MARGARITA QUINTOS vs.

BECK
FACTS:
Beck (defendant), a tenant of Quintos (plaintiff), occupied Quintos’ house. When the
contract of lease novated, Quintos gratuitously granted to the Beck the use of the
furniture subject to the condition that the latter would return them upon demand.
Quintos sold the property to Maria and Rosario Lopez. The three notified Beck of the
conveyance, giving him 60 days to vacate the premises and also required him to return
the furniture. Beck, through another person, told Quintos that she may call for the
furniture in the house’s ground floor. Beck later informed her that he cannot give up 3
gas heaters and 4 electric lamps as he would still use them when the lease is due to
expire. Quintos refused to get the furniture since Beck had declined to make delivery of
all of them. Before vacating the house, Beck deposited with the Sheriff all the furniture
belonging to Quintos and they are now on deposit in the warehouse.

ISSUES:
Whether Beck complied with his obligation to return the furniture upon the plaintiff's
demand;
Whether Quintos is bound to bear the deposit fees thereof

RULING:
1. No.
2. Beck is bound to bear the deposit fees.
The contract entered into between the parties is one of commadatum, because under it
Quintos gratuitously granted the use of the furniture to Beck, reserving for herself the
ownership thereof; by this contract Beck bound himself to return the furniture to Quintos,
upon the latter’s demand.
The obligation voluntarily assumed by Beck to return the furniture upon Quintos’
demand, means that he should return all of them to her at the latter's residence or
house. Beck did not comply with this obligation when he merely placed them at the
disposal of Quintos, retaining for his benefit the three gas heaters and the four electric
lamps. The provisions of article 1169 of the Civil Code cited by counsel for the parties
are not squarely applicable. The trial court, therefore, erred when it came to the legal
conclusion that the plaintiff failed to comply with her obligation to get the furniture when
they were offered to her.
As Beck had voluntarily undertaken to return all the furniture to the plaintiff, upon the
latter's demand, the Court could not legally compel her to bear the expenses
occasioned by the deposit of the furniture at Beck’s behest. The latter, as bailee, was
not entitled to place the furniture on deposit; nor was the plaintiff under a duty to accept
the offer to return the furniture, because he wanted to retain the three gas heaters and
the four electric lamps.
As to the value of the furniture, we do not believe that Quintos is entitled to the payment
thereof by Beck in case of his inability to return some of the furniture because under
paragraph 6 of the stipulation of facts, Beck has neither agreed to nor admitted the
correctness of the said value. Should he fail to deliver some of the furniture, the value
thereof should be latter determined by the trial Court through evidence which the parties
may desire to present.