition. - Any party to arbitration may petition the appropriate court for
judicial relief from the ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary question upholding or declining
its jurisdiction. Should the ruling of the arbitral tribunal declining its jurisdiction be reversed by the
court, the parties shall be free to replace the arbitrators or any one of them in accordance with the
rules that were applicable for the appointment of arbitrator sought to be replaced.

Rule 3.13. When petition may be filed. - The petition may be filed within thirty (30) days after having
received notice of that ruling by the arbitral tribunal.
Rule 3.14. Venue. - The petition may be filed before the Regional Trial Court of the place where
arbitration is taking place, or where any of the petitioners or respondents has his principal place of
business or residence.

Rule 3.15. Grounds. - The petition may be granted when the court finds that the arbitration
agreement is invalid, inexistent or unenforceable as a result of which the arbitral tribunal has no
jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.

Rule 3.16. Contents of petition. - The petition shall state the following:

a. The facts showing that the person named as petitioner or respondent has legal capacity to
sue or be sued;

b. The nature and substance of the dispute between the parties;

c. The grounds and the circumstances relied upon by the petitioner; and

d. The relief/s sought.

In addition to the submissions, the petitioner shall attach to the petition a copy of the request for
arbitration and the ruling of the arbitral tribunal.

The arbitrators shall be impleaded as nominal parties to the case and shall be notified of the
progress of the case.

Rule 3.17. Comment/Opposition. - The comment/opposition must be filed within fifteen (15) days
from service of the petition.

Rule 3.18. Court action. - (A) Period for resolving the petition.- The court shall render judgment on
the basis of the pleadings filed and the evidence, if any, submitted by the parties, within thirty (30)
days from the time the petition is submitted for resolution.

(B) No injunction of arbitration proceedings. - The court shall not enjoin the arbitration proceedings
during the pendency of the petition.

Judicial recourse to the court shall not prevent the arbitral tribunal from continuing the proceedings
and rendering its award.

(C) When dismissal of petition is appropriate. - The court shall dismiss the petition if it fails to comply
with Rule 3.16 above; or if upon consideration of the grounds alleged and the legal briefs submitted
by the parties, the petition does not appear to be prima facie meritorious.

Rule 3.19. Relief against court action. - The aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration of
the order of the court. The decision of the court shall, however, not be subject to appeal. The ruling
of the court affirming the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction shall not be subject to a petition for certiorari.
The ruling of the court that the arbitral tribunal has no jurisdiction may be the subject of a petition for
certiorari.

Rule 3.20. Where no petition is allowed. - Where the arbitral tribunal defers its ruling on preliminary
question regarding its jurisdiction until its final award, the aggrieved party cannot seek judicial relief
to question the deferral and must await the final arbitral award before seeking appropriate judicial
recourse.

A ruling by the arbitral tribunal deferring resolution on the issue of its jurisdiction until final award,
shall not be subject to a motion for reconsideration, appeal or a petition for certiorari.

Rule 3.21. Rendition of arbitral award before court decision on petition from arbitral tribunal’s
preliminary ruling on jurisdiction. - If the arbitral tribunal renders a final arbitral award and the Court
has not rendered a decision on the petition from the arbitral tribunal’s preliminary ruling affirming its
jurisdiction, that petition shall become ipso facto moot and academic and shall be dismissed by the
Regional Trial Court. The dismissal shall be without prejudice to the right of the aggrieved party to
raise the same issue in a timely petition to vacate or set aside the award.

Rule 3.22. Arbitral tribunal a nominal party. - The arbitral tribunal is only a nominal party. The court
shall not require the arbitral tribunal to submit any pleadings or written submissions but may consider
the same should the latter participate in the proceedings, but only as nominal parties thereto.

RULE 4: REFERRAL TO ADR

Rule 4.1. Who makes the request. - A party to a pending action filed in violation of the arbitration
agreement, whether contained in an arbitration clause or in a submission agreement, may request
the court to refer the parties to arbitration in accordance with such agreement.

Rule 4.2. When to make request. - (A) Where the arbitration agreement exists before the action is
filed. - The request for referral shall be made not later than the pre-trial conference. After the pre-trial
conference, the court will only act upon the request for referral if it is made with the agreement of all
parties to the case.

(B) Submission agreement. - If there is no existing arbitration agreement at the time the case is filed
but the parties subsequently enter into an arbitration agreement, they may request the court to refer
their dispute to arbitration at any time during the proceedings.

Rule 4.3. Contents of request. - The request for referral shall be in the form of a motion, which shall
state that the dispute is covered by an arbitration agreement.

Apart from other submissions, the movant shall attach to his motion an authentic copy of the
arbitration agreement.

The request shall contain a notice of hearing addressed to all parties specifying the date and time
when it would be heard. The party making the request shall serve it upon the respondent to give him
the opportunity to file a comment or opposition as provided in the immediately succeeding Rule
before the hearing.

Rule 4.4. Comment/Opposition. - The comment/opposition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from
service of the petition. The comment/opposition should show that: (a) there is no agreement to refer
the dispute to arbitration; and/or (b) the agreement is null and void; and/or (c) the subject-matter of
the dispute is not capable of settlement or resolution by arbitration in accordance with Section 6 of
the ADR Act.

Rule 4.5. Court action. - After hearing, the court shall stay the action and, considering the statement
of policy embodied in Rule 2.4, above, refer the parties to arbitration if it finds prima facie, based on
the pleadings and supporting documents submitted by the parties, that there is an arbitration
agreement and that the subject-matter of the dispute is capable of settlement or resolution by
arbitration in accordance with Section 6 of the ADR Act. Otherwise, the court shall continue with the
judicial proceedings.

Rule 4.6. No reconsideration, appeal or certiorari. - An order referring the dispute to arbitration shall
be immediately executory and shall not be subject to a motion for reconsideration, appeal or petition
for certiorari.

An order denying the request to refer the dispute to arbitration shall not be subject to an appeal, but
may be the subject of a motion for reconsideration and/or a petition for certiorari.

Rule 4.7. Multiple actions and parties. - The court shall not decline to refer some or all of the parties
to arbitration for any of the following reasons:

a. Not all of the disputes subject of the civil action may be referred to arbitration;

b. Not all of the parties to the civil action are bound by the arbitration agreement and referral
to arbitration would result in multiplicity of suits;

c. The issues raised in the civil action could be speedily and efficiently resolved in its entirety
by the court rather than in arbitration;

d. Referral to arbitration does not appear to be the most prudent action; or

e. The stay of the action would prejudice the rights of the parties to the civil action who are
not bound by the arbitration agreement.

The court may, however, issue an order directing the inclusion in arbitration of those parties who are
not bound by the arbitration agreement but who agree to such inclusion provided those originally
bound by it do not object to their inclusion.

Rule 4.8. Arbitration to proceed.- Despite the pendency of the action referred to in Rule 4.1, above,
arbitral proceedings may nevertheless be commenced or continued, and an award may be made,
while the action is pending before the court.

RULE 5: INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION

Rule 5.1. Who may ask for interim measures of protection. - A party to an arbitration agreement may
petition the court for interim measures of protection.

Rule 5.2. When to petition. - A petition for an interim measure of protection may be made (a) before
arbitration is commenced, (b) after arbitration is commenced, but before the constitution of the
arbitral tribunal, or (c) after the constitution of the arbitral tribunal and at any time during arbitral
proceedings but, at this stage, only to the extent that the arbitral tribunal has no power to act or is
unable to act effectively.

Rule 5.3. Venue. - A petition for an interim measure of protection may be filed with the Regional Trial
Court, which has jurisdiction over any of the following places:

a. Where the principal place of business of any of the parties to arbitration is located;
 b. Where any of the parties who are individuals resides;

c. Where any of the acts sought to be enjoined are being performed, threatened to be
performed or not being performed; or

d. Where the real property subject of arbitration, or a portion thereof is situated.

Rule 5.4. Grounds. - The following grounds, while not limiting the reasons for the court to grant an
interim measure of protection, indicate the nature of the reasons that the court shall consider in
granting the relief:

a. The need to prevent irreparable loss or injury;

b. The need to provide security for the performance of any obligation;

c. The need to produce or preserve evidence; or

d. The need to compel any other appropriate act or omission.

Rule 5.5. Contents of the petition. - The verified petition must state the following:

a. The fact that there is an arbitration agreement;

b. The fact that the arbitral tribunal has not been constituted, or if constituted, is unable to act
or would be unable to act effectively;

c. A detailed description of the appropriate relief sought;

d. The grounds relied on for the allowance of the petition

Apart from other submissions, the petitioner must attach to his petition an authentic copy of the
arbitration agreement.

Rule 5.6. Type of interim measure of protection that a court may grant.- The following, among
others, are the interim measures of protection that a court may grant:

a. Preliminary injunction directed against a party to arbitration;

b. Preliminary attachment against property or garnishment of funds in the custody of a bank

or a third person;

c. Appointment of a receiver;

d. Detention, preservation, delivery or inspection of property; or,

e. Assistance in the enforcement of an interim measure of protection granted by the arbitral

tribunal, which the latter cannot enforce effectively.

Rule 5.7. Dispensing with prior notice in certain cases. - Prior notice to the other party may be
dispensed with when the petitioner alleges in the petition that there is an urgent need to either (a)
preserve property, (b) prevent the respondent from disposing of, or concealing, the property, or (c)
prevent the relief prayed for from becoming illusory because of prior notice, and the court finds that
the reason/s given by the petitioner are meritorious.

Rule 5.8. Comment/Opposition. - The comment/opposition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from
service of the petition. The opposition or comment should state the reasons why the interim measure
of protection should not be granted.

Rule 5.9. Court action. - After hearing the petition, the court shall balance the relative interests of the
parties and inconveniences that may be caused, and on that basis resolve the matter within thirty
(30) days from (a) submission of the opposition, or (b) upon lapse of the period to file the same, or
(c) from termination of the hearing that the court may set only if there is a need for clarification or
further argument.

If the other parties fail to file their opposition on or before the day of the hearing, the court shall motu
proprio render judgment only on the basis of the allegations in the petition that are substantiated by
supporting documents and limited to what is prayed for therein.

In cases where, based solely on the petition, the court finds that there is an urgent need to either (a)
preserve property, (b) prevent the respondent from disposing of, or concealing, the property, or (c)
prevent the relief prayed for from becoming illusory because of prior notice, it shall issue an
immediately executory temporary order of protection and require the petitioner, within five (5) days
from receipt of that order, to post a bond to answer for any damage that respondent may suffer as a
result of its order. The ex-parte temporary order of protection shall be valid only for a period of
twenty (20) days from the service on the party required to comply with the order. Within that period,
the court shall:

a. Furnish the respondent a copy of the petition and a notice requiring him to comment
thereon on or before the day the petition will be heard; and

b. Notify the parties that the petition shall be heard on a day specified in the notice, which
must not be beyond the twenty (20) day period of the effectivity of the ex-parte order.

The respondent has the option of having the temporary order of protection lifted by posting an
appropriate counter-bond as determined by the court.

If the respondent requests the court for an extension of the period to file his opposition or comment
or to reset the hearing to a later date, and such request is granted, the court shall extend the period
of validity of the ex-partetemporary order of protection for no more than twenty days from expiration
of the original period.

After notice and hearing, the court may either grant or deny the petition for an interim measure of
protection. The order granting or denying any application for interim measure of protection in aid of
arbitration must indicate that it is issued without prejudice to subsequent grant, modification,
amendment, revision or revocation by an arbitral tribunal.

Rule 5.10. Relief against court action. - If respondent was given an opportunity to be heard on a
petition for an interim measure of protection, any order by the court shall be immediately executory,
but may be the subject of a motion for reconsideration and/or appeal or, if warranted, a petition for
certiorari.
Rule 5.11. Duty of the court to refer back. - The court shall not deny an application for assistance in
implementing or enforcing an interim measure of protection ordered by an arbitral tribunal on any or
all of the following grounds:

a. The arbitral tribunal granted the interim relief ex parte; or

b. The party opposing the application found new material evidence, which the arbitral tribunal
had not considered in granting in the application, and which, if considered, may produce a
different result; or

c. The measure of protection ordered by the arbitral tribunal amends, revokes, modifies or is
inconsistent with an earlier measure of protection issued by the court.

If it finds that there is sufficient merit in the opposition to the application based on letter (b) above,
the court shall refer the matter back to the arbitral tribunal for appropriate determination.

Rule 5.12. Security. - The order granting an interim measure of protection may be conditioned upon
the provision of security, performance of an act, or omission thereof, specified in the order.

The Court may not change or increase or decrease the security ordered by the arbitral tribunal.

Rule 5.13. Modification, amendment, revision or revocation of court’s previously issued interim
measure of protection. - Any court order granting or denying interim measure/s of protection is
issued without prejudice to subsequent grant, modification, amendment, revision or revocation by
the arbitral tribunal as may be warranted.

An interim measure of protection issued by the arbitral tribunal shall, upon its issuance be deemed to
have ipso jure modified, amended, revised or revoked an interim measure of protection previously
issued by the court to the extent that it is inconsistent with the subsequent interim measure of
protection issued by the arbitral tribunal.

Rule 5.14. Conflict or inconsistency between interim measure of protection issued by the court and
by the arbitral tribunal. - Any question involving a conflict or inconsistency between an interim
measure of protection issued by the court and by the arbitral tribunal shall be immediately referred
by the court to the arbitral tribunal which shall have the authority to decide such question.

Rule 5.15. Court to defer action on petition for an interim measure of protection when informed of
constitution of the arbitral tribunal. - The court shall defer action on any pending petition for an
interim measure of protection filed by a party to an arbitration agreement arising from or in
connection with a dispute thereunder upon being informed that an arbitral tribunal has been
constituted pursuant to such agreement. The court may act upon such petition only if it is established
by the petitioner that the arbitral tribunal has no power to act on any such interim measure of
protection or is unable to act thereon effectively.

Rule 5.16. Court assistance should arbitral tribunal be unable to effectively enforce interim measure
of protection. - The court shall assist in the enforcement of an interim measure of protection issued
by the arbitral tribunal which it is unable to effectively enforce.

RULE 6: APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATORS

Rule 6.1. When the court may act as Appointing Authority. - The court shall act as Appointing
Authority only in the following instances:

a. Where any of the parties in an institutional arbitration failed or refused to appoint an

arbitrator or when the parties have failed to reach an agreement on the sole arbitrator (in an
arbitration before a sole arbitrator) or when the two designated arbitrators have failed to
reach an agreement on the third or presiding arbitrator (in an arbitration before a panel of
three arbitrators), and the institution under whose rules arbitration is to be conducted fails or
is unable to perform its duty as appointing authority within a reasonable time from receipt of
the request for appointment;

b. In all instances where arbitration is ad hoc and the parties failed to provide a method for
appointing or replacing an arbitrator, or substitute arbitrator, or the method agreed upon is
ineffective, and the National President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) or his
duly authorized representative fails or refuses to act within such period as may be allowed
under the pertinent rules of the IBP or within such period as may be agreed upon by the
parties, or in the absence thereof, within thirty (30) days from receipt of such request for
appointment;

c. Where the parties agreed that their dispute shall be resolved by three arbitrators but no
method of appointing those arbitrators has been agreed upon, each party shall appoint one
arbitrator and the two arbitrators thus appointed shall appoint a third arbitrator. If a party fails
to appoint his arbitrator within thirty (30) days of receipt of a request to do so from the other
party, or if the two arbitrators fail to agree on the third arbitrator within a reasonable time from
their appointment, the appointment shall be made by the Appointing Authority. If the latter
fails or refuses to act or appoint an arbitrator within a reasonable time from receipt of the
request to do so, any party or the appointed arbitrator/s may request the court to appoint an
arbitrator or the third arbitrator as the case may be.

Rule 6.2. Who may request for appointment. - Any party to an arbitration may request the court to
act as an Appointing Authority in the instances specified in Rule 6.1 above.

Rule 6.3. Venue. - The petition for appointment of arbitrator may be filed, at the option of the
petitioner, in the Regional Trial Court (a) where the principal place of business of any of the parties is
located, (b) if any of the parties are individuals, where those individuals reside, or (c) in the National
Capital Region.

Rule 6.4. Contents of the petition. -The petition shall state the following:

a. The general nature of the dispute;

b. If the parties agreed on an appointment procedure, a description of that procedure with

reference to the agreement where such may be found;

c. The number of arbitrators agreed upon or the absence of any agreement as to the number
of arbitrators;

d. The special qualifications that the arbitrator/s must possess, if any, that were agreed upon
by the parties;
 e. The fact that the Appointing Authority, without justifiable cause, has failed or refused to act
as such within the time prescribed or in the absence thereof, within a reasonable time, from
the date a request is made; and

f. The petitioner is not the cause of the delay in, or failure of, the appointment of the
arbitrator.

Apart from other submissions, the petitioner must attach to the petition (a) an authentic copy of the
arbitration agreement, and (b) proof that the Appointing Authority has been notified of the filing of the
petition for appointment with the court.

Rule 6.5. Comment/Opposition. - The comment/opposition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from
service of the petition.

Rule 6.6. Submission of list of arbitrators. - The court may, at its option, also require each party to
submit a list of not less than three (3) proposed arbitrators together with their curriculum vitae.

Rule 6.7. Court action. - After hearing, if the court finds merit in the petition, it shall appoint an
arbitrator; otherwise, it shall dismiss the petition.

In making the appointment, the court shall have regard to such considerations as are likely to secure
the appointment of an independent and impartial arbitrator.

At any time after the petition is filed and before the court makes an appointment, it shall also dismiss
the petition upon being informed that the Appointing Authority has already made the appointment.

Rule 6.8. Forum shopping prohibited. - When there is a pending petition in another court to declare
the arbitration agreement inexistent, invalid, unenforceable, on account of which the respondent
failed or refused to participate in the selection and appointment of a sole arbitrator or to appoint a
party-nominated arbitrator, the petition filed under this rule shall be dismissed.

Rule 6.9. Relief against court action. - If the court appoints an arbitrator, the order appointing an
arbitrator shall be immediately executory and shall not be the subject of a motion for reconsideration,
appeal or certiorari. An order of the court denying the petition for appointment of an arbitrator may,
however, be the subject of a motion for reconsideration, appeal or certiorari.

RULE 7: CHALLENGE TO APPOINTMENT OF ARBITRATOR

Rule 7.1. Who may challenge. - Any of the parties to an arbitration may challenge an arbitrator.

Rule 7.2. When challenge may be raised in court. - When an arbitrator is challenged before the
arbitral tribunal under the procedure agreed upon by the parties or under the procedure provided for
in Article 13 (2) of the Model Law and the challenge is not successful, the aggrieved party may
request the Appointing Authority to rule on the challenge, and it is only when such Appointing
Authority fails or refuses to act on the challenge within such period as may be allowed under the
applicable rule or in the absence thereof, within thirty (30) days from receipt of the request, that the
aggrieved party may renew the challenge in court.

Rule 7.3. Venue. - The challenge shall be filed with the Regional Trial Court (a) where the principal
place of business of any of the parties is located, (b) if any of the parties are individuals, where those
individuals reside, or (c) in the National Capital Region.
Rule 7.4. Grounds. - An arbitrator may be challenged on any of the grounds for challenge provided
for in Republic Act No. 9285 and its implementing rules, Republic Act No. 876 or the Model Law. The
nationality or professional qualification of an arbitrator is not a ground to challenge an arbitrator
unless the parties have specified in their arbitration agreement a nationality and/or professional
qualification for appointment as arbitrator.

Rule 7.5. Contents of the petition. - The petition shall state the following:

a. The name/s of the arbitrator/s challenged and his/their address;

b. The grounds for the challenge;

c. The facts showing that the ground for the challenge has been expressly or impliedly
rejected by the challenged arbitrator/s; and

d. The facts showing that the Appointing Authority failed or refused to act on the challenge.

The court shall dismiss the petition motu proprio unless it is clearly alleged therein that the
Appointing Authority charged with deciding the challenge, after the resolution of the arbitral tribunal
rejecting the challenge is raised or contested before such Appointing Authority, failed or refused to
act on the challenge within thirty (30) days from receipt of the request or within such longer period as
may apply or as may have been agreed upon by the parties.

Rule 7.6. Comment/Opposition. - The challenged arbitrator or other parties may file a comment or
opposition within fifteen (15) days from service of the petition.

Rule 7.7. Court action. - After hearing, the court shall remove the challenged arbitrator if it finds
merit in the petition; otherwise, it shall dismiss the petition.

The court shall allow the challenged arbitrator who subsequently agrees to accept the challenge to
withdraw as arbitrator.

The court shall accept the challenge and remove the arbitrator in the following cases:

a. The party or parties who named and appointed the challenged arbitrator agree to the
challenge and withdraw the appointment.

b. The other arbitrators in the arbitral tribunal agree to the removal of the challenged
arbitrator; and

c. The challenged arbitrator fails or refuses to submit his comment on the petition or the brief
of legal arguments as directed by the court, or in such comment or legal brief, he fails to
object to his removal following the challenge.

The court shall decide the challenge on the basis of evidence submitted by the parties.

The court will decide the challenge on the basis of the evidence submitted by the parties in the
following instances:

a. The other arbitrators in the arbitral tribunal agree to the removal of the challenged
arbitrator; and
 b. If the challenged arbitrator fails or refuses to submit his comment on the petition or the
brief of legal arguments as directed by the court, or in such comment or brief of legal
arguments, he fails to object to his removal following the challenge.

Rule 7.8. No motion for reconsideration, appeal or certiorari. - Any order of the court resolving the
petition shall be immediately executory and shall not be the subject of a motion for reconsideration,
appeal, or certiorari.

Rule 7.9. Reimbursement of expenses and reasonable compensation to challenged arbitrator. -

Unless the bad faith of the challenged arbitrator is established with reasonable certainty by
concealing or failing to disclose a ground for his disqualification, the challenged arbitrator shall be
entitled to reimbursement of all reasonable expenses he may have incurred in attending to the
arbitration and to a reasonable compensation for his work on the arbitration. Such expenses include,
but shall not be limited to, transportation and hotel expenses, if any. A reasonable compensation
shall be paid to the challenged arbitrator on the basis of the length of time he has devoted to the
arbitration and taking into consideration his stature and reputation as an arbitrator. The request for
reimbursement of expenses and for payment of a reasonable compensation shall be filed in the
same case and in the court where the petition to replace the challenged arbitrator was filed. The
court, in determining the amount of the award to the challenged arbitrator, shall receive evidence of
expenses to be reimbursed, which may consist of air tickets, hotel bills and expenses, and inland
transportation. The court shall direct the challenging party to pay the amount of the award to the
court for the account of the challenged arbitrator, in default of which the court may issue a writ of
execution to enforce the award.

RULE 8: TERMINATION OF THE MANDATE OF ARBITRATOR

Rule 8.1. Who may request termination and on what grounds.- Any of the parties to an arbitration
may request for the termination of the mandate of an arbitrator where an arbitrator becomes de jure
or de facto unable to perform his function or for other reasons fails to act without undue delay and
that arbitrator, upon request of any party, fails or refuses to withdraw from his office.

Rule 8.2. When to request. - If an arbitrator refuses to withdraw from his office, and subsequently,
the Appointing Authority fails or refuses to decide on the termination of the mandate of that arbitrator
within such period as may be allowed under the applicable rule or, in the absence thereof, within
thirty (30) days from the time the request is brought before him, any party may file with the court a
petition to terminate the mandate of that arbitrator.

Rule 8.3. Venue. - A petition to terminate the mandate of an arbitrator may, at that petitioner’s
option, be filed with the Regional Trial Court (a) where the principal place of business of any of the
parties is located, (b) where any of the parties who are individuals resides, or (c) in the National
Capital Region.

Rule 8.4. Contents of the petition. - The petition shall state the following:

a. The name of the arbitrator whose mandate is sought to be terminated;

b. The ground/s for termination;

c. The fact that one or all of the parties had requested the arbitrator to withdraw but he failed
or refused to do so;
 d. The fact that one or all of the parties requested the Appointing Authority to act on the
request for the termination of the mandate of the arbitrator and failure or inability of the
Appointing Authority to act within thirty (30) days from the request of a party or parties or
within such period as may have been agreed upon by the parties or allowed under the
applicable rule.

The petitioner shall further allege that one or all of the parties had requested the arbitrator to
withdraw but he failed or refused to do so.

Rule 8.5. Comment/Opposition. - The comment/opposition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from
service of the petition.

Rule 8.6. Court action. - After hearing, if the court finds merit in the petition, it shall terminate the
mandate of the arbitrator who refuses to withdraw from his office; otherwise, it shall dismiss the
petition.

Rule 8.7. No motion for reconsideration or appeal. - Any order of the court resolving the petition shall
be immediately executory and shall not be subject of a motion for reconsideration, appeal or petition
for certiorari.

Rule 8.8. Appointment of substitute arbitrator. - Where the mandate of an arbitrator is terminated, or
he withdraws from office for any other reason, or because of his mandate is revoked by agreement
of the parties or is terminated for any other reason, a substitute arbitrator shall be appointed
according to the rules that were applicable to the appointment of the arbitrator being replaced.

RULE 9: ASSISTANCE IN TAKING EVIDENCE

Rule 9.1. Who may request assistance. - Any party to an arbitration, whether domestic or foreign,
may request the court to provide assistance in taking evidence.

Rule 9.2. When assistance may be sought. - Assistance may be sought at any time during the
course of the arbitral proceedings when the need arises.

Rule 9.3. Venue. - A petition for assistance in taking evidence may, at the option of the petitioner, be
filed with Regional Trial Court where (a) arbitration proceedings are taking place, (b) the witnesses
reside or may be found, or (c) where the evidence may be found.

Rule 9.4. Ground. - The court may grant or execute the request for assistance in taking evidence
within its competence and according to the rules of evidence.

Rule 9.5. Type of assistance. - A party requiring assistance in the taking of evidence may petition
the court to direct any person, including a representative of a corporation, association, partnership or
other entity (other than a party to the ADR proceedings or its officers) found in the Philippines, for
any of the following:

a. To comply with a subpoena ad testificandum and/or subpoena duces tecum;

b. To appear as a witness before an officer for the taking of his deposition upon oral
examination or by written interrogatories;
 c. To allow the physical examination of the condition of persons, or the inspection of things or
premises and, when appropriate, to allow the recording and/or documentation of condition of
persons, things or premises (i.e., photographs, video and other means of
recording/documentation);

d. To allow the examination and copying of documents; and

e. To perform any similar acts.

Rule 9.6. Contents of the petition. - The petition must state the following:

a. The fact that there is an ongoing arbitration proceeding even if such proceeding could not
continue due to some legal impediments;

b. The arbitral tribunal ordered the taking of evidence or the party desires to present
evidence to the arbitral tribunal;

c. Materiality or relevance of the evidence to be taken; and

d. The names and addresses of the intended witness/es, place where the evidence may be
found, the place where the premises to be inspected are located or the place where the acts
required are to be done.

Rule 9.7. Comment/Opposition. - The comment/opposition must be filed within fifteen (15) days from
service of the petition.

Rule 9.8. Court action. - If the evidence sought is not privileged, and is material and relevant, the
court shall grant the assistance in taking evidence requested and shall order petitioner to pay costs
attendant to such assistance.

Rule 9.9. Relief against court action. - The order granting assistance in taking evidence shall be
immediately executory and not subject to reconsideration or appeal. If the court declines to grant
assistance in taking evidence, the petitioner may file a motion for reconsideration or appeal.

Rule 9.10. Perpetuation of testimony before the arbitral tribunal is constituted. - At anytime before
arbitration is commenced or before the arbitral tribunal is constituted, any person who desires to
perpetuate his testimony or that of another person may do so in accordance with Rule 24 of the
Rules of Court.

Rule 9.11. Consequence of disobedience. - The court may impose the appropriate sanction on any
person who disobeys its order to testify when required or perform any act required of him.

RULE 10: CONFIDENTIALITY/PROTECTIVE ORDERS

Rule 10.1. Who may request confidentiality. - A party, counsel or witness who disclosed or who was
compelled to disclose information relative to the subject of ADR under circumstances that would
create a reasonable expectation, on behalf of the source, that the information shall be kept
confidential has the right to prevent such information from being further disclosed without the
express written consent of the source or the party who made the disclosure.
Rule 10.2. When request made. - A party may request a protective order at anytime there is a need
to enforce the confidentiality of the information obtained, or to be obtained, in ADR proceedings.

Rule 10.3. Venue. - A petition for a protective order may be filed with the Regional Trial Court where
that order would be implemented.

If there is a pending court proceeding in which the information obtained in an ADR proceeding is
required to be divulged or is being divulged, the party seeking to enforce the confidentiality of the
information may file a motion with the court where the proceedings are pending to enjoin the
confidential information from being divulged or to suppress confidential information.

Rule 10.4. Grounds. - A protective order may be granted only if it is shown that the applicant would
be materially prejudiced by an unauthorized disclosure of the information obtained, or to be
obtained, during an ADR proceeding.

Rule 10.5. Contents of the motion or petition. - The petition or motion must state the following:

a. That the information sought to be protected was obtained, or would be obtained, during an
ADR proceeding;

b. The applicant would be materially prejudiced by the disclosure of that information;

c. The person or persons who are being asked to divulge the confidential information
participated in an ADR proceedings; and

d. The time, date and place when the ADR proceedings took place.

Apart from the other submissions, the movant must set the motion for hearing and contain a notice
of hearing in accordance with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 10.6. Notice. - Notice of a request for a protective order made through a motion shall be made
to the opposing parties in accordance with Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 10.7. Comment/Opposition. - The comment/opposition must be filed within fifteen (15) days
from service of the petition. The opposition or comment may be accompanied by written proof that
(a) the information is not confidential, (b) the information was not obtained during an ADR
proceeding, (c) there was a waiver of confidentiality, or (d) the petitioner/movant is precluded from
asserting confidentiality.

Rule 10.8. Court action. - If the court finds the petition or motion meritorious, it shall issue an order
enjoining a person or persons from divulging confidential information.

In resolving the petition or motion, the courts shall be guided by the following principles applicable to
all ADR proceedings: Confidential information shall not be subject to discovery and shall be
inadmissible in any adversarial proceeding, whether judicial or quasi judicial. However, evidence or
information that is otherwise admissible or subject to discovery does not become inadmissible or
protected from discovery solely by reason of its use therein.

For mediation proceedings, the court shall be further guided by the following principles:

a. Information obtained through mediation shall be privileged and confidential.

 b. A party, a mediator, or a nonparty participant may refuse to disclose and may prevent any
other person from disclosing a mediation communication.

c. In such an adversarial proceeding, the following persons involved or previously involved in

a mediation may not be compelled to disclose confidential information obtained during the
mediation: (1) the parties to the dispute; (2) the mediator or mediators; (3) the counsel for the
parties: (4) the nonparty participants; (5) any persons hired or engaged in connection with
the mediation as secretary, stenographer; clerk or assistant; and (6) any other person who
obtains or possesses confidential information by reason of his/ her profession.

d. The protection of the ADR Laws shall continue to apply even if a mediator is found to have
failed to act impartially.

e. A mediator may not be called to testify to provide information gathered in mediation. A

mediator who is wrongfully subpoenaed shall be reimbursed the full cost of his attorney fees
and related expenses.

Rule 10.9. Relief against court action. - The order enjoining a person or persons from divulging
confidential information shall be immediately executory and may not be enjoined while the order is
being questioned with the appellate courts.

If the court declines to enjoin a person or persons from divulging confidential information, the
petitioner may file a motion for reconsideration or appeal.

Rule 10.10. Consequence of disobedience. - Any person who disobeys the order of the court to
cease from divulging confidential information shall be imposed the proper sanction by the court.

RULE 11: CONFIRMATION, CORRECTION OR VACATION OF AWARD IN DOMESTIC

ARBITRATION

Rule 11.1. Who may request confirmation, correction or vacation. - Any party to a domestic
arbitration may petition the court to confirm, correct or vacate a domestic arbitral award.

Rule 11.2. When to request confirmation, correction/modification or vacation. -

(A) Confirmation. - At any time after the lapse of thirty (30) days from receipt by the petitioner of the
arbitral award, he may petition the court to confirm that award.

(B) Correction/Modification. - Not later than thirty (30) days from receipt of the arbitral award, a party
may petition the court to correct/modify that award.

(C) Vacation. - Not later than thirty (30) days from receipt of the arbitral award, a party may petition
the court to vacate that award.

(D) A petition to vacate the arbitral award may be filed, in opposition to a petition to confirm the
arbitral award, not later than thirty (30) days from receipt of the award by the petitioner. A petition to
vacate the arbitral award filed beyond the reglementary period shall be dismissed.

(E) A petition to confirm the arbitral award may be filed, in opposition to a petition to vacate the
arbitral award, at any time after the petition to vacate such arbitral award is filed. The dismissal of
the petition to vacate the arbitral award for having been filed beyond the reglementary period shall
not result in the dismissal of the petition for the confirmation of such arbitral award.

(F) The filing of a petition to confirm an arbitral award shall not authorize the filing of a belated
petition to vacate or set aside such award in opposition thereto.

(G) A petition to correct an arbitral award may be included as part of a petition to confirm the arbitral
award or as a petition to confirm that award.

Rule 11.3. Venue. - The petition for confirmation, correction/modification or vacation of a domestic
arbitral award may be filed with Regional Trial Court having jurisdiction over the place in which one
of the parties is doing business, where any of the parties reside or where arbitration proceedings
were conducted.

Rule 11.4. Grounds. - (A) To vacate an arbitral award. - The arbitral award may be vacated on the
following grounds:

a. The arbitral award was procured through corruption, fraud or other undue means;

b. There was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitral tribunal or any of its members;

c. The arbitral tribunal was guilty of misconduct or any form of misbehavior that has
materially prejudiced the rights of any party such as refusing to postpone a hearing upon
sufficient cause shown or to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy;

d. One or more of the arbitrators was disqualified to act as such under the law and willfully
refrained from disclosing such disqualification; or

e. The arbitral tribunal exceeded its powers, or so imperfectly executed them, such that a
complete, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was not made.

The award may also be vacated on any or all of the following grounds:

a. The arbitration agreement did not exist, or is invalid for any ground for the revocation of a
contract or is otherwise unenforceable; or

b. A party to arbitration is a minor or a person judicially declared to be incompetent.

The petition to vacate an arbitral award on the ground that the party to arbitration is a minor or a
person judicially declared to be incompetent shall be filed only on behalf of the minor or incompetent
and shall allege that (a) the other party to arbitration had knowingly entered into a submission or
agreement with such minor or incompetent, or (b) the submission to arbitration was made by a
guardian or guardian ad litem who was not authorized to do so by a competent court.

In deciding the petition to vacate the arbitral award, the court shall disregard any other ground than
those enumerated above.

(B) To correct/modify an arbitral award. - The Court may correct/modify or order the arbitral tribunal
to correct/modify the arbitral award in the following cases:
 a. Where there was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the
description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award;

b. Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them, not affecting the
merits of the decision upon the matter submitted;

c. Where the arbitrators have omitted to resolve an issue submitted to them for resolution; or

d. Where the award is imperfect in a matter of form not affecting the merits of the
controversy, and if it had been a commissioner’s report, the defect could have been
amended or disregarded by the Court.

Rule 11.5. Form of petition. - An application to vacate an arbitral award shall be in the form of a
petition to vacate or as a petition to vacate in opposition to a petition to confirm the same award.

An application to correct/modify an arbitral award may be included in a petition to confirm an arbitral

award or in a petition to vacate in opposition to confirm the same award.

When a petition to confirm an arbitral award is pending before a court, the party seeking to vacate or
correct/modify said award may only apply for those reliefs through a petition to vacate or
correct/modify the award in opposition to the petition to confirm the award provided that such petition
to vacate or correct/modify is filed within thirty (30) days from his receipt of the award. A petition to
vacate or correct/modify an arbitral award filed in another court or in a separate case before the
same court shall be dismissed, upon appropriate motion, as a violation of the rule against forum-
shopping.

When a petition to vacate or correct/modify an arbitral award is pending before a court, the party
seeking to confirm said award may only apply for that relief through a petition to confirm the same
award in opposition to the petition to vacate or correct/modify the award. A petition to confirm or
correct/modify an arbitral award filed as separate proceeding in another court or in a different case
before the same court shall be dismissed, upon appropriate motion, as a violation of the rule against
forum shopping.

As an alternative to the dismissal of a second petition for confirmation, vacation or

correction/modification of an arbitral award filed in violation of the non-forum shopping rule, the court
or courts concerned may allow the consolidation of the two proceedings in one court and in one
case.

Where the petition to confirm the award and petition to vacate or correct/modify were simultaneously
filed by the parties in the same court or in different courts in the Philippines, upon motion of either
party, the court may order the consolidation of the two cases before either court.

In all instances, the petition must be verified by a person who has knowledge of the jurisdictional
facts.

Rule 11.6. Contents of petition. - The petition must state the following:

a. The addresses of the parties and any change thereof;

b. The jurisdictional issues raised by a party during arbitration proceedings;

 c. The grounds relied upon by the parties in seeking the vacation of the arbitral award
whether the petition is a petition for the vacation or setting aside of the arbitral award or a
petition in opposition to a petition to confirm the award; and

d. A statement of the date of receipt of the arbitral award and the circumstances under which
it was received by the petitioner.

Apart from other submissions, the petitioner must attach to the petition the following:

a. An authentic copy of the arbitration agreement;

b. An authentic copy of the arbitral award;

c. A certification against forum shopping executed by the applicant in accordance with

Section 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court; and

d. An authentic copy or authentic copies of the appointment of an arbitral tribunal.

Rule 11.7. Notice. - Upon finding that the petition filed under this Rule is sufficient both in form and
in substance, the Court shall cause notice and a copy of the petition to be delivered to the
respondent allowing him to file a comment or opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from receipt
of the petition. In lieu of an opposition, the respondent may file a petition in opposition to the petition.

The petitioner may within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the petition in opposition thereto file a
reply.

Rule 11.8. Hearing. - If the Court finds from the petition or petition in opposition thereto that there
are issues of fact, it shall require the parties, within a period of not more than fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the order, to simultaneously submit the affidavits of all of their witnesses and reply
affidavits within ten (10) days from receipt of the affidavits to be replied to. There shall be attached to
the affidavits or reply affidavits documents relied upon in support of the statements of fact in such
affidavits or reply affidavits.

If the petition or the petition in opposition thereto is one for vacation of an arbitral award, the
interested party in arbitration may oppose the petition or the petition in opposition thereto for the
reason that the grounds cited in the petition or the petition in opposition thereto, assuming them to
be true, do not affect the merits of the case and may be cured or remedied. Moreover, the interested
party may request the court to suspend the proceedings for vacation for a period of time and to
direct the arbitral tribunal to reopen and conduct a new hearing and take such other action as will
eliminate the grounds for vacation of the award. The opposition shall be supported by a brief of legal
arguments to show the existence of a sufficient legal basis for the opposition.

If the ground of the petition to vacate an arbitral award is that the arbitration agreement did not exist,
is invalid or otherwise unenforceable, and an earlier petition for judicial relief under Rule 3 had been
filed, a copy of such petition and of the decision or final order of the court shall be attached thereto.
But if the ground was raised before the arbitral tribunal in a motion to dismiss filed not later than the
submission of its answer, and the arbitral tribunal ruled in favor of its own jurisdiction as a
preliminary question which was appealed by a party to the Regional Trial Court, a copy of the order,
ruling or preliminary award or decision of the arbitral tribunal, the appeal therefrom to the Court and
the order or decision of the Court shall all be attached to the petition.
If the ground of the petition is that the petitioner is an infant or a person judicially declared to be
incompetent, there shall be attached to the petition certified copies of documents showing such fact.
In addition, the petitioner shall show that even if the submission or arbitration agreement was
entered into by a guardian or guardian ad litem, the latter was not authorized by a competent court
to sign such the submission or arbitration agreement.

If on the basis of the petition, the opposition, the affidavits and reply affidavits of the parties, the
court finds that there is a need to conduct an oral hearing, the court shall set the case for hearing.
This case shall have preference over other cases before the court, except criminal cases. During the
hearing, the affidavits of witnesses shall take the place of their direct testimonies and they shall
immediately be subject to cross-examination thereon. The Court shall have full control over the
proceedings in order to ensure that the case is heard without undue delay.

Rule 11.9. Court action. - Unless a ground to vacate an arbitral award under Rule 11.5 above is fully
established, the court shall confirm the award.

An arbitral award shall enjoy the presumption that it was made and released in due course of
arbitration and is subject to confirmation by the court

In resolving the petition or petition in opposition thereto in accordance with these Special ADR
Rules, the court shall either confirm or vacate the arbitral award. The court shall not disturb the
arbitral tribunal’s determination of facts and/or interpretation of law.

In a petition to vacate an award or in petition to vacate an award in opposition to a petition to confirm

the award, the petitioner may simultaneously apply with the Court to refer the case back to the same
arbitral tribunal for the purpose of making a new or revised award or to direct a new hearing, or in
the appropriate case, order the new hearing before a new arbitral tribunal, the members of which
shall be chosen in the manner provided in the arbitration agreement or submission, or the law. In the
latter case, any provision limiting the time in which the arbitral tribunal may make a decision shall be
deemed applicable to the new arbitral tribunal.

In referring the case back to the arbitral tribunal or to a new arbitral tribunal pursuant to Rule 24 of
Republic Act No. 876, the court may not direct it to revise its award in a particular way, or to revise
its findings of fact or conclusions of law or otherwise encroach upon the independence of an arbitral
tribunal in the making of a final award.

RULE 12: RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OR SETTING ASIDE OF AN

INTERNATIONALCOMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AWARD

Rule 12.1. Who may request recognition and enforcement or setting aside. - Any party to an
international commercial arbitration in the Philippines may petition the proper court to recognize and
enforce or set aside an arbitral award.

Rule 12.2. When to file petition. - (A) Petition to recognize and enforce. - The petition for
enforcement and recognition of an arbitral award may be filed anytime from receipt of the award. If,
however, a timely petition to set aside an arbitral award is filed, the opposing party must file therein
and in opposition thereto the petition for recognition and enforcement of the same award within the
period for filing an opposition.

(B) Petition to set aside. - The petition to set aside an arbitral award may only be filed within three (3)
months from the time the petitioner receives a copy thereof. If a timely request is made with the
arbitral tribunal for correction, interpretation or additional award, the three (3) month period shall be
counted from the time the petitioner receives the resolution by the arbitral tribunal of that request.

A petition to set aside can no longer be filed after the lapse of the three (3) month period. The
dismissal of a petition to set aside an arbitral award for being time-barred shall not automatically
result in the approval of the petition filed therein and in opposition thereto for recognition and
enforcement of the same award. Failure to file a petition to set aside shall preclude a party from
raising grounds to resist enforcement of the award.

Rule 12.3. Venue. - A petition to recognize and enforce or set aside an arbitral award may, at the
option of the petitioner, be filed with the Regional Trial Court: (a) where arbitration proceedings were
conducted; (b) where any of the assets to be attached or levied upon is located; (c) where the act to
be enjoined will be or is being performed; (d) where any of the parties to arbitration resides or has its
place of business; or (e) in the National Capital Judicial Region.

Rule 12.4. Grounds to set aside or resist enforcement. - The court may set aside or refuse the
enforcement of the arbitral award only if:

a. The party making the application furnishes proof that:

(i). A party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity, or the said
agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing
any indication thereof, under Philippine law; or

(ii). The party making the application to set aside or resist enforcement was not given
proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was
otherwise unable to present his case; or

(iii). The award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the
terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration; provided that, if the decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part
of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be
set aside or only that part of the award which contains decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration may be enforced; or

(iv). The composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties, unless such agreement was in conflict
with a provision of Philippine law from which the parties cannot derogate, or, failing
such agreement, was not in accordance with Philippine law;

b. The court finds that:

(i). The subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration under
the law of the Philippines; or

(ii). The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to public policy.

In deciding the petition, the Court shall disregard any other ground to set aside or enforce the arbitral
award other than those enumerated above.
The petition to set-aside or a pleading resisting the enforcement of an arbitral award on the ground
that a party was a minor or an incompetent shall be filed only on behalf of the minor or incompetent
and shall allege that (a) the other party to arbitration had knowingly entered into a submission or
agreement with such minor or incompetent, or (b) the submission to arbitration was made by a
guardian or guardian ad litem who was not authorized to do so by a competent court.

Rule 12.5. Exclusive recourse against arbitral award. - Recourse to a court against an arbitral award
shall be made only through a petition to set aside the arbitral award and on grounds prescribed by
the law that governs international commercial arbitration. Any other recourse from the arbitral award,
such as by appeal or petition for review or petition for certiorari or otherwise, shall be dismissed by
the court.

Rule 12.6. Form. - The application to recognize and enforce or set aside an arbitral award, whether
made through a petition to recognize and enforce or to set aside or as a petition to set aside the
award in opposition thereto, or through a petition to set aside or petition to recognize and enforce in
opposition thereto, shall be verified by a person who has personal knowledge of the facts stated
therein.

When a petition to recognize and enforce an arbitral award is pending, the application to set it aside,
if not yet time-barred, shall be made through a petition to set aside the same award in the same
proceedings.

When a timely petition to set aside an arbitral award is filed, the opposing party may file a petition for
recognition and enforcement of the same award in opposition thereto.

Rule 12.7. Contents of petition. - (A) Petition to recognize and enforce. - The petition to recognize
and enforce or petition to set aside in opposition thereto, or petition to set aside or petition to
recognize and enforce in opposition thereto, shall state the following:

a. The addresses of record, or any change thereof, of the parties to arbitration;

b. A statement that the arbitration agreement or submission exists;

c. The names of the arbitrators and proof of their appointment;

d. A statement that an arbitral award was issued and when the petitioner received it; and

e. The relief sought.

Apart from other submissions, the petitioner shall attach to the petition the following:

a. An authentic copy of the arbitration agreement;

b. An authentic copy of the arbitral award;

c. A verification and certification against forum shopping executed by the applicant in

accordance with Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court; and

d. An authentic copy or authentic copies of the appointment of an arbitral tribunal.

(B) Petition to set aside. - The petition to set aside or petition to set aside in opposition to a petition
to recognize and enforce an arbitral award in international commercial arbitration shall have the
same contents as a petition to recognize and enforce or petition to recognize and enforce in
opposition to a petition to set aside an arbitral award. In addition, the said petitions should state the
grounds relied upon to set it aside.

Further, if the ground of the petition to set aside is that the petitioner is a minor or found incompetent
by a court, there shall be attached to the petition certified copies of documents showing such fact. In
addition, the petitioner shall show that even if the submission or arbitration agreement was entered
into by a guardian or guardian ad litem, the latter was not authorized by a competent court to sign
such the submission or arbitration agreement.

In either case, if another court was previously requested to resolve and/or has resolved, on appeal,
the arbitral tribunal’s preliminary determination in favor of its own jurisdiction, the petitioner shall
apprise the court before which the petition to recognize and enforce or set aside is pending of the
status of the appeal or its resolution.

Rule 12.8. Notice. - Upon finding that the petition filed under this Rule is sufficient both in form and
in substance, the court shall cause notice and a copy of the petition to be delivered to the
respondent directing him to file an opposition thereto within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
petition. In lieu of an opposition, the respondent may file a petition to set aside in opposition to a
petition to recognize and enforce, or a petition to recognize and enforce in opposition to a petition to
set aside.

The petitioner may within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the petition to set aside in opposition to a
petition to recognize and enforce, or from receipt of the petition to recognize and enforce in
opposition to a petition to set aside, file a reply.

Rule 12.9. Submission of documents. - If the court finds that the issue between the parties is mainly
one of law, the parties may be required to submit briefs of legal arguments, not more than fifteen
(15) days from receipt of the order, sufficiently discussing the legal issues and the legal basis for the
relief prayed for by each of them.

If the court finds from the petition or petition in opposition thereto that there are issues of fact relating
to the ground(s) relied upon for the court to set aside, it shall require the parties within a period of not
more than fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order simultaneously to submit the affidavits of all of
their witnesses and reply affidavits within ten (10) days from receipt of the affidavits to be replied to.
There shall be attached to the affidavits or reply affidavits, all documents relied upon in support of
the statements of fact in such affidavits or reply affidavits.

Rule 12.10. Hearing. - If on the basis of the petition, the opposition, the affidavits and reply affidavits
of the parties, the court finds that there is a need to conduct an oral hearing, the court shall set the
case for hearing. This case shall have preference over other cases before the court, except criminal
cases. During the hearing, the affidavits of witnesses shall take the place of their direct testimonies
and they shall immediately be subject to cross-examination thereon. The court shall have full control
over the proceedings in order to ensure that the case is heard without undue delay.

Rule 12.11. Suspension of proceedings to set aside. - The court when asked to set aside an arbitral
award may, where appropriate and upon request by a party, suspend the proceedings for a period of
time determined by it to give the arbitral tribunal an opportunity to resume the arbitral proceedings or
to take such other action as in the arbitral tribunal’s opinion will eliminate the grounds for setting
aside. The court, in referring the case back to the arbitral tribunal may not direct it to revise its award
in a particular way, or to revise its findings of fact or conclusions of law or otherwise encroach upon
the independence of an arbitral tribunal in the making of a final award.

The court when asked to set aside an arbitral award may also, when the preliminary ruling of an
arbitral tribunal affirming its jurisdiction to act on the matter before it had been appealed by the party
aggrieved by such preliminary ruling to the court, suspend the proceedings to set aside to await the
ruling of the court on such pending appeal or, in the alternative, consolidate the proceedings to set
aside with the earlier appeal.

Rule 12.12. Presumption in favor of confirmation. - It is presumed that an arbitral award was made
and released in due course and is subject to enforcement by the court, unless the adverse party is
able to establish a ground for setting aside or not enforcing an arbitral award.

Rule 12.13. Judgment of the court. - Unless a ground to set aside an arbitral award under Rule 12.4
above is fully established, the court shall dismiss the petition. If, in the same proceedings, there is a
petition to recognize and enforce the arbitral award filed in opposition to the petition to set aside, the
court shall recognize and enforce the award.

In resolving the petition or petition in opposition thereto in accordance with the Special ADR Rules,
the court shall either set aside or enforce the arbitral award. The court shall not disturb the arbitral
tribunal’s determination of facts and/or interpretation of law.

Rule 12.14. Costs. - Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties in writing, at the time the case is
submitted to the court for decision, the party praying for recognition and enforcement or setting aside
of an arbitral award shall submit a statement under oath confirming the costs he has incurred only in
the proceedings for such recognition and enforcement or setting aside. The costs shall include the
attorney’s fees the party has paid or is committed to pay to his counsel of record.

The prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of costs, which shall include reasonable attorney’s
fees of the prevailing party against the unsuccessful party. The court shall determine the
reasonableness of the claim for attorney’s fees.

RULE 13: RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF A FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARD

Rule 13.1. Who may request recognition and enforcement. - Any party to a foreign arbitration may
petition the court to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award.

Rule 13.2. When to petition. - At any time after receipt of a foreign arbitral award, any party to
arbitration may petition the proper Regional Trial Court to recognize and enforce such award.

Rule 13.3. Venue. - The petition to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award shall be filed, at
the option of the petitioner, with the Regional Trial Court (a) where the assets to be attached or
levied upon is located, (b) where the act to be enjoined is being performed, (c) in the principal place
of business in the Philippines of any of the parties, (d) if any of the parties is an individual, where any
of those individuals resides, or (e) in the National Capital Judicial Region.

Rule 13.4. Governing law and grounds to refuse recognition and enforcement. - The recognition and
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award shall be governed by the 1958 New York Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (the "New York Convention") and this Rule.
The court may, upon grounds of comity and reciprocity, recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral
award made in a country that is not a signatory to the New York Convention as if it were a
Convention Award.

A Philippine court shall not set aside a foreign arbitral award but may refuse it recognition and
enforcement on any or all of the following grounds:

a. The party making the application to refuse recognition and enforcement of the award
furnishes proof that:

(i). A party to the arbitration agreement was under some incapacity; or the said
agreement is not valid under the law to which the parties have subjected it or, failing
any indication thereof, under the law of the country where the award was made; or

(ii). The party making the application was not given proper notice of the appointment
of an arbitrator or of the arbitral proceedings or was otherwise unable to present his
case; or

(iii). The award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the
terms of the submission to arbitration, or contains decisions on matters beyond the
scope of the submission to arbitration; provided that, if the decisions on matters
submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so submitted, only that part
of the award which contains decisions on matters not submitted to arbitration may be
set aside; or

(iv). The composition of the arbitral tribunal or the arbitral procedure was not in
accordance with the agreement of the parties or, failing such agreement, was not in
accordance with the law of the country where arbitration took place; or

(v). The award has not yet become binding on the parties or has been set aside or
suspended by a court of the country in which that award was made; or

b. The court finds that:

(i). The subject-matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement or resolution by

arbitration under Philippine law; or

(ii). The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to public policy.

The court shall disregard any ground for opposing the recognition and enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award other than those enumerated above.

Rule 13.5. Contents of petition. - The petition shall state the following:

a. The addresses of the parties to arbitration;

b. In the absence of any indication in the award, the country where the arbitral award was
made and whether such country is a signatory to the New York Convention; and

c. The relief sought.

Apart from other submissions, the petition shall have attached to it the following:
 a. An authentic copy of the arbitration agreement; and

b. An authentic copy of the arbitral award.

If the foreign arbitral award or agreement to arbitrate or submission is not made in English, the
petitioner shall also attach to the petition a translation of these documents into English. The
translation shall be certified by an official or sworn translator or by a diplomatic or consular agent.

Rule 13.6. Notice and opposition. - Upon finding that the petition filed under this Rule is sufficient
both in form and in substance, the court shall cause notice and a copy of the petition to be delivered
to the respondent allowing him to file an opposition thereto within thirty (30) days from receipt of the
notice and petition.

Rule 13.7. Opposition. - The opposition shall be verified by a person who has personal knowledge of
the facts stated therein.

Rule 13.8. Submissions. - If the court finds that the issue between the parties is mainly one of law,
the parties may be required to submit briefs of legal arguments, not more than thirty (30) days from
receipt of the order, sufficiently discussing the legal issues and the legal bases for the relief prayed
for by each other.

If, from a review of the petition or opposition, there are issues of fact relating to the ground/s relied
upon for the court to refuse enforcement, the court shall, motu proprio or upon request of any party,
require the parties to simultaneously submit the affidavits of all of their witnesses within a period of
not less than fifteen (15) days nor more than thirty (30) days from receipt of the order. The court
may, upon the request of any party, allow the submission of reply affidavits within a period of not
less than fifteen (15) days nor more than thirty (30) days from receipt of the order granting said
request. There shall be attached to the affidavits or reply affidavits all documents relied upon in
support of the statements of fact in such affidavits or reply affidavits.

Rule 13.9. Hearing. - The court shall set the case for hearing if on the basis of the foregoing
submissions there is a need to do so. The court shall give due priority to hearings on petitions under
this Rule. During the hearing, the affidavits of witnesses shall take the place of their direct
testimonies and they shall immediately be subject to cross-examination. The court shall have full
control over the proceedings in order to ensure that the case is heard without undue delay.

Rule 13.10. Adjournment/deferment of decision on enforcement of award. - The court before which a
petition to recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award is pending, may adjourn or defer rendering
a decision thereon if, in the meantime, an application for the setting aside or suspension of the
award has been made with a competent authority in the country where the award was made. Upon
application of the petitioner, the court may also require the other party to give suitable security.

Rule 13.11. Court action. - It is presumed that a foreign arbitral award was made and released in
due course of arbitration and is subject to enforcement by the court.

The court shall recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award unless a ground to refuse recognition
or enforcement of the foreign arbitral award under this rule is fully established.

The decision of the court recognizing and enforcing a foreign arbitral award is immediately
executory.
In resolving the petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award in accordance
with these Special ADR Rules, the court shall either [a] recognize and/or enforce or [b] refuse to
recognize and enforce the arbitral award. The court shall not disturb the arbitral tribunal’s
determination of facts and/or interpretation of law.

Rule 13.12. Recognition and enforcement of non-convention award. - The court shall, only upon
grounds provided by these Special ADR Rules, recognize and enforce a foreign arbitral award made
in a country not a signatory to the New York Convention when such country extends comity and
reciprocity to awards made in the Philippines. If that country does not extend comity and reciprocity
to awards made in the Philippines, the court may nevertheless treat such award as a foreign
judgment enforceable as such under Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court.

PART III
PROVISIONS SPECIFIC TO MEDIATION

RULE 14: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Rule 14.1. Application of the rules on arbitration. - Whenever applicable and appropriate, the
pertinent rules on arbitration shall be applied in proceedings before the court relative to a dispute
subject to mediation.

RULE 15: DEPOSIT AND ENFORCEMENT OF MEDIATED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS

Rule 15.1. Who makes a deposit. - Any party to a mediation that is not court-annexed may deposit
with the court the written settlement agreement, which resulted from that mediation.

Rule 15.2. When deposit is made. - At any time after an agreement is reached, the written
settlement agreement may be deposited.

Rule 15.3. Venue. - The written settlement agreement may be jointly deposited by the parties or
deposited by one party with prior notice to the other party/ies with the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court (a) where the principal place of business in the Philippines of any of the parties is located;
(b) if any of the parties is an individual, where any of those individuals resides; or (c) in the National
Capital Judicial Region.

Rule 15.4. Registry Book. - The Clerk of Court of each Regional Trial Court shall keep a Registry
Book that shall chronologically list or enroll all the mediated settlement agreements/settlement
awards that are deposited with the court as well as the names and address of the parties thereto and
the date of enrollment and shall issue a Certificate of Deposit to the party that made the deposit.

Rule 15.5. Enforcement of mediated settlement agreement. - Any of the parties to a mediated
settlement agreement, which was deposited with the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, may,
upon breach thereof, file a verified petition with the same court to enforce said agreement.

Rule 15.6. Contents of petition. - The verified petition shall:

a. Name and designate, as petitioner or respondent, all parties to the mediated settlement
agreement and those who may be affected by it;

b. State the following:

 (i). The addresses of the petitioner and respondents; and

(ii). The ultimate facts that would show that the adverse party has defaulted to
perform its obligation under said agreement; and

c. Have attached to it the following:

(i). An authentic copy of the mediated settlement agreement; and

(ii). Certificate of Deposit showing that the mediated settlement agreement was
deposited with the Clerk of Court.

Rule 15.7. Opposition. - The adverse party may file an opposition, within fifteen (15) days from
receipt of notice or service of the petition, by submitting written proof of compliance with the
mediated settlement agreement or such other affirmative or negative defenses it may have.

Rule 15.8. Court action. - After a summary hearing, if the court finds that the agreement is a valid
mediated settlement agreement, that there is no merit in any of the affirmative or negative defenses
raised, and the respondent has breached that agreement, in whole or in part, the court shall order
the enforcement thereof; otherwise, it shall dismiss the petition.

PART IV
PROVISIONS SPECIFIC TO CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION

RULE 16: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Rule 16.1. Application of the rules on arbitration. - Whenever applicable and appropriate, the rules
on arbitration shall be applied in proceedings before the court relative to a dispute subject to
construction arbitration.

RULE 17: REFERRAL TO CIAC

Rule 17.1. Dismissal of action. - A Regional Trial Court before which a construction dispute is filed
shall, upon becoming aware that the parties have entered into an arbitration agreement, motu
proprio or upon motion made not later than the pre-trial, dismiss the case and refer the parties to
arbitration to be conducted by the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), unless all
parties to arbitration, assisted by their respective counsel, submit to the court a written agreement
making the court, rather than the CIAC, the body that would exclusively resolve the dispute.

Rule 17.2. Form and contents of motion. - The request for dismissal of the civil action and referral to
arbitration shall be through a verified motion that shall (a) contain a statement showing that the
dispute is a construction dispute; and (b) be accompanied by proof of the existence of the arbitration
agreement.

If the arbitration agreement or other document evidencing the existence of that agreement is already
part of the record, those documents need not be submitted to the court provided that the movant has
cited in the motion particular references to the records where those documents may be found.

The motion shall also contain a notice of hearing addressed to all parties and shall specify the date
and time when the motion will be heard, which must not be later than fifteen (15) days after the filing
of the motion. The movant shall ensure receipt by all parties of the motion at least three days before
the date of the hearing.

Rule 17.3. Opposition. - Upon receipt of the motion to refer the dispute to arbitration by CIAC, the
other party may file an opposition to the motion on or before the day such motion is to be heard. The
opposition shall clearly set forth the reasons why the court should not dismiss the case.

Rule 17.4. Hearing. - The court shall hear the motion only once and for the purpose of clarifying
relevant factual and legal issues.

Rule 17.5. Court action. - If the other parties fail to file their opposition on or before the day of the
hearing, the court shall motu proprio resolve the motion only on the basis of the facts alleged in the
motion.

After hearing, the court shall dismiss the civil action and refer the parties to arbitration if it finds,
based on the pleadings and supporting documents submitted by the parties, that there is a valid and
enforceable arbitration agreement involving a construction dispute. Otherwise, the court shall
proceed to hear the case.

All doubts shall be resolved in favor of the existence of a construction dispute and the arbitration
agreement.

Rule 17.6. Referral immediately executory. - An order dismissing the case and referring the dispute
to arbitration by CIAC shall be immediately executory.

Rule 17.7. Multiple actions and parties. - The court shall not decline to dismiss the civil action and
make a referral to arbitration by CIAC for any of the following reasons:

a. Not all of the disputes subject of the civil action may be referred to arbitration;

b. Not all of the parties to the civil action are bound by the arbitration agreement and referral
to arbitration would result in multiplicity of suits;

c. The issues raised in the civil action could be speedily and efficiently resolved in its entirety
by the Court rather than in arbitration;

d. Referral to arbitration does not appear to be the most prudent action; or

e. Dismissal of the civil action would prejudice the rights of the parties to the civil action who
are not bound by the arbitration agreement.

The court may, however, issue an order directing the inclusion in arbitration of those parties who are
bound by the arbitration agreement directly or by reference thereto pursuant to Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 9285.

Furthermore, the court shall issue an order directing the case to proceed with respect to the parties
not bound by the arbitration agreement.

Rule 17.8. Referral - If the parties manifest that they have agreed to submit all or part of their dispute
pending with the court to arbitration by CIAC, the court shall refer them to CIAC for arbitration.
 PART V
PROVISIONS SPECIFIC TO OTHER FORMS OF ADR

RULE 18: GENERAL PROVISIONS

Rule 18.1. Applicability of rules to other forms of ADR. - This rule governs the procedure for matters
brought before the court involving the following forms of ADR:

a. Early neutral evaluation;

b. Neutral evaluation;

c. Mini-trial;

d. Mediation-arbitration;

e. A combination thereof; or

f. Any other ADR form.

Rule 18.2. Applicability of the rules on mediation. - If the other ADR form/process is more akin to
mediation (i.e., the neutral third party merely assists the parties in reaching a voluntary agreement),
the herein rules on mediation shall apply.

Rule 18.3. Applicability of rules on arbitration.-If the other ADR form/process is more akin to
arbitration (i.e., the neutral third party has the power to make a binding resolution of the dispute), the
herein rules on arbitration shall apply.

Rule 18.4. Referral. - If a dispute is already before a court, either party may before and during pre-
trial, file a motion for the court to refer the parties to other ADR forms/processes. At any time during
court proceedings, even after pre-trial, the parties may jointly move for suspension of the action
pursuant to Article 2030 of the Civil Code of the Philippines where the possibility of compromise is
shown.

Rule 18.5. Submission of settlement agreement. - Either party may submit to the court, before which
the case is pending, any settlement agreement following a neutral or an early neutral evaluation,
mini-trial or mediation-arbitration.

PART VI
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, APPEAL AND CERTIORARI

RULE 19: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, APPEAL AND CERTIORARI

A. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

Rule 19.1. Motion for reconsideration, when allowed. - A party may ask the Regional Trial to
reconsider its ruling on the following:

a. That the arbitration agreement is inexistent, invalid or unenforceable pursuant to Rule 3.10
(B);
 b. Upholding or reversing the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 3.19;

c. Denying a request to refer the parties to arbitration;

d. Granting or denying a party an interim measure of protection;

e. Denying a petition for the appointment of an arbitrator;

f. Refusing to grant assistance in taking evidence;

g. Enjoining or refusing to enjoin a person from divulging confidential information;

h. Confirming, vacating or correcting a domestic arbitral award;

i. Suspending the proceedings to set aside an international commercial arbitral award and
referring the case back to the arbitral tribunal;

j. Setting aside an international commercial arbitral award;

k. Dismissing the petition to set aside an international commercial arbitral award, even if the
court does not recognize and/or enforce the same;

l. Recognizing and/or enforcing, or dismissing a petition to recognize and/or enforce an

international commercial arbitral award;

m. Declining a request for assistance in taking evidence;

n. Adjourning or deferring a ruling on a petition to set aside, recognize and/or enforce an

international commercial arbitral award;

o. Recognizing and/or enforcing a foreign arbitral award, or refusing recognition and/or

enforcement of the same; and

p. Granting or dismissing a petition to enforce a deposited mediated settlement agreement.

No motion for reconsideration shall be allowed from the following rulings of the Regional Trial Court:

a. A prima facie determination upholding the existence, validity or enforceability of an

arbitration agreement pursuant to Rule 3.1 (A);

b. An order referring the dispute to arbitration;

c. An order appointing an arbitrator;

d. Any ruling on the challenge to the appointment of an arbitrator;

e. Any order resolving the issue of the termination of the mandate of an arbitrator; and

f. An order granting assistance in taking evidence.

Rule 19.2. When to move for reconsideration. - A motion for reconsideration may be filed with the
Regional Trial Court within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the questioned
ruling or order.

Rule 19.3. Contents and notice. - The motion shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds
therefor and shall be filed with the court and served upon the other party or parties.

Rule 19.4. Opposition or comment. - Upon receipt of the motion for reconsideration, the other party
or parties shall have a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days to file his opposition or comment.

Rule 19.5. Resolution of motion. - A motion for reconsideration shall be resolved within thirty (30)
days from receipt of the opposition or comment or upon the expiration of the period to file such
opposition or comment.

Rule 19.6. No second motion for reconsideration. - No party shall be allowed a second motion for
reconsideration.

B. GENERAL PROVISIONS ON APPEAL AND CERTIORARI

Rule 19.7. No appeal or certiorari on the merits of an arbitral award. - An agreement to refer a
dispute to arbitration shall mean that the arbitral award shall be final and binding. Consequently, a
party to an arbitration is precluded from filing an appeal or a petition for certiorari questioning the
merits of an arbitral award.

Rule 19.8. Subject matter and governing rules. - The remedy of an appeal through a petition for
review or the remedy of a special civil action of certiorari from a decision of the Regional Trial Court
made under the Special ADR Rules shall be allowed in the instances, and instituted only in the
manner, provided under this Rule.

Rule 19.9. Prohibited alternative remedies. - Where the remedies of appeal and certiorari are
specifically made available to a party under the Special ADR Rules, recourse to one remedy shall
preclude recourse to the other.

Rule 19.10. Rule on judicial review on arbitration in the Philippines. - As a general rule, the court can
only vacate or set aside the decision of an arbitral tribunal upon a clear showing that the award
suffers from any of the infirmities or grounds for vacating an arbitral award under Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 876 or under Rule 34 of the Model Law in a domestic arbitration, or for setting
aside an award in an international arbitration under Article 34 of the Model Law, or for such other
grounds provided under these Special Rules.

If the Regional Trial Court is asked to set aside an arbitral award in a domestic or international
arbitration on any ground other than those provided in the Special ADR Rules, the court shall
entertain such ground for the setting aside or non-recognition of the arbitral award only if the same
amounts to a violation of public policy.

The court shall not set aside or vacate the award of the arbitral tribunal merely on the ground that
the arbitral tribunal committed errors of fact, or of law, or of fact and law, as the court cannot
substitute its judgment for that of the arbitral tribunal.
Rule 19.11. Rule on judicial review of foreign arbitral award. - The court can deny recognition and
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award only upon the grounds provided in Article V of the New York
Convention, but shall have no power to vacate or set aside a foreign arbitral award.

C. APPEALS TO THE COURT OF APPEALS

Rule 19.12. Appeal to the Court of Appeals. - An appeal to the Court of Appeals through a petition
for review under this Special Rule shall only be allowed from the following final orders of the
Regional Trial Court:

a. Granting or denying an interim measure of protection;

b. Denying a petition for appointment of an arbitrator;

c. Denying a petition for assistance in taking evidence;

d. Enjoining or refusing to enjoin a person from divulging confidential information;

e. Confirming, vacating or correcting/modifying a domestic arbitral award;

f. Setting aside an international commercial arbitration award;

g. Dismissing the petition to set aside an international commercial arbitration award even if
the court does not decide to recognize or enforce such award;

h. Recognizing and/or enforcing an international commercial arbitration award;

i. Dismissing a petition to enforce an international commercial arbitration award;

j. Recognizing and/or enforcing a foreign arbitral award;

k. Refusing recognition and/or enforcement of a foreign arbitral award;

l. Granting or dismissing a petition to enforce a deposited mediated settlement agreement;

and

m. Reversing the ruling of the arbitral tribunal upholding its jurisdiction.

Rule 19.13. Where to appeal. - An appeal under this Rule shall be taken to the Court of Appeals
within the period and in the manner herein provided.

Rule 19.14. When to appeal. - The petition for review shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the decision of the Regional Trial Court or the denial of the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.

Rule 19.15. How appeal taken. - Appeal shall be taken by filing a verified petition for review in seven
(7) legible copies with the Court of Appeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the adverse
party and on the Regional Trial Court. The original copy of the petition intended for the Court of
Appeals shall be marked original by the petitioner.
Upon the filing of the petition and unless otherwise prescribed by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner
shall pay to the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals docketing fees and other lawful fees of
P3,500.00 and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs.

Exemption from payment of docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted
by the Court of Appeals upon a verified motion setting forth valid grounds therefor. If the Court of
Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit
for costs within fifteen days from the notice of the denial.

Rule 19.16. Contents of the Petition. - The petition for review shall (a) state the full names of the
parties to the case, without impleading the court or agencies either as petitioners or respondent, (b)
contain a concise statement of the facts and issues involved and the grounds relied upon for the
review, (c) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or a certified true copy of the
decision or resolution of the Regional Trial Court appealed from, together with certified true copies of
such material portions of the record referred to therein and other supporting papers, and (d) contain
a sworn certification against forum shopping as provided in the Rules of Court. The petition shall
state the specific material dates showing that it was filed within the period fixed herein.

Rule 19.17. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. - The court shall dismiss the petition if it
fails to comply with the foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful
fees, the deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, the contents and the documents, which
should accompany the petition.

Rule 19.18. Action on the petition. - The Court of Appeals may require the respondent to file a
comment on the petition, not a motion to dismiss, within ten (10) days from notice, or dismiss the
petition if it finds, upon consideration of the grounds alleged and the legal briefs submitted by the
parties, that the petition does not appear to be prima facie meritorious.

Rule 19.19. Contents of Comment. - The comment shall be filed within ten (10) days from notice in
seven (7) legible copies and accompanied by clearly legible certified true copies of such material
portions of the record referred to therein together with other supporting papers. The comment shall
(a) point out insufficiencies or inaccuracies in petitioner’s statement of facts and issues, and (b) state
the reasons why the petition should be denied or dismissed. A copy thereof shall be served on the
petitioner, and proof of such service shall be filed with the Court of Appeals.

Rule 19.20. Due course. - If upon the filing of a comment or such other pleading or documents as
may be required or allowed by the Court of Appeals or upon the expiration of the period for the filing
thereof, and on the basis of the petition or the records, the Court of Appeals finds prima facie that
the Regional Trial Court has committed an error that would warrant reversal or modification of the
judgment, final order, or resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due course to the petition;
otherwise, it shall dismiss the same.

Rule 19.21. Transmittal of records. - Within fifteen (15) days from notice that the petition has been
given due course, the Court of Appeals may require the court or agency concerned to transmit the
original or a legible certified true copy of the entire record of the proceeding under review. The
record to be transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the proceeding. The Court of
Appeals may require or permit subsequent correction of or addition to the record.

Rule 19.22. Effect of appeal. - The appeal shall not stay the award, judgment, final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed unless the Court of Appeals directs otherwise upon such terms as it
may deem just.
Rule 19.23. Submission for decision. - If the petition is given due course, the Court of Appeals may
set the case for oral argument or require the parties to submit memoranda within a period of fifteen
(15) days from notice. The case shall be deemed submitted for decision upon the filing of the last
pleading or memorandum required by the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals shall render judgment within sixty (60) days from the time the case is
submitted for decision.

Rule 19.24. Subject of appeal restricted in certain instance. - If the decision of the Regional Trial
Court refusing to recognize and/or enforce, vacating and/or setting aside an arbitral award is
premised on a finding of fact, the Court of Appeals may inquire only into such fact to determine the
existence or non-existence of the specific ground under the arbitration laws of the Philippines relied
upon by the Regional Trial Court to refuse to recognize and/or enforce, vacate and/or set aside an
award. Any such inquiry into a question of fact shall not be resorted to for the purpose of substituting
the court’s judgment for that of the arbitral tribunal as regards the latter’s ruling on the merits of the
controversy.

Rule 19.25. Party appealing decision of court confirming arbitral award required to post bond. - The
Court of Appeals shall within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the petition require the party appealing
from the decision or a final order of the Regional Trial Court, either confirming or enforcing an arbitral
award, or denying a petition to set aside or vacate the arbitral award to post a bond executed in
favor of the prevailing party equal to the amount of the award.

Failure of the petitioner to post such bond shall be a ground for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the
petition.

D. SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI

Rule 19.26. Certiorari to the Court of Appeals. - When the Regional Trial Court, in making a ruling
under the Special ADR Rules, has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a party may file a special civil action for
certiorari to annul or set aside a ruling of the Regional Trial Court.

A special civil action for certiorari may be filed against the following orders of the court.

a. Holding that the arbitration agreement is inexistent, invalid or unenforceable;

b. Reversing the arbitral tribunal’s preliminary determination upholding its jurisdiction;

c. Denying the request to refer the dispute to arbitration;

d. Granting or refusing an interim relief;

e. Denying a petition for the appointment of an arbitrator;

f. Confirming, vacating or correcting a domestic arbitral award;

g. Suspending the proceedings to set aside an international commercial arbitral award and
referring the case back to the arbitral tribunal;
 h. Allowing a party to enforce an international commercial arbitral award pending appeal;

i. Adjourning or deferring a ruling on whether to set aside, recognize and or enforce an

international commercial arbitral award;

j. Allowing a party to enforce a foreign arbitral award pending appeal; and

k. Denying a petition for assistance in taking evidence.

Rule 19.27. Form. - The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the questioned
judgment, order or resolution of the Regional Trial Court, copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the
Rules of Court.

Upon the filing of the petition and unless otherwise prescribed by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner
shall pay to the clerk of court of the Court of Appeals docketing fees and other lawful fees of
P3,500.00 and deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment of docket and other
lawful fees and the deposit for costs may be granted by the Court of Appeals upon a verified motion
setting forth valid grounds therefor. If the Court of Appeals denies the motion, the petitioner shall pay
the docketing and other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen days from the notice of the
denial.

Rule 19.28. When to file petition. - The petition must be filed with the Court of Appeals within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be annulled or set aside. No
extension of time to file the petition shall be allowed.

Rule 19.29. Arbitral tribunal a nominal party in the petition. - The arbitral tribunal shall only be a
nominal party in the petition for certiorari. As nominal party, the arbitral tribunal shall not be required
to submit any pleadings or written submissions to the court. The arbitral tribunal or an arbitrator may,
however, submit such pleadings or written submissions if the same serves the interest of justice.

In petitions relating to the recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award, the arbitral
tribunal shall not be included even as a nominal party. However, the tribunal may be notified of the
proceedings and furnished with court processes.

Rule 19.30. Court to dismiss petition. - The court shall dismiss the petition if it fails to comply with
Rules 19.27 and 19.28 above, or upon consideration of the ground alleged and the legal briefs
submitted by the parties, the petition does not appear to be prima facie meritorious.

Rule 19.31. Order to comment. - If the petition is sufficient in form and substance to justify such
process, the Court of Appeals shall immediately issue an order requiring the respondent or
respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from
receipt of a copy thereof. Such order shall be served on the respondents in such manner as the
court may direct, together with a copy of the petition and any annexes thereto.

Rule 19.32. Arbitration may continue despite petition for certiorari. - A petition for certiorari to the
court from the action of the appointing authority or the arbitral tribunal allowed under this Rule shall
not prevent the arbitral tribunal from continuing the proceedings and rendering its award. Should the
arbitral tribunal continue with the proceedings, the arbitral proceedings and any award rendered
therein will be subject to the final outcome of the pending petition for certiorari.
Rule 19.33. Prohibition against injunctions. - The Court of Appeals shall not, during the pendency of
the proceedings before it, prohibit or enjoin the commencement of arbitration, the constitution of the
arbitral tribunal, or the continuation of arbitration.

Rule 19.34. Proceedings after comment is filed. - After the comment is filed, or the time for the filing
thereof has expired, the court shall render judgment granting the relief prayed for or to which the
petitioner is entitled, or denying the same, within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days.

Rule 19.35. Service and enforcement of order or judgment. - A certified copy of the judgment
rendered in accordance with the last preceding section shall be served upon the Regional Trial Court
concerned in such manner as the Court of Appeals may direct, and disobedience thereto shall be
punished as contempt.

E. APPEAL BY CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT

Rule 19.36. Review discretionary. - A review by the Supreme Court is not a matter of right, but of
sound judicial discretion, which will be granted only for serious and compelling reasons resulting in
grave prejudice to the aggrieved party. The following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring
the court's discretion, indicate the serious and compelling, and necessarily, restrictive nature of the
grounds that will warrant the exercise of the Supreme Court’s discretionary powers, when the Court
of Appeals:

a. Failed to apply the applicable standard or test for judicial review prescribed in these
Special ADR Rules in arriving at its decision resulting in substantial prejudice to the
aggrieved party;

b. Erred in upholding a final order or decision despite the lack of jurisdiction of the court that
rendered such final order or decision;

c. Failed to apply any provision, principle, policy or rule contained in these Special ADR
Rules resulting in substantial prejudice to the aggrieved party; and

d. Committed an error so egregious and harmful to a party as to amount to an undeniable

excess of jurisdiction.

The mere fact that the petitioner disagrees with the Court of Appeals’ determination of questions of
fact, of law or both questions of fact and law, shall not warrant the exercise of the Supreme Court’s
discretionary power. The error imputed to the Court of Appeals must be grounded upon any of the
above prescribed grounds for review or be closely analogous thereto.

A mere general allegation that the Court of Appeals has committed serious and substantial error or
that it has acted with grave abuse of discretion resulting in substantial prejudice to the petitioner
without indicating with specificity the nature of such error or abuse of discretion and the serious
prejudice suffered by the petitioner on account thereof, shall constitute sufficient ground for the
Supreme Court to dismiss outright the petition.

Rule 19.37. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a
judgment or final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals issued pursuant to these Special ADR
Rules may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall
raise only questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth.
Rule 19.38. Time for filing; extension. - The petition shall be filed within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the judgment or final order or resolution appealed from, or of the denial of the petitioner's motion
for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after notice of the judgment.

On motion duly filed and served, with full payment of the docket and other lawful fees and the
deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Supreme Court may for
justifiable reasons grant an extension of thirty (30) days only within which to file the petition.

Rule 19.39. Docket and other lawful fees; proof of service of petition. - Unless he has theretofore
done so or unless the Supreme Court orders otherwise, the petitioner shall pay docket and other
lawful fees to the clerk of court of the Supreme Court of P3,500.00 and deposit the amount of
P500.00 for costs at the time of the filing of the petition. Proof of service of a copy thereof on the
lower court concerned and on the adverse party shall be submitted together with the petition.

Rule 19.40. Contents of petition. - The petition shall be filed in eighteen (18) copies, with the original
copy intended for the court being indicated as such by the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full name
of the appealing party as the petitioner and the adverse party as respondent, without impleading the
lower courts or judges thereof either as petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate the material dates
showing when notice of the judgment or final order or resolution subject thereof was received, when
a motion for new trial or reconsideration, if any, was filed and when notice of the denial thereof was
received; (c) set forth concisely a statement of the matters involved, and the reasons or arguments
relied on for the allowance of the petition; (d) be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original,
or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order or resolution certified by the clerk of court of the
court a quo and the requisite number of plain copies thereof, and such material portions of the
record as would support the petition; and (e) contain a sworn certification against forum shopping.

Rule 19.41. Dismissal or denial of petition. - The failure of the petitioner to comply with any of the
foregoing requirements regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, deposit for costs,
proof of service of the petition, and the contents of and the documents which should accompany the
petition shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof.

The Supreme Court may on its own initiative deny the petition on the ground that the appeal is
without merit, or is prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that the questions raised therein are too
insubstantial to require consideration.

Rule 19.42. Due course; elevation of records. - If the petition is given due course, the Supreme
Court may require the elevation of the complete record of the case or specified parts thereof within
fifteen (15) days from notice.

PART VII
FINAL PROVISIONS

RULE 20: FILING AND DEPOSIT FEES

Rule 20.1. Filing fee in petitions or counter-petitions to confirm or enforce, vacate or set aside
arbitral award or for the enforcement of a mediated settlement agreement. - The filing fee for filing a
petition to confirm or enforce, vacate or set aside an arbitral award in a domestic arbitration or in an
international commercial arbitration, or enforce a mediated settlement agreement shall be as follows:

PhP 10,000.00 - if the award does not exceed PhP 1,000,000.00

 PhP 20,000.00 - if the award does not exceed PhP 20,000,000.00

PhP 30,000.00 - if the award does not exceed PhP 50,000,000.00

PhP 40,000.00 - if the award does not exceed PhP 100,000,000.00

PhP 50,000.00 - if the award exceeds PhP 100,000,000.00

The minimal filing fee payable in "all other actions not involving property" shall be paid by
the petitioner seeking to enforce foreign arbitral awards under the New York Convention in
the Philippines.

Rule 20.2. Filing fee for action to enforce as a counter-petition. - A petition to enforce an arbitral
award in a domestic arbitration or in an international commercial arbitration submitted as a petition to
enforce and/or recognize an award in opposition to a timely petition to vacate or set aside the arbitral
award shall require the payment of the filing fees prescribed in Rule 20.1 above.

Rule 20.3. Deposit fee for mediated settlement agreements. - Any party to a mediated settlement
agreement who deposits it with the clerk of court shall pay a deposit fee of P500.00.

Rule 20.4. Filing fee for other proceedings. - The filing fee for the filing of any other proceedings,
including applications for interim relief, as authorized under these Special Rules not covered under
any of the foregoing provisions, shall be P10,000.00.

RULE 21: COSTS

Rule 21.1. Costs. - The costs of the ADR proceedings shall be borne by the parties equally unless
otherwise agreed upon or directed by the arbitrator or arbitral tribunal.

Rule 21.2. On the dismissal of a petition against a ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary
question upholding its jurisdiction. - If the Regional Trial Court dismisses the petition against the
ruling of the arbitral tribunal on a preliminary question upholding its jurisdiction, it shall also order the
petitioner to pay the respondent all reasonable costs and expenses incurred in opposing the petition.
"Costs" shall include reasonable attorney’s fees. The court shall award costs upon application of the
respondent after the petition is denied and the court finds, based on proof submitted by respondent,
that the amount of costs incurred is reasonable.

Rule 21.3. On recognition and enforcement of a foreign arbitral award. - At the time the case is
submitted to the court for decision, the party praying for recognition and enforcement of a foreign
arbitral award shall submit a statement under oath confirming the costs he has incurred only in the
proceedings in the Philippines for such recognition and enforcement or setting-aside. The costs shall
include attorney’s fees the party has paid or is committed to pay to his counsel of record.

The prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of costs which shall include the reasonable
attorney’s fees of the prevailing party against the unsuccessful party. The court shall determine the
reasonableness of the claim for attorney’s fees.

Rule 21.4. Costs. - At the time the case is submitted to the court for decision, the party praying for
confirmation or vacation of an arbitral award shall submit a statement under oath confirming the
costs he has incurred only in the proceedings for confirmation or vacation of an arbitral award. The
costs shall include the attorney’s fees the party has paid or is committed to pay to his counsel of
record.

The prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of costs with respect to the proceedings before the
court, which shall include the reasonable attorney’s fees of the prevailing party against the
unsuccessful party. The court shall determine the reasonableness of the claim for attorney’s fees.

Rule 21.5. Bill of Costs. - Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties in writing, at the time the
case is submitted to the court for decision, the party praying for recognition and enforcement or for
setting aside an arbitral award shall submit a statement under oath confirming the costs he has
incurred only in the proceedings for such recognition and enforcement or setting-aside. The costs
shall include attorney’s fees the party has paid or is committed to pay to his counsel of record.

The prevailing party shall be entitled to an award of costs, which shall include reasonable attorney’s
fees of the prevailing party against the unsuccessful party. The court shall determine the
reasonableness of the claim for attorney’s fees.

Rule 21.6. Government’s exemption from payment of fees. - The Republic of the Philippines, its
agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from paying legal fees provided in these Special ADR
Rules. Local governments and government controlled corporation with or with or without
independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees.

RULE 22: APPLICABILITY OF THE RULES OF COURT

Rule 22.1. Applicability of Rules of Court. - The provisions of the Rules of Court that are applicable
to the proceedings enumerated in Rule 1.1 of these Special ADR Rules have either been included
and incorporated in these Special ADR Rules or specifically referred to herein.

In connection with the above proceedings, the Rules of Evidence shall be liberally construed to
achieve the objectives of the Special ADR Rules.

RULE 23: SEPARABILITY

Rule 23.1. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any part of the Special ADR Rules shall be held
unconstitutional or invalid, other Rules or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby, shall
continue to be in full force and effect.

RULE 24: TRANSITORY PROVISIONS

Rule 24.1. Transitory Provision. - Considering its procedural character, the Special ADR Rules shall
be applicable to all pending arbitration, mediation or other ADR forms covered by the ADR Act,
unless the parties agree otherwise. The Special ADR Rules, however, may not prejudice or impair
vested rights in accordance with law.

RULE 25: ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Rule 25.1. Applicability of the Special ADR Rules to Online Dispute Resolution. - Whenever
applicable and appropriate, the Special ADR Rules shall govern the procedure for matters brought
before the court involving Online Dispute Resolution.
Rule 25.2. Scope of Online Dispute Resolution. - Online Dispute Resolution shall refer to all
electronic forms of ADR including the use of the internet and other web or computed based
technologies for facilitating ADR.

RULE 26: EFFECTIVITY

Rule 26.1. Effectivity. - The Special ADR Rules shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

RULE A: GUIDELINES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF ISSUES RELATED TO ARBITRATION OF

LOANS SECURED BY COLLATERAL

Rule A.1. Applicability of an arbitration agreement in a contract of loan applies to the accessory
contract securing the loan. - An arbitration agreement in a contract of loan extends to and covers the
accessory contract securing the loan such as a pledge or a mortgage executed by the borrower in
favor of the lender under that contract of loan.

Rule A.2. Foreclosure of pledge or extra-judicial foreclosure of mortgage not precluded by

arbitration. - The commencement of the arbitral proceeding under the contract of loan containing an
arbitration agreement shall not preclude the lender from availing himself of the right to obtain
satisfaction of the loan under the accessory contract by foreclosure of the thing pledged or by extra-
judicial foreclosure of the collateral under the real estate mortgage in accordance with Act No. 3135.

The lender may likewise institute foreclosure proceedings against the collateral securing the loan
prior to the commencement of the arbitral proceeding.

By agreeing to refer any dispute under the contract of loan to arbitration, the lender who is secured
by an accessory contract of real estate mortgage shall be deemed to have waived his right to obtain
satisfaction of the loan by judicial foreclosure.

Rule A.3. Remedy of the borrower against an action taken by the lender against the collateral before
the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. - The borrower providing security for the payment of his loan
who is aggrieved by the action taken by the lender against the collateral securing the loan may, if
such action against the collateral is taken before the arbitral tribunal is constituted, apply with the
appropriate court for interim relief against any such action of the lender. Such interim relief may be
obtained only in a special proceeding for that purpose, against the action taken by the lender against
the collateral, pending the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. Any determination made by the court in
that special proceeding pertaining to the merits of the controversy, including the right of the lender to
proceed against the collateral, shall be only provisional in nature.

After the arbitral tribunal is constituted, the court shall stay its proceedings and defer to the
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal over the entire controversy including any question regarding the
right of the lender to proceed against the collateral.

Rule A.4. Remedy of borrower against action taken by the lender against the collateral after the
arbitral tribunal has been constituted. - After the arbitral tribunal is constituted, the borrower
providing security for the payment of his loan who is aggrieved by the action taken by the lender
against the collateral securing the loan may apply to the arbitral tribunal for relief, including a claim
for damages, against such action of the lender. An application to the court may also be made by the
borrower against any action taken by the lender against the collateral securing the loan but only if
the arbitral tribunal cannot act effectively to prevent an irreparable injury to the rights of such
borrower during the pendency of the arbitral proceeding.

An arbitration agreement in a contract of loan precludes the borrower therein providing security for
the loan from filing and/or proceeding with any action in court to prevent the lender from foreclosing
the pledge or extra-judicially foreclosing the mortgage. If any such action is filed in court, the lender
shall have the right provided in the Special ADR Rules to have such action stayed on account of the
arbitration agreement.

Rule A.5. Relief that may be granted by the arbitral tribunal. - The arbitral tribunal, in aid of the
arbitral proceeding before it, may upon submission of adequate security, suspend or enjoin the
lender from proceeding against the collateral securing the loan pending final determination by the
arbitral tribunal of the dispute brought to it for decision under such contract of loan.

The arbitral tribunal shall have the authority to resolve the issue of the validity of the foreclosure of
the thing pledged or of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the collateral under the real estate mortgage if
the same has not yet been foreclosed or confirm the validity of such foreclosure if made before the
rendition of the arbitral award and had not been enjoined.

Rule A.6. Arbitration involving a third-party provider of security. - An arbitration agreement contained
in a contract of loan between the lender and the borrower extends to and covers an accessory
contract securing the loan, such as a pledge, mortgage, guaranty or suretyship, executed by a
person other than the borrower only if such third-party securing the loan has agreed in the accessory
contract, either directly or by reference, to be bound by such arbitration agreement.

Unless otherwise expressly agreed upon by the third-party securing the loan, his agreement to be
bound by the arbitration agreement in the contract of loan shall pertain to disputes arising from or in
connection with the relationship between the lender and the borrower as well as the relationship
between the lender and such third-party including the right of the lender to proceed against the
collateral securing the loan, but shall exclude disputes pertaining to the relationship exclusively
between the borrower and the provider of security such as that involving a claim by the provider of
security for indemnification against the borrower.

In this multi-party arbitration among the lender, the borrower and the third party securing the loan,
the parties may agree to submit to arbitration before a sole arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators to
be appointed either by an Appointing Authority designated by the parties in the arbitration agreement
or by a default Appointing Authority under the law.

In default of an agreement on the manner of appointing arbitrators or of constituting the arbitral

tribunal in such multi-party arbitration, the dispute shall be resolved by a panel of three arbitrators to
be designated by the Appointing Authority under the law. But even in default of an agreement on the
manner of appointing an arbitrator or constituting an arbitral tribunal in a multi-party arbitration, if the
borrower and the third party securing the loan agree to designate a common arbitrator, arbitration
shall be decided by a panel of three arbitrators: one to be designated by the lender; the other to be
designated jointly by the borrower and the provider of security who have agreed to designate the
same arbitrator; and a third arbitrator who shall serve as the chairperson of the arbitral panel to be
designated by the two party-designated arbitrators.