Applicability of the Rules of Civil Action
In the application of venue statutes and rules —
HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ vs.HERMINIO
MARAVILLA
Respondent also contends that appeals in special
proceedings, as distinguished from ordinary civil cases, are
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals, since they are not enumerated in Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act, as amended. Granting, arguendo, that a special
proceeding is not a civil action, it has never been decided that
a special proceeding is not a "civil case". On the other hand, it
has been held that the term "civil case" includes special
proceedings. Moreover, Section 2, Rule 73, of the Rules of
Court provides that the rules on ordinary civil actions are
applicable in special proceedings where they are not
inconsistent with, or when they may serve to supplement
the provisions relating to special proceedings.
Consequently, the procedure of appeal is the same in civil
actions as in special proceedings.
ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER vs. ESTATE OF ALICE O.
SHEKER
“Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. - In the
absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in
ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in
special proceedings”.
Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of
the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but in the
absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I
of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be
applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable.
The word practicable is defined as possible to
practice or perform; capable of being put into practice,
done or accomplished. This means that in the absence of
special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in
special proceedings as much as possible and where doing so
would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in
the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in
ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to
special proceedings.
Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and
initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-personal
service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money
claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate
proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings
such as the settlement of the estate of a deceased person
Venue and Process
Jurisdiction
GARCIA vs. FULE
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it
is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the
terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place
and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular
length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary.
GARCIA-QUIAZON vs. BELEN
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of
the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules –
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it
is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the
terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey
the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."
Testate Proceedings is preferred over intestate
proceedings
ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS vs. JUDGE TOMAS R.
LEONIDAS
The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous
that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in
an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should
be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge
assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing
the two cases.
VICENTE URIARTE v. THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL
According to the SC, although it can not be denied
that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of
the estate of a deceased person, whether in accordance with
the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will,
is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his
estate. It was equally true, however, that in accordance with
settled jurisprudence, testate proceedings, for the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate
proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held
repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it is found that the
decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of
the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at
that stage an administrator had already been appointed,
the latter being required to render final account and turn
over the estate in his possession to the executor
subsequently appointed.
ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO vs. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS
The Judiciary Act concededly confers original
jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all matter
of probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other
hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule
of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in
order to prevent conflict among the different courts which
otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the
Rule specifies that "the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."It is equally
conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of
his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject
matter but merely of venue. It should be noted that the Rule on
venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or
intestate petition is first filed acquires exclusive
jurisdiction.The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that
"the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion
of all other courts."
A fair reading of the Rule, since it deals with venue
and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate
jurisdiction, indicates that the court with whom the petition
is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction
over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a
petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been
presented in another court where the decedent obviously had
his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow
and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate
petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may
be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the
petition and hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead
defer to the second court which has before it the petition for
probate of the decedent's alleged last will.
Extent of Jurisdiction of probate court
Heirs of Ypon vs. Ricaforte
Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who
are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for
recovery of ownership and possession of property. This must
take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and
ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court
cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the
reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special
proceeding.
In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v.
Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters
relating to the rights of filiation and heirship must be
ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding
instituted precisely for the purpose of determining such rights.
By way of exception, the need to institute a separate
special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be
dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties
in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial
court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue
of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment
thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but
had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be
re-opened.
Heirs of TEOFILO GABATAN, v. Hon. COURT OF
APPEALS and LOURDES EVERO PACANA
General Rule: The main cause of action in the court
a quo is the recovery of ownership and possession of property.
It is undisputed that the subject property was owned by the
deceased during his lifetime. Jurisprudence dictates that the
determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased
must be made in the proper special proceedings in court,
and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and
possession of property. This must take precedence over the
action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court
has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a
declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that
such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.
Exception: It would be more practical to dispense
with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the
status of Lourdes as the sole heir of Juan Gabatan, especially
since the parties to civil case, had voluntarily submitted the
issue to the RTC and already presented their evidence
regarding the issue of heirship in the proceeding. Also, the
RTC assumed jurisdiction over the same and consequently
rendered judgment thereon.
VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ VS. CA

The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not
be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon
the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding
ownership which may be instituted by the parties
Order of exclusion (or inclusion) is not a final order;
that it is interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once
and for all the title to the subject lots; that the prevailing rule is
that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate
court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is
not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the
parties.
TERESITA N. DE LEON, ZENAIDA C. NICOLAS vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS
A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate
proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally.
PACIOLES, JR. v. CHUATOCO-CHING
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial
court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to
matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate
of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court
exercises special and limited jurisdiction.
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an
intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon questions
of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not
a property should be included in the inventory.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated
in a long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to
ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the
deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his
property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his
estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an
intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court
has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must
be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction as a regional trial court.
Exception to probate court’s limited jurisdiction
THELMA M. ARANAS v. TERESITA V. MERCADO
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial
court, either as a probate court or an intestate court, relates
only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule
is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one in
charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate,
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be
a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the
deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his
estate. All that the said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered by
the administrator.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as
justified by expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass
upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to final determination of
ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested
parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate
court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily,
its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the
property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property
of the deceased spouse.
Summary Settlement of Estates
Extrajudicial Settlement by agreement
PORTUGAL VS. PORTUGAL-BELTRAN
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or
wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugals estate,
executed the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the
second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Said rule is an exception to the general rule that when a
person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a
qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule
78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed
to name an executor therein.
MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS
 There is no law that requires partition among
heirs to be in writing to be valid. In Hernandez vs. Andal,
supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put
in a public document and registered has for its purpose the
protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of
the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of
registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It
follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed
with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when
there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected.
Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs
of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a
manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law.
There is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred
that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the
validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.

In the matter of Intestate Estate of Delgado

The above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were
related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-
brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they
may inherit from each other. Since Josefa Delgado had heirs
other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly
adjudicated Josefa’s estate all to himself. Adjudication by an
heir of the decedent’s entire estate to himself by means of an
affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:

RULE 74, SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement

between heirs. – If the decedent left no will and no debts and
the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of
administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see
fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the
register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do so in
an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he
may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an affidavit
filed in the office of the register of deeds.