Professional Documents
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7 January 2019
2018 marked the sixth consecutive year of unexpected stress Puneet Gulati*, CFA
Analyst
on real estate demand and developers HSBC Securities and Capital Markets (India) Private Limited
puneetgulati@hsbc.co.in
We expect 2019 to be another critical year for real estate +91 22 2268 1235
developers as it will test their mettle to survive and then thrive Saurabh Jain*
Analyst
HSBC Securities and Capital Markets (India) Private Limited
Maintain Buy ratings on Oberoi Realty, Godrej Properties, Sobha, saurabh2jain@hsbc.co.in
+91 22 6164 0691
and Prestige – our preferred plays on industry consolidation
Umang Shah*
Analyst, Financials
2018 – Another forgettable year. Ever since the end of 2012, real estate demand HSBC Securities and Capital Markets (India) Private Limited
has been on a downward slide. Concerns about affordability, anti-real estate political umang.shah@hsbc.co.in
+91 22 2268 1243
sentiment, withdrawal of tax incentives, demonetisation, and real estate act and
Goods and Services Tax (GST) have eroded speculative and investor-led demand
* Employed by a non-US affiliate of HSBC Securities (USA) Inc, and is
and made end-users defer purchases on expectation for a better bargain. All of these not registered/ qualified pursuant to FINRA regulations
have destroyed real estate demand as well as balance sheets of developers over
2014-17. Even as 2018 was drawing to a close, we saw further liquidity pressure on
non-banking financial companies (NBFCs), which have so far been an oxygen for
dilapidated balance sheets of numerous financially stressed developers. In this
backdrop, sales in CY18 have fallen by 40% and launches by 70% from CY11 levels
as end-users continue to defer their purchases waiting for a better bargain.
2019 – Will this finally set the bottom? We believe while the worst of the liquidity
crisis for NBFCs appears to be over, it is yet to fully translate into increased financial
stress on developers who could see further curtailment of new launches. The positive
is that a sharp fall in the number of launches even at a much reduced sales
momentum is resulting in a reduced overhang of unsold inventory. And some
developers have such high levels of distress that their under-construction unsold
inventory will no longer be counted as available for sale in the eyes of buyers. Thus,
we expect a minimum downward pressure on prices of under-construction inventory
as buyers will prefer to stay with strong developers. We believe developers with a
strong balance sheet and strong brand will gain significant market share in both
project pipeline accumulation (at much more attractive rates) and sales.
OBER IN, GPL IN, SOBHA IN, and PEPL IN are preferred plays. Oberoi Realty
and Godrej Properties having raised money last year and are much better placed for
project acquisitions. We expect market share gains for OBER, GPL, SOBHA, and
PEPL on account of their brands and strong track records of delivery and quality.
Rea estate sales in India peaked in 2011 while the launches peaked in 2012. Ever since the
end of 2012, both have been on a steady downward slide. It all started with concerns about
affordability in 2012 and accelerated with the rise of anti-real estate political sentiment when the
Modi government came to power in 2014, thus resulting in an erosion of speculative demand.
The year was followed by plugging excess tax incentives for second homes, thus eroding the
second leg of investment demand. 2016 was a big year of setback for the real estate industry as
the government announced demonetisation in an attempt to plug flow and stock of unaccounted
money. Real estate was considered a channel for parking this unaccounted wealth and, hence,
the industry suffered as demonetisation made this alternate source of funding difficult for the
industry.
The year 2017 further dented the balance sheets as the new real estate act came into force
which required stricter compliance with the law and a higher number of approvals before
developers can start their sales. The year also saw the implementation of GST, which effectively
put c12% tax on sales of under-construction property, thus making it more unaffordable.
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7 January 2019
In the last six years of weakening demand as the balance sheets of real estate developers
deteriorated, they resorted to high cost funding from NBFCs. Even as the underlying demand
remained weak, NBFCs have continued to increase lending to the developers.
Growth of the underlying real estate sector and lenders loan book to the sector
50%
Growth rate of lending to real estate developers
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18
-10%
-20%
-30%
Growth rate of sales and new launches in the underlying residential real estate market
-40%
-50% Bank credit to Developers (INR bn) NBFC/HFC credit to Developers (INR bn) New launches (msf) Sales vol (msf) Sales value (INR bn)
Source: RBI, NHB, Prop Equity, JLL, HSBC. Note: real estate sales and new launches are for top 8 cities. NBFC and HFCs lending to developers
NBFCs have become their largest and the last source of oxygen as regulations got tighter and
capital controls became stricter for developers.
Market Share
Banks 64% 62% 62% 58% 56% 48% 42%
NBFCs/ HFCs 36% 38% 38% 42% 44% 52% 58%
Growth (%)
Banks 12% 22% 9% 7% 4% 0%
NBFCs/ HFCs 19% 22% 28% 15% 45% 30%
Source: RBI, NHB, JLL, HSBC. Note: This does not include individual housing loans
Even as 2018 was drawing to a close, we saw further liquidity pressure on NBFCs which have
so far been an oxygen for dilapidated balance sheets of numerous financially stressed
developers.
NBFCs have significantly curtailed fresh lending to the real estate sector in the last three
months of 2018. They are now asking their developer borrowers to return the money, wherever
possible. In some cases, NBFCs had increased their cost of lending to a much higher level to
discourage their teams from lending more.
There is an anecdotal evidence which makes us believe NBFCs declined loan disbursals even
to homebuyers despite having sanctioned the loan as they try to restore liquidity. The
subvention schemes for new projects have been put on hold.
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7 January 2019
4.5
3.5
2.5
2
Feb-12 Sep-12 Apr-13 Nov-13 Jun-14 Jan-15 Aug-15 Mar-16 Oct-16 May-17 Dec-17 Jul-18
Source: Bloomberg, HSBC
The cost of borrowing for NBFCs has also increased post September 2018 liquidity crisis which
will get passed on to the real estate developers.
In this backdrop, sales have fallen by 40% and launches by 70% from 2011 levels as even end-
users continue to defer their purchases waiting for a better bargain.
900
63% 65%
700 55%
45%
500
35%
300 25%
15%
100 4% 4% 5% 5%
2%
-1%
-6% -5%
(100) -8%
-13% -15%
(300) -24% -25%
CY08 CY09 CY10 CY11 CY12 CY13 CY14 CY15 CY16 CY17 CY18e
Total Absorption (msqf) New Launches (msqf) Absorption Growth (%)
Source: Prop Equity, HSBC
Ever since the beginning of 2018, real estate stocks have continued to underperform the Nifty
50 Index, partly reversing the gains experienced in 2017. This was also partly due to rising
interest rates in 2018 and partly because of pullback of a sharp revival experienced in 2017.
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7 January 2019
400 13,000
12,000
350
11,000
300
10,000
250 9,000
8,000
200
7,000
150
6,000
100 5,000
Jan-14 Jul-14 Jan-15 Jul-15 Jan-16 Jul-16 Jan-17 Jul-17 Jan-18 Jul-18 Jan-19
CNX Realty - LHS CNX NIFTY (50) - PRICE INDEX
Source: Refinitiv, HSBC
The uptrend in market share gains, which began in 2017 with the implementation of Real Estate
Regulations Act (RERA), slowed a bit in 2018. This was largely because smaller developers
took time to revive themselves after battling the Real Estate Regulations Act (RERA) and
managed to get all approvals only in 2018.
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While the worst of the NBFC liquidity crisis seems to be behind us,
we expect liquidity stress to eventually get transferred to developers
We expect this stress to slow down launches further and keep buyers
away from under-construction properties of weaker developers
This should create opportunities for consolidation by stronger
developers and increase their sales market share
Increased lending by banks to NBFCs, roll over of a large part of the mutual fund debt, and
curtailment of fresh lending have resulted in NBFCs tiding over the liquidity crisis without any
defaults.
Jan-10
Jan-11
Jan-12
Jan-13
Jan-14
Jan-15
Jan-16
Jan-17
Jan-18
Apr-14
Jul-15
Oct-16
Jan-13
Jun-13
Nov-13
Feb-15
Dec-15
Mar-17
Jan-18
Jun-18
Nov-18
Sep-14
May-16
Aug-17
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We expect NBFCs to be more discerning and exercise greater caution while lending to weaker
developers. We also expect NBFCs to approach stronger developers to take over stressed
projects of smaller and weaker developers in a bid to reduce pressure from non-performing
assets (NPA) on themselves. This curtailment in lending will likely result in a further slowdown
from the current already-slow launch rates.
40 40
30 30
20 20
10 10
- 0
Jan-08
Jun-08
Nov-08
Apr-09
Sep-09
Feb-10
Jul-10
Dec-10
May-11
Oct-11
Mar-12
Aug-12
Jan-13
Jun-13
Nov-13
Apr-14
Sep-14
Feb-15
Jul-15
Dec-15
May-16
Oct-16
Mar-17
Aug-17
Jan-18
Jun-18
With run rates of launches remaining much lower, we expect the burden of an excess inventory
to reduce.
From a data perspective, the outstanding inventory still remains high. However, given the
increased risk related to completion of projects by numerous developers as financing comes
under further stress, buyers will largely avoid buying apartments of under-construction projects
of small and weaker developers, in our view. This will likely make a part of under-construction
and unsold inventory ‘unbuyable’.
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7 January 2019
Unsold inventory (msf) and in months based on last three months sales run rate
1,400 60
Supply - LHS Outstanding Inventory (months)
1,200 50
1,000
40
800
(Mn sq ft)
30
600
20
400
200 10
- 0
Jan-08
Jul-08
Jan-09
Jul-09
Jan-10
Jul-10
Jan-11
Jul-11
Jan-12
Jul-12
Jan-13
Jul-13
Jan-14
Jul-14
Jan-15
Jul-15
Jan-16
Jul-16
Jan-17
Jul-17
Jan-18
Jul-18
Source: PropEquity, HSBC
We expect a weaker pace for launches even at slower absorption rates to bring down
outstanding unsold inventory even at slower absorption rates and, hence, ease the burden on
the real estate market. This will give the developers an opportunity to improve pricing, which we
believe is the real driver for real estate demand in India.
Absorption and new launches and outstanding inventory for key cities and combined Top 8 cities
Total Real Estate absorption (m sq ft) Total Real Estate Launches (m sq ft) Total Real Estate supply (end of month) - msf
Mum Gur Bang Noida Pune Ahd Top 8 Mum Gur Bang Noida Pune Ahd Top 8 Mum Gur Bang Noida Pune Ahd Top 8
CY08 23.7 27.5 43.5 5.9 44.6 10.4 289.9 CY08 15.7 32.9 36.6 5.1 41.9 14.5 281.1 CY08 31.0 33.4 57.0 7.9 60.8 15.4 397.9
CY09 23.0 34.1 31.6 29.1 39.5 18.0 302.4 CY09 28.4 31.5 22.6 37.6 34.4 25.2 308.6 CY09 36.4 30.9 47.9 16.5 55.8 22.6 404.1
CY10 31.4 40.6 43.6 67.8 50.5 30.9 492.4 CY10 50.2 55.6 55.9 84.5 57.8 51.8 681.2 CY10 55.2 45.9 60.3 33.2 63.1 43.5 592.9
CY11 28.1 46.2 62.4 45.6 56.0 46.5 502.6 CY11 40.6 52.1 96.1 65.2 63.6 68.9 646.9 CY11 67.7 51.8 94.0 52.8 70.8 65.8 737.2
CY12 23.4 41.9 77.1 35.7 56.7 47.2 495.2 CY12 32.8 53.8 105.7 35.9 70.0 54.0 653.2 CY12 77.0 63.7 122.6 53.0 84.1 72.6 895.3
CY13 24.4 27.6 90.8 19.2 52.7 41.0 465.2 CY13 46.1 36.7 136.9 12.4 69.8 36.1 603.0 CY13 98.7 72.7 168.7 46.2 101.2 67.7 1033.0
CY14 25.6 16.6 88.2 12.6 52.1 38.1 406.8 CY14 38.2 18.5 112.3 14.3 73.8 45.5 526.7 CY14 111.3 74.6 192.8 47.9 122.9 75.1 1152.9
CY15 31.6 16.4 80.6 11.9 55.0 46.9 422.8 CY15 42.8 13.9 85.2 11.7 66.4 38.8 465.5 CY15 122.5 72.0 197.4 47.7 134.3 86.2 1195.6
CY16 26.2 13.7 68.7 10.0 47.3 43.2 388.0 CY16 30.8 11.0 59.3 5.7 54.5 38.8 378.8 CY16 127.2 69.3 188.0 43.4 141.6 81.7 1186.4
CY17 23.6 9.9 51.7 6.9 41.2 29.1 295.8 CY17 11.4 6.0 40.6 3.3 32.9 16.0 216.8 CY17 127.2 64.6 162.7 39.8 133.3 68.6 1107.3
CY18e 25.1 11.9 54.4 7.3 46.3 23.0 311.8 CY18e 13.4 6.8 54.3 4.2 26.1 15.0 213.6 CY18e 115.5 60.9 157.3 37.2 117.5 61.8 1009.1
CY19e 25.1 13.1 59.8 8.0 48.6 24.2 332.6 CY19e 13.4 6.4 57.0 4.0 27.4 15.0 213.6 CY19e 103.8 54.2 154.5 33.2 96.2 52.7 890.0
Change Change
CY09 -3% 24% -27% 389% -12% 73% 4% CY09 81% -4% -38% 643% -18% 74% 10% CY09 18% -8% -16% 108% -8% 47% 2%
CY10 37% 19% 38% 133% 28% 72% 63% CY10 77% 76% 147% 125% 68% 105% 121% CY10 51% 48% 26% 102% 13% 92% 47%
CY11 -11% 14% 43% -33% 11% 50% 2% CY11 -19% -6% 72% -23% 10% 33% -5% CY11 23% 13% 56% 59% 12% 51% 24%
CY12 -17% -9% 23% -22% 1% 1% -1% CY12 -19% 3% 10% -45% 10% -22% 1% CY12 14% 23% 30% 0% 19% 10% 21%
CY13 4% -34% 18% -46% -7% -13% -6% CY13 41% -32% 29% -65% 0% -33% -8% CY13 28% 14% 38% -13% 20% -7% 15%
CY14 5% -40% -3% -34% -1% -7% -13% CY14 -17% -50% -18% 15% 6% 26% -13% CY14 13% 3% 14% 4% 21% 11% 12%
CY15 23% -1% -9% -6% 5% 23% 4% CY15 12% -25% -24% -18% -10% -15% -12% CY15 10% -3% 2% 0% 9% 15% 4%
CY16 -17% -17% -15% -16% -14% -8% -8% CY16 -28% -21% -30% -51% -18% 0% -19% CY16 4% -4% -5% -9% 5% -5% -1%
CY17 -10% -28% -25% -31% -13% -33% -24% CY17 -63% -45% -31% -43% -40% -59% -43% CY17 0% -7% -13% -8% -6% -16% -7%
CY18e 6% 21% 5% 6% 13% -21% 5% CY18e 17% 13% 34% 30% -21% -6% -1% CY18e -9% -6% -3% -7% -12% -10% -9%
CY19e 0% 10% 10% 10% 5% 5% 7% CY19e 0% -5% 5% -5% 5% 0% 0% CY19e -10% -11% -2% -11% -18% -15% -12%
Source: Prop Equity, HSBC
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With NBFC restraining their lending to developers, we believe many developers and even
NBFCs will approach stronger and reputed developers to take over the projects of smaller
developers and provide an exit to NBFCs or to reduce their debt.
In the current environment of stress and lack of trust by buyers, reputed developers will be able
to enter into attractive agreements with land owners and NBFCs and generate higher-than-
normative return, in our view. This should also allow them to increase their market share and
better control market pricing.
Oberoi Realty and Godrej Properties are best placed to acquire stressed assets
Both the companies raised INR10bn last year and have a very comfortable balance sheet. Both
have demonstrated a track record of adding value to land by virtue of their brand and
construction quality. In line with management commentary, we believe both companies are
looking to buy stressed assets or land at attractive valuations. This would allow them to increase
their portfolio offering and price it competitively in the market. Needless to say, we expect them
to gain sales market share as well as their strong brand and balance sheet to inspire confidence
in the minds of sceptical buyers.
Sobha and Prestige remain strong players in stable real estate markets of Bangalore
While both Sobha and Prestige don’t have enough room on their balance sheet to take more
debt to aggressively acquire stressed projects, we expect them to opportunistically pick up
some projects. They both have a strong brand and reputation to generate buyer confidence. In
the current environment where a buyer is doubting the ability of developers to complete the
projects, Sobha and Prestige will gain greater market share in sales, in our view.
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Target Price Valuation methodology: Our valuation is based on a DCF model of project cash flows. We use a WACC of 10.9%, a risk-free rate of 3%, and an equity
INR320 risk premium of 6%. We calculate the 12-month forward fair value by applying a discount of 22% at 1 standard deviation above the mean to our NAV
estimate of INR474. We then discount the value back by one year to reflect the current fair value target price of INR320. Our TP implies 37.3% upside and
Rating we have a Buy rating.
Buy
Downside risks include: (1) Large price cuts by the developer; (2) sales take longer than expected to recover; and (3) increase in debt to meet construction
capex.
Sobha Investment view: Buy
SOBHA IN Sobha has a strong brand name in South Indian markets with a track record of timely delivery with good quality. This should allow it to command a
preference in the eyes of buyers over other developers. Sobha also has a demonstrated ability of delivering affordable housing projects, which should
CMP allow it to maintain its sales momentum in the weak markets as well.
INR456.5
Valuation methodology: We value the company on a DCF model of project cash flows. We use a WACC of 11.1%, a risk-free rate of 3%, an equity risk
Target Price premium of 6%, and a beta of 1.5 (unchanged). We calculate the 12-month forward fair value by applying a discount of 22% at 1 standard deviation above
INR560 the mean to our NAV estimate of INR786. We then discount the value back by one year to reflect the current fair value target price of INR560. Our TP
implies 22.7% upside and we have a Buy rating.
Rating
Buy Downside risks include: (1) Slower-than-expected sales momentum in the Dream Acres and Marina One project in Cochin; (2) large price cuts by the
developer; and (3) an increase in debt to meet construction capex.
Godrej Investment view: Buy
Properties GPL is one of the very few real estate companies which has a pan-India presence to source and sell large projects. We think it has one of the best
GPL IN management teams and processes to execute Joint Development agreements. GPL has raised money last year and also has an access to a fund
platform. This makes it one of the best positioned companies to take over stressed projects at attractive valuations, in our view. Also, a strong brand and
CMP good track record of executions allows it to command a preference over other developers in the minds of the buyers and sell at a premium.
IN677.1
Valuation methodology: Our valuation is based on a DCF model of project cash flows. We use a WACC of 9.7%, a risk-free rate of 3%, and an equity
Target Price risk premium of 6%. We calculate the 12-month forward fair value by applying a premium of 23% at 1 standard deviation above the mean to our NAV
INR750 estimate of INR656. We then discount the value back by one year to reflect the current fair value target price of INR750. Our TP implies 10.8% upside and
we have a Buy rating as we expect strong project additions in the current year.
Rating
Buy Downside risks include: (1) Severe slowdown in the NCR market; (2) large price cuts by the developer; and (3) slippages from the expected launch
pipeline.
Oberoi Realty Investment view: Buy
OBER IN We believe the business model for the company has now become more robust with a greater emphasis on annuity assets, entering into the mid-income
residential segment, becoming more agile by offering schemes to attract customers and, last but not the least, gaining in incremental development
CMP potential stemming from transit oriented development (TOD) policy. This significantly increases the longevity of the development cycle. The company also
INR448.6 has raised money and is well placed to further grow its portfolio in the stressed real estate market. The company has an impressive track record of adding
value to its land and we expect the acquisitions to be accretive.
Target Price
INR565 Valuation methodology: We value the company on a DCF model of project cash flows. We use a WACC of 11.5%, a risk-free rate of 3%, and an equity
risk premium of 6%. We value the company on Mar’19 NAV of INR630. We apply a discount of 1 standard deviation (unchanged) above mean which is an
Rating 8% discount to NAV, as we believe the residential market is at the bottom of the cycle, as management has raised cash in a stressed market and is in a
Buy position to add value to its existing portfolio. We discount it for three months to arrive at current Dec’18 fair value of INR565. Our TP implies 25.9% upside
and we have a Buy rating.
Downside risks include: (1) Any delay in the launch of new phases/new projects could be a threat to expected cash flows in the wake of slow sales in
existing projects; and (2) if the Mumbai market remains weak, there is a threat to sales of prestige marquee projects such as Worli, where significant capex
has already been incurred.
DLF Investment view: Hold
DLFU IN DLF has a large portfolio of unsold inventory, which is largely in the luxury and premium segment of Gurgaon and which we expect will take five years to
sell. It also has a strong commercial office portfolio, which reduces the cyclicality of earnings.
CMP
INR172.5 Valuation methodology: We value the company on a DCF model of project cash flows. We now use a WACC of 12.1%, a risk-free rate of 3%, and an
equity risk premium of 6%. We calculate end-FY19 fair value by applying a discount of 27% at mean discount to our NAV estimate of INR259 (unchanged),
Target Price which leads to a current fair value target price of INR185. Our TP implies 7.3% upside and we have a Hold rating as we expect sales momentum to remain
INR185 at the current level only.
Rating Downside risks include: (1) Severe slowdown in the NCR luxury market, which is DLF’s present focus; (2) any large price cuts by DLF which would hurt
Hold its valuation; and (3) a sharp increase in debt to meet construction capex. Upside risks include: (1) Pick-up in the NCR markets, especially in the luxury
segment; (2) a further reduction in interest rates; and (3) a higher-than-expected valuation of the DCCDL transaction.
Source: Bloomberg, HSBC estimates. Priced on 3 January 2018
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Valuation charts
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Source: Refinitiv, HSBC Source: Refinitiv, HSBC
40%
20%
0%
1 std dev above Historic Mean discount
-20% Historic Mean discount
-40%
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Disclosure appendix
Analyst Certification
The following analyst(s), economist(s), or strategist(s) who is(are) primarily responsible for this report, including any analyst(s)
whose name(s) appear(s) as author of an individual section or sections of the report and any analyst(s) named as the covering
analyst(s) of a subsidiary company in a sum-of-the-parts valuation certifies(y) that the opinion(s) on the subject security(ies) or
issuer(s), any views or forecasts expressed in the section(s) of which such individual(s) is(are) named as author(s), and any other
views or forecasts expressed herein, including any views expressed on the back page of the research report, accurately reflect
their personal view(s) and that no part of their compensation was, is or will be directly or indirectly related to the specific
recommendation(s) or views contained in this research report: Puneet Gulati, CFA, Saurabh Jain and Umang Shah
Important disclosures
Equities: Stock ratings and basis for financial analysis
HSBC and its affiliates, including the issuer of this report (“HSBC”) believes an investor's decision to buy or sell a stock should
depend on individual circumstances such as the investor's existing holdings, risk tolerance and other considerations and that
investors utilise various disciplines and investment horizons when making investment decisions. Ratings should not be used or
relied on in isolation as investment advice. Different securities firms use a variety of ratings terms as well as different rating
systems to describe their recommendations and therefore investors should carefully read the definitions of the ratings used in
each research report. Further, investors should carefully read the entire research report and not infer its contents from the rating
because research reports contain more complete information concerning the analysts' views and the basis for the rating.
From 23rd March 2015 HSBC has assigned ratings on the following basis:
The target price is based on the analyst’s assessment of the stock’s actual current value, although we expect it to take six to 12
months for the market price to reflect this. When the target price is more than 20% above the current share price, the stock will
be classified as a Buy; when it is between 5% and 20% above the current share price, the stock may be classified as a Buy or a
Hold; when it is between 5% below and 5% above the current share price, the stock will be classified as a Hold; when it is between
5% and 20% below the current share price, the stock may be classified as a Hold or a Reduce; and when it is more than 20%
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Our ratings are re-calibrated against these bands at the time of any 'material change' (initiation or resumption of coverage, change
in target price or estimates).
Upside/Downside is the percentage difference between the target price and the share price.
Prior to this date, HSBC’s rating structure was applied on the following basis:
For each stock we set a required rate of return calculated from the cost of equity for that stock’s domestic or, as appropriate,
regional market established by our strategy team. The target price for a stock represented the value the analyst expected the
stock to reach over our performance horizon. The performance horizon was 12 months. For a stock to be classified as Overweight,
the potential return, which equals the percentage difference between the current share price and the target price, including the
forecast dividend yield when indicated, had to exceed the required return by at least 5 percentage points over the succeeding 12
months (or 10 percentage points for a stock classified as Volatile*). For a stock to be classified as Underweight, the stock was
expected to underperform its required return by at least 5 percentage points over the succeeding 12 months (or 10 percentage
points for a stock classified as Volatile*). Stocks between these bands were classified as Neutral.
*A stock was classified as volatile if its historical volatility had exceeded 40%, if the stock had been listed for less than 12 months
(unless it was in an industry or sector where volatility is low) or if the analyst expected significant volatility. However, stocks which
we did not consider volatile may in fact also have behaved in such a way. Historical volatility was defined as the past month's
average of the daily 365-day moving average volatilities. In order to avoid misleadingly frequent changes in rating, however,
volatility had to move 2.5 percentage points past the 40% benchmark in either direction for a stock's status to change.
12
EQUITIES ● REMD
7 January 2019
For the distribution of non-independent ratings published by HSBC, please see the disclosure page available at
http://www.hsbcnet.com/gbm/financial-regulation/investment-recommendations-disclosures.
Jan-15
Jan-16
Jan-17
Jan-18
Jan-19
Source: HSBC
Source: HSBC
Godrej Properties (GODR.BO) share price performance Rating & target price history
INR Vs HSBC rating history
From To Date Analyst
Hold Reduce 11 May 2016 Puneet Gulati
Reduce Buy 26 Jan 2017 Puneet Gulati
855
Target price Value Date Analyst
755
Price 1 280.00 11 May 2016 Puneet Gulati
655 Price 2 290.00 10 Aug 2016 Puneet Gulati
Price 3 375.00 26 Jan 2017 Puneet Gulati
555
Price 4 450.00 21 Mar 2017 Puneet Gulati
455 Price 5 600.00 18 May 2017 Puneet Gulati
Price 6 750.00 25 Oct 2017 Puneet Gulati
355 Price 7 825.00 05 Mar 2018 Puneet Gulati
255 Price 8 750.00 25 Oct 2018 Puneet Gulati
Source: HSBC
155
Jan-14
Jan-15
Jan-16
Jan-17
Jan-18
Jan-19
Source: HSBC
13
EQUITIES ● REMD
7 January 2019
Oberoi Realty Ltd (OEBO.NS) share price performance Rating & target price history
INR Vs HSBC rating history
From To Date Analyst
Hold Buy 31 Jul 2018 Puneet Gulati
Target price Value Date Analyst
584
534 Price 1 275.00 18 Jan 2016 Puneet Gulati
Price 2 250.00 11 May 2016 Puneet Gulati
484 Price 3 260.00 23 Aug 2016 Puneet Gulati
434 Price 4 300.00 24 Oct 2016 Puneet Gulati
384 Price 5 310.00 26 Jan 2017 Puneet Gulati
Price 6 330.00 21 Mar 2017 Puneet Gulati
334 Price 7 336.00 05 May 2017 Puneet Gulati
284 Price 8 330.00 31 Jul 2017 Puneet Gulati
234 Price 9 460.00 09 Nov 2017 Puneet Gulati
Price 10 470.00 31 Jan 2018 Puneet Gulati
184 Price 11 600.00 31 Jul 2018 Puneet Gulati
Jan-14
Jan-15
Jan-16
Jan-17
Jan-18
Jan-19
Price 12 565.00 23 Oct 2018 Puneet Gulati
Source: HSBC
Source: HSBC
Prestige Estates Projects (PREG.BO) share price Rating & target price history
performance INR Vs HSBC rating history
From To Date Analyst
Hold Reduce 11 May 2016 Puneet Gulati
Reduce Buy 26 Jan 2017 Puneet Gulati
330 Target price Value Date Analyst
Price 1 180.00 11 Feb 2016 Puneet Gulati
280 Price 2 150.00 11 May 2016 Puneet Gulati
Price 3 200.00 26 Jan 2017 Puneet Gulati
Price 4 230.00 21 Mar 2017 Puneet Gulati
230 Price 5 260.00 18 May 2017 Puneet Gulati
Price 6 285.00 18 Aug 2017 Puneet Gulati
180 Price 7 310.00 09 Nov 2017 Puneet Gulati
Price 8 345.00 30 Jan 2018 Puneet Gulati
Price 9 350.00 24 Aug 2018 Puneet Gulati
130 Price 10 320.00 31 Oct 2018 Puneet Gulati
Jan-14
Jan-15
Jan-16
Jan-17
Jan-18
Jan-19
Source: HSBC
Source: HSBC
Sobha Limited (SOBH.BO) share price performance INR Rating & target price history
Vs HSBC rating history
From To Date Analyst
Hold Reduce 18 Mar 2016 Puneet Gulati
Reduce Buy 26 Jan 2017 Puneet Gulati
620
Buy Hold 14 Dec 2017 Puneet Gulati
570 Hold Buy 26 Mar 2018 Puneet Gulati
520 Target price Value Date Analyst
470 Price 1 220.00 18 Mar 2016 Puneet Gulati
420 Price 2 240.00 11 May 2016 Puneet Gulati
Price 3 245.00 12 Sep 2016 Puneet Gulati
370
Price 4 300.00 26 Jan 2017 Puneet Gulati
320 Price 5 370.00 21 Mar 2017 Puneet Gulati
270 Price 6 485.00 18 May 2017 Puneet Gulati
Price 7 540.00 14 Nov 2017 Puneet Gulati
220 Price 8 570.00 12 Feb 2018 Puneet Gulati
Jan-14
Jan-15
Jan-16
Jan-17
Jan-18
Jan-19
To view a list of all the independent fundamental ratings disseminated by HSBC during the preceding 12-month period, please
use the following links to access the disclosure page:
14
EQUITIES ● REMD
7 January 2019
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Additional disclosures
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