At the trial, petitioners presented Virgilio Santos.
He testified that at about 1:00 and 2:00 in
EDNA A. RAYNERA, for herself and on behalf of the minors RIANNA and REIANNE
RAYNERA, petitioners, vs. FREDDIE HICETA and JIMMY ORPILLA, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of
Appeals,[1] reversing that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Manila. [2]
The rule is well-settled that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are generally considered
final and may not be reviewed on appeal. However, this principle admits of certain exceptions,
among which is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court, a re-
examination of the facts and evidence may be undertaken.[3] This case falls under the cited
exception.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Edna A. Raynera was the widow of Reynaldo Raynera and the mother and legal
guardian of the minors Rianna and Reianne, both surnamed Raynera. Respondents Freddie Hiceta
and Jimmy Orpilla were the owner and driver, respectively, of an Isuzu truck-trailer, with plate No.
NXC 848, involved in the accident.
On March 23, 1989, at about 2:00 in the morning, Reynaldo Raynera was on his way home. He
was riding a motorcycle traveling on the southbound lane of East Service Road, Cupang,
Muntinlupa. The Isuzu truck was travelling ahead of him at 20 to 30 kilometers per hour.[4] The
truck was loaded with two (2) metal sheets extended on both sides, two (2) feet on the left and
three (3) feet on the right. There were two (2) pairs of red lights, about 35 watts each, on both sides
of the metal plates.[5] The asphalt road was not well lighted.
At some point on the road, Reynaldo Raynera crashed his motorcycle into the left rear portion
of the truck trailer, which was without tail lights. Due to the collision, Reynaldo sustained head
injuries and truck helper Geraldino D. Lucelo[6] rushed him to the Paraaque Medical Center. Upon
arrival at the hospital, the attending physician, Dr. Marivic Aguirre, [7]pronounced Reynaldo Raynera
dead on arrival.
At the time of his death, Reynaldo was manager of the Engineering Department, Kawasaki
Motors (Phils.) Corporation. He was 32 years old, had a life expectancy of sixty five (65) years, and
an annual net earnings of not less than seventy three thousand five hundred (P73,500.00)
pesos,[8] with a potential increase in annual net earnings of not less than ten percent (10%) of his
salary.[9]
On May 12, 1989, the heirs of the deceased demanded[10]
from
respondents payment of damages arising from the death of Reynaldo Raynera as a result of the
vehicular accident.The respondents refused to pay the claims.
On September 13, 1989, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila [11] a
complaint[12] for damages against respondents owner and driver of the Isuzu truck.
In their complaint against respondents, petitioners sought recovery of damages for the death
of Reynaldo Raynera caused by the negligent operation of the truck-trailer at nighttime on the
highway, without tail lights.
In their answer filed on April 4, 1990, respondents alleged that the truck was travelling
slowly on the service road, not parked improperly at a dark portion of the road, with no tail lights,
license plate and early warning device.
the morning of March 23, 1989, he and his wife went to Alabang market, on board a tricycle. They
passed by the service road going south, and saw a parked truck trailer, with its hood open and
without tail lights. They would have bumped the truck but the tricycle driver was quick in avoiding
a collision. The place was dark, and the truck had no early warning device to alert passing
motorists.[13]
On the other hand, respondents presented truck helper Geraldino Lucelo.[14] He testified that
at the time the incident happened, the truck was slowly traveling at approximately 20 to 30
kilometers per hour. Another employee of respondents, auto-mechanic Rogoberto Reyes,[15] testified
that at about 3:00 in the afternoon of March 22, 1989, with the help of Lucelo, he installed two (2)
pairs of red lights, about 30 to 40 watts each, on both sides of the steel plates.[16] On his part, traffic
investigation officer Cpl. Virgilio del Monte[17] admitted that these lights were visible at a distance of
100 meters.
On December 19, 1991, the trial court rendered decision in favor of
petitioners. It found respondents Freddie Hiceta and Jimmy Orpilla negligent in view of these
circumstances: (1) the truck trailer had no license plate and tail lights; (2) there were only two pairs
of red lights, 50 watts[18] each, on both sides of the steel plates; and (3) the truck trailer was
improperly parked in a dark area.
The trial court held that respondents negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of
Reynaldo Rayneras death, for which they are jointly and severally liable to pay damages to
petitioners. The trial court also held that the victim was himself negligent, although this was
insufficient to overcome respondents negligence. The trial court applied the doctrine of
contributory negligence[19] and reduced the responsibility of respondents by 20% on account of the
victims own negligence.
The dispositive portion of the lower courts decision reads as follows:
All things considered, the Court is of the opinion that it is fair and reasonable to fix the living and
other expenses of the deceased the sum of P54,000.00 a year or about P4,500.00 a month (P150.00
p/d) and that, consequently, the loss or damage sustained by the plaintiffs may be estimated
at P1,674,000.00 for the 31 years of Reynaldo Rayneras life expectancy.
Taking into account the cooperative negligence of the deceased Reynaldo Raynera, the Court
believes that the demand of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damages on 80-20
ratio. Thus, P1,337,200.00 shall be paid by the defendants with interest thereon, at the legal rate,
from date of decision, as damages for the loss of earnings. To this sum, the following shall be added:
(a) P33,412.00, actually spent for funeral services, interment and memorial lot;
(b) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees;
(c) cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.[20]
On January 10, 1992, respondents Hiceta and Orpilla appealed to the Court of Appeals. [21]
After due proceedings, on April 28, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered decision setting aside
the appealed decision. The appellate court held that Reynaldo Rayneras bumping into the left rear
portion of the truck was the proximate cause of his death,[22] and consequently, absolved
respondents from liability.
 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
In this petition, the heirs of Reynaldo Raynera contend that the appellate court erred in: (1)
overturning the trial courts finding that respondents negligent operation of the Isuzu truck was the
proximate cause of the victims death; (2) applying the doctrine of last clear chance; (3) setting aside
the trial courts award of actual and compensatory damages.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the responsibility to avoid the collision with the front
vehicle lies with the driver of the rear vehicle.
Consequently, no other person was to blame but the victim himself since he was the one who
bumped his motorcycle into the rear of the Isuzu truck. He had the last clear chance of avoiding the
accident.

The issues presented are (a) whether respondents were negligent, and if so, (b) whether such
negligence was the proximate cause of the death of Reynaldo Raynera.
Petitioners maintain that the proximate cause of Reynaldo Rayneras death was respondents
negligence in operating the truck trailer on the highway without tail lights and license plate.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari and AFFIRM the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No. 35895, dismissing the amended complaint in Civil Case No. 89-
50355, Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Manila.
No costs.

The Court finds no reason to disturb the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. SO ORDERED.

Negligence is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided by those

considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of
something, which a prudent and reasonable man would not do.[23]

Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.[24]

During the trial, it was established that the truck had no tail lights. The photographs taken of
the scene of the accident showed that there were no tail lights or license plates installed on the
Isuzu truck. Instead, what were installed were two (2) pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, and
one (1) pair of lights in front of the truck. With regard to the rear of the truck, the photos taken and
the sketch in the spot report proved that there were no tail lights.

Despite the absence of tail lights and license plate, respondents truck was visible in the
highway. It was traveling at a moderate speed, approximately 20 to 30 kilometers per hour.It used
the service road, instead of the highway, because the cargo they were hauling posed a danger to
passing motorists. In compliance with the Land Transportation Traffic Code (Republic Act No.
4136)[25] respondents installed 2 pairs of lights on top of the steel plates, as the vehicles cargo load
extended beyond the bed or body thereof.

We find that the direct cause of the accident was the negligence of the victim. Traveling
behind the truck, he had the responsibility of avoiding bumping the vehicle in front of him.He was in
control of the situation. His motorcycle was equipped with headlights to enable him to see what was
in front of him. He was traversing the service road where the prescribed speed limit was less than
that in the highway.

Traffic investigator Cpl. Virgilio del Monte testified that two pairs of 50-watts bulbs were on
top of the steel plates,[26] which were visible from a distance of 100 meters.[27] Virgilio Santos
admitted that from the tricycle where he was on board, he saw the truck and its cargo of iron plates
from a distance of ten (10) meters.[28] In light of these circumstances, an accident could have been
easily avoided, unless the victim had been driving too fast and did not exercise due care and
prudence demanded of him under the circumstances.

Virgilio Santos testimony strengthened respondents defense that it was the victim who was
reckless and negligent in driving his motorcycle at high speed. The tricycle where Santos was on
board was not much different from the victims motorcycle that figured in the accident. Although
Santos claimed the tricycle almost bumped into the improperly parked truck, the tricycle driver was
able to avoid hitting the truck.

It has been said that drivers of vehicles who bump the rear of another vehicle are presumed
to be the cause of the accident, unless contradicted by other evidence. [29] The rationale behind the
presumption is that the driver of the rear vehicle has full control of the situation as he is in a
position to observe the vehicle in front of him.
STEPHEN CANG and GEORGE NARDO y JOSOL, G.R. No. 163078
Petitioners, Petitioners, meanwhile, claimed that it was the motorcycle that bumped into the
Present:
taxi. Nardo narrated that he was driving the taxi on the inner lane (near the center island) along P.
CORONA, J.,
Chairperson, del Rosario St., moving towards the intersection of D. Jakosalem St. When the caution signal of the
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR., traffic light flashed, he immediately slowed down. It was at that point that the motorcycle bumped
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ. into the taxis rear.[5]

HERMINIA CULLEN, Promulgated:

Respondent.
Respondent, as employer, out of compassion, paid all of Saycons hospital and medical
November 25, 2009
expenses amounting to P185,091.00.[6] She also alleged that due to the injuries Saycon sustained, he
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
was unable to work. For humanitarian reasons, respondent had given Saycon an amount equivalent

DECISION to his wages from October 31, 1996 to May 30, 1997. She also gave Saycon P2,000.00 per month

NACHURA, J.: from June 1997 until he was able to return to work.[7]

Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the On July 3, 1997, respondent filed a Complaint for damages against petitioners praying

Decision[1] dated December 2, 2002 and the Resolution[2] dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of that judgment be rendered ordering the latter to pay, jointly and severally, P205,091.00 in actual

Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69841. In the assailed Decision, the CA reversed and set aside the damages; P2,000.00 per month from June 1997 up to the time Saycon would be able to return to

Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20504, an work, with 6% per annum interest from the date of extrajudicial demand; P50,000.00 as exemplary

action for damages. damages; 20% of the total amount by way of attorneys fees; P10,000.00 as acceptance fee; P500.00

per court appearance, as appearance fee; P20,000.00 as litigation expenses; and the cost of the

The claim for damages was precipitated by a vehicular accident involving a taxicab bearing Plate No. suit.[8]

GVG-672, owned by petitioner Stephen Cang and driven by petitioner George Nardo, and a

motorcycle owned by respondent Herminia Cullen and driven by Guillermo Saycon. Petitioner Cang filed a Motion to Dismiss contending that the complaint violated

Presidential Decree No. 1508, or the Katarungang Pambarangay Law. The motion was dismissed on

On October 29, 1996, at about 3:10 p.m., Saycon was driving the Honda motorcycle, with September 24, 1997.[9]

Plate No. LLC-A-4589, along P. del Rosario Street, Cebu City, occupying the middle portion of the

outer lane. The taxi, on the other hand, was traveling on the inner lane and slightly behind, but to Subsequently, petitioners filed their Answer with Counterclaims. Cang averred that

the left of, the motorcycle. Respondent alleged that between Sikatuna and D. Jakosalem Streets, the Nardo was not driving the taxi as the formers employee, but that Nardo was leasing the taxi from

taxi veered to the right and sideswiped the motorcycle, then attempted to speed away. Peace him.[10] Petitioners also claimed that Nardo did not sideswipe the motorcycle driven by Saycon, nor

officers near the scene flagged down the taxi. As a result of the collision, Saycon was seriously did the latter speed away after the incident. They maintained that, at the time of the impact, Nardos

injured.[4] taxi was on its proper lane and that it was the motorcycle that veered into Nardos lane and bumped

the taxi.[11] Further, they alleged that after the impact, Nardo drove the taxi backward to where
Saycon and the motorcycle were slumped on the road. He then alighted from the taxi. Meanwhile,
two traffic enforcers had crossed the street. After examining Saycons injuries, one of the enforcers
ordered Nardo to bring the former to a hospital. Nardo hesitated for a moment because he wanted
the enforcers to make a sketch of the accident first, to show the exact positions of the vehicles at the
time of the accident. However, he was prevailed upon by the traffic enforcers to bring Saycon to the
hospital. Hence, it was not true that Nardo attempted to speed away from the scene of the
accident. Petitioner Cang also claimed that Saycon was driving the motorcycle without any
protective headgear and that the latter was not authorized to drive the motorcycle since he only had
a students permit.[12] Petitioner Cang prayed that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit, for
lack of cause of action and for lack of legal capacity. He also prayed for the award of P50,000.00 as
moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P10,000.00 as acceptance fee, P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees, P20,000.00 as litigation expenses, and P1,000.00 per court appearance.[13]
After trial, the RTC ruled in petitioners favor. In its Decision[14] dated January 31, 2000,
the trial court disposed:
WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the defendants. Plaintiffs (sic) complaint is
hereby dismissed.
Defendants counterclaims are likewise denied.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[15]
Respondent appealed the RTC Decision to the CA. On December 2, 2002, the CA
promulgated the assailed Decision,[16] reversing the RTC Decision, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision dated
January 31, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 22 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Defendants-appellees are hereby ordered
to pay plaintiff-appellant, jointly and severally[,] the following:
1.) The sum of P166,197.08 as actual damages which were incurred for the
hospitalization and other medical expenses of plaintiff-appellants
driver Guillermo Saycon; and
`2.) The sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Petitioners are now before this Court on Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the
CA Decision and its Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration. They argue that the CA
erred in reversing the judgment rendered by the trial court; in giving credence to the eyewitness
testimony of Ike Aldemita, that petitioner Nardo had overtaken the motorcycle driven by Saycon
and, therefore, was the negligent party; and in awarding damages to respondent.[18]
The petition is meritorious.
We note that the present Petition raises questions of fact. Whether a person is negligent
or not is a question of fact which we cannot ordinarily pass upon in a petition for review
on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors of law.[19]
However, although findings of fact of the CA are generally conclusive on this Court, this
rule admits of the following exceptions:[20]
(1) the factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court are
contradictory;
(2) the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures;
(3) the inference made by the Court of Appeals from its findings of
fact is mainly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4) there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
(5) the appellate court, in making its findings, goes beyond the
issues of the case and such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
appellant and appellee;
(6) the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a
misapprehension of facts;
(7) the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion; and
(8) the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court or are mere conclusions without citation of specific
evidence, or where the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by
 respondent, or where the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised
on the absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record.
Thus, when there are conflicting findings of fact by the CA on one hand and by the trial
court on the other, as in this case,[21] the Court may give due course to petitions raising factual issues
by way of exception and only in the presence of extremely meritorious circumstances. [22]
Contrary to the CAs ruling, we find that the RTC correctly disregarded Aldemitas
testimony. Between the RTC and the CA, it is the formers assessment of the witnesses credibility
that should control.[23]
The trial court gave little credence to Aldemitas testimony, upon its finding that:
On the other hand, multicab driver Aldemita contended that he saw
everything. He said that the motorcycle and the taxi overtook him. He told the
court during his testimony that the motorcycle was ahead of the taxi. He
further said that the motorcycle was nearer him (TSN, February 13, 1998,
Savellon, p. 4). The court finds him inconsistent. If both were ahead of him and
the motorcycle was ahead of the taxi, then, the motorcycle could not be nearer
him. Because if the motorcycle was indeed nearer him, then, it could not have
been ahead of the taxi. But rather, the taxi was ahead of the motorcycle. But in
a later testimony, he said that they were beside each other (TSN, Feb. 12, 1998,
Savellon, p. 17).
He also said that both tried to pass the lane which would fit only two
vehicles. He told the court that both vehicles were running fast at a speed of
more than 30 kph when the motorcycle was hit by the taxi. It would seem to
the court that both vehicles were racing each other. Aldemita further said that
in trying to pass the motorcycle, the taxi hit the left handle bar of the
motorcycle. The handle bar was twisted and the motorcycle fell down to the
left side. But if the taxi was indeed to the left of the motorcycle and if it really
swerved to the right and hit the motorcycle the law of force would tell us that
the motorcycle would fall to the right after impact. It is the most logical
direction for the motorcycle to fall. If the taxi was indeed traveling at a fast
speed when it hit the motorcycle, the impact would not have only caused a
mere twisted handle and the motorcycle would not have only fallen on its side
as claimed by Aldemita. High speed impact would have caused the motorcycle
and its driver greater damage and would have dislocated them much farther
away than where it fell in this case.
He claimed that he was more or less ten (10) meters from the site of
the accident when it happened (TSN, Feb. 12, 1998, p. 12). The court can,
therefore, say that he was also quite far from the scene of the accident and
could not be that certain as to what really happened.
Aldemita also said that he signaled the taxi driver to stop (TSN, Feb.
12, 1998, Savellon, p. 6). However, later when asked, he said he signaled the
policeman to stop the taxi driver or not (sic). He also claimed that he was near
(sic) the motorcyclist than the policemen. He further claimed that he was there
at the scene of the accident to help but later said he never saw the driver of the
taxi (TSN, Feb. 12, 1998, Savellon, p. 17). The court finds this highly unusual for
somebody who claimed to be at the scene of the accident not to see the driver
who came out of his vehicle to reason out with the responding enforcers. He
said he was the one who removed the motorcycle which pinned its driver and
then helped carried (sic) the driver to the taxi as told by the policeman (TSN,
Feb. 12, 1998, Savellon p. 7). But later, he said that somebody took his place in
carrying the victim because there were already many people (TSN, Feb. 12,
1998, Savellon, p. 17). x x x.
xxxx
The court also cannot fail to notice the uncontroverted allegation of
Nardo during his testimony that Aldemita was not the person (the multicab
driver) he saw during the time of the accident. He claimed that the person who
testified in court last February 12, 1998, was not the driver of the multicab
who was at the scene of the accident that fateful night (sic) of October 29, 1996
(TSN, Aug. 24, 1998, Pieras, p. 12). Allegations and claims like this when not
countered and disproved would certainly cast doubt on the credibility of the
subject person and consequently, on his testimonies, too.
Based on the points, the court cannot help but find Aldemitas
testimony as uncertain and filled with so many inconsistencies. They
contradicted with each other at many instances. The court believes in either of
the two possibilities -- Aldemita did not really actually and exactly see the
whole incident or he was lying through his teeth. Thus, the court cannot give so
much weight to his testimony.[24]
The CA failed to refute the trial courts detailed analysis of the events leading to the
accident and what transpired thereafter. It merely said that the lower court should have considered
Aldemitas eyewitness testimony.[25] The CA based its findings of the accident only on Aldemitas
account. It failed to consider all the other testimonial and documentary evidence analyzed by the
trial court, which substantially controverted Aldemitas testimony.
In contrast, the trial court found Nardo more credible on the witness stand. Thus:
During his testimonies, Nardo appeared to be consistent, sincere
and certain in his statements. He appeared to be acknowledgeable (sic) in his
work as a driver. He conveyed a definite degree of credibility when he testified.
The Court has decided to give more appreciation to his testimonies. [26]
We are inclined to give greater weight to the trial courts assessment of the two witnesses.
The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are accorded great weight
and respect even considered as conclusive and binding on this Court [27] since the trial judge had the
unique opportunity to observe the witness firsthand and note his demeanor, conduct and attitude
under grueling examination.[28] Only the trial judge can observe the furtive glance, blush of
conscious shame, hesitation, flippant or sneering tone, calmness, sigh of a witness, or his scant or
full realization of an oath all of which are useful aids for an accurate determination of a witness
honesty and sincerity.[29] He can thus be expected to determine with reasonable discretion which
testimony is acceptable and which witness is worthy of belief.[30]
Absent any showing that the trial courts calibration of the credibility of the witnesses was
flawed, we are bound by its assessment.[31] This Court will sustain such findings unless it can be
shown that the trial court ignored,[32] overlooked, misunderstood,[33] misappreciated,[34] or
misapplied[35] substantial facts and circumstances, which, if considered, would materially affect the
result of the case.[36]
We find no such circumstances in this case. The trial courts meticulous and dispassionate
analysis of the facts of the case is noteworthy. It succeeded in presenting a clear and logical picture
of the events even as it admitted that the resolution of the case was made more difficult by the
inefficiencies, indifference, ineptitude, and dishonesty of the local law enforcers, and the
litigants,[37] which left the court without an official sketch of the accident, [38] with no photographs or
any other proof of the damage to the respondents motorcycle, [39] with an altered police
report,[40] and with the baffling matter of the victims drivers license being issued two days after the
accident took place when the victim was supposed to be in the hospital.[41]
These handicaps notwithstanding, the trial court methodically related in detail all the
testimonial and documentary evidence presented, and made the most rational analysis of what truly
happened on the day of the incident.
The trial court categorically found that it was not the taxi that bumped the motorcycle. It
concluded that based on the evidence presented before the court, it was the motorcycle that
bumped the taxi.[42] It also found that at the time of the accident, Saycon, the driver of the
motorcycle, did not have a license but only had a student drivers permit. Further, Saycon was not
wearing the proper protective headgear and was speeding.[43] Hence, the trial court concluded:
It was really pitiful that Saycon suffered for what he did. But then, he
has only himself to blame for his sad plight. He had been careless in driving the
motorcycle without a helmet. For speeding. (sic) For driving alone with only a
student permit. (sic) For causing the accident. (sic) If the driver was found
violating traffic rules, a legal presumption that he was negligent arises.[44]
Section 30 of Republic Act No. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
provides:
Sec. 30. Student-drivers permit Upon proper application and the
payment of the fee prescribed in accordance with law, the Director or his
deputies may issue student-drivers permits, valid for one year to persons not
under sixteen years of age, who desire to learn to operate motor vehicles.
A student-driver who fails in the examination on a professional or
non-professional license shall continue as a student-driver and shall not be
allowed to take another examination at least one month thereafter. No
student-driver shall operate a motor vehicle, unless possessed of a valid
student-drivers permit and accompanied by a duly licensed driver.
The licensed driver duly accredited by the Bureau, acting as
instructor to the student driver, shall be equally responsible and liable as the
latter for any violation of the provisions of this Act and for any injury or
damage done by the motor vehicle on account or as a result of its operation by
a student-driver under his direction.[45]
Saycon was in clear violation of this provision at the time of the accident. Corollarily, Article 2185 of
the Civil Code states:
Art. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a
person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap,
he was violating any traffic regulation.
The Civil Code characterizes negligence as the omission of that diligence required by the
nature of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of
the place.[46] Negligence, as it is commonly understood, is conduct that creates an undue risk of harm
to others. It is the failure to observe that degree of care, precaution and vigilance that the
circumstances justly demand.[47] It is the omission to do something which a reasonable man, guided
by considerations that ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, would do, or doing
something that a prudent and reasonable man would not do.[48]
To determine whether there is negligence in a given situation, this Court laid down this
test: Did defendant, in doing the alleged negligent act, use that reasonable care and caution which an
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, the person is guilty of
negligence.[49]
Based on the foregoing test, we can conclude that Saycon was negligent. In the first place, he should
not have been driving alone. The law clearly requires that the holder of a student-drivers permit
should be accompanied by a duly licensed driver when operating a motor vehicle. Further, there is
the matter of not wearing a helmet and the fact that he was speeding. All these prove that he was
negligent.
Under Article 2179 of the Civil Code,
[w]hen the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and
proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence
was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the injury being
the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the
courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
The trial court gave more credence to Nardos version of the accident that he was on his
proper lane, that he was not speeding, and that it was the motorcycle that bumped into his taxi. The
trial court established that the accident was caused wholly by Saycons negligence. It held that the
injuries and damages suffered by plaintiff (respondent) and Saycon were not due to the acts of
defendants (petitioners) but due to their own negligence and recklessness.[50]
Considering that Saycon was the negligent party, he would not have been entitled to recover
damages from petitioners had he instituted his own action. Consequently, respondent, as his
employer, would likewise not be entitled to claim for damages.
Further militating against respondents claim is the fact that she herself was negligent in
the selection and supervision of her employee. Article 2180 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in their company.
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are
likewise responsible for damages caused by their employees in the service of
the branches in which the latter are employed or on the occasion of their
functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business
or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a
special agent; but not when the damage has been caused by the official to
whom the task done properly pertains, in which case what is provided in
Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage.[51]
When an employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own
duties, there arises the juris tantum presumption that his employer is negligent, rebuttable only by
proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family.[52] Thus, in the selection of
prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience and service records. With respect to the supervision of employees, employers must

formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary

measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be shown by concrete proof, including

documentary evidence.[53]

The fact that Saycon was driving alone with only a students permit is, to our minds, proof

enough that Cullen was negligent either she did not know that he only had a students permit or she

allowed him to drive alone knowing this deficiency. Whichever way we look at it, we arrive at the

same conclusion: that she failed to exercise the due diligence required of her as an employer in

supervising her employee. Thus, the trial court properly denied her claim for damages. One who

seeks equity and justice must come to this Court with clean hands.[54]

In sum, we hold that the trial court correctly found that it was Saycon who caused the

accident and, as such, he cannot recover indemnity for his injury. On the other hand, respondent, as

Saycons employer, was also negligent and failed to exercise the degree of diligence required in

supervising her employee. Consequently, she cannot recover from petitioners what she had paid for

the treatment of her employees injuries.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The

Decision dated December 2, 2002 and the Resolution dated February 23, 2004 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69841 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial

Court of Cebu, Branch 22, in Civil Case No. CEB-20504 is hereby REINSTATED. No pronouncement

as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE G.R. No. 170414 Before the Court are three consolidated petitions for review [1] of the 28 October 2004
INSURANCE SYSTEM, Decision[2] and the 15 November 2005 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73214.
Petitioner, The 28 October 2004 Decision affirmed the 27 July 2001 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 112) of Pasay City. The 15 November 2005 Resolution modified the 28 October 2004
- versus - Decision of the Court of Appeals.

PACIFIC AIRWAYS CORPORATION, The Antecedent Facts

ELY BUNGABONG, and On 2 April 1996, at around 6:45 p.m., the Twin Otter aircraft of Philippine Airways Corporation
MICHAEL GALVEZ, (PAC) arrived at the Manila International Airport [5] from El Nido, Palawan.[6] In command of the
Respondents. aircraft was Ely B. Bungabong.[7] With Bungabong in the cockpit was Michael F. Galvez as co-pilot.[8]
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
Upon touchdown, the Twin Otter taxied along the runway and proceeded to the Soriano Hangar to
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., G.R. No. 170418 disembark its passengers.[9] After the last passenger disembarked, PACs pilots started the engine of
ROGELIO CASIO, and the Twin Otter in order to proceed to the PAC Hangar located at the other end of the airport.[10] At
RUEL ISAAC, around 7:18 p.m., Galvez contacted ground control to ask for clearance to taxi to taxiway
Petitioners, delta.[11] Rogelio Lim, ground traffic controller on duty at the Air Transportation Office (ATO), issued
the clearance on condition that he be contacted again upon reaching taxiway delta intersection. [12]
- versus -
PACs pilots then proceeded to taxi to taxiway delta at about 7:19 and 19 seconds. [13] Upon reaching
the intersection of taxiway delta, Galvez repeated the request to taxi to taxiway delta, which request
PACIFIC AIRWAYS CORPORATION, was granted.[14] Upon reaching fox 1, Galvez requested clearance to make a right turn to fox 1 and to
ELY BUNGABONG and cross runway 13 in order to proceed to fox 1 bravo.[15] ATO granted the request.[16] At this point, the
MICHAEL GALVEZ, Twin Otter was still 350 meters away from runway 13.[17] Upon reaching runway 13, PACs pilots did
Respondents. not make a full stop at the holding point to request clearance right before crossing runway
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 13.[18] Without such clearance, PACs pilots proceeded to cross runway 13.
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE, G.R. No. 170460
DANILO ALZOLA, and Meanwhile, the Philippine Airlines (PAL) Boeing 737, manned by pilots Rogelio Casio and Ruel
ERNESTO* LIM, Present: Isaac, was preparing for take-off along runway 13. The PAL pilots requested clearance to push and
Petitioners, start[19] on runway 13. Ernesto Linog, Jr., air traffic controller on duty at the ATO issued the
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, clearance.[20] Subsequently, at 7:20 and 18 seconds, Linog, Jr. gave PALs Boeing 737 clearance to
PERALTA, take off.[21] Pilots Casio and Isaac then proceeded with the take-off procedure.[22] While already on
- versus - ABAD, take-off roll, Casio caught a glimpse of the Twin Otter on the left side of the Boeing 737 about to
PEREZ,** and cross runway 13.[23]
MENDOZA, JJ.
While the Twin Otter was halfway through runway 13, Galvez noticed the Boeing 737 and told
Bungabong that an airplane was approaching them from the right side.[24]Bungabong then
PACIFIC AIRWAYS CORPORATION, said, Diyos ko po and gave full power to the Twin Otter.[25] The PAL pilots attempted to abort the
ELY BUNGABONG, and take-off by reversing the thrust of the aircraft.[26]However, the Boeing 737 still collided with the
MICHAEL GALVEZ, Twin Otter.[27]
Respondents,
The Boeing 737 dragged the Twin Otter about 100 meters away.[28] When the Twin Otter stopped,
PACs pilots ran away from the aircraft for fear it might explode.[29]While observing the Twin Otter
GOVERNMENT SERVICE Promulgated: from a safe distance, they saw passengers running down from the Boeing 737. [30] When PACs pilots
INSURANCE SYSTEM, returned to the aircraft to get their personal belongings, they saw that the Twin Otter was a total
Intervenor. August 25, 2010 wreck.[31]
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
At 7:21 and 2 seconds on that fateful evening, the PAL pilots informed ATOs control tower that they
had hit another aircraft, referring to the Twin Otter. [32] Bungabong suffered sprain on his shoulder
DECISION while Galvez had laceration on his left thumb.[33] An ambulance brought the two pilots to Makati
Medical Center where they were treated for serious and slight physical injuries.[34]

CARPIO, J.: On 7 May 1996, PAC, Bungabong, and Galvez filed in the Regional Trial Court (Branch 112) of Pasay
City a complaint[35] for sum of money and damages against PAL, Casio, Isaac, ATO, Lim, Linog, Jr., and
ATOs traffic control supervisor, Danilo Alzola. The Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), as
The Case insurer of the Boeing 737 that figured in the collision, intervened.

The Ruling of the Trial Court


The trial court ruled that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence of Alzola, Lim, and
Linog, Jr., as ATOs traffic control supervisor, ground traffic controller, and air traffic controller,
respectively, at the time of the collision. The trial court further held that the direct cause of the
collision was the negligence of Casio and Isaac, as the pilots of the Boeing 737 that collided with the
Twin Otter. The decretal portion of the trial courts decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants Philippine Air Lines and
its pilots, Rogelio Casio and Ruel Isaac, and Air Transportation Office and its comptrollers, Danilo
Alzola, Rogelio Lim and Ernesto Linog, Jr., jointly and severally, to pay:
a) Plaintiff Pacific Airways Corporation the amount of Php15,000,000.00 and the further amount of
Php100,000.00 a day from April 2, 1996 until it is fully reimbursed for the value of its RP-C1154
plane, as actual damages, and the amount of Php3,000,000.00, as exemplary damages, and the
amount of Php1,000,000.00, as and for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation;
b) Plaintiffs Ely B. Bongabong[36] and Michael F. Galvez, the amount of Php5,000.00 each, as actual
damages; the amount of Php500,000.00, as and for moral damages; Php500,000.00 as and for
exemplary damages, and the amount of Php50,000.00, as and for attorneys fees;
c) Defendants are, likewise, ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to plaintiffs the costs of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[37]
PAL, Casio, Isaac, GSIS, ATO, Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr., all appealed the trial courts Decision to the
Court of Appeals.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals found that the trial court did not commit any reversible error. In its 28 October
2004 decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 112, Pasay City dated July 27, 2001 is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[38]
PAL, Casio, Isaac, GSIS, ATO, Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr., filed their respective motions for
reconsideration. The appellate court denied for lack of merit all the motions for reconsideration
except the one filed by Linog, Jr.
The Court of Appeals gave weight to the 20 March 2003 Decision[39] on appeal of the RTC (Branch
108) of Pasay City in Criminal Case No. 02-1979 acquitting Linog, Jr., who was convicted in the
original Decision together with Alzola and Lim, of reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with serious and slight physical injuries in connection with the collision. Since Alzola and
Lim did not appeal, the judgment of conviction against them became final. Alzola and Lim
were sentenced to arresto mayoror imprisonment for two (2) months.[40]
The Court of Appeals reasoned that since the trial court in the criminal case has ruled that Linog, Jr.
was not negligent, then the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. In its 15
November 2005 Resolution, the Court of Appeals decreed:
WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the motions for reconsideration is MODIFIED in that the case
against defendant-appellant ERNESTO LINOG, JR. is dismissed. The decision is AFFIRMED in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.[41]
Hence, the instant consolidated petitions for review.
In G.R. No. 170418, petitioners PAL, Casio, and Isaac argue that the Court of Appeals should have
applied the emergency rule instead of the last clear chance doctrine. Petitioners claim that even if
the PAL pilots were negligent, PAL had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
pilots. Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals awarded damages without any specific
supporting proof as required by law. Petitioners also claim that the Court of Appeals should have
awarded their counterclaim for damages.
In G.R. No. 170414, petitioner GSIS points out that PACs pilots were the ones guilty of negligence as
they violated the Rules of the Air, which provide that right of way belongs to the aircraft on take-off
roll and the aircraft on the right side of another. GSIS stresses that such negligence was the
proximate cause of the collision. GSIS posits that PAC, Bungabong, and Galvez should be held
solidarily liable to pay GSIS the cost of repairing the insured aircraft.
In G.R. No. 170460, petitioners ATO, Alzola, and Lim call our attention to the fact that PAC was a
mere lessee, not the owner of the Twin Otter. They argue that PAC, as mere lessee, was not the real
party-in-interest in the complaint seeking recovery for damages sustained by the Twin Otter.
Petitioners maintain that ground and air traffic clearances were the joint responsibility of ATO and
the pilots-in-command. Petitioners aver that Bungabong and Galvez were negligent in asking for
clearance to cross an active runway while still 350 meters away from the runway. Petitioners claim
that PAL had the right of way and that PACs pilots had the last clear chance to prevent the collision.
The Issue
The sole issue for resolution is who among the parties is liable for negligence under the
circumstances.
The Courts Ruling
The petitions are meritorious.
In a petition for review under Rule 45, only questions of law may be raised. This rule, however,
admits of certain exceptions as when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on a
misapprehension of facts or the Court of Appeals fails to notice certain relevant facts which, if
properly considered, will justify a different conclusion.[42]
After thoroughly going over the evidence on record in this case, we are unable to sustain the finding
of fact and legal conclusion of the Court of Appeals.
To ascertain who among the parties is liable for negligence, we must refer to the applicable rules
governing the specific traffic management of aircrafts at an airport. The Rules of the Air[43] of the Air
Transportation Office apply to all aircrafts registered in the Philippines. [44] The Boeing 737 and the
Twin Otter in this case were both registered in the Philippines. Both are thus subject to the Rules of
the Air. In case of danger of collision between two aircrafts, the Rules of the Air state:
2.2.4.7 Surface Movement of Aircraft. In case of danger of collision between two aircrafts taxiing on
the maneuvering area of an aerodrome, the following shall apply:
a) When two aircrafts are approaching head on, or approximately so, each shall stop or where
practicable, alter its course to the right so as to keep well clear.
b) When two aircrafts are on a converging course, the one which has the other on its right shall give
way.[45] (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, however, the Boeing 737 and the Twin Otter were not both taxiing at the time of the
collision. Only the Twin Otter was taxiing. The Boeing 737 was already on take-off roll. The Rules of
the Air provide:
2.2.4.6 Taking Off. An aircraft taxiing on the maneuvering area of an aerodrome shall give way to
aircraft taking off or about to take off.[46] (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, PALs aircraft had the right of way at the time of collision, not simply because it was on
the right side of PACs aircraft, but more significantly, because it was taking off or about to take off.
PACs Pilots
For disregarding PALs right of way, PACs pilots were grossly negligent. Gross negligence is one that
is characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is
a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to
consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[47]
We find it hard to believe that PACs pilots did not see the Boeing 737 when they looked to the left
and to the right before approaching the runway. It was a clear summer evening in April and the
Boeing 737, only 200 meters away, had its inboard lights, outboard lights, taxi lights, and logo lights
on before and during the actual take-off roll.[48] The only plausible explanation why PACs pilots did
not see the Boeing 737 was that they did not really look to the left and to the right before crossing
the active runway.
Records show that PACs pilots, while still 350 meters away, prematurely requested clearance to
cross the active runway.[49] ATO points out that PACs pilots should have made a full stop at the
holding point to ask for updated clearance right before crossing the active runway. [50] Had PACs
pilots done so, ATO would by then be in a position to determine if there was an aircraft on a take-off
roll at the runway. The collision would not have happened.
ATO, Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr.
The Rules of Air Control govern airplane traffic management and clearance at the then Manila
International Airport. It contains several provisions indicating that airplane traffic management and
clearance are not the sole responsibility of ATO and its traffic controllers, but of the pilots-in-
command of aircrafts as well. The Rules of Air Control state:
1.3 The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall, whether manipulating the controls or not, be
responsible for the operation of the aircraft in accordance with the rules of the air, except that
he may depart from these rules in circumstances that render such departure absolutely necessary in
the interest of safety. (Emphasis supplied)
1.5 The pilot-in-command of an aircraft shall have final authority as to the disposition of the aircraft
while he is in command.[51] (Emphasis supplied)
3.1 Clearances are based solely on expediting and separating aircraft and do not constitute authority
to violate any applicable regulations for promoting safety of flight operationsor for any other
purpose. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
If an air traffic control clearance is not suitable to the pilot-in-command of an aircraft, he may
request, and, if practicable, obtain an amended clearance. [52] (Emphasis supplied)
10.1.5 Clearances issued by controllers relate to traffic and aerodrome conditions only
and do not relieve a pilot of any responsibility whatsoever in connection with a possible violation of
applicable rules and regulations.[53] (Emphasis supplied)
Therefore, even if ATO gave both PALs pilots and PACs pilots clearance to take off and clearance to
cross runway 13, respectively, it remained the primary responsibility of the pilots-in-command to
see to it that the respective clearances given were suitable. Since the pilots-in-command have
the final authority as to the disposition of the aircraft, they cannot, in case a collision occurs, pass
the blame to ATO for issuing clearances that turn out to be unsuitable.
The clearance to cross runway 13, premature as it was, was not an absolute license for PACs pilots
to recklessly maneuver the Twin Otter across an active runway. PACs pilots should have stopped
first at the holding point to ask for clearance to cross the active runway. It was wrong for them to
have relied on a prematurely requested clearance which was issued while they were still 350
meters away. Their defense, that it did not matter whether the clearance was premature or not as
long as the clearance was actually granted,[54] only reveals their poor judgment and gross negligence
in the performance of their duties.
On the other hand, evidence on record shows that the air traffic controller properly issued the
clearance to take off to the Boeing 737. Nothing on record indicates any irregularity in the issuance
of the clearance. In fact, the trial court, in the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in
damage to property with serious and slight physical injuries in connection with the collision, ruled
that air traffic controller Linog, Jr. was not negligent. The Court of Appeals, in its 15 November 2005
Resolution, absolved Linog, Jr. of civil liability for damages based on his acquittal in the criminal
case.
While Alzola and Lim, as found by the trial court in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, may
have been negligent in the performance of their functions, such negligence is only
contributory.[55] Their contributory negligence arises from their granting the premature request of
PACs pilots for clearance to cross runway 13 while the Twin Otter was still 350 meters away from
runway 13. However, as explained earlier, the granting of their premature request for clearance did
not relieve PACs pilots from complying with the Rules of the Air.
PALs Pilots
Records show that PALs pilots timely requested clearance to take off. Linog, Jr., ATOs air traffic
controller, duly issued the clearance to take off.[56] Under the Rules of the Air, PALs aircraft being on
take-off roll undisputedly had the right of way.[57] Further, the Rules of Air Control provide:
2.2.4.1 The aircraft that has the right of way shall maintain its heading and speed, x x
x. [58] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even if Casio noticed from the corner of his eye a small airplane taxiing on the left side and
approaching halfway of fox 1,[59] it was fairly reasonable for PALs pilots to assume that they may
proceed with the take-off because the taxiing aircraft would naturally respect their right of way and
not venture to cross the active runway while the Boeing 737 was on take-off roll.
Applicable by analogy is the case of Santos v. BLTB,[60] where the Court applied the principle that a
motorist who is properly proceeding on his own side of the highway, even after he sees an
approaching motorist coming toward him on the wrong side, is generally entitled to assume that the
other motorist will return to his proper lane of traffic.
Proximate Cause
After assiduously studying the records of this case and carefully weighing the arguments of the
parties, we are convinced that the immediate and proximate case of the collision is the gross
negligence of PACs pilots. Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the
result would not have occurred.[61] In this case, the fact that PACs pilots disregarded PALs right of
way and did not ask for updated clearance right before crossing an active runway was the
proximate cause of the collision. Were it not for such gross negligence on the part of PACs pilots, the (1) Philippine Airlines, Inc. actual or compensatory damages in the amount of US$548,819.93;
collision would not have happened. (2) Rogelio Casio and Ruel Isaac individually moral damages in the amount of P100,000, exemplary
damages in the amount of P100,000, and attorneys fees in the amount of P50,000; and
The Civil Code provides that when a plaintiffs own negligence is the immediate and proximate cause (3) the Government Service Insurance System, as insurer subrogee of Philippine Airlines,
of his injury, he cannot recover damages. actual or compensatory damages in the amount of US$2,775,366.84.
Art. 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury,
he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and No pronouncement as to costs.
proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. (Emphasis supplied) SO ORDERED.
Under the law and prevailing jurisprudence,[62] PAC and its pilots, whose own gross negligence was
the immediate and proximate cause of their own injuries, must bear the cost of such injuries. They
cannot recover damages. Civil Case No. 96-0565 for sum of money and damages, which PAC,
Bungabong, and Galvez filed against PAL, Casio, Isaac, ATO, Alzola, Lim, and Linog, Jr. should have
been dismissed for lack of legal basis.

PALs Counterclaims

We find supported by law and evidence on record PALs counterclaim for actual or compensatory
damages but only in the amount of US$548,819.93[63] representing lease charges during the period
the Boeing 737 was not flying. The said amount cannot be claimed against the insurance policy
covering the Boeing 737. In this connection, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2207. If the plaintiffs property has been insured, and he has received indemnity from the
insurance company for the injury or loss arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained
of, the insurance company shall be subrogated to the rights of the insured against the wrongdoer or
the person who has violated the contract. If the amount paid by the insurance company does not
fully cover the injury or loss, the aggrieved party shall be entitled to recover the deficiency from the
person causing the loss or injury. (Emphasis supplied)

Under the law, GSIS, as insurer subrogee of PALs right to claim actual or compensatory damages in
connection with the repair of the damaged Boeing 737, is entitled to reimbursement for the amount
it advanced. GSIS claims reimbursement for the amount of US$2,775,366.84.[64] In support of its
claim, GSIS presented statements of account, check vouchers, and invoices [65] proving payment for
the repair of the Boeing 737 in the total amount of US$2,775,366.84. We find the claim fully
supported by evidence on record and thus we resolve to grant the same.

With regard to PALs other counterclaims, settled is the rule that the award of moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorneys fees is discretionary based on the facts and circumstances of each case.
The actual losses sustained by the aggrieved parties and the gravity of the injuries must be
considered in arriving at reasonable levels.[66]Understandably, Casio and Isaac suffered sleepless
nights and were temporarily unable to work after the collision. They are thus entitled to moral
damages as well as exemplary damages considering that PACs pilots acted with gross
negligence.[67] Attorneys fees are generally not recoverable except when exemplary damages are
awarded[68] as in this case. We thus deem the amounts of P100,000 in moral damages, P100,000 in
exemplary damages, and P50,000 in attorneys fees to be in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence and appropriate given the circumstances.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions. We SET ASIDE the 28 October 2004 Decision and the 15
November 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73214 affirming in toto the 27
July 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 112) of Pasay City. However, we SUSTAIN the
dismissal of the case against Ernesto Linog, Jr.

Civil Case No. 96-0565 for sum of money and damages, filed by Pacific Airways Corporation (PAC),
Ely B. Bungabong, and Michael F. Galvez, is DISMISSED for lack of legal basis.

Pacific Airways Corporation, Ely B. Bungabong, and Michael F. Galvez are ORDERED to solidarily
pay:
NATIONAL POWER G.R. No. 165969
CORPORATION,
Petitioner, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
HEIRS OF NOBLE CASIONAN,
Respondents. November 27, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
PETITIONING power company pleads for mitigation of awarded damages on ground of contributory
negligence. But is the victim in this case partly to blame for his electrocution and eventual demise?
This is a review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which found the National
Power Corporation (NPC) liable for damages for the death of Noble Casionan due to electrocution
from the companys high tension transmission lines.
The Facts
The facts, as found by the trial court are as follows:
Respondents are the parents of Noble Casionan, 19 years old at the time of the incident that claimed
his life on June 27, 1995. He would have turned 20 years of age on November 9 of that year. Noble
was originally from Cervantes, Ilocos Sur. He worked as a pocket miner in Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon,
Benguet.
A trail leading to Sangilo, Itogon, existed in Dalicno and this trail was regularly used by members of
the community. Sometime in the 1970s, petitioner NPC installed high-tension electrical
transmission lines of 69 kilovolts (KV) traversing the trail. Eventually, some of the transmission
lines sagged and dangled reducing their distance from the ground to only about eight to ten
feet. This posed a great threat to passersby who were exposed to the danger of electrocution
especially during the wet season.
As early as 1991, the leaders of Ampucao, Itogon made verbal and written requests for NPC to
institute safety measures to protect users of the trail from their high tension wires. On June 18,
1991 and February 11, 1993, Pablo and Pedro Ngaosie, elders of the community, wrote Engr.
Paterno Banayot, Area Manager of NPC, to make immediate and appropriate repairs of the high
tension wires. They reiterated the danger it posed to small-scale miners especially during the wet
season. They related an incident where one boy was nearly electrocuted.
In a letter dated March 1, 1995, Engr. Banayot informed Itogon Mayor Cresencio Pacalso
that NPC had installed nine additional poles on their Beckel-Philex 60 KV line. They likewise
identified a possible rerouting scheme with an estimated total cost of 1.7 million pesos to improve
the distance from its deteriorating lines to the ground.
On June 27, 1995, Noble and his co-pocket miner, Melchor Jimenez, were at Dalicno. They cut two
bamboo poles for their pocket mining. One was 18 to 19 feet long and the other was 14 feet
long. Each man carried one pole horizontally on his shoulder: Noble carried the shorter pole while
Melchor carried the longer pole. Noble walked ahead as both passed through the trail underneath
the NPC high tension transmission lines on their way to their work place.
As Noble was going uphill and turning left on a curve, the tip of the bamboo pole he was carrying
touched one of the dangling high tension wires. Melchor, who was walking behind him, narrated
that he heard a buzzing sound when the tip of Nobles pole touched the wire for only about one or
two seconds. Thereafter, he saw Noble fall to the ground. Melchor rushed to Noble and shook him
but the latter was already dead. Their co-workers heard Melchors shout for help and together they
brought the body of Noble to their camp.
A post-mortem examination by Dra. Ignacia Reyes Ciriaco, Municipal Health Officer of Itogon,
Benguet, determined the cause of death to be cardiac arrest, secondary to ventricular fibulation,
secondary to electrocution.[2] She also observed a small burned area in the middle right finger of the
victim.
Police investigators who visited the site of the incident confirmed that portions of the high tension
wires above the trail hung very low, just about eight to ten feet above the ground. They noted that
the residents, school children, and pocket miners usually used the trail and had to pass directly
underneath the wires. The trail was the only viable way since the other side was a precipice. In
addition, they did not see any danger warning signs installed in the trail.
The elders and leaders of the community, through Mayor Cresencio Pacalso, informed the General
Manager of NPC in Itogon of the incident. After learning of the electrocution, NPC repaired the
dangling and sagging transmission lines and put up warning signs around the area.
Consequently, the heirs of the deceased Noble filed a claim for damages against the NPC before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Benguet. In its answer, NPC denied being negligent in maintaining the
safety of the high tension transmission lines. It averred that there were danger and warning signs
installed but these were stolen by children. Excavations were also made to increase the necessary
clearance from the ground to about 17 to 18 feet but some towers or poles sank due to pocket
mining in the area.
At the trial, NPC witnesses testified that the cause of death could not have been electrocution
because the victim did not suffer extensive burns despite the strong 69 KV carried by the
transmission lines. NPC argued that if Noble did die by electrocution, it was due to his own
negligence. The company counter-claimed for attorneys fees and cost of litigation.
RTC Disposition
On February 17, 1998, the RTC decided in favor of respondents. The fallo of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant NPC
as follows:
1. Declaring defendant NPC guilty of Negligence (Quasi-Delict) in connection with the death of Noble
Casionan;
2. Ordering NPC as a consequence of its negligence, to pay the plaintiffs Jose and Linda Casionan, as
heirs of the deceased, Noble Casionan, the following Damages:
a. P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their son Noble Casionan;
b. P100,000.00 as moral damages;

c. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
d. P52,277.50 as actual damages incurred for the expenses of burial and wake in connection with
the death of Noble Casionan;
e. P720,000.00 as the loss of unearned income; and
f. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees and the cost of suit; and
3. Dismissing the counter claim of the NPC for lack of merit.[3]
The RTC gave more credence to the testimony of witnesses for respondents than those of NPC who
were not actually present at the time of the incident. The trial court observed that witnesses for NPC
were biased witnesses because they were all employed by the company, except for the witness from
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The RTC found:
Melchor Jimenez was very vivid in his account. He declared that he and Noble Casionan cut two
bamboo poles, one 14 feet and the other about 18 feet. The shorter bamboo pole was carried by
Noble Casionan and the longer bamboo pole was carried by him. And they walked along the trail
underneath the transmission lines. He was following Noble Casionan. And when they were going
uphill in the trail and Noble Casionan was to turn left in a curve, the bamboo pole of Casionan swung
around and its tip at the back touched for one or two seconds or for a split moment the transmission
line that was dangling and a buzzing sound was heard. And Casionan immediately fell dead and
simply stopped breathing. What better account would there be than this? Melchor Jimenez was an eye
witness as to how it all happened.[4] (Emphasis added)
The RTC ruled that the negligence of NPC in maintaining the high-tension wires was established by
preponderance of evidence. On this score, the RTC opined:
2. On the matter of whether plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant NPC, obviously, they
would have. x x x This negligence of the NPC was well established and cannot be denied because
previous to this incident, the attention of NPC has already been called by several requests and demands
in 1991, 1993 and 1995 by elders and leaders of the community in the area to the fact that their
transmission lines were dangling and sagging and the clearance thereof from the line to the ground
was only 8 to 10 feet and not within the standard clearance of 18 to 20 feet but no safety measures
were taken. They did not even put danger and warning signs so as to warn persons passing
underneath.[5] (Emphasis added)
Disagreeing with the ruling of the trial court, NPC elevated the case to the CA. In its appeal, it argued
that the RTC erred in ruling that NPC was liable for Nobles
death. Further, even assuming that Noble died of electrocution, the RTC erred in not finding that he
was guilty of contributory negligence and in awarding excessive damages.
CA Disposition
On June 30, 2004, the CA promulgated its decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the amount
of moral damages is REDUCED to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); and the award of attorneys
fees in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) is DELETED.[6]
The CA sustained the findings of fact of the trial court but reduced the award of moral damages
from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00. The CA further disallowed the award of attorneys fees because the
reason for the award was not expressly stated in the body of the decision.
Issues
The following issues are presented for Our consideration: (i) Whether the award for damages
should be deleted in view of the contributory negligence of the victim; and (ii) Whether the award
for unearned income, exemplary, and moral damages should be deleted for lack of factual and legal
bases.[7]
Our Ruling
I
That the victim Noble died from being electrocuted by the high-tension transmission wires of
petitioner is not contested by petitioner. We are, however, asked to delete or mitigate the damages
awarded by the trial and appellate courts in view of what petitioner alleges to be contributory
negligence on the part of the victim.
As a rule, only questions of law may be entertained on appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. The
finding of negligence on the part of petitioner by the trial court and affirmed by the CA is a question
of fact which We cannot pass upon since it would entail going into factual matters on which the
finding of negligence was based.[8] Corollary to this, the finding by both courts of the lack of
contributory negligence on the part of the victim is a factual issue which is deemed conclusive upon
this Court absent any compelling reason for Us to rule otherwise.
But even if We walk the extra mile, the finding of liability on the part of petitioner must stay.
Petitioner contends that the mere presence of the high tension wires above the trail did not cause
the victims death. Instead, it was Nobles negligent carrying of the bamboo pole that caused his
death. It insists that Noble was negligent when he allowed the bamboo pole he was carrying to
touch the high tension wires. This is especially true because other people traversing the trail have
not been similarly electrocuted.
Petitioners contentions are absurd.
The sagging high tension wires were an accident waiting to happen. As established during trial,
the lines were sagging around 8 to 10 feet in violation of the required distance of 18 to 20 feet. If the
transmission lines were properly maintained by petitioner, the bamboo pole carried by Noble
would not have touched the wires. He would not have been electrocuted.
Petitioner cannot excuse itself from its failure to properly maintain the wires by attributing
negligence to the victim. In Ma-ao Sugar Central Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[9] this Court held that the
responsibility of maintaining the rails for the purpose of preventing derailment accidents belonged
to the company. The company should not have been negligent in ascertaining that the rails were
fully connected than to wait until a life was lost due to an accident. Said the Court:
In this petition, the respondent court is faulted for finding the petitioner guilty of negligence
notwithstanding its defense of due diligence under Article 2176 of the Civil Code and for disallowing
the deductions made by the trial court.
Investigation of the accident revealed that the derailment of the locomotive was caused by protruding
rails which had come loose because they were not connected and fixed in place by fish plates. Fish
plates are described as strips of iron 8" to 12" long and 3 " thick which are attached to the rails by 4
bolts, two on each side, to keep the rails aligned. Although they could be removed only with special
equipment, the fish plates that should have kept the rails aligned could not be found at the scene of
the accident.
There is no question that the maintenance of the rails, for the purpose, inter alia, of preventing
derailments, was the responsibility of the petitioner, and that this responsibility was not
discharged. According to Jose Reyes, its own witness, who was in charge of the control and
supervision of its train operations, cases of derailment in the milling district were frequent and
there were even times when such derailments were reported every hour. The petitioner should
therefore have taken more prudent steps to prevent such accidents instead of waiting until a life
was finally lost because of its negligence.[10]
Moreover, We find no contributory negligence on Nobles part.
Negligence is the failure to observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree
of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury.[11] On the other hand, contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the
injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below the
standard which he is required to conform for his own protection. [12] There is contributory
negligence when the partys act showed lack of ordinary care and foresight that such act could cause
him harm or put his life in danger.[13] It is an act or omission amounting to want of ordinary care on
the part of the person injured which, concurring with the defendants negligence, is the proximate
cause of the injury.[14]
The underlying precept on contributory negligence is that a plaintiff who is partly responsible for
his own injury should not be entitled to recover damages in full but must bear the consequences of
his own negligence.[15] If indeed there was contributory negligence on the part of the victim, then it
is proper to reduce the award for damages. This is in consonance with the Civil Code provision that
liability will be mitigated in consideration of the contributory negligence of the injured party. Article
2179 of the Civil Code is explicit on this score:
When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot
recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of
the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover damages, but the courts
shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
In Ma-ao Sugar Central, it was held that to hold a person as having contributed to his injuries, it
must be shown that he performed an act that brought about his injuries in disregard of warnings or
signs on an impending danger to health and body. This Court held then that the victim was not
guilty of contributory negligence as there was no showing that the caboose where he was riding was
a dangerous place and that he recklessly dared to stay there despite warnings or signs of impending
danger.[16]
In this case, the trail where Noble was electrocuted was regularly used by members of the
community. There were no warning signs to inform passersby of the impending danger to their lives
should they accidentally touch the high tension wires. Also, the trail was the only viable way from
Dalicon to Itogon. Hence, Noble should not be faulted for simply doing what was ordinary routine to
other workers in the area.
Petitioner further faults the victim in engaging in pocket mining, which is prohibited by the DENR in
the area.
In Aonuevo v. Court of Appeals,[17] this Court ruled that the violation of a statute is not sufficient to
hold that the violation was the proximate cause of the injury, unless the very injury that happened
was precisely what was intended to be prevented by the statute. In said case, the allegation of
contributory negligence on the part of the injured party who violated traffic regulations
when he failed to register his bicycle or install safety gadgets thereon was struck down. We quote:
x x x The bare fact that Villagracia was violating a municipal ordinance at the time of the accident
may have sufficiently established some degree of negligence on his part, but such negligence is without
legal consequence unless it is shown that it was a contributing cause of the injury. If anything at all, it
is but indicative of Villagracias failure in fulfilling his obligation to the municipal government, which
would then be the proper party to initiate corrective action as a result. But such failure alone is not
determinative of Villagracias negligence in relation to the accident. Negligence is relative or
comparative, dependent upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which
the particular circumstances reasonably require. To determine if Villagracia was negligent, it is not
sufficient to rely solely on the violations of the municipal ordinance, but imperative to examine
Villagracias behavior in relation to the contemporaneous circumstances of the accident.
xxxx
Under American case law, the failures imputed on Villagracia are
not grievous enough so as to negate monetary relief. In the absence of statutory requirement, one is
not negligent as a matter of law for failing to equip a horn, bell, or other warning devise onto a
bicycle. In most cases, the absence of proper lights on a bicycle does not constitute negligence as a
matter of law but is a question for the jury whether the absence of proper lights played a causal part
in producing a collision with a motorist. The absence of proper lights on a bicycle at night, as required
by statute or ordinance, may constitute negligence barring or diminishing recovery if the bicyclist is
struck by a motorist as long as the absence of such lights was a proximate cause of the collision;
however, the absence of such lights will not preclude or diminish recovery if the scene of the accident
was well illuminated by street lights, if substitute lights were present which clearly rendered the
bicyclist visible, if the motorist saw the bicycle in spite of the absence of lights thereon, or if the
motorist would have been unable to see the bicycle even if it had been equipped with lights. A bicycle
equipped with defective or ineffective brakes may support a finding of negligence barring or
diminishing recovery by an injured bicyclist where such condition was a contributing cause of the
accident.
The above doctrines reveal a common thread. The failure of the bicycle owner to comply with
accepted safety practices, whether or not imposed by ordinance or statute, is not sufficient to negate or
mitigate recovery unless a causal connection is established between such failure and the injury
sustained. The principle likewise finds affirmation in Sanitary Steam, wherein we declared that the
violation of a traffic statute must be shown as the proximate cause of the injury, or that it
substantially contributed thereto. Aonuevo had the burden of clearly proving that the alleged
negligence of Villagracia was the proximate or contributory cause of the latters injury.[18] (Emphasis
added)
That the pocket miners were unlicensed was not a justification for petitioner to leave their
transmission lines dangling. We quote with approval the observation of the RTC on this matter:
The claim of NPC that the pocket miners have no right to operate within the area of Dalicno, Itogon,
Benguet as there was no permit issued by DENR is beside the point. The fact is that there were not
only pocket miners but also there were many residents in the area of Dalicno, Ampucao, Itogon,
Benguet using the trail. These residents were using this trail underneath the transmission lines x x
x. They were using this trail even before the transmission lines were installed in the 1970s by
NPC. The pocket miners, although they have no permit to do pocket mining in the area, are also human
beings who have to eke out a living in the only way they know how. The fact that they were not issued a
permit by the DENR to do pocket mining is no justification for NPC to simply leave their transmission
lines dangling or hanging 8 to 10 feet above the ground posing danger to the life and limb of everyone
in said community. x x x[19](Emphasis added)
In sum, the victim was not guilty of contributory negligence. Hence, petitioner is not entitled to a
mitigation of its liability.
II
We now determine the propriety of the awards for loss of unearned income, moral, and exemplary
damages.
From the testimony of the victims mother, it was duly established during trial that he was
earning P3,000.00 a month. To determine the compensable amount of lost earnings, We
consider (1) the number of years for which the victim would otherwise have lived (life expectancy); SO ORDERED.
and (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased. Life expectancy is computed by
applying the formula (2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American Expectancy Table of
Mortality or the Actuarial Combined Experience Table of Mortality. The second factor is computed
by multiplying the life expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the total earnings less
expenses necessary in the creation of such earnings or income and less living and other incidental
expenses. The net earning is ordinarily computed at fifty percent (50%) of the gross earnings. Thus,
the formula used by this Court in computing loss of earning capacity is: Net Earning Capacity = [2/3
x (80 age at time of death) x (gross annual income reasonable and necessary living expenses)]. [20]

We sustain the trial court computation of unearned income of the victim:

x x x the loss of his unearned income can be computed as follows: two-thirds of 80 years, minus 20
years, times P36,000.00 per year, equals P1,440,000.00. This is because Noble Casionan, at the time
of his death, was 20 years old and was healthy and strong. And, therefore, his life expectancy would
normally reach up to 80 years old in accordance with the above formula illustrated in the aforesaid
cases. Thus, Noble Casionan had 60 more years life expectancy since he was 20 years old at the time
of his death on June 27, 1995. Two-thirds of 60 years times P36,000.00 since he was earning
about P3,000.00 a month of P36,000.00 a year would be P1,440,000.00.

However, in determining the unearned income, the basic concern is to determine the damages
sustained by the heirs or dependents of the deceased Casionan. And here, the damages consist not of
the full amount of his earnings but the support they would have received from the deceased had he
not died as a consequence of the unlawful act of the NPC. x x x The amount recoverable is not the
loss of the entire earnings but the loss of that portion of the earnings which the heirs would have
received as support. Hence, from the amount of P1,440,000.00, a reasonable amount for the
necessary expenses of Noble Casionan had he lived would be deducted. Following the ruling
in People v. Quilaton, 205 SCRA 279, the Court deems that 50 percent of the gross earnings of the
deceased of P1,440,000.00 should be deducted for his necessary expenses had he lived, thus leaving
the other half of about P720,000.00 as the net earnings that would have gone for the support of his
heirs. This is the unearned income of which the heirs were deprived of.[21]

In quasi delicts, exemplary damages are awarded where the offender was guilty of gross
negligence.[22] Gross negligence has been defined to be the want or absence of even slight care or
diligence as to amount to a reckless disregard of the safety of person or property. It evinces a
thoughtless disregard of consequences without exerting any effort to avoid them. [23]

Petitioner demonstrated its disregard for the safety of the members of the community of Dalicno
who used the trail regularly when it failed to address the sagging high tension wires despite
numerous previous requests and warnings. It only exerted efforts to rectify the danger it posed after
a death from electrocution already occurred. Gross negligence was thus apparent, warranting the
award of exemplary damages.

As to the award of moral damages, We sustain the CA reduction of the award. Moral damages are
designed to compensate the claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer. It is not meant to enrich the complainant but to enable the injured party to obtain
means to obviate the moral suffering experience. Trial courts should guard against the award of
exorbitant damages lest they be accused of prejudice or corruption in their decision making.[24] We
find that the CA correctly reduced the award from P100,000.00 to P50,000.00.

As for the award for attorneys fees, well-settled is the rule that the reason for the award must be
discussed in the text of the courts decision and not only in the dispositive portion. [25] Except for
the fallo, a discussion on the reason for the award for attorneys fees was not included by the RTC in
its decision. The CA thus correctly disallowed it on appeal.

WHREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
LAMBERT S. RAMOS, G.R. No. 184905
Petitioner,
Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus - Chico-Nazario,
Velasco, Jr.,
Nachura, and
Peralta, JJ.
C.O.L. REALTY CORPORATION,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 28, 2009
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution is whether petitioner can be held solidarily liable with his driver, Rodel
Ilustrisimo, to pay respondent C.O.L. Realty the amount of P51,994.80 as actual damages suffered in
a vehicular collision.
The facts, as found by the appellate court, are as follows:
On or about 10:40 oclock in the morning of 8 March 2004, along Katipunan (Avenue), corner Rajah
Matanda (Street), Quezon City, a vehicular accident took place between a Toyota Altis Sedan bearing
Plate Number XDN 210, owned by petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation, and driven by Aquilino Larin
(Aquilino), and a Ford Expedition, owned by x x x Lambert Ramos (Ramos) and driven by Rodel
Ilustrisimo (Rodel), with Plate Number LSR 917. A passenger of the sedan, one Estela Maliwat
(Estela) sustained injuries. She was immediately rushed to the hospital for treatment.
(C.O.L. Realty) averred that its driver, Aquilino, was slowly driving the Toyota Altis car at a speed of
five to ten kilometers per hour along Rajah Matanda Street and has just crossed the center lane of
Katipunan Avenue when (Ramos) Ford Espedition violently rammed against the cars right rear door
and fender. With the force of the impact, the sedan turned 180 degrees towards the direction where
it came from.
Upon investigation, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found probable cause to indict
Rodel, the driver of the Ford Expedition, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property. In the meantime, petitioner demanded from respondent reimbursement for the expenses
incurred in the repair of its car and the hospitalization of Estela in the aggregate amount of
P103,989.60. The demand fell on deaf ears prompting (C.O.L. Realty) to file a Complaint for Damages
based on quasi-delict before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila (MeTC), Quezon City,
docketed as Civil Case No. 33277, and subsequently raffled to Branch 42.
As could well be expected, (Ramos) denied liability for damages insisting that it was the negligence
of Aquilino, (C.O.L. Realtys) driver, which was the proximate cause of the accident. (Ramos)
maintained that the sedan car crossed Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street despite the
concrete barriers placed thereon prohibiting vehicles to pass through the intersection.
(Ramos) further claimed that he was not in the vehicle when the mishap occurred. He asserted that
he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his driver,
Rodel.
Weighing the respective evidence of the parties, the MeTC rendered the Decision dated 1 March
2006 exculpating (Ramos) from liability, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant case is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Counterclaims of the defendant
are likewise DISMISSED for lack of sufficient factual and legal basis.
SO ORDERED.
The aforesaid judgment did not sit well with (C.O.L. Realty) so that he (sic) appealed the same
before the RTC of Quezon City, raffled to Branch 215, which rendered the assailed Decision dated 5
September 2006, affirming the MeTCs Decision. (C.O.L. Realtys) Motion for Reconsideration met the
same fate as it was denied by the RTC in its Order dated 5 June 2007. [1]
C.O.L. Realty appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the view that Aquilino was negligent
in crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street since, as per Certification of the
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) dated November 30, 2004, such act is
specifically prohibited. Thus:
This is to certify that as per records found and available in this office the crossing of vehicles
at Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street to Blue Ridge Subdivision, Quezon City has
(sic) not allowed since January 2004 up to the present in view of the ongoing road
construction at the area.[2] (Emphasis supplied)
Barricades were precisely placed along the intersection of Katipunan Avenue and Rajah Matanda
Street in order to prevent motorists from crossing Katipunan Avenue. Nonetheless, Aquilino
crossed Katipunan Avenue through certain portions of the barricade which were broken, thus
violating the MMDA rule.[3]
However, the Court of Appeals likewise noted that at the time of the collision, Ramos vehicle was
moving at high speed in a busy area that was then the subject of an ongoing construction (the
Katipunan Avenue-Boni Serrano Avenue underpass), then smashed into the rear door and fender of
the passengers side of Aquilinos car, sending it spinning in a 180-degree turn.[4] It therefore found
the driver Rodel guilty of contributory negligence for driving the Ford Expedition at high speed
along a busy intersection.
Thus, on May 28, 2008, the appellate court rendered the assailed Decision,[5] the dispositive portion
of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 5 September 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 215 is hereby MODIFIED in that respondent Lambert Ramos is held solidarily liable with
Rodel Ilustrisimo to pay petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporation the amount of P51,994.80 as actual
damages. Petitioner C.O.L. Realty Corporations claim for exemplary damages, attorneys fees and
cost of suit are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, the instant petition, which
raises the following sole issue:
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, AND THE
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT AND JUSTIFY THE SAME IS INSUFFICIENT.
We resolve to GRANT the petition.
There is no doubt in the appellate courts mind that Aquilinos violation of the MMDA prohibition
against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street was the proximate cause of the
accident. Respondent does not dispute this; in its Comment to the instant petition, it even conceded
that petitioner was guilty of mere contributory negligence. [6]
Thus, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that:
The Certification dated 30 November 2004 of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
(MMDA) evidently disproved (C.O.L. Realtys) barefaced assertion that its driver, Aquilino, was not to
be blamed for the accident
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that as per records found and available in this office the crossing of vehicles
at Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda Street to Blue Ridge Subdivision, Quezon City has (sic) not
allowed since January 2004 up to the present in view of the ongoing road construction at the area.
This certification is issued upon request of the interested parties for whatever legal purpose it may
serve.
(C.O.L. Realty) admitted that there were barricades along the intersection of Katipunan
Avenue and Rajah Matanda Street. The barricades were placed thereon to caution drivers not to
pass through the intersecting roads. This prohibition stands even if, as (C.O.L. Realty) claimed, the
barriers were broken at that point creating a small gap through which any vehicle could pass. What
is clear to Us is that Aquilino recklessly ignored these barricades and drove through it. Without
doubt, his negligence is established by the fact that he violated a traffic regulation. This finds
support in Article 2185 of the Civil Code
Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.
Accordingly, there ought to be no question on (C.O.L. Realtys) negligence which resulted in the
vehicular mishap.[7]
However, it also declared Ramos liable vicariously for Rodels contributory negligence in driving
the Ford Expedition at high speed along a busy intersection. On this score, the appellate court made
the following pronouncement:
As a professional driver, Rodel should have known that driving his vehicle at a high speed in a major
thoroughfare which was then subject of an on-going construction was a perilous act. He had no
regard to (sic) the safety of other vehicles on the road. Because of the impact of the collision,
(Aquilinos) sedan made a 180-degree turn as (Ramos) Ford Expedition careened and smashed into
its rear door and fender. We cannot exculpate Rodel from liability.
Having thus settled the contributory negligence of Rodel, this created a presumption of negligence
on the part of his employer, (Ramos). For the employer to avoid the solidary liability for a tort
committed by his employee, an employer must rebut the presumption by presenting adequate and
convincing proof that in the selection and supervision of his employee, he or she exercises the care
and diligence of a good father of a family. Employers must submit concrete proof, including
documentary evidence, that they complied with everything that was incumbent on them.
(Ramos) feebly attempts to escape vicarious liability by averring that Rodel was highly
recommended when he applied for the position of family driver by the Social Service Committee of
his parish. A certain Ramon Gomez, a member of the churchs livelihood program, testified that a
background investigation would have to be made before an applicant is recommended to the
parishioners for employment. (Ramos) supposedly tested Rodels driving skills before accepting him
for the job. Rodel has been his driver since 2001, and except for the mishap in 2004, he has not been
involved in any road accident.
Regrettably, (Ramos) evidence which consisted mainly of testimonial evidence remained
unsubstantiated and are thus, barren of significant weight. There is nothing on the records which
would support (Ramos) bare allegation of Rodels 10-year unblemished driving record. He failed to
present convincing proof that he went to the extent of verifying Rodels qualifications, safety record,
and driving history.
So too, (Ramos) did not bother to refute (C.O.L. Realtys) stance that his driver was texting with his
cellphone while running at a high speed and that the latter did not slow down albeit he knew that
Katipunan Avenue was then undergoing repairs and that the road was barricaded with barriers. The
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence in the selection of driver remains unrebutted.
As the employer of Rodel, (Ramos) is solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the former.
Certainly, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to
their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision of employees, the employer
must formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation and impose
disciplinary measures for the breach thereof. These, (Ramos) failed to do.[8]
Petitioner disagrees, arguing that since Aquilinos willful disregard of the MMDA prohibition was the
sole proximate cause of the accident, then respondent alone should suffer the consequences of the
accident and the damages it incurred. He argues:
20. It becomes apparent therefore that the only time a plaintiff, the respondent herein, can recover
damages is if its negligence was only contributory, and such contributory negligence was the
proximate cause of the accident. It has been clearly established in this case, however, that
respondents negligence was not merely contributory, but the sole proximate cause of the accident.
xxxx
22. As culled from the foregoing, respondent was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
Respondents vehicle should not have been in that position since crossing the said intersection was
prohibited. Were it not for the obvious negligence of respondents driver in crossing the intersection
that was prohibited, the accident would not have happened. The crossing of respondents vehicle in a
prohibited intersection unquestionably produced the injury, and without which the accident would
not have occurred. On the other hand, petitioners driver had the right to be where he was at the
time of the mishap. As correctly concluded by the RTC, the petitioners driver could not be expected
to slacken his speed while travelling along said intersection since nobody, in his right mind, would
do the same. Assuming, however, that petitioners driver was indeed guilty of any contributory
negligence, such was not the proximate cause of the accident considering that again, if respondents
driver did not cross the prohibited intersection, no accident would have happened. No imputation of
any lack of care on Ilustrisimos could thus be concluded. It is obvious then that petitioners driver
was not guilty of any negligence that would make petitioner vicariously liable for damages.
23. As the sole proximate cause of the accident was respondents own driver, respondent cannot
claim damages from petitioner.[9]
On the other hand, respondent in its Comment merely reiterated the appellate courts findings and
pronouncements, conceding that petitioner is guilty of mere contributory negligence, and insisted
on his vicarious liability as Rodels employer under Article 2184 of the Civil Code.
Articles 2179 and 2185 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts apply in this case, viz:
Article 2179. When the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate and
proximate cause of the injury being the defendants lack of due care, the plaintiff may recover
damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.
Article 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring contributory
negligence of his own servant or agent, the latters negligence is imputed to his superior and will
defeat the superiors action against the third person, assuming of course that the contributory
negligence was the proximate cause of the injury of which complaint is made.[10]

Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilinos act of crossing Katipunan
Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it was prohibited by law. Moreover, it
was the proximate cause of the accident, and thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered
by respondent from the accident.

Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing
the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor,
the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event
should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the
moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.[11]

If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from Rajah Matanda,
the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward event is exactly what the MMDA
prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and intelligent person who resides within the vicinity
where the accident occurred, Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a
natural and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is considered
dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the ongoing construction of the
Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest error for the Court of Appeals to have
overlooked the principle embodied in Article 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiffs own
negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.

Hence, we find it unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodels contributory negligence, since it
cannot overcome or defeat Aquilinos recklessness which is the immediate and proximate cause of
the accident. Rodels contributory negligence has relevance only in the event that Ramos seeks to
recover from respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will have
the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor. In other words, an assertion of
contributory negligence in this case would benefit only the petitioner; it could not eliminate
respondents liability for Aquilinos negligence which is the proximate result of the accident.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 28, 2008 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 99614 and its Resolution of October 13, 2008 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 215 dated September 5,
2006 dismissing for lack of merit respondents complaint for damages is hereby REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.