1.

Juan Frivaldo vs Commission on Elections

174 SCRA 245 – Law on Public Officers – Citizenship of a Public Officer
In 1988, Juan Frivaldo won as governor of Sorsogon. Salvador Estuye, President of the League of Municipalities of
Sorsogon, filed with the COMELEC a petition for annulment of Frivaldo’s election and proclamation because apparently,
Frivaldo, in 1983, was naturalized as an American. In his defense, Frivaldo said that he was forced to be naturalized
because the then President Marcos was after him; but that participating in the Philippine elections, he has effectively lost
his American citizenship pursuant to American laws. He also assailed the petition as he claimed that it is in the nature of a
quo warranto which is already filed out of time, the same not being filed ten days after his proclamation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo can validly serve as a governor.
HELD: No. He has not regained Filipino citizenship. As far as Philippine law is concerned, he is not a Filipino. He lost his
citizenship when he declared allegiance to the United States. Even if he did lose his US citizenship, that did not restore his
being a Filipino because he did not undergo naturalization or repatriation proceedings. Neither did his participation in the
1988 elections restore his Philippine citizenship. At best, he is a stateless person. He cannot serve as governor when he
owes allegiance to a foreign state. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent
violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the
ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was
qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks to serve
in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and
fidelity to any other state.

2. LABO vs. COMELEC Case Digest

LABO vs. COMELEC

176 SCRA 1

Facts: Petitioner Ramon Labo, elected mayor of Baguio City was questioned on his citizenship. He was married in the
Philippines to an Australian citizen. The marriage was declared void in the Australian Federal Court in Sydney on the
ground that the marriage had been bigamous. According to Australian records, Labo is still an Australian citizen.

Issue: Whether or not Petitioner Labo is a citizen of the Philippines.

Held: The petitioner’s contention that his marriage to an Australian national in 1976 did not automatically divest him of
Philippine citizenship is irrelevant. There is no claim or finding that he automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that
marriage. He became a citizen of Australia because he was naturalized as such through a formal and positive process,
simplified in his case because he was married to an Australian citizen. As a condition for such naturalization, he formally
took the Oath of Allegiance and/or made the Affirmation of Allegiance, renouncing all other allegiance. It does not appear
in the record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship.

3. Torayno vs COMELEC GR No 137329 09 August 2000

Facts: Vicente Emano was provincial governor of Misamis Oriental for three terms until 1995 election and his
certificate of candidacy showed that his residence was in Tagoloan, Misamis Oriental. On 14 June 1997, while still
governor he executed a voter registration record in Cagayan de Oro City which is geographically located in Misamis
Oriental, claiming 20 years of residence. He filed candidacy for mayor in the said city and stated that his residence for
the preceding two years and five months was in the same city. Rogelio Torayno Sr filed petition for disqualification of
 Emano fo failing to meet the residency requirement. Emano won the mayoral post and proclaimed winner. Torayno
filed for annulment of election of Emano. COMELEC upheld its decision.
Issue: Whether or not Emano failed the constitutional residency requirement?
Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC resolution affirmed. Emano was the overwhelming choice of the people of
Cagayan de Oro. The court find it apt to reiterate the principle that the manifest will of the people as expressed
through the ballot be given the fullest effect. Emano was actually and physically residing in CDO while discharging his
duties as governor and even paid his community tax certificate in the same. The residency requirement intends to
prevent the possibility of a “stranger unacquainted with the conditions and needs of the community from seeing an
elective office to serve that community.”

4. Coquilla vs COMELEC [385 SCRA 607; GR 151914, September 17, 2002]

(Municipal Corporation, Qualifications – Residence)

Facts: Petitioner Coquilla was born of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar, where he grew up and resided.

In 1965, he joined the US Navy and subsequently naturalized as a US citizen.

On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, albeit continued making
several trips to the US.

On November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines subsequently after his application for repatriation
was approved.

On November 21, 2000, he applied for registration as a voter of Butunga, Oras, Eastern Samar.

On February 27, 2001, he filed his COC stating therein that he has been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for 2 years.

On March 5, 2001, respondent incumbent mayor of Oras who was running for re-election, sought the cancellation of
petitioner’s COC on the ground that the latter had resided in Oras for only about 6 months since when he took his oath as
a citizen of the Philippines.

On May 14, 2001, petitioner garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed mayor of Oras.

Issue: WON petitioner satisfied the residency requirement for the position of mayor.

Held: No. Par. 39, Chapter 1, Title 2 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) provides that an elective official must be a
“…resident therein (barangay, municipality, city or province) for at least 1 year immediately preceeding the day of the
election…”

The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but
rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus
manendi). A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside
and continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of a new domicile (domicile of choice).
In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a US citizen after enlisting in the US Navy in
1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, he was an alien.

5. Papandayan, Jr. vs COMELEC [381 SCRA133]

Facts:

In the May 14, 2001 elections, 3 candidates ran for the position of mayor of Tubaran, Lanao del Sur, namely: petitioner
Papandayan Jr., respondent Balt, who was the incumbent mayor seeking reelection, and Bantuas. Respondent Balt sought
the disqualification of petitioner alleging that petitioner was not a resident of Barangay Tangcal in Tubaran, Lanao del Sur
but a permanent resident of Bayang, Lanao del Sur.
Petitioner claimed that he was a resident of Tangcal, Tubaran; that in 1990, he transferred his domicile from Bayang to
Tangcal and stayed there with his wife, a native of Tangcal; that he managed an agricultural land in Tubaran; and that he
filed in 1998 his COC for the position of municipal mayor of Tubaran, which he later withdraw.

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in declaring him disqualified in a resolution, on the
ground that he is not a resident of Tubaran.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner is disqualified to run as an elective official.

Held:

No. The petitioner has duly proven that, although he was formerly a resident of Bayang, he later transferred residence to
Tangcal, Tubaran as shown by his actual and physical presence therein for 10 years prior to the May 14, 2001 elections.
Par. 39, Chapter 1, Title 2 of the Local Government Code (RA 7160) provides that an elective official must be a “…resident
therein (barangay, municipality, city or province) for at least 1 year immediately preceding the day of the election…”

Domicile and residence are synonymous. The term residence as used in election law, imports not only an intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, couple with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to
return.

Requisites in order to acquire a new domicile by choice are: there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.

6. ENGR. ERNESTO T. MATUGAS,petitioner,Vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ROBERT LYNDON S.

BARBERS,respondents.

G.R. No. 151944. January 20, 2004

Facts:
On 28 February 28 2001, Private Respondent Robert Lyndon Barbers filed his certificate of candidacy as governor of
Surigao del Norte for 2001 elections. Petitioner Ernesto T. Matugas, who is also a candidate for governor, filed with
COMELEC a Petition to Disqualify Barbers as candidate.

His main contention is that Barbers is not a Filipino citizen. To support his claim, Matugas presented the following
documents:

1 Photocopy of a letter-request of a certain Jesus Agana, a “confidential agent” of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID), addressed to one George Clarke, purportedly of the United States Embassy regarding the US
citizenship of Barbers;
2 A notation on the letter request allegedly made by George Clarke, stating that Barbers was naturalized on 11
October 1991;
3 Photocopy of a Certification from the BID containing Barbers' travel records and indicating in some documents
that he is American;
4 Certification from the Office of the Solicitor General's Special Committee on Naturalization stating that there is no
pending petition by, or grant of repatriation to, Barbers.

Meanwhile, Barbers won the gubernatorial race on 17 May 2001. Matugas then filed a Motion for Suspension/Annulment
of Proclamation of Barbers. However, Barbers was proclaimed the duly elected governor of Surigao del Norte on 28 May
2001.

COMELEC then dismissed the Petition to Disqualify. It found “little or no probative value” in the notation of George Clarke
to Agana’s letter-request.While noting that the BID certification involving the travel records of Barbers stated that he was
an American, it held that there is no other independent evidence to justify Matugas's claim that Barbers has renounced his
allegiance to the Philippines.

Matugas filed a Motion for reconsideration, which was denied. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme
Court, and presented the following additional documents:

1 Photocopy of a document purportedly coming from the US Dirstrict Court of California showing the Naturalization
of Barbers signed by its Deputy Clerk;
2 Photocopy of a purported Authentication attached to the previous document coming from the Philippine Consul
in Los Angeles, California stating the following: "The annexed document is an Information of Naturalization Re:
Robert Lyndon Barbers executed by United States District Court, Central District of California."

Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Admit Original Documents, appending the originals
of the above documents.

Issue:W/N Barbers should have been disqualified.

Ruling: No.
One who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. Matugas did not overcome his burden of presenting substantial
evidence with the documents he presented.

For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private. Public documents include the
written official acts or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country. The record of such public documents may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record.

If the record is not kept in the Philippines, the attested copy should be accompanied by a certificate that such officer has
custody thereof. Said certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.

The grant of United States citizenship by naturalization is an official act of the United States. The document containing the
record of this act is a public document, so this document can only be evidenced by its official publication or a copy duly
attested by the officer having legal custody thereof.

The George Clarke's notation in the letter-request of Jesus Agana is neither an official publication of the document that
contains the record of private respondent’s naturalization, nor a copy attested by the officer who has legal custody of the
record. Matugas also did not show if Clarke is the officer charged with the custody of such record.

Furthermore, Matugas only presented photocopies of the letter-request and notation, as well as the BID certification, in
contravention of the above-cited rule.

In any case, the BID certification contains inconsistent entries regarding the “nationality” of Barbers. While some entries
indicate that he is “American,” other entries state that he is “Filipino.”

The new documents presented in the Petition for Certiorari cannot also be admitted in evidence. In this case, the
Authentication executed the Philippine Consul in Los Angeles does not state that the Deputy Clerk who signed the
document has the custody of the document being authenticated.

Lastly, the Petitioner's calls to consider alleged new evidence not presented before the COMELEC is clearly beyond the the
Supreme Courts’ certiorari powers. Doing so would be tantamount to holding a new investigation.

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and it cannot be asked to substitute its own judgment and discretion for that of
the COMELEC.

The rule in appellate procedure is that a factual question may not be raised for the first time on appeal,and documents
forming no part of the proofs before the appellate court will not be considered in disposing of the issues of an action.
Piecemeal presentation of evidence is simply not in accord with orderly justice.

The same rules apply with greater force in certiorari proceedings. It would be absurd to hold COMELEC guilty of grave
abuse of discretion for not considering evidence not presented before it. The patent unfairness of Matugas’s plea militates
against the admission and consideration of the subject documents.
7. EMILIANA TORAL KARE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

G.R. No. 157526. April 28, 2004

When a mayoral candidate who gathered the highest number of votes is disqualified after the election is held, a
permanent vacancy is created, and the vice mayor succeeds to the position.

Facts:
Petitioner Moll and Private Respondent Ceriola were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of Malinao,
Albay, during the elections of May 14, 2001.
Moll obtained the highest number of votes cast for the position while Ceriola came in second, with a total of
nine hundred eighty-seven (987) votes separating the two. Kare was elected vice mayor in the same election.
On May 18, 2001, Ceriola filed a Petition to Confirm the Disqualification and/or Ineligibility of Dindo K. Moll to
Run for Any Elective Position. The Petition alleged that the latter had been sentenced by final judgment to suffer
the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and nine (9) months of prision correccional, for the
crime of usurpation of authority or official functions under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code.
In its May 28, 2001 Resolution,[2] the Comelec First Division dismissed the Petition. Ceriola filed his Motion
for Reconsideration with the Comelec en banc which, on August 31, 2001, set aside the said Resolution. It
thereafter directed the clerk of the Comelec to remand the Petition to the provincial election supervisor of Albay
for hearing and reception of evidence.

Ruling of the Comelec En Banc

On March 19, 2003, after the provincial election supervisor of Albay submitted the report and
recommendation, the Comelec en banc issued the questioned Resolution affirming Molls disqualification and
proclaiming Ceriola as the mayor-elect of the municipality.
As earlier adverted to, the Comelec ruled that Moll had indeed been disqualified from being a mayoral
candidate in the May 14, 2001 local election, and that his subsequent proclamation as mayor was void ab
initio. Consequently, he was disqualified from holding that office.
The Comelec further ruled that the trial courts final judgment of conviction of Moll disqualified him from filing
his certificate of candidacy and continued to disqualify him from holding office. Accordingly, the votes cast in his
favor were stray or invalid votes, and Ceriola -- the candidate who had obtained the second highest number of
votes -- was adjudged the winner.Thus, the Comelec ordered the Municipal Board of Canvassers to proclaim him as
the mayor-elect of the municipality.
Before Ceriolas actual proclamation, Kare filed a Petition before this Court with a prayer for a Status Quo
Order, which was granted on April 1, 2003.[3] In this Order, the Comelec, the provincial election supervisor of
Albay, and the municipal canvassers of Malinao (Albay) were required to observe the status quo prevailing before
the filing of the Petition.
The other Petition was filed by Moll.
Issues:

After going through the Memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court has determined that the following
are the two issues that have to be resolved:
1. Should Moll be disqualified from running and/or holding the position of mayor?
2.) If the first issue is answered in the affirmative, who should become the mayor -- Ceriola, the second placer in
the mayoral election? Or Kare, the elected vice mayor?

Ruling:

The Petition in GR No. 157526 is partly meritorious, but the Petition in GR No. 157527 has no merit.

First Issue:
Disqualification
Moll argues that he cannot be disqualified from running for mayor, since his judgement of conviction[5] -- the
basis of his disqualification -- has allegedly not yet attained finality. He contends that while the said judgment
promulgated on May 11, 1999 was not appealed by filing the Notice of Appeal in the ordinary course of the
proceedings, he still filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated May 28, 1999 within the reglementary
period.[6] Thus, according to him, the filing of such Motion stayed the finality of his conviction.
We disagree. Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure reads thus:
Sec. 7. Modification of judgment. -- A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set
aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment
in a criminal case becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has
applied for probation. (Italics supplied)
In turn, Section 6 of Rule 122 provides:
Sec. 6. When appeal to be taken. - An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the
judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be interrupted
from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion shall
have been served upon the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run. (Italics
supplied)
It is clear that the period for appeal is interrupted by the filing of either a motion for reconsideration or a
motion for a new trial. Moll makes it appear that his filing of a motion for reconsideration should have stayed the
running of the period for filing an appeal. What he did file, however, was a Motion to Quash the Information; and
when it was denied, he filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the denial.
The Rules of Court mandates that an appeal should be filed within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the
judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. It necessarily follows that this period is interrupted only
by the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the judgment or of the final order being appealed.
Neither Molls Motion to Quash Information nor his Motion for Reconsideration was directed at the judgment
of conviction. Rather, they both attacked a matter extraneous to the judgment. Hence, they cannot affect the
period of appeal granted by the Rules of Court in relation to the conviction.
 Moll himself admitted that no regular appeal was filed because he was still questioning the propriety of the
denial of his Motion to Quash the Information and the propriety of the conduct of the promulgation of his
sentence despite his absence x x x.[7] Aside from not interrupting his judgment of conviction, the motion to quash
was even belatedly filed. Such a motion may be filed by the accused at any time before entering a plea[8] and
certainly not on the day of the promulgation, as Moll did.
As to his contention that the promulgation of judgment was not valid because it was done in his absence, we
agree with the Office of the Solicitor General, which argues as follows:
It was not contested that Moll received a notice of the promulgation, in fact his counsel was present on the day of
the promulgation - to file a motion to quash. Hence, because of Molls unexplained absence, the promulgation of
the judgment could be validly made by recording the judgment in the criminal docket and serving him a copy
thereof to his last known address or thru his counsel (Section 6, Rule 120, Rules of Court).[9]
Indubitably, since no appeal of the conviction was seasonably filed by Moll, the judgment against him has
become final.[10] Thus, the Comelec en banc correctly ruled that he was disqualified from running for mayor,
under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code (RA No. 7160), which provides:
Section 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one
(1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
x x x x x x x x x.
Moll was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor to one (1) year and nine (9)
months of prision correccional, a penalty that clearly disqualified him from running for any elective local position.
Second Issue:
The Lawful Mayor

In allowing Ceriola -- the second placer in the mayoralty race -- to be proclaimed mayor-elect after the
disqualification of Moll, the Comelec applied Section 211(24) of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which provides:
Sec. 211. Rules for the appreciation of ballots. In the reading and appreciation of ballots, every ballot shall be
presumed to be valid unless there is clear and good reason to justify its rejection. The board of election inspectors
shall observe the following rules, bearing in mind that the object of the election is to obtain the expression of the
voters will:
xxxxxxxxx
24. Any vote cast in favor of a candidate who has been disqualified by final judgment shall be considered as stray
and shall not be counted but it shall not invalidate the ballot.
The poll body interpreted the phrase disqualified by final judgment to mean disqualification by a final
judgment of conviction, which was the ground upon which Moll was disqualified. It ruled:
In this case, the disqualification is based specifically on the final judgment of conviction by a court against private
respondent. This final judgment disqualified private respondent from filing his certificate of candidacy in the first
instance, and continues to disqualify private respondent from holding office. Accordingly, the votes cast in his favor
were stray or invalid votes and the general rule in the Sunga Case does not apply. Consequently, petitioner, having
obtained the highest number of valid votes, is entitled to be proclaimed the winning mayoralty candidate.[11]
Further, it said:
x x x As such, this instance constitutes an exception to the general rule enunciated in the Sunga Case. In the
language of the said case, the foregoing provision of law is a statute which clearly asserts a legislative policy
contrary to the rule that the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be declared the winner,
given that the votes for the disqualified candidate, though of highest number, are deemed stray and
invalid. Consequently, the so-called second placer shall be declared the winner because he or she in fact obtained
the highest number of valid votes.[12]
Such arguments do not persuade.
In every election, the choice of the people is the paramount consideration, and their expressed will must at all
times be given effect.[13] When the majority speaks by giving a candidate the highest number of votes in the
election for an office, no one else can be declared elected in place of the former.[14] In a long line of cases, this
Court has definitively ruled that the Comelec cannot proclaim as winner the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes, should the winning candidate be declared ineligible or disqualified.[15]
The Comelec, however, asserts that this case falls under the exception declared by the Court in Sunga v.
Comelec,[16] from which we quote:
x x x The votes cast for a disqualified person may not be valid to install the winner into office or maintain him
there. But in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if
the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was qualified, they should not be treated as stray, void
or meaningless.[17]
According to the Comelec, Section 211(24) of the OEC is a clear legislative policy that is contrary to the rule
that the second placer cannot be declared winner.
We disagree.
The provision that served as the basis of Comelecs Decision to declare the second placer as winner in the
mayoral race should be read in relation with other provisions of the OEC.Section 72 thereof, as amended by RA
6646, provides as follows:
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than
seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast
for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his
violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to
office." (Italics supplied)
When read together, these provisions are understood to mean that any vote cast in favor of a candidate,
whose disqualification has already been declared final regardless of the ground therefor, shall be considered
stray. The Comelec misconstrued this provision by limiting it only to disqualification by conviction in a final
judgment.
Obviously, the disqualification of a candidate is not only by conviction in a final judgment; the law lists other
grounds for disqualification.[18] It escapes us why the Comelec insists that Section 211(24) of the OEC is strictly for
those convicted by a final judgment. Such an interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the other provisions of the
election code.
More important, it is clear that it was only on March 19, 2003, that the Comelec en banc issued Resolution
No. SPA No. 01-272. The Resolution adopted the recommendation of the provincial election supervisor of Albay to
disqualify Moll from running as a mayoral candidate in Malinao, Albay. Thus, on May 14, 2001, when the electorate
voted for him as mayor, they were under the belief that he was qualified. There is no presumption that they agreed
to the subsequent invalidation of their votes as stray votes, in case of his disqualification.
A subsequent finding by the Comelec en banc that Moll was ineligible cannot retroact to the date of the
election and thereby invalidate the votes cast for him.[19]
 Moreover, Moll was not notoriously known to the public as an ineligible candidate. As discussed above, the
Resolution declaring him as such was rendered long after the election. Thus, on the part of those who voted for
him, their votes are presumed to have been cast with a sincere belief that he was a qualified candidate, and
without any intention to misapply their franchise. Thus, their votes cannot be treated as stray, void, or
meaningless.[20]
The Comelecs interpretation of a section in the OEC cannot supplant an accepted doctrine laid down by this
Court. In Aquino v. Comelec,[21] we said:
x x x To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute
our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He
was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified
candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially
changed. We are not prepared to extrapolate the results under such circumstances.[22]
To allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the
electorate is to disenfranchise them through no fault on their part, and to undermine the importance and the
meaning of democracy and the right of the people to elect officials of their choice.[23]
Theoretically, the second placer could receive just one vote. In such a case, it would be absurd to proclaim the
totally repudiated candidate as the voters choice. Moreover, there are instances in which the votes received by the
second placer may not be considered numerically insignificant. In such situations, if the equation changes because
of the disqualification of an ineligible candidate, voters preferences would nonetheless be so volatile and
unpredictable that the results for qualified candidates would not be self-evident.[24] The absence of the apparent
though ineligible winner among the choices could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates other than the second
placer.[25] Where an ineligible candidate has garnered either a majority or a plurality of the votes, by no
mathematical formulation can the runnerup in the election be construed to have obtained the majority or the
plurality of votes cast.[26]
We reiterate that this Court has no authority under any law to impose upon and compel the people of
Malinao, Albay, to accept Ceriola as their mayor.[27] The law on succession under Section 44 of Republic Act 7160,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code, would then apply. This provision relevantly states:
SECTION 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor.
(a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor
concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice
governor, mayor, or vice-mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the
second highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the
case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other sanggunian members
according to their ranking as defined herein.
x x x x x x x x x.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise
permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
The language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal. Thus, it admits no room for interpretation, but
merely for application.[28] Accordingly, when Moll was adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy was
created for failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the office.[29] In such eventuality, the duly elected vice
mayor shall succeed as provided by law.[30]
For violating the law and the clear jurisprudence on this matter, the Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion.[31]
WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No 157526 is PARTLY GRANTED, and the assailed
Resolution MODIFIED. Petitioner Salvador K. Moll is DECLARED ineligible for the position of municipal mayor of
Malinao, Albay. In view of the vacancy created in that office, Petitioner Emiliana Toral Kare, the duly elected vice
mayor, shall succeed as mayor, following the rule on succession. The status quo order of this Court dated April 1,
2003, is made permanent. Petitioner Kare shall continue discharging the duties and powers of the mayor of
Malinao, Albay. The Petition in GR 157527 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

8. DE LA TORRE vs COMELEC
258 SCRA 483, 1996

Facts: Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre was disqualified by the Commission on Elections from running for the
position of Mayor of Cavinti, Laguna in the May 8, 1995 elections. The ground cited by the COMELEC was Section
40(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991. Said section provides that those sentenced by final judgement for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more imprisonment within two
(2) years after serving sentence are disqualified from running for any elective local position. It was established by
the COMELEC that the petitioner was found guilty by the Municipal Trial Court for violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law. It was contended by the petitioner that Section 40(a) is not applicable to him because he was granted
probation by the MTC.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves moral turpitude.
2. Whether or not a grant of probation affects Section 40(a)’s applicability.

Held: The Supreme Court held that actual knowledge by the “fence” of the fact that property received is stolen
displays the same degree of malicious deprivation of one’s rightful property as that which animated the robbery or
theft which, by their very nature, are crimes of moral turpitude. Anent the second issue, suffice it to say that the
legal effect of probation is only to suspend the execution of the sentence. Petitioner’s conviction of fencing which
already declared as a crime of moral turpitude and thus falling squarely under the disqualification found in Section
40(a), subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of probation.

9. llll

10. Lingating vs Comelec

Facts:

During the first term of Mayor Sulong, an administrative complaint was filed against him and several other
individuals for Dishonesty, Falsification of Public Documents, Malversation of Public Funds and violation RA No.
3019. On February 4 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Zamboanga Del Sur found him guilty of the charges
and ordered his removal from office. Mayor Sulong filed a motion for reconsideration and/or notice of appeal
shortly thereafter. The Sanggunian ordered the complainant in AC No 12-91 to comment.

Pending appeal, then Vice‐Mayor Vicente Imbing took his oath and assumed the office of Mayor of Lapuyan on
March 3, 1992 pursuant to Section 68 of the Local Gov't Code which allows for the execution pending appeal
of administrative decisions. From February 1992 to August 2001, no comment was ever filed by the complainant
in AC No 12-91 nor has the Sanggunian resolved Sulong’s MR/Appeal.

In the May 2001 Elections, Lingating and Sulong both ran for the position of Mayor of Lapuyan. On May 3, 2001,
Lingating file a petition for disqualification of Sulong on the ground that the latter is disqualified from running for
any elective local position having been removed from office during his first term (1988-1991) as a result of an
administrative case (AC No 12-91) pursuant to Section 40(b) of the Local Government Code. Respondent Sulong
denied that the decision in AC No 12-91 had ever become final and executory since up to the filing of the
disqualification case, no comment has been filed nor has the appeal been resolved. After the parties had filed their
memoranda, the case was submitted for resolution. The COMELEC, however, was unable to render judgment
before the elections of May 14, 2001, where Sulong was elected and proclaimed Mayor of Lapuyan.

In a resolution dated August 1, 2001, the COMELEC declared respondent Cesar B. Sulong disqualified adhering to
section 40(b) of the Local Government Code. Respondent Sulong filed an MR arguing that the decision in AC No.
12-91 has not become final and executory; that at no time had he been removed by virtue of the said decision,
and that the issue was moot and academic having been "overtaken by the local elections of May 11, 1992."

Lingating filed an opposition to the MR contending that the fact that Sulong was succeeded by Vice Mayor Imbing
was proof that AC No. 12-91 had indeed become final. Lingating also prayed that he be installed as Mayor of
Lapuyuan in view of Sulong's disqualification.

The COMELEC First Division denied Lingating’s motion on the ground that the disqualification of an elected
candidate does not entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to occupy the office
vacated. Lingating then filed a motion for reconsideration of this order.

The COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the first division, citing Aguinaldo v. COMELEC that re-election
renders an administrative case moot and academic. It also ruled that respondent Sulong was not entitled to occupy
the office thus vacated.

Lingating contends that the COMELEC en banc erred in applying the ruling in Aguinaldo vs. COMELEC. Instead,
Lingating argues that the applicable case is Reyes v. COMELEC where the court held that an elective local executive
officer, who is removed before the expiration of the term for which he was elected, is disqualified from being a
candidate for a local elective position under Section 40(b) of the LGC. Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not Sumulong is disqualified to run for local election

Held:

The filing of motion for reconsideration by Sulong prevented the decision of Sangguniang Panlalawigan from
becoming final. There is thus no decision finding Sulong guilty to speak of. Neither can the succession of the then
vice-mayor of Lapuyan, Vicente Imbing, to the office of mayor be considered proof that the decision in AC No. 12-
91 had become final because it appears to have been made pursuant to Sec 68 [16] of the Local Government Code,
which makes decisions in administrative cases immediately executory.

Aguinaldo and Reyes Cases are inapplicable. In Aguinaldo v COMELEC, the court held that removal cannot extend
beyond the term during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a public official is not removed before his
term of office expires, he can no longer be removed if he is thereafter re-elected for another term. However,
Aguinaldo is not applicable as at the time the case was decided, there was no provision similar to 40(b) of the LGC
and hence, cannot be given retroactive effect. Neither is Reyes vs. COMELEC applicable as AC No. 12-91 remains to
this day, not final. (G.R. No. 153475, November 13, 2002)

11. MERCADO VS.MANZANO, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

307 SCRA 631, May 26, 1999 (Constitutional Law – Dual Citizenship, Dual Allegiance)

FACTS: In the case at bar, petitioner was seeking the disqualification of respondent to hold elective office on the
ground that he is a dual citizen, having been born in the United States of Filipino parents. Pursuant to Local
Government Code of 1991 (RA 7160), those with dual citizenship are disqualified from running any elective local
position.

ISSUE: Whether or not dual citizenship is a ground for disqualification.

HELD: No, because dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. What is inimical is not dual citizenship per se,
but with naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Hence, the phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must be understood as referring to “dual
allegiance”. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this disqualification.

12. EDUARDO T. RODRIGUEZ

vs.
COMELEC, BIENVENIDO O. MARQUEZ, JR.
G.R. No. 120099 July 24, 1996

Facts:
Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez Jr. (Rodriguez and Marquez, for
brevity) were protagonists for the gubernatorial post of Quezon Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez
won and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. Marquez challenged Rodriguez’ victory via petition for quo
warranto before the COMELEC, alleging that the latter has a pending case in LA, hence, a fugitive from justice and
thus disqualified for the elective position.

Marquez Decision defined the term “fugitive from justice”, which includes not only those who flee after conviction
to avoid punishment but likewise those who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution. This definition truly
finds support from jurisprudence (. . .), and it may be so conceded as expressing the general and ordinary
connotation of the term

In previous case, the issue of whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice” under the definition thus given
was not passed upon by the Court. That task was to devolve on the COMELEC upon remand of the case to it, with
the directive to proceed therewith with dispatch conformably with the MARQUEZ Decision.

Rodriguez and Marquez renewed their rivalry for the same position of governor. This time, Marquez challenged
Rodriguez’ candidacy via petition for disqualification before the COMELEC, based principally on the same allegation
that Rodriguez is a “fugitive from justice.”

The COMELEC, allegedly having kept in mind the MARQUEZ Decision definition of “fugitive from justice”, found
Rodriguez to be one. At any rate, Rodriguez again emerged as the victorious candidate in the May 8, 1995 election
for the position of governor.

Marquez filed urgent motions to suspend Rodriguez’ proclamation which the COMELEC granted.

Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC decision suspending Rodriguez is valid?

Held: No
The definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the compelling factor that animates one’s flight from a
particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when there
is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of
conviction.

To elaborate, the same parties (Rodriguez and Marquez) and issue (whether or not Rodriguez is a “fugitive from
justice”) are involved in the MARQUEZ Decision and the instant petition. The MARQUEZ Decision was an appeal
(the Marquez’ quo warranto petition before the COMELEC). The instant petition is also an appeal although the
COMELEC resolved the latter jointly (Marquez’ petition for the disqualification of Rodriguez). Therefore, what was
irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule in the MARQUEZ Decision must govern the instant petition. And
we specifically refer to the concept of “fugitive from justice” as defined in the main opinion in the MARQUEZ
Decision, which highlights the significance of an intent to evade but which Marquez and the COMELEC, with their
proposed expanded definition, seem to trivialize or undermine.

To re-define “fugitive from justice” would only foment instability in our jurisprudence when hardly has the ink
dried in the MARQUEZ Decision.

To summarize, the term “fugitive from justice” as a ground for the disqualification or ineligibility of a person
seeking to run for any elective local petition under Section 40(e) of the Local Government Code, should be
understood according to the definition given in the MARQUEZ Decision

A “fugitive from justice” includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged, flee to avoid prosecution.

Intent to evade on the part of a candidate must therefore be established by proof that there has already been a
conviction or at least, a charge has already been filed, at the time of flight.

Not being a “fugitive from justice” under this definition, Rodriguez cannot be denied the Quezon Province
gubernatorial post.

13. Nolasco vs. Comelec 275 scra 762 (Jurisdiction of COMELEC)

Facts: Florentino P. Blanco and Eduado A. Alarilla both vied for the mayoral position of Meycauayan, Bulacan
during the election held 8 May 1995. Blanco garnered the highest number of votes. Edgardo Nolasco was elected
vice-mayor. On 9 May, Alarilla filed with the Comelec a petition to disqualify Blanco on grounds that the latter
committed acts in violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, i.e. for giving money to influence, induce
or corrupt the voters or public officials performing election functions; for committing acts of terrorism to enhance
his candidacy; and for spending in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the Election Code
(P10 million against 97,000 registered voters). On 15 August, the Comelec disqualified Blanco on the ground of
vote-buying and ordered the Board of Canvassers of Meycauayan, Bulacan to reconvene and to determine the
winner out of the remaining qualified candidates who shall be immediately proclaimed. Blanco moved for
reconsideration while Nolasco, as vice mayor, intervened in the proceedings. Nolasco urged that as vice-mayor he
should be declared mayor in the event Blanco was finally disqualified. Both motions were denied. Hence, the
petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether the disqualification of the mayor-elect warrants the declaration of any of the remaining qualified
mayoral candidates, upon the canvassing of votes, as mayor.

Held: In a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes cannot be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. Permanent vacancies (i.e. when an elective local
official fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily
resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office) in the Offices of the
Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and Vice Mayor are governed by Section 44, Chapter 2 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 and Article 38 of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Local Government Code of 1991. Vice-
Mayor Edgardo C. Nolasco was adjudged as Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan in view of the disqualification of
mayor-elect Florentino P. Blanco.

14. Borja vs COMELEC [295 SCRA 157; GR 133495, September 3, 1998] (Term of Office)

(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification, Succession – Exception to the 3 term limit)

Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term
ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the
incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as
Mayor.

On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the
May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capco’s
disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by
June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.

The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent
Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration, majority
overturned the original decision.

Issue: WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?

Held: No. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that “…the term of office of elective local officials… …shall
be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the
full term for which he was elected.”

This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 71) which states that “…no local
elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected….”

The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned] was elected.” The purpose of this
provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may serve.
Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing the service of the
official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term not withstanding his voluntary
renunciation of office prior to its expiration.

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right to
serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive
terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of
times before the disqualification can apply.

15. Socrates vs COMELEC, 391 SCRA 457; G.R. No. 154512, November 12, 2002

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011 ( Term of Office)

(Local Government, Recall Election: Exception to the 3 term limit)

Facts: COMELEC gave due course to the Recall Resolution against Mayor Socrates of the City of Puerto Princesa,
and scheduled the recall election on September 7, 2002.

On August 23, 2002, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election.

Different petitioners filed their respective petitions, which were consolidated seeking the disqualification of
Hagedorn to run for the recall election and the cancellation of his COC on the ground that the latter is disqualified
from running for a fourth consecutive term, having been elected and having served as mayor of the city for three
(3) consecutive full terms in 1992, 1995 and 1998 immediately prior to the instant recall election for the same
post.

COMELEC’s First Division dismissed in a resolution the petitioner for lack of merit. And COMELEC declared
Hagedorn qualified to run in the recall election.

Issue: WON one who has been elected and served for 3 consecutive full terms is qualified to run for mayor in the
recall election.

Held: Yes. The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in Section 8, Article X of the Constitution,
which states:

“Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by
law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.”

This three-term limit rule is reiterated in Section 43 (b) of RA No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code, which provides:

“Section 43. Term of Office. – (a) x x x

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official was elected.”

The first part provides that an elective local official cannot serve for more than three consecutive terms. The clear
intent is that only consecutive terms count in determining the three-term limit rule. The second part states that
voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time does not interrupt the continuity of service. The clear intent
is that involuntary severance from office for any length of time interrupts continuity of service and prevents the
service before and after the interruption from being joined together to form a continuous service or consecutive
terms.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a fourth term. The
prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the third
consecutive term. Any subsequent election, like a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibition for two
reasons. First, a subsequent election like a recall election is no longer an immediate re-election after three
consecutive terms. Second, the intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of
service.

Based from the deliberations of a Constitutional Commission, what the Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-
election for a fourth term following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however, does not prohibit a
subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long as the re-election is not immediately after the end of the third
consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term following the third consecutive term is a subsequent
election but not an immediate re-election after the third term.

Neither does the Constitution prohibit one barred from seeking immediate re-election to run in any other
subsequent election involving the same term of office. What the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth
term.

In the case of Hagedorn, his candidacy in the recall election on September 24, 2002 is not an immediate re-election
after his third consecutive term which ended on June 30, 2001. The immediate re-election that the Constitution
barred Hagedorn from seeking referred to the regular elections in 2001.

16. Lonzanida vs COMELEC [311 SCRA 602] (Term of Office)

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Local Government, Disqualification: Exception to the 3 term limit rule)

Facts: Petitioner Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales prior to the May 1995 elections. In the May 1995 elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales and was again proclaimed winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His
proclamation in 1995 was contested by his opponent who filed an election protest. The court rendered a judgment
declaring the results of the said election last May 8, 1995, as null and void on the ground that there was a failure of
election.

In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor of San Antonio and was
proclaimed winner. Prior proclamation, His opponent timely filed a petition to disqualify him from running on the
ground that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post.
The COMELEC found that Lonzanida’s assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he
was later unseated before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing
the three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Hence, COMELEC issued a resolution
granting the petition for disqualification

Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions maintaining that he was duly elected
mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in 1995 cannot be counted as service of a
term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for local government officials, because he was not the duly
elected mayor of San Antonio in the May 1995 elections.

The private respondent maintains that the petitioner’s assumption of office in 1995 should be considered as
service of one full term because he discharged the duties of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or
barely a few months before the next mayoral elections.

Issue: WON petitioner’s assumption of office as mayor of San Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to 1998 may be
considered as service of one full term for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local
government officials.

Held: No. Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides that, “the term of office of elective local officials, except
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for more
than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as
an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”

Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule, that: “No local elective official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for
any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official concerned was elected.”

The petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because he was ordered to vacate his
post before the expiration of the term.

Pursuant to the constitutional provision above, voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced
term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of
time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner
vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance
with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term.

17. Adormeo vs COMELEC [76 SCRA 90; GR 147927; February 4, 2002]

(Municipal Corporation: Interruption, Recall – Exception to the 3 term limit)

Facts: Petitioner and private respondent incumbent mayor were the only candidates who filed their COC for mayor
of Lucena City in the May 2001 elections.
Private respondent was elected mayor in May 1992, where he served the full term. Again, he was re-elected in
May 1995, where he again served the full term. In the recall election of May 2000, he again won and served only
the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to the latter in the 1998 election.

Petitioner filed a petition to cancel COC and/or disqualification of the respondent in the ground that the latter was
elected and had served as city mayor for 3 consecutive terms contending that serving the unexpired term of office
is considered as 1 term.

Private respondent maintains that his service as city mayor of Lucena is not consecutive. He lost his bid for a
second re-election in 1998 and during Tagarao’s incumbency, he was a private citizen, thus he had not been a
mayor for 3 consecutive terms.

Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that the term of office of elective officials, except barangay
officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be 3 years and no such official shall serve for more than 3
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.

Section 43(b) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code) provides that “no local elective official shall serve for more than
3 consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned
was elected.”

Issue: WON private respondent had already served 3 consecutive term for mayor of Lucena City.

Held: No. Private respondent was not elected for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a private citizen.
The continuity of his term as mayor was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.

Neither can respondent’s victory in the recall election be deemed a voluntary renunciation for clearly it is not.
Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts
to an interruption of continuity of service (Lonzanida vs COMELEC).

Hence, being elected in a recall election interrupts the 3 consecutive term limit.

18. Latasa vs COMELEC 417 Scra 601 Effects on Conversion of LGU)

Facts:

Petitioner Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and
1998. In February 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy for city mayor for the 2001 elections. He stated therein
that he is eligible therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three consecutive terms as mayor
of the Municipality of Digos and is now running for the first time for the position of city mayor.

Sunga, also a candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a petition to deny
petitioner's candidacy since the latter had already been elected and served for three consecutive terms. Petitioner
countered that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacy for the 2001 elections since this will
be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.

The Comelec’s First Division denied petitioner's certificate of candidacy. However, his motion for reconsideration
was not acted upon by the Comelec en banc before election day and he was proclaimed winner. Only after the
proclamation did the Comelec en banc issue a resolution that declared him disqualified from running for mayor of
Digos City, and ordered that all votes cast in his favor should not be counted.

Petitioner appealed, contending that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it attained a
different juridical personality separate from the municipality of Digos. So when he filed his certificate of candidacy
for city mayor, it should not be construed as vying for the same local government post.

Issue:

Is petitioner Latasa eligible to run as candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City of Digos
immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos?

Held:

As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed freely to choose those who will govern
them. Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of the
people.

Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law,

shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation

of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the

full term for which he was elected.

An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for same local government post, unless two
conditions concur: 1.) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.

True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and distinct from that of the municipality. This
does not mean, however, that for the purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the
municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post as that of the office of the city
mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the municipality.
Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as those in the city. These inhabitants are the same
group of voters who elected petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive terms. These are
also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and authority as their chief executive for nine years.

The framers of the Constitution specifically included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will
govern them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive power over a particular territorial
jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of
city mayor after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would obviously defeat the very
intent of the framers when they wrote this exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as
mayor of the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief executive over the same
territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to
be avoided by the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.(Latasa vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 154829, 10 December 2003)

Note:

● It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v. COMELEC that after an elective official
has been proclaimed as winner of the elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his qualifications.
An opposing party's remedies after proclamation would be to file a petition for quo warranto within ten days after
the proclamation. Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools designed to facilitate
the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to set aside
technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.

19.
ROBERTO R. MONROY v. CA, GR No. L-23258, 1967-07-01

Facts:

Petitioner

Monroy was the incumbent Mayor of Navotas, Rizal, when on September 15, 1961, his certificate of candidacy as...
representative of the first district of Rizal in the forthcoming elections... was filed with the Commission on
Elections. Three days later,... petitioner filed a letter withdrawing said certificate of candidacy.

The Commission on Elections,... approved the withdrawal.

But on September 21, 1961, respondent... del Rosario, then the vice-mayor of Navotas, took his oath of office as
municipal mayor on the... theory that petitioner had forfeited the said office upon his filing of the certificate of
candidacy in question.

Court of First Instance of Rizal... held in the suit for injunction instituted by petitioner... that (a) the former had
ceased to be mayor... after his certificate of candidacy was filed... respondent del Rosario became municipal mayor
upon his having assumed office as such... petitioner must reimburse, as actual damages, the salaries to which
respondent was entitled as Mayor from September 21, 1961 up to the time he can reassume said office

This judgment was

Court of Appeals, affirmed in toto

Hence, this petition for certiorari... argues that both the lower court and the Court of Appeals... no jurisdiction to
do - review a resolution of the Commission on Elections.

Petitioner would next maintain that respondent Court of Appeals likewise erred in affirming a lower court judg-
ment requiring petitioner to pay respondent Del Rosario by way of actual damages the salaries he was allegedly
entitled to receive from September 21, 1961, to the... date of petitioner's vacation of his office as mayor.

Issues:

whether or not petitioner was still the municipal mayor after September 15, 1961.

Ruling:

whether or not petitioner was still the municipal mayor after September 15, 1961.

Rev. Election Code providing that ?

"Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually
holding, shall be considered resigned from his office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy,"... makes the forfeiture automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the certificate of
candidacy for another office

Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the certificate is filed, the seat is... forfeited forever and
nothing save a new election or appointment can restore the ousted official.

The present case for... injunction and quo warranto involves the forfeiture of the office of municipal mayor by the
incumbent occupant thereof and the claim to that office by the vice mayor... general rule... that the rightful
incumbent of a public office may recover from an officer de facto the salary received by the latter during the time
of his wrongful tenure, even though he entered into the office in good faith and under... color of title"... that
applies in the present case.

The resulting hardship occasioned by the operation of this rule to the de facto officer who did actual work is
recognized; but it is... far more cogently acknowledge that the de facto doctrine has been formulated, not for the
protection of the de facto officer principally, but rather for the protection of the public and individuals who get
involved in the official... acts of persons discharging the duties of an office without being lawful officers.[7] The
question of compensation involves different principles and concepts however. Here, it is possession of title, not of
the... office, that is decisive.

A de facto officer, not having good title, takes the salaries at his risk and must therefore account to the de jure
officer for whatever amount of salary he... received during the period of his wrongful retention of the public office.

20. Aguinaldo Vs. Comelec

21. Montesclaros vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 152295

July 9, 2002

CARPIO, J.

Facts: The Commission on Elections, on December 4, 2001 issued Resolution Nos. 4713 and 4714 to govern the SK
elections on May 6, 2002. On February 18, 2002, petitioner Antoniette V.C. Montesclaros sent a letter to the
COMELEC, demanding that the SK elections be held as scheduled on May 6, 2002. She also urged the COMELEC to
respond to her letter within 10 days upon receipt of the letter, otherwise, she will seek judicial relief.

On the other hand, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo, wrote letters dated 20 February 2002 to the
Speaker of the House and the Senate President about the status of pending bills on the SK and Barangay elections.
In his letters, the COMELEC Chairman intimated that it was “operationally very difficult” to hold both elections
simultaneously in May 2002. Instead, he expressed support for the bill of Senator Franklin Drilon that proposed to
hold the Barangay elections in May 2002 and postpone the SK elections to November 2002.

Instead of receiving a response letter, petitioners received a copy of COMELEC En Banc Resolution 4763 dated
February 5, 2002 recommending to Congress the postponement of the SK elections to November 2002 but holding
the Barangay elections in May 2002 as scheduled. Eventually, on March 6, 2002, the Senate and the House of
Representatives passed their respective bills postponing the SK elections. On March 11, 2002, the Bicameral
Conference Committee of the Senate and the House came out with a Report recommending approval of the
reconciled bill consolidating Senate Bill 2050 and House Bill 4456. The Bicameral Committee’s consolidated bill
reset the SK and Barangay elections to 15 July 2002 and lowered the membership age in the SK to at least 15 but
not more than 18 years of age. On this same date, Montesclaros filed the petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with prayer for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction, seeking to prevent the
postponement of the SK elections originally scheduled 6 May 2002 and also to prevent the reduction of the age
requirement for membership in the SK. The consolidated bill was approved by the Senate and the House of
Representatives and later on signed into law by the President.

Issue: Whether or not there is an actual controversy in the case which seeks to prevent a postponement of the 6
May 2002 SK elections, and which seeks to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the
membership age in the SK.
Ruling: At first, the Court takes judicial notice of the following events that have transpired since petitioners filed
this petition. These are as follows:

1. The May 6, 2002 SK elections and May 13, 2002 Barangay elections were not held as scheduled.

2. Congress enacted RA No. 9164 which provides that voters and candidates for the SK elections must be
"at least 15 but less than 18 years of age on the day of the election." RA No. 9164 also provides that there
shall be a synchronized SK and Barangay elections on July 15, 2002.

3. The COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 4846, the rules and regulations for the conduct of the July
15, 2002 synchronized SK and Barangay elections.

In this case, the court mentioned the requisites which must be complied with for the Court to exercise its power of
judicial review. These are (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case or controversy; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.

The Court ruled that in this case there is no actual controversy requiring the exercise of the power of judicial
review. While seeking to prevent a postponement of SK elections, petitioners are but amenable to a resetting of
the SK elections to any date not later than 15 July 2002, the date which RA 9164 has reset the SK elections. This
only shows that with respect to the date of the SK elections, there is therefore no actual controversy requiring
judicial intervention. Also, their prayer to prevent Congress from enacting into law a proposed bill lowering the
membership age in the SK does not present an actual justiciable controversy. According to the Court, a proposed
bill is not subject to judicial review because it is not a law. A proposed bill creates no right and imposes no duty
legally enforceable by the Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect, violates no constitutional right or duty. The
Court has no power to declare a proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be in the
nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be
exercised in vacuo.

It also emphasized that there can be no justiciable controversy involving the constitutionality of a proposed bill.
The Court can exercise its power of judicial review only after a law is enacted, not before.

It also noted that under the separation of powers, the Court can neither restrain Congress from passing any law
nor dictate to Congress the object or subject of bills that Congress should enact into law.

The Court cannot also direct the COMELEC to allow over-aged voters to vote or be voted for in an election that is
limited under RA No. 9164 to youths at least 15 but less than 18 years old. A law is needed to allow all those who
have turned more than 21 years old on or after May 6, 2002 to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections.
Petitioners' remedy is legislation, not judicial intervention.

Regarding petitioners’ personal and substantial interest, the Court ruled that petitioners have no such rights or
interests in maintaining the suit.

The Court stated that a party must show that he has been, or is about to be denied some personal right or privilege
to which he is lawfully entitled. A party must also show that he has a real interest in the suit. By "real interest" is
meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or future, contingent, subordinate,
or inconsequential interest.
In this case, petitioners seek to enforce a right originally conferred by law on those who were at least 15 but not
more than 21 years old. But with the passage of RA No. 9164, this right is limited to those who on the date of the
SK elections are at least 15 but less than 18 years old. The new law restricts membership in the SK to this specific
age group. Not falling within this classification, petitioners have ceased to be members of the SK and are no longer
qualified to participate in the July 15, 2002 SK elections. Plainly, petitioners no longer have a personal and
substantial interest in the SK elections.

The Court had not seen constitutional issue on this case. At the time petitioners filed their petition, RA No. 9164,
which reset the SK elections and reduced the age requirement for SK membership, was not yet enacted into law
and even after the passage of RA No. 9164, they failed to assail any of its provisions that could be unconstitutional.
The Court however mentioned the only semblance of a constitutional issue which is the petitioners’ claim that SK
membership is a "property right within the meaning of the Constitution. This argument however is bereft of merit.
Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer qualified
because of an amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership.
Only those who qualify as SK members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK
membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right protected by the
Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law to
change or even withdraw the statutory right.

The Court also gave emphasis that public office is not a property right. As the Constitution expressly states, a
"Public office is a public trust." No one has a vested right to any public office, much less a vested right to an
expectancy of holding a public office.

The petition is dismissed.

22. MENZON VS. PETILLA

1991 (Gutierrez)

Facts:
 Because no Governor had been proclaimed in the province of Leyte, Secretary of Local Government Luis
Santos designated Vice-Governor Leopoldo Petilla as Acting Governor of Leyte. Petitioner Aurelio Menzon, a
senior member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, was designated by Secretary Luis Santos to act as the Vice-
Governor for the province of Leyte.
 Provincial Administrator Tente Quintero inquired from the Undersecretary of the Department of Local
Government, Jacinto Rubillar, on the legality of the appointment of petitioner to act as Vice-Governor.
Undersecretary Rubillar stated that the appointment of petitioner as the temporary Vice- Governor is not
necessary since the Vice-Governor who is temporarily performing the functions of the Governor, could
concurrently assume the functions of both offices.
 The Sangguniang Panlalawigan in a special session issued Resolution No. 505 where it held invalid the
appointment of the petitioner as acting Vice-Governor of Leyte.
 Undersecretary Rubillar explained his opinion: “the peculiar situation in the Province of Leyte, where the
electoral controversy in the Office of the Governor has not yet been settled, calls for the designation of the
Sangguniang Member to act as vice-governor temporarily.”
 The Acting Governor and the Sangguniang Panlalawigan refused to correct Resolution No. 505 and to pay the
petitioner the emoluments attached to the Office of Vice-Governor.
 The petitioner filed before the SC a petition for certiorari and mandamus and sought the nullification of
Resolution No. 505 and payment of his salary for his services as the acting Vice-Governor of Leyte.
 Adelina Larrazabal was proclaimed the Governor of the province of Leyte.
 The provincial treasurer of Leyte allowed the payment to the petitioner of his salary as acting Vice-Governor.
 Supreme Court dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner.
 Respondent Petilla requested Governor Larrazabal to direct the petitioner to pay back to the province of Leyte
all emoluments and compensation which he received while acting as the Vice-Governor.
 The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration and prayed that the Supreme Court uphold his right to
receive the salary and emoluments attached to the office of the Vice-Governor while he was acting as such.

Issues:
1) Whether or not there was a vacancy? YES
2) Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to make temporary appointments? YES

Held:
1. Petilla's automatic assumption to the acting Governorship resulted in a vacancy in the office of Vice-Governor.
 Law on Public Officers: There is no vacancy when the office is occupied by a legally qualified incumbent. There
is a vacancy when there is no person lawfully authorized to assume and exercise the duties of the office.
 The office of the Vice-Governor was left vacant when the elected Vice-Governo Petilla was appointed Acting
Governor. The office to which he was elected was left barren of a legally qualified person to exercise the
duties of the office of the Vice-Governor.
 There is no satisfactory showing that Petilla continued to simultaneously exercise the duties of the Vice-
Governor. The nature of the duties of a Provincial Governor calls for a full-time occupant to discharge them.
More so when the vacancy is for an extended period.
 The fact that the Secretary of Local Government was prompted to appoint the petitioner shows the need to fill
up the position during the period it was vacant. The Department Secretary had the discretion to ascertain
whether or not the Provincial Governor should devote all his time to that particular office.

2. SC declared valid the temporary appointment extended to the petitioner to act as the Vice-Governor.
 Under the circumstances of this case and the silence of the Local Government Code, in order to obviate the
dilemma resulting from an interregnum created by the vacancy, the President, acting through her alter ego,
the Secretary of Local Government, may remedy the situation. The exigencies of public service demanded
nothing less than the immediate appointment of an acting Vice-Governor.
 Commonwealth Act No. 588 and Revised Administrative Code of 1987: The President is empowered to make
temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case of any vacancy that may occur. In the absence of any
contrary provision in the Local Government Code and in the best interest of public service, the procedure in
the two laws may be similarly applied in the present case.
 Section 49, LGC: In case a permanent vacancy arises when a Vice-Governor assumes the Office of the
Governor, . . . refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntary resigns or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office the sangguniang panlalawigan . . .
member who obtained the highest number of votes in the election immediately preceding, . . . shall assume
the office for the unexpired term of the Vice-Governor.
 The mode of succession for permanent vacancies may be observed in a temporary vacancy in the same office.
There was a need to fill the vacancy. The petitioner is the member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan with the
highest number of votes. The Department Secretary acted correctly in extending the temporary appointment.

The COURT GRANTS the motion. The additional compensation which the petitioner has received shall be
considered as payment for actual services rendered as acting Vice-Governor and may be retained by him.
23. Ramon Labo, Jr. vs COMELEC [211 SCRA 297;GR 105111, July 3, 1992]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification, 2nd Highest Number of Votes)

Facts: For the second time around, believing that he is a Filipino ctizen, Ramon Labo, Jr filed his COC for mayor of
Baguio City on March 23, 1992 for the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner Roberto Ortega on other hand, also filed
his COC for the same office on March 25, 1992.

On March 26, 1992, petitioner Ortega filed a disqualification proceeding against Labo before the COMELEC on the
ground that Labo is not a Filipino citizen.

On May 9, 1992, respondent Comelec issued the assailed resolution denying Labo’s COC.

On May 10, 1992, respondent Comelec issued an Order which reads: Acting on the “Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Clarification”, filed by respondent (Labo) on May 9, 1992, the Commission resolves that the decision promulgated
on May 9, 1992 disqualifying respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., shall become final and executory only after five (5)
days from promulgation pursuant to Rule 18, Section 13, Paragraph (b) of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.

Accordingly, respondent (Labo) may still continue to be voted upon as candidate for City Mayor of Baguio City on
May 11, 1992 subject to the final outcome of this case in the event the issue is elevated to the Supreme Court
either on appeal or certiorari.

On May 13, 1992, respondent Comelec resolved, motu proprio to suspend the proclamation of Labo in the event
he wins in the elections for the City Mayor of Baguio.

On May 15, 1992, petitioner Labo filed the instant petition for review with prayer, among others, for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order to set aside the May 9, 1992 resolution of respondent Comelec; to render
judgment declaring him as a Filipino citizen; and to direct respondent Comelec to proceed with his proclamation in
the event he wins in the contested elections.

Petitioner Ortega argues that respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to
implement its May 9, 1992 resolution notwithstanding the fact that said resolution disqualifying Labo has already
become final and executory.

Petitioner Ortega submits that since this Court did not issue a temporary restraining order as regards the May 9,
1992 resolution of respondent Comelec cancelling Labo’s certificate of candidacy, said resolution has already
become final and executory. Ortega further posits the view that as a result of such finality, the candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes should be declared Mayor of Baguio City.

Sec. 78 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy
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