Salonga vs Farrales and sheriff
That plaintiff herein, in view of the sale to three tenants defendants of the
Facts: January 2, 1973; the appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga assisted by her husband, filed a
complaint against Julita B. Farrales and the Sheriff of Olongapo City with the Court of First Instance
of Zambales and Olongapo City. plaintiff most respectfully prays for the following relief:
a) Ordering defendant Julita Farrales to sell to plaintiff the parcel of land containing an area of 156
Square Meters, more or less, where the house of strong materials of plaintiff exists.
b) Ordering the defendants not to disturb nor interfere in the peaceful possession or occupation of the
land by plaintiff
to restrain from enforcing the Writ of Execution issued in connection with the judgment rendered in
Civil Case No. 650 for ejectment in the City Court of Olongapo City,
a suit for ejectment filed by defendant-appellee Farrales against five defendants, among whom the
herein appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga; 5 that on January 23, 1973, defendant-appellee
Farrales filed a motion to deny the motion for the issuance of a preliminary injunction for being vague
and her answer with counterclaim to the complaint
that on January 13, 1975, the defendant-appellee Julita B. Farrales filed a motion to dismiss the
appeal on the ground that the appeal has become moot and academic because "the house of the
plaintiffs-appellants, subject matter of this appeal was demolished on October 21, 1974, Annex "A",
Sheriff's return and the land where this house was built was delivered to her and she is now the one
in possession ..
THAT defendant Farrales is the titled owner of a parcel of residential land situated in Sta. Rita,
Olongapo City, Identity of which is not disputed, formerly acquired by her from one Leoncio Dytuco
who, in turn, acquired the same from the Corpuz Family of which only 361 square meters, more or
less, not actually belong to said defendant after portions thereof had been sold to Marciala Zarsadias,
Catalino Pascual and Rosanna Quiocson*; (*Per Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit B, the vendee is
actually Dionisio Quiocson);
3) THAT even prior to the acquisition by defendant Farrales (if the land aforesaid, plaintiff was already
in possession as lessee of some 156 square meters thereof, on which she had erected a house, paying
rentals thereon first to the original owners and later to defendant Farrales.
(4) THAT, sometime prior to November, 1968, defendant Farrales filed an ejectment case for non-
payment of rentals against plaintiff and her husband-jointly with other lessees of other portions of the
land, to wit, Jorge Carvajal, Catalino Pascua, Marciala Zarsadias, and the spouses Cesar and
Rosalina Quiocson - Civil Case No. 650 of the Olongapo City Court, Branch 1, in which, on November
20, 1968, and reiterated on February 4, 1970, a decision was rendered in favor of defendant Farrales
and ordering the therein defendants, including plaintiff herein and her husband, to vacate the portion
occupied by them and to pay rentals in arrears, attorney's fees and costs;
The lower court explained its conclusion thus:
... From the very allegations of the complaint, it is clearly admitted -
5.
portions of land occupied by each of said three tenant-defendants, by defendant
Julita B. Farrales, also offered to purchase from said defendant the area of One
Hundred Fifty-Six (156) Square Meters, more or less, where plaintiff's house of strong
materials exists, but, defendant Julita B. Farrales, despite the fact that said
plaintiff's order to purchase was just, fair and reasonable persistently refused such
offer, and instead insisted to execute the judgment rendered in the ejectment case,
Issue: The main legal question involved in this appeal is whether or not the court a quo erred in
dismissing the complaint for specific performance or the ground that there exists no legally
enforceable compromise agreement upon which the defendant-appellee Farrales can be compelled to
sell the piece of land in question to plaintiff-appellant, Consolacion Duque Salonga.
Ruling:
Hence, if plaintiff's offer to purchase was, as aforesaid persistently refused by defendant, it is obvious
that no meeting of the and, took place and, accordingly, no contract, either to sell or of sale, was ever
perfected between them. This is only firmed up even more by plaintiff's admission on the witness
stand that no agreement respecting the purchase and sale of the disputed land was finalized because,
while defendant Farrales purportedly wanted payment in cash, plaintiff did not have any money for
that purpose and neither were negotiations ever had respecting any possible arrangement for
payment in installments.
Since contracts are enforceable only from the moment of perfection and there is here no perfected
contract at all, it goes without saying that plaintiff has absolutely nothing to enforce against
defendant Farrales, and the fact that defendant Farrales previously sold portions of the land to other
lessees similarly situated as plaintiff herein, does not change the situation because, as to said other
lessees, a perfected contract existed - which is not the case with plaintiff.
The trial court found as a fact that no compromise agreement to sell the land in question was ever
perfected between the defendant-appellee as vendor and the plaintiffs-appellants as vendees. 24
It is elementary that consent is an essential element for the existence of a contract, and where it is
wanting, the contract is non-existent. The essence of consent is the conformity of the parties on the
terms of the contract, the acceptance by one of the offer made by the other. The contract to sell is a
bilateral contract. Where there is merely an offer by one party, without the acceptance of the other,
there is no consent
It appears in this case that the offeree, the defendant-appellee Julita B. Farrales not only did not
accept, but rejected the offer of plaintiffs-appellants, spouses Salonga to buy the land in question.
There being no consent there is. therefore, no contract to sell to speak of.
Likewise, it must be borne in mind that the alleged compromise agreement to sell the land in question
is unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, 26 and thus, renders all the more ineffective the action
for specific performance in the court a quo.
Moreover, as correctly found by the trial court, the plaintiffs-appellants, as lessees, are neither
builders in good faith nor in bad faith. Their rights are governed not by Article 448 but by Art. 1678 of
the New Civil Code. 27 As lessees, they may remove the improvements should the lessor refuse to
reimburse them, but the lessee does not have the right to buy the land
As to the contention that Sec. 6, Article II of the New Constitution is applicable to the case at bar, it
must be remembered that social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners
who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection. The social justice consecrated in
our constitution was not intended to take away rights from a person and give them to another who is
not entitled thereto.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
National Grains Authority vs IAC
Facts: private respondent Leon Soriano offered to sell palay grains to the NFA, through William Cabal,
the Provincial Manager of NFA stationed at Tuguegarao, Cagayan. He submitted the documents
required by the NFA. Private respondent Soriano's documents were processed and accordingly, he was
given a quota of 2,640 cavans of palay. The quota noted in the Farmer's Information Sheet
represented the maximum number of cavans of palay that Soriano may sell to the NFA.
Soriano delivered 630 cavans of palay. when Soriano demanded payment of the 630 cavans of palay,
he was informed that its payment will be held in abeyance since Mr. Cabal was still investigating on
an information he received that Soriano was not a bona tide farmer and the palay delivered by him
was not produced from his farmland. Cabal wrote Soriano advising him to withdraw from the NFA
warehouse the 630 cavans Soriano delivered stating that NFA cannot legally accept the said delivery
on the basis of the subsequent certification of the BAEX technician, Napoleon Callangan that Soriano
is not a bona fide farmer. Instead of withdrawing the 630 cavans of palay, private respondent Soriano
insisted that the palay grains delivered be paid. the trial court rendered judgment ordering petitioner
National Food Authority, its officers and agents to pay respondent Soriano (as plaintiff in Civil Case
No. 2754) the amount of P 47,250.00 representing the unpaid price of the 630 cavans of palay plus
legal interest. Intermediate Appellate Court upheld the findings of the trial court and affirmed the
decision ordering NFA and its officers to pay Soriano the price of the 630 cavans of rice plus interest.
Issue: Whether the petitioner’s contention is corret and whether Art 1458 is applicable in this case.
Ruling: petition is not impressed with merit.
Article 1458 of the Civil Code of the Philippines defines sale as a contract whereby one of the
contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing,
and the other party to pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent. A contract, on the
other hand, is a meeting of minds between two (2) persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to
the other, to give something or to render some service
In the case at bar, Soriano initially offered to sell palay grains produced in his farmland to NFA. When
the latter accepted the offer by noting in Soriano's Farmer's Information Sheet a quota of 2,640
cavans, there was already a meeting of the minds between the parties. The object of the contract,
being the palay grains produced in Soriano's farmland and the NFA was to pay the same depending
upon its quality. The fact that the exact number of cavans of palay to be delivered has not been
determined does not affect the perfection of the contract. Article 1349 of the New Civil Code provides:
". . .. The fact that the quantity is not determinate shall not be an obstacle to the existence of the
contract, provided it is possible to determine the same, without the need of a new contract between
the parties." In this case, there was no need for NFA and Soriano to enter into a new contract to
determine the exact number of cavans of palay to be sold. Soriano can deliver so much of his produce
as long as it does not exceed 2,640 cavans.
Sale is a consensual contract, " ... , there is perfection when there is consent upon the subject matter
and price, even if neither is delivered."
The acceptance referred to which determines consent is the acceptance of the offer of one party by the
other and not of the goods delivered as contended by petitioners.
From the moment the contract of sale is perfected, it is incumbent upon the parties to comply with
their mutual obligations or "the parties may reciprocally demand performance" thereof. (Article 1475,
Civil Code, 2nd par.).
The reason why NFA initially refused acceptance of the 630 cavans of palay delivered by Soriano is
that it (NFA) cannot legally accept the said delivery because Soriano is allegedly not a bona fide
farmer. The trial court and the appellate court found that Soriano was a bona fide farmer and
therefore, he was qualified to sell palay grains to NFA.
Both courts likewise agree that NFA's refusal to accept was without just cause. The above factual
findings which are supported by the record should not be disturbed on appeal.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is DISMISSED.
Dizon vs CA/overland
----facts: May 23, 1974, private respondent Overland Express Lines, Inc. (lessee) entered into a
Contract of Lease with Option to Buy with petitioners[1] (lessors). The term of the lease was for one (1)
year commencing from May 16, 1974 up to May 15, 1975. During this period, private respondent was
granted an option to purchase for the amount of P3,000.00 per square meter. For failure of private
respondent to pay the increased rental of P8,000.00 per month effective June 1976, petitioners filed
an action for ejectment. the alleged question of whether petitioner was granted an extension of the
option to buy the property; whether such option, if any, extended the lease or whether petitioner
actually paid the alleged P300,000.00 to Fidela Dizon, as representative of private respondents in
consideration of the option and, whether petitioner thereafter offered to pay the balance of the
supposed purchase price, are all merely incidental and do not remove the unlawful detainer case from
the jurisdiction of respondent court. In consonance with the ruling in the case of Teodoro, Jr. vs.
Mirasol (supra), the above matters may be raised and decided in the unlawful detainer suit as, to rule
otherwise, would be a violation of the principle prohibiting multiplicity of suits.
private respondent filed before the Regional Trial Court. It sought to compel the execution of a deed of
sale pursuant to the option to purchase and the receipt of the partial payment, and to fix the period
to pay the balance. In an Order dated October 25, 1985, the trial court denied the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction on the ground that the decision of the then City Court for the ejectment of
the private respondent, having been affirmed by the then Intermediate Appellate Court and the
Supreme Court, has become final and executory. On appeal,[8] respondent Court of Appeals rendered
a decision[9] upholding the jurisdiction of the City Court of Quezon City in the ejectment case. It also
concluded that there was a perfected contract of sale between the parties on the leased premises and
that pursuant to the option to buy agreement, private respondent had acquired the rights of a vendee
in a contract of sale. It opined that the payment by private respondent of P300,000.00 on June 20,
1975 as partial payment for the leased property, which petitioners accepted (through Alice A. Dizon)
and for which an official receipt was issued, was the operative act that gave rise to a perfected
contract of sale, and that for failure of petitioners to deny receipt thereof, private respondent can
therefore assume that Alice A. Dizon, acting as agent of petitioners, was authorized by them to receive
the money in their behalf. The Court of Appeals went further by stating that in fact, what was
entered into was a “conditional contract of sale” wherein ownership over the leased property shall not
pass to the private respondent until it has fully paid the purchase price. Since private respondent did
not consign to the court the balance of the purchase price and continued to occupy the subject
premises, it had the obligation to pay the amount of P1,700.00 in monthly rentals until full payment
of the purchase price.
The defendants-appellees are ordered to execute the deed of absolute sale of the property in question,
free from any lien or encumbrance whatsoever, in favor of the plaintiff-appellant, and to deliver to the
latter the said deed of sale, as well as the owner’s duplicate of the certificate of title to said property
upon payment of the balance of the purchase price by the plaintiff-appellant.
Ruling: We find both petitions impressed with merit.
First. Petitioners have established a right to evict private respondent from the subject premises for
non-payment of rentals. The term of the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy was for a period of one
(1) year (May 16, 1974 to May 15, 1975) during which the private respondent was given an option to
purchase said property at P3,000.00 per square meter. After the expiration thereof, the lease was for
P3,000.00 per month.
Admittedly, no definite period beyond the one-year term of lease was agreed upon by petitioners and
private respondent. However, since the rent was paid on a monthly basis, the period of lease is
considered to be from month to month in accordance with Article 1687 of the New Civil Code.[18]
Where the rentals are paid monthly, the lease, even if verbal may be deemed to be on a monthly basis,
expiring at the end of every month pursuant to Article 1687, in relation to Article 1673 of the Civil
Code.[19] In such case, a demand to vacate is not even necessary for judicial action after the
expiration of every month.[20]
When private respondent failed to pay the increased rental of P8,000.00 per month in June 1976, the
petitioners had a cause of action to institute an ejectment suit against the former with the then City
Court. In this regard, the City Court (now MTC) had exclusive jurisdiction over the ejectment suit.
Second. Having failed to exercise the option within the stipulated one-year period, private
respondent cannot enforce its option to purchase anymore. Moreover, even assuming arguendo that
the right to exercise the option still subsists at the time private respondent tendered the amount on
June 20, 1975, the suit for specific performance to enforce the option to purchase was filed only on
October 7, 1985 or more than ten (10) years after accrual of the cause of action as provided under
Article 1144 of the New Civil Code.[21]
In this case, there was a contract of lease for one (1) year with option to purchase. The contract of
lease expired without the private respondent, as lessee, purchasing the property but remained in
possession thereof. Hence, there was an implicit renewal of the contract of lease on a monthly basis.
The other terms of the original contract of lease which are revived in the implied new lease under
Article 1670 of the New Civil Code[22] are only those terms which are germane to the lessee’s right of
continued enjoyment of the property leased.[23] Therefore, an implied new lease does not ipso facto
carry with it any implied revival of private respondent’s option to purchase (as lessee thereof) the
leased premises.
Third. There was no perfected contract of sale between petitioners and private respondent. Private
respondent argued that it delivered the check of P300,000.00 to Alice A. Dizon who acted as agent of
petitioners pursuant to the supposed authority given by petitioner Fidela Dizon, the payee thereof.
Private respondent further contended that petitioners’ filing of the ejectment case against it based on
the contract of lease with option to buy holds petitioners in estoppel to question the authority of
petitioner Fidela Dizon. It insisted that the payment of P300,000.00 as partial payment of the
purchase price constituted a valid exercise of the option to buy.
Under Article 1475 of the New Civil Code, “the contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a
meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. From that
moment, the parties may reciprocally demand performance, subject to the provisions of the law
governing the form of contracts.” Thus, the elements of a contract of sale are consent, object, and
price in money or its equivalent. It bears stressing that the absence of any of these essential elements
negates the existence of a perfected contract of sale. Sale is a consensual contract and he who alleges
it must show its existence by competent proof.[25]
In an attempt to resurrect the lapsed option, private respondent gave P300,000.00 to petitioners (thru
Alice A. Dizon) on the erroneous presumption that the said amount tendered would constitute a
perfected contract of sale pursuant to the contract of lease with option to buy. There was no valid
consent by the petitioners (as co-owners of the leased premises) on the supposed sale entered into by
Alice A. Dizon, as petitioners’ alleged agent, and private respondent. The basis for agency is
representation and a person dealing with an agent is put upon inquiry and must discover upon his
peril the authority of the agent.[26] As provided in Article 1868 of the New Civil Code,[27] there was
no showing that petitioners consented to the act of Alice A. Dizon nor authorized her to act on their
behalf with regard to her transaction with private respondent. The most prudent thing private
respondent should have done was to ascertain the extent of the authority of Alice A. Dizon.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, both petitions are GRANTED. The decision dated March 29,
1994 and the resolution dated October 19, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 25153-54, as well as the decision
dated December 11, 1995 and the resolution dated April 23, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33113 of the
Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Facts: there is absolutely no written proof of Alice Dizon's authority to bind petitioners. First of all,
she was not even a co-owner of the property. Neither was she empowered by the co-owners to act on
their behalf.
The acceptance of the amount of P300,000.00, purportedly as partial payment of the purchase price
of the land, was an act integral to the sale of the land. As a matter of fact, private respondent invokes
such receipt of payment as giving rise to a perfected contract of sale. In this connection, Article 1874
of the Civil Code is explicit that: "When a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an
agent, the authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void."
Thus the authority of an agent to execute a contract for the sale of real estate must be conferred in
writing and must give him specific authority, either to conduct the general business of the principal
or to execute a binding contract containing terms and conditions which are in the contract he did
execute. A special power of attorney is necessary to enter into any contract by which the ownership of
an immovable is transmitted or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration. The
express mandate required by law to enable an appointee of an agency (couched) in general terms to
sell must be one that expressly mentions a sale or that includes a sale as a necessary ingredient of
the act mentioned.
petitioners cannot be deemed to have received partial payment of the supposed purchase price for the
land through Alice Dizon. It cannot even be said that Alice Dizon's acceptance of the money bound at
least the share of Fidela Dizon, in the absence of a written power of attorney from the latter. It should
be borne in mind that the Receipt dated June 20, 1975, while made out in the name of Fidela Dizon,
was signed by Alice Dizon alone.
there could not have been a perfected contract of sale. As we held in our Decision dated January 28,
1999, the implied renewal of the contract of lease between the parties affected only those terms and
conditions which are germane to the lessee's right of continued enjoyment of the property. The option
to purchase afforded private respondent expired after the one-year period granted in the contract.
Otherwise stated, the implied renewal of the lease did not include the option to purchase.
In this case, there was a contract of lease for one (1) year with option to purchase. The contract of
lease expired without the private respondent, as lessee, purchasing the property but remained in
possession thereof. Hence, there was an implicit renewal of the contract of lease on a monthly basis.
The other terms of the original contract of lease which are revived in the implied new lease under
Article 1670 of the New Civil Code are only those terms which are germane to the lessee's right of
continued enjoyment of the property leased. Therefore, an implied new lease does not ipso facto carry
with it any implied revival of private respondent's option to purchase (as lessee thereof) the leased
premises. The provision entitling the lessee the option to purchase the leased premises is not deemed
incorporated in the impliedly renewed contract because it is alien to the possession of the lessee.
Private respondent's right to exercise the option to purchase expired with the termination of the
original contract of lease for one year. The rationale of this Court is that:
"This is a reasonable construction of the provision, which is based on the presumption that
when the lessor allows the lessee to continue enjoying possession of the property for fifteen
days after the expiration of the contract he is willing that such enjoyment shall be for the
entire period corresponding to the rent which is customarily paid — in this case up to the
end of the month because the rent was paid monthly.
ACCORDINGLY, the Motion to Suspend Procedural Rules in the Higher Interest of Substantial
Justice filed by private respondent is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
Labagala vs Santiago
Facts: Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 64729. The Register of Deeds of
Manila was required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in the certificate of title to said
property. Jose died and respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and possession
against herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, to, recover from
her the 1/3 portion of said property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioner's sole
possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents alleged that Jose's share in the property belongs to them by operation of law, because
they are the only legal heirs of their brother, who died intestate and without issue. They claimed that
the purported sale of the property made by their brother to petitioner sometime in March 1979 5 was
executed through petitioner's machinations and with malicious intent, to enable her to secure the
corresponding transfer certificate of title (TCT No. 1723346) in petitioner's name alone.
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery .The deed showed that Jose affixed his
thumbmark thereon but respondents averred that, having been able to graduate from college, Jose
never put his thumb mark on documents he executed but always signed his name in full
petitioner claimed that her true name is not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by respondent but Ida C.
Santiago. She claimed not to know any person by the name of Ida C. Labagala. She claimed to be the
daughter of Jose and thus entitled to his share in the subject property. She maintained that she had
always stayed on the property, ever since she was a child. She argued that the purported sale of the
property was in fact a donation to her, and that nothing could have precluded Jose from putting his
thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of his signature. She pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose
never acknowledged respondents' claim over the property such that respondents had to sue to claim
portions thereof. She lamented that respondents had to disclaim her in their desire to obtain
ownership of the whole property.
Apart from respondents' testimonies, the appellate court noted that the birth certificate of Ida
Labagala presented by respondents showed that Ida was born of different parents, not Jose and his
wife.
Issue: (1) Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been
in reality a donation, or some other act or contract.
whether or not respondents may impugn petitioner's filiation in this action for recovery of title and
possession; and (2) whether or not petitioner is entitled to Jose's 1/3 portion of the property he co-
owned with respondents, through succession, sale, or donation.
Ruling: On the first issue, we find petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code to be
misplaced. Said article provides:
.Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be brought within one year
from the recording of the birth in the Civil Register, if the husband should be in the same
place, or in a proper case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if they should reside in the
Philippines; and two years if abroad. If the birth of the child has been concealed, the term
shall be counted from the discovery of the fraud.
A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt exists
that a child is indeed a man's child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs)
denies the child's filiation.
However, the present case is not one impugning petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not
merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at all
In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioner's legitimate status but are, instead, asserting
that she is not at all their brother's child. The birth certificate presented by respondents support this
allegation.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that:
The Certificate. of Record of Birth (Exhibit H)19 plainly states that... Ida was the child of the
spouses Leon Labagala and [Cornelia] Cabrigas. This document states that it was Leon
Labagala who made the report to the Local Civil Registrar and therefore the supplier of the
entries in said Certificate. Therefore, this certificate is proof of the filiation of Ida. Appellee
however denies that Exhibit H is her Birth Certificate. She insists that she is not Ida
Labagala but Ida Santiago.
the appellee Ida could only present her testimony and a baptismal certificate (Exhibit 12) stating that
appellee's parents were Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. But then, a decisional rule in
evidence states that a baptismal certificate is not a proof of the parentage of the baptized person. This
document can only prove the identity of the baptized, the date and place of her baptism, the identities
of the baptismal sponsors and the priest who administered the sacrament -- nothing more.
petitioner's counsel admitted that petitioner did not have a birth certificate indicating that she is Ida
Santiago, though she had been using this name all her life.
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive proof of filiation. 24 More so are the
entries made in an income tax return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and the
amount thereof
Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of the Court of Appeals that petitioner is in
reality the child of Leon Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary to her averment, not of Jose
Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose, it follows that petitioner can not inherit
from him through intestate succession. It now remains to be seen whether the property in dispute
was validly transferred to petitioner through sale or donation.
On the validity of the purported deed of sale, however, we agree with the Court of Appeals that:
...This deed is shot through and through with so many intrinsic defects that a reasonable
mind is inevitably led to the conclusion that it is fake.
Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have the right to transfer ownership of the
entire property to petitioner since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters.28 Petitioner could not have given
her consent to the contract, being a minor at the time.29 Consent of the contracting parties is among
the essential requisites of a contract,30 including one of sale, absent which there can be no valid
contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not pay any centavo for the property,31 which makes the
sale void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be shown to have been
in reality a donation, or some other act or contract.
Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of donation. Again, as explained by the Court
of Appeals:
...Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid donation. It lacks the
acceptance of the donee required by Art. 725 of the Civil Code. Being a minor
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Mercado vs Espiritu
Facts: plaintiffs alleged that they and their sisters Concepcion and Paz, all surnamed Mercado, were
the children and sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu, a sister of the deceased Luis Espiritu; that
Margarita Espiritu died in 1897, leaving as her paraphernal property a tract of land of 48 hectares in
area. Said counsel therefore asked that judgment be rendered in plaintiffs' favor by holding to be null
and void the sale they made of their respective shares of their land, to Luis Espiritu, and that the
defendant be ordered to deliver and restore to the plaintiffs the shares of the land that fell to the latter
in the partition of the estate of their deceased mother Margarita Espiritu, together with the products
thereof, uncollected since 1901, or their equivalent, to wit, P450 per annum, and to pay the costs of
the suit.
In due season the defendant administrator answered the aforementioned complaint, denying each
and all of the allegations therein contained, and in special defense alleged that the land, the subject-
matter of the complaint, had an area of only 21 cavanes of seed rice; that, on May 25, 1894, its
owner, the deceased Margarita Espiritu y Yutoc, the plaintiffs' mother, with the due authorization of
her husband Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz sold to Luis Espiritu for the sum of P2,000 a portion
of said land, to wit, an area such as is usually required for fifteen cavanes of seed; that subsequently,
on May 14, 1901, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the plaintiffs' father, in his capacity as
administrator of the property of his children sold under pacto de retro to the same Luis Espiritu at the
price of P375 the remainder of the said land, to wit, an area covered by six cavanes of seed to meet
the expenses of the maintenance of his (Wenceslao's) children, and this amount being still insufficient
the successively borrowed from said Luis Espiritu other sums of money aggregating a total of P600
The records shows it to have been fully proven that in 1891 Lucas Espiritu obtained title by
composition with the State, to three parcels of land, adjoining each other, in the sitio of Panducot of
the pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan, containing altogether an area of 75 hectares, 25 ares, and 59
centares, which facts appear in the title Exhibit D; that, upon Luis Espiritu's death, his said lands
passed by inheritance to his four children named Victoria, Ines, Margarita, and Luis; and that, in the
partition of said decedent's estate, the parcel of land described in the complaint as containing forty-
seven and odd hectares was allotted to the brother and sister Luis and Margarita, in equal shares.
Margarita Espiritu.
It was also duly proven that, by a notarial instrument of May 25, 1894, the plaintiffs' mother
conveyed by actual and absolute sale for the sum of P2,000, to her brother Luis Espiritu a portion of
the land now on litigation, or an area such as is usually covered by about 15 cavanes of seed; and
that, on account of the loss of the original of said instrument, which was on the possession of the
purchaser Luis Espiritu, and furthermore because, during the revolution, the protocols or registers of
public documents of the Province of Bulacan were burned, Wenceslao Mercado y Arnedo Cruz, the
widower of the vendor and father of the plaintiffs, executed, at the instance of the interested party
Luis Espiritu, the notarial instrument Exhibit 1
The plaintiffs have absolutely no right whatever to recover said first parcel of land, as its ownership
was conveyed to the purchaser by means of a singular title of purchase and sale; and as to the other
portion of 6 cavanes of seed, they could have redeemed it before May 17, 1910, upon the payment or
the return of the sum which their deceased father Wenceslao Mercado had, during his lifetime,
The signature and handwriting of the document Exhibit 2 were identified as authentic by one of the
plaintiffs, Consejo Mercado, and as the record shows no evidence whatever that this document is
false, and it does not appear to have been assailed as such,

However, even prior to said date, to wit, on May 14th of the same year, 1901, the widower Wenceslao
Mercado, according to the private document Exhibit 2, pledged or mortgaged to the same man, Luis
Espiritu, for P375, a part, or an area covered by six cavanes of seed, of the land that had belonged to
this vendor's deceased wife, to the said Luis Espiritu and which now forms a part of the land in
question — a transaction which Mercado was obliged to make in order to obtain funds with which "to
cover his children's needs.
The witness Ines Espiritu testified that after the death of the plaintiffs' father, it was Luis Espiritu
who directed the cultivation of the land in litigation. This testimony was corroborated by her sister
Victoria Espiritu, who added that her nephew, the plaintiff Domingo, had lived for some time, she did
not know just how long, under the control of Luis Espiritu.
The courts, in their interpretation of the law, have laid down the rule that the sale of real estate, made
by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when in fact they are not, is valid, and they will not be
permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted by them,
For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the judgment appealed from have been
refuted, and deeming said judgment to be in accordance with law and the evidence of record, we
should, and do hereby, affirm the same
Ching vs Goyanko

Patricio Tanjucto, the notary before whom the deed Exhibit 3 was ratified, was a witness for the
defendant. He testified that this deed was drawn up by him at the request of the plaintiff Josefa
Mercado; that the grantors of the instrument assured him that they were all of legal age; that said
document was signed by the plaintiffs and the other contracting parties, after it had been read to
them and had been translated into the Pampangan dialect for those of them who did not understand
Spanish
Facts: Joseph Goyanko (Goyanko) and Epifania dela Cruz (Epifania) were married.1[1] Out of the
union were born respondents Joseph,
Respondents claim that in 1961, their parents acquired a 661 square meter property located at 29 F.
Cabahug St., Cebu City but that as they (the parents) were Chinese citizens at the time, the property
was registered in the name of their aunt, Sulpicia Ventura

Issue: Is there fraud of deed of sale to the Espiritus? Sulpicia executed a deed of sale2[2] over the property in favor of respondents father Goyanko.

Ruling: The evidence adduced at the trial does not show, even circumstantially, that the purchaser Goyanko executed on October 12, 1993 a deed of sale3[3] over the property in favor of his common-
Luis Espiritu employed fraud, deceit, violence, or intimidation, in order to effect the sale mentioned in law-wife-herein petitioner Maria B. Ching
the document Exhibit 3, executed on May 17, 1910. In this document the vendors, the brother and
the sisters Domingo, Maria del Consejo, Paz and, Josefa surnamed Mercado y Espiritu, attested the
certainty of the previous sale which their mother, during her lifetime, had made in behalf of said
purchaser Luis Espiritu, her brother with the consent of her husband Wenceslao Mercado, father of
the vendors of the portion of land situated in the barrio of Panducot, pueblo of Calumpit, Bulacan

in the aforementioned sale, according to the deed of May 25, 1894, Margarita Espiritu conveyed to her
brother Luis the parcel of 15 cavanes of seed, Exhibit 1, and after her death the plaintiffs' widowed
father mortgaged or pledged the remaining parcel or portion of 6 cavanes of seed to her brother-in-
law, Luis Espiritu, in May, 1901 (Exhibit 2). So it is that the notarial instrument Exhibit 3, which was
assailed by the plaintiffs, recognized the validity of the previous contracts,

So that Luis Espiritu was, during his lifetime, and now, after his death, his testate or intestate estate
is in lawful possession of the parcel of land situated in Panducot that contains 21 cavanes of seed, by
virtue of the title of conveyance of ownership of the land measuring 15 cavane
After Goyankos death on March 11, 1996, respondents discovered that ownership of the property had
already been transferred in the name of petitioner. Respondents thereupon had the purported
signature of their father in the deed of sale verified by the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory
which found the same to be a forgery.
Respondents thus filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a complaint for recovery of property
and damages against petitioner, praying for the nullification of the deed of sale.
In defense, petitioner claimed that she is the actual owner of the property as it was she who provided
its purchase price. To disprove that Goyankos signature in the questioned deed of sale is a forgery,
she presented as witness the notary public who testified that Goyanko appeared and signed the
document in his presence.
appellate court reversed that of the trial court and declared null and void the questioned deed
of sale and TCT No. 138405. Held the appellate court:
. . . The subject property having been acquired during the existence of a
valid marriage between Joseph Sr. and Epifania dela Cruz-Goyanko, is presumed
to belong to the conjugal partnership. Moreover, while this presumption in favor of
conjugality is rebuttable with clear and convincing proof to the contrary, we find no
evidence on record to conclude otherwise. The record shows that while Joseph Sr.
and his wife Epifania have been estranged for years and that he and defendant-
appellant Maria Ching, have in fact been living together as common-law husband
and wife, there has never been a judicial decree declaring the dissolution of his
marriage to Epifania nor their conjugal partnership. It is therefore undeniable that
the 661-square meter property located at No. 29 F. Cabahug Street, Cebu City
belongs to the conjugal partnership.
Even if we were to assume that the subject property was not conjugal, still we
cannot sustain the validity of the sale of the property by Joseph, Sr. to defendant-
appellant Maria Ching, there being overwhelming evidence on records that they
have been living together as common-law husband and wife. On this score, Art.
1352 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1352. Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause, produce
no effect whatsoever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy.
Issue: is there a valid sale? Is ART. 1352. Contracts without cause, or with unlawful cause,
produce no effect whatever. The cause is unlawful if it is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy, applicable?
Ruling: there is no valid sale. ART. 1409. The following contracts are
inexistent and void from the beginning:
(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy;
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;
(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the
transaction;
(4) Those whose object is outside the commerce of men;
(5) Those which contemplate an impossible service;
(6) Those where the intention of the parties relative to the principal
object of the contract cannot be ascertained;
(7) Those expressly prohibited or declared void by law.
These contracts cannot be ratified. Neither can the right to set up the
defense of illegality be waived.
ARTICLE 1490. The husband and wife cannot sell property to each other,
except:
(1) When a separation of property was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements; or
(2) When there has been a judicial separation of property under Article
191. (Underscoring supplied)
The proscription against sale of property between spouses applies even to common law
relationships
Anent the second issue, we find that the contract of sale was null and void for
being contrary to morals and public policy. The sale was made by a husband in
favor of a concubine after he had abandoned his family and left the conjugal
home where his wife and children lived and from whence they derived their
support. The sale was subversive of the stability of the family, a basic social
institution which public policy cherishes and protects.
Article 1409 of the Civil Code states inter alia that: contracts whose
cause, object, or purposes is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order,
or public policy are void and inexistent from the very beginning.
The prohibitions apply to a couple living as husband and wife without benefit of marriage,
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in
legal union.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Medina vs Collector of Internal Revenue
Facts: petitioner, married, acquired forest, concessions in the municipalities of San Mariano and
Palanan in the Province of Isabela. From 1946 to 1948, the logs cut and removed by the petitioner
from his concessions were sold to different persons in Manila through his agent, Mariano Osorio.
petitioner's wife, started to engage in business as a lumber dealer. Mrs. Medina, In turn, sold in
Manila the logs bought from her husband through the same agent, Mariano Osorio. The proceeds
were, upon instructions from petitioner, either received by Osorio for petitioner or deposited by said
agent in petitioner's current account with the Philippine National Bank.
On the thesis that the sales made by petitioner to his wife were null and void pursuant to the
provisions of Article 1490 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (formerly, Art. 1458, Civil Code of 1889),
the Collector considered the sales made by Mrs. Medina as the petitioner's original sales taxable
under Section 186 of the National Internal Revenue Code and, therefore, imposed a tax assessment
on petitioner, calling for the petitioner protested the assessment; however, respondent Collector
insisted on his demand. payment of P4,553.54 as deficiency sales taxes and surcharges from 1949 to
1952. petitioner protested the assessment; however, respondent Collector insisted on his demand.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals, which rendered judgment as aforesaid. The Court's
decision was based on two main findings, namely, (a) that there was no premarital agreement of
absolute separation of property between the Medina spouse; and (b) assuming that there was such an
agreement, the sales in question made by petitioner to his wife were fictitious, simulated, and not
bona fide.
Issue: Is art 1490 applicable?
Ruling: Petitioner's contention that the respondent Collector can not assail the questioned sales, he
being a stranger to said transactions, is likewise untenable. The government, as correctly pointed out
by the Tax Court, is always an interested party to all matters involving taxable transactions and,
needless to say, qualified to question their validity or legitimacy whenever necessary to block tax
evasion.
Contracts violative of the provisions of Article 1490 of the Civil Code are null and void (Uy Sui Pin vs.
Cantollas, 70 Phil. 55; Uy Coque vs. Sioca 45 Phil. 43). Being void transactions, the sales made by the
petitioner to his wife were correctly disregarded by the Collector in his tax assessments that
considered as the taxable sales those made by the wife through the spouses' common agent, Mariano
Osorio. In upholding that stand, the Court below committed no error.
it is now settled in this jurisdiction that illegally obtained documents and papers are admissible in
evidence, if they are found to be competent and relevant to the case (see Wong & Lee vs. Collector of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-10155, August 30, 1958). In fairness to the Collector, however, it should
be stated that petitioner's imputation is vehemently denied by him, and relying on Sections 3, 9, 337
and 338 of the Tax Code and the pertinent portions of Revenue Regulations No. V-1 and citing this
Court's ruling in U.S. vs. Aviado, 38 Phil. 10, the Collector maintains that he and other internal
revenue officers and agents could require the production of books of accounts and other records from
a taxpayer. Having arrived at the foregoing conclusion, it becomes unnecessary to discuss the other
issues raised, which are but premised on the assumption that a premarital agreement of total
separation of property existed between the petitioner and his wife.
Naval vs Enriquez
Facts: Don Jorge Enriquez, as heir of his deceased parents, Antonio Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca
Villanueva, whose estates were at that time still undistributed, by public instrument sold to Don
Victoriano Reyes his interest in both estates, equivalent to a tenth part thereof, for the sum of 7,000
pesos. The deed was executed in this city before Don Enrique Barrera, a notary public, who certified
in the document that the vendor received the said consideration at the time of the execution of the
instrument.
By another instrument executed April 15, 1886, before the same notary, Don Enrique Barrera y
Caldes, Don Victoriano Reyes sold to Doña Carmen de la Cavada this interest in the estate of Don
Antonio Enriquez and Doña Ciriaca Villanueva, which by the deed above referred to, he had acquired
from Don Jorge Enriquez for the same consideration of 7,000 pesos, which money he received from
the purchaser in the presence of the notary, who so certifies in the deed itself.
The purchaser, Doña Carmen, was the wife of Don Francisco Enriquez, who was the executor and
administrator of the testamentary estate of Don Antonio Enriquez at the dates of the execution of the
two above mentioned.
The plaintiffs demand that these deeds be declared null and void, as well as the contracts evidenced
thereby, apparently solely so far as they refer to the estate of Don Antonio Enriquez, no mention being
made of the estate of Doña Ciriaca Villanueva in the complaint. This relief is prayed for upon the
following grounds:
(1) Because the said contracts were executed without consideration, it being alleged with respect to
this matter that Don Jorge Enriquez did not receive any consideration for the sale made by him in
favor of Don Victoriano Reyes, and that the latter did not receive any sum whatever as a consideration
for the sale in turn executed by him in favor of Doña Carmen de la Cavada. Upon this ground the
plaintiffs contend that the deeds in question were consummated and were executed for the purpose of
deceiving and defrauding Don Jorge Enriquez and his family.
(2) Because Don Victoriano Reyes, the purchaser under the first deed, merely acted as an
intermediary at the request and instance of Don Francisco Enriquez for the purpose of subsequently
facilitating the acquisition by Doña Carmen de la Cavada, his wife, of the hereditary share of Don
Jorge Enriquez, the real acquirer being Don Francisco Enriquez, the executor and administrator of
the estate of Don Antonio Enriquez. The conclusion of the plaintiffs is that as such executor Don
Francisco Enriquez was unable to acquire by his own act or that of any intermediary the said
hereditary portion of Don Jorge Enriquez under the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 1459 of the
Civil Code.
(a) The evidence introduced by the plaintiffs is not sufficient to authorize the conclusion that there
was no consideration for the sales referred to in the complaint. It is true that Victoriano Reyes
testified that he paid nothing to Don Jorge Enriquez, and received nothing from Carmen de la Cavada
as consideration for either of the sales. But against this statement is the testimony of the notary, Don
Enrique Barrera y Caldes, before whom both contracts were executed, and that of the defendants
Francisco Enriquez and Doña Carmen de la Cavada, who expressly affirm the contrary; and more
especially the statement is contrary to the recitals of the deeds themselves, which confirm the
statements of the witnesses last referred to. The deeds clearly and expressly recite the fact of the
receipt by the respective purchasers of the stipulated price or consideration of 7,000 pesos at the time
and place of the execution of the deeds.
These instruments having been executed with all the formalities prescribed by the law, they are
admissible as evidence against the contracting parties and their successors with respect to recitals
made therein by the former (Art. 1218, Civil Code.) Their evidentiary force can not be overcome except
by other evidence of greater weight, sufficient to overcome the legal presumption of the regularity of
acts and contracts celebrated with all the legal requisites under the safeguard of a notarial certificate.
This presumption has not been rebutted in the present case, in which the evidence against it,
consisting of the sole testimony of Don Victoriano Reyes, which, moreover, is expressly controverted
by that of the other witnesses at the trial, involves the improbable conclusion that the witness, as well
as Jorge Enriquez, from whom the plaintiffs derived title, the notary public, and the attesting
witnesses to both instruments consented to the commission of the grave crime of falsification of
public documents—for this would be the result were the statements of the said Victoriano Reyes
true—without having any interest in so doing or expecting to derive any benefit from the commission
of the crime, the plaintiffs not having alleged or proven the existence of such an interest on their part.
It appears, on the contrary, from the testimony of Victoriano Reyes himself that he received no
compensation for his participation in the matter.
With respect to Jorge Enriquez, the conclusion, still more improbable if possible, would be that he
had voluntarily and spontaneously taken part in the commission of a grave crime, which not only was
not of the slightest benefit to himself, but the commission of which is supposed to have had for its
object the causing of harm to him. The allegation is that the purpose of the crime was to deprive him,
without the slightest compensation, of his paternal and maternal inheritance, which according to the
complaint was the only possession of himself and his numerous family. This is the most inexplicable
and improbable aspect of the facts alleged in the complaint. It is beyond comprehension, and we can
not believe that Jorge Enriquez, who according to the plaintiffs was absolutely without means of
support for himself and his family, would convey to another his large interest in the estate without
receiving any consideration therefor, and that to do this he would commit the grave crime of
falsification. To justify this conclusion it would be necessary to suppose that Jorge Enriquez was
absolutely devoid of intelligence or that he was the victim or error, violence, intimidation, or fraud.
But these are circumstances which counsel for the plaintiffs have not demonstrated or even sought to
demonstrate.
An examination of the evidence leads us to the conclusion that the payment of the consideration of
7,000 pesos expressed in the two deeds in question was actually and really made, and that the
allegation of the plaintiffs that the contracts of sale evidenced by these deeds were made without
consideration is unfounded.
At all events the action of which the plaintiffs might have availed themselves for the purpose of having
those contracts declared void upon the ground, even admitting hypothetically that there was no
consideration, is barred by the statute of limitations, inasmuch as from the date of those contracts
down to the death of Jorge Enriquez, which occurred July 6, 1891, more than five year had passed
and more than fifteen before the filing of the complaint on January 9, 1902, nothing having been done
in the meantime on the part of the plaintiffs or the person under whom they claim to interrupt the
running of the statute. The action of nullity only lasts four years, counted from the date of the
consummation of the contract, when the action is based, as in this case, upon the absence of
consideration. (Art. 1301 of the Civil Code.)
The contract of sale is consummated by the delivery of the purchase money and of the thing sold.
“When the sale is made by public instrument the execution of the instrument is equivalent to the
delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, unless from the instrument itself the contrary
intention clearly appears.” (Art. 1462, par. 2, Civil Code.) And article 1464 provides that “With respect
to incorporeal property [to which class the hereditary right which was the object of the contracts in
question pertains], the provisions of paragraph 2 of article 1462 shall govern.” In the deeds of sale
executed by Victoriano Reyes in favor of Doña Carmen de la Cavada we find the following: “In
consequence he (the vendor) by virtue of this title cedes and conveys all rights which he has or may
have to the part of the inheritance which is the object of this sale, to the end that the purchaser, in
the place and stead of the vendor, may exercise all the acts of ownership corresponding to her right,
to which end by means of the delivery of this instrument and of his other title deeds he makes the
transfer necessary to consummate the contract, which upon his part he declares to be perfect and
consummated from this date.”
In view of this clause and for the legal provisions above cited, it is evident that the delivery of the
things sold was effected by the mere execution of the deed of sale; and it appearing from the deed
itself that the consideration was delivered to the vendor at the time, and the contrary not having been
sufficiently proven, the conclusion follows that the sale was consummated them and there, and that
from that time the period of four years fixed by law for the prescription of the action of nullity must be
counted in this case.
(b) The thing sold in the two contracts of sale mentioned in the complained was the hereditary right of
Don Jorge Enriquez, which evidently was not in charge of the executor, Don Francisco Enriquez.
Executors, even in those cases in which they administer the property pertaining to the estate, do not
administer the hereditary rights of any heir. This right is vested entirely in the heirs, who retain it or
transmit it in whole or in part, as they may deem convenient, to some other person absolutely
independent of the executor, whose authority, whatever powers the testator may have desired to
confer upon him, do not and can not under any circumstances in the slightest degree limit the power
of the heirs to dispose of the said right at will. That right does not form part of the property delivered
to the executor for administration.
This conclusion having been reached, we are of the opinion that article 1459 of the Civil Code, cited
by the plaintiffs to show the alleged incapacity of Don Francisco Enriquez as executor of the will of
Don Antonio Enriquez, to acquire by purchase the hereditary right of Jorge Enriquez, has no
application to the present case. The prohibition which paragraph 3 of that article imposes upon
executors refers to the property confided to their care, and does not extend, therefore, to property not
falling within this class. Legal provisions of a prohibitive character must be strictly construed, and
should not be extended to cases not expressly comprised within their text.
Consequently, even upon the supposition that the executor, Don Francisco Enriquez, was the person
who really acquired the hereditary rights of Jorge Enriquez, the sale in question would not for that
reason be invalid, the executor, Don Francisco Enriquez, not being legally incapable of acquiring the
hereditary right in question as the plaintiffs erroneously suppose.
This being so, the question as to whether the money paid by Doña Carmen de la Cavada for the
purchase of the said right was her sole and exclusive property, or whether it was the property of her
husband Don Francisco Enriquez, or whether it was the property of the community of goods existing
between them, is absolutely unimportant, for, be the fact as it may, the conclusion must always be
that the incapacity to purchase, alleged as one of the legal grounds upon which the complaint rests,
does not exist.
Enough has been said to show that the action brought by the plaintiffs is devoid of foundation. It is
not, therefore, necessary to decide the other questions raised by the parties at the trial.
The judgment of the court below is reversed and the complaint dismissed, without costs in either
instance. So ordered.