G. R. No. 101469 September 4, 1992 However, that transaction appeared to be unauthorized under P.D. No.

However, that transaction appeared to be unauthorized under P.D. No. 3-A dated January 11, 1973
which provides that the reclamation of areas under water, whether foreshore or inland, will be done
only by the national government or any person authorized by it with a proper contract.
MALAYAN INTEGRATED INDUSTRIES, CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CITY OF MANDAUE, MAYOR ALFREDO M. OUANO, VICE MAYOR Moreover, Executive Order No. 525 of President Marcos designated the Public Estates Authority
PATERNO P. CANETE, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNGSOD MEMBERS MANUEL M. MASANGKAY, (PEA) as "the central authority primarily responsible for integrating, directing and coordinating all
NOEL C. SOON, CESAR CABAHUG, JR., RAYMUNDO A. CENIZA, CYNTHIA S. BLANCO, PONTICO E. reclamation projects for and in behalf of the National Government."
FORTUNA, RAFAEL J. MAYOL and PAULINO P. DY, F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC., CEBU CONTRACTORS
ASSOCIATION, MANDAUE REALTY & RESOURCES CORPORATION AND PHILIPPINE ORION
Acting Minister of Justice Catalino Macaraig, Jr., in his Opinion No. 70, Series of 1979 dated July 16,
PROPERTIES, INC., respondents.
1979, opined that P.D. No. 3-A impliedly withdrew or repealed the right of Mandaue City under its
charter (Sec. 94, R.A. 5519) to reclaim its submerged or foreshore lands. He added, however, that "if
Sumcad, Senires & Associates for petitioner. the PEA decides to authorize the City of Mandaue to reclaim its own foreshore, the former may
execute a contract with the latter pursuant to the above-scored provision of Executive Order No. 3-A
in connection with Sec. 1, of P.D. No. 3-A,. . . ." (p. 332, Rollo, Vol. I).

Accordingly, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue, in its session of October 12, 1979, passed
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
Resolution No. 116 authorizing the City Mayor to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with the
PEA. Its Resolution No. 117 of the same date authorized the City Mayor to enter into a contract with
In this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition, Malayan Integrated Industries Corporation the PEA for the reclamation of 360 hectares, more or less, of the foreshore and submerged lands of
(hereafter MALAYAN) prays that upon the filing of its verified petition, a restraining order or a writ Mandaue City.
of preliminary injunction be issued by this Court to stop the respondents from further proceeding in
CA-G.R. SP No. 25621 and, after a consideration of the merits of the petition, judgment be rendered
On November 26, 1979, the City of Mandaue and MALAYAN signed a Confirmatory Agreement
annulling the appellate court's resolutions dated August 9, 1991 and August 28, 1991, and the writ
whereby MALAYAN bound itself to undertake and prepare at its own expense, the detailed and
of preliminary injunction issued by it on August 29, 1991.
integrated development plan on land use, including technical, economic, marketing and financial
feasibility studies required by the Office of the President, and to submit the completed study "not
The only issue in this case is whether the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction, or acted with later than July 31, 1980" (p. 344, Rollo, Vol. I).
grave abuse of discretion, in issuing a writ of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. SP No. 25621
entitled, "The City of Mandaue, et al. vs. Hon. Leonardo B. Cañares and Malayan Integrated
On August 13, 1980, MALAYAN submitted to PEA documents relating to the Metro Cebu
Industries Corporation," "enjoining the respondents and anyone acting in their place and stead,
Reclamation and Development Project. Two days later, or on August 15, 1980, MALAYAN submitted
from enforcing the Orders of December 18, 1990 and June 28, 1991 in Civil Case No. CEB-9658 until
a detailed land use and development strategy and an overview of the project.
further orders. . ." (p. 1239, Rollo, Vol. II).

This is a simple case which has been made to appear complicated by the over-extended pleadings of
the parties. The petition and its annexes consist of 1,273 pages. The respondents are not to be
outdone with their comments of 395 pages. Running true to form, the petitioner filed a reply of 307
pages. The pleadings comprise 3 volumes, each several inches thick. Such profligacy with words is
hard to match. Counsels on both sides should heed the admonition of Justice Isagani A. Cruz that:
On September 29, 1980, PEA Chairman, Ruben Ancheta, recommended approval of the project.
Although President Marcos "approved in principle" the reclamation and development project,
the contract of reclamation and development between the City of Mandaue and MALAYAN remained
hanging in the air (p. 338, Rollo, Vol. I).

Counsel should remember that they do a disservice to the administration of After the 1986 "People Power" Revolution, the project was resubmitted to President Corazon C.
justice and contribute to its delay by imposing on the time of the courts with Aquino for approval.
irrelevant discussions that only clutter the record. (Arturo E. Edudela, et al. vs.
Hon. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 89265, July 17, 1992.)
On June 13, 1988, the City of Mandaue reiterated its request to President Aquino "for approval and
go-signal to commence the reclamation work" (p. 417, Rollo, Vol. I). The letter was referred by the
The records show that on December 12, 1977, a reclamation contract was signed between the City President to PEA.
of Mandaue and MALAYAN for the reclamation of some 180 (later increased to 360) hectares of
offshore and foreshore land and their development into an industrial and trading center with a
As of May 24, 1989, the detailed and integrated plan on land use, including technical, economic,
modern harbor and port facilities for both domestic and international commerce. The area would
marketing and financial feasibility studies submitted by MALAYAN remained "still pending approval
connect Cebu City harbor with the City of Mandaue from the Cabahug coastway up to the Cebu City-
by the Office of the President." (p. 441, Rollo, Vol. I.)
Mandaue boundary. The project was supposed to be completed within four (4) years after approval
of the contract by the Office of the President.
On February 13, 1989, PEA's General Manager, Eduardo C. Zialcita, advised MALAYAN that the
feasibility study should be updated.
Since the Office of the President seemed to have reservations concerning the contract between
MALAYAN and the City of Mandaue, and in view of the City's desire to undertake the reclamation
project without further delay, City Mayor Alfredo M. Ouano informed the PEA on April 15, 1989 that
the City was negotiating with F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., in consortium with the Cebu Contractors
Association, to undertake the preparation of the detailed feasibility and development plan for the
reclamation project. Mayor Ouano pointed out that F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. is a reputable private
construction firm in Manila, "with international prestige and proven capability as a reclamation
contractor with its own dredging equipment and the financial capacity to undertake, on its own, the
Mandaue reclamation project" (p. 483, Rollo, Vol. I).
On April 19, 1989, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue passed Resolution No. 134/89
authorizing the City Mayor to enter into a reclamation contract with F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. subject to
the President's approval.
This contract with F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., was signed a week later, on April 26, 1989.
Upon learning about the city's contract with F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., MALAYAN inquired from the Office
of the President whether Section 7 of R.A. 5519, known as the Charter of the City of Mandaue,
providing that the City alone shall have authority to reclaim its offshore land, had been repealed,
revoked, amended or superseded by Section 1 of P.D. No. 3-A, promulgated on January 11, 1973, and
Section 1 of E.O. No. 525 dated February 14, 1979.
The query was answered in the affirmative on August 31, 1989 by the Chief State Counsel, Elmer T.
Bautista, citing Justice Secretary Macaraig's Opinion No. 70, S. 1979, "which opinion still stands" (p.
498, Rollo, Vol. I).
On May 6, 1989, the PEA recommended the approval in principle of the proposed reclamation
project subject to the following conditions:
(a) Submission to PEA by the City of Mandaue, for review and approval a
Master Development Plan for the planned reclamation, within six (6) months
from date hereof, otherwise project approval shall be deemed automatically
revoked.
(b) Undertaking of Detailed Engineering Studies for the major physical
infrastructures involved.
(c) Supervision by PEA of the reclamation and related infrastructure works
and the cost of such supervision to be charged to the Project.
(d) Delegation of authority to Mandaue City to negotiate with a reputable
Contractor that shall undertake physical reclamation works under a proper
contrast, which shall contain stipulations on the compensation, costs of the
projects and other relevant conditions subject to the review and approval of
the Public Estates Authority as provided under existing laws.
(e) That the previous approval in principle granted to Malayan Integrated
Industries Corporation for a similar reclamation project, jointly with the
Province of Cebu, City of Cebu, City of Mandaue, Municipality of Cordova and
the City of Lapu-Lapu, by former President Marcos be deemed abandoned, and
set aside, by reason of the failure of Malayan Integrated Industries Corporation
to execute/implement the project for a long period of time reckoned from
1979 to the present. Moreover, there appears to be a lack of indorsement by
the local government of Cebu Province and Mandaue City of this undertaking
by Malayan Integrated Industries Corporation. (Emphasis supplied; pp. 530-
531, Rollo, Vol. I.)
MALAYAN filed a protest with the Office of the President against the reclamation contract between
the City of Mandaue and F.F. Cruz & Co. (pp. 542-545, Rollo, Vol. I).
On PEA's recommendation, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., by authority of the President,
approved on, June 27, 1989, the proposed Mandaue reclamation project, covering approximately
180 hectares of foreshore and submerged lands, subject to certain conditions, and declared that "the
Contract of Reclamation and Development entered into by and between the City of Mandaue and
Malayan Integrated Industries Corporation on December 12, 1977 is hereby DISAPPROVED, and/or
is hereby declared as without force and effect, it appearing from the records that the same was
entered in violation of the provisions of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 3-A, and/or for the
failure of said corporation to implement, as stipulated, the project within a reasonable period of
time." (pp. 583-584, Rollo, Vol. I; emphasis supplied.)
On November 26, 1990, MALAYAN filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, Cebu City (originally
in the Regional Trial Court, Manila but it withdrew the case) a petition for prohibitory and
mandatory preliminary injunction against the City of Mandaue, F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., the Cebu
Contractors Association, the Mandaue Realty Resources Corporation and Philippine Orion
Properties, Inc. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-9658 in which MALAYAN prayed the
Court to restrain the implementation of the reclamation contract between the City of Mandaue and
F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. as it would work injustice to MALAYAN and violate MALAYAN's valid and
previously perfected contract with the City of Mandaue, and it would cause damages to MALAYAN
which has already incurred expenses and invested huge sums of money in the Mandaue
Reclamation Project. MALAYAN also prayed the Court to issue a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction allowing MALAYAN to immediately undertake actual reclamation works in the Mandaue
Reclamation Project.
On November 29, 1990, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents "from further continuing with the implementation of the aforementioned contract
being questioned, until further orders from this Court" (p. 649, Rollo, Vol. I).
An Urgent Motion to Quash the Restraining Order and a separate Motion to Dismiss the petition
filed by the respondent did not prosper.
After a proper hearing, Judge Leonardo B. Cañares granted on December 18, 1990 the writ of
preliminary prohibitory injunction prayed for by MALAYAN upon its posting a P5 million injunction
bond. The dispositive part of his order reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, upon the filing of an injunction bond with this Court amounting
to P5,000,000.00, let a writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction be issued,
enjoining all of the respondents, their assigns, agents, representatives or
anybody acting for them or in their behalf from implementing the Contract of
Reclamation dated April 26, 1989, executed by and between Mandaue City and
respondents F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. and Cebu Contractors Association and all
other reclamation contracts executed in favor of said respondents and/or
assigns by the City of Mandaue and/or Public Estates Authority, and from
conducting any kind of works in any part of the area covered by the Mandaue
Reclamation Project.
 The motions to dismiss and other incidents filed by the respondents are
hereby denied for being premature. (pp. 677-678, Rollo, Vol. I.)
After the respondents' motions for reconsideration were denied by the Court, they filed in the Court
of Appeals on August 9, 1991, a petition for certiorari with prohibitory and mandatory preliminary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 25621, entitled, "City of Mandaue,
F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., et al, petitioners vs. Judge Leonardo B. Cañares and Malayan Integrated
Industries Corporation, respondents" praying that the preliminary writ of injunction issued by
Judge Cañares be nullified, that respondent MALAYAN be prohibited from interfering with the
reclamation works of the petitioners, City of Mandaue and F.F. Cruz; that respondents Judge Cañares
and MALAYAN be restrained from enforcing the orders dated December 19, 1990 and June 28, 1991
of respondent Judge; that the petition of MALAYAN in the Case No. CEB-9658 be dismissed; and that
MALAYAN be prohibited from interfering with the contract of reclamation between the City of
Mandaue and F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., the Memorandum of Agreement between the PEA, the City of
Mandaue and MARECO, and all other related contracts and activities concerning the Mandaue
Reclamation Project.
The Court of Appeals issued on August 9, 1991 a temporary restraining order to preserve the status
quo and enjoined the respondents and anyone acting in their place from enforcing Judge Cañares'
orders of December 19, 1990 and June 28, 1991, until further orders from said court.
On August 28, 1991, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a
P10,000,000.00 bond posted by F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc.
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the appellate court's resolution, MALAYAN filed
a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court to annul it.
After a careful consideration of the voluminous petition and the equally voluminous responses of
the public and private respondents, the Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not abuse its
discretion in stopping Judge Cañares and MALAYAN from interfering with the prosecution of the
Mandaue reclamation project by respondents F.F. Cruz &. Co., Inc. and its associates, the Cebu
Contractors Association, Mandaue Realty Resources Corporation and Philippine Orion Properties,
Inc.
In the first place, as explained in the Appellate Court's resolution, the contract between the City of
Mandaue and F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., et al. "had been approved by the Office of the President," while the
reclamation contract with MALAYAN "was disapproved" (pp. 1236-1237, Rollo, Vol. II).
. . . the Mandaue Reclamation Project, subject of the contract between the
Mandaue local government and private petitioners, has been approved by the
Office of the President of the Philippines (Annex "M" of the Petition). In the same
official document, the "Contract Reclamation and Development" entered into by
and between the City of Mandaue and respondent Malayan Integrated Industrial
Corporation on December 12, 1977 was disapproved. And pursuant to the
approved reclamation project and the contract entered into by and between
them, petitioners undertook the reclamation of foreshore and submerged
lands from the Cabahug Causway in Mandaue City towards the boundary with
Cebu City. In the course thereof at least a total of 23.4710 hectares of said
lands have been reclaimed by private petitioners after spending the sum of
P181,476,690.59 as of December 31, 1990. (Emphasis supplied.)
Secondly, Judge Cañares' writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, halting the prosecution of the
Mandaue reclamation project, violated P.D. No. 1818 which prohibits courts from issuing such writ
to stop any person, entity, or government official, from proceeding with or continuing the execution
or implementation of an infrastructure project, such as the reclamation of foreshore and submerged
lands along the coast of Mandaue City up to the Cebu City boundary for the purpose of developing
the reclaimed area into an industrial and trading center with a modern harbor and port facilities for
both domestic and international commerce. P.D. No. 1818 provides:
P.D. 1818 –– Prohibiting courts from issuing restraining orders or preliminary
injunctions in cases involving infrastructure and natural resource development
projects of, and public utilities operated by, the Government.
WHEREAS, Presidential Decree No. 605 prohibits the issuance by the courts of
restraining orders or injunctions in cases involving concessions, licences, and
other permits issued by administrative officials or bodies for the exploitation,
development and utilization of natural resources of the country;
WHEREAS, it is in the public interest to adopt a similar prohibition against the
issuance of such restraining orders or injunctions in other areas of activity
equally critical to the economic development effort of the nation, in order not
to disrupt or hamper the pursuit of essential government projects;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by
virtue of the powers vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby decree and
order as follows:
Sec. 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case,
dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery,
forest or other natural resource development project of the government, or
any public utility operated by the government, including among others public
utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities stevedoring and arrastre
contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from
proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such
project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity
necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.
The Court of Appeals further observed that "in the balance of inconveniences the petitioners appear
to stand to suffer grave and irreparable injury, and much more damages than MIIC (MALAYAN)
which has not done any reclamation works on the area subject of the dispute."(p.1239, Rollo, Vol. II.)
Although the letter to the PEA advising it of the approval of the reclamation contract between the
City of Mandaue and F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. and the disapproval of the earlier agreement between the
City of Mandaue and MALAYAN, was signed by the Executive Secretary, "by authority of the
President," and not by the President's own hand, the Executive Secretary's action is presumed to be
valid and to have been regularly performed in behalf of the President (Section 2[m], Rule 131,
Revised Rules on Evidence) and thus should be accorded due respect (Lacson-Magallanes vs. Paño,
129 Phil. 123; GSIS vs. CIR, December 30, 1961; Soriano vs. Ancheta, March 18, 1985; Rogue vs.
Director of Lands, July 1, 1976). As head of the Executive Office, the Executive Secretary, is an alter
ego of the President (Sec. 22, Chap. 8, Title II, Book II, 1987 E.O. 292, Adm. Code of 1987). One of his
myriad functions is "to exercise primary authority to sign papers "By authority of the President,"
attest executive orders and other presidential issuances unless attestation is specifically delegated
to other officials by him or by the President; assist the President in the administration of special
projects; and perform such other functions as the President may direct" (Sec. 22, subpars. 10, 14
and 18, Ibid). Paraphrasing Villena vs. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phils. 451, his personality is in
reality "but the projection of that of the President," his acts, "performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive." The approval by the Office of the President of the
reclamation contract in favor of F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. and the rejection of the contract with MALAYAN,
is not subject to review by the courts in view of the principle of separation of powers which accords
co-equal status to the three great branches of the government, absent any showing that the
President, in doing so, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Only on that ground may this Court justifiably
intervene in a transaction that otherwise would be the exclusive preserve of the Chief Executive.

In fact, while MALAYAN has asked the courts to nullify the reclamation contract between the City of
Mandaue and F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., it did not assail the Office of the President for having approved it.
Its petition for prohibitory and mandatory injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (CEB-
9658), did not implead, as respondents, nor charge with grave abuse of discretion, the President of
the Philippines, Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr., Deputy Executive Secretary Magdangal
Elma, Jr., and PEA General Manager Eduardo Zialcita, for having approved or recommended the
approval, by the President, of the said reclamation contract with F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc. and the
disapproval of the prior agreement between the City of Mandaue and MALAYAN.

WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the assailed resolution dated August 28, 1991
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 25621, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is DENIED
for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, "[b]y authority of the President" decided the
controversy, modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, and (1) declared that "it would be for the public interest that
G.R. No. L-27811 November 17, 1967
appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for their existence, be
allocated that portion on which they have made improvements;" and (2) directed that the
LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant, controverted land (northern portion of Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan, Davao,
vs. with Latian River as the dividing line) "should be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and
JOSE PAÑO, HON. JUAN PAJO, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. JUAN DE G. allocated to actual occupants, without prejudice to the corporation's right to reimbursement for the
RODRIGUEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, defendants- cost of surveying this portion." It may be well to state, at this point, that the decision just mentioned,
appellees. signed by the Executive Secretary, was planted upon the facts as found in said decision.

Leopoldo M. Abellera for plaintiff-appellant. Plaintiff corporation took the foregoing decision to the Court of First Instance praying that judgment
Victorio Advincula for defendant Jose Paño. be rendered declaring: (1) that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Office of the Solicitor General for defendant Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and has full force and effect; and (2) that the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary to law and of
Executive Secretary. no legal force and effect.

SANCHEZ, J.: And now subject of this appeal is the judgment of the court a quo dismissing plaintiff's case.

The question — May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision
of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources — yielded an affirmative answer from the lower court.1
Hence, this appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the provisions of Sections 17
and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
The undisputed controlling facts are:
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land
situated in Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao.
On January 9, 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of
the above public land to plaintiff.
On April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially released from the forest
zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land.
1. Plaintiff's mainstay is Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 141. The precept there is that decisions of
the Director of Lands "as to questions of facts shall be conclusive when approved" by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources. Plaintiff's trenchment claim is that this statute is controlling
not only upon courts but also upon the President.
Plaintiff's position is incorrect. The President's duty to execute the law is of constitutional
origin.3 So, too, is his control of all executive departments. 4 Thus it is, that department heads are
men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at
pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over,
confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not
be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary.
Particularly in reference to the decisions of the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, the standard practice is to allow appeals from such decisions to
the Office of the President.5This Court has recognized this practice in several cases. In one, the
decision of the Lands Director as approved by the Secretary was considered superseded by that of
the President's appeal.6 In other cases, failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy of appeal was
considered a fatal defect, warranting dismissal of the case, for non-exhaustion of all administrative
remedies.7

On January 26, 1955, Jose Paño and nineteen other claimants 2 applied for the purchase of ninety
hectares of the released area.
On March 29, 1955, plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire
released area. This was protested by Jose Paño and his nineteen companions upon the averment
that they are actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application.
The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision on July 31,
1956 giving due course to the application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose
Paño and his companions. A move to reconsider failed.
On July 5, 1957, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources — on appeal by Jose Paño for
himself and his companions — held that the appeal was without merit and dismissed the same.
The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines.
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the
President's power of control over the executive departments. 8 And control simply means "the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter." 9
This unquestionably negates the assertion that the President cannot undo an act of his department
secretary.
2. Plaintiff next submits that the decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an undue delegation of
power. The Constitution, petitioner asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the
presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the
constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.
It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in
person.10 Not as correct, however, is it so say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his
Executive Secretary acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in
person.11 Reason is not wanting for this view. The President is not expected to perform in person all
the multifarious executive and administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an
auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that "under
our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the
President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order" that the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue. 12

3. But plaintiff underscores the fact that the Executive Secretary is equal in rank to the other
department heads, no higher than anyone of them. From this, plaintiff carves the argument that one
department head, on the pretext that he is an alter ego of the President, cannot intrude into the zone
of action allocated to another department secretary. This argument betrays lack of appreciation of
the fact that where, as in this case, the Executive Secretary acts "[b]y authority of the President," his
decision is that of the President's. Such decision is to be given full faith and credit by our courts. The
assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the President may
rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore, unless the action
taken is "disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,"13 that remains the act of the Chief
Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed.14 No such disapproval or reprobation is even
intimated in the record of this case.

For the reasons given, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed. Costs against plaintiff. So
ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 127249. February 27, 1998]
CAMARINES NORTE ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (CANORE-CO); RUBEN N.
BARRAMEDA; ELVIS L. ESPIRITU; MERARDO G. ENERO, JR.; MARCELITO B.
ABAS; and REYNALDO V. ABUNDO, petitioners, vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES,
in his capacity as Executive Secretary; REX TANTIONGCO; HONESTO DE
JESUS; ANDRES IBASCO; TEODULO M. MEA; and VICENTE
LUKBAN, respondent.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
May the Office of the President validly constitute an ad hoc committee to take over
and manage the affairs of an electric cooperative?
This is the key issue in this original action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court wherein the petitioners seek to (a) annul and set aside
Memorandum Order No. 409 of the Office of the President dated 3 December 1996
constituting an Ad Hoc Committee to take over and manage the affairs of the Camarines
Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc., (hereafter CANORECO) until such time as a general
membership meeting can be called to decide the serious issues affecting the said
cooperative and normalcy in operations is restored"; and (b) prohibit the respondents
from performing acts or continuing proceedings pursuant to the Memorandum Order.
The factual backdrop of this case is not complicated.
Petitioner CANORECO is an electric cooperative organized under the provisions of
P.D. No. 269, otherwise known as the National Electrification Administration Decree, as
amended by P.D. No. 1645.
On 10 March 1990, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law R.A. No. 6938
and R.A. No. 6939. The former is the Cooperative Code of the Philippines, while the latter
created the Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) and vested solely upon the CDA
the power to register cooperatives.
Article 122 of the Cooperative Code expressly provides that electric cooperatives
shall be covered by the Code. Article 128 of the said Code and Section 17 of R.A. No. 6939
similarly provide that cooperatives created under P.D. No. 269, as amended by P.D. No.
1645, shall have three years within which to qualify and register with the CDA and that
after they shall have so qualified and registered, the provisions of Sections 3 and 5 of P.D.
No. 1645 shall no longer be applicable to them. These Sections 3 and 5 read as follows:
SEC. 3. Section 5(a), Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby amended by
adding sub-paragraph (6) to read as follows:
(6) To authorize the NEA Administrator to designate, subject to the confirmation of the
Board Administrators, an Acting General Manager and/or Project Supervisor for a
Cooperative where vacancies in the said positions occur and/or when the interest of the
Cooperative and the program so requires, and to prescribe the functions of said Acting
General Manager and/or Project Supervisor, which powers shall not be nullified, altered
or diminished by any policy or resolution of the Board of Directors of the Cooperative
concerned.
...
SEC. 5. Section 10, Chapter II of Presidential Decree No. 269 is hereby amended to read
as follows:
Section 10. Enforcement Powers and Remedies. -- In the exercise of its power of
supervision and control over electric cooperatives and other borrower, supervised or
controlled entities, the NEA is empowered to issue orders, rules and regulations
and motu proprio or upon petition of third parties, to conduct investigations, referenda
and other similar actions in all matters affecting said electric cooperatives and other
borrower, or supervised or controlled entities.
...
Finally, the repealing clause (Article 127) of the Cooperative Code provides:
Provided, however, That nothing in this Code shall be interpreted to mean the
amendment or repeal of any provision of Presidential Decree No. 269: Provided, further,
That the electric cooperatives which qualify as such under this Code shall fall under the
coverage thereof.
CANORECO registered with the CDA pursuant to R.A. No. 6938 and R.A. No.
6939. On 8 March 1993, the CDA issued a Certificate of Provisional Registration (T-003-
93) to CANORECO effective for two years.[1] On 1 March 1995, the CDA extended this
provisional registration until 4 May 1997.[2] However, on 10 July 1996, CANORECO filed
with the CDA its approved amendments to its Articles of Cooperation converting itself
from a non-stock to a stock cooperative pursuant to the provisions of R.A. No. 6938 and
the Omnibus Implementing Rules and Regulations on Electric Cooperatives. On the same
date the CDA issued a Certificate of Registration [3] of the amendments to CANORECO
Articles of Cooperation certifying that CANORECO is registered as a full-[f]ledged
cooperative under and by virtue of R.A. 6938.
Previously, on 11 March 1995, the Board of Directors of CANORECO[4] approved
Resolution No. 22 appointing petitioner Reynaldo V. Abundo as permanent General
Manager. The Board was composed of
Ruben N. Barrameda -- President
Elvis L. Espiritu -- Vice president
Merardo G. Enero, Jr. -- Secretary
Marcelito B. Abas -- Treasurer
Antonio R. Obias -- Director
Luis A. Pascua -- Director
Norberto Z. Ochoa -- Director
Leonida Z. Manalo -- OIC GM/Ex-Officio
On 28 May 1995, Antonio Obias, Norberto Ochoa, Luis Pascua, and Felicito Ilan held
a special meeting of the Board of Directors of CANORECO. The minutes of the
meeting[5] showed that President Ruben Barrameda, Vice-President Elvis Espiritu, and
Treasurer Marcelito Abas were absent; that Obias acted as temporary chairman; that the
latter informed those present that it was the responsibility of the Board after the annual
meeting to meet and elect the new set of officers, but that despite the fact that he had
called the attention of President Barrameda and Directors Abas and Espiritu for the
holding thereof, the three chose not to appear; and that those present in the special
meeting declared all positions in the board vacant and thereafter proceeded to hold
elections by secret balloting with all the directors present considered candidates for the
positions. The following won and were declared as the newly elected officers of the
CANORECO:
President . . . . . . . . Norberto Ochoa
Vice President . . . . Antonio Obias
Secretary . . . . . . . . Felicito Ilan
Treasurer. . . . . . . . Luis Pascua
Thereupon, these newly elected officers approved the following resolutions:
1) Resolution No. 27, c.s. -- confirming the election of the new set of officers of the
Board of Directors of CANORECO
2) Resolution No. 28, c.s. -- recalling Resolution No. 22, c.s. appointing Mr. Reynaldo
V. Abundo as permanent General Manager in view of the fact that such
appointment was in violation of the provisions of R.A. 6713; declaring the
position of General Manager as vacant; and designating Mr. Oscar Acobera as
Officer-in-Charge
3) Resolution No. 29, c.s. -- authorizing the Board President, or in his absence, the
Vice-President, countersigned by the Treasurer, or in his absence, the
Secretary, to be the only officers who can transfer funds from savings to current
accounts; and authorizing the Officer-in-Charge, Mr. Acobera, to issue checks
without countersignature in an amount not to exceed P3,000.00 and in excess
thereof, to be countersigned by the President and/or the Treasurer
4) Resolution No. 30, c.s. -- hiring the services of Atty. Juanito Subia as retainer-
lawyer for CANORECO.[6]
The petitioners challenged the above resolutions and the election of officers by
filing with the CDA a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Board Resolutions and Election
of Officers with Prayer for Issuance of Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order, which
the CDA docketed as CDA-CO Case No. 95-010.
In its Resolution of 15 February 1996,[7] the CDA resolved the petition in favor of
the petitioners and decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Board Meeting of May 28, 1995, participated by
the respondents, and all the Resolutions issued on such occasion, are hereby declared
NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
Likewise, the election of respondents Norberto Ochoa, Antonio Obias, Felicito Ilan, and
Luis Pascua, as President, Vice-President, Secretary, and Treasurer, respectively, of
CANORECO is hereby declared NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
Hence, respondents Norberto Ochoa, Antonio Obias, Felicito Ilan, and Luis Pascua are
hereby ordered to refrain from representing themselves as President, Vice-President,
Secretary, and Treasurer, respectively, of CANORECO. The same respondents are further
ordered to refrain from acting as authorized signatories to the bank accounts of
CANORECO.
Further respondent Felicito Ilan is hereby ordered to refrain from exercising the duties
and functions of a member of the Board of CANORECO until the election protest is
resolved with finality by the proper forum. In the meantime, the incumbency of
petitioner Merardo Enero, Jr. as Director of the CANORECO Board is hereby recognized.
A status quo is hereby ordered as regards the position of General Manager, being held by
Mr. Reynaldo Abundo, considering that the recall of his appointment was done under a
void Resolution, and that the designation of Mr. Oscar Acodera as Officer-in-Charge,
under the same void Resolution, has no force and effect.
Finally, respondents Antonio Obias, Norberto Ochoa, Luisito Pascua, and petitioners
Ruben Barrameda, Elvis Espiritu, Marcelito Abas and Merardo Enero, Jr. are hereby
ordered to work together, as Board of Directors, for the common good of CANORECO and
its consumer-members, and to maintain an atmosphere of sincere cooperation among
the officers and members of CANORECO.
On 28 June 1996, in defiance of the abovementioned Resolution of the CDA and
with the active participation of some officials of the National Electrification
Administration (NEA), the group of Norberto Ochoa, Antonio Obias, Felicito Ilan, and Luis
Pascua forcibly took possession of the offices of CANORECO and assumed the duties as
officers thereof.[8]
 On 26 September 1996, pursuant to the writ of execution and order to vacate
issued by the CDA, the petitioners were able to reassume control of the CANORECO and
to perform their respective functions.[9]
On 3 December 1996, the President of the Philippines issued Memorandum Order
No. 409[10] onstituting an Ad Hoc Committee to temporarily take over and manage the
affairs of CANORECO. It reads as follows:
To efficiently and effectively address the worsening problem of the Camarines Norte
Electric Cooperative, Inc. (CANORECO) and in order not to prejudice and endanger the
interest of the people who rely on the said cooperative for their supply of electricity, an
AD HOC Committee is hereby constituted to take over and manage the affairs of
CANORECO until such time as a general membership meeting can be called to decide the
serious issues affecting the said cooperative and normalcy in operations is
restored. Further, if and when warranted, the present Board of Directors may be called
upon by the Committee for advisory services without prejudice to the receipt of their per
diems as may be authorized by existing rules and regulations.
The AD HOC Committee shall be composed of the following:
REX TANTIONGCO -- Chairman
Presidential Assistant on Energy Affairs
HONESTO DE JESUS -- Member
Cooperative Development Authority Nominee
ANDRES IBASCO -- Member
Cooperative Development Authority Nominee
TEODULO M. MEA -- Member
National Electrification Administration Nominee
VICENTE LUKBAN -- Member
National Electrification Administration Nominee
The said Committee shall have the following functions:
1. Designate the following upon the recommendation of the Chairman:
1.1 an Acting General Manager who shall handle the day-to-day
operations of the Cooperative. In the meantime, the General
Manager shall be deemed to be on leave without prejudice to the
payment of his salaries legally due him; and
1.2 a Comptroller who shall handle the financial affairs of
the Cooperative.
2. Ensure that:
The AD HOC Committee shall submit a written report to the President, through the Office
of the Executive Secretary, every two (2) weeks from the effectivity of this Order.
A General Membership Meeting shall be called by the AD HOC Committee to determine
whether or not there is a need to change the composition of the membership of the
Cooperatives Board of Directors. If the need exists, the AD HOC Committee shall call for
elections. Once the composition of the Board of Directors is finally settled, it shall decide
on the appointment of a General Manager in accordance with prescribed laws, rules and
regulations. Upon the appointment of a General Manager, the Committee shall
become functus officio.
This Memorandum Order shall take effect immediately.
On 11 December 1996, the petitioners filed this petition wherein they claim that
I. THE PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER TO TAKE OVER AND MANAGE OR TO
ORDER THE TAKE-OVER OR MANAGEMENT OF CANORECO.
II. [THE] TAKE-OVER OF CANORECO BY THE AD HOC COMMITTEE IS
UNLAWFUL DESPITE DESIGNATION OF CANORECO CONSUMERS AS
MEMBERS OF AD HOC COMMITTEE.
III. [THE] RELEGATION OF PETITIONERS AS MERE ADVISERS TO THE AD
HOC COMMITTEE AMOUNTS TO REMOVAL FROM OFFICE WHICH THE
PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER TO DO.MOREOVER, PETITIONERS
REMOVAL VIOLATES PETITIONERS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
IV. THE PRESIDENT IS LIKEWISE WITHOUT POWER TO DESIGNATE OR
ORDER THE DESIGNATION OF AN ACTING GENERAL MANAGER FOR
CANORECO AND TO CONSIDER THE INCUMBENT REYNALDO V. ABUNDO
TO BE ON LEAVE.
The petitioners assert that there is no provision in the Constitution or in a statute
expressly, or even impliedly, authorizing the President or his representatives to take
over or order the take-over of electric cooperatives. Although conceding that while the
State, through its police power, has the right to interfere with private business or
commerce, they maintain that the exercise thereof is generally limited to the regulation
of the business or commerce and that the power to regulate does not include the power
to take over, control, manage, or direct the operation of the business. Accordingly, the
creation of the Ad Hoc Committee for the purpose of take-over was illegal and void.
The petitioners further claim that Memorandum Order No. 409 removed them
from their positions as members of the Board of Directors of CANORECO. The President
does not have the authority to appoint, much less to remove, members of the board of
directors of a private enterprise including electric cooperatives. He cannot rely on his
power of supervision over the NEA to justify the designation of an acting general
manager for CANORECO under P.D. No. 269 as amended by P.D. No. 1645, for CANORECO
had already registered with the CDA pursuant to R.A. No. 6938 and R.A. No. 6939; hence,
the latter laws now govern the internal affairs of CANORECO.
On 3 January 1997, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order.
On 9 January 1997, the petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion informing the
Court that on 8 January 1997 respondent Rex Tantiongco notified the petitioners that
the Ad HocCommittee was taking over the affairs and management of CANORECO
effective as of that date.[11] They reiterated their plea for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order because the Ad Hoc Committee has taken control of CANORECO and
usurped the functions of the individual petitioners.
In the Resolution dated 13 January 1997, we required respondents to comment on
the petition.
Despite four extensions granted it, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) failed to
file its Comment. Hence, in the resolution of 16 July 1997 we deemed the OSG to have
waived the filing of its Comment and declared this case submitted for decision. The OSGs
motion to admit its Comment, as well as the attached Comment, belatedly filed on 24 July
1997 was merely noted without action in the resolution of 13 August 1997. We also
subsequently denied for lack of merit its motion for reconsideration.
We find the instant petition impressed with merit.
Having registered itself with the CDA pursuant to Section 128 of R.A. No. 6938 and
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6939, CANORECO was brought under the coverage of said
laws. Article 38 of R.A. No. 6938 vests upon the board of directors the conduct and
management of the affairs of cooperatives, and Article 39 provides for the powers of the
board of directors. These sections read:
Article 38. Composition of the Board of Directors. -- The conduct and management of the
affairs of a cooperative shall be vested in a board of directors which shall be composed of
not less than five (5) nor more than fifteen (15) members elected by the general
assembly for a term fixed in the by-laws but not exceeding a term of two (2) years and
shall hold office until their successors are duly elected and qualified, or until duly
removed. However, no director shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms.
Article 39. Powers of the Board of Directors. -- The board of directors shall direct and
supervise the business, manage the property of the cooperative and may, by resolution,
exercise all such powers of the cooperative as are not reserved for the general assembly
under this Code and the by-laws.
As to the officers of cooperatives, Article 43 of the Code provides:
ART. 43. Officers of the Cooperatives. The board of directors shall elect from among
themselves only the chairman and vice-chairman, and elect or appoint other officers of
the cooperative from outside of the board in accordance with their by-laws. All officers
shall serve during good behavior and shall not be removed except for cause and after due
hearing. Loss of confidence shall not be a valid ground for removal unless evidenced by
acts or omissions causing loss of confidence in the honesty and integrity of such
officer. No two (2) or more persons with relationship up to the third degree of
consanguinity or affinity shall serve as elective or appointive officers in the same
board.[12]
Under Article 34 of the Code, the general assembly of cooperatives has the exclusive
power, which cannot be delegated, to elect or appoint the members of the board of
directors and to remove them for cause. Article 51 thereof provides for removal of
directors and officers as follows:
ART. 51. Removal. -- An elective officer, director, or committee member may be removed
by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the voting members present and constituting a quorum,
in a regular or special general assembly meeting called for the purpose. The person
involved shall be given an opportunity to be heard at said assembly.
Memorandum Order No. 409 clearly removed from the Board of Directors of
CANORECO the power to manage the affairs of CANORECO and transferred such power
to the Ad HocCommittee, albeit temporarily. Considering that (1) the take-over will be
until such time that a general membership meeting can be called to decide the serious
issues affecting the said cooperative and normalcy in operations is restored, and (2) the
date such meeting shall be called and the determination of whether there is a need to
change the composition of the membership of CANORECOs Board of Directors are
exclusively left to the Ad Hoc Committee, it necessarily follows that the incumbent
directors were, for all intents and purposes, suspended at the least, and removed, at the
most, from their office. The said Memorandum did no less to the lawfully appointed
General Manager by directing that upon the settlement of the issue concerning the
composition of the board of directors the Committee shall decide on the appointment of
a general manager. In the meantime, it authorized the Committee to designate upon the
recommendation of the Chairman an Acting Manager, with the lawfully appointed
Manager considered on leave, but who is, however, entitled to the payment of his
salaries.
Nothing in law supported the take-over of the management of the affairs of
CANORECO, and the suspension, if not removal, of the Board of Directors and the officers
thereof.
It must be pointed out that the controversy which resulted in the issuance of the
Memorandum Order stemmed from a struggle between two groups vying for control of
the management of CANORECO. One faction was led by the group of Norberto Ochoa,
while the other was petitioners group whose members were, at that time, the incumbent
directors and officers. It was the action of Ochoa and his cohorts in holding a special
meeting on 28 May 1995 and then declaring vacant the positions of cooperative officers
and thereafter electing themselves to the positions of president, vice-president,
treasurer, and secretary of CANORECO which compelled the petitioners to file a petition
with the CDA. The CDA thereafter came out with a decision favorable to the petitioners.
Obviously there was a clear case of intra-cooperative dispute. Article 121 of the
Cooperative Code is explicit on how the dispute should be resolved; thus:
ART. 121. Settlement of Disputes. -- Disputes among members, officers, directors, and
committee members, and intra-cooperative disputes shall, as far as practicable, be
settled amicably in accordance with the conciliation or mediation mechanisms embodied
in the by-laws of the cooperative, and in applicable laws.
Should such a conciliation/mediation proceeding fail, the matter shall be settled in a
court of competent jurisdiction.
Complementing this Article is Section 8 of R.A. No. 6939, which provides:
SEC. 8. Mediation and Conciliation. Upon request of either or both or both parties, the
[CDA] shall mediate and conciliate disputes with the cooperative or between
cooperatives: Provided, That if no mediation or conciliation succeeds within three (3)
months from request thereof, a certificate of non-resolution shall be issued by the
commission prior to the filing of appropriate action before the proper courts.
enact laws, within constitutional limits, to promote the order, safety, health, morals, and
general welfare of society.[15] It is lodged primarily in the legislature. By virtue of a valid
delegation of legislative power, it may also be exercised by the President and
administrative boards, as well as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including
the barangay.[16] Delegation of legislative powers to the President is permitted in
Sections 23(2) and 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.[17] The pertinent laws on
cooperatives, namely, R.A. No. 6938, R.A. No. 6939, and P.D. No. 269 as amended by P.D.
No. 1645 do not provide for the President or any other administrative body to take over
the internal management of a cooperative. Article 98 of R.A. 6938 instead provides:
ART. 98. Regulation of Public Service Cooperatives. -- (1) The internal affairs of public
service cooperatives such as the rights and privileges of members, the rules and
procedures for meetings of the general assembly, board of directors and committees; for
the election and qualification of officers, directors, and committee members; allocation
and distribution of surpluses, and all other matters relating to their internal affairs shall
be governed by this Code.

Even granting for the sake of argument that the party aggrieved by a decision of the We do not then hesitate to rule that Memorandum Order No. 409 has no
CDA could pursue an administrative appeal to the Office of the President on the theory constitutional and statutory basis. It violates the basic underlying principle enshrined in
that the CDA is an agency under its direct supervision and control, still the Office of the Article 4(2) of R.A. No. 6938 that cooperatives are democratic organizations and that
President could not in this case, motu proprio or upon request of a party, supplant or their affairs shall be administered by persons elected or appointed in a manner agreed
overturn the decision of the CDA. The record does not disclose that the group of upon by the members. Likewise, it runs counter to the policy set forth in Section 1 of R.A.
Norberto Ochoa appealed from the decision of the CDA in CDA-CO Case No. 95-010 to the No. 6939 that the State shall, except as provided in said Act, maintain a policy of non-
Office of the President as the head of the Executive Department exercising supervision interference in the management and operation of cooperatives.
and control over said agency. In fact the CDA had already issued a Cease and Desist Order
dated 14 August 1996 ordering Antonio Obias, Norberto Ochoa, Luis Pascua, Felicito Ilan WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and Memorandum Order No. 409 of
and their followers to cease and desist from acting as the Board of Directors and Officers the President is hereby declared INVALID.
of Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative (CANORECO) and to refrain from implementing
their Resolution calling for the District V Election on August 17 and 24, SO ORDERED.
1996.[13] Consequently, the said decision of the CDA had long become final and executory
when Memorandum Order No. 409 was issued on 3 December 1996. That Memorandum
cannot then be considered as one reversing the decision of the CDA which had attained
finality.
Under Section 15, Chapter III of Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987
(Executive Order No. 292), decisions of administrative agencies become final and
executory fifteen days after receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected
unless within that period an administrative appeal or judicial review, if proper, has been
perfected. One motion for reconsideration is allowed. A final resolution or decision of an
administrative agency also binds the Office of the President even if such agency is under
the administrative supervision and control of the latter.
We have stated before, and reiterate it now, that administrative decisions must end
sometime, as fully as public policy demands that finality be written on judicial
controversies. Public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not
be altered at every step, for the rule of non quieta movere prescribes that what had
already been terminated should not be disturbed. A disregard of this principle does not
commend itself to sound public policy.[14]
Neither can police power be invoked to clothe with validity the assailed
Memorandum Order No. 409. Police power is the power inherent in a government to
G.R. No. L-17169 November 30, 1963 Angco charging him with having committed a grave neglect of duty and observed a conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the customs service. On the strength of this complaint President
Ramon Magsaysay constituted an investigating committee to investigate Ang-Angco composed of
ISIDRO C. ANG-ANGCO, Petitioner, vs. HON. NATALIO P. CASTILLO, ET AL., Respondents.
former Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, as Chairman, and Atty. Arturo A. Alafriz and Lt. Col. Angel
A. Salcedo, as members. Together with Collector Ang-Angco, Mr. Aquiles J. Lopez, was also
Juan T. David for petitioner. investigated by the same Committee, who was also charged in a separate complaint with serious
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents. misconduct in office or conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the State. As a result, Collector
Ang-Angco was suspended from office in the latter part of December,
1956.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

After the investigation, the committee submitted to President Magsaysay its report recommending
On October 8, 1956, the Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc. wrote a letter to the
that a suspension of 15 days, without pay, be imposed upon Ang-Angco chargeable against the
Secretary of Commerce and Industry requesting for special permit to withdraw certain commodities
period of his suspension. On April 1, 1957, Collector Ang-Angco was reinstated to his office by
from the customs house which were imported without any dollar allocation or remittance of foreign
Secretary Hernandez, but the decision on the administrative case against him remained pending
exchange. Said commodities consisted of 1,188 units of pepsi-cola concentrates which were not
until the death of President Magsaysay. After around three years from the termination of the
covered by any Central Bank release certificate. On the same date, the company addressed an
investigation during which period Ang-Angco had been discharging the duties of his office,
identical request to the Secretary of Finance who was also the Chairman of the Monetary Board of
Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo, by authority of the President, rendered a decision on the case
the Central Bank. Senator Pedro Sabido, in behalf of the company, likewise wrote said official urging
on February 12, 1960 finding Ang-Angco "guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
that authority be given to withdraw the abovementioned concentrates. Not content with this step,
service", and considering him resigned effective from the date of notice, with prejudice to
he also wrote to Dr. Andres Castillo, Acting Governor of the Central Bank, urging, the same matter.
reinstatement in the Bureau of Customs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Then Secretary Hernandez wrote another letter to Dr. Castillo stating, "Senator Sabido is taking this
to you personally. Unless we have legal objection, I would like to authorize the withdrawal of the
concentrates upon payment of all charges in pesos. Please expedite action."chanrobles virtual law Upon learning said decision from the newspapers, Collector Ang-Angco wrote a letter to President
library Carlos P. Garcia calling attention to the fact that the action taken by Secretary Castillo in removing
him from office had the effect of depriving him of his statutory right to have his case originally
decided by the Commissioner of Civil Service, as well as of his right of appeal to the Civil Service
Almost at the same time, the Import-Export Committee of the Central Bank, thru Mr. Gregorio
Board of Appeals, whose decision under Republic Act No. 2260 is final, besides the fact that such
Licaros, submitted to the Monetary Board a memorandum on the joint petition of the company and
decision is in violation of the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to officers or employees in
Sabido Law Office for authority to withdraw the concentrates from the customs house stating
the civil service against removal or suspension except for cause in the manner provided by
therein that it sees no objection to the proposal. The Monetary Board, however, failed to take up the
law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
matter in its meeting of October 12, 1956 for the reason that the transaction did not involve any
dollar allocation or foreign exchange, and of this decision Mr. Licaros was
informed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library In a letter dated February 16, 1960, Secretary Castillo, also by authority of the President, denied the
request for reconsideration. Not satisfied with this resolution, Collector Ang-Angco sent a
memorandum to President Garcia reiterating once more the same grounds on which he predicated
Having failed to secure the necessary authority from the Central Bank, on October 13, 1956, the
his request for reconsideration. Again Secretary Castillo, also by authority of the President, in letter
counsel of the Pepsi-Cola Far East Trade Development Co., Inc., approached Collector of Customs
dated July 1, 1960, denied the appeal. In this instance, Secretary Castillo asserted that the President
Isidro Ang-Angco in an attempt to secure from him the immediate release of the concentrates, but
virtue of his power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices, can take direct
this official seeing perhaps that the importation did not carry any release certificate from the
action and dispose of the administrative case in question inasmuch as the provisions of law that
Central Bank advised the counsel to try to secure the necessary release certificate from the No-
would seem to vest final authority in subordinate officers of the executive branch of the government
Dollar Import Office that had jurisdiction over the case. In the morning of the same day, Mr. Aquiles
over administrative matters falling under their jurisdiction cannot divest the President of his power
J. Lopez, of said Office, wrote a letter addressed to the Collector of Customs stating, among other
of control nor diminish the same.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
things, that his office had no objection to the release of the 1,188 units of concentrates but that it
could not take action on the request as "the same is not within the jurisdiction of the No-Dollar
Import Office within the contemplation of R.A. No. 1410." The counsel already referred to above Hence, after exhausting all the administrative remedies available to him to secure his reinstatement
showed the letter to Collector of Customs Ang-Angco who upon perusing it still hesitated to grant to the office from which he was removed without any valid cause or in violation of his right to due
the release. Instead he suggested that the letter be amended in order to remove the ambiguity process of law, Collector Ang-Angco filed before this Court the present petition for certiorari,
appearing therein, but Mr. Lopez refused to amend the letter stating that the same was neither a prohibition and mandamus with a petition for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction.
permit nor a release. Secretary of Finance Hernandez having been contacted by telephone, Collector The Court gave due course to the petition, but denied the request for
of Customs Ang-Angco read to him the letter after which the Secretary verbally expressed his injunction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
approval of the release on the basis of said certificate. Collector Ang-Angco, while still in doubt as to
the propriety of the action suggested, finally authorized the release of the concentrates upon
The main theme of petitioner is that respondent Executive Secretary Natalio P. Castillo in acting on
payment of the corresponding duties, customs charges, fees and
his case by authority of the President in the sense of considering him as resigned from notice
taxes.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
thereof, violated the guaranty vouchsafed by the Constitution to officers and employees in the
classified service in that he acted in violation of Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 which
When Commissioner of Customs Manuel P. Manahan learned of the release of the concentrates in vests in the Commissioner of Civil Service the original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide
question he immediately ordered their seizure but only a negligible portion thereof remained in the administrative cases against officers and employees in the classified service, deprived him of his
warehouse. Whereupon, he filed an administrative complaint against Collector of Customs Ang- right of appeal under Section 18 (b) of the same Act to the Civil Service Board of Appeals whose
decision on the matter is final, and removed him from the service without due process in violation of
Section 32 of the same Act which expressly provides that the removal or suspension of any officer or
employee from the civil service shall be accomplished only after due process, and of Section 4,
Article XII of our Constitution which provides that "No officer or employee in the civil service shall
be removed except for cause as provided for by law." Since petitioner is an officer who belongs to
the classified civil service and is not a presidential appointee, but one appointed by the Secretary of
Finance under the Revised Administrative Code, he cannot be removed from the service by the
President in utter disregard of the provisions of the Civil Service Act of
1959.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Respondents, on their part, do not agree with this theory entertained by petitioner. They admit that
if the theory is to be considered in the light of the provisions of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the
same may be correct, for indeed the Civil Service Law as it now stands provides that all officers and
employees who belong to the classified service come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commissioner of Civil Service and as such all administrative cases against them shall be indorsed to
said official whose decision may be appealed to the Civil Service Board of Appeals from whose
decision no further appeal can be taken. They also admit that petitioner belongs to the classified
civil service. But it is their theory that the pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law applicable to
employees in the classified service do not apply to the particular case of petitioner since to hold
otherwise would be to deprive the President of his power of control over the officers and employees
of the executive branch of the government. In other words, respondents contend that, whether the
officers or employees concerned are presidential appointees or belong to the classified service, if
they are all officers and employees in the executive department, they all come under the control of
the President and, therefore, his power of removal may be exercised over them directly without
distinction. Indeed, respondents contend that, if, as held in the case of Negado v. Castro, 55 O.G.,
10534, the President may modify or set aside a decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals at the
instance of the office concerned, or the respondent employee, or may even do so motu propio, there
would be in the final analysis no logical difference between removing petitioner by direct action of
the President and separating him from the service by ultimate action by the President should an
appeal be taken from the decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals to him, or if in his discretion
he may motu proprio consider it necessary to review the Board's decision. It is contended that this
ruling still holds true in spite of the new provision wrought into the law by Republic Act 2260 which
eliminated the power of review given to the President because the power of control given by the
Constitution to the President over officers and employees in the executive department can only be
limited by the Constitution and not by Congress, for to permit Congress to do so would be to
diminish the authority conferred on the President by the Constitution which is tantamount to
amending the Constitution itself (Hebron v. Reyes, L- 9124, July 28, 1958). Indeed this is the
argument invoked by respondent Castillo in taking direct action against petitioner instead of
following the procedure outlined in the Civil Service Act of 1959 as may be seen from the following
portion of his decision.
In connection with the second ground advanced in support of your petition, it is contended that in
deciding the case directly, instead of transmitting it to the Commissioner of Civil Service for original
decision, his Office deprived the respondent of his right to appeal to the Civil Service Board of
Appeals. This contention overlooks the principle that the President may modify or set aside a
decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals at the instance of either the office concerned or the
respondent employee, or may even do so motu proprio (Negado vs. Castro, 55 O.G, No. 51, p. 10534,
Dec. 21, 1959). There would therefore be no difference in effect between direct action by the
President and ultimate action by him should an appeal be taken from the decision of the
Commissioner of Civil Service or the Civil Service Board of Appeals. The result is that the President's
direct action would be the final decision that would be reached in case an appeal takes its due
course.
Thus, we see that the main issue involved herein is whether the President has the power to take
direct action on the case of petitioner even if he belongs to the classified service in spite of the
provisions now in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959. Petitioner sustains the negative contending
that the contrary view would deprive him of his office without due process of law while respondents
sustain the affirmative invoking the power of control given to the President by the Constitution over
all officers and employees, belonging to the executive
department.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
To begin with, we may state that under Section 16 (i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959 it is the
Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction to decide administrative
cases of all officers and employees in the classified service for in said section the following is
provided: "Except as otherwise provided by law, (the Commissioner shall) have final authority to
pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all permanent officers and employees in the
competitive or classified service and upon all matters relating to the employees." The only limitation
to this power is that the decision of the Commissioner may be appealed to the Civil Service Board of
Appeals, in which case said Board shall decide the appeal within a period of 90 days after the same
has been submitted for decision, whose decision in such case shall be final (Section 18, Republic Act
2260). It should be noted that the law as it now stands does not provide for any appeal to the
President, nor is he given the power to review the decision motu proprio, unlike the provision of the
previous law, Commonwealth Act No. 598, which was expressly repealed by the Civil Service Act of
1959 (Rep. Act 2260), which provides that the decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals may be
reversed or modified motu proprio by the President. It is, therefore, clear that under the present
provision of the Civil Service Act of 1959, the case of petitioner comes under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service, and having been deprived of the procedure laid
down therein in connection with the investigation and disposition of his case, it may be said that he
has been deprived of due process as guaranteed by said law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
It must, however, be noted that the removal, separation and suspension of the officers and
employees of the classified service are subject to the saving clause "Except as otherwise provided by
law" (Section 16 [i], Republic Act No. 2260). The question then may be asked: Is the President
empowered by any other law to remove officers and employees in the classified civil
service?chanrobles virtual law library
The only law that we can recall on the point is Section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code, the
pertinent portion of which we quote:
(b) To remove officials from office conformably to law and to declare vacant the offices held by such
removed officials. For disloyalty to the (United States) Republic of the Philippines, the (Governor-
General) President of the Philippines may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or
authority under the Government of the (Philippine Islands) Philippines.
The phrase "conformably to law" is significant. It shows that the President does not have blanket
authority move any officer or employee of the government but his power must still be subject to the
law that passed by the legislative body particularly with regard the procedure, cause and finality of
the removal of persons who may be the subject of disciplinary action. Here, as above stated we have
such law which governs action to be taken against officers and employees in classified civil service.
This law is binding upon President.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Another provision that may be mentioned is Section (D) of the Revised Administrative Code, which
provides:
Power to appoint and remove. - The Department Head, the recommendation of the chief of the
Bureau or office concerned, shall appoint all subordinate officers and employees appointment is
not expressly vested by law in the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines, and may remove
or punish them, except as especially provided otherwise, in accordance the Civil Service Law.
The phrase "in accordance with the Civil Service is also significant. So we may say that even granting
for administrative purposes, the President of the Philippines is considered as the Department Head
of the Civil Service Commission, his power to remove is still subject to the Civil Service Act of 1959,
and we already know with regard to officers and employees who belong to classified service the
finality of the action is given to the Commissioner of Civil Service or the Civil Board of
Appeals.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the
provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by law vest the appointment of the
inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department" (Article VII, Section
10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these officers whose appointments are vested on heads of
departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in view of
this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of 1959.

Let us now take up the power of control given to President by the Constitution over all officers and
employees in the executive department which is now in by respondents as justification to override
the specific visions of the Civil Service Act. This power of control couched in general terms for it
does not set in specific manner its extent and scope. Yes, this Court in the case of Hebron v.
Reyes, supra, had already occasion to interpret the extent of such power to mean "the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter," 1 to
distinguish it from the power of general supervision over municipal government, but the decision
does not go to the extent of including the power to remove an officer or employee in the executive
department. Apparently, the power merely applies to the exercise of control over the acts of the
subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the act. It only means that the President may
set aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the performance of his
duties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We have no doubt that when Congress, by law, vests the appointment of inferior officers in the
heads of departments it may limit and restrict power of removal as it seem best for the public
interest. The constitutional authority in Congress to thus vest the appointment implies authority to
limit, restrict, and regulate the removal by such laws as Congress may enact in relation to the
officers so appointed. The head of a department has no constitutional prerogative of appointment to
officers independently of legislation of Congress, and by such legislation he must be governed, not
only in making appointments but in all that is incident thereto. (U.S. v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483)
In resume, we may conclude that the action taken by respondent Executive Secretary, even with the
authority of the President, in taking direct action on the administrative case of petitioner, without
submitting the same to the Commissioner of Civil Service, is contrary to law and should be set
aside.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that petitioner be immediately reinstated to his office as

That meaning is also the meaning given to the word "control" as used in administrative law. Thus,
Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, without prejudice of submitting his case to the
the Department Head pursuant to Section 79(C) is given direct control of all bureaus and offices
Commissioner of Civil Service to be dealt with in accordance with law. No
under his department by virtue of which he may "repeal or modify decisions of the chiefs of said
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
bureaus or offices", and under Section 74 of the same Code, the President's control over the
virtual law l ibra ry

executive department only refers to matters of general policy. The term "policy" means a settled or
definite course or method adopted and followed by a government, body, or individual, 2 and it
cannot be said that the removal of an inferior officer comes within the meaning of control over a
specific policy of government.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

But the strongest argument against the theory of respondents is that it would entirely nullify and set
at naught the beneficient purpose of the whole civil service system implanted in this jurisdiction,
which is to give stability to the tenure of office of those who belong to the classified service, in
derogation of the provisions of our Constitution which provides that "No officer or employee in the
civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Section 4, Article
XII, Constitution).Here, we have two provisions of our Constitution which are apparently in conflict,
the power of control by the President embodied in Section 10 (1), Article VII, and the protection
extended to those who are in the civil service of our government embodied in Section 4, Article XII.
It is our duty to reconcile and harmonize these conflicting provisions in a manner that may give to
both full force and effect and the only logical, practical and rational way is to interpret them in the
manner we do it in this decision. As this Court has aptly said in the case of Lacson v. Romero:

... To hold that civil service officials hold their office at the will of the appointing power subject to
removal or forced transfer at any time, would demoralize and undermine and eventually destroy the
whole Civil Service System and structure. The country would then go back to the days of the old
Jacksonian Spoils System under which a victorious Chief Executive, after the elections could if so
minded, sweep out of office, civil service employees differing in Political color or affiliation from
him, and sweep in his Political followers and adherents, especially those who have given him help,
political or otherwise. (Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil. 740, 754)

There is some point in the argument that the Power of control of the President may extend to the
Power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who belong to the executive
department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong to the classified service for such can
be justified under the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint
(Lacson V. Romero, supra), but not with regard to those officers or employees who belong to the
G.R. No. L-22754 December 31, 1965 of Republic Act No. 2260. Respondents finally averred that the letter of Congressman Joaquin R.
Roces is in effect a valid administrative complaint because it contained specific charges which
constitute just causes for his suspension and removal; that said charges need not be sworn to for the
RUBEN A. VILLALUZ, petitioner,
Chief Executive, as administrative head of petitioner, is empowered to commence administrative
vs.
proceedings motu proprio pursuant to Executive Order No. 370, series of 1941, without need of any
CALIXTO ZALDIVAR, ET AL., respondents.
previous verified complaint. And as special defense respondents averred that petitioner is guilty of
laches for having allowed almost four years before instituting the present action.
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo and Juan T. David for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
There is merit in the claim that petitioner, being a presidential appointee, belongs to the non-
competitive or unclassified service of the government and is such he can only be investigated and
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: removed from office after due hearing the President of the Philippines under the principle that "the
power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint" as can be clearly implied from Section 5 of
Republic Act No. 2260. Such is what we ruled in the recent case of Ang-Angco wherein on this point
Petitioner seeks his reinstatement as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office with payment of
we said:
back salaries in a petition filed before this Court on April 1, 1964.

There is some point in the argument that the power of control of the President may
He alleged that he was nominated as chief of said office on May 20, 1958 and two days thereafter his
extend to the power to investigate, suspend or remove officers and employees who
nomination was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments; that on May 26, 1958 he took his
belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do not belong
oath of office as such after having been informed of his nomination by then Acting Assistant
to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to
Executive Secretary Sofronio C. Quimson; that in a letter dated January 28, 1960 addressed to the
remove is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson v. Romero, supra), but not with
President of the Philippines by Congressman Joaquin R. Roces as Chairman of the Committee on
regard to those officers or employees who belong, to the classified service for as to them
Good Government of the House of Representatives, the latter informed the former of the findings
that inherent power cannot be exercised. This is in line with the provision of our
made by his Committee concerning alleged gross mismanagement and inefficiency committed by
Constitution which says that the "Congress may by law vest the appointment of inferior
petitioner in the Motor Vehicles Office which are summed up in the letter, as follows: (1)
officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in the head of departments" (Article VII,
malpractice in office resulting in huge losses to the government; (2) failure to correct inadequate
Section 10 [3], Constitution). (Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al., L-17169, November 30, 1963).
controls or intentional toleration of the same, facilitating thereby the commission of graft and
corruption; and (3) negligence to remedy unsatisfactory accounting; that as a result of said findings.
Congressman Roces recommended the replacement of petitioner and of his assistant chief Aurelio Consequently, as a corollary to the foregoing ruling, we may state that the Commissioner of Civil
de Leon as well as the complete revamp of the offices coming under the Motor Vehicles Office by the Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative charges filed against petitioner
new chief who may be appointed thereafter; that having been officially informed of the content of because the authority of said Commissioner to pass upon questions of suspension, separation, or
said letter, then Secretary of Public Works and Communications furnished petitioner with a copy removal can only be exercised with reference to permanent officials and employees in the classified
thereof requiring him to explain within 72 hours why no administrative action should be taken service to which classification petitioner does not belong. This is also what we said in the Ang-Angco
against him relative to the charges contained in the letter; that petitioner answered the letter as case when, in interpreting Section 16 (i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only
required wherein he explained and refuted in detail each and everyone of the charges contained in permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified service come under the exclusive
the letter of Congressman Roces; that on February 15, 1960, the then Executive Secretary Natalio P. jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service.
Castillo suspended petitioner as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, having thereupon
created an investigating committee with the only purpose of investigating the charges against
There is, therefore, no error of procedure committed by respondents insofar as the investigation
petitioner and his assistant Aurelio de Leon, and to undertake the investigation a prosecution panel
and disciplinary action taken against petitioner is concerned, even if he is under the control and
was created headed by Special Prosecutor Emilio A. Gancayco; that after the investigation said
supervision of the Department of Public Works, in view of the reason we have already stated that he
committee submitted its report to the President of the Philippines who thereafter issued
is a presidential appointee who comes exclusively under the jurisdiction of the President. The
Administrative Order No. 332 decreeing the removal from office of petitioner; that as a result of
following rationale supports this view:
petitioner's removal Apolonio Ponio was appointed to take his place as acting administrator; and
that, after having been officially notified of his removal, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
and/or reinstatement, and when this was denied, he filed the instant petition before this Court. Let us now take up the power of control given to the President by the Constitution over
all officers and employees in the executive departments which is now involved by
respondent as justification to override the specific provisions of the Civil Service Act. This
Respondents in their answer denied the claim of petitioner that the charges contained in the letter
power of control is couched in general terms for it does not set in specific manner its
of Congressman Roces were not directed against him but against his office in general for the truth is
extent and scope. Yes, this Court in the case of Hebron v. Reyes, supra, occasion to
that he was, specifically charged with mismanagement, gross inefficiency and negligence in the
interpret the extent of such power to mean "the power of an officer to alter or modify or
performance of his duties as Chief of the Motor Vehicles Office, and as a result he was required to
nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
the same within 72 hours to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against him.
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter," to distinguish it from
Respondents also denied that petitioner was investigated without being accorded due process is
the power of general supervision over municipal government, but the decision does not
required by law for in fact he was given every reasonable opportunity to present his defense, to
go to the extent of including the power to remove an officer or employee in the executive
secure the attendance of witnesses, and to produce documents in his behalf in a manner consistent
department. Apparently, the power merely applies to the exercise of control over the acts
with administrative due process. Respondent also averred that the President of the Philippines,
of the subordinate and not over the actor or agent himself of the act. It only means that
contrary to petitioner's claim, has jurisdiction to investigate and remove him since he is a
the President may set aside the judgment or action taken by a subordinate in the
presidential appointee who belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified service under Section 5
performance of his duties.
 That meaning is also the meaning given to the word "control" as used in administrative
law. Thus, the Department Head pursuant to Section 79 (c) is given direct control of all
bureaus and offices under his department by virtue of which he may "repeal or modify
decisions of the chiefs of said bureaus or offices," and under Section 74 of the same Code,
the President's control over the executive department only refers to matters of general
policy. The term "policy" means a settled or definite course or method adopted and
followed by a government, body or individual, and it cannot be said that the removal of an
inferior officer comes within the meaning of control over a specific policy of government.
(Ang-Angco v. Castillo, et al., supra)

With regard to the claim that the administrative proceedings conducted against petitioner which led
to his separation are illegal simply because the charges preferred against him by Congressman
Roces were not sworn to as required by Section 72 of Republic Act No. 2260, this much we can say:
said proceedings having been commenced against petitioner upon the authority of the Chief
Executive who was his immediate administrative head, the same may be commenced by him motu
proprio without previous verified complaint pursuant to Executive Order No. 370, series of 1941,
the pertinent provisions of which are is follows:

(1) Administrative proceedings may be commenced a government officer or employee by

the head or chief of the bureau or office concerned motu proprio or upon complaint of any
person which shall be subscribed under oath by the complainant: Provided, That if a
complaint is not or cannot be sworn to by the complainant, the head or chief of the
bureau or office concerned may in his discretion, take action thereon if the public interest
or the special circumstances of the case, so warrant. 1

Finally, on the theory that the instant petition partakes of the nature of quo warranto which seeks
petitioners reinstatement to his former position as Administrator of the Motor Vehicles Office, we
are of the opinion that it has now no legal raison d'etre for having been filed more than one year
after its cause of action had accrued. As this Court has aptly said: "a delay of slightly over one (1)
year was considered sufficient ... to be an action for mandamus, by reason of laches or abandonment
of office. We see no reason to depart from said view in the present case, petitioner herein having
allowed about a year and a half to elapse before seeking reinstatement." (Jose V. Lacson, et al., L-
10177, May 17, 1957).

WHEREFORE, petition is denied. No costs.

G.R. No. L-21607 January 30, 1970
RAFAEL MACAILING, SILVESTRE MACAILING DOMINICO NECESITO and RAFAEL
NECESITO, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
TOMAS ANDRADA, MARIA ANDRADA, FEDERICO ANDRADA, FLORENCIA VDA. DE ANDRADA,
Jesus ANDRADA, ANDREA R. GAURANA (HEIRS OF SALVADOR ANDRADA) and ASSISTANT
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ENRIQUE C. QUEMA (in behalf of the President), defendants-
appellants.
Clemente M. Aliño for plaintiffs-appellees.
Melquiades S. Sucaldito for defendants-appellants.
Office of the Solicitor General for nominal party only.
SANCHEZ, J.:
In this appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cotabato ruling that defendant heirs
of Salvador Andrada have lost their right to appeal from a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources1 and that, accordingly, defendant Executive Secretary, in behalf of the
President, may no longer review such decision, we have for factual backdrop the following:
A dispute over four (4) parcels of land in Lebak, Cotabato, arose between plaintiffs, settlers thereon
occupying four hectares each, and Salvador Andrada (later substituted by his heirs), sales applicant
of a bigger parcel, which includes the lands occupied by plaintiffs. The District Land Officer of
Cotabato decided in plaintiffs' favor, excluded the four parcels of land claimed by plaintiffs. The
Director of Lands, however, reversed, declared that the portions adjudged to the four plaintiffs
"shall be restored to the heirs (of Salvador Andrada) who should include them proportionately in
the new application to be filed by them respectively."
Appeal having been taken to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the latter, on
October 27, 1956, in turn reversed the Director of Lands by awarding to plaintiffs the lands they
claimed. Defendants sought reconsideration. On May 30, 1957, the Secretary denied. Defendants
moved once more to reconsider. On September 12, 1957, the Secretary rejected the reconsideration,
ruled that his judgment in the case "had long become final and executory," and said: "Upon a review
of the records, we found that the decision sought to be reconsidered in the present motion had long
become final and executory. Consequently, this Office has no more jurisdiction to entertain the said
motion." The Secretary categorically stated that the case was "considered a closed matter insofar as
this Office is concerned." Defendants received copy of this denial on October 14, 1957.
On October 23, 1957, defendants appealed to the Office of the President.
On August 20, 1959, in a letter-decision, Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema, "[b]y
authority of the President reversed the decision of the Secretary and declared that the lands
involved "should be restored to the heirs of Andrada to be included in their individual applications."
Plaintiffs, on December 23, 1959, started the present suit in the Cotabato court. They raised the
issue of finality of the decision of the Secretary.
On January 21, 1963, upon a stipulation of facts entered into by the parties, the court rendered
judgment, viz:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, dated October 27, 1956, marked as Exhibit
"G" of the STIPULATION OF FACTS valid, final and executory, and is hereby
given due course and effect. A copy of said Exhibit "G" of the STIPULATION OF
FACTS is hereby attached and appended as part and parcel of this decision, as
Annex "A" thereof.
The decision signed by Assistant Executive Secretary Enrique C. Quema by
authority of the President dated August 20, 1959, marked as Exhibit "L" of the
Stipulation of Facts is hereby declared null and void and without any effect.
The Court refrains from making any special pronouncement as to costs.
Defendants appealed direct to this Court.
1. Defendants take the view that plaintiffs' remedy is certiorari, not an ordinary civil action before
the Court of First Instance. They aver that since plaintiffs did not avail of the proper remedy, the
action should be dismissed.
In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes especially provide for
such judicial review; others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not necessarily imply that
judicial review is unavailable. Modes of judicial review vary according to the statutes; appeal,
petition for review or a writ of certiorari. No general rule applies to all the various administrative
agencies. Where the law stands mute, the accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the
Rules of Court are still available.2
Deducible from the foregoing is that where administrative agencies have original jurisdiction in the
premises, the court's interference with administrative action is necessarily limited. A review thereof
cannot be done through an ordinary civil action if constitutional or legislative authority therefor is
wanting. The remedies that can be availed of where the statute is silent, as in the present case, are
the special civil actions for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus specified in the Rules of Court.
In this case, therefore, we have no alternative but to hold that the plaintiffs' appropriate remedy
is certiorari, not an ordinary civil action.
Certiorari appears to be the real course of action here taken by plaintiffs. While the petition by itself
does not conform to the formal requirements, the allegations thereof show that plaintiffs charge
defendant Assistant Executive Secretary with grave abuse of discretion in upholding defendants'
appeal "in desecration of a solemn decision" of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
"that had already become 'final and executory'." No necessity there was for plaintiffs to aver that
there was no plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This can be clearly
read from the factual narration in the complaint. After all, the case has already reached the
administrative
peak — the Office of the President has already acted thereon. The fact that the petition was not
verified may be excused. The case presented was one which shaped out a question of law. There
were no facts that really needed confirmation under oath. In fact, no trial was conducted by the
court below. Absence of verification here is not fatally defective. 3
Thus it is, that plaintiffs' case, as we see it, is the special civil action of certiorari.
2. The next question is whether or not the Court of First Instance of Cotabato has jurisdiction to
issue a writ of certiorari in this case, considering that defendant Assistant Executive Secretary holds
office in Manila outside the territorial boundaries of said court.
The pertinent statutory provision, Section 44 (h) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, reads: "Courts of First
Instance shall have original jurisdiction ... (h) Said court and their judges, or any of them, shall have
the power to issue writ of injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas
corpus in their respective provinces and district in the manner provided in the Rules of Court."
Complementary thereto is Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court,4providing that: "The petition may be
filed ... if it relates to the acts or omissions of an inferior court, or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, in a Court of First instance having jurisdiction thereof."
As early as Castaño vs. Lobingier, 7 Phil. 91, 93-94, under previous legislation similar to Section
44(h) aforequoted, this Court has held that the writs of injunction and certiorari cannot be issued by
the Court of First Instance of Leyte against the Justice of the Peace of Manila, who is outside the
territorial boundaries of the issuing court. In Acosta vs. Alvendia, L-14598, October 31, 1960, the
Court of First Instance of Manila issued a writ of preliminary injunction against the provincial sheriff
of Nueva Ecija restraining the latter from executing the judgment rendered in a tenancy case by the
Court of Agrarian Relations in Nueva Ecija. Upon Section 44 (h) and Section 2, Rule 58,5 this Court
nullified the injunctive writ because "the jurisdiction or authority of courts of first instance to
control or restrain acts by means of the writ of injunction is limited to acts which are being
committed or about to be committed within the territorial boundaries of their respective provinces
and districts."
Illuminating is Samar Mining Co., Inc. vs. Arnado, L-17109, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 782, 786. in that
case, a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed in the Court of
First Instance of Manila against the Regional Administrator and Labor Attorney of the Department
of Labor assigned to Cebu City, to review the latter's acts in a workmen's compensation case. The
case was dismissed below upon the ground of wrong venue. This Court affirmed. Speaking through
then Associate, now Chief, Justice Roberto Concepcion, we pronounced that the ordinary rules of
venue in Rule 4 do not apply; the Section 4, Rule 65, heretofore transcribed, contemplates of venue,
not jurisdiction, although it makes the former co-terminous with or dependent upon, the latter; that
the jurisdiction therein alluded to is that over "the corporation, board, officer, or person" whose acts
are in question, notjurisdiction over the subject matter of the case; and that the rule-making power of
this Court is limited to matters of pleading, practice and procedure and the admission to the practice
of law, whereas the power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts is
within the exclusive province of Congress (Section 2, Article VIII, Constitution). We there concluded
that the issuance of the writs prayed for over persons outside the territorial boundaries of the
courts of first instance is denied said courts by the Judiciary Act of 1948.
In Hacbang vs. The Leyte Autobus Co., Inc., L-17907, May 30, 1963, 8 SCRA 103, injunctive relief was
sought in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to restrain the sheriff of Leyte from proceeding with the
sale of a passenger bus upon a writ of execution of a judgment rendered by the Leyte court. It was
held that the Cebu court acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
In Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Mfg. Co., Inc. vs. National Administrator of Regional Office No. 2, L-
20491, August 31, 1965, 14 SCRA 1019, a petition for certiorari and prohibition was lodged in the
Court of First Instance of Manila against the Hearing Officer and Regional Administrator of the
Department of Labor in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in connection with a workmen's compensation case.
We held that the Manila court was without power to issue the writs of certiorari and prohibition,
relying upon the authority of Samar Mining, and was bereft of authority to issue a writ of injunction,
citing Acosta.
In People vs. Mencias, L-19633, November 28, 1966, 18 SCRA 807, the Court of First Instance of Rizal
enjoined the Manila fiscals, amongst others, from proceeding with the preliminary investigation of a
criminal complaint. This Court declared the Rizal court to be devoid of authority to so enjoin in line
with Alhambra. Then in 1967, the case of Santos vs. Moreno, L-15829, December 4, 1967, 21 SCRA
1141, 1152, affirmed Castaño vs. Lobingier, supra. This was followed by Cudiamat vs. Torres L-
24225, February 22, 1968, 22 SCRA 695, 698. There, preliminary injunction emanated from the
Court of First Instance of Rizal restraining the implementation of an award on a Public bidding for
the supply of a police call and signal box system for Manila. Enjoined were the members of the on
awards of Manila and the winner of the bid. This Court, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, ruled that: "The
Preliminary injunction that may be granted by a court of first instance under said Section 2 [Rule
58] is, in its application, co-extensive with the territorial boundaries of the province or district in
which the said court sits." This doctrine was reiterated in NAWASA vs. Reyes, L-28597, February 29,
1968, 22 SCRA 905, where the Court of First Instance of Rizal enjoined NAWASA with its offices in
Manila from proceeding with a particular bidding to be conducted in that city.
3. Worth remembering, of course, is that in the foregoing jurisprudence, injunctive or prohibitory
writs are involved. Where the sole issue in court, however, is the legality of the decision of
administrative officials, a different rule obtains.
Instructive on this point is Gayacao vs. Executive Secretary, L-21066, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 753,
756-757. There, plaintiff Gayacao instituted proceedings for certiorari and mandamus in the Court of
First Instance of Basilan City against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, the Director of Lands, and a private respondent. Gayacao sought nullification of
the decision of the Director of Lands, and the affirmatory decisions of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the Executive Secretary, for being contrary to law. Respondent officials
moved to dismiss. They averred that the Basilan court had no jurisdiction to issue writs
of certiorari or mandamus against them because the administrative orders and decisions
complained of were promulgated by officers holding office outside the court's territorial
jurisdiction. They invoked Section 44(h) of the Judiciary Act of 1948 and Castaño vs. Lobingier,
supra, Acosta vs. Alvendia, supra, and Samar Mining Co., Inc. vs. Arnado, supra. The lower court
dismissed the case. Gayacao appealed. We reversed. This Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, pronounced that: "The doctrines invoked in support of the theory of non-jurisdiction
(Castaño vs. Lobingier, 7 Phil 91; Acosta vs. Alvendia, L-14598, Oct. 31, 1960; Samar Mining vs.
Arnado, L-17109, June 30, 1961) are inapplicable, in that those cases involved petitions for writs of
injunction seeking to control the actions of courts or officers outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the respondent courts involved. Here the sole point in issue is whether the decision of the
respondent public officers was legally correct or not, and, without going into the merits of the case,
we see no cogent reason why this power of judicial review should be confined to the courts of first
instance of the locality where the offices of respondents are maintained, to the exclusion of the
courts of first instance in those localities where the plaintiffs reside, and where the questioned
decisions are being enforced." We there emphasized that: "It is easy to see that if the contested
ruling of the court below is sustained the same would result not only in hardship to litigants of
limited means, practically amounting to denial of access to the courts, but would also unnecessarily
encumber the Manila courts whose dockets are already overburdened. Actually, since Ortua vs.
Singson, 59 Phil. 440, the power of provincial courts of first instance to review administrative
decisions of national officials, has been consistently recognized."
Palanan Lumber & Plywood Co., Inc. vs. Arranz, L-27106, March 20, 1968, 22 SCRA 1186, then drew
the line between the precept enunciated in Gayacao and previous case law. This Court, again
speaking thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, there said that "the ruling in Gayacao vs. Executive Secretary,
L-21066, April 30, 1965, has not varied the rule, at least in so far as prohibitory writs are concerned.
The Gayacao case conceded the power of the provincial Court of First Instance to take cognizance of
cases involving judicial review of administrative decisions, where the sole issue before the Court, is
'whether the decision of respondent public officials was legally correct or not'; but it clearly
reaffirmed the non-jurisdiction rulings previously cited where writs of injunction are issued or
sought in order to control acts of non-resident officials."6
In Palanan, which concerned a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed in the Court of First
Instance of Isabela against, amongst others, the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources and the Executive Secretary, it was thus ruled that: "Since the petition before
the respondent Court of First Instance of Isabela not only questioned the legal correctness of the
decision of the Office of the President, in splitting the forest concession between both contending
logging companies, but also sought to enjoin enforcement of that decision, it is evident that even
under the Gayacao ruling, the respondent Court could not validly issue the writ of injunction
complained of when the officials sought to be restrained were not stationed within its territory." 7
Clearly then does the Gayacao case hold sway in the controversy before us.
Indeed, numerous are the cases where courts of first instance of provinces have rightly assumed
jurisdiction over petitions to review acts of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, both of whom may be found in Manila. For instance, in the 1949 case of Alejo
vs. Garchitorena, 83 Phil. 924, 928, this Court impliedly upheld the power of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija to review land decisions of the Director of Lands and the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
But more to the point here is the recent case of Desiata vs. Executive Secretary,
L-21894, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 487, where we affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Agusannullifying the decision of the Executive Secretary, acting for and in behalf of the
President, rendered on appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources.
We hold that the Cotabato court has jurisdiction.
4. We now go to the merits of the appeal. Plaintiffs' position is that defendants' appeal to the
President was time-barred. The trial court sustained. The provisions of Lands Administrative Order
No. 6 are thus brought to the fore. Section 12 thereof provides:
12. Finality of decision promulgated by the Secretary.—The decision of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now Agriculture and Natural
Resources) or the Under Secretary on an appealed case shall become final,
unless otherwise specifically stated therein, after the lapse of thirty (30) days
from the date of its receipt by the interested parties.
Section 13 following reads:
13. No reconsideration of final decision or order.—After a decision or order of
the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources], the Under Secretary or
the Director of Lands has become final, no motion or petition for
reconsideration of such decision or reinvestigation of the case shall be
entertained by the Secretary of Agriculture and [Natural Resources] the Under
Secretary or the Director of Lands, as the case may be, except as provided in
Section 14 hereof.
And Section 14 is to this effect: "Upon such terms as may be considered just, the Secretary of
Agriculture and [Natural Resources], the Under Secretary or the Director of Lands may relieve a
party or his legal representative from a decision, order, or other proceeding taken against him
through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise, default or excusable neglect: Provided, That application
therefor be made within a reasonable time but in no case exceeding one (1) year after such decision,
order or proceeding was taken."
Defendants do not dispute plaintiffs' averment that they (defendants) did not move to reconsider or
appeal from the Secretary's decision of October 27, 1956 — within 30 days from their receipt
thereof. Indeed, they attempted to appeal only on October 23, 1957. They merely contend that their
appeal was but 9 days after October 14, 1957, the date defendants received the September 12, 1957
ruling of the Secretary denying their second motion for reconsideration. That ruling, it must be
remembered, drew attention to the fact that the Secretary's decision "had long become final and
executory." By reason of which, declaration was made that "this (Secretary's) Office had no more
jurisdiction to entertain the said motion."
It is the thesis of defendants that the power of review on appeal is inherent in the President; that the
Constitution fixes no period for such appeal, and that, therefore, appeal can be entertained by the
President even outside the 30-day period provided in Section 12, Lands Administrative Order No. 6.
Controlling in this case is Desiata vs. Executive Secretary, supra. Desiata was also a public lands case
originating from the Bureau of Lands and appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. After the decision of the Secretary, the case was taken to the Office of the President
outside the 30-day period mentioned in Section 12 of Lands Administrative Order No. 6 afore-
quoted. The Executive Secretary revoked the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources. Whereupon, the aggrieved party went to the Court of First Instance of Agusan on a
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition. The Agusan court and this Court on appeal both
held that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Executive Secretary in entertaining
the appeal from a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources which has become
final; and, therefore, the decision of the Executive Secretary was null and void. This Court stressed
in clear terms that — "The decision having become final, the Executive Secretary had no more power
to review it ... .8
Argument has been made in Desiata "that Administrative Order No. 6 itself recognized certain
exceptions wherein decisions of the Secretary of Agriculture do not become final even after 30 days,
particularly citing Section 14 thereof." Nonetheless, this Court pronounced: "But this proviso is
unavailing to him because he does not contend that in his case there obtains any of the recognized
exceptions to finality listed thereunder, to wit: mistake, inadvertence, default or excusable
negligence."9
We find no reason to retreat from the foregoing precepts enunciated by this Court in Desiata.
Indeed, it is not contended that Lands Administrative Order No. 6 does not have the force and effect
of law. Nor can it be, with success. In administrative law, an administrative regulation adopted
pursuant to law, is law. Administratively speaking then, 30 days after receipt by the interested
parties, the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources becomes final, except in
cases of mistakes, inadvertence, surprise, default or excusable neglect. In which case,
the Secretary may relieve a party of a decision, order or other proceeding taken against him upon
application made within a reasonable time but in no case exceeding one (1) year after such decision,
order or proceeding was taken. Defendants do not come within the exception just noted.
The executive power itself has laid down the rules for the parties in administrative conflicts to
follow. To be borne in mind is that a Department Secretary is the alter ego of the President. We must
assume then that an administrative rule laid down by a Department Secretary is, to all intents and
purposes, that of the President, unless countermanded by the latter. It is illogical, unreasonable and
unfair for the executive branch of the government itself to set aside administrative rules — unless
previously changed beforehand — in a specific case for the convenience of one of the parties
thereof. Closed proceedings should remain closed; vested rights should not be unsettled. A contrary
view would, as correctly pointed out by plaintiffs, throw the rule of law to the winds.
In Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs. Zayco, L-20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316, 320 321, we find the
following pertinent passage:
 The appellees' view that the period fixed in Administrative Order No. 6-2 of the
Director of Forestry cannot bind the Office of the President since the latter has
supervision and control over the former cannot commend itself to sound
Public policy. Even administrative decisions must end sometime, as fully as
public policy demands that finality be written on judicial controversies (Manila
Electric Co. vs. Public Service Commission, 61 Phil. 456).

In other words, public interest requires that proceedings already terminated

should not be altered at every step. The rule of non quieta movere prescribes
that what was already terminated should not be disturbed (Espiritu vs. San
Miguel Brewery, 63 Phil. 615). 10 We do not doubt that even the Office of the
President subscribes to the above rule. As aptly remarked by Justice Malcolm
in Dy Cay vs. Crossfield & O'Brien, 38 Phil. 527:

Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk

of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become
final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object
for which courts were instituted was to put an end to
controversy. To fulfill this purpose and to do so speedily,
certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set
up to spur on the slothful. ...

Indeed, "[t]he rule which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent
authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive, or administrative
officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts having general
judicial powers. 11

We, accordingly, hold that the August 20, 1959 letter decision of the Assistant Executive Secretary
"by authority of the President" reversing the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources in this case is null and void and of no force and effect.

For the reasons given, the lower court's decision (labeled Order) of January 31, 1963 appealed from
is hereby affirmed. No costs allowed. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Barredo, JJ., concur.

Castro and Teehankee, JJ., concurs in the result.

Fernando, J., reserves his vote.

Villamor, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-20051 May 30, 1966
ANTIQUE SAWMILLS, INC., petitioner and appellant,
vs.
AQUILES R. ZAYCO, ET AL., respondents and appellees.
C. T. Reyes, D. G. Magno and R. R. Tulod for petitioner and appellant.
Gamboa and Gamboa for respondent and appellee Zayco.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for appellee Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
REGALA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of first Instance of Manila dismissing the petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction filed by the Antique Sawmills, Inc. seeking the annulment
of the decisions of the Executive Secretary dated August 27, 1956 and February 25, 1958 in DANR
Case Nos. 1020 and 1020-A (In Re Forestry Notice No. 1598).
The only issue raised in this case is whether the Office of the President still retains or possesses
jurisdiction to review on appeal a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
which has become final. The issue came up by reason of the following incidents:
On September 30, 1954, a public bidding was conducted for the award of a 12680-hectare forest
area. Four parties submitted bid applications with the Bureau of Forestry, namely: the petitioner-
appellant, Antique Sawmills, Inc., the
respondent-appellee, Aquiles Zayco, Crisencio Milendez and Pedro T. Lo. On November 29, 1954, the
Director of Forestry awarded the bid to the respondent-appellee, Aquiles R. Zayco. Thereafter, the
losing bidders appealed the above award to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
who, on March 23, 1955, however, affirmed the same.
To the above order of March 23, 1955, all the losing bidders filed a motion for reconsideration with
the Secretary of Agricultural and Natural Resources and acting on this motion, the said Secretary
issued an order on July 14, 1955 modifying the original exclusive award to Aquiles R. Zayco. Under
this July 14, 1955 order, the forest area in question was awarded in equal portions to Aquiles R.
Zayco and the petitioner-appellant, Antique Sawmills, Inc.1äwphï1.ñët
Zayco received a copy of the above-mentioned order on July 28, 1955, and on August 20, 1955, he
filed against it a motion for reconsideration. On September 10, 1955, this motion for
reconsideration was denied. Zayco received a copy of this order on November 27, 1955.
On December 19, 1955, Zayco filed with the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources a
second motion for reconsideration which, on February 15, 1956, was resolved by the latter thus —
It appears that the herein motion which in effect is a second motion for reconsideration
was filed too late, that is, outside the reglementary period of thirty (30) days prescribed
in Section 10 of Forestry Administrative Order No. 6-2. From the time the movant
received notice of the order sought to be reconsidered on July 28, 1955, to the time he
filed his first motion for reconsideration on August 20, 1955, twenty-three (23) days had
elapsed; and from his receipt of the order of this Office dated September 10, 1955,
denying the first motion for reconsideration on November 22, 1955, to the filing of the
instant motion on December 19, 1955, twenty-seven (27) days had elapsed. All in all, fifty
(50) days had elapsed from his receipt of the order sought to be reconsidered to the filing
of the herein motion. Consequently, the said order of this office dated July 14, 1955 had
already become final and executory pursuant to the aforecited regulation.
It appears further that the grounds upon which the instant motion is based are
unmeritorious and undeserving of further consideration. That the appellant Antique
Sawmills, Inc. fraudulently misrepresented the facts of this case, is a gratuituous assertion
belied by the evidence on record and then further charge that said appellant is a dummy
or is acting not on its own behalf but for another entity, for the present is unfounded and
based on the mere suspicions of the movant. At any rate, another re-examination of the
evidence on record has not only led us to the same conclusion, but also convinced us
more of the justice and wisdom of our disposition in the order of July 14, 1955.
On February 27, 1956, the respondent-appellee appealed the above order of February 15, 1956 to
the Office of the President. On March 10, 1956, the herein appellant interposed an opposition to the
above-mentioned appeal on the main ground that the order appealed from had already become final
and executory.
On August 27, 1956, however, the Executive Secretary rendered a decision sustaining the appeal
and reversing the order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated July 14, 1955.
This order of the Executive Secretary awarded the entire forest concession in question to the
respondent-appellee, Aquiles B. Zayco. Pertinent portion of the decision reads:
The first issue to be resolved in this appeal is whether or not this Office can pass upon the
merits of the instant case, it appearing that the appeal was filed after the lapse of thirty
(30) days from appellant's receipt of that Department's order dated July 14, 1955. It
appears, however, in the affidavit of the appellant and in the records of this case that he
was not duly represented by counsel in the main stages of the proceedings, and that he
was not aware of the reglementary period within which to take the various steps to
protect his rights. Moreover, there was no advertence on notice by that Department upon
the herein appellant that he had to exercise his rights within certain fixed periods. While
it can not be denied that, for the sake of orderly proceedings, technical rules may be
relaxed in the interest of justice and equity. We are inclined to liberalize the rule in this
case to attain an approximation to substantial justice. An examination of the record
shows that the order modifying that Department's decision dated March 23, 1955, lacks
legal and equitable basis. For this reason, this Office is constrained to pass upon the
substantial merits of the case.
After the denial of his motion for reconsideration on the order of the Executive Secretary, the
petitioner instituted with the Court of First Instance of Manila the instant proceedings.
The petitioner's theory is simple. It contends that the period provided by the rules for the perfection
of an appeal is not only mandatory but jurisdictional. Thus, since, the respondent-appellee failed to
perfect his appeal on time and finality had already set in the order of July 14, 1955, the Office of the
President could not have required jurisdiction over the same.
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the said period is a mere procedural technicality
which, at least in administrative proceedings, may liberally be relaxed.
In a long line of cases,1 the Supreme Court has ruled that compliance with the period provided by
law for the perfection of an appeal is not merely mandatory but also a jurisdictional requirement.
Thus, in the case of Miranda vs. Guanzon, et al., 92 Phil. 168, this Court held:
 Section 13 of Rule 41 provides that when the appeal is not perfected within the
reglementary period the appeal shall be dismissed. The requirement regarding the
perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional. Such failure has the effect of rendering final the judgment of the court, and
the certification of the record on appeal thereafter cannot restore the jurisdiction which
has been lost. The dismissal of the appeal can be effected even after the case has been
elevated to the Court of Appeals (Rule 52, Section 1[a]). Appellee's failure to file a motion
for dismissal of appeal in the court of origin before the transmittal of the record to the
appellate court, does not constitute a waiver on his part to interpose such objection.
(Emphasis supplied)

That administrative rules and regulations have the force of law can no longer be questioned. Only
recently, in the case of Valerio vs. Secretary of Agriculture, et al., G.R. No. L-18587, April 23, 1963, we
reaffirmed that —

x x x it cannot be contended, as the court a quo intimated, that an administrative

regulation should not be given the same weight as to rule of court but should rather be
given a more liberal interpretation for, as is well known, a regulation adopted pursuant to
law has the force and effect of law. In fact it is a wise policy that administrative
regulations be given the same force as rules of court in order to maintain the regularity of
administrative proceedings.

The appellees' view that the period fixed in Administrative Order No. 6-2 of the Director of Forestry
cannot bind the Office of the President since the latter has supervision and control over the former
cannot commend itself to sound public policy. Even administrative decisions must and sometime, as
fully as public policy demands that finality be written on judicial controversies (Manila Electric Co.
vs. Public Service Commission, 61 Phil. 456).

In other words, public interest requires that proceedings already terminated should not be altered
at every step. The rule of non quieta movere prescribes that what was already terminated should not
be disturbed (Espiritu vs. San Miguel Brewery, 63 Phil. 615). We do not doubt that even the Office of
the President subscribes to the above rule. As aptly remarked by Justice Malcolm in Dy Cay vs.
Crossfield & O'Brien, 38 Phil. 527:

Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments
of courts should become final at some definite date fixed by law. The very object for
which courts were instituted was to put an end to controversy. To fulfill this purpose and
to do so steadily, certain time limits, more or less arbitrary, have to be set up to spur on
the slothful. ...

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby revoked and set aside. The award made under the
Order of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated July 14, 1955 is hereby declared
valid, effective and subsisting. Costs against the appellee, Aquiles Zayco.

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez,
JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 131457. April 24, 1998]
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. BAULA,
MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
The dramatic and well-publicized hunger strike staged by some alleged farmer-beneficiaries
in front of the Department of Agrarian Reform compound in Quezon City on October 9, 1997
commanded nationwide attention that even church leaders and some presidential candidates tried
to intervene for the strikers cause.
The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision[1] of the Office of the President (OP),
issued through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, which
approved the conversion of a one hundred forty-four (144)-hectare land from agricultural to agro-
industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the President, through then Deputy Executive
Secretary Renato C. Corona, to issue the so-called Win-Win Resolution[2] on November 7, 1997,
substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become final and executory. The
said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the
extent of forty-four (44) hectares, and ordered the remaining one hundred (100) hectares to be
distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
But, did the Win-Win Resolution culminate in victory for all the contending parties?
The above-named petitioners cried foul. They have come to this Court urging us to annul and
set aside the Win-Win Resolution and to enjoin respondent Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao of the
Department of Agrarian Reform from implementing the said Resolution.
Thus, the crucial issue to be resolved in this case is: What is the legal effect of the Win-Win
Resolution issued by the Office of the President on its earlier Decision involving the same subject
matter, which had already become final and executory?
The antecedent facts of this controversy, as culled from the pleadings, may be stated as
follows:
1. This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by
the Norberto Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the
petitioners. The property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14371 [3] of the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
2. In 1984, the land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing
Corporation, now Del Monte Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten
(10) years under the Crop Producer and Growers Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of
title. The lease expired in April, 1994.
3. In October, 1991, during the existence of the lease, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) placed the entire 144-hectare property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land
value at P2.38 million.[4]
4. NQSRMDC resisted the DARs action. In February, 1992, it sought and was granted by the
DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in
DARAB Case No. X-576, a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR
Region X Director, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land
Bank), and their authorized representatives to desist from pursuing any activity or activities
concerning the subject land until further orders.[5]
5. Despite the DARAB order of March 31, 1992, the DAR Regional Director issued a
memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, directing the Land Bank to open a trust account for P2.38
million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary proceedings to determine the just
compensation of the subject property. NQSRMDC objected to these moves and filed on June 9, 1992
an Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order of March 31, 1992 and to nullify the summary
proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank on the valuation of the
subject property.
6. The DARAB, on October 22, 1992, acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by (a) ordering
the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank to seriously comply with the terms of the order dated
March 31, 1992; (b) nullifying the DAR Regional Directors memorandum, dated May 21, 1992, and
the summary proceedings conducted pursuant thereto; and (c) directing the Land Bank to return
the claim folder of Petitioner NQSRMDCs subject property to the DAR until further orders. [6]
7. The Land Bank complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust account it opened
in the name of petitioner NQSRMDC.[7]
8. In the meantime, the Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon, headed by
Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed Resolution No. 6, [8] dated January 7, 1993, designating certain
areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Zones where the
subject property is situated.
9. What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES) Decision of March 29, 1996,
pertinent portions of which we quote:
Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting
or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from agricultural to
industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject
new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people.
Parenthetically, under said section, 4th to 5th class municipalities may authorize the classification of
five percent (5%) of their agricultural land area and provide for the manner of their utilization or
disposition.
On 12 October 1993, the Bukidnon Provincial Land Use Committee approved the said
Ordinance. Accordingly, on 11 December 1993, the instant application for conversion was filed by
Mr. Gaudencio Beduya in behalf of NQSRMDC/BAIDA (Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Development
Association).
Expressing support for the proposed project, the Bukidnon Provincial Board, on the basis of a Joint
Committee Report submitted by its Committee on Laws, Committee on Agrarian Reform and Socio-
Economic Committee approved, on 1 February 1994, the said Ordinance now docketed as
Resolution No. 94-95. The said industrial area, as conceived by NQSRMDC (project proponent) is
supposed to have the following components:
1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes the following: Institute for Continuing
Higher Education; Institute for Livelihood Science (Vocational and Technical School); Institute for
Agribusiness Research; Museum, Library, Cultural Center, and Mindanao Sports Development
Complex which covers an area of 24 hectares;
2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing for corn oil, corn starch, various
corn products; rice processing for wine, rice-based snacks, exportable rice; cassava processing for
starch, alcohol and food delicacies; processing plants, fruits and fruit products such as juices;
processing plants for vegetables processed and prepared for market; cold storage and ice plant;
cannery system; commercial stores; public market; and abattoir needing about 67 hectares;
3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for recreation, horse-back riding,
memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover 33 hectares; and
4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room hotel, restaurants, dormitories
and a housing project covering an area of 20 hectares.
The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4, 1995, adopted by the
Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon Provincial Office, as one of its flagship projects. The
same was likewise favorably recommended by the Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon; the
municipal, provincial and regional office of the DAR; the Regional Office (Region X) of the DENR
(which issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate on June 5, 1995); the Executive Director,
signing By Authority of PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ, Office of the President Mindanao; the Secretary of
DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo D. Clemente.
In the same vein, the National Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation Office, Bagontaas
Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Julius S. Maquiling, Chief, Provincial Irrigation Office, interposed NO
OBJECTION to the proposed conversion as long as the development cost of the irrigation systems
thereat which is P2,377.00 per hectare be replenished by the developer x x x. Also, the Kisolon-San
Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, interposed no
objection to the proposed conversion of the land in question as it will provide more economic
benefits to the community in terms of outside investments that will come and employment
opportunities that will be generated by the projects to be put up x x x.
On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation held at the Kisolan
Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director Jose Macalindong of DAR Central Office and
DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the people of the affected barangay rallied behind their respective
officials in endorsing the project.
Notwithstanding the foregoing favorable recommendation, however, on November 14, 1994, the
DAR, thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands under Section 65 of
R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the conversion of the subject land
from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same under the compulsory coverage of
CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all qualified beneficiaries on the following grounds:
1. The area is considered as a prime agricultural land with irrigation facility;
2. The land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA);
3. The existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable;
4. There is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements for the beneficiaries;
5. The procedures on how the area was identified and reclassified for agro-industrial project has no
reference to Memo Circular No. 54, Series of 1993, E.O. No. 72, Series of 1993, and E.O. No. 124,
Series of 1993.
A Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Order was filed on January 9, 1995 by applicant but
the same was denied (in an Order dated June 7, 1995). [9]
10. Thus, the DAR Secretary ordered the DAR Regional Director to proceed with the
compulsory acquisition and distribution of the property. [10]
11. Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon appealed[11] the order of denial to the Office of the
President and prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be
more beneficial to the people of Bukidnon.
12. To prevent the enforcement of the DAR Secretarys order, NQSRMDC, on June 29, 1995,
filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary
injunction,[12] docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 37614.
13. Meanwhile, on July 25, 1995, the Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, then Presidential
Assistant for Mindanao, after conducting an evaluation of the proposed project, sent a
memorandum[13] to the President favorably endorsing the project with a recommendation that the
DAR Secretary reconsider his decision in denying the application of the province for the conversion
of the land.
14. Also, in a memorandum[14] to the President dated August 23, 1995, the Honorable Rafael
Alunan III, then Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG),
recommended the conversion of the subject land to industrial/institutional use with a request that
the President hold the implementation of the DAR order to distribute the land in question.
15. On October 23, 1995, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 37614, issued a
Resolution[15] ordering the parties to observe status quo pending resolution of the petition. At the
hearing held in said case on October 5, 1995, the DAR, through the Solicitor General, manifested
before the said court that the DAR was merely in the processing stage of the applications of farmers-
claimants and has agreed to respect status quo pending the resolution of the petition. [16]
16. In resolving the appeal, the Office of the President, through then Executive Secretary
Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, dated March 29, 1996, reversing the
DAR Secretarys decision, the pertinent portions of which read:
After a careful evaluation of the petition vis--vis the grounds upon which the denial thereof by
Secretary Garilao was based, we find that the instant application for conversion by the Municipality
of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To be sure, converting the land in question from
agricultural to agro-industrial would open great opportunities for employment and bring about real
development in the area towards a sustained economic growth of the municipality. On the other
hand, distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as there are none)
does not guarantee such benefits.
Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land with irrigation
facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by petitioner, while it is true that there is,
indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the same merely passes thru the property (as a right of way)
to provide water to the ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. The land itself, subject of the
instant petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for several years, planted with pineapple by the
Philippine Packing Corporation.
On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory Acquisition (NCA) and
that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas covered by NCA is not applicable, suffice it
to state that the said NCA was declared null and void by the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) as early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB
correctly pointed out that under Section 8 of R.A. No. 6657, the subject property could not validly be
the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the lease contract with Del Monte
Philippines, a Multi-National Company, or until April 1994, and ordered the DAR Regional Office and
the Land Bank of the Philippines, both in Butuan City, to `desist from pursuing any activity or
activities covering petitioners land.
On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family has already contributed
substantially to the land reform program of the government, as follows: 300 hectares of rice land in
Nueva Ecija in the 70s and another 400 hectares in the nearby Municipality of Impasugong,
Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago, for which they have not received just compensation up to this time.
Neither can the assertion that there is no clear and tangible compensation package arrangements
for the beneficiaries hold water as, in the first place, there are no beneficiaries to speak about, for
the land is not tenanted as already stated.
Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject property for agro-
industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the law granting autonomy to local
government units in the management of their local affairs. Stated more simply, the language of
Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is clear and affords no room for any other interpretation. By
unequivocal legal mandate, it grants local government units autonomy in their local affairs including
the power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the manner of their
utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant
communities.
WHEREFORE, in pursuance of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate and in view of the
favorable recommendations of the various government agencies abovementioned, the subject
Order, dated November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby
SET ASIDE and the instant application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED.[17]
17.On May 20, 1996, DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision.
18 On September 11, 1996, in compliance with the OP decision of March 29, 1996, NQSRMDC
and the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) executed a Memorandum of
Agreement whereby the former donated four (4) hectares from the subject land to DECS for the
establishment of the NQSR High School.[18]
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it
discovered that the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that
during the pendency of both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it
filed against DAR in the Court of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by Governor Carlos O.
Fortich, the DAR, without giving just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title on
August 11, 1995 and had it transferred in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No.
T-50264[19] of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused
the issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in
the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries under TCT No. AT-3536[20] of the Registry of Deeds of
Bukidnon.
19. Thus, on April 10, 1997, NQSRMDC filed a complaint [21] with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon (Branch 9), docketed as Civil Case No. 2687-97, for annulment and
cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others. The RTC then issued a
Temporary Restraining Order on April 30, 1997[22] and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on May 19,
1997,[23] restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from
NQSRMDC the possession of the subject land.
20. Meanwhile, on June 23, 1997, an Order[24] was issued by then Executive Secretary Ruben
D. Torres denying DARs motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the reglementary
period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March 29, 1996 OP decision had
already become final and executory.
21. The DAR filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of the June 23, 1997
Order of the President.
22. On August 12, 1997, the said writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was
challenged by some alleged farmers before the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and
prohibition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44905, praying for the lifting of the injunction and for the
issuance of a writ of prohibition from further trying the RTC case.
23. On October 9, 1997, some alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front
of the DAR Compound in Quezon City to protest the OP Decision of March 29, 1996. On October 10,
1997, some persons claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC property filed a motion for
intervention (styled as Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, asking that the OP
Decision allowing the conversion of the entire 144-hectare property be set aside.[25]
24. President Fidel V. Ramos then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to resolve
their grievance within the framework of the law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding Task
Force (FFTF) chaired by Agriculture Secretary Salvador Escudero to look into the controversy and
recommend possible solutions to the problem.[26]
25. On November 7, 1997, the Office of the President resolved the strikers protest by issuing
the so-called Win/Win Resolution penned by then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the President, through Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996, is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. NQSRMDCs application for conversion is APPROVED only with respect to the
approximately forty-four (44) hectare portion of the land adjacent to the
highway, as recommended by the Department of Agriculture.
2. The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares traversed by an
irrigation canal and found to be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed
to qualified farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with RA 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law with a right of way to said portion
from the highway provided in the portion fronting the highway. For this
purpose, the DAR and other concerned government agencies are directed to
immediately conduct the segregation survey of the area, valuation of the
property and generation of titles in the name of the identified farmer-
beneficiaries.
3. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully and
meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified farmer-
beneficiaries.
4. The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby further directed to expedite
payment of just compensation to NQSRMDC for the portion of the land to be
covered by the CARP, including other lands previously surrendered by
NQSRMDC for CARP coverage.
 5. The Philippine National Police is hereby directed to render full assistance to
the Department of Agrarian Reform in the implementation of this Order.
We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on October 10, 1997 without
ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since it is unnecessary to pass upon it at this time.
SO ORDERED.[27]
A copy of the Win-Win Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon,
Mayor Rey B. Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997[28] and, on
December 4, 1997, they filed the present petition for certiorari, prohibition (under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court) and injunction with urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction (under Rule 58, ibid.), against then Deputy Executive Secretary
Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.
On December 12, 1997, a Motion For Leave To Intervene[29] was filed by alleged farmer-
beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that they are real parties in interest as they were previously
identified by respondent DAR as agrarian reform beneficiaries on the 144-hectare property subject
of this case. The motion was vehemently opposed[30] by the petitioners.
In seeking the nullification of the Win-Win Resolution, the petitioners claim that the Office of
the President was prompted to issue the said resolution after a very well-managed hunger strike led
by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically blackmailing
the Office of the President to come up with this purely political decision to appease the farmers, by
reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and
executory in an Order of 23 June 1997.[31] Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then
Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona committed grave abuse of discretion and acted
beyond his jurisdiction when he issued the questioned Resolution of 7 November 1997. [32] They
availed of this extraordinary writ of certiorari because there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law.[33] They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the subject
Resolution because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to seek
a reconsideration .[34]
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed that it be
dismissed outright on the following grounds:
(1) The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review directly
with the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(2) The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed Win-Win
Resolution before filing the present petition; and
(3) Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
These are the preliminary issues which must first be resolved, including the incident on the
motion for intervention filed by the alleged farmer-beneficiaries.
Anent the first issue, in order to determine whether the recourse of petitioners is proper or
not, it is necessary to draw a line between an error of judgment and an error of
jurisdiction. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its
jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal.[35] On the other hand, an error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial
body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack
or in excess of jurisdiction.[36] This error is correctable only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.[37]
It is true that under Rule 43, appeals from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of
any quasi-judicial agency exercising quasi-judicial functions,[38] including the Office of the
President,[39] may be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a verified petition for review [40] within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the said judgment, final order or resolution,[41] whether the appeal
involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.[42]
However, we hold that, in this particular case, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is
inapplicable considering that the present petition contains an allegation that the challenged
resolution is patently illegal[43] and was issued with grave abuse of discretion and beyond his
(respondent Secretary Renato C. Coronas) jurisdiction[44] when said resolution substantially
modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become final and executory. In
other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an error of judgment
which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul and set
aside the assailed resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what
the petitioners have correctly done. The pertinent portion of Section 1 thereof provides:
SECTION 1. Petition for certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such
incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
x x x x x x x x x.
The office of a writ of certiorari is restricted to truly extraordinary cases cases in which the act of
the lower court or quasi-judicial body is wholly void.[45]
The aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 65 mandates that the person aggrieved by the assailed
illegal act may file a verified petition (for certiorari) in the proper court. The proper court where
the petition must be filed is stated in Section 4 of the same Rule 65 which reads:
SEC. 4. Where petition filed.- The petition may be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of
the judgment, order or resolution sought to be assailed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the
acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial
Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also
be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in
the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-
judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or these Rules, the petition shall be filed in
and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. (4a)
Under the above-quoted Section 4, the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Regional Trial
Court have original concurrent jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari, [46] prohibition[47] and
mandamus.[48] But the jurisdiction of these three (3) courts are also delineated in that, if the
challenged act relates to acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or
person, the petition must be filed with the Regional Trial Court which exercises jurisdiction over the
territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. And if it involves the act or omission of a quasi-
judicial agency, the petition shall be filed only with the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise provided
by law or the Rules of Court. We have clearly discussed this matter of concurrence of jurisdiction
in People vs. Cuaresma, et. al.,[49] through now Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, thus:
x x x. This Courts original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus,
quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional
Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of
their respective regions. It is also shared by this Court, and by the Regional Trial Court, with the
Court of Appeals (formerly, Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latters competence to issue the extraordinary writs
was restricted to those in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve
as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level (inferior) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. (Citations omitted)
But the Supreme Court has the full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed
directly to it if compelling reasons, or the nature and importance of the issues raised, warrant. This
has been the judicial policy to be observed and which has been reiterated in subsequent cases,
namely:[50] Uy vs. Contreras, et. al.,[51] Torres vs. Arranz,[52] Bercero vs. De Guzman,[53] and Advincula vs.
Legaspi, et. al.[54] As we have further stated in Cuaresma:
x x x. A direct invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be
allowed only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out
in the petition. This is established policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Courts time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts docket.
Pursuant to said judicial policy, we resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present
petition in the interest of speedy justice[55] and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an
end to the present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national
interest because of the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed
resolution. Moreover, as will be discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and
requiring the petitioners to file their petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a
waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is
well-entrenched in our jurisprudence. We reiterate what we said in Piczon vs. Court of Appeals:[56]
Be it remembered that rules of procedure are but mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of
justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate
rather than promote substantial justice, must always be avoided. Time and again, this Court has
suspended its own rules and excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher
interests of justice so require. In the instant petition, we forego a lengthy disquisition of the proper
procedure that should have been taken by the parties involved and proceed directly to the merits of
the case."
As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse when
they failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before seeking judicial
recourse, suffice it to state that the said motion is not necessary when the questioned resolution is a
patent nullity,[57] as will be taken up later.
With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the filing by the petitioners of: (a) a
petition for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No. 37614) with the
Court of Appeals; (b) a complaint for annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction
against DAR and 141 others (Civil Case No. 2687-97) with the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon; and (c) the present petition, constitute forum shopping.
We disagree.
The rule is that:
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. The principle applies not only
with respect to suits filed in the courts but also in connection with litigation commenced in the
courts while an administrative proceeding is pending, as in this case, in order to defeat
administrative processes and in anticipation of an unfavorable administrative ruling and a favorable
court ruling. This specially so, as in this case, where the court in which the second suit was brought,
has no jurisdiction (citations omitted).
The test for determining whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping has been laid
down in the 1986 case of Buan vs. Lopez (145 SCRA 34), x x x and that is, forum shopping exists
where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will
amount to res judicata in the other, as follows:
There thus exists between the action before this Court and RTC Case No. 86-36563 identity of
parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, as well as identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and the identity
on the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action, will,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration: all the requisites, in fine, of auter action pendant.'[58]
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum
shopping. The test for determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res adjudicata in the action under
consideration. A cursory examination of the cases filed by the petitioners does not show that the
said cases are similar with each other. The petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the
nullification of the DAR Secretarys order to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and
distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the civil case in RTC of Malaybalay,
Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title issued in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, with damages, was based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying for
cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDCs title, used documents which were earlier declared null and
void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDCs title was made without payment of just
compensation; and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present
petition is entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed Win-
Win Resolution of the Office of the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued
long after the previous two cases were instituted.
The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for intervention filed by
alleged farmer-beneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their motion, movants
contend that they are the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are real parties in
interest. To prove this, they attached as Annex I in their motion a Master List of Farmer-
Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged master list was made pursuant to the directive in the
dispositive portion of the assailed Win-Win Resolution which directs the DAR to carefully and
meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified farmer-beneficiaries. However, a
perusal of the said document reveals that movants are those purportedly Found Qualified and
Recommended for Approval. In other words, movants are merely recommendee farmer-
beneficiaries.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited
or injured by the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Real interestmeans
a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,
subordinate or consequential interest.[59] Undoubtedly, movants interest over the land in question is
a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not real parties in interest.
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is, as
intimated earlier, null and void. Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand on.
 Now to the main issue of whether the final and executory Decision dated March 29,1996 can
still be substantially modified by the Win-Win Resolution.
We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines
are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise
provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such
period.
Therefore, the assailed Win-Win Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of
March 29, 1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by
Justice Thomas A. Street[62] in a 1918 case,[63] is a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw
and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head. [64]
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolution dated
November 7, 1997, issued by the Office of the President in OP Case No. 96-C-6424, is hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave To Intervene filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries
is hereby DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in
exceptionally meritorious cases. (Emphasis ours)

It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character
whenever practicable.

When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the Decision
of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration
thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision.
Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain
the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion
became the basis of the assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and
Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for
reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second
motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided
in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been
entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby
allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality.Thus, the act of the Office of the
President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996 Decision which had
already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that
accord finality to administrative determinations.

In San Luis, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al.[60] we held:

Since the decisions of both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President had long
become final and executory, the same can no longer be reviewed by the courts. It is well-established
in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to
their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final
judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata [Brillantes v. Castro, 99 Phil. 497 (1956),
Ipekdijna Merchandizing Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-15430, September 30, 1963, 9
SCRA 72.] The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a matter once judicially
determined by competent authority applies as well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public,
executive or administrative officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments
of courts having general judicial powers [Brillantes v. Castro, supra at 503].

The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or

quasi-judicial body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble
purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. [61] This is a fundamental principle in our justice
system, without which there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this
principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which
violates such principle must immediately be struck down.
G.R. No. L-7708 May 30, 1955
JOSE MONDANO, petitioner,
vs.
FERNANDO SILVOSA, Provincial Governor of Surigao, JOSE ARREZA and OLIMPIO EPIS,
Members of the Provincial Board, respondents.
D. Avila and C. H. Lozada for petitioner.
Olimpio R. Epis in his own behalf and for his co-respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
The petitioner is the duly elected and qualified mayor of the municipality of Mainit, province of
Surigao. On 27 February 1954 Consolacion Vda. de Mosende filed a sworn complaint with the
Presidential Complaints and Action Committee accusing him of (1) rape committed on her daughter
Caridad Mosende; and (2) concubinage for cohabiting with her daughter in a place other than the
conjugal dwelling. On 6 March the Assistant Executive Secretary indorsed the complaint to the
respondent provincial governor for immediate investigation, appropriate action and report. On 10
April the petitioner appeared before the provincial governor in obedience to his summons and was
served with a copy of the complaint filed by the provincial governor with provincial board. On the
same day, the provincial governor issued Administrative Order No. 8 suspending the petitioner from
office. Thereafter, the Provincial Board proceeded to hear the charges preferred against the
petitioner over his objection.
The petitioner prays for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to enjoin the respondents
from further proceeding with the hearing of the administrative case against him and for a
declaration that the order of suspension issued by the respondent provincial governor is illegal and
without legal effect.
On 4 May 1954 the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for was issued after filing and approval of
a bond for P500.
The answer of the respondents admits the facts alleged in the petition except those that are
inferences and conclusions of law and invokes the provisions of section 79 (c)of the Revised
Administrative Code which clothes the department head with "direct control, direction, and
supervision over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction . . ." and to that end "may order the
investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his
Department and in connection therewith may appoint a committee or designate an official or person
who shall conduct such investigations; . . ."and the rule in the case of Villena vs. Secretary of
Interior, 67 Phil. 452, which upheld "the power of the Secretary of Interior to conduct at its own
initiative investigation of charges against local elective municipal officials and to suspend them
preventively," on the board proposition "that under the presidential type of government which we
have adopted and considering the departmental organization established and continued in force by
paragraph 1, section 11, Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Departments, the heads of the various executive
departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive."
The executive departments of the Government of the Philippines created and organized before the
approval of the Constitution continued to exist as "authorized by law until the Congress shall
provide otherwise."1 Section 10, paragraph 1, Article VII, of the Constitution provides: "The
President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be
faithfully executed." Under this constitutional provision the President has been invested with the
power of control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices, but not of all local
governments over which he has been granted only the power of general supervision as may be
provided by law. The Department head as agent of the President has direct control and supervision
over all bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction as provided for in section 79 (c) of the Revised
Administrative Code, but he does not have the same control of local governments as that exercised
by him over bureaus and offices under his jurisdiction. Likewise, his authority to order the
investigation of any act or conduct of any person in the service of any bureau or office under his
department is confined to bureaus or offices under his jurisdiction and does not extend to local
governments over which, as already stated, the President exercises only general supervision as may
be provided by law. If the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code are to be
construed as conferring upon the corresponding department head direct control, direction, and
supervision over all local governments and that for the reason he may order the investigation of an
official of a local government for malfeasance in office, such interpretation would be contrary to the
provisions of paragraph 1, section 10, Article VII, of the Constitution. If "general supervision over all
local governments" is to be construedas the same power granted to the Department Head in section
79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then there would no longer be a distinction or difference
between the power of control and that of supervision. In administrative law supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their
duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power
of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. Such is
the import of the provisions of section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code and 37 of Act No.
4007. The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged the provincial supervision over municipal
officials in the provincial governor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaints made
under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other form of
maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moral
turpitude."2 And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit written charges touching the matter to
the provincial board, furnishing a copy of such charges to the accused either personally or by
registered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (not being the municipal treasurer)
pending action by the board, if in his opinion the charge be one affecting the official integrity of the
officer in question." 3 Section 86 of the Revised Administrative Code adds nothing to the power of
supervision to be exercised by the Department Head over the administration of . . . municipalities . .
.. If it be construed that it does and such additional power is the same authority as that vested in the
Department Head by section 79 (c) of the Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power
must be deemed to have been abrogated by section 10 (1), Article VII, of the Constitution.
In Lacson vs. Roque, 49 Off. Gaz. 93, this Court held that the power of the President to remove
officials from office as provided for in section 64 (b) of the Revised Administrative Code must be
done "conformably to law;" and only for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines he "may at any
time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the
(Philippine Islands) Philippines." Again, this power of removal must be exercised conformably to
law.
In the indorsement to the provincial governor the Assistant Executive Secretary requested
immediate investigation, appropriate action and report on the complaint indorsed to him, and called
his attention to section 2193 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides for the institution
of judicial proceedings by the provincial fiscal upon direction of the provincial governor. If the
indorsement of the Assistant Executive Secretary be taken as a designation of the provincial
governor to investigate the petitioner, then he would only be acting as agent of the Executive, but
the investigation to be conducted by him would not be that which is provided for in sections 2188,
2189 and 2190 of the Revised Administrative Code. The charges preferred against the respondent
are not malfeasances or any of those enumerated or specified in section 2188 of the Revised
Administrative Code, because rape and concubinage have nothing to do with the performance of his
duties as mayor nor do they constitute or involve" neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or any
other form of maladministration of office." True, they may involve moral turpitude, but before the
provincial governor and board may act and proceed in accordance with the provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code referred to, a conviction by final judgment must precede the filing by
the provincial governor of charges and trial by the provincial board. Even the provincial fiscal
cannot file an information for rape without a sworn complaint of the offended party who is 28 years
of age and the crime of concubinage cannot be prosecuted but upon sworn complaint of the
offended spouse.4 The charges preferred against the petitioner, municipal mayor of Mainit, province
of Surigao, not being those or any of those specified in section 2188 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the investigation of such charges by the provincial board is unauthorized and illegal. The
suspension of the petitioner as mayor of the municipality of Mainit is, consequently, unlawful and
without authority of law.

The writ of prohibition prayed for is granted, without pronouncement as to costs.


G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965
EMMANUEL PELAEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE AUDITOR GENERAL, respondent.
Zulueta, Gonzales, Paculdo and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
During the period from September 4 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines,
purporting to act pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, issued Executive
Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33) municipalities enumerated in
the margin.1 Soon after the date last mentioned, or on November 10, 1964 petitioner Emmanuel
Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer, instituted the present special civil
action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General, to restrain
him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds
in implementation of said executive orders and/or any disbursement by said municipalities.
Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void, upon the ground that said Section 68
has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 and constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power. Respondent maintains the contrary view and avers that the present action is
premature and that not all proper parties — referring to the officials of the new political
subdivisions in question — have been impleaded. Subsequently, the mayors of several
municipalities adversely affected by the aforementioned executive orders — because the latter have
taken away from the former the barrios composing the new political subdivisions — intervened in
the case. Moreover, Attorneys Enrique M. Fernando and Emma Quisumbing-Fernando were allowed
to and did appear as amici curiae.
The third paragraph of Section 3 of Republic Act No. 2370, reads:
Barrios shall not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed except
under the provisions of this Act or by Act of Congress.
Pursuant to the first two (2) paragraphs of the same Section 3:
All barrios existing at the time of the passage of this Act shall come under the provisions
hereof.
Upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected, a new barrio may be
created or the name of an existing one may be changed by the provincial board of the
province, upon recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in
which the proposed barrio is stipulated. The recommendation of the municipal council
shall be embodied in a resolution approved by at least two-thirds of the entire
membership of the said council: Provided, however, That no new barrio may be created if
its population is less than five hundred persons.
Hence, since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be
created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the
corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and
the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed
barrio is situated." Petitioner argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even
create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are
units of municipalities?"
Respondent answers in the affirmative, upon the theory that a new municipality can be created
without creating new barrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the new
municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of the petitioner's argument, which
is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of
the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. The cogency and
force of this argument is too obvious to be denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic and
experience, it cannot be offset except by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to the
contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act No. 2379, has been
brought to our attention.
Moreover, section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the disputed executive orders
are based, provides:
The (Governor-General) President of the Philippines may by executive order define the
boundary, or boundaries, of any province, subprovince, municipality, [township]
municipal district, or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory
comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovinces, separate any
political division other than a province, into such portions as may be required, merge any
of such subdivisions or portions with another, name any new subdivision so created, and
may change the seat of government within any subdivision to such place therein as the
public welfare may require: Provided, That the authorization of the (Philippine
Legislature) Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained whenever the boundary of
any province or subprovince is to be defined or any province is to be divided into one or
more subprovinces. When action by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines
in accordance herewith makes necessary a change of the territory under the jurisdiction
of any administrative officer or any judicial officer, the (Governor-General) President of
the Philippines, with the recommendation and advice of the head of the Department
having executive control of such officer, shall redistrict the territory of the several officers
affected and assign such officers to the new districts so formed.
Upon the changing of the limits of political divisions in pursuance of the foregoing
authority, an equitable distribution of the funds and obligations of the divisions thereby
affected shall be made in such manner as may be recommended by the (Insular Auditor)
Auditor General and approved by the (Governor-General) President of the Philippines.
Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does
not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relying upon Municipality of Cardona vs.
Municipality of Binañgonan (36 Phil. 547), which, he claims, has settled it. Such claim is untenable,
for said case involved, not the creation of a new municipality, but a mere transfer of territory — from
an already existing municipality (Cardona) to another municipality (Binañgonan), likewise, existing
at the time of and prior to said transfer (See Gov't of the P.I. ex rel. Municipality of Cardona vs.
Municipality, of Binañgonan [34 Phil. 518, 519-5201) — in consequence of the fixing and definition,
pursuant to Act No. 1748, of the common boundaries of two municipalities.
It is obvious, however, that, whereas the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or
settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of
an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into
effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is
essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function"
(State ex rel. Higgins vs. Aicklen, 119 S. 425, January 2, 1959) or "solely and exclusively the exercise
of legislative power" (Udall vs. Severn, May 29, 1938, 79 P. 2d 347-349). As the Supreme Court of
Washington has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart, February 13, 1890, 23 Pac. 405, 409),
"municipal corporations are purely the creatures of statutes."
Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the
details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation
of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself — it must set forth
therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate 2 — and (b) fix a
standard — the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable — to which the
delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. 2a Indeed, without a statutory declaration
of policy, the delegate would in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every
law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority.2b Hence, he could thereby arrogate upon himself the power, not only to make the law, but,
also — and this is worse — to unmake it, by adopting measures inconsistent with the end sought to
be attained by the Act of Congress, thus nullifying the principle of separation of powers and the
system of checks and balances, and, consequently, undermining the very foundation of our
Republican system.
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled requirements for a
valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any
policy to be carried out or implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently
precise to avoid the evil effects above referred to. In this connection, we do not overlook the fact
that, under the last clause of the first sentence of Section 68, the President:
... may change the seat of the government within any subdivision to such place therein as
the public welfare may require.
It is apparent, however, from the language of this clause, that the phrase "as the public welfare may
require" qualified, not the clauses preceding the one just quoted, but only the place to which the seat
of the government may be transferred. This fact becomes more apparent when we consider that
said Section 68 was originally Section 1 of Act No. 1748, 3 which provided that, "whenever in the
judgment of the Governor-General the public welfare requires, he may, by executive order," effect
the changes enumerated therein (as in said section 68), including the change of the seat of the
government "to such place ... as the public interest requires." The opening statement of said Section 1
of Act No. 1748 — which was not included in Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code —
governed the time at which, or the conditions under which, the powers therein conferred could be
exercised; whereas the last part of the first sentence of said section referred exclusively to
the place to which the seat of the government was to be transferred.
cancel certificates or permits for the sale of speculative securities. Both cases involved grants
to administrative officers of powers related to the exercise of their administrative functions, calling
for the determination of questions of fact.
Such is not the nature of the powers dealt with in section 68. As above indicated, the creation of
municipalities, is not an administrative function, but one which is essentially and eminently
legislative in character. The question of whether or not "public interest" demands the exercise of
such power is not one of fact. it is "purely a legislativequestion "(Carolina-Virginia Coastal Highway
vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310-313, 315-318), or a political question (Udall vs.
Severn, 79 P. 2d. 347-349). As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has aptly characterized it, "the
question as to whether incorporation is for the best interest of the community in any case is
emphatically a question of public policy and statecraft" (In re Village of North Milwaukee, 67 N.W.
1033, 1035-1037).
For this reason, courts of justice have annulled, as constituting undue delegation of legislative
powers, state laws granting the judicial department, the power to determine whether certain
territories should be annexed to a particular municipality (Udall vs. Severn, supra, 258-359); or
vesting in a Commission the right to determine the plan and frame of government of proposed
villages and what functions shall be exercised by the same, although the powers and functions of the
village are specifically limited by statute (In re Municipal Charters, 86 Atl. 307-308); or conferring
upon courts the authority to declare a given town or village incorporated, and designate its metes
and bounds, upon petition of a majority of the taxable inhabitants thereof, setting forth the area
desired to be included in such village (Territory ex rel Kelly vs. Stewart, 23 Pac. 405-409); or
authorizing the territory of a town, containing a given area and population, to be incorporated as a
town, on certain steps being taken by the inhabitants thereof and on certain determination by a
court and subsequent vote of the inhabitants in favor thereof, insofar as the court is allowed to
determine whether the lands embraced in the petition "ought justly" to be included in the village,
and whether the interest of the inhabitants will be promoted by such incorporation, and to enlarge
and diminish the boundaries of the proposed village "as justice may require" (In re Villages of North
Milwaukee, 67 N.W. 1035-1037); or creating a Municipal Board of Control which shall determine
whether or not the laying out, construction or operation of a toll road is in the "public interest" and
whether the requirements of the law had been complied with, in which case the board shall enter an
order creating a municipal corporation and fixing the name of the same (Carolina-Virginia Coastal
Highway vs. Coastal Turnpike Authority, 74 S.E. 2d. 310).
Insofar as the validity of a delegation of power by Congress to the President is concerned, the case
of Schechter Poultry Corporation vs. U.S. (79 L. Ed. 1570) is quite relevant to the one at bar. The
Schechter case involved the constitutionality of Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act
authorizing the President of the United States to approve "codes of fair competition" submitted to
him by one or more trade or industrial associations or corporations which "impose no inequitable
restrictions on admission to membership therein and are truly representative," provided that such
codes are not designed "to promote monopolies or to eliminate or oppress small enterprises and
will not operate to discriminate against them, and will tend to effectuate the policy" of said Act. The
Federal Supreme Court held:

At any rate, the conclusion would be the same, insofar as the case at bar is concerned, even if we
To summarize and conclude upon this point: Sec. 3 of the Recovery Act is without
assumed that the phrase "as the public welfare may require," in said Section 68, qualifies all other
precedent. It supplies no standards for any trade, industry or activity. It does not
clauses thereof. It is true that in Calalang vs. Williams (70 Phil. 726) and People vs. Rosenthal (68
undertake to prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact
Phil. 328), this Court had upheld "public welfare" and "public interest," respectively, as sufficient
determined by appropriate administrative procedure. Instead of prescribing rules of
standards for a valid delegation of the authority to execute the law. But, the doctrine laid down in
conduct, it authorizes the making of codes to prescribe them. For that legislative
these cases — as all judicial pronouncements — must be construed in relation to the specific facts
undertaking, Sec. 3 sets up no standards, aside from the statement of the general aims of
and issues involved therein, outside of which they do not constitute precedents and have no binding
rehabilitation, correction and expansion described in Sec. 1. In view of the scope of that
effect.4 The law construed in the Calalang case conferred upon the Director of Public Works, with
broad declaration, and of the nature of the few restrictions that are imposed, the
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, the power to issue rules and
discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting laws for
regulations to promote safe transitupon national roads and streets. Upon the other hand, the
the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually unfettered. We
Rosenthal case referred to the authority of the Insular Treasurer, under Act No. 2581, to issue and
 think that the code making authority thus conferred is an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power.
If the term "unfair competition" is so broad as to vest in the President a discretion that is "virtually
unfettered." and, consequently, tantamount to a delegation of legislative power, it is obvious that
"public welfare," which has even a broader connotation, leads to the same result. In fact, if the
validity of the delegation of powers made in Section 68 were upheld, there would no longer be any
legal impediment to a statutory grant of authority to the President to do anything which, in his
opinion, may be required by public welfare or public interest. Such grant of authority would be a
virtual abdication of the powers of Congress in favor of the Executive, and would bring about a total
collapse of the democratic system established by our Constitution, which it is the special duty and
privilege of this Court to uphold.
power over local governments than that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or
offices, it reverses the process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over
municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments, bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly does, said
Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on March 10, 1917, must be
deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly
incompatible and inconsistent with said statutory enactment. 7
There are only two (2) other points left for consideration, namely, respondent's claim (a) that "not
all the proper parties" — referring to the officers of the newly created municipalities — "have been
impleaded in this case," and (b) that "the present petition is premature."

It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in question were issued after the legislative bills
As regards the first point, suffice it to say that the records do not show, and the parties do not claim,
for the creation of the municipalities involved in this case had failed to pass Congress. A better proof of
that the officers of any of said municipalities have been appointed or elected and assumed office. At
the fact that the issuance of said executive orders entails the exercise of purely legislative functions
any rate, the Solicitor General, who has appeared on behalf of respondent Auditor General, is the
can hardly be given.
officer authorized by law "to act and represent the Government of the Philippines, its offices and
agents, in any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the services of a lawyer"
Again, Section 10 (1) of Article VII of our fundamental law ordains: (Section 1661, Revised Administrative Code), and, in connection with the creation of the
aforementioned municipalities, which involves a political, not proprietary, function, said local
officials, if any, are mere agents or representatives of the national government. Their interest in the
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or offices,
case at bar has, accordingly, been, in effect, duly represented. 8
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.
With respect to the second point, respondent alleges that he has not as yet acted on any of the
executive order & in question and has not intimated how he would act in connection therewith. It is,
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the
however, a matter of common, public knowledge, subject to judicial cognizance, that the President
exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments,
has, for many years, issued executive orders creating municipal corporations and that the same
bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power
have been organized and in actual operation, thus indicating, without peradventure of doubt, that
is denied by the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With
the expenditures incidental thereto have been sanctioned, approved or passed in audit by the
respect to the latter, the fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of
General Auditing Office and its officials. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that respondent
checking whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by
would adopt a different policy as regards the new municipalities involved in this case, in the
statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the
absence of an allegation to such effect, and none has been made by him.
same or its officers act Within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the
municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed
thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio and the
disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred
even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against to. It is so ordered.
him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.5
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect, remove any of
its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein the barrio in which the official
Zaldivar, J., took no part.
concerned resides, for his office would thereby become vacant. 6 Thus, by merely brandishing the
power to create a new municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local
officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control
denied to him by the Constitution.

Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus or offices
implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof or to interfere in the
exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control does not include the authority either to
abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged
power of the President to create municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by
him of an authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive departments,
bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely
fail to comply with the constitutional mandate above quoted. Instead of giving the President less
G.R. No. 90336 August 12, 1991 officers of the FABC and seeking its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the
manner it was conducted.2
RUPERTO TAULE, petitioner,
vs. In compliance with the order of respondent Secretary, petitioner Ruperto Taule as President of the
SECRETARY LUIS T. SANTOS and GOVERNOR LEANDRO VERCELES, respondents. FABC, filed his comment on the letter-protest of respondent Governor denying the alleged
irregularities and denouncing said respondent Governor for meddling or intervening in the election
of FABC officers which is a purely non-partisan affair and at the same time requesting for his
Balgos & Perez and Bugaring, Tugonon & Associates Law Offices for petitioner.
appointment as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province being the duly elected
Juan G. Atencia for private respondent.
President of the FABC in Catanduanes.3

On August 4, 1989, respondent Secretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of
the FABC in Catanduanes held on June 18, 1989 and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as
possible to be presided by the Regional Director of Region V of the Department of Local
GANCAYCO, J.: Government.4

The extent of authority of the Secretary of Local Government over the katipunan ng mga Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of August 4, 1989 but it was denied by
barangay or the barangay councils is brought to the fore in this case. respondent Secretary in his resolution of September 5, 1989.5

On June 18,1989, the Federation of Associations of Barangay Councils (FABC) of Catanduanes,
composed of eleven (11) members, in their capacities as Presidents of the Association of Barangay
Councils in their respective municipalities, convened in Virac, Catanduanes with six members in
attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its officers.
In the petition for certiorari before Us, petitioner seeks the reversal of the resolutions of respondent
Secretary dated August 4, 1989 and September 5, 1989 for being null and void.
Petitioner raises the following issues:

Present were petitioner Ruperto Taule of San Miguel, Allan Aquino of Viga, Vicente Avila of Virac,
1) Whether or not the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction to entertain an election protest
Fidel Jacob of Panganiban, Leo Sales of Caramoran and Manuel Torres of Baras. The Board of
involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils;
Election Supervisors/Consultants was composed of Provincial Government Operation Officer
(PGOO) Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as Chairman with Provincial Treasurer Luis A. Manlapaz, Jr. and
Provincial Election Supervisor Arnold Soquerata as members. 2) Whether or not the respondent Governor has the legal personality to file an election protest;

When the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five (5) of its members, the 3) Assuming that the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or not
Provincial Treasurer and the Provincial Election Supervisor walked out. he committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election;

The election nevertheless proceeded with PGOO Alberto P. Molina, Jr. as presiding officer. Chosen as
members of the Board of Directors were Taule, Aquino, Avila, Jacob and Sales.
Thereafter, the following were elected officers of the FABC:
The Katipunan ng mga Barangay is the organization of all sangguniang barangays in the following
levels: in municipalities to be known as katipunang bayan; in cities, katipunang panlungsod; in
provinces, katipunang panlalawigan; in regions, katipunang pampook; and on the national
level, katipunan ng mga barangay.6

The Local Government Code provides for the manner in which the katipunan ng mga barangay at all
President — Ruperto Taule
levels shall be organized:

Vice-President — Allan Aquino

Sec. 110. Organization. — (1) The katipunan at all levels shall be organized in the
following manner:
Secretary — Vicente Avila
(a) The katipunan in each level shall elect a board of directors and a set of officers. The
Treasurer — Fidel Jacob president of each level shall represent the katipunan concerned in the next higher level of
organization.
Auditor — Leo Sales1
(b) The katipunan ng mga barangay shall be composed of the katipunang pampook,
which shall in turn be composed of the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan and
On June 19, 1989, respondent Leandro I. Verceles, Governor of Catanduanes, sent a letter to
the katipunang panlungsod. The presidents of the katipunang bayan in each province
respondent Luis T. Santos, the Secretary of Local Government, * protesting the election of the
shall constitute the katipunang panlalawigan. The katipunang panlungsod and the
 katipunang bayan shall be composed of the punong barangays of cities and
municipalities, respectively.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent Secretary, acting in accordance with the provision of the Local Government Code
empowering him to "promulgate in detail the implementing circulars and the rules and regulations
to carry out the various administrative actions required for the initial implementation of this Code
in such a manner as will ensure the least disruption of on-going programs and projects7 issued
Department of Local Government Circular No. 89-09 on April 7, 1989,8 to provide the guidelines for
the conduct of the elections of officers of the Katipunan ng mga Barangay at the municipal, city,
provincial, regional and national levels.
It is now the contention of petitioner that neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction
upon the respondent Secretary over election contests involving the election of officers of the FABC,
the katipunan ng mga barangay at the provincial level. It is petitioner's theory that under Article IX,
C, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, it is the Commission on Elections which has jurisdiction over
all contests involving elective barangay officials.
On the other hand, it is the opinion of the respondent Secretary that any violation of the guidelines
as set forth in said circular would be a ground for filing a protest and would vest upon the
Department jurisdiction to resolve any protest that may be filed in relation thereto.
Under Article IX, C, Section 2(2) of the 1987 Constitution, the Commission on Elections shall
exercise "exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction." The 1987
Constitution expanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC by granting it appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction or
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. 9
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials is limited to
appellate jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the law, 10 the sworn petition
contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan
Trial Court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the
same office within 10 days after the proclamation of the results. A voter may also contest the
election of any barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the
Philippines by filing a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial
Court within 10 days after the proclamation of the results of the election. 11 Only appeals from
decisions of inferior courts on election matters as aforestated may be decided by the COMELEC.
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC is over popular
elections, the elected officials of which are determined through the will of the electorate. An election
is the embodiment of the popular will, the expression of the sovereign power of the people.12 It
involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. 13 Specifically, the term
"election," in the context of the Constitution, may refer to the conduct of the polls, including the
listing of voters, the holding of the electoral campaign, and the casting and counting of the
votes14 which do not characterize the election of officers in the Katipunan ng mga barangay.
"Election contests" would refer to adversary proceedings by which matters involving the title or
claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the winner, is settled
whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute 15 and in the case of elections of
barangay officials, it is restricted to proceedings after the proclamation of the winners as no pre-
proclamation controversies are allowed.16
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the
katipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by law
whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. The COMELEC exercises only appellate
jurisdiction over election contests involving elective barangay officials decided by the Metropolitan
or Municipal Trial Courts which likewise have limited jurisdiction. The authority of the COMELEC
over the katipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the
representative of the katipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their
own respective organization.17
However, the Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest
involving the election of officers of the FABC.
There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as set
forth in Section 222 of the Local Government Code.
Likewise, under Book IV, Title XII, Chapter 1, See. 3(2) of the Administrative Code of 1987, ** the
respondent Secretary has the power to "establish and prescribe rules, regulations and other
issuances and implementing laws on the general supervision of local government units and on the
promotion of local autonomy and monitor compliance thereof by said units."
Also, the respondent Secretary's rule making power is provided in See. 7, Chapter II, Book IV of the
Administrative Code, to wit:
(3) Promulgate rules and regulations necessary to carry out department objectives,
policies, functions, plans, programs and projects;
Thus, DLG Circular No. 89-09 was issued by respondent Secretary in pursuance of his rule-making
power conferred by law and which now has the force and effect of law.18
Now the question that arises is whether or not a violation of said circular vests jurisdiction upon the
respondent Secretary, as claimed by him, to hear a protest filed in relation thereto and consequently
declare an election null and void.
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative
agencies are bereft of quasi- judicial powers.19 The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is
dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer
it upon themselves.20 Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their determinations. 21
There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary implication
conferring upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an
election protect involving officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. An understanding of the extent
of authority of the Secretary over local governments is therefore necessary if We are to resolve the
issue at hand.
Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of general
supervision22 "to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law."23 The general
supervision is exercised by the President through the Secretary of Local Government. 24
In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see
that the subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them the
former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment
of the former for that of the latter. The fundamental law permits the Chief Executive to wield no
more authority than that of checking whether said local government or the officers thereof perform
their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. 25 Supervisory
power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does
not include any restraining authority over such body. 26
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over
local governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or
regularity of the election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will
give him more power than the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over
local government officials for it will permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan
activity aimed at strengthening the barangay as the basic component of local governments so that
the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved. In fact, his order that the new elections to be
conducted be presided by the Regional Director is a clear and direct interference by the Department
with the political affairs of the barangays which is not permitted by the limitation of presidential
power to general supervision over local governments.27
Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments. 28 This state policy
is echoed in the Local Government Code wherein it is declared that "the State shall guarantee and
promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant
communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and
social progress."29 To deny the Secretary of Local Government the power to review the regularity of
the elections of officers of the katipunan would be to enhance the avowed state policy of promoting
the autonomy of local governments.
Moreover, although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other
issuances, the Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local
government units of such issuances.30 To monitor means "to watch, observe or check.31 This is
compatible with the power of supervision of the Secretary over local governments which as earlier
discussed is limited to checking whether the local government unit concerned or the officers thereof
perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Even the Local Government Code which
grants the Secretary power to issue implementing circulars, rules and regulations is silent as to how
these issuances should be enforced. Since the respondent Secretary exercises only supervision and
not control over local governments, it is truly doubtful if he could enforce compliance with the DLG
Circular.32 Any doubt therefore as to the power of the Secretary to interfere with local affairs should
be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.
Thus, the Court holds that in assuming jurisdiction over the election protest filed by respondent
Governor and declaring the election of the officers of the FABC on June 18, 1989 as null and void, the
respondent Secretary acted in excess of his jurisdiction. The respondent Secretary not having the
jurisdiction to hear an election protest involving officers of the FABC, the recourse of the parties is
to the ordinary courts. The Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the
protest.33
The provision in DLG Circular No. 89-15 amending DLG Circular No. 89-09 which states that
"whenever the guidelines are not substantially complied with, the election shall be declared null and
void by the Department of Local Government and an election shall conduct and being invoked by the
Solicitor General cannot be applied. DLG Circular No. 89-15 was issued on July 3, 1989 after the June
18, 1989 elections of the FABC officers and it is the rule in statutory construction that laws,
including circulars and regulations34 cannot be applied retrospectively.35Moreover, such provision is
null and void for having been issued in excess of the respondent Secretary's jurisdiction, inasmuch
as an administrative authority cannot confer jurisdiction upon itself.
As regards the second issue raised by petitioner, the Court finds that respondent Governor has the
personality to file the protest. Under Section 205 of the Local Government Code, the membership of
the sangguniang panlalawiganconsists of the governor, the vice-governor, elective members of the
said sanggunian and the presidents of the katipunang panlalawigan and the kabataang
barangay provincial federation. The governor acts as the presiding officer of the sangguniang
panlalawigan.36
As presiding officer of the sagguniang panlalawigan, the respondent governor has an interest in the
election of the officers of the FABC since its elected president becomes a member of the assembly. If
the president of the FABC assumes his presidency under questionable circumstances and is allowed
to sit in the sangguniang panlalawiganthe official actions of the sanggunian may be vulnerable to
attacks as to their validity or legality. Hence, respondent governor is a proper party to question the
regularity of the elections of the officers of the FABC.
As to the third issue raised by petitioner, the Court has already ruled that the respondent Secretary
has no jurisdiction to hear the protest and nullify the elections.
Nevertheless, the Court holds that the issue of the validity of the elections should now be resolved in
order to prevent any unnecessary delay that may result from the commencement of an appropriate
action by the parties.
The elections were declared null and void primarily for failure to comply with Section 2.4 of DLG
Circular No. 89-09 which provides that "the incumbent FABC President or the Vice-
President shall preside over the reorganizational meeting, there being a quorum." The rule
specifically provides that it is the incumbent FABC President or Vice-President who shall preside
over the meeting. The word "shall" should be taken in its ordinary signification, i.e., it must be
imperative or mandatory and not merely
permissive,37 as the rule is explicit and requires no other interpretation. If it had been intended that
any other official should preside, the rules would have provided so, as it did in the elections at the
town and city levels38 as well as the regional level..39
It is admitted that neither the incumbent FABC President nor the Vice-President presided over the
meeting and elections but Alberto P. Molina, Jr., the Chairman of the Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants. Thus, there was a clear violation of the aforesaid mandatory provision. On
this ground, the elections should be nullified.
Under Sec. 2.3.2.7 of the same circular it is provided that a Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants shall be constituted to oversee and/or witness the canvassing of votes and
proclamation of winners. The rules confine the role of the Board of Election
Supervisors/Consultants to merely overseeing and witnessing the conduct of elections. This is
consistent with the provision in the Local Government Code limiting the authority of the COMELEC
to the supervision of the election.40
In case at bar, PGOO Molina, the Chairman of the Board, presided over the elections. There was
direct participation by the Chairman of the Board in the elections contrary to what is dictated by the
rules. Worse, there was no Board of Election Supervisors to oversee the elections in view of the walk
out staged by its two other members, the Provincial COMELEC Supervisor and the Provincial
Treasurer. The objective of keeping the election free and honest was therefore compromised.
The Court therefore finds that the election of officers of the FABC held on June 18, 1989 is null and
void for failure to comply with the provisions of DLG Circular No. 89-09.
Meanwhile, pending resolution of this petition, petitioner filed a supplemental petition alleging that
public respondent Local Government Secretary, in his memorandum dated June 7, 1990, designated
Augusto Antonio as temporary representative of the Federation to the sangguniang panlalawigan of
Catanduanes.41 By virtue of this memorandum, respondent governor swore into said office Augusto
Antonio on June 14, 1990.42
The Solicitor General filed his comment on the supplemental petition43 as required by the resolution
of the Court dated September 13,1990.
In his comment, the Solicitor General dismissed the supervening event alleged by petitioner as
something immaterial to the petition. He argues that Antonio's appointment was merely temporary
"until such time that the provincial FABC president in that province has been elected, appointed and
qualified."44 He stresses that Antonio's appointment was only a remedial measure designed to cope
with the problems brought about by the absence of a representative of the FABC to the "sanggunian
ang panlalawigan."
Sec. 205 (2) of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) provides-
Augusto Antonio is not the president of the federation. He is a member of the federation but he was
not even present during the elections despite notice. The argument that Antonio was appointed as a
remedial measure in the exigency of the service cannot be sustained. Since Antonio does not meet
the basic qualification of being president of the federation, his appointment to the sangguniang
panlalawigan is not justified notwithstanding that such appointment is merely in a temporary
capacity. If the intention of the respondent Secretary was to protect the interest of the federation in
the sanggunian, he should have appointed the incumbent FABC President in a hold-over capacity.
For even under the guidelines, the term of office of officers of the katipunan at all levels shall be
from the date of their election until their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified,
without prejudice to the terms of their appointments as members of the sanggunian to which they
may be correspondingly appointed.49 Since the election is still under protest such that no successor
of the incumbent has as yet qualified, the respondent Secretary has no choice but to have the
incumbent FABC President sit as member of the sanggunian. He could even have appointed
petitioner since he was elected the president of the federation but not Antonio. The appointment of
Antonio, allegedly the protege of respondent Governor, gives credence to petitioner's charge of
political interference by respondent Governor in the organization. This should not be allowed. The
barangays should be insulated from any partisan activity or political intervention if only to give true
meaning to local autonomy.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED in that the resolution of respondent Secretary dated August
(2) The sangguniang panlalawigan shall be composed of the governor, the vice-governor,
4, 1989 is hereby SET ASIDE for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction.
elective members of the said sanggunian and the presidents of the katipunang
panlalawigan and the kabataang barangay provincial federation who shall be appointed
by the President of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied.) The election of the officials of the ABC Federation held on June 18, 1989 is hereby
annulled.1âwphi1 A new election of officers of the federation is hereby ordered to be conducted
immediately in accordance with the governing rules and regulations.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, under Sec. 2 likewise states:

The Supplemental petition is hereby GRANTED. The appointment of Augusto Antonio as

xxx xxx xxx
representative to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in a temporary capacity is declared null and void.

The sangguniang panlalawigan of each province shall be composed of the governor as

No costs.
chairman and presiding officer, the vice-governor as presiding officer pro tempore, the
elective sangguniang panlalawigan members, and the appointive members consisting of
the president of the provincial association of barangay councils, and the president of the SO ORDERED.
provincial federation of the kabataang barangay. (Emphasis supplied.)

In Ignacio vs. Banate Jr.45 the Court, interpreting similarly worded provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg.
337 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 on the composition of the sangguniang panlungsod,46 declared as
null and void the appointment of private respondent Leoncio Banate Jr. as member of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Roxas representing the katipunang panlungsod ng mga
barangay for he lacked the elegibility and qualification required by law, not being a barangay
captain and for not having been elected president of the association of barangay councils. The Court
held that an unqualified person cannot be appointed a member of the sanggunian, even in an acting
capacity. In Reyes vs. Ferrer,47 the appointment of Nemesio L. Rasgo Jr. as representative of the youth
sector to the sangguniang panlungsod of Davao City was declared invalid since he was never the
president of the kabataang barangay city federation as required by Sec. 173, Batas Pambansa Blg.
337.

In the present controversy involving the sangguniang panlalawigan, the law is likewise explicit. To
be appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit in the sangguniang panlalawigan is the
president of the katipunang panlalawigan. The appointee must meet the qualifications set by
law.48 The appointing power is bound by law to comply with the requirements as to the basic
qualifications of the appointee to the sangguniang panlalawigan. The President of the Philippines or
his alter ego, the Secretary of Local Government, has no authority to appoint anyone who does not
meet the minimum qualification to be the president of the federation of barangay councils.
G.R. No. L-31641 October 23, 1981 It is the contention of herein petitioner that although Section 90 of the Revised Charter of Cebu,
which provides:
MAYOR EULOGIO E. BORRES, Petitioner, vs. HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge, Court of
First Instance of Cebu, Branch III, 114th Judicial District, and SILVERIO Section 90. Power and Duties of the Chief of Police. - There shall be a Chief of Police with a salary of
PARAGES, Respondents.chanrobles virtual law library seven thousand eight hundred pesos per annum who shall have charge of the police department and
everything pertaining thereto including the organization, administration, discipline, and disposition
of, and the transfer of, members from and to the city police and detective bureau; ... and shall
DE CASTRO, * J.:chanrobles virtual law library
promptly and faithfully execute an orders of the Mayor, including assignments and transfer of
personnel.
In 1968, herein petitioner Eulogio Borres was then the acting mayor of Cebu City, while private
respondent Silverio Parages was a detective in the Cebu Police Department holding such position in
is applicable, it should, however, be read in the light of section 20 of the said law, which reads:
a permanent capacity being a civil service eligible. He was assigned to the Homicide and General
Investigation Section of the Investigation Branch of said department, particularly to the Missing
Persons Section.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library Section 20. General Powers and Duties of the Mayor. -The Mayor shall have the following general
powers and duties: chanrobles virtual law library
On November 14, 1968, acting on verbal complaints that respondent Parages had been molesting
Chinese businessman in Cebu and the fact that his performance was not satisfactory, petitioner xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
Borres issued a memorandum ordering the detail of respondent to his office. 1chanrobles virtual law
library
e. To see that executive officers and employees of the city are properly discharging their respective
duties. The Mayor may, in the interest of the service, transfer officers and employees not appointed
On November 21, 1968, after the said detail order was endorsed by the Chief of Police, Parages was by the President of the Philippines from one section, division, service, or department to another
served with a copy thereof, but he refused to receive it and to comply with said order. He informed section, division, service, or department without changing the compensation they receive.
petitioner that he was declining the detail because the order was illegal 2 and continued to report to
his unit. 3 chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner likewise cites Section 19 of the City Charter which provides: chanrobles virtual law
library
On December 7, 1968, Parages filed a petition for prohibition and injunction in the court a quo
against petitioner. The court, however, did not issue the writ of preliminary injunction as prayed for,
Section 19. Nature of Office; Qualifications, compensations. - The Mayor shall be the Chief executive
but preferred to hear the evidence before taking any action. 4chanrobles virtual law library
of the city and as such shall have immediate control over the executive functions of the different
departments and agencies of the city, subject to the general supervision of the President as may be
Meanwhile, in view of respondent's refusal to comply with the detail order, petitioner charged him provided for by law ... .
with insubordination and neglect of duty in the Police Commission through the City Board of
Investigators. At the same time, he ordered the suspension of respondent. 5 Respondent thus
and Section 32 which enumerates the departments on which the mayor may exercise supervision
amended his petition for prohibition and injunction, with the additional prayer that his suspension
and control and reads:
be declared illegal.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Section 32. City Departments.- There shall be the following city departments over which the Mayor
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision dated February 4, 1969 declaring the
shall have direct supervision and con trol any existing law to the contrary
detail order of November 14, 1968 illegal and therefore null and void, for being contrary to Section
notwithstanding: chanrobles virtual law library
90 of Republic A.ct No. 3857, otherwise known as Revised Charter of the City of Cebu and to the
constitutional protection of security of tenure. Consequently, it held the order of suspension dated
December 16, 1968 likewise illegal, and ordered the immediate reinstatement of private respondent xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
to the service and the payment of his back salaries.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
(6) Police Department chanrobles virtual law library

In the order of March 3, 1969, the lower court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the
xxx xxx xxx
decision and granted the immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal upon filing by
private respondent of a bond in the sum of P 3,000.00. 6 chanrobles virtual law library
Private respondent, on the other hand, claims that pursuant to Administrative Order No. 42, Series
of 1937, issued by the Civil Service Commission "whenever the Head of any Department or
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari, raising principally the issue of
Dependency of the National Government deems it necessary to assign any employee outside of the
whether or not it is within the power of the Mayor to order the detail of private respondent under
Bureau or office where he is regularly employed, or to perform within the same Bureau or office a
the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu and the latter's suspension for refusing to comply with the
kind of work which is different from that for which the position he occupies has been provided, the
order.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
said Department or Dependency shall issue an order stating the necessity for such special
assignment and a copy of the older shall be furnished to the Budget Office, but no such special
assignment shall be made for more than 30 days." He also claims that in addition to the foregoing
requirement, Memorandum Circular Nos. 45 and 29 of the Civil Service Commission dated
September 24, 1964 and July 29, 1965, respectively require that all assignments and reassignments
to positions of a grade or character not contemplated by the examination from the results of which
appointment was made ... should also be submitted to the Commission for prior
approval.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Aside from the aforementioned administrative order and circulars, private respondent likewise
cites Section 684 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: chanrobles virtual law library
No person appointed to a position in the classified service shall, without the approval of the
Commission of Civil Service, be assigned, to or employed in a position of a grade or character not
contemplated by the examination from the result of which appointment was made, unless otherwise
provided by law.
Private respondent also disputes the validity of his suspension, claiming that contrary to Section 16
of Republic Act No. 4864, he was suspended even before the filing of an administrative complaint
against him. Section 16 provides:
Section 16. Suspension of Members of the Police Force or Agency. - When an administrative charge is
filed under oath against any member of the local police agency, the city mayor or municipal mayor,
as the case may be, may suspend the respondent: Provided, That the charge involves disloyalty to
the government, dishonesty, oppression, grave misconduct, serious irregularities, or serious neglect
of duty, if there are strong reasons to believe that the respondent is probably guilty thereof which
would warrant his suspension or removal from the service. ... .
He further contends that the suspension order is a premature conclusion considering that the detail
order was then already subject of a judicial determination as to its
validity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under the foregoing facts and the pertinent laws cited, the power of petitioner, as Mayor of Cebu
City, to detail respondent cannot be denied. Such power to detail must necessarily be deemed
included in his power of control and supervision over different departments, among which is the
Police Department, as expressly so provided in Sections 19 and 32 of the Revised Charter of
Cebu.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, this Court had the occasion to define "Supervision"
and "control", thus: chanrobles virtual law library
Supervision means overseeing of the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate
officers perform their duties; control on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter,
modify or nullify or set aside what subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and
to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.
In Rodriguez, et al. vs. Montinola, et al., 94 Phil. 964, 972, We had earlier said: chanrobles virtual law
library
To supervise is to oversee, to have oversight of, to superintend the execution of or the performance
of a thing, or the movements or work of a person, to inspect with authority: to inspect and direct the
work of others. It is to be noted that there are two senses in which the term "supervision" has been
understood. In one it means superintending alone or the oversight of the performance of a thing
without power to control or to direct. In the other, the inspection is coupled with the right to direct
or even to annul. The decisions of courts in the United States distinguish between supervision
exercised by an official of a department, and supervision for the purpose of preventing and
punishing abuses, discrimination and so forth.
If by the grant of the power of control and supervision, the Mayor can nullify or set aside what a
subordinate had done in the performance of his duties, it is evident that he can order the detail of
private respondent to correct or prevent him from committing any abuse in the performance of his
duties; otherwise, said Sections 19 and 32 of the city charter would just be stale and meaningless
provisions.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The power to detail may also be gleaned from the fact that Section 20 of the same charter provides
that the Mayor has the power to see to it that executive officers and employees are properly
discharging their respective duties. It should be recalled that the Mayor issued the questioned detail
order after he has received reports that Parages' efficiency is far from satisfactory and had been
molesting Chinese businessmen. Hence, in this desire to gain information of actual facts and closely
look at his activities, he ordered the detail of private respondent to his office. There is no effective
way by which the Mayor can see to it that private respondent properly discharged his
duties.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Furthermore, the same Section 20 authorizes the Mayor, in the interest of the service, to transfer
officers and employees from one section, division, service or department without changing the
compensation. A transfer is a movement of personnel, more or less permanent in nature, while
detail is merely temporary. In the former, the employee concerned loses position, while in the latter
he does not. 7 It would be illogical to hold that a Mayor can transfer employees from one station to
another which action involves permanency and severance of official connection of the transferee
with his former position, but cannot order the detail of private respondent which is for a more or
less brief period, and is therefore only temporary in
character.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The power of the Mayor in the disposition and transfer of members of the Police Department is not
by any means limited by the provision of Section 90 of the Revised Charter of the City of Cebu which
refers expressly to the powers and duties of the Chief of Police of Cebu which are thereby
enumerated. Among such duties is to execute promptly and faithfully all orders of the Mayor
"including assignments and transfers of personnel." Section 90 of the said charter, therefore, far
from supporting private respondent's claim of illegality of his detail order issued by the Mayor,
expressly recognizes the latter's powers to make transfer of personnel in the police department,
under the more general grant of power to him under Section 20 of the Charter of Cebu City which
gives him very broad power to make transfer of officers and employees from one section, division,
service or department to another section, division, service or department without changing the
compensation they receive.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The administrative order and circulars cited by private respondent are totally inapplicable to the
case at bar. Administrative Order No. 42, Series 1937, refers to Head of any Department or
Dependency of the National Government assigning any employee outside of the bureau or office,
where he is regularly employed. Moreover, they are in the nature of general laws which cannot
prevail over the charter of Cebu which is a special law granting the City Mayor exclusive power of
control and supervision over city employees. Public service and the practical necessities of efficient
and honest government demand immediate action from the Mayor. The stability and efficiency of
the city government may be jeopardized if the Mayor has to secure prior approval of the
Commissioner of Civil Service in order that he may validly detail and closely supervise an employee.
As was aptly said in Pineda vs. Claudio, 28 SCRA 34, it is the local executive, more than anybody else,
who is primarily responsible for efficient (and honest) governmental administration in the locality
and the effective maintenance of peace and order therein, and is directly answerable to the people
who elected him. Nowhere is this more true than in the sensitive area of police
administration.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Similarly, the case of Lejano vs. Garcia, 109 Phil. 117. which held that an office cannot be detailed or
transferred even temporarily without his consent has no application in the instant case. In that case,
the transfer of petitioner Lejano already amounted to removal, for as found by this Court, such
transfer was not a mere temporary assignment but a veritable new appointment which he had
declined, and that respondents had already appointed another to take Lejano's
place.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Likewise not in point is the constitutional provision on security of tenure. A temporary detail is
neither removal, suspension or transfer when made in the interest of public service 8 and absent a
showing of manifest abuse of discretion or that the detail is due to some improper motive or
purpose. 9As found by the respondent court, the alleged bad faith of the petitioner in ordering the
detail of respondent to his office is not clear and the doubt should be resolved in his favor. Be that as
it may, it should also be stressed that the constitutional provision on removal or suspension except
for cause as provided by law gives in to the fundamental postulate that a public office is a public
trust. 10chanrobles virtual law library

As regards the order of suspension dated December 16, 1968, We are also constrained to reject the
contention of private respondent that his suspension is invalid because it was made before the filing
of the complaint. For while it is true that the complaint dated December 16, 1968 was forwarded by
the Office of the Mayor and filed before the Police Commission only in the morning of December 17,
1968, 11 the said suspension order was expressly made to take effect only upon receipt of the same
by petitioner. 12 it was not shown when petitioner received said order of suspension, but in all
likelihood it must have been not before the filing of the
complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Neither does the filing of the petition for prohibition and injunction render the suspension order
invalid. The mere filing of the petition did not, ipso facto, make the detail order illegal, nor did it
authorize private respondent to ignore the said order, the implementation of which had not been
restrained by the lower court. Noteworthy is the fact that the issuance of the detail order carries
with it the presumption of regularity. 13 chanrobles virtual law library

The suspension order was predicated on his obstinate refusal to obey the detail, and although the
charge involved was denominated by petitioner as neglect of duty it cannot be doubted that such
refusal properly constitutes grave misconduct which is one of the grounds for suspending an officer
under Section 16 of the Polcom Law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court dated February 4, 1969 is hereby set aside and
another one is entered declaring legal and with full force and effect petitioner's questioned detail
and suspension orders. Without cost.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 72969-70 December 17, 1986 The above-stated resolution was on appeal declared null and void by the Intermediate Court of
Appeals, 14 and its decision is now before us in a petition for review on certiorari.
PHILIPPINE GAMEFOWL COMMISSION AND HEE ACUSAR, petitioners,
vs. We shall first compare the powers vested respectively in the Philippine Gamefowl Commission and
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, MAYOR CELESTINO E. MARTINEZ, JR., THE the city and municipal officials under the applicable laws, to wit, P.D. 1802, P.D. 1802-A and the
SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF BOGO (CEBU), and SANTIAGO SEVILLA, respondents. Local Government Code.

Ramon M. Durano & Associates for petitioner Hee Acusar. The pertinent powers of the Philippine Gamefowl Commission under Section 2 of P.D. 1802, which
became effective on January 16, 1981, are the following.
Clavel Asas-Martinez for respondents.
a) Promulgate and enforce rules and regulations relative to the holding of cockfight
derbies and cockfights in the Philippines including the frequency sites, conduct and
operation of such derbies and cockfights;

CRUZ, J.:
b) Issue licenses for the holding of international derbies;

This case involves a conflict of jurisdiction between the Philippine Gamefowl Commission and the
xxx xxx xxx
municipal government of Bogo, Cebu, both of which claim the power to issue licenses for the
operation of cockpits in the said town.
d) Fix and periodically revise whenever necessary, subject to the approval of the Ministry
of Finance, the rates of license fees and other levies that may be imposed on local derbies
The issue arose when Hee Acusar, who was operating the lone cockpit in Bogo, was ordered to
and cockfights and international cockfight derbies, cockpit personnel and employees;
relocate the same pursuant to P.D. No. 449, the Cockfighting Law of 1974, on the ground that it was
situated in a tertiary commercial zone, a prohibited area. 1 Although the period of grace for such
relocation was extended to June 11, 1980 by P.D. 1535, Acusar failed to comply with the e) To promulgate rules and regulations relative to the holding, methods, procedures,
requirement, as a result of which the Philippine Constabulary considered the cockpit phased operations and conduct of cockfighting in general as well as accreditation of cockpit
out. 2 To add to his troubles, the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in a petition to compel the municipal personnel and association of cockpit owners, operators and lessees, to elevate the
mayor to issue Acusar a permit to operate a cockpit, declared that he had waived his right to a standard of cockfighting;
renewal thereof because of his failure to relocate. 3
xxx xxx xxx
On July 24, 1980, Santiago Sevilla, private respondent herein, was granted a license to operate a
cockpit by Mayor Celestino E. Martinez by authority of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bogo and with
By contrast, P.D. 1802, as amended by P.D. 1802-A, provides as follows:
subsequent approval of the PC Regional Command 7 as required by law. 4 As only one cockpit is
allowed by law in cities or municipalities with a population of not more than one hundred
thousand, 5 Acusar sued to revoke this license. He failed, however, first before the PC Recom 7 6 and SECTION 1. Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1802 is hereby amended to read as
later before the Court of First Instance of Cebu. 7 His petition for certiorari challenging the decision follows:
of the lower court was dismissed by this Court. 8
Sec. 4. City and Municipal Mayors with the concurrence of their respective "Sanggunians"
Nothing daunted, Acusar went to the Philippine Gamefowl Commission seeking a renewal of his shall have the authority to license and regulate regular cockfighting pursuant to the rules
cockpit license and the cancellation of Sevilla's in what was docketed as PGC Case No. 10. He and regulations promulgated by the Commission and subject to its review and
succeeded initially with the issuance by the PGC on August 16, 1984, of an interlocutory order supervision.
allowing him to temporarily operate his cockpit. 9 This was challenged in two separate
actions 10 filed by Sevilla and the municipal government of Bogo in the Court of First Instance of
According to the Local Government Code, the municipal mayor has the power to "grant licenses and
Cebu which, on petition of Acusar, were temporarily restrained by the Intermediate Appellate
permits in accordance with existing laws and municipal ordinances and revoke them for violation of
Court. 11This same court also temporarily restrained the enforcement of the PGC order of August 16,
the conditions upon which they have been granted," 15 and the Sangguniang Bayan is authorized to
1984 pending consideration of the petition to nullify it filed by Sevilla and the Bogo municipal
"regulate cockpits, cockfighting and the keeping or training of gamecocks, subject to existing
officials. 12
guidelines promulgated by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission." 16

On December 6, 1984, the Philippine Gamefowl Commission issued its resolution on the merits of
A study of the above-cited powers shows that it is the municipal mayor with the authorization of the
Acusar's petition and ordered Mayor Martinez and the Sangguniang Bayan "to issue the necessary
Sangguniang Bayan that has the primary power to issue licenses for the operation of ordinary
mayor's permit in favor of Hee Acusar" and "to cancel and/or revoke the mayor's permit in favor of
cockpits. Even the regulation of cockpits is vested in the municipal officials, subject only to the
Engr. Santiago A. Sevilla." The Commission also "RESOLVED to issue the Registration Certificate of
guidelines laid down by the Philippine Gamefowl Commission. Its power to license is limited only
Hee Acusar for the current year 1984 and revoke the Registration Certificate of E ngr. Santiago A.
to international derbies and does not extend to ordinary cockpits. Over the latter kind of cockpits, it
Sevilla." 13
has the power not of control but only of review and supervision.
We have consistently held that supervision means "overseeing or the power or authority of an In ordering the respondent municipal officials to cancel the mayor's permit in favor of Santiago A.
officer to see that their subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill Sevilla and to issue another one in favor of Acusar, the PGC was exercising not the powers of mere
them, the former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform their supervision and review but the power of control, which had not been conferred upon it.
duties." 17 Supervision is a lesser power than control, which connotes "the power of the officer to
alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of his duties and to
The other issue raised by the petitioner is easily resolved. It appearing that they are supported by
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. " 18 Review, on the other hand, is a
substantial evidence, we accept the factual findings of the respondent court that Acusar's cockpit
reconsideration or reexamination for purposes of correction. 19
was within the prohibited area and was therefore correctly considered phased out when its
operator failed to relocate it as required by law. According to the Court of Appeals, "it is not
As thus defined, the power of supervision does not snow the supervisor to annul the acts of the controverted that Acusar's cockpit is near a Roman Catholic church near the Cebu Roosevelt
subordinate, for that comes under the power of control. What it can do only is to see to it that the Memorial College, near residential dwellings and near a public market." These circumstances should
subordinate performs his duties in accordance with law. The power of review is exercised to be more than enough to disqualify Acusar even under the prior-operator rule he invokes, assuming
determine whether it is necessary to correct the acts of the subordinate. If such correction is that rule was applicable.
necessary, it must be done by the authority exercising control over the subordinate or through the
instrumentality of the courts of justice, unless the subordinate motu proprio corrects himself after
Under that rule, preference is given to the actual holder of the permit, but in the instant case Acusar
his error is called to his attention by the official exercising the power of supervision and review over
could not be said to be actually holding the permit at the time it was given to Sevilla. Acusar had
him.
then already forfeited his right to renew it by reason of his non-compliance with the requirement to
relocate.
At that, even the power of review vested in the Philippine Gamefowl Commission by P.D. 1802-A
may have been modified by the Local Government Code, which became effective on February 14,
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local
1983. Under the Code, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is supposed to examine the ordinances,
autonomy which is intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development
resolutions and executive orders issued by the municipal government and to annul the same, but
of our local political subdivisions as "self-reliant communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal
only on one ground, to wit, that it is beyond the powers of the municipality or ultra
corporations are the small republics from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization
vires. 20 Significantly, no similar authority is conferred in such categorical terms on the Philippine
of local governments will enable their inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and, more
Gamefowl Commission regarding the licensing and regulation of cockpits by the municipal
important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in public affairs as members of the
government.
body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue interference by the national government in
purely local affairs which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units.
The conferment of the power to license and regulate municipal cockpits in the municipal authorities The decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the
is in line with the policy of local autonomy embodied in Article II, Section 10, and Article XI of the spirit of the Constitution.
1973 Constitution. It is also a recognition, as the Court of Appeals correctly points out, of the
superior competence of the municipal officials in dealing with this local matter with which they can
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The decision of the respondent court of Appeals dated May
be expected to be more knowledgeable than the national officials. Surely, the Philippine Gamefowl
29, 1985, is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against petitioner Hee Acusar.
Commission cannot claim to know more than the municipal mayor and the Sangguniang Bayan of
Bogo, Cebu, about the issues being disputed by the applicants to the cockpit license.
SO ORDERED.
At any rate, assuming that the resolution of the Sangguniang Bayan authorizing the issuance of a
cockpit license to Sevilla was subject to reversal by the PGC, such action could be justified only if
based upon a proven violation of law by the municipal officials. It may not be made only for the
purpose of substituting its own discretion for the discretion exercised by the municipal authorities
in determining the applicant to which the lone cockpit license should be issued.

In the absence of a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion, the choice of the municipal
authorities should be respected by the PGC and in any event cannot be replaced by it simply because
it believes another person should have been selected. Stated otherwise, the PGC cannot directly
exercise the power to license cockpits and in effect usurp the authority directly conferred by law on
the municipal authorities.

If at all, the power to review includes the power to disapprove; but it does not carry the authority to
substitute one's own preferences for that chosen by the subordinate in the exercise of its sound
discretion. In the instant case, the PGC did not limit itself to vetoing the choice of Sevilla, assuming
he was disqualified, but directly exercised the authority of replacing him with its own choice.
Assuming Sevilla was really disqualified, the choice of his replacement still remained with the
municipal authorities, subject only to the review of the PGC.
G.R. No. 85439 January 13, 1992
KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN
NG MUNTINLUPA, INC. (KBMBPM), TERESITA A. FAJARDO, NADYESDA B. PONSONES, MA. FE V.
BOMBASE, LOIDA D. LUCES, MARIO S. FRANCISCO, AMADO V. MANUEL and ROLANDO G.
GARCIA, incumbent members of the Board, AMADO G. PEREZ and MA. FE V. BOMBASE,
incumbent General Manager and Secretary-Treasurer, respectively, petitioners,
vs.
HON. CARLOS G. DOMINGUEZ, Secretary of Agriculture, Regional Director of Region IV of the
Department of Agriculture ROGELIO P. MADRIAGA, RECTO CORONADO and Municipal Mayor
IGNACIO R. BUNYE, both in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila and
as Presiding Officer of Sangguniang Bayan ng Muntinglupa, and JOHN DOES, respondents.
G.R. No. 91927 January 13, 1992
IGNACIO R. BUNYE, JAIME R. FRESNEDI, CARLOS G. TENSUAN, VICTOR E. AGUINALDO,
ALEJANDRO I. MARTINEZ, EPIFANIO A. ESPELETA, REY E. BULAY, LUCIO B. CONSTANTINO,
ROMAN E. NIEFES, NEMESIO O. MOZO, ROGER SMITH, RUFINO B. JOAQUIN, NOLASCO I. DIAZ,
RUFINO IBE and NESTOR SANTOS, petitioners,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE OMBUDSMAN and ROGER C. BERBANO, Special Prosecutor
III, respondents.
Jose O. Villanueva and Roberto B. Romanillos for petitioners in G.R. No. 85439.
Alampay & Manhit Law Offices for petitioners in G.R. No. 91927.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
These cases have been consolidated because they are closely linked with each other as to factual
antecedents and issues.
The first case, G.R. No. 85439 (hereinafter referred to as the Kilusang Bayan case), questions the
validity of the order of 28 October 1988 of then Secretary of Agriculture Hon. Carlos G. Dominguez
which ordered: (1) the take-over by the Department of Agriculture of the management of the
petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng
Muntilupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) pursuant to the Department's regulatory and supervisory powers under
Section 8 of P.D. No. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 13, (2) the creation of a
Management Committee which shall assume the management of KBMBPM upon receipt of the
order, (3) the disbandment of the Board of Directors, and (4) the turn over of all assets, properties
and records of the KBMBPM the Management Committee.
The second case. G.R. No. 91927 (hereinafter referred to as the Bunye case), seeks the nullification of
the Resolution of 4 January 1990 of the Sandiganbayan admitting the Amended Information against
petitioners in Criminal Case No. 13966 and denying their motion to order or direct preliminary
investigation, and its Resolution of 1 February 1990 denying the motion to reconsider the former.
The procedural and factual antecedents are not disputed.
On 2 September 1985, the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa (hereinafter, Municipality), Metro
Manila, thru its then Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr., entered into a contract with the KILUSANG BAYAN
SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA SA BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA, INC.
(KBMBPM) represented by its General Manager, Amado Perez, for the latter's management and
operation of the new Muntinlupa public market. The contract provides for a twenty-five (25) year
term commencing on 2 September 1985, renewable for a like period, unless sooner terminated
and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties, at a monthly consideration of Thirty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P35,000) to be paid by the KBMBPM within the first five (5) days of each month
which shall, however, be increased by ten percent (10%) each year during the first five (5) years
only. 1
The KBMBPM is a service cooperative organized by and composed of vendors occupying the New
Muntinlupa Public Market in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 175 and Letter of Implementation No. 23; its articles of incorporation and by-laws were
registered with the then Office of the Bureau of Cooperatives Development (thereafter the Bureau of
Agricultural Cooperatives Development or BACOD and now the Cooperative Development
Authority). 2
Following his assumption into office as the new mayor succeeding Santiago Carlos, Jr., petitioner
Ignacio Bunye, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the "virtual 50-year term of the
agreement, contrary to the provision of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337," and
the "patently inequitable rental," directed a review of the aforesaid contract. 3 He sought opinions
from both the Commission on Audit and the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) on the validity of the
instrument. In separate letters, these agencies urged that appropriate legal steps be taken towards
its rescission. The letter of Hon. Elfren Cruz of the MMC even granted the Municipality authority "to
take the necessary legal steps for the cancellation/recission of the above cited contract and make
representations with KBMBPM for the immediate transfer/takeover of the possession, management
and operation of the New Muntinlupa Market to the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa." 4
Consequently, upon representations made by Bunye with the Municipal Council, the latter approved
on 1 August 1988 Resolution No. 45 abrogating the contract. To implement this resolution, Bunye,
together with his co-petitioners and elements of the Capital Command of the Philippine
Constabulary, proceeded, on 19 August 1986, to the public market and announced to the general
public and the stallholders thereat that the Municipality was taking over the management and
operation of the facility, and that the stallholders should henceforth pay their market fees to the
Municipality, thru the Market Commission, and no longer to the KBMBPM. 5
On 22 August 1988, the KBMBPM filed with Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati a
complaint for breach of contract, specific performance and damages with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the Municipality and its officers, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 88-1702. 6 The complaint was premised on the alleged illegal take-over of the public market
effected "in excess of his (Bunye's) alleged authority" and thus "constitutes breach of contract and
duty as a public official."
The writ applied for having been denied, 7 the KBMBPM officers resisted the attempts of Bunye and
company to complete the take-over; they continued holding office in the KBS building, under their
respective official capacities. The matter having been elevated to this Court by way
of certiorari, 8 We remanded the same to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as C.A.-G.R. No. L-
16930. 9
On 26 August 1988, Amado Perez filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a letter-complaint
charging Bunye and his co-petitioners with oppression, harassment, abuse of authority and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 10 for taking over the management and
operation of the public market from KBMBPM. 11
In a subpoena dated 7 October 1988, prosecutor Mothalib C. Onos of the Office of the Special WHEREAS, it is ordered that the Department of Agriculture in the exercise of
Prosecutor directed Bunye and his co-petitioners to submit within ten (10) days from receipt its regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of PD 175, as amended,
thereof counter-affidavits, affidavits of their witnesses and other supporting documents. 12 The and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 113, take over the management of
subpoena and letter-complaint were received on 12 October 1988. KBMBPM under the following directives:

On 20 October 1988, two (2) days before the expiration of the period granted to file said documents, 1. THAT a Management Committee is hereby created
Bunye, et al. filed by mail an urgent motion for extension of "at least fifteen (15) days from October composed of the following:
22, 1988" within which to comply 13 with the subpoena.
a) Reg. Dir. or OIC RD — DA Region IV
Thereafter, the following transpired which subsequently gave rise to these petitions:
b) Atty. Rogelio P. Madriaga — BACOD
G.R. No. 85439
c) Mr. Recto Coronado — KBMBPM
In the early morning of 29 October 1988, a Saturday, respondent Madriaga and Coronado, allegedly
accompanied by Mayor Bunye and the latters' heavily armed men, both in uniform and in civilian
d) Mrs. Nadjasda Ponsones — KBMBPM
clothes, together with other civilians, namely: Romulo Bunye II, Alfredo Bunye, Tomas Osias,
Reynaldo Camilon, Benjamin Taguibao, Benjamin Bulos and other unidentified persons, allegedly
through force, violence and intimidation, forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners e) One (1) from the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa
located at the second floor of the KBS Building, new Muntinlupa Public Market, purportedly to serve to be designated by the Sangguniang Pambayan ng
upon petitioners the Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture dated 28 October 1988, and to Muntinlupa;
implement the same, by taking over and assuming the management of KBMBPM, disbanding the
then incumbent Board of Directors for that purpose and excluding and prohibiting the General
2. THAT the Management Committee shall, upon receipt
Manager and the other officers from exercising their lawful functions as such. 14 The Order of the
of this Order, assume the management of KBMBPM;
Secretary reads as follows: 15

3. THAT the present Board of Directors is hereby

ORDER
disbanded and the officers and Manager of the KBMBPM
are hereby directed to turnover all assets, properties and
WHEREAS, the KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA records of the KBMBPM to the Management Committee
NG BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA, INC., (KBMBPM), herein created;
Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila is a Cooperative registered under the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 175, as amended;
4. THAT the Management Committee is hereby
empowered to promulgate rules of procedure to govern
WHEREAS, the Department of Agriculture is empowered to regulate and its workings as a body;
supervise cooperatives registered under the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 175, as amended;
5. THAT the Management Committee shall submit to the
undersigned thru the Director of BACOD monthly reports
WHEREAS, the general membership of the KBMBPM has petitioned the on the operations of KBMBPM;
Department of Agriculture for assistance in the removal of the members of the
Board of Directors who were not elected by the general membership of said
6. THAT the Management Committee shall call a General
cooperative;
Assembly of all registered members of the KBMBPM
within Ninety (90) days from date of this Order to decide
WHEREAS, the on-going financial and management audit of the Department of such matters affecting the KBMBPM, including the
Agriculture auditors show (sic) that the management of the KBMBPM is not election of a new set of Board of Director (sic).
operating that cooperative in accordance with PD. 175, LOI No. 23, the
Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the provisions of the by-laws of KBMBPM;
This Order takes effect immediately and shall continue to be in force until the
members of the Board of Directors shall have been duly elected and qualified.
WHEREAS, the interest of the public so demanding it is evident and urgently
necessary that the KBMBPM MUST BE PLACED UNDER MANAGEMENT TAKE-
Done this 28th day of October, 1988 at Quezon City.
OVER of the Department of Agriculture in order to preserve the financial
interest of the members of the cooperative and to enhance the cooperative
development program of the government; As claimed by petitioners, the Order served on them was not written on the stationary of the
Department, does not bear its seal and is a mere xerox copy.
The so-called petition upon which the Order is based appears to be an unverified petition dated 10
October 1988 signed, according to Mayor Bunye, 16 by 371 members of the KBMBPM.
On 2 November 1988, petitioners filed the petition in this case alleging, inter alia, that:
(a) Respondent Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing
the Order for he arrogated unto himself a judicial function by determining the
alleged guilt of petitioners on the strength of a mere unverified petition; the
disbandment of the Board of Directors was done without authority of law since
under Letter of Implementation No. 23, removal of officers, directors or
committee members could be done only by the majority of the members
entitled to vote at an annual or special general assembly and only after an
opportunity to be heard at said assembly.
(b) Respondent Secretary acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary and
despotic manner, so patent and gross that it amounted to a grave abuse of
discretion.
(c) The Order is a clear violation of the By-Laws of KBMBPM and is likewise
illegal and unlawful for it allows or tolerates the violation of the penal
provisions under paragraph (c), Section 9 of P.D. No. 175.
(d) The Order is a clear violation of the constitutional right of the individual
petitioners to be heard. 17
They pray that upon the filing of the petition, respondents, their agents, representatives or persons
acting on their behalf be ordered to refrain, cease and desist from enforcing and implementing the
questioned Order or from excluding the individual petitioners from the exercise of their rights as
such officers and, in the event that said acts sought to be restrained were already partially or wholly
done, to immediately restore the management and operation of the public market to petitioners,
order respondents to vacate the premises and, thereafter, preserve the status quo; and that, finally,
the challenged Order be declared null and void.
In the Resolution of 9 October 1988, 18 We required the respondents to Comment on the petition.
Before any Comment could be filed, petitioners filed on 2 January 1989 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
praying that respondent Atty. Rogelio Madriaga, who had assumed the position of Chairman of the
Management Committee, be ordered to stop and/or cancel the scheduled elections of the officers of
the KBMBPM on 6 January 1989 and, henceforth, desist from scheduling any election of officers or
Members of the Board of Directors thereof until further orders on the Court. 19 The elections were,
nevertheless, held and a new board of directors was elected. So, on 19 January 1989, petitioners
filed a supplemental motion 20 praying that respondent Madriaga and the "newly elected Board of
Directors be ordered to cease and desist from assuming, performing or exercising powers as such,
and/or from removing or replacing the counsels of petitioners as counsels for KBMBPM and for
Atty. Fernando Aquino, Jr., to cease and desist from unduly interfering with the affairs and business
of the cooperative."
Respondent Bunye, by himself, filed his Comment on 23 January 1989. 21 He denies the factual
allegations in the petition and claims that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. A
reply thereto was filed by petitioners on 7 February 1989. 22
Respondent Recto Coronado filed two (2) Comments. The first was filed on 6 February 1989 23 by
his counsel, Atty. Fernando Aquino, Jr., and the second, which is for both him and Atty. Madriaga,
was filed by the latter on 10 February 1989. 24
On 20 February 1989, petitioners filed a Reply to the first Comment of Coronado 25 and an Ex-
Parte Motion for the immediate issuance of a cease and desist order 26 praying that the so-called
new directors and officers of KBMBPM, namely: Tomas M. Osias, Ildefonso B. Reyes, Paulino Moldez,
Fortunato M. Medina, Aurora P. del Rosario, Moises Abrenica, and Lamberto Casalla, be ordered to
immediately cease and desist from filing notices of withdrawals or motions to dismiss cases filed by
the Cooperative now pending before the courts, administrative offices and the Ombudsman and
Tanodbayan, and that if such motions or notices were already filed, to immediately withdraw and
desist from further pursuing the same until further orders of this Court. The latter was precipitated
by the Resolution No. 19 of the "new" board of directors withdrawing all cases filed by its
predecessors against Bunye, et al., and more particularly the following cases: (a) G.R. No. 85439 (the
instant petition), (b) Civil Case No. 88-1702, (c) OSP Case No. 88-2110 before the Ombudsman, (d)
IBP Case No. 88-0119 before the Tanodbayan, and Civil Case No. 88-118 for Mandamus. 27
On 1 March 1989, We required the Solicitor General to file his Comment to the petition and the
urgent motion for the immediate issuance of a cease and desist order. 28
A motion to dismiss the instant petition was filed on 30 March 1989. 29 On 19 April 1989, We
resolved to dismiss the case and consider it closed and terminated. 30 Thereupon, after some
petitioners filed a motion for clarification and reconsideration, We set aside the dismissal order and
required the new directors to comment on the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss filed by the
former. 31
The new board, on 14 June 1989, prayed that its Manifestation of 6 June 1989 and Opposition dated
9 June 1989, earlier submitted it response to petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the order
dismissing the instant petition, be treated as its Comment. 32 Both parties then continued their legal
fencing, serving several pleadings on each other.
In Our Resolution of 9 August 1989, 33 We gave the petition due course and required the parties to
submit their respective Memoranda.
On 14 August 1989, petitioners filed an urgent ex-parte motion for the immediate issuance of a
cease and desist order 34 in view of the new board's plan to enter into a new management contract;
the motion was noted by this Court on 23 August 1989. A second ex-parte motion, noted on 18
October 1989, was filed on 19 September 1989 asking this court to consider the "Invitation to pre-
qualify and bid" for a new contract published by respondent Bunye. 35
In a belated Comment 36 for the respondent Secretary of Agriculture filed on 22 September 1989, the
Office of the Solicitor General asserts that individual petitioners, who were not allegedly elected by
the members or duly designated by the BACOD Director, have no right or authority to file this case;
the assailed Order of the Secretary was issued pursuant to P.D. No. 175, more particularly Section 8
thereof which authorizes him "(d) to suspend the operation or cancel the registration of any
cooperative after hearing and when in its judgment and based on findings, such cooperative is
operating in violation of this Decree, rules and regulations, existing laws as well as the by-laws of
the cooperative itself;" the Order is reasonably necessary to correct serious flaws in the cooperative
and provide interim measures until election of regular members to the board and officers thereof;
the elections conducted on 6 January 1989 are valid; and that the motion to dismiss filed by the new
board of directors binds the cooperative. It prays for the dismissal of the petition.
Respondent Secretary of Agriculture manifested on 22 September 1989 that he is adopting the
Comment submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General as his memorandum; 37 petitioners and
respondents Coronado and Madriaga filed their separate Memoranda on 6 November 1989; 38 while
the new board of directors submitted its Memorandum on 11 December 1989. 39
The new KBMBPM board submitted additional pleadings on 16 February 1990 which it deemed Arraignment was set for 18 October 1989. 52
relevant to the issues involved herein. Reacting, petitioners filed a motion to strike out improper
and inadmissible pleadings and annexes and sought to have the pleaders cited for contempt.
However, on 14 October 1989, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan an "Omnibus Motion to
Although We required respondents to comment, the latter did not comply.
Remand to the Office of the Ombudsman; to Defer Arraignment and to Suspend Proceedings." 53

Nevertheless, a manifestation was filed by the same board on 25 February 1991 40 informing this
Subsequently, through new counsel, petitioners filed on 17 October 1989 a Consolidated
Court of the holding, on 9 January 1991, of its annual general assembly and election of its board of
Manifestation and Supplemental Motion 54 praying, inter alia, for the quashal of the information on
directors for 1991. It then reiterates the prayer that the instant petition be considered withdrawn
the ground that they were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation and that the
and dismissed. Petitioners filed a counter manifestation alleging that the instant petition was
information did not charge an offense.
already given due course on 9 August 1989. 41 In its traverse to the counter manifestation, the new
board insists that it "did not derive authority from the October 28, 1988 Order, the acts of the
Management Committee, nor (sic) from the elections held in (sic) January 6, 1989," but rather from The Sandiganbayan issued an order on 18 October 1989 deferring arraignment and directing the
the members of the cooperative who elected them into office during the elections. parties to submit their respective memoranda, 55 which petitioners complied with on 2 November
1989. 56 On 16 November 1989, special Prosecutor Berbano filed a motion to admit amended
information. 57
Petitioners filed a rejoinder asserting that the election of new directors is not a supervening event
independent of the main issue in the present petition and that to subscribe to the argument that the
issues in the instant petition became moot with their assumption into office is to reward a wrong On 17 November 1989, the Sandiganbayan handed down a Resolution 58 denying for lack of merit
done. the Omnibus Motion to Remand the Case To The Office of the Ombudsman, to Defer Arraignment
and to Suspend Proceedings. Petitioners then filed a motion to order a preliminary
investigation 59 on the basis of the introduction by the amended information of new, material and
G. R. NO. 91927
substantive allegations, which the special prosecutor opposed, 60 thereby precipitating a rejoinder
filed by petitioners. 61
Petitioners claim that without ruling on their 20 October 1988 motion for an extension of at last 15
days from 22 October 1988 within which to file their counter-affidavits, which was received by the
On 4 January 1990, the Sandiganbayan handed down a Resolution 62 admitting the Amended
Office of the Special Prosecutor on 3 November 1988, Special Prosecutor Onos promulgated on 11
Information and denying the motion to direct preliminary investigation. Their motion to reconsider
November 1988 a Resolution finding the evidence on hand sufficient to establish a prima facie case
this Resolution having been denied in the Resolution of 1 February 1990, 63 petitioners filed the
against respondents (herein petitioners) and recommending the filing of the corresponding
instant petition on 12 February 1990.
information against them before the Sandiganbayan. 42 Petitioners also claim that they submitted
their counter-affidavits on 9 November 1988. 43
Petitioners claim that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying petitioners their
In their motion dated 2 December 1988, petitioners move for a reconsideration of the above
right to preliminary investigation and in admitting the Amended Information.
Resolution, 44 which was denied by Onos 45 in his 18 January 1989 Order. The information against
the petitioners was attached to this order.
They then pray that: (a) the 4 January and 1 February 1990 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan,
admitting the amended information and denying the motion for reconsideration, respectively, be
Upon submission of the records for his approval, the Ombudsman issued a first indorsement on 4
annulled; (b) a writ be issued enjoining the Sandiganbayan from proceeding further in Criminal
April 1989 referring to "Judge Gualberto J. de la Llana, Acting Director , IEO/RSSO, this Office, the
Case No. 13966; and (c) respondents be enjoined from pursuing further actions in the graft case.
within records of OSP Case No. 88-02110 . . . for further preliminary investigation . . ." 46

We required the respondents to Comment on the petition.

Thereafter, on 28 April 1989, Bunye and company received a subpoena from de la Llana requiring
them to appear before the latter on 25 April 1989, 47 submit a report and file comment. After being
granted an extension, Bunye and company submitted their comment on 18 May 1989. 48
On 22 August 1989, de la Llana recommended the filing of an information for violation of section 3
(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 49 The case was referred to special prosecuting
officer Jose Parentela, Jr. who, in his Memorandum 50 to the Ombudsman through the Acting Special
Prosecutor, likewise urged that an information be filed against herein petitioners. On 3 October
1989, the Ombudsman signed his conformity to the Memorandum and approved the 18 January
information prepared by Onos, which was then filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Consequently, Bunye, et al. were served arrest warrants issued by the Sandiganbayan. Detained at
the NBI on 9 October 1989, they claim to have discovered only then the existence of documents
recommending and approving the filing of the complaint and a memorandum by special prosecutor
Bernardita G. Erum proposing the dismissal of the same. 51
On 21 February 1990, petitioners' counsel filed a motion to drop Epifanio Espeleta and Rey E. Dulay
as petitioners, 64 and in the Comment they filed on 30 March 1990, in compliance with Our
Resolution of 1 March 1990, they state that they do not interpose any objection to the motion.
On 20 March 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General moved that it be excused from filing comment
for the respondents as it cannot subscribe to the position taken by the latter with respect to the
questions of law involved. 65We granted this motion in the resolution of 8 May 1990.
Respondent Berbano filed his comment on 10 September 1991 and petitioners replied on 20
December 1990; Berbano subsequently filed a Rejoinder thereto on 11 January 1991. 66 The
Sandiganbayan then filed a manifestation proposing that it be excused from filing comment as its
position
on the matters in issue is adequately stated in the resolutions sought to be annulled. 67 On 7 March
1991, We resolved to note the manifestation and order the instant petition consolidated with G.R.
No. 85439.
The present dispute revolves around the validity of the antecedent proceedings which led to the
filing of the original information on 18 January 1989 and the amended information afterwards.
THE ISSUES AND THEIR RESOLUTION
1. G. R. No. 85439.
As adverted to in the introductory portion of this Decision, the principal issue in G.R. No. 85439 is
the validity of the 28 October 1988 Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture. The exordium of
said Order unerringly indicates that its basis is the alleged petition of the general membership of the
KBMBPM requesting the Department for assistance "in the removal of the members of the Board of
Directors who were not elected by the general membership" of the cooperative and that the
"ongoing financial and management audit of the Department of Agriculture auditors show (sic) that
the management of the KBMBPM is not operating that cooperative in accordance with P.D. 175, LOI
23, the Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the provisions and by-laws of KBMBPM." It is also
professed therein that the Order was issued by the Department "in the exercise of its regulatory and
supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No.
113."
Respondents challenge the personality of the petitioners to bring this action, set up the defense of
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, and assert that the Order was lawfully and validly
issued under the above decree and Executive Order.
We find merit in the petition and the defenses interposed do not persuade Us.
Petitioners have the personality to file the instant petition and ask, in effect, for their reinstatement
as Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, defining an action for mandamus, permits a person who
has been excluded from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which he is entitled, to file
suit. 68 Petitioners, as ousted directors of the KBMBPM, are questioning precisely the act of
respondent Secretary in disbanding the board of directors; they then pray that this Court restore
them to their prior stations.
As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this requirement does
not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the
President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. 69 This
doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed. There
was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts could
be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also yields to
other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, 70 or
where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. 71 Such is the claim of
petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.
And now on the validity of the assailed Order.
Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 (implementing P.D. No. 175) provides the
procedure for the removal of directors or officers of cooperatives, thus:
An elected officer, director or committee member may be removed by a vote of
majority of the members entitled to vote at an annual or special general
assembly. The person involved shall have an opportunity to be heard.
A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17, Article III of the KBMBPM's by-laws, reads:
Sec. 17. Removal of Directors and Committee Members. — Any elected director
or committee member may be removed from office for cause by a majority
vote of the members in good standing present at the annual or special general
assembly called for the purpose after having been given the opportunity to be
heard at the assembly.
Under the same article are found the requirements for the holding of both the annual general
assembly and a special general assembly.
Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of
cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express
provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision, petitioners cannot be
deprived of that right.
The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto
himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the
petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which
grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not give him that
right.
An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. 72 These powers should not be extended by implication
beyond what may to necessary for their just and reasonable execution. 73
Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; (b) direct the performance of duty; restrain the
commission of acts; (c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate
officials or
units; (d) determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and (e) prescribe standards,
guidelines, plans and programs. Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the authority of
the department or its equivalent to: (1) generally oversee the operations of such agencies and
insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference with
day-to-day activities; (2) require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of management
audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies, standards and
guidelines of the department; (3) take such action as may be necessary for the proper performance
of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other forms of mal-
administration; (4) review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may not increase
or add to them. 74
The power to summarily disband the board of directors may not be inferred from any of the
foregoing as both P.D. No. 175 and the by-laws of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by
which directors and officers are to be removed. The Secretary should have known better than to
disregard these procedures and rely on a mere petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM
and an on-going audit by Department of Agriculture auditors in exercising a power which he does
not have, expressly or impliedly. We cannot concede to the proposition of the Office of the Solicitor
General that the Secretary's power under paragraph (d), Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 above quoted to
suspend the operation or cancel the registration of any cooperative includes the "milder authority of
suspending officers and calling for the election of new officers." Firstly, neither suspension nor
cancellation includes the take-over and ouster of incumbent directors and officers, otherwise the
law itself would have expressly so stated. Secondly, even granting that the law intended such as
postulated, there is the requirement of a hearing. None was conducted.
Likewise, even if We grant, for the sake of argument, that said power includes the power to disband
the board of directors and remove the officers of the KBMBPM, and that a hearing was not expressly
required in the law, still the Order can be validly issued only after giving due process to the affected
parties, herein petitioners.
Due process is guaranteed by the Constitution 75 and extends to administrative proceedings. In the
landmark case of Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 76 this Court, through Justice Laurel, laid
down the cardinal primary requirements of due process in administrative proceedings, foremost of
which is the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in
support thereof. The need for notice and the opportunity to be heard is the heart of procedural due
process, be it in either judicial or administrative proceedings. 77 Nevertheless, a plea of a denial of
procedural due process does not lie where a defect consisting in an absence of notice of hearing was
thereafter cured by the aggrieved party himself as when he had the opportunity to be heard on a
subsequent motion for reconsideration. This is consistent with the principle that what the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of an
opportunity to be heard. 78
dismiss a complaint or information. Much less does it affect the court's jurisdiction. In People
vs. Casiano, 83 this Court ruled:
Independently of the foregoing, the absence of such investigation [preliminary]
did not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.
Much less did it affect the jurisdiction of the court of first instance over the
present case. Hence, had the defendant-appellee been entitled to another
preliminary investigation, and had his plea of not guilty upon arraignment not
implied a waiver of said right, the court of first instance should have, either
conducted such preliminary investigation, or ordered the Provincial Fiscal to
make it, in pursuance of section 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code (as
amended by Republic Act No. 732), or remanded the record for said
investigation to the justice of the peace court, instead of dismissing the case as
it did in the order appealed from.
This doctrine was thereafter reiterated or affirmed in several case. 84
In the instant case, even if it is to be conceded for argument's sake that there was in fact no
preliminary investigation, the Sandiganbayan, per Doromal vs.Sandiganbayan, 85 "should merely
suspend or hold in abeyance proceedings upon the questioned Amended Information and remand
the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for him to conduct a preliminary investigation."

In the instant case, there was no notice of a hearing on the alleged petition of the general
It is Our view, however, that petitioners were not denied the right to preliminary investigation.
membership of the KBMBPM; there was, as well, not even a semblance of a hearing. The Order was
They, nevertheless, insist that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Special
based solely on an alleged petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM. There was then a
Prosecutor existed more in form than in substance. This is anchored on the failure by prosecutor
clear denial of due process. It is most unfortunate that it was done after democracy was restored
Onos to consider the counter-affidavits filed by petitioners. The same sin of omission is ascribed to
through the peaceful people revolt at EDSA and the overwhelming ratification of a new Constitution
Acting Director de la Llana who purportedly failed to consider the comments submitted by the
thereafter, which preserves for the generations to come the gains of that historic struggle which
petitioners pursuant to a subpoena dated 13 April 1989. The failure of special prosecutor Berbano
earned for this Republic universal admiration.
to conduct a preliminary investigation before amending the information is also challenged.

If there were genuine grievances against petitioners, the affected members should have timely raise
It is finally urged that the Sandiganbayan completely disregarded the "glaring anomaly that on its
these issues in the annual general assembly or in a special general assembly. Or, if such a remedy
face the Information filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor" was prepared and subscribed on
would be futile for some reason or another, judicial recourse was available.
18 January 1989, while the records indicate that the preliminary investigation was concluded on 3
October 1989.
Be that as it may, petitioners cannot, however, be restored to their positions. Their terms expired in
1989, thereby rendering their prayer for reinstatement moot and academic. Pursuant to Section 13
In his Comment, respondent Berbano dispassionately traces the genesis of the criminal information
of the by-laws, during the election at the first annual general assembly after registration, one-half
filed before the Sandiganbayan. His assessment that a preliminary investigation sufficient in
plus one (4) of the directors obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for two years, and the
substance and manner was conducted prior to the filing of the information reflects the view of the
remaining directors (3) for one year; thereafter, all shall be elected for a term of two years. Hence, in
Sandiganbayan, maintained in both the 17 November 1989 and 4 January 1990 resolutions, that
1988, when the board was disbanded, there was a number of directors whose terms would have
there was compliance with the requirements of due process.
expired the next year (1989) and a number whose terms would have expired two years after
(1990). Reversion to the status quo preceding 29 October 1988 would not be feasible in view of this
turn of events. Besides, elections were held in 1990 and 1991. 79 The affairs of the cooperative are Petitioners were provided a reasonable period within which to submit their counter-affidavits; they
presently being managed by a new board of directors duly elected in accordance with the did not avail of the original period; they moved for an extension of at least fifteen (15) days from 22
cooperative's by-laws. October 1988. Despite the urgency of its nature, the motion was sent by mail. The extension prayed
for was good up to 6 November 1988. But, as admitted by them, they filed the Counter-Affidavits
only on 9 November 1988. Yet, they blamed prosecutor Onos for promulgating the 11 November
2. G. R. No. 91927.
1989 Resolution and for, allegedly, not acting on the motion. Petitioners then should not lay the
blame on Onos; they should blame themselves for presuming that the motion would be granted.
The right of an accused to a preliminary investigation is not among
the rights guaranteed him in the Bill of Rights. As stated in Marcos, et al. vs. Cruz, 80 "the
This notwithstanding, petitioners were able to file a Motion for Reconsideration on 13 December
preliminary investigation in criminal cases is not a creation of the Constitution; its origin is
1988 requesting that the reviewing prosecutor consider the belatedly filed documents; 86 thus,
statutory and it exists and the right thereto can be invoked when so established and granted by law.
there is the recommendation of prosecutor Bernardita Erum calling for the dismissal of the charges
It is so specifically granted by procedural law. 81 If not waived, absence thereof may amount to a
on 2 March 1989, which, however, was not sustained upon subsequent review. The Sandiganbayan,
denial of due process. 82 However, lack of preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash or
in its 17 November 1989 Resolution, succinctly summed up the matter when it asserted that "even 2. DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the petition in G.R. No. 91927.
granting, for the sake of argument, that prosecutor Onos . . . failed to consider accused-movants'
counter-affidavits, such defect was cured when a "Motion for Reconsideration" was filed, and
No pronouncement as to costs.
which . . . de la Llana took into account upon review."

IT IS SO ORDERED.
It may not then be successfully asserted that the counter-affidavits were not considered by the
Ombudsman in approving the information. Perusal of the factual antecedents reveals that a second
investigation was conducted upon the "1st Indorsement" of the Ombudsman of 4 April 1989. As a
result, subpoenas were issued and comments were asked to be submitted, which petitioners did, but
only after a further extension of fifteen (15) days from the expiration of the original deadline. From
this submission the matter underwent further review.

Moreover, in the 18 January 1989 Order of prosecutor Onos, there was an ample discussion of the
defenses raised by the petitioners in their counter-affidavits, thus negating the charge that the
issues raised by them were not considered at all. 87

It is indisputable that the respondents were not remiss in their duty to afford the petitioners the
opportunity to contest the charges thrown their way. Due process does not require that the accused
actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that
is required is that he be given the opportunity to submit such if he is so minded. 88

In any event, petitioners did in fact, although belatedly, submit their counter-affidavits and as a
result thereof, the prosecutors concerned considered them in subsequent reviews of the
information, particularly in the re-investigation ordered by the Ombudsman.

And now, as to the protestation of lack of preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the
Amended Information. The prosecution may amend the information without leave of court before
arraignment, 89 and such does not prejudice the accused. 90 Reliance on the pronouncements
in Doromal vs. Sandiganbayan 91 is misplaced as what obtained therein was the preparation of an
entirely new information as contrasted with mere amendments introduced in the amended
information, which also charges petitioners with violating Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft Law.

In Gaspar vs. Sandiganbayan, 92 We held that there is no rule or law requiring the Tanodbayan to
conduct another preliminary investigation of a case under review by it. On the contrary, under P.D.
No. 911, in relation to Rule 12, Administrative Order No. VII, the Tanodbayan may, upon review,
reverse the findings of the investigator and thereafter "where he finds a prima facie case, to cause
the filing of an information in court against the respondent, based on the same sworn statements or
evidence submitted, without the necessity of conducting another preliminary investigation."

Respondent Sandiganbayan did not then commit any grave abuse of discretion in respect to its
Resolutions of 4 January 1990 and 1 February 1990.

The petition then must fail.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 85439; declaring null and void the challenged Order of 28
October 1988 of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture; but denying, for having become moot and
academic, the prayer of petitioners that they be restored to their positions in the KBMBPM.

G.R. No. 112497 August 4, 1994
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER ANTHONY
ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG PANGLUNSOD AND THE CITY OF MANILA, respondents.
The City Legal Officer for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for Caltex (Phils.).
Joseph Lopez for Sangguniang Panglunsod of Manila.
L.A. Maglaya for Petron Corporation.
CRUZ, J.:
The principal issue in this case is the constitutionality of Section 187 of the Local Government Code
reading as follows:
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue
Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. — The procedure for approval of local
tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the
provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for
the purpose prior to the enactment thereof; Provided, further, That any
question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue
measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity
thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60)
days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such
appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance
and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided,
finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of
the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal,
the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of
competent jurisdiction.
Pursuant thereto, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer,
declared Ordinance No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-
compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and for containing
certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.1
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of Manila revoked the
Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding inter alia that the procedural
requirements had been observed. More importantly, it declared Section 187 of the Local
Government Code as unconstitutional because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power
of control over local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the
Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of the Philippines only
the power of supervision over local governments.2
The present petition would have us reverse that decision. The Secretary argues that the annulled
Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural requirements for the enactment of tax
ordinances as specified in the Local Government Code had indeed not been observed.
Parenthetically, this petition was originally dismissed by the Court for non-compliance with Circular
1-88, the Solicitor General having failed to submit a certified true copy of the challenged
decision.3 However, on motion for reconsideration with the required certified true copy of the
decision attached, the petition was reinstated in view of the importance of the issues raised therein.
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of
Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law. Specifically, BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases
in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation,4 even as the accused in a
criminal action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is charged
with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they contravene the Bill of
Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of lower courts in all cases in which the
constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential
decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
In the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection,
bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws,
no less than on the doctrine of separation of powers. As the questioned act is usually the handiwork
of the legislative or the executive departments, or both, it will be prudent for such courts, if only out
of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this Court in the consideration of its
validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the
concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion.5
It is also emphasized that every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful
hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on the theory that the measure was first carefully
studied by the executive and the legislative departments and determined by them to be in
accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest showing that there was
indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a conclusion is reached by the required
majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it cannot escape, that the challenged
act must be struck down.
In the case before us, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code
unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances and,
inferentially, to annul them. He cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the
first being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter,"
while the second is "the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their
functions in accordance with law."6 His conclusion was that the challenged section gave to the
Secretary the power of control and not of supervision only as vested by the Constitution in the
President of the Philippines. This was, in his view, a violation not only of Article X, specifically
Section 4 thereof, 7 and of Section 5 on the taxing powers of local governments,8 and the policy of
local autonomy in general.
We do not share that view. The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the provision.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed
tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters or procedure in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the wisdom or reasonableness, of
modifies or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the tax measure.
the judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the
Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of what the Code should be. He
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue
did not pronounce the ordinance unwise or unreasonable as a basis for its annulment. He did not
Code is another matter.
say that in his judgment it was a bad law. What he found only was that it was illegal. All he did in
reviewing the said measure was determine if the petitioners were performing their functions in
accordance with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the enactment of tax ordinances and In his resolution, Secretary Drilon declared that there were no written notices of public hearings on
the grant of powers to the city government under the Local Government Code. As we see it, that was the proposed Manila Revenue Code that were sent to interested parties as required by Art. 276(b) of
an act not of control but of mere supervision. the Implementing Rules of the Local Government Code nor were copies of the proposed ordinance
published in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Art. 276(a).
No minutes were submitted to show that the obligatory public hearings had been held. Neither were
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his
copies of the measure as approved posted in prominent places in the city in accordance with Sec.
discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it
511(a) of the Local Government Code. Finally, the Manila Revenue Code was not translated into
himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees
Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated among the people for their information and guidance,
to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
conformably to Sec. 59(b) of the Code.
discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or
re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the
doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed. In Judge Palattao found otherwise. He declared that all the procedural requirements had been
the opinion of the Court, Secretary Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code and that the City of Manila had not been able
performed an act not of control but of mere supervision. to prove such compliance before the Secretary only because he had given it only five days within
which to gather and present to him all the evidence (consisting of 25 exhibits) later submitted to the
trial court.
The case of Taule v. Santos 9 cited in the decision has no application here because the jurisdiction
claimed by the Secretary of Local Governments over election contests in the Katipunan ng Mga
Barangay was held to belong to the Commission on Elections by constitutional provision. The To get to the bottom of this question, the Court acceded to the motion of the respondents and called
conflict was over jurisdiction, not supervision or control. for the elevation to it of the said exhibits. We have carefully examined every one of these exhibits
and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have indeed been observed. Notices
of the public hearings were sent to interested parties as evidenced by Exhibits G-1 to 17. The
Significantly, a rule similar to Section 187 appeared in the Local Autonomy Act, which provided in
minutes of the hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3. Exhibits B and C show that the
its Section 2 as follows:
proposed ordinances were published in the Balita and the Manila Standard on April 21 and 25,
1993, respectively, and the approved ordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5, 1993 issues of the
A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless Manila Standard and in the July 6, 1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q, Q-1, Q-2, and Q-3.
the ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided, however, That the Secretary
of Finance shall have authority to suspend the effectivity of any ordinance
The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as approved but this omission does not affect
within one hundred and twenty days after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if,
its validity, considering that its publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general
in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust, excessive,
circulation will satisfy due process. It has also not been shown that the text of the ordinance has
oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared national
been translated and disseminated, but this requirement applies to the approval of local
economy policy, and when the said Secretary exercises this authority the
development plans and public investment programs of the local government unit and not to tax
effectivity of such ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or as a whole,
ordinances.
for a period of thirty days within which period the local legislative body may
either modify the tax ordinance to meet the objections thereto, or file an
appeal with a court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or We make no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila Revenue Code as their validity has
the part or parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as revoked. not been raised in issue in the present petition.
Thereafter, the local legislative body may not reimpose the same tax or fee
until such time as the grounds for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to
WHEREFORE, the judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged decision of the Regional
exist.
Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional but
AFFIRMING its finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue
That section allowed the Secretary of Finance to suspend the effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his Code have been observed. No pronouncement as to costs.
opinion, the tax or fee levied was unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of these
flaws would involve the exercise of judgment or discretion and not merely an examination of
SO ORDERED.
whether or not the requirements or limitations of the law had been observed; hence, it would smack
of control rather than mere supervision. That power was never questioned before this Court but, at
any rate, the Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude under Section 187. All he is permitted
to do is ascertain the constitutionality or legality of the tax measure, without the right to declare
that, in his opinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or confiscatory. He has no discretion on this
matter. In fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the