FERDINAND A. CRUZ, 332 Edang St., Pasay City, G.R. No.

154464

Petitioner,

Present:

- versus -

TINGA, J.,*

JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge, Regional CHICO-NAZARIO,

Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, Metro Manila,
Acting Chairperson,
Public Respondent.
VELASCO, JR.,*

NACHURA, and
BENJAMIN MINA, JR., 332 Edang St., Pasay City,
REYES, JJ.
Private Respondent.

Promulgated:

September 11, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was directly filed with this Court assailing
the Resolutions dated May 10, 2002[1] and July 31, 2002[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 108,
Pasay City, which denied the appearance of the plaintiff Ferdinand A. Cruz, herein petitioner, as party
litigant, and the refusal of the public respondent, Judge Priscilla Mijares, to voluntarily inhibit herself
from trying the case. No writ of preliminary injunction was issued by this Court.
The antecedents:

On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for and on
his behalf, before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for
Abatement of Nuisance. Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court[3] that a non-lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation
personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from
the Court Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant.
Atty. Stanley Cabrera, counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial
brief to which petitioner Cruz vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after
the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares then remarked, Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa
Huwes. Ok? and proceeded to hear the pending Motion to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on
May 2, 2002.

On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit,[4] praying for the
voluntary inhibition of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the
respondent judge in the conduct of the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge
Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a
negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice will not be served.[5]

In an Order[6] dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing
tenuous allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary
inhibition, considering that it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration[7] of the said order.

On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality.[8] In the same Order, the trial court held
that for the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his
failure to satisfy the requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance
was denied.

In a motion for reconsideration,[9] petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule
138-A, but Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to
different circumstances, but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an
Order[10] dated July 31, 2002.
On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition and assigns the
following errors:

I.

THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT
DENIED THE APPEARANCE OF THE PETITIONER, FOR AND IN THE LATTERS BEHALF, IN CIVIL CASE NO. 01-
0401 [sic] CONTRARY TO RULE 138, SECTION 34 OF THE RULES OF COURT, PROVIDING FOR THE
APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS AS A PARTY LITIGANT;

II.

THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DID NOT
VOLUNTARILY INHIBIT DESPITE THE ADVENT OF JURISPRUDENCE [sic] THAT SUCH AN INHIBITION IS
PROPER TO PRESERVE THE PEOPLES FAITH AND CONFIDENCE TO THE COURTS.

The core issues raised before the Court are: (1) whether the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court may issue; and (2) whether the respondent
court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the
appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying
the case.

This Courts jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction is not
exclusive; it has concurrent jurisdiction with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as an absolute, unrestrained freedom to choose the court
where the application therefor will be directed.[11] A becoming regard of the judicial hierarchy most
certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against the RTCs should be filed
with the Court of Appeals.[12] The hierarchy of courts is determinative of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs; and only in exceptional cases and for compelling reasons, or if
warranted by the nature of the issues reviewed, may this Court take cognizance of petitions filed directly
before it.[13]
Considering, however, that this case involves the interpretation of Section 34, Rule 138 and Rule 138-A
of the Rules of Court, the Court takes cognizance of herein petition. Nonetheless, the petitioner is
cautioned not to continue his practice of filing directly before this Court petitions under Rule 65 when
the issue raised can be resolved with dispatch by the Court of Appeals. We will not tolerate litigants who
make a mockery of the judicial hierarchy as it necessarily delays more important concerns before us.

In resolving the second issue, a comparative reading of Rule 138, Section 34 and Rule 138-A is necessary.

Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of
the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical
legal education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any
civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent
indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the
law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be
signed by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf because of
his failure to comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioners appearance, the court a quotersely finds
refuge in the fact that, on December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually
became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized schools
clinical legal education program and is under supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law
school.

However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which
provides:
Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid
of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an
attorney, and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the contention of
the petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which
he is a party. The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an
attorney, and that his appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar.
The individual litigant may personally do everything in the course of proceedings from commencement
to the termination of the litigation.[14] Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is
restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law,[15] petitioner,
not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares and hazards of his own
ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the litigation of Civil
Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his right
to represent himself.

The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must,
therefore, be subject to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A,
when the basis of the petitioners claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions
when a law student may appear in courts, while the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as
a party representing himself.

The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is
misplaced. The Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited law
student practice. In fact, it was intended as an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may
appear in courts and was incorporated to the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A.

It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard by
himself and counsel,[16] this Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be
waived.[17] The rationale for this ruling was articulated in People v. Holgado,[18] where we declared that
even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the
rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but because he
does not know how to establish his innocence.
The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern that
the Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil
case. Thus, a party litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyers assistance,
effectively undertake the successful pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case,
petitioner alleges that he is a law student and impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate
the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident to this decision.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law
student may appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision of a
lawyer, before inferior courts. Here, we have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent
himself in court. We should grant his wish.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias and
partiality by ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative
demeanor during the pre-trial when she said: Hay naku, masama yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?
Petitioner avers that by denying his motion, the respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative
of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing petitioners and his co-plaintiffs loss of faith and confidence in the
respondents impartiality.

We do not agree.

It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative case[19] against the
respondent for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on
September 15, 2002. We now adopt the Courts findings of fact in the administrative case and rule that
there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself
from the trial of the case.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and
convincing evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial,[20] as voluntary inhibition
is primarily a matter of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on
whether she should inhibit herself must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the
circumstances prevailing in the case before her.[21] Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City are MODIFIED. Regional Trial Court, Branch 108, Pasay City
is DIRECTED to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-0410 as a party litigant.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1459. October 14, 2003]

IMELDA Y. MADERADA, complainant, vs. Judge ERNESTO H. MEDIODEA, 12th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Under the Rules of Court, parties to a case in a first-level court may -- without having to resign from
their posts -- conduct their own litigation in person as well as appear for and on their own behalf as
plaintiffs or defendants. However, appearing as counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff subjects the employee
to administrative liability.

The Case and the Facts

A Complaint[1] dated January 3, 2002, was filed by Imelda Y. Maderada against Judge Ernesto
H. Mediodea of the 12th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo. In the
Complaint, the judge was charged with gross ignorance of the law amounting to grave misconduct for
failing to observe and apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in Civil Case No. 252.[2]

On September 7, 2001, complainant filed before the 12th MCTC of Cabatuan and Maasin, Iloilo --
presided over by Judge Erlinda Tersol -- an action for forcible entry with a prayer for preliminary
injunction, temporary restraining order (TRO) and damages[3] covered by the Rule on Summary
Procedure. Because complainant was the clerk of court in the aforesaid sala, Judge Tersol inhibited
herself from the case.Thus, Executive Judge Tito Gustilo designated respondent judge to hear and
decide the case.

In an Order[4] dated September 13, 2001, respondent required the defendants in the civil case to show
cause why the preliminary injunction should not be granted. Respondent judge scheduled the hearing
on September 21, 2001, but defendants therein filed a Manifestation[5] on September 17, 2001, praying
that they be given an additional period of ten days to file an answer. After the September 21 hearing,
respondent reset the hearing to September 28, 2001.[6] Meanwhile, the defendants filed their
Opposition[7] to complainants prayer for preliminary injunction and TRO. The September 28 hearing was
held in abeyance after the defendants lawyer questioned the authority of complainant to appear on
behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.[8] Respondent gave the defendants ten days[9] to file a
motion to disqualify complainant from appearing as counsel and thereafter to complainant to file her
opposition thereto.

In his Order[10] dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied the defendants Motion[11] to disqualify
complainant from appearing on behalf of and as counsel for her co-plaintiff.

Complainant filed a total of three Motions[12] praying for judgment to be rendered on the civil case. In an
Order[13] dated October 19, 2001, respondent denied complainants Motions because of the pending
hearing for the issuance of a restraining order and an injunction. He likewise denied the defendants
Motion for extension of time to file an answer.[14] Complainant did not ask for a reconsideration of the
denial of her Motion for Rendition of Judgment.
In his Comment[15] on the Complaint, respondent contends that complainant filed a Petition for his
inhibition after filing two administrative cases against him. He argues that the mere filing of
administrative charges against judges is not a ground for disqualifying them from hearing cases. In the
exercise of their discretion, however, they may voluntarily disqualify themselves. It is worth noting that
respondent later inhibited himself from Civil Case No. 252. The case was then reassigned to
Judge Loida Maputol of the 14th MCTC, San Miguel-Alimodian-Leon, Iloilo.

Respondent avers that the delay in the resolution of the case cannot be attributed to him, considering
that he was mandated by law and the rules of procedure to pass upon every motion presented before
him.[16] Besides, complainant allegedly failed to present evidence necessary for the immediate resolution
of her prayer for preliminary injunction.[17] Moreover, she supposedly failed to exhaust the remedies
available to her to question the validity of his Orders. Instead, she tried to compel him to render a
decision on the case.[18]

Respondent likewise refutes complainants assertion that she appeared as counsel on her own behalf
because she could not afford the services of a lawyer. Such claim was allegedly without basis, since her
compensation and other benefits as clerk of court were more than enough to pay for the services of
counsel.[19] He further alleges that she did not secure authority from this Court to appear as counsel, and
that she failed to file her leave of absence every time she appeared in court.[20]

Evaluation and Recommendation of the

Court Administrator

The OCA agreed with respondent that the issuance of the preliminary injunction prayed for in the
Complaint should first be resolved before judgment should be rendered in the principal action.
However, it opined that the prayer for preliminary injunction should have been decided within 30 days
from the filing thereof. It noted that both the motion for preliminary injunction and the principal action
for forcible entry remained unresolved even after four months had already lapsed since the filing of Civil
Case No. 252.

Accordingly, the OCA recommended that respondent judge be fined in the amount of P1,000 with a
stern warning that a similar infraction in the future would be dealt with more severely.[21]

It did not, however, find complainant completely faultless. It therefore undertook another round of
investigation, the subject of which was complainants appearance in court as counsel for herself and on
behalf of her co-plaintiff without court authority.

According to the OCA, officials and employees of the judiciary must devote their full time to government
service to ensure the efficient and speedy administration of justice. Although they are not absolutely
prohibited from engaging in a vocation or a profession, they should do so only with prior approval of this
Court. The OCA added that [e]ngaging in any private business, vocation or profession without prior
approval of the Court is tantamount to moonlighting, which amounts to malfeasance in office.[22]

Thus, it recommended that Complainant Maderada be fined in the amount of P1,000 for appearing as
counsel without authority from this Court, with a stern warning that any similar infraction in the future
would be dealt with more severely. The OCA also recommended that she be directed to file her
application for leaves of absence on the days she had appeared in court to litigate her case.
The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendations of the OCA, but modify the penalty to conform to the
rules.

Administrative Liability

The Rules of Court clearly provide that actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, regardless of the
amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the Rule on
Summary Procedure.[23] These actions are summary in nature, because they involve the disturbance of
the social order, which should be restored as promptly as possible.[24] Designed as special civil actions,
they are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure to disencumber the courts from the usual
formalities of ordinary actions.[25] Accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure that may cause
unnecessary delays should be carefully avoided.[26] The actions for forcible entry and
unlawful detainer are designed to provide expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the
right to possession of the property involved.Both are time procedures designed to bring immediate
relief.[27]

Moreover, as correctly observed by the OCA, in an action for forcible entry, parties are entitled to the
provisional remedy of preliminary injunction.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of court actions or proceedings prior to the
judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to refrain from doing a
particular act or acts.[28] It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is
known as a preliminary mandatory injunction.[29] Since this remedy is granted prior to the judgment or
final order, we agree with both the OCA and respondent that the prayer for preliminary injunction
should first be resolved before the main case of forcible entry is decided.

However, respondent should have resolved the Motion for Preliminary Injunction within 30 days from
its filing. There can be no mistaking the clear command of Section 15 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:

Sec. 15. Preliminary injunction -- The court may grant preliminary injunction, in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 58 hereof, to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of dispossession
against the plaintiff.

A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry or unlawful detainer may, within five (5)
days from the filing of the complaint, present a motion in the action for forcible entry or
unlawful detainer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to restore him in his
possession. The court shall decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof. (Italics ours)

Judges have no other option but to obey. In fact, the provision uses the word shall to evince its
mandatory character. We cannot subscribe to the belief of respondent that since there was a prayer for
the issuance of a preliminary injunction, the main case for forcible entry would have to wait until after
he shall have decided the injunction plea, no matter how long it took. If that were so, then the main
case would lose its summary nature.

Respondent should have known that since a prayer for preliminary injunction is merely a provisional
remedy in an action for forcible entry, it should lend itself to the summary nature of the main case. This
is the very reason why the Rules of Court mandate that a preliminary injunction in a forcible entry case
be decided within 30 days from its filing. Preliminary injunctions and TROs are extraordinary remedies
provided by law for the speedy adjudication of an ejectment case in order to save the dispossessed
party from further damage during the pendency of the original action.

Time and time again, this Court has impressed upon judges the need to decide, promptly and
judiciously, cases and other matters pending before their courts.[30] To a large extent, the publics faith
and confidence in the judicial system is boosted by the judicious and prompt disposition of cases and
undermined by any delay thereof.[31] Judges are thus enjoined to decide cases with dispatch.

Their failure to do so constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative
sanction on them. Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial Conduct specifically obliges judges to dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide cases within the required periods. Often have we ruled that their
inability to decide a case within the required period is not excusable and constitutes gross
inefficiency.[32] To avoid sanction, they should ask this Court for an extension and give their reasons for
the delay.

Although respondent is correct in asserting that he is mandated to rule on every motion, he cannot use
this excuse to evade the clear command of the rule that cases should be decided within the prescribed
period. This Court notes with concern the plethora of motions and pleadings filed in this case, which
should have been tried under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Yet, even after four months had lapsed
since the filing of the original Complaint for forcible entry, the prayer for preliminary injunction and the
main case remained unresolved.

Respondent is reminded that in order to meet the deadlines set for deciding cases, judges should at all
times remain in full control of the proceedings in their sala.[33] They should not be at the mercy of the
whims of lawyers and parties, for it is not the latters convenience that should be the primordial
consideration, but the administration of justice.[34]

To reiterate, judges are bound to dispose of the courts business promptly and to decide cases within the
required period. They are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of
their judicial functions and duties. As held by this Court in Gallego v. Acting Judge Doronila:[35]

We cannot countenance such undue delay by a judge especially at a time when the clogging of court
dockets is still the bane of the judiciary whose present leadership has launched an all-out program to
minimize, if not totally eradicate, docket congestion and undue delay in the disposition of cases. Judges
are called upon to observe utmost diligence and dedication in the performance of their judicial functions
and duties.[36]

The prompt disposition of cases becomes even more pronounced when a municipal trial court is called
upon to decide a case governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure. As eloquently put by Justice Jose
C. Vitug, speaking for the Court in Cruz Jr. v. Judge Joven:[37]

x x x. Being the paradigm of justice in the first instance, a municipal trial court judge, more than any
other colleague on the bench, is the immediate embodiment of how that trust is carried out. In the
evolvement of the public perception on the judiciary, there can likely be no greater empirical data that
influences it than the prompt and proper disposition of cases before the courts.[38]
We have often held that failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period
constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against erring
judges.Given the facts of this case, a fine of P10,000 is appropriate pursuant to current
jurisprudence[39] and Rule 140.[40]

As to Complainant Maderada, the OCA recommended that she be fined in the amount of P1,000 for
supposedly engaging in a private vocation or profession without prior approval of the Court. The Office
of the Court Administrator held that her appearance as counsel for herself and on behalf of her co-
plaintiff was tantamount to moonlighting, a species of malfeasance in office.

Since complainant was charged with engaging in a private vocation or profession when she appeared on
her own behalf in court, the necessary implication was that she was in the practice of law. We clarify. A
partys right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by law. Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court provides:

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. -- In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid
of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney,
and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

This provision means that in a litigation, parties may personally do everything during its progress -- from
its commencement to its termination.[41] When they, however, act as their own attorneys, they are
restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure as those qualified to practice law; otherwise,
ignorance would be unjustifiably rewarded.[42] Individuals have long been permitted to manage,
prosecute and defend their own actions; and when they do so, they are not considered to be in the
practice of law.[43] One does not practice law by acting for himself any more than he practices medicine
by rendering first aid to himself.[44]

The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or
vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by
rendering legal advise to others.[45] Private practice has been defined by this Court as follows:

x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary action, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Practice of law to fall
within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and other officials or employees
of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from engaging in private practice] has
been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as a lawyer and
demanding payment for such services. x x x.[46] (Citations omitted)

Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself out to
the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence, she cannot be said
to be in the practice of law.

Blacks Law Dictionary defines profession in the collective sense as referring to the members of such a
vocation.[47] In turn, vocation is defined as a persons regular calling or business; ones occupation or
profession.[48]
The law allows persons who are not lawyers by profession to litigate their own case in court. The right of
complainant to litigate her case personally cannot be taken away from her. Her being an employee of
the judiciary does not remove from her the right to proceedings in propria persona or to self-
representation. To be sure, the lawful exercise of a right cannot make one administratively liable. Thus,
we need not go into a discussion of the Courts ruling in Cayetano v. Monsod[49] regarding the extent of
the practice of law.

However, it was also clearly established that complainant had appeared on behalf of her co-plaintiff in
the case below, for which act the former cannot be completely exonerated. Representing oneself is
different from appearing on behalf of someone else.

The raison detre for allowing litigants to represent themselves in court will not apply when a person is
already appearing for another party. Obviously, because she was already defending the rights of another
person when she appeared for her co-plaintiff, it cannot be argued that complainant was merely
protecting her rights. That their rights may be interrelated will not give complainant authority to appear
in court. The undeniable fact remains that she and her co-plaintiff are two distinct individuals. The
former may be impairing the efficiency of public service once she appears for the latter without
permission from this Court.

We cannot countenance any act that would undermine the peoples faith and confidence in the judiciary,
even if we consider that this was the first time complainant appeared in court, that she appeared for her
own sister, and that there was no showing she did so for a fee. Again we should be reminded that
everyone connected with an office that is charged with the dispensation of justice carries a heavy
burden of responsibility.[50] Given these circumstances, the penalty of reprimand[51] is sufficient.

This Court reiterates its policy not to tolerate or condone any conduct, act or omission that falls short of
the exacting norms of public office, especially on the part of those expected to preserve the image of
the judiciary. Thus, it will not shirk from its responsibility of imposing discipline upon its employees in
order not to diminish the peoples faith in our justice system. But when the charge has no basis, it will
not hesitate to shield the innocent court employee from any groundless accusation that trifles with
judicial processes,[52] and that serves only to disrupt rather than promote the orderly administration of
justice.[53]

WHEREFORE, Respondent Judge Ernesto H. Mediodea is hereby found GUILTY of gross inefficiency in
failing to observe the reglementary periods in deciding cases, and is FINED in the amount of P10,000
with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or of a similar act in the future shall be dealt with
more severely. On the other hand, Imelda Y. Maderada is hereby REPRIMANDED for appearing as
counsel on behalf of a co-plaintiff without court authority and is likewise warned that a future similar act
shall be sanctioned more severely.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7325 January 21, 2015

DR. DOMICIANO F. VILLAHERMOSA, SR., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ISIDRO L. CARACOL, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Domiciano F. Villahermosa, Sr., against Atty. Isidro L.
Caracol for deceit, gross misconduct and violation of oath under Section 27,2 Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.

Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases3 involving cancellation of emancipation patents and
transfer certificates of title, cancellation of special power of attorney and deeds of absolute sale and
recovery of ownership and possession of parcels of land derived from Original Certificate of Title (OCT)
No. 433 which covered 23.3018 hectares of land in Valencia, Bukidnon. Counsel on record for plaintiff
was Atty. Fidel Aquino.

OCT No. 433 was a homestead patent granted to Micael Babela who had two sons, Fernando and Efren.
As legal heirs of Micael, Fernando received 53,298 square meters while Efren received 33,296 square
meters. Subsequently, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) were issued in their respective names.

When the agrarian reform law4 was enacted on October 21, 1972, emancipation patents and titles were
issued to Hermogena and Danilo Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program,who in turn sold the parcels of
land to complainant’s spouse, Raymunda Villahermosa. A deed of absolute sale was executed in favor of
Raymunda.

On March 2, 1994, the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) issued a decision
ordering the cancellation of the emancipation patents and TCTs derived from OCT No. 433 stating that it
was not covered by the agrarian reform law. This decision was appealed to and affirmed by the DARAB
Central Board and the Court of Appeals.

On September 25, 2002, Atty. Caracol, as "Add’l Counsel for the Plaintiffs-Movant," filed a motion for
execution with the DARAB, Malaybalay, Bukidnon praying for the full implementation of the March 2,
1994 decision.5

On December 20, 2005, Atty. Caracol filed a Motion for Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and
Demolition6which he signed as "Counsel for the Plaintiff Efren Babela"7. Villahermosa filed this
complaint8 alleging that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions since he obtained no authority
from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited that Efren could not have authorized
Atty. Caracol to file the second motion because Efren had already been dead9 for more than a year. He
claimed that Atty. Caracol’s real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who had allegedly bought the
same parcel of land. Villahermosa presented affidavits of Efren’s widow10and daughter11 both stating
that Efren never executed a waiver of rights and that the parcel of land was sold to Villahermosa
through a deed of sale. Both also stated that they werefamiliar with Efren’s signature. They state that
the signature inthe waiver was different from his usual signature. Villahermosa averred that Atty.
Caracol committed deceit and gross misconduct.
In addition, Villahermosa claimed that Atty. Caracol introduced falsified and manufactured evidence
intothe proceedings. Atty. Caracol, in introducing a document denominated asWaiver of Rights where
Efren waived all his rights in favor of Ernesto Aguirre, was able to secure the execution of the judgment
in one of the cases12 in favor of Ernesto Aguirre. Villahermosa also filed a case13 for falsification of public
document and use of falsified document against Ernesto Aguirre and Atty. Caracol.14

Atty. Caracol insists that Efren and Ernesto authorized him to appear as "additional counsel". He said
that he had consulted Atty. Aquino who advised him to go ahead with the filing. Moreover, he stated
that he was not aware that there was a waiver of rights executed in Ernesto Aguirre’s favor.

In its Report and Recommendation,15 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed deceitful acts and misconduct. It found that respondent
did not present credible evidence to controvert the allegation that he was not authorized by plaintiff or
counsel of record. Respondent admitted that at the time of the filing of the second motion, Efren was
dead. It noted that Atty. Caracol did not explain how he obtained the authority nor did he present any
proof of the authority. However, there was insufficient evidence to hold him liable for falsification.

The IBP CBD stated that Atty. Caracol clearly misled and misrepresented to the DARAB, Region X that he
was counsel of Efren to protect the interest of Ernesto Aguirre, his real client, violating his oath as a
lawyer. It thus recommended that Atty. Caracol be suspended from the practice of law for a period of
five years.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted the report and recommendation but modified the penalty to one
year suspension from the practice of law.16 Atty. Caracol moved for reconsideration17 but was denied.18

Atty. Caracol filed a notice of appeal19 which this Court returned to him since no legal fees are required
in administrative cases.20

We adopt the findings of the IBP.

The Rules of Court under Rule 138, Section 21 provides for a presumption of a lawyer’s appearance on
behalf of his client, hence:

SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to

represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney isrequired to authorize him
to appear in court for his client, butthe presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a
case to produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to
any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice
requires. An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave
of the court, may be punished for contemptas an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official
transactions. (Emphases supplied)

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pamintuan Dev’t. Co.,21 this Court said that while a lawyer is not
required to present proof of his representation, when a court requires that he show suchauthorization,
it is imperative that he show his authority to act. Thus:

A lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of a
formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his client’s
name. However, [a] court, on its own initiative or on motion of the other party may require a lawyer to
adduce authorization from the client.22

Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a person without being
retained nor may he appear in court without being employed unless by leave of court.23 If an attorney
appears on a client’s behalf without a retainer or the requisite authority neither the litigant whom he
purports to represent nor the adverse party may be bound or affected by his appearance unless the
purported client ratifies or is estopped to deny his assumed authority.24 If a lawyer corruptly or willfully
appears as an attorney for a party toa case without authority, he may be disciplined or punished for
contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction.25

We must also take into consideration that even if a lawyer is retained by a client, an attorney-client
relationship terminates upon death of either client or the lawyer.26

Here, Atty. Caracol was presumed to have authority when he appeared in the proceedings before the
DARAB. The records are unclear at what point his authority to appear for Efren was questioned. Neither
is there any indication that Villahermosa in fact questioned his authority during the course of the
proceedings.

However, Atty. Caracol knew that Efren had already passed away at the time he filed the Motion for
Issuance of Second Alias Writ of Execution and Demolition. As an honest, prudent and conscientious
lawyer, he should have informed the Court of his client’s passing and presented authority that he was
retained by the client’s successors-in-interest and thus the parties may have been substituted.27

We also note the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz in People v. Mendoza28 where he stated:

I am bothered by the improvident plea of guilty made by accused Juan Magalop, presumably upon the
adviceof his counsel, Atty. Isidro L. Caracol of the CLAO (now the PAO). It would seem that this lawyer
was less than conscientious when he advised his indigent client to admit a crime the man did no[t]
commit. As the ponenciaobserves, "outside of his improvident plea of guilt, there is absolutely no
evidence against him – presented or forthcoming. From the evidence of the prosecution, there is no way
by which Magalop could have been implicated."

It seems to me that if any one is guilty in this case, it is the PAO lawyer who, through an incredible lack
of zeal in the discharge of his duties, was apparently willing, without any moral compunctions at all, and
without proof, to consign an innocent man to prison.

The PAO is supposed to defend the accused, not to condemn them without cause.1âwphi1 The defense
counsel in this case did not seem to appreciate this responsibility when he prodded Magalop to plead
guilty and waived the right to submit evidence in his behalf.29

While this observation does not serve to exacerbate Atty. Caracol’s liability under the present
circumstances, we would like to highlight the important role of an attorney in our judicial system.
Because of the particular nature of an attorney’s function it is essential that they should act with
fairness, honesty and candor towards the courts and his clients.30 Under Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
This flows out from the lawyer's oath which each lawyer solemnly swears to uphold the law and court
processes in the pursuit of justice. Thus, a lawyer must be more circumspect in his demeanor and
attitude towards the public in general as agents of the judicial system.

Here, Atty. Caracol, as observed by the IBP CBD, has been less than candid about his representation. We
also observe that he has used underhanded means to attain his purpose. Atty. Caracol's blatant
disregard of his duties as a lawyer cannot be countenanced. In view of his actions of contravening his
lawyer's oath and in violation of Canons 8 and 10 and Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility we deem it proper to suspend him from the practice of law for a period of one year.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Isidro L. Caracol GUILTY. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent
Atty. Isidro L. Caracol from the practice of law for ONE YEAR effective upon finality of this Resolution,
with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to
respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of
Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
 QUERY OF ATTY. KAREN M. SILVERIO-BUFFE, A.M. No. 08-6-352-RTC
FORMER Clerk of Court BRANCH 81,
ROMBLON, ROMBLON ON THE PROHIBITION
FROM ENGAGING IN THE PRIVATE PRACTICE Present:
OF LAW.
PUNO, C.J.,
*
QUISUMBING,
*
YNARES-SANTIAGO,

CARPIO,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO, and

ABAD, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 19, 2009

x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This administrative matter started as a letter-query dated March 4, 2008 of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe
(Atty. Buffe) addressed to the Office of the Court Administrator, which query the latter referred to the
Court for consideration. In the course of its action on the matter, the Court discovered that the query
was beyond pure policy interpretation and referred to the actual situation of Atty. Buffe, and, hence,
was a matter that required concrete action on the factual situation presented.

The query, as originally framed, related to Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713, as amended
(or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees). This provision places
a limitation on public officials and employees during their incumbency, and those already separated
from government employment for a period of one (1) year after separation, in engaging in the private
practice of their profession. Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 provides:

SECTION 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:

xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or

xxx

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

In her letter-query, Atty. Buffe posed these questions: Why may an incumbent engage in private practice
under (b)(2), assuming the same does not conflict or tend to conflict with his official duties, but a non-
incumbent like myself cannot, as is apparently prohibited by the last paragraph of Sec. 7? Why is the
former allowed, who is still occupying the very public position that he is liable to exploit, but a non-
incumbent like myself who is no longer in a position of possible abuse/exploitation cannot?[1]
The query arose because Atty. Buffe previously worked as Clerk of Court VI of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 81 of Romblon; she resigned from her position effective February 1, 2008. Thereafter (and
within the one-year period of prohibition mentioned in the above-quoted provision), she engaged in the
private practice of law by appearing as private counsel in several cases before RTC-Branch 81 of
Romblon.

Atty. Buffe alleged that Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 gives preferential treatment to an incumbent
public employee, who may engage in the private practice of his profession so long as this practice does
not conflict or tend to conflict with his official functions. In contrast, a public official or employee who
has retired, resigned, or has been separated from government service like her, is prohibited from
engaging in private practice on any matter before the office where she used to work, for a period of one
(1) year from the date of her separation from government employment.

Atty. Buffe further alleged that the intention of the above prohibition is to remove the exercise of clout,
influence or privity to insider information, which the incumbent public employee may use in the private
practice of his profession. However, this situation did not obtain in her case, since she had already
resigned as Clerk of Court of RTC-Branch 18 of Romblon. She advanced the view that she could engage
in the private practice of law before RTC-Branch 81 of Romblon, so long as her appearance as legal
counsel shall not conflict or tend to conflict with her former duties as former Clerk of Court of that
Branch.

Then Deputy Court Administrator (now Court Administrator) Jose P. Perez made the following
observations when the matter was referred to him:

The general intent of the law, as defined in its title is to uphold the time-honored principle of public
office being a public trust. Section 4 thereof provides for the norms of conduct of public officials and
employees, among others: (a) commitment to public interest; (b) professionalism; and (c) justness and
sincerity. Of particular significance is the statement under professionalism that [t]hey [public officials
and employees] shall endeavor to discourage wrong perceptions of their roles as dispensers or peddlers
of undue patronage.

Thus, it may be well to say that the prohibition was intended to avoid any impropriety or the
appearance of impropriety which may occur in any transaction between the retired government
employee and his former colleagues, subordinates or superiors brought about by familiarity, moral
ascendancy or undue influence, as the case may be.[2]

Subsequently, in a Minute Resolution dated July 15, 2008, we resolved to refer this case to the Office of
the Chief Attorney (OCAT) for evaluation, report and recommendation.[3] The OCAT took the view that:
The premise of the query is erroneous. She interprets Section 7 (b) (2) as a blanket authority for an
incumbent clerk of court to practice law. Clearly, there is a misreading of that provision of law.[4]

and further observed:

The confusion apparently lies in the use of the term such practice after the phrase provided that. It may
indeed be misinterpreted as modifying the phrase engage in the private practice of their profession
should be prefatory sentence that public officials during their incumbency shall not be disregarded.
However, read in its entirety, such practice may only refer to practice authorized by the Constitution or
law or the exception to the prohibition against the practice of profession. The term law was intended by
the legislature to include a memorandum or a circular or an administrative order issued pursuant to the
authority of law.

xxx

The interpretation that Section 7 (b) (2) generally prohibits incumbent public officials and employees
from engaging in the practice of law, which is declared therein a prohibited and unlawful act, accords
with the constitutional policy on accountability of public officers stated in Article XI of the Constitution

xxx

The policy thus requires public officials and employees to devote full time public service so that in case
of conflict between personal and public interest, the latter should take precedence over the
former.[5][Footnotes omitted]

With respect to lawyers in the judiciary, the OCAT pointed to Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct
for Court Personnel the rule that deals with outside employment by an incumbent judicial employee and
which limits such outside employment to one that does not require the practice of law.[6] The
prohibition to practice law with respect to any matter where they have intervened while in the
government service is reiterated in Rule 6.03, Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
governs the conduct of lawyers in the government service.[7]

In view of the OCAT findings and recommendations, we issued an En Banc Resolution dated November
11, 2008 directing the Court Administrator to draft and submit to the Court a circular on the practice of
profession during employment and within one year from resignation, retirement from or cessation of
employment in the Judiciary. We likewise required the Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to (i)
verify if Atty. Buffe had appeared as counsel during her incumbency as clerk of court and after her
resignation in February 2008, and (ii) submit to the Court a report on his verification.[8]

In compliance with this our Resolution, Executive Judge Ramiro R. Geronimo of RTC-Branch 81 of
Romblon reported the following appearances made by Atty. Buffe:

(1) Civil Case No. V-1564, entitled Oscar Madrigal Moreno, Jr. et al. versus Leonardo M. Macalam, et al.
on February 19, 2008, March 4, 2008, April 10, 2008 and July 9, 2008 as counsel for the plaintiffs;

(2) Civil Case No. V-1620, entitled Melchor M. Manal versus Zosimo Malasa, et al., on (sic) February,
2008, as counsel for the plaintiff;

(3) Civil Case No. V-1396, entitled Solomon Y. Mayor versus Jose J. Mayor, on February 21, 2008, as
counsel for the plaintiff; and

(4) Civil Case No. V-1639, entitled Philippine National Bank versus Sps. Mariano and Olivia Silverio,
on April 11, 2008 and July 9, 2008, as counsel for the defendants.

Atty. Buffe herself was furnished a copy of our November 11, 2008 En Banc Resolution and she filed a
Manifestation (received by the Court on February 2, 2009) acknowledging receipt of our November 11,
2008 Resolution. She likewise stated that her appearances are part of Branch 81 records. As well, she
informed the Court that she had previously taken the following judicial remedies in regard to the above
query:

1. SCA No. 089119028 (Annex C), filed with Branch 54 of the RTC Manila, which had been
dismissed without prejudice on July 23, 2008 (Annex D) a recourse taken when undersigned was still a
private practitioner;

2. SCA No. 08120423 (Annex A), filed with Branch 17 of the RTC of Manila, which had been also
dismissed (with or without prejudice) on December 4, 2008 (Annex B) a recourse taken when
undersigned was already a public prosecutor appearing before the same Branch 81, after she took her
oath of office as such on August 15, 2008.[Emphasis supplied]

She also made known her intent to elevate the dismissal of the above cases so that eventually, the
Honorable Supreme Court may put to rest the legal issue/s presented in the above petitions which is, why
is it that R.A. No. 6713, Sec. 7 (b)(2) and last par. thereof, apparently contains an express prohibition
(valid or invalid) on the private practice of undersigneds law profession, before Branch 81, while on the
other hand not containing a similar, express prohibition in regard to undersigneds practice of profession,
before the same court, as a public prosecutor within the supposedly restricted 1-year period?

OUR ACTION AND RULING

Preliminary Considerations

As we stated at the outset, this administrative matter confronts us, not merely with the task of
determining how the Court will respond to the query, both with respect to the substance and form (as
the Court does not give interpretative opinions[9] but can issue circulars and regulations relating to
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts[10] and in the exercise of its administrative supervision over
all courts and personnel thereof[11]), but also with the task of responding to admitted violations of
Section 7 (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 and to multiple recourses on the same subject.

After our directive to the Office of the Court Administrator to issue a circular on the subject of the query
for the guidance of all personnel in the Judiciary, we consider this aspect of the present administrative
matter a finished task, subject only to confirmatory closure when the OCA reports the completion of the
undertaking to us.

Atty. Buffes admitted appearance, before the very same branch she served and immediately after her
resignation, is a violation that we cannot close our eyes to and that she cannot run away from under the
cover of the letter-query she filed and her petition for declaratory relief, whose dismissal she manifested
she would pursue up to our level. We note that at the time she filed her letter-query (on March 4, 2008),
Atty. Buffe had already appeared before Branch 81 in at least three (3) cases. The terms of Section 7
(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 did not deter her in any way and her misgivings about the fairness of the law
cannot excuse any resulting violation she committed. In other words, she took the risk of appearing
before her own Branch and should suffer the consequences of the risk she took.

Nor can she hide behind the two declaratory relief petitions she filed, both of which were dismissed, and
her intent to elevate the dismissal to this Court for resolution. The first, filed before the RTC, Branch 54,
Manila, was dismissed on July 23, 2008 because the court declined to exercise the power to declare
rights as prayed for in the petition, as any decision that may be rendered will be inutile and will not
generally terminate the uncertainty or controversy.[12] The second, filed with the RTC, Branch 17, Manila,
was dismissed for being an inappropriate remedy after the dismissal ordered by the RTC, Branch
54, Manila, on December 4, 2008.[13] Under these circumstances, we see nothing to deter us from ruling
on Atty. Buffes actions, as no actual court case other than the present administrative case, is now
actually pending on the issue she raised. On the contrary, we see from Atty. Buffes recourse to this
Court and the filing of the two declaratory petitions the intent to shop for a favorable answer to her
query. We shall duly consider this circumstance in our action on the case.

A last matter to consider before we proceed to the merits of Atty. Buffes actions relates to possible
objections on procedural due process grounds, as we have not made any formal directive to Atty. Buffe
to explain why she should not be penalized for her appearance before Branch 81 soon after her
resignation from that Branch. The essence of due process is the grant of the opportunity to be heard;
what it abhors is the lack of the opportunity to be heard.[14] The records of this case show that Atty.
Buffe has been amply heard with respect to her actions. She was notified, and she even responded to
our November 11, 2008 directive for the Executive Judge of the RTC of Romblon to report on Atty.
Buffes appearances before Branch 81; she expressly manifested that these appearances were part of the
Branch records. Her legal positions on these appearances have also been expressed before this
Court; first, in her original letter-query, and subsequently, in her Manifestation. Thus, no due process
consideration needs to deter us from considering the legal consequences of her appearances in her
previous Branch within a year from her resignation.

The Governing Law: Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713

Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713 generally provides for the prohibited acts and transactions of public officials
and employees. Subsection (b)(2) prohibits them from engaging in the private practice of their
profession during their incumbency. As an exception, a public official or employee can engage in the
practice of his or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized
by the Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict, or tend to conflict, with his
or her official functions.

The Section 7 prohibitions continue to apply for a period of one year after the public official or
employees resignation, retirement, or separation from public office, except for the private practice of
profession under subsection (b)(2), which can already be undertaken even within the one-year
prohibition period. As an exception to this exception, the one-year prohibited period applies with
respect to any matter before the office the public officer or employee used to work with.

The Section 7 prohibitions are predicated on the principle that public office is a public trust; and serve to
remove any impropriety, real or imagined, which may occur in government transactions between a
former government official or employee and his or her former colleagues, subordinates or superiors.
The prohibitions also promote the observance and the efficient use of every moment of the prescribed
office hours to serve the public.[15]
Parenthetically, in the case of court employees, Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 is not the only
prohibition to contend with; Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel also
applies. The latter provision provides the definitive rule on the outside employment that an incumbent
court official or court employee may undertake in addition to his official duties:

Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of the following
requirements:

(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the courts or
conducts business with the Judiciary;

(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working hours and is not
incompatible with the performance of the court personnels duties and responsibilities;

(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, however, that court
personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law schools, review or
continuing education centers or similar institutions;

(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel to disclose confidential
information acquired while performing officials duties;

(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of government,
unless specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.

Where a conflict of interest exists, may reasonably appear to exist, or where the outside employment
reflects adversely on the integrity of the Judiciary, the court personnel shall not accept outside
employment. [Emphasis supplied]

In both the above discussed aspect of R.A. No. 6713 and the quoted Canon 3, the practice of law is
covered; the practice of law is a practice of profession, while Canon 3 specifically mentions any outside
employment requiring the practice of law. In Cayetano v. Monsod,[16] we defined the practice of law as
any activity, in and out of court, that requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession; to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of
service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.[17] Under both
provisions, a common objective is to avoid any conflict of interest on the part of the employee who may
wittingly or unwittingly use confidential information acquired from his employment, or use his or her
familiarity with court personnel still with the previous office.

After separation from the service, Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel ceases
to apply as it applies specifically to incumbents, but Section 7 and its subsection (b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713
continue to apply to the extent discussed above. Atty. Buffes situation falls under Section 7.

Atty. Buffes Situation

A distinctive feature of this administrative matter is Atty. Buffes admission that she immediately
engaged in private practice of law within the one-year period of prohibition stated in Section 7(b)(2) of
R.A. No. 6713. We find it noteworthy, too, that she is aware of this provision and only objects to its
application to her situation; she perceives it to be unfair that she cannot practice before her old office
Branch 81 for a year immediately after resignation, as she believes that her only limitation is in matters
where a conflict of interest exists between her appearance as counsel and her former duties as Clerk of
Court. She believes that Section 7 (b)(2) gives preferential treatment to incumbent public officials and
employees as against those already separated from government employment.

Atty. Buffe apparently misreads the law. As the OCAT aptly stated, she interprets Section 7 (b)(2) as a
blanket authority for an incumbent clerk of court to practice law. We reiterate what we have explained
above, that the general rule under Section 7 (b)(2) is to bar public officials and employees from the
practice of their professions; it is unlawful under this general rule for clerks of court to practice their
profession. By way of exception, they can practice their profession if the Constitution or the law allows
them, but no conflict of interest must exist between their current duties and the practice of their
profession. As we also mentioned above, no chance exists for lawyers in the Judiciary to practice their
profession, as they are in fact expressly prohibited by Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel from doing so. Under both the general rule and the exceptions, therefore, Atty. Buffes
basic premise is misplaced.

As we discussed above, a clerk of court can already engage in the practice of law immediately after her
separation from the service and without any period limitation that applies to other prohibitions under
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6713. The clerk of courts limitation is that she cannot practice her profession within
one year before the office where he or she used to work with. In a comparison between a resigned,
retired or separated official or employee, on the one hand, and an incumbent official or employee, on
the other, the former has the advantage because the limitation is only with respect to the office he or
she used to work with and only for a period of one year. The incumbent cannot practice at all, save only
where specifically allowed by the Constitution and the law and only in areas where no conflict of
interests exists. This analysis again disproves Atty. Buffes basic premises.

A worrisome aspect of Atty. Buffes approach to Section 7 (b)(2) is her awareness of the law and her
readiness to risk its violation because of the unfairness she perceives in the law. We find it disturbing
that she first violated the law before making any inquiry. She also justifies her position by referring to
the practice of other government lawyers known to her who, after separation from their judicial
employment, immediately engaged in the private practice of law and appeared as private counsels
before the RTC branches where they were previously employed. Again we find this a cavalier attitude on
Atty. Buffes part and, to our mind, only emphasizes her own willful or intentional disregard of Section 7
(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713.
By acting in a manner that R.A. No. 6713 brands as unlawful, Atty. Buffe contravened Rule 1.01 of Canon
1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES

xxx

Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

As indicated by the use of the mandatory word shall, this provision must be strictly complied with. Atty.
Buffe failed to do this, perhaps not with an evil intent, considering the misgivings she had about Section
7 (b)(2)s unfairness. Unlawful conduct under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, however, does not necessarily
require the element of criminality, although the Rule is broad enough to include it.[18]Likewise, the
presence of evil intent on the part of the lawyer is not essential to bring his or her act or omission within
the terms of Rule 1.01, when it specifically prohibits lawyers from engaging in unlawful conduct.[19] Thus,
we find Atty. Buffe liable under this quoted Rule.

We also find that Atty. Buffe also failed to live up to her lawyers oath and thereby violated Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility when she blatantly and unlawfully practised law within the
prohibited period by appearing before the RTC Branch she had just left. Canon 7 states:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. [Emphasis supplied]

By her open disregard of R.A. No. 6713, she thereby followed the footsteps of the models she cited and
wanted to replicate the former court officials who immediately waded into practice in the very same
court they came from. She, like they, disgraced the dignity of the legal profession by openly disobeying
and disrespecting the law.[20] By her irresponsible conduct, she also eroded public confidence in the law
and in lawyers.[21] Her offense is not in any way mitigated by her transparent attempt to cover up her
transgressions by writing the Court a letter-query, which she followed up with unmeritorious petitions
for declaratory relief, all of them dealing with the same Section 7 (b)(2) issue, in the hope perhaps that
at some point she would find a ruling favorable to her cause. These are acts whose implications do not
promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.[22]

Considering Atty. Buffes ready admission of violating Section 7(b)(2), the principle of res ipsa
loquitur finds application, making her administratively liable for violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[23] In several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers
without further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where the facts on record sufficiently
provided the basis for the determination of their administrative liability.
In Prudential Bank v. Castro,[24] the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further investigation
after considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not
only cast dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest
and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer
and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial
fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases.[25] The Court held that those cases sufficiently
provided the basis for the determination of respondents' administrative liability, without need for
further inquiry into the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.[26]

Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy,[27] that no evidentiary hearing is required
before the respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already established by the facts
on record.

We applied the principle of res ipsa loquitur once more in In re: Wenceslao Laureta[28] where we
punished a lawyer for grave professional misconduct solely based on his answer to a show-cause order
for contempt and without going into a trial-type hearing. We ruled then that due process is satisfied as
long as the opportunity to be heard is given to the person to be disciplined.[29]

Likewise in Zaldivar v. Gonzales,[30] the respondent was disciplined and punished for contempt for his
slurs regarding the Courts alleged partiality, incompetence and lack of integrity on the basis of his
answer in a show-cause order for contempt. The Court took note that the respondent did not deny
making the negative imputations against the Court through the media and even acknowledged the
correctness of his degrading statements. Through a per curiam decision, we justified imposing upon him
the penalty of suspension in the following tenor:

The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the
Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to
the Court's exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an
officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing
justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or
impede and degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for
the exercise of disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the
contempt power.[31]

These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation of
an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long
as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty.
Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-query
and Manifestation filed before this Court.

A member of the bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for
violation of the lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.[32] The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.[33]

In this case, we cannot discern any mitigating factors we can apply, save OCATs observation that Atty
Buffes letter-query may really reflect a misapprehension of the parameters of the prohibition on the
practice of the law profession under Section 7 (b) (2) of R.A. No. 6713. Ignorance of the law, however, is
no excuse, particularly on a matter as sensitive as practice of the legal profession soon after ones
separation from the service. If Atty. Buffe is correct in the examples she cited, it is time to ring the bell
and to blow the whistle signaling that we cannot allow this practice to continue.

As we observed earlier,[34] Atty. Buffe had no qualms about the simultaneous use of various fora in
expressing her misgivings about the perceived unfairness of Section 7 of R.A. 6713. She formally lodged
a query with the Office of the Court Administrator, and soon after filed her successive petitions for
declaratory relief. Effectively, she exposed these fora to the possibility of embarrassment and confusion
through their possibly differing views on the issue she posed. Although this is not strictly the forum-
shopping that the Rules of Court prohibit, what she has done is something that we cannot help but
consider with disfavor because of the potential damage and embarrassment to the Judiciary that it
could have spawned. This is a point against Atty. Buffe that cancels out the leniency we might have
exercised because of the OCATs observation about her ignorance of and misgivings on the extent of the
prohibition after separation from the service.

Under the circumstances, we find that her actions merit a penalty of fine of P10,000.00, together with a
stern warning to deter her from repeating her transgression and committing other acts of professional
misconduct.[35] This penalty reflects as well the Courts sentiments on how seriously the retired,
resigned or separated officers and employees of the Judiciary should regard and observe the
prohibition against the practice of law with the office that they used to work with.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we find Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe GUILTY of professional

misconduct for violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
She is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00), and STERNLY WARNED that a
repetition of this violation and the commission of other acts of professional misconduct shall be dealt
with more severely.

Let this Decision be noted in Atty. Buffes record as a member of the Bar.SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. MTJ-13-1837 September 24, 2014
[formerly OCA IPI No. 12-2463-MTJ]

CONRADO ABE LOPEZ, represented by ATTY. ROMUALDO JUBAY, Complainant,

vs.
JUDGE ROGELIO S. LUCMAYON, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Mandaue City,
Cebu, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

We resolve the administrative complaint1 filed by Conrado Abe Lopez (complainant) charging Judge
Rogelio S. Lucmayon (respondent), Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 1, Mandaue City, Cebu, with
Dishonesty, Corruption and Malpractice relative to a land dispute involving their families.

The Antecedent Facts

In a verified complaint-affidavit dated December 12, 2011, the complainant, through his counsel Atty.
Romualdo M. Jubay, alleged that when he was eight years old, he inherited from his adoptive father
Restituto Lopez one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 1718 with an area of 355 square meters located in Balamban,
Cebu, evidenced by a document entitled "Katapusan Panugon" (Testamente). He claimed that while the
document mentioned Lot No. 1718, he ended up receiving a portion of Lot No. 1696 with a total land
area of 49,817 square meters, that became the object of an extrajudicial settlement involving him, his
adoptive mother Honorata Lopez, and the relatives of the respondent in December 1978. Half of Lot No.
1696 was cultivated by his adoptive mother until the latter’s death in 1982. He took over the cultivation
of the land after he retired as a seafarer in 1988.

The complainant alleged that sometime in October 2004, he and the respondent met in a waiting shed
located in front of the house of the latter’s grandmother in Buanoy, Balamban, Cebu. At that meeting,
the respondent allegedly deceived him into signinga Special Power of Attorney (SPA) to process the sale
of Lot No. 1696 to the prospective buyer, Aboitiz Group of Company. Unknown to the complainant, the
said SPA contained at the bottom portion, a so-called "Waiver of Rights" that the respondent had
deceptively inserted in order to strip him of his ownership of Lot No. 1696. After signing the document
(notarizedby a certain Atty. Arturo C. Mata (Atty. Mata) without the complainant’s presence), the
respondent allegedly told the complainant that he no longer had any right over the property. In March
2005, the father of the respondent, Pedro Lucmayon (Pedro), ordered him to cease cultivating the land
because of the Waiver of Rights in the SPA he signed.

The complainant also asserted that the respondent had caused Pedro and his siblings to execute a
document entitled "Supplemental Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of Moises Legaspino and
Victoria Lopez" to the damage and prejudice of the complainant and his adoptive mother. He alleged
that in the extrajudicial settlement, his name and the name of his adoptive mother were excluded. They
claimed that as legal heirs of the late Restituto Lopez (Restituto) who, in turn, had inherited the property
from his late mother Victoria Lopez (the co-owner of the property), their exclusion from the extrajudicial
settlement was anact of dishonesty to which the respondent should be held administratively liable.
In his comment2 dated March 8, 2012, the respondent vehemently denied that he convinced the
complainant to sell his shares in the property; he claimed that it was the complainant who was
interested in selling his shares after he got tired of cultivating the land. He also denied that he deceived
the complainant into signing the Waiver of Rights. He contended that the filing of the administrative
case against him was intended to embarrass and harass him.

The respondent further stated that the signing of the Waiver of Rights was done after he discovered that
the complainant was not legally adopted. He added that since there had been no legal adoption, the
complainant could not be considered as a legal heir and was not entitled to any portion of the land. He
stated, too, that his participation in the sale transaction was limited to informing his parents and
relatives that the complainant is not a legal heir of Resitituto.

The Report and Recommendation of the OCA

In its evaluation report3 dated October 23, 2012,the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) noted that
the allegations in the administrative complaint are basically the same allegations the complainant raised
in the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents he filed against the respondent, which
complaint the Office ofthe City Prosecutor of Cebu City dismissed. The City Prosecutor found that the
complainant’s allegations lacked merit and evidentiary proof. It also found that the complainant failed to
discharge the burden of proving the respondents’ administrative liability and recommended the
dismissal of the administrative complaint for lack of merit. The recommendation reads:

"RECOMMENDATION: It is therefore respectfully recommended for the consideration of the Honorable

Court that the administrative complaint against Judge Rogelio S. Lucmayon, Branch 1, Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Mandaue City, Cebu, be DISMISSED for lack of merit."

On December 5, 2012, the Court issued a Resolution4 adopting and approving the OCA’s findings of fact,
conclusions of law and recommendation, and dismissed the complaint against the respondent.

The complainant sought reconsideration5 contending that the OCA’s findings of fact were clearly
erroneous. He pointed out the OCA failed to appreciate and consider the other circumstances that
clearly showed the respondent’s dishonesty, corruption and malpractice. He reiterated that the
respondent made him sign three (3) SPAs and deceived him into signing the Waiver of Rights at the
bottom portion of the third SPA, which SPA was allegedly notarized by Atty. Mata withouthis presence.
He also stated that the respondent’s allegation that he was not a legally adopted son of Restituto is
baseless; since as shown in Restituto’s Testamente, he had been adopted and considered as Restituto’s
true child.

The Court referred back the complainant’s Motion for Reconsideration to the OCA for evaluation, report
and recommendation.

In its Memorandum6 dated July 23, 2013, addressed to Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, the OCA
recommended that the administrative case be re-docketed as a regular administrative matter and that
the respondent be held administratively liable for acts of impropriety. The OCA held that while the
respondent’s act of asking the complainant to sign the SPAs may not constitute dishonesty, corruption
or misconduct, his other actions (specifically requiring the complainant to sign the SPAs and allowing
Atty. Matato notarize the Waiver of Rights without each other’s presence) as well as his appointment as
the complainant’s attorney-in-fact, violate Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct7 and amount to
impropriety.

Asked to comment, the respondent insisted that the complainant still failed to adduce substantial
evidence establishing his administrative liability. He pointed out that contrary to the complainant’s
contention, Atty. Mata never admitted that he notarized the Waiver of Rights outside the complainant’s
presence. He also alleged that the mere fact that the complainant appointed him asattorney-in-fact
does not ipso factotaint his actions with impropriety.

The Court’s Ruling

Based on the allegations of the complaint, the respondent’s comment, and the findings of the OCA, we
find that the respondent is liable for violation of Rule 5.06 of the Codeof Judicial Conduct ("Code") and
Impropriety.

Respondent Violated Rule 5. 06 of the Code

As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or
other fiduciary. The intent of the rule is to limit a judge's involvement in the affairs and interests of
private individuals to minimize the risk of conflict with his judicial duties and to allow him to devote his
undivided attention to the performance of his official functions. When a member of the bench serves as
administrator of the properties of private individuals, he runsthe risk of losing his neutrality and
impartiality, especially when the interests of his principal conflicts with those of the litigant who comes
before his court.8

The only exception to this rule as set forth in Rule 5.06 is when the estate or trust belongs to, or the
ward is a member of his immediate family, and only if his service as executor, administrator, trustee,
guardian or fiduciary will not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties. The Code
defines "immediate family" as being limited to the spouse and relatives within the second degree of
consanguinity.9

In this case, since complainant clearly does not fall under respondent’s "immediate family" as herein
defined, the latter’s appointment as the former’s attorney-in-fact isnot a valid exception to the rule.

Furthermore, by serving as attorney-in-fact, the respondent not only allowed himself to be distracted
from the performance of his judicial duties; he also undertook to perform all acts necessary to protect
the complainant’s interest. In effect, the respondent acted as the complainant’s fiduciary, in direct and
patent violation of the prohibition against judges.

As held in Ramos v. Barot:10

Being and serving as an attorney-in-fact is within the purview of "other fiduciary" as used in Rule 5.06.
As a noun, "fiduciary" means "a person holding the character of a trustee, or a character analogous to
that of a trustee, in respect to the trust and confidenceinvolved in it and the scrupulous good faith and
candor which it requires." A fiduciary primarily acts for another's benefit, pursuant to his undertaking as
such fiduciary, in matters connected withsaid undertaking x x x. (Emphasis Supplied)

As a judge who is expected to observe the ethical rules that govern judicial conduct both in public and
private affairs, the respondent should have been more circumspect in accepting the appointment as an
attorney-infact of the complainant. He should be reminded that the Code of Judicial Conduct – which,
among others, prohibits members of the bench from engaging in extra-judicial activities that tends to
create a conflict with their judicial duties– must be strictly complied with.11 We conclude that for
violation of the rules, the respondent should be sanctioned.

Respondent is Guilty of Impropriety

On the charge of impropriety, wehave repeatedly reminded members of the Judiciary to keep their
conduct beyond reproach and suspicion, and to be free from any appearance of impropriety in their
personal behavior, both in the discharge of their official duties and in their everyday lives.12

Canon II of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides:

Rule 2.00: A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities. Rule
2.01: A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary.

By the very nature of their work, judges should observe an exacting standard of morality and decency.
For no position exacts a greater demand on the moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual
than a seat in the Judiciary.13

In Vedana v. Valencia,14 this Court pointedly stated that:

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety
not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties,but also to his behavior outside his sala as
a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private
morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote publicconfidence in the integrity and
impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have recently explained, a
judge’s official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:

Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on
conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.

A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service.1âwphi1 The personal
behavior of a judge, both inthe performance of official duties and in private life should be above
suspicion. (Emphasis Supplied).

In the present administrative complaint, we agree with the OCA that the respondent’s acts of: (1)
making the complainant sign at least two (2) documents – consisting of SPA and Waiver of Rights –
without the presence of a counsel; and (2) allowing the notarization of the documents outside the
presence of the executor, amount to impropriety. While no evidence directly shows that the respondent
had deceived the complainant into signing these documents, this Court cannot ignore the fact that the
documents the respondent himself prepared greatly prejudiced the complainant. We also note that the
Waiver of Rights benefitted the respondent and his family. As a judge who is more learned in the law
than the complainant, the respondent, at the very least should have taken the appropriate steps (e.g.
advise the former to engage the services of a lawyer who could lend him unbiased legal advice regarding
the legal effects of the waiver) to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in his dealings.
This step, the respondent failed to take. In these lights, the Court finds the respondent guilty of
impropriety.
The Applicable Penalty

Under Section 11(B), in relation toSection 9(4) of Rule 140, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC,15 violation of Supreme Court rules constitutes a less serious charge punishable by any of the
following sanctions:

1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than
three (3) months; or

2. A fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00.

On the other hand, Impropriety which constitutes as a light charge is punishable by:

1. A fine of not less than ₱1,000.00 but not exceeding ₱10,000.00 and/or;

2. Censure;

3. Reprimand;

4. Admonition with warning.

Considering the nature and extent of the respondent's transgressions, we find it proper to impose on
him the following penalties: (1) a fine of Twenty Thousand Pesos (₱20,000.00) for violation of Rule 5.06
of the Code; and (2) a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (₱10,000.00) for impropriety. WHEREFORE, the
respondent Judge Rogelio S. Lucmayon, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Mandaue City, Cebu is found
GUILTY of (1) violating Rule 5.06 of the Code of Judicial Conduct; and (2) impropriety. We hereby impose
the total fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱30,000.00) for these offenses, with a STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
RAMON C. GONZALEZ, A.C. No. 5321

Complainant,

Present:

PANGANIBAN, CJ, Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO, SR., and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

Atty. ARNEL C. ALCARAZ, Promulgated:

Respondent. September 27, 2006

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, CJ:

Disbarment cases are sui generis. Being neither criminal nor civil in nature, these are not intended to
inflict penal or civil sanctions. The main question to be determined is whether respondent is still fit to
continue to be an officer of the court in the dispensation of justice.

The Case and the Facts

This case arose from a Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed by Ramon C. Gonzalez with the Office of the Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court. The Complaint was subsequently referred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[2] Complainant charged
Atty. Arnel C. Alcaraz with grave misconduct, abuse of authority, and acts unbecoming a lawyer. The
antecedents were summarized by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) as follows:
x x x [C]omplainant alleges that on 11 August 2000, while he was driving along the South Superhighway
upon entering the Sucat Toll Gate heading towards Makati, respondent, who was driving a Nissan Infiniti
suddenly cut across his path while overtaking him and almost hit his car had he not been able to evade
it. According to complainant, he chased respondents car and when he was side by side with respondents
car, he angrily confronted respondent and then drove on. Complainant claims that respondent then
chased him and shot him twice but fortunately missed him by a few inches[,] but broken glass coming
from the shattered window allegedly hit him and slightly wounded his right arm and
stomach. Complainant adds that respondent allegedly tried to escape but he was able to chase him and
block his way at the Nichols Toll Gate where the PNCC guards responded to his call for
assistance.According to complainant, respondent attempted to escape and avoid the PNCC guards by
proclaiming boisterously that he is a lawyer and a customs official but complainant was able to block
his way again and their vehicles collided in the process. Complainant claims that he requested the PNCC
guards to confiscate respondents firearm and accompany them to the nearest police station. At the time
of the arrest, respondent allegedly opened the back door of his car and pretended to have accidentally
dropped so much money which distracted the policemen from further searching the car.

At the police station, respondent allegedly identified himself and his lady companion, a
certain Ferlita Semeniano, and [said] that he was the Deputy Customs Collector assigned
at Batangas City. Complainant claims that respondent yielded one (1) Super .38 cal. Springfield
Automatic Pistol, SN NMII 3138, one (1) magazine with seven (7) live ammos and three (3) spent (empty)
shells. Complainant adds that respondent presented only an unsigned Memorandum Receipt (MR) of
the firearm without any Mission Order or Permit to Carry. Complainant claims that respondent allegedly
kept calling persons to help him and a fabricated Mission Order was brought and presented by another
person more than eight hours after the shooting incident and apprehension.

Complainant alleges that the Nissan Infiniti used by respondent is allegedly a luxury vehicle which was
not covered by any document whatsoever and it was not verified whether stolen or smuggled.

Complainant finally alleges that the PNP Crime Laboratory examined his car and they recovered one slug
in between the wall of the left rear door while the other bullet went through the right front seat and
exited at the left rear door of complainants car and that cases of Frustrated Homicide and Illegal
Possession of Firearms were already filed at the Paraaque City Prosecutors Office.

xxxxxxxxx

In his Comment dated 04 January 2001, respondent claims that the present administrative case is
unfounded and unwarranted and was allegedly filed in bad faith, with malice and ill motive and allegedly
has no other purpose but to harass, vex, humiliate and dishonor him. In support thereof, respondent
points to the fact that complainant filed substantially identical complaint affidavits with the same
identical alleged cause of action as that of the present administrative case at [various] judicial, quasi-
judicial and administrative tribunals and accused him of forum-shopping.

Respondent denied the narration of facts stated in complainants Complaint-Affidavit as self-serving, a

misrepresentation of facts and obviously tainted. Respondent claims that he was not the aggressor
during the incident and that he did not provoke complainant. Respondent claims that he justly acted in
self-defense and defense of a stranger under the true actuality of facts and circumstances the[n]
prevailing.

Respondent also claims that the acts complained of in the present case were not connected with the
practice of the legal profession and the fact that he was a lawyer is merely coincidental, immaterial and
irrelevant.

xxxxxxxxx

In connection with the cases filed by the parties against each other, respondent submitted the xxx
Resolutions/Decisions issued in said cases to show that the charges filed against him by the complainant
were dismissed while the criminal cases he filed against the latter [were] filed in court.

xxxxxxxxx

Finally, it is the submission of the respondent that since the alleged acts complained of are not within
the sphere of his professional duties as a lawyer, but rather are acts done in his non-professional or
private capacity, the same, cannot allegedly be the subject of an administrative complaint for
disbarment.[3]

Report and Recommendation

of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines

In his Report,[4] IBP Investigating Commissioner Rafael Antonio M. Santos said that the dismissal of the
criminal and other administrative charges filed by complainant indicated that respondents version of the
incident was given credence by the investigating officials and agencies of the various other tribunals in
which these charges were filed.Consequently, since no sufficient evidence warranted the imposition of
further disciplinary sanctions on respondent, the investigating commissioner recommended the
dismissal of the administrative case.

In Resolution No. XVI-2005-29 dated March 12, 2005, the board of governors of the IBP adopted the
Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Santos.

On July 8, 2005, the Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court for
final action, pursuant to Section 12(b) of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court. On August 4, 2005,
complainant asked this Court to set aside Resolution No. XVI-2005-29 of the IBP board of
governors. Upon orders of this Court,[5] respondent filed on August 22, 2005, his Comment on
complainants plea.

The Courts Ruling

The Court disagrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

At the outset, we stress that the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent did not erase the
occurrence of the shooting incident, which he himself does not deny.Moreover, this incident has been
established by clear and convincing evidence. Thus, he must face the consequences of his actions.

The first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides as follows:

CANON 1. - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.[6]

Furthermore, respondent bound himself to obey the laws in his attorneys oath,[7] which underscores the
role of lawyers as officers of our legal system. A lawyers brash transgression of any, especially a penal,
law is repulsive and reprehensible and cannot be countenanced by this Court.[8]
Admitting that he fired shots in the direction of complainant while they were speeding along South
Luzon Expressway,[9] respondent justifies his actions by claiming self-defense and defense of a
stranger. During the traffic altercation, complainant allegedly exchanged angry words with respondent
and, from an open car window, even threw a handful of coins at the latter.[10] Respondent further avers
that, from his higher vantage point, he saw complainant draw a pistol.[11] The former contends that
when he fired the shots, he had no intention of hitting complainant but merely wanted to scare him
away.

Reviewing the factual circumstances, we are convinced that the defenses proffered are mere
afterthoughts. Based on the physical and documentary evidence, complainants version of the incident is
more credible.

First, the allegation of respondent that complainant hit him with coins is highly improbable. At that time,
both vehicles were speeding along the highway. Since the PNP Crime Laboratory Report[12] showed that
the bullets fired by respondent had come from the right side, his vehicle must have been to the right of
complainants. If we were to accept this version, the coins hurled by complainant had to pass through his
cars right window and then through the left window of respondents admittedly taller sports utility
vehicle (SUV). Given their relative positions, it is highly incredible that the coins could have hit
respondent and his companion.

Second, assuming that respondent and his companion were indeed hit by coins, this alleged fact was not
a sufficient unlawful aggression that would justify shooting at complainant.

As a lawyer, respondent should know that the following three requisites must concur to justify self-
defense: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it;
and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person claiming self-defense.[13] On the other
hand, in defense of a stranger, the first two requisites must also be present together with the element
that the person defending was not induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.[14]

Of these requisites, unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for upholding both self-defense and
defense of a stranger; the fundamental raison detre of these defenses is the necessity to prevent or
repel an aggression.[15] The alleged throwing of coins by complainant cannot be considered a sufficient
unlawful aggression. Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent threat
to life and limb.[16] There was no aggression to prevent or repel. Absent this imminent threat,
respondent had no legal reason to shoot in the direction of complainant.
Third, for lack of supporting evidence, neither can merit be accorded to respondents claim of imminent
threat after allegedly seeing complainant draw a pistol. The Joint Affidavit[17] of PNCC
Officers Florencio Celada y Seso, Jr. and Mario Puso y Visaya mentioned no firearm found in the
possession of complainant. Except for the bare and belated allegations of respondent, there was no
showing that complainants alleged possession of the pistol had been reported to the PNCC officers or
later to the police headquarters. Thus, without proof of the existence of the firearm, respondent has not
convincingly shown any legal justification for his act of firing at complainant.[18]

Fourth, right after the shooting incident, respondent fled the scene. He stopped only when PNCC officers
blocked his vehicle in response to complainants call for assistance. If respondent was only protecting
himself and his companion, then his righteous indignation should have propelled him to report
immediately his version of the incident to the PNCC officers.

Disbarment Proceedings

Sui Generis

Respondent maintains that the dismissal of the cases filed by complainant against him in the various
tribunals and agencies proves that the present case for disbarment is unfounded.

We do not agree.

Well-established is the rule that administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their
own. These cases are distinct from and proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.[19] In
Re Almacen,[20] the Court discoursed on this point thus:

x x x [D]isciplinary proceedings [against lawyers] are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal,
x x x [they do] not involve x x x a trial of an action or a suit, but [are] rather investigation[s] by the Court
into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a
criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be
initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such.
Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of
members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x.[21]
Respondents administrative liability stands on grounds different from those in the other cases
previously filed against him; thus, the dismissal of these latter cases does not necessarily result in
administrative exculpation. Settled is the rule that, being based on a different quantum of proof, the
dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence does not necessarily foreclose the
finding of guilt in an administrative proceeding.[22]

Misconduct Committed

in a Private Capacity

Untenable is respondents argument that the acts complained of cannot be the subject of a complaint for
disbarment, because they were done in his private capacity.

Whether in their professional or in their private capacity, lawyers may be disbarred or suspended for
misconduct. This penalty is a consequence of acts showing their unworthiness as officers of the courts;
as well as their lack of moral character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor.[23] When the misconduct
committed outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them to be morally unfit for the
office and the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, they may be suspended or
disbarred.[24]

In Cordon v. Balicanta,[25] this Court explained the rationale for this holding as follows:

x x x. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled
in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them. Thus, the requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as
far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Lawyers are expected to
abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to the Bar but also throughout their legal
career, in order to maintain one's good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral
character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do
the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be
so because vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with his client's property, reputation, his life, his all.[26]

The vengeful and violent behavior exhibited by respondent in what should have been a simple traffic
altercation reveals his conceit and delusions of self-importance. By firing his gun openly in a congested
highway and exposing complainant and the general public to danger, he showed his utter lack of a sense
of responsibility, as well as of respect for law and order.

Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by respondents gross misconduct. In line with Lao
v. Medel,[27] Co v. Bernardino,[28] and Saburnido v. Madroo,[29] suspension from the practice of law for
one year is appropriate in this case.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Arnel C. Alcaraz is found GUILTY of gross misconduct and is hereby SUSPENDED for
one year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6678 October 9, 2006

JOCELYN A. SAQUING, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NOEL A. MORA, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Complainant Jocelyn A. Saquing seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty. Noel A. Mora for grave
misconduct for allegedly conspiring with spouses Paulino and Manuela Mora in inducing her to buy an
unregistered parcel of land, and for performing a notarial act without a commission, he being a lawyer
of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO).

Complainant alleged that in June 2004, she bought from the spouses Mora 7,828 square meter parcel of
allegedly registered land located at Sitio Paquiel, Camasi, Peñablanca, Cagayan, for P782,800.00.1 On
July 8, 2004, she paid the amount of P550,000.00 to the spouses Mora at the house of the respondent,
who prepared a handwritten acknowledgment receipt, which reads:2

ACKNOWLEDGMENT RECEIPT

This is to acknowledge receipt the amount of FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P550,000.00)
from MS. JOCELYN [A.] SAQUING as partial payment of the Lot 108-3, PSU-(2f) 02-165983 Amd3 with an
area of Seven Thousand Eight Hundred Twenty Eight (7,828) square meters located at Camasi,
Peñablanca, Cagayan.

The balance in the amount of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS
(P232,800.00) shall be paid within the period of three (3) months.

Executed this 8th day of July, 2004 at Tuguegarao City.

(Sgd.) JOCELYN [A.] SAQUING (Sgd.) PAULINO MORA

(Sgd.) MANUELA ASPA MORA

SIGNED IN THE PRESENCE OF:

____________________________

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 8th day of July, 2004 at Tuguegarao.

(Sgd.) ATTY. NOEL A. MORA3

After payment of the remaining balance, respondent prepared the Deed of Absolute Sale of a Portion of
Unregistered Land,4 but complainant refused to affix her signature on the deed because it was stated
therein that the land was unregistered, contrary to the representations of the spouses and the
respondent.5

When the spouses Mora refused to return the contract price, complainant filed a complaint for estafa
against them at the City Prosecutor’s Office, Tuguegarao City, and an administrative case for disbarment
against the respondent at the Office of the Bar Confidant.6

Respondent denied conspiring with spouses Mora regarding the sale of the land. He alleged that before
he prepared the acknowledgment receipt, the parties had already agreed on the terms of the contract;
thus, there was no need for him to convince complainant to buy the land. He admitted that he asked the
parties to subscribe the acknowledgment receipt and swear before him but claimed that he did it only
for complainant’s protection in case any problem would arise. He denied giving any assurance that the
land was registered. In fact, he explained to her the status of the case with the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and that the spouses were facilitating the titling of the
property in their names.7

Complainant filed a Reply8 to respondent’s comment, after which the case was referred to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.9 In its Resolution
No. XVII-2006-238, dated April 27, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors approved the report and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, Lolita A. Quisumbing, finding respondent guilty of
violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for notarizing the
Acknowledgment Receipt without notarial commission and recommending that he be reprimanded with
warning that repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely.10

This resolution is now before us for review.

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof is upon the complainant and this Court will exercise its
disciplinary power only if the former establishes its case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory
evidence.11 Considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the
Bar, this Court has consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.12

Complainant’s evidence consists mainly of her Affidavit-Complaint, Acknowledgment Receipt, Deed of

Absolute Sale of a Portion of Unregistered Land and her testimony before the Commission attesting to
the truth of the allegations in her affidavit.

We agree with the Investigating Commissioner that while the evidence of complainant is sufficient to
support the charge that respondent notarized the Acknowledgment Receipt without a notarial
commission, the same however is insufficient to prove that respondent conspired with spouses Mora in
inducing her to purchase the land. Thus,

Other than complainant’s bare allegation, there is no extant proof adequately showing that respondent
told her that the property was registered land. Instead, we find sufficient evidence to support the
finding that there was no connivance and that complainant was aware that the property was still to be
titled:
1. The Acknowledgment Receipt describes the property as "Lot 108-3, PSU (2f) 02-165983 xxx" and not
by TCT or OCT Number.

2. The Acknowledgment Receipt provides that the balance shall be paid within a period of three (3)
months. Thus, complainant had sufficient time to demand or verify if the property was registered with
the Registry of Deeds. But instead of doing so, she made further payments on 16 August 2004 and 8
September 2004.

3. Complainant was present when the property was being surveyed for the purpose of segregating the
lot to be adjudicated to her. The status of the property was further explained to her by Engr. Camb[r]i
during the segregation survey of the property she bought.

4. The Lot Descriptions attached to the Survey Plan prepared by Engr. Cambri specifically states that Lot
No. 15 was complainant’s.

5. The property was adjudicated to the spouses Mora by the DENR in the Order dated 5 October 2001
which already became final and executory. In a way, the title of spouses of the lot was confirmed and in
the process of making it perfect through the approval of the subdivision plan and the appropriate public
land application. This was explained by respondent to complainant since he is the lawyer of the spouses
in the DENR case.13

Anent the charge of notarizing a document without a notarial commission, we agree that such an act
violates Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which reads:

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

In Nunga v. Viray,14 the Court held that:

Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has
no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one,
performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more
specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is
not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath
similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct."

For such misconduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers with suspension from the practice of law,
revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even disbarment.15

Disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must
always be exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of
misconduct affecting the standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a
member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment should not be decreed where any punishment less severe –
such as a reprimand, suspension, or fine – would accomplish the end desired.16

In Joson v. Baltazar,17 the Court suspended a lawyer for three months for unauthorized notarization of a
deed of sale. Considering, however, that in the instant case, it was only an Acknowledgment Receipt
that was notarized; that it was done to protect the complainant; that it was the first offense of the
respondent; and the heavy workload of the respondent as Public Attorney, we find the recommended
penalty of reprimand sufficient under the present circumstances.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Resolution No. XVII-2006-238, dated April 27, 2006, of the IBP
Board of Governors which adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Investigating
Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing, finding respondent Atty. Noel A. Mora GUILTY of violating Rule
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for notarizing an acknowledgment receipt
without a notarial commission and recommending that he be REPRIMANDED with warning that
repetition of the same act will be dealt with more severely, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON, A.C. No. 6968

Complainant,

Present:

- versus -

QUISUMBING, Chairperson,

ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO, CARPIO,

Respondent. CARPIO MORALES,

x-----------------------------------------x TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

ATTY. MARICHU C. LAMBINO,

Complainant,

Promulgated:

-versus- August 9, 2006

ATTY. ORLANDO V. DIZON,

Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

The killing during a rumble on December 8, 1994 of University of the Philippines (UP) graduating student
Dennis Venturina, the chairperson of the UP College of Public Administration Student Council, drew the
then Chancellor of UP Diliman Roger Posadas to seek the assistance of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).

Acting on the request of Chancellor Posadas, Atty. Orlando Dizon, then Chief of the Special Operations
Group (SOG) of the NBI, together with his men, repaired to the Office of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head of
the UP Security Force on December 12, 1994.
As two student-suspects in the killing, Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, were at the time in
the office of Col. Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested to take them into his custody. Atty. Marichu Lambino,
Legal Counsel of UP Diliman, who repaired to the Office of Col. Bentain, advised against
Atty. Dizons move, however, he not being armed with a warrant for their arrest.

Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor for students Rosario Torres-Yu, who also repaired to the office
of the colonel, joined Atty. Lambino in opposing the turn-over of the suspects to Atty. Dizon, despite the
latters claim that under its Charter the NBI was authorized to make warrantless arrests.

The suspects lawyer, one Atty. Villamor, later also showed up at the office of Col. Bentain and after what
appeared to be a heated discussion between Atty. Dizon and the UP officials, the students were allowed
to go back to their dormitories, with Atty. Villamor undertaking to accompany them to the NBI the
following morning.

The two student-suspects were eventually indicted in court.

Hence, spawned the filing of a complaint by Atty. Dizon against Atty. Lambino before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP), for violation of Canon 1, Rules 1.1 to 1.3 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, docketed as CBD Case No. 346.

Atty. Dizon had earlier filed a criminal complaint also against Atty. Lambino, together with
Chancellor Posadas and Vice Chancellor Torres-Yu and Col. Bentain, before the Ombudsman, for
violation of P.D. 1829 which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution
of criminal offenses.

Atty. Lambino in turn charged Atty. Dizon before the IBP with violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, and 1.03; Canon 6, Rules 6.01 and 6.02; and Canon
8, Rule 8.01, docketed as CBD Case No. 373.

The administrative cases were, on motion of Atty. Lambino, consolidated. Before the IBP Commission on
Bar Discipline (CBD), the issues were defined as follows:

1. Whether the act of Atty. Lambino in refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of
Atty. Dizon constitutes violation of Code of Professional Responsibility.
2. Whether the act of Atty. Dizon in trying to arrest the student-suspects constitutes violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

By Report and Recommendation submitted to the Board of Governors of the IBP on June 20, 2005, CBD
Investigating Commissioner Siegfrid B. Mison recommended the dismissal of the complaint against
Atty. Lambino in light of a finding that she acted within her official duties as she safeguarded the rights
of the students in accordance with the schools substitute parental authority and within the bounds of
the law as the NBI agents had no warrants of arrest.

With respect to the complaint against Atty. Dizon, the Commissioner recommended to reprimand him
for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility in recklessly tr[ying] to arrest the suspects without
warrant.

The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution of October 22, 2005, adopted and approved the
Commissioners Report. The IBP thereupon transferred to this Court its Notice of Resolution, together
with the records of the cases which this Court noted by Resolution of February 1, 2006.

As earlier stated, the issue against Atty. Lambino is whether she violated the Canons of Professional
Ethics in refusing to turn over the suspected students to the group of Atty. Dizon.

When the complaint of Atty. Dizon before the Ombudsman against Chancellor Posadas, Vice Chancellor
Torres-Yu and Atty. Lambino was elevated on Certiorari and Prohibition, this Court addressing in the
negative the two issues raised therein, to wit:

(1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a
warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioner for violation of P.D. No.
1829. x x x,[1]

held that the objection of the said UP officials to the arrest of the students cannot be construed as a
violation of P.D. No. 1829, Sec. 1 (c) without rendering it unconstitutional,[2] they having a right to
prevent the arrest [of the students] at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal.[3]
Indeed, Atty. Lambino was legally justified in advising against the turn over of the suspects to
Atty. Dizon, there being no basis for him to effect a warrantless arrest. Atty. Dizons administrative
complaint against her must then be dismissed.

Respecting the complaint against Atty. Dizon, this Court, also in Posadas v. Ombudsman, held that [f]or
the failure of the NBI agents to comply with the constitutional and procedural requirements, . . . their
attempt to arrest [the two student-suspects] without a warrant was illegal.[4]

In the main, Atty. Dizon invoked Section 1 (a) of Republic Act 157 (The NBI Charter) which empowers the
NBI to undertake investigations of crimes and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon its
own initiative and as public interest may require[5] and to make arrests. The invocation does not
impress. Said section does not grant the NBI the power to make warrantless arrests. The NBI Charter
clearly qualifies the power to make arrests to be in accordance with existing laws and rules.

Members of the investigation staff of the Bureau of Investigation shall be peace officers, and as such
have the following powers:

(a) To make arrests, searches and seizures in accordance with existing laws and rules.[6]

x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students without a warrant, Atty. Dizon violated Rule
1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

xxxx

Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system. (Emphasis supplied).
WHEREFORE, CBD Case No. 346 against Atty. Marichu C. Lambino is DISMISSED.

Atty. Orlando V. Dizon is, in CBD Case No. 373, found guilty of violation of Canon 1 of Rule 1.02 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and is REPRIMANDED and WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the National Bureau of
Investigation, and the Department of Justice.

SO ORDERED.
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, A.C. No. 6672

Complainant,

Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,

- v e r s u s - CORONA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and

BERSAMIN, JJ.

ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO,

Respondent. Promulgated:

September 4, 2009

x-----------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment[1] filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan & Linsangan
Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services.

Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his
clients[2] to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance[3] and
expeditious collection on their claims.[4] To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them
and sent them text messages.

To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit[5] of James Gregorio attesting that
Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize
respondents services instead, in exchange for a loan of P50,000. Complainant also attached respondents
calling card:[6]
Front

NICOMEDES TOLENTINO

LAW OFFFICE

CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES

W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

Fe Marie L. Labiano

Paralegal

1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01 Tel: 362-7820

6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar Fax: (632) 362-7821

Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926) 2701719

Back

SERVICES OFFERED:

CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE

TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN

REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,

INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH

AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS

ABROAD.

(emphasis supplied)

Hence, this complaint.

Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulation of the
said calling card.[7]
The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.[8]

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and recommendation,[9] found
that respondent had encroached on the professional practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.02[10] and
other canons[11] of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule
against soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in Section 27,
Rule 138[12] of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that respondent be reprimanded with a
stern warning that any repetition would merit a heavier penalty.

We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we modify the
recommended penalty.

The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into complainants professional
practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the means employed by respondent in furtherance of
the said misconduct themselves constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the manner by which a
lawyers services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the CPR provides:

CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR,
DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT OF FACTS.

Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and not a business;
lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares.[13] To allow a lawyer to
advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the publics
estimation and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which every
member of the bar is called.[14]

Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:

RULE 2.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT DO OR PERMIT TO BE DONE ANY ACT DESIGNED PRIMARILY TO
SOLICIT LEGAL BUSINESS.

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or through
paid agents or brokers.[15] Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for disbarment.[16]

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
RULE 1.03. A LAWYER SHALL NOT, FOR ANY CORRUPT MOTIVE OR INTEREST, ENCOURAGE ANY SUIT OR
PROCEEDING OR DELAY ANY MANS CAUSE.

This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal business by an
attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain employment)[17] as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty.[18]

Complainant presented substantial evidence[19] (consisting of the sworn statements of the very same
persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed
solicited legal business as well as profited from referrals suits.

Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later admitted it during the
mandatory hearing.

Through Labianos actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen were enticed to
transfer representation on the strength of Labianos word that respondent could produce a more
favorable result.

Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03 and
Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

With regard to respondents violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a lawyer should not
steal another lawyers client nor induce the latter to retain him by a promise of better service, good
result or reduced fees for his services.[20] Again the Court notes that respondent never denied having
these seafarers in his client list nor receiving benefits from Labianos referrals. Furthermore, he never
denied Labianos connection to his office.[21] Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep
into anothers legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent violated
Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are fully
protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a
client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he
is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographers fees for transcript of
stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the
client.
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyers independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected.[22] It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the clients cause. If the lawyer lends money to the
client in connection with the clients case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter
of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.[23] Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which may take care
of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to
the clients cause.[24]

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice[25] which calls for the exercise of
the Courts disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes warrants serious sanctions for
initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.[26] Thus, in this
jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of
unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.

Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the prohibition on lending
money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the
wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly incommensurate to its findings.

A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyers best
advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his
character and conduct.[27] For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by
publication in reputable law lists or use of simple professional cards.

Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

(a) lawyers name;

(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

(c) address;

(d) telephone number and

(e) special branch of law practiced.[28]

Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to
entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance
their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking
advantage of their financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the
integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial
evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was personally and
directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labianos calling cards.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and
Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is
hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of one year effective immediately from
receipt of this resolution. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme
Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
[A.C. No. 5299. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. ISMAEL G. KHAN, JR., Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, complainant, vs. ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, respondent.

[G.R. No. 157053. August 19, 2003]

ATTY. RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO, petitioner, vs. IBP COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE and ATTY. ISMAEL
G. KHAN, JR., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and Chief, Public Information
Office, respondents.

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This administrative complaint arose from a paid advertisement that appeared in the July 5, 2000 issue of
the newspaper, Philippine Daily Inquirer, which reads: ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE Specialist 532-
4333/521-2667.[1]

Ms. Ma. Theresa B. Espeleta, a staff member of the Public Information Office of the Supreme Court,
called up the published telephone number and pretended to be an interested party. She spoke to Mrs.
Simbillo, who claimed that her husband, Atty. Rizalino Simbillo, was an expert in handling annulment
cases and can guarantee a court decree within four to six months, provided the case will not involve
separation of property or custody of children. Mrs. Simbillo also said that her husband charges a fee of
P48,000.00, half of which is payable at the time of filing of the case and the other half after a decision
thereon has been rendered.

Further research by the Office of the Court Administrator and the Public Information Office revealed
that similar advertisements were published in the August 2 and 6, 2000 issues of the Manila Bulletin and
August 5, 2000 issue of The Philippine Star.[2]

On September 1, 2000, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., in his capacity as Assistant Court Administrator and
Chief of the Public Information Office, filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Rizalino T. Simbillo
for improper advertising and solicitation of his legal services, in violation of Rule 2.03 and Rule 3.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.[3]

In his answer, respondent admitted the acts imputed to him, but argued that advertising and
solicitation per se are not prohibited acts; that the time has come to change our views about the
prohibition on advertising and solicitation; that the interest of the public is not served by the absolute
prohibition on lawyer advertising; that the Court can lift the ban on lawyer advertising; and that the
rationale behind the decades-old prohibition should be abandoned. Thus, he prayed that he be
exonerated from all the charges against him and that the Court promulgate a ruling that advertisement
of legal services offered by a lawyer is not contrary to law, public policy and public order as long as it is
dignified.[4]

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation.[5] On June 29, 2002, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline passed Resolution No. XV-
2002-306,[6]finding respondent guilty of violation of Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court, and suspended him from the practice of
law for one (1) year with the warning that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with more
severely. The IBP Resolution was noted by this Court on November 11, 2002.[7]

In the meantime, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration,[8] which was denied by the IBP
in Resolution No. XV-2002-606 dated October 19, 2002[9]

Hence, the instant petition for certiorari, which was docketed as G.R. No. 157053 entitled, Atty. Rizalino
T. Simbillo, Petitioner versus IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr., Asst. Court
Administrator and Chief, Public Information Office, Respondents. This petition was consolidated with
A.C. No. 5299 per the Courts Resolution dated March 4, 2003.

In a Resolution dated March 26, 2003, the parties were required to manifest whether or not they were
willing to submit the case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings.[10] Complainant filed his
Manifestation on April 25, 2003, stating that he is not submitting any additional pleading or evidence
and is submitting the case for its early resolution on the basis of pleadings and records
thereof. [11] Respondent, on the other hand, filed a Supplemental Memorandum on June 20, 2003.

We agree with the IBPs Resolutions Nos. XV-2002-306 and XV-2002-606.

Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility read:

Rule 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.

Rule 3.01. A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services.

Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. A member of the
bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party
without authority to do so.

It has been repeatedly stressed that the practice of law is not a business.[12] It is a profession in which
duty to public service, not money, is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits.[13] The gaining of
a livelihood should be a secondary consideration.[14] The duty to public service and to the administration
of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal interests
or what they owe to themselves.[15] The following elements distinguish the legal profession from a
business:

1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the
highest eminence without making much money;

2. A relation as an officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough sincerity,
integrity and reliability;

3. A relation to clients in the highest degree of fiduciary;

4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to
current business methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with
their clients.[16]

There is no question that respondent committed the acts complained of. He himself admits that he
caused the publication of the advertisements. While he professes repentance and begs for the Courts
indulgence, his contrition rings hollow considering the fact that he advertised his legal services
again after he pleaded for compassion and after claiming that he had no intention to violate the
rules. Eight months after filing his answer, he again advertised his legal services in the August 14, 2001
issue of the Buy & Sell Free Ads Newspaper.[17] Ten months later, he caused the same advertisement to
be published in the October 5, 2001 issue of Buy & Sell.[18] Such acts of respondent are a deliberate and
contemptuous affront on the Courts authority.

What adds to the gravity of respondents acts is that in advertising himself as a self-styled Annulment of
Marriage Specialist, he wittingly or unwittingly erodes and undermines not only the stability but also the
sanctity of an institution still considered sacrosanct despite the contemporary climate of permissiveness
in our society. Indeed, in assuring prospective clients that an annulment may be obtained in four to six
months from the time of the filing of the case,[19] he in fact encourages people, who might have
otherwise been disinclined and would have refrained from dissolving their marriage bonds, to do so.

Nonetheless, the solicitation of legal business is not altogether proscribed. However, for solicitation to
be proper, it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal profession. If it is made in a modest and
decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the lawyer and to the bar.[20] Thus, the use of simple signs
stating the name or names of the lawyers, the office and residence address and fields of practice, as well
as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use of calling
cards is now acceptable.[21] Publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the standards
of conduct imposed by the canon, of brief biographical and informative data is likewise allowable. As
explicitly stated in Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc.:[22]

Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyers name and the names
of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law
practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation,
degrees and other educational distinctions; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal
authorships; legal teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law
lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented.

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer
permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management, or contents of which are
calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower dignity or standing of the
profession.
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement
of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and
special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm
or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of
the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but
not under a designation of special branch of law. (emphasis and italics supplied)

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent RIZALINO T. SIMBILLO is found GUILTY of violation of
Rules 2.03 and 3.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
Court. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR effective upon receipt of this
Resolution. He is likewise STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will be dealt
with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be entered in his record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
Bar Matter No. 553 June 17, 1993

MAURICIO C. ULEP, petitioner,

vs.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., respondent.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of annexes "A" and "B" (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession
other than those allowed by law."

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.
ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767 LEGAL 5217232, 5222041 CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am— 6:00 pm 7-Flr. Victoria Bldg.,
UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE.

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday
to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree's Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave., LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy CLINIC, INC.1 Tel. 521-7232;
521-7251; 522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champterous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of
the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by
the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as hereinbefore quoted.

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisement at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly
in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O'Steen vs. State Bar of Arizona,2 reportedly decided by
the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the
(1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers'
Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Womens Lawyers' Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the
Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federacion International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective
position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with
appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this
bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:

xxx xxx xxx

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e.,
"legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are
essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from government or non-
government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like
clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitutes practice of law?

xxx xxx xxx

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent's foreign
citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes
the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one's legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent's act of establishing a
"legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually
restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as
aforedescribed.4

xxx xxx xxx

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply
assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name
being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes
the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for
medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical
clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent's name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case,
appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being
operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and
this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being
offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by
it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the
respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals,
public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to
inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize
to Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one
instance when a foreign divorce is recognized, and that is:

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:

Article 1. Marriage is special contract of permanent union between a man and woman entered into
accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and
not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during the
marriage within the limits provided by this Code.
By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that
Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by
simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce,
violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice,
where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright
malpractice.

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of
the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper
and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes
light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the
Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this
particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of
immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.

If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above
impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that
criminal acts are being encouraged or committed
(a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with impunity simply because the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the crime is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, (that) the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute
legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier
discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader,
members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary
to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of
the Bar.

xxx xxx xxx

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it presently
offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering,
storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services
will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However,
when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law,
there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in
other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit
them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and
advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer
using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of
law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for
the protection of the public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if
such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then
be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require further
proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent's services ought to be prohibited outright,
such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or
otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information
given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal
under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer
should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend
any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar,
with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal
services.

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice
in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such
practice may be considered, the corporation's Article of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to
each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court.5

2. Philippine Bar Association:

xxx xxx xxx.

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent's acts of
holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment
for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory
powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to
stretch credulity. Respondent's own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don
Parkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that
the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an
attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1984
ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot
be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the
scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public
cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of
practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court
discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be
assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified
themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for
respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice.6

3. Philippine Lawyers' Association:

The Philippine Lawyers' Association's position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are wit:

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral;
and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to supress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate
officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent posits that is it not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal
support services" to answers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose
Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent's Comment). But its advertised
services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice,
albeit outside of court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and
adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the
Investments Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.
Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and
procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training,
knowledge and experience.

Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall
squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law."7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle:

In resolving, the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the
protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities
who may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-
year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a
lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdiction as an aid to the administration of justice,
there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals
to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these
courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines.
In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to make measures to protect the general public from
being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals"
without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be
brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the
present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal
services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures
should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services
without being qualified to offer such services. 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that
information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa
extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal
matters , will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent's name — The Legal Clinic,
Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also
gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are
doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent's allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent
corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article."9

5. Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain
which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in
that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a
secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has
to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages
in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an
agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing
lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal
services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of
the petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The
law has yet to be amended so that such act could become justifiable.

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are
possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage
here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country
there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good
morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws
cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an
attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional, and offenses of this character justify
permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion Internacional de Abogados:

xxx xxx xxx

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms
or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the
practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful
practice of law.

. . . . Of necessity, no one . . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar
with such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law
forbids. It seems . . . .clear that (the consultant's) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as
a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . . . It
is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable
acquaintance with broad features of the law . . . . Our knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate —
moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching
their particular business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with
zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans
and specification in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.

But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the
statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not,
provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and the
architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed this function
would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if
the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the
elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of the industrial
relations experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers.
Among the larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate special
responsibility in employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and
skill in such matter, and without regard to legal thinking or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the
defendants have the same service that the larger employers get from their own specialized staff.

The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate
courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that]
a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class
of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical
education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.

In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining
his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his
client along the path charted by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not
the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily efforts are along economic and psychological lines.
The law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of
building the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or information
defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as
a minor feature of his work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the
bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a welfare program, he drew employees' wills.

Another branch of defendant's work is the representations of the employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law.
Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject
under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a
member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where the business turns on a question
of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land
depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable
outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from
differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle
it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the proofs.

Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the
federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with
such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The
rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear in person, or by counsel,
or by other representative. Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. 'Counsel' here
means a licensed attorney, and ther representative' one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal.
(Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-
156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility
succintly states the rule of conduct:

Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.

1.10. In the present case. the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A" Petition).
Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making
arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as
complicated as that described in "Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-
Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as
the Legal Clinic, renders such services then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and
visas (See Annexes "A" and "B" Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute of
law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the subject and
determines on the subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.
It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic's
paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would
constitute unauthorized practice of law.

It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which publication of a legal text which purports
to say what the law is amount to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in
the text may be accepted by a particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . .
Apparently it is urged that the conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to
how the forms should be filled out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation
with many approved and accepted texts. Dacey's book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal
contact or relationship with a particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and
trust so necessary to the status of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE
REPRESENTATION AND ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the
book assumes to offer general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal
advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the
defendant's publication does not purport to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a
designated or readily identified person in a particular situation — in their publication and sale of the kits,
such publication and sale did not constitutes the unlawful practice of law . . . . There being no legal
impediment under the statute to the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against
defendant maintaining an office for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation,
annulment or separation agreement any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the
prohibition in the memorandum of modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest in
any publishing house publishing his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact
with any prospective purchaser. The record does fully support, however, the finding that for the change
of $75 or $100 for the kit, the defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning
particular problems which might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser's asserted
matrimonial cause of action or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of
necessary documents (The injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of
law, particularly with reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific
problems of particular individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation
agreement sought and should be affirmed. (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2D 270 [1973], cited in
Statsky, supra at p. 101.).

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory. "It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would
constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry
may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.

xxx xxx xxx

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the
wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites
of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not
necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services?" or
"legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11
A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for the proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice
of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down
general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now
take into account.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any
kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such
matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed
by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and
authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in the a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of
law. 15 One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to
an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a statute,
and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18

In the recent case of Cayetano vs. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down
the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases on court.(Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken , 129 Ohio St. 23, 193N. E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:

. . . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their right under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee,
or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative
capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v.
C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S. W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852).

This Court, in the case of Philippines Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management
of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before
a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters or estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of
legal advice on a large variety of subjects and the preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions
may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions
of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between
that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules o Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass], 194 N. E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 197 A. 139, 144).

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law."

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent's own description of the services it
has been offering, to wit:
Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and
lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and
modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of
information and communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering;
locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of
basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property,
or business registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation
like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries that
they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory
to emigration to the foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in
court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient management
of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts and other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services. 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical knowhow, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice
to justify an exception to the general rule.

What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers.
Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In
providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the
credulity of this Court that all the respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a
copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so
called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him
or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for the which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That
activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not
be altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice,
as the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely giving legal advice, contract drafting and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of
the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippines Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an
insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own
"proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh
floor of the Victoria Building along U. N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client's problem, and
even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of
lawyers, who, like doctors are "specialists" in various fields can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has
specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation, and family law. These
specialist are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.
The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "when they come, we start by analyzing the problem.
That's what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what's bothering you, they take your
temperature, they observe you for the symptoms and so on. That's how we operate, too. And once the
problem has been categorized, then it's referred to one of our specialists.

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal
Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of
loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital the residents or the interns. We can take
care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa hospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It's just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which requires more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich
relative who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property,
we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would
need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her
property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with the problem. Now, if
there were other heirs contesting your rich relatives will, then you would need a litigator, who knows
how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case. 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which
it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation
and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals,
but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member
of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the
court. 24

The same rule is observed in the american jurisdiction wherefrom respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically
so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have
complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are
allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study,
have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to
advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to the
construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the
practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from
competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by
incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control.27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent's position that the concept in the United States
of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.
Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for
judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.

Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools
and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in
the Philippines. 28As the concept of the "paralegals" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States,
standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or
guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of
Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of
professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered
as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have
been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable
services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons
licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use
of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
business. 35 Prior to the adoption of the code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional
Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional
employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the
manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's
position, and all other like self-laudation. 36
The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer's advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession. advertise his talents or skill as in a manner similar
to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The prescription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the that the practice of law is a
profession. Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs. vs. Estanislao R. Bayot 38 an
advertisement, similar to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held
to constitute improper advertising or solicitation.

The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127
expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for
an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and
not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he
defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple
of Jehovah. "The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.).

We repeat, the canon of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome
of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service
which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they
may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly
allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer's name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date
and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and
other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented." 42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or
likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43

The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement
of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and
special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm
or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of
the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but
not under a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is
being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation
for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall
under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, et al. vs. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for
an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the
fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly,
whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility.
Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein
are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46 This
goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent,
can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the
prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates,
on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public
opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%
Honest from 65% to 14%
Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is
already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.
In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of
law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and
proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt
with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which
the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain
from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the
present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter
be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of
our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this
country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by
employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the
Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment of
the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent's corporate charter, in light of the putative
misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for such
action as may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of
the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting,
directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional
Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action
in accordance herewith.
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC March 8, 2011

RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE
FACULTY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF
PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE SUPREME COURT"

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

For disposition of the Court are the various submissions of the 37 respondent law professors1 in
response to the Resolution dated October 19, 2010 (the Show Cause Resolution), directing them to
show cause why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of specific provisions
of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerated therein.

At the outset, it must be stressed that the Show Cause Resolution clearly dockets this as an
administrative matter, not a special civil action for indirect contempt under Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, contrary to the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Justice Sereno)
to the said October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution. Neither is this a disciplinary proceeding grounded
on an allegedly irregularly concluded finding of indirect contempt as intimated by Associate Justice
Conchita Carpio Morales (Justice Morales) in her dissenting opinions to both the October 19, 2010 Show
Cause Resolution and the present decision.

With the nature of this case as purely a bar disciplinary proceeding firmly in mind, the Court finds that
with the exception of one respondent whose compliance was adequate and another who manifested he
was not a member of the Philippine Bar, the submitted explanations, being mere denials and/or
tangential to the issues at hand, are decidedly unsatisfactory. The proffered defenses even more
urgently behoove this Court to call the attention of respondent law professors, who are members of the
Bar, to the relationship of their duties as such under the Code of Professional Responsibility to their civil
rights as citizens and academics in our free and democratic republic.

The provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility involved in this case are as follows:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.

RULE 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

CANON 10 - A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.

Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of paper, the language
or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not
been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends
of justice.

CANON 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.

RULE 11.05 A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.

CANON 13 — A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which
tends to influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.

Established jurisprudence will undeniably support our view that when lawyers speak their minds, they
must ever be mindful of their sworn oath to observe ethical standards of their profession, and in
particular, avoid foul and abusive language to condemn the Supreme Court, or any court for that matter,
for a decision it has rendered, especially during the pendency of a motion for such decision’s
reconsideration. The accusation of plagiarism against a member of this Court is not the real issue here
but rather this plagiarism issue has been used to deflect everyone’s attention from the actual concern of
this Court to determine by respondents’ explanations whether or not respondent members of the Bar
have crossed the line of decency and acceptable professional conduct and speech and violated the Rules
of Court through improper intervention or interference as third parties to a pending case. Preliminarily,
it should be stressed that it was respondents themselves who called upon the Supreme Court to act on
their Statement,2 which they formally submitted, through Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen (Dean Leonen),
for the Court’s proper disposition. Considering the defenses of freedom of speech and academic
freedom invoked by the respondents, it is worth discussing here that the legal reasoning used in the
past by this Court to rule that freedom of expression is not a defense in administrative cases against
lawyers for using intemperate speech in open court or in court submissions can similarly be applied to
respondents’ invocation of academic freedom. Indeed, it is precisely because respondents are not
merely lawyers but lawyers who teach law and mould the minds of young aspiring attorneys that
respondents’ own non-observance of the Code of Professional Responsibility, even if purportedly
motivated by the purest of intentions, cannot be ignored nor glossed over by this Court.

To fully appreciate the grave repercussions of respondents’ actuations, it is apropos to revisit the factual
antecedents of this case.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

Antecedent Facts and Proceedings

On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya,
et al. v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel3 for
Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising
solely the following grounds:

I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable Courts’ (sic) assertion that
the Executive’s foreign policy prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely, under the relevant
jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such prerogatives are proscribed by international human
rights and humanitarian standards, including those provided for in the relevant international
conventions of which the Philippines is a party.4
II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader, if fundamental,
responsibility of states to protect the human rights of its citizens – especially where the rights asserted
are subject of erga omnes obligations and pertain to jus cogens norms.5

On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel
Regalado Bagares (Atty. Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230,
where they posited for the first time their charge of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration
of the Vinuya decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque and Bagares asserted that:

I.

IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT’S JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28,
2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT LEAST THREE SOURCES – AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK PUBLISHED BY THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005
AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S ARGUMENTS FOR
DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A
STRONG CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS.7

They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of extensive
plagiarism but of (sic) also of twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit
the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying the Petition."8

According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were
namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle and Evan Fox-Decent’s article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;"9 (2)
Christian J. Tams’ book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations in International Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis’
article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime."11

On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July 19, 2010,
journalists Aries C. Rufo and Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of
ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak website.12 The same article appeared on the GMA News
TV website also on July 19, 2010.13

On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the Manila
Standard Today.14 In the said column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors
purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored
with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof. Criddle’s response to the
post by Julian Ku regarding the news report15 on the alleged plagiarism in the international law blog,
Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Ku’s blog entry in this wise:

The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed yesterday with
the Philippine Supreme Court yesterday. The motion is available here:

http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/

The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four sentences and citations that are
identical to sentences and citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent).
Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations until after the
motion was filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens discussion is that it implies that
the prohibitions against crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms.
Our article emphatically asserts the opposite. The Supreme Court’s decision is available
here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm17

On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to the
charge of plagiarism contained in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.18

In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark
Ellis, wrote the Court, to wit:

Your Honours:

I write concerning a most delicate issue that has come to my attention in the last few days.

Much as I regret to raise this matter before your esteemed Court, I am compelled, as a question of the
integrity of my work as an academic and as an advocate of human rights and humanitarian law, to take
exception to the possible unauthorized use of my law review article on rape as an international crime in
your esteemed Court’s Judgment in the case of Vinuya et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No.
162230, Judgment of 28 April 2010).

My attention was called to the Judgment and the issue of possible plagiarism by the Philippine chapter
of the Southeast Asia Media Legal Defence Initiative (SEAMLDI),19 an affiliate of the London-based Media
Legal Defence Initiative (MLDI), where I sit as trustee.

In particular, I am concerned about a large part of the extensive discussion in footnote 65, pp. 27-28, of
the said Judgment of your esteemed Court. I am also concerned that your esteemed Court may have
misread the arguments I made in the article and employed them for cross purposes. This would be ironic
since the article was written precisely to argue for the appropriate legal remedy for victims of war
crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity.

I believe a full copy of my article as published in the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law
in 2006 has been made available to your esteemed Court. I trust that your esteemed Court will take the
time to carefully study the arguments I made in the article.

I would appreciate receiving a response from your esteemed Court as to the issues raised by this letter.

With respect,

(Sgd.)
Dr. Mark Ellis20

In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the Committee on Ethics
and Ethical Standards (the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the
Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22, 2010
letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The matter was subsequently docketed as A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC.

On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to comment on the letter
of Justice Del Castillo.21
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the
Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement), was posted in Newsbreak’s website22 and on
Atty. Roque’s blog.23 A report regarding the statement also appeared on various on-line news sites, such
as the GMA News TV24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on the same date. The statement was likewise posted at
the University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 201026 and at
said college’s website.27

On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the Philippines
College of Law Faculty (UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chief
Justice Corona). The cover letter dated August 10, 2010 of Dean Leonen read:

The Honorable
Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines

Through: Hon. Renato C. Corona

Chief Justice

Subject: Statement of faculty

from the UP College of Law
on the Plagiarism in the case of
Vinuya v Executive Secretary

Your Honors:

We attach for your information and proper disposition a statement signed by thirty[-]eight
(38)28members of the faculty of the UP College of Law. We hope that its points could be considered by
the Supreme Court en banc.

Respectfully,

(Sgd.)
Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
Dean and Professor of Law

(Emphases supplied.)

The copy of the Statement attached to the above-quoted letter did not contain the actual signatures of
the alleged signatories but only stated the names of 37 UP Law professors with the notation (SGD.)
appearing beside each name. For convenient reference, the text of the UP Law faculty Statement is
reproduced here:

RESTORING INTEGRITY

A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION
IN THE SUPREME COURT
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered
abuse during a time of war. After they courageously came out with their very personal stories of abuse
and suffering as "comfort women", waited for almost two decades for any meaningful relief from their
own government as well as from the government of Japan, got their hopes up for a semblance of judicial
recourse in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230 (28 April 2010), they only had
these hopes crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the
Highest Court of the land.

It is within this frame that the Faculty of the University of the Philippines College of Law views the
charge that an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court committed plagiarism and misrepresentation in
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary. The plagiarism and misrepresentation are not only affronts to the
individual scholars whose work have been appropriated without correct attribution, but also a serious
threat to the integrity and credibility of the Philippine Judicial System.

In common parlance, ‘plagiarism’ is the appropriation and misrepresentation of another person’s work
as one’s own. In the field of writing, it is cheating at best, and stealing at worst. It constitutes a taking of
someone else’s ideas and expressions, including all the effort and creativity that went into committing
such ideas and expressions into writing, and then making it appear that such ideas and expressions were
originally created by the taker. It is dishonesty, pure and simple. A judicial system that allows plagiarism
in any form is one that allows dishonesty. Since all judicial decisions form part of the law of the land, to
allow plagiarism in the Supreme Court is to allow the production of laws by dishonest means. Evidently,
this is a complete perversion and falsification of the ends of justice.

A comparison of the Vinuya decision and the original source material shows that the ponente merely
copied select portions of other legal writers’ works and interspersed them into the decision as if they
were his own, original work. Under the circumstances, however, because the Decision has been
promulgated by the Court, the Decision now becomes the Court’s and no longer just the ponente’s. Thus
the Court also bears the responsibility for the Decision. In the absence of any mention of the original
writers’ names and the publications from which they came, the thing speaks for itself.

So far there have been unsatisfactory responses from the ponente of this case and the spokesman of
the Court.

It is argued, for example, that the inclusion of the footnotes from the original articles is a reference to
the ‘primary’ sources relied upon. This cursory explanation is not acceptable, because the original
authors’ writings and the effort they put into finding and summarizing those primary sources are
precisely the subject of plagiarism. The inclusion of the footnotes together with portions of their
writings in fact aggravates, instead of mitigates, the plagiarism since it provides additional evidence of a
deliberate intention to appropriate the original authors’ work of organizing and analyzing those primary
sources.

It is also argued that the Members of the Court cannot be expected to be familiar with all legal and
scholarly journals. This is also not acceptable, because personal unfamiliarity with sources all the more
demands correct and careful attribution and citation of the material relied upon. It is a matter of
diligence and competence expected of all Magistrates of the Highest Court of the Land.
But a far more serious matter is the objection of the original writers, Professors Evan Criddle and Evan
Fox-Descent, that the High Court actually misrepresents the conclusions of their work entitled "A
Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens," the main source of the plagiarized text. In this article they argue that
the classification of the crimes of rape, torture, and sexual slavery as crimes against humanity have
attained the status of jus cogens, making it obligatory upon the State to seek remedies on behalf of its
aggrieved citizens. Yet, the Vinuya decision uses parts of the same article to arrive at the contrary
conclusion. This exacerbates the intellectual dishonesty of copying works without attribution
by transforming it into an act of intellectual fraud by copying works in order to mislead and deceive.

The case is a potential landmark decision in International Law, because it deals with State liability and
responsibility for personal injury and damage suffered in a time of war, and the role of the injured
parties’ home States in the pursuit of remedies against such injury or damage. National courts rarely
have such opportunities to make an international impact. That the petitioners were Filipino "comfort
women" who suffered from horrific abuse during the Second World War made it incumbent on the
Court of last resort to afford them every solicitude. But instead of acting with urgency on this case, the
Court delayed its resolution for almost seven years, oblivious to the deaths of many of the petitioners
seeking justice from the Court. When it dismissed the Vinuya petition based on misrepresented and
plagiarized materials, the Court decided this case based on polluted sources. By so doing, the Supreme
Court added insult to injury by failing to actually exercise its "power to urge and exhort the Executive
Department to take up the claims of the Vinuya petitioners. Its callous disposition, coupled with false
sympathy and nonchalance, belies a more alarming lack of concern for even the most basic values of
decency and respect. The reputation of the Philippine Supreme Court and the standing of the Philippine
legal profession before other Judiciaries and legal systems are truly at stake.

The High Court cannot accommodate less than absolute honesty in its decisions and cannot accept
excuses for failure to attain the highest standards of conduct imposed upon all members of the Bench
and Bar because these undermine the very foundation of its authority and power in a democratic
society. Given the Court’s recent history and the controversy that surrounded it, it cannot allow the
charges of such clear and obvious plagiarism to pass without sanction as this would only further erode
faith and confidence in the judicial system. And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest
for justice not only of Filipino women, but of women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the
horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice
to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and misinterpreted texts.

The Court cannot regain its credibility and maintain its moral authority without ensuring that its own
conduct, whether collectively or through its Members, is beyond reproach. This necessarily includes
ensuring that not only the content, but also the processes of preparing and writing its own decisions, are
credible and beyond question. The Vinuya Decision must be conscientiously reviewed and not casually
cast aside, if not for the purpose of sanction, then at least for the purpose of reflection and guidance. It
is an absolutely essential step toward the establishment of a higher standard of professional care and
practical scholarship in the Bench and Bar, which are critical to improving the system of administration
of justice in the Philippines. It is also a very crucial step in ensuring the position of the Supreme Court as
the Final Arbiter of all controversies: a position that requires competence and integrity completely
above any and all reproach, in accordance with the exacting demands of judicial and professional ethics.
With these considerations, and bearing in mind the solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as
teachers in the profession of Law, it is the opinion of the Faculty of the University of the Philippine
College of Law that:

(1) The plagiarism committed in the case of Vinuya v. Executive Secretary is unacceptable, unethical and
in breach of the high standards of moral conduct and judicial and professional competence expected of
the Supreme Court;

(2) Such a fundamental breach endangers the integrity and credibility of the entire Supreme Court and
undermines the foundations of the Philippine judicial system by allowing implicitly the decision of cases
and the establishment of legal precedents through dubious means;

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial
function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have been left
without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein;

(4) In light of the extremely serious and far-reaching nature of the dishonesty and to save the honor and
dignity of the Supreme Court as an institution, it is necessary for the ponente of Vinuya v. Executive
Secretary to resign his position, without prejudice to any other sanctions that the Court may consider
appropriate;

(5) The Supreme Court must take this opportunity to review the manner by which it conducts research,
prepares drafts, reaches and finalizes decisions in order to prevent a recurrence of similar acts, and to
provide clear and concise guidance to the Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal
research and writing in pleadings, practice, and adjudication.

Malcolm Hall, University of the Philippines College of Law, Quezon City, 27 July 2010.

(SGD.) MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Dean and Professor of Law

(SGD.) FROILAN M. BACUNGAN (SGD.) PACIFICO A. AGABIN

Dean (1978-1983) Dean (1989-1995)

(SGD.) MERLIN M. MAGALLONA (SGD.) SALVADOR T. CARLOTA

Dean (1995-1999) Dean (2005-2008) and Professor of Law

REGULAR FACULTY

(SGD.) CARMELO V. SISON (SGD.) JAY L. BATONGBACAL

Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) PATRICIA R.P. SALVADOR DAWAY (SGD.) EVELYN (LEO) D. BATTAD

Associate Dean and Associate Professor Assistant Professor
 (SGD.) DANTE B. GATMAYTAN (SGD.) GWEN G. DE VERA
Associate Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) THEODORE O. TE (SGD.) SOLOMON F. LUMBA

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

(SGD.) FLORIN T. HILBAY (SGD.) ROMMEL J. CASIS

Assistant Professor Assistant Professor

LECTURERS

(SGD.) JOSE GERARDO A. ALAMPAY (SGD.) JOSE C. LAURETA

(SGD.) ARTHUR P. AUTEA (SGD.) DINA D. LUCENARIO

(SGD.) ROSA MARIA J. BAUTISTA (SGD.) OWEN J. LYNCH

(SGD.) MARK R. BOCOBO (SGD.) ANTONIO M. SANTOS

(SGD.) DAN P. CALICA (SGD.) VICENTE V. MENDOZA

(SGD.) TRISTAN A. CATINDIG (SGD.) RODOLFO NOEL S. QUIMBO

(SGD.) SANDRA MARIE O. CORONEL (SGD.) GMELEEN FAYE B. TOMBOC

(SGD.) ROSARIO O. GALLO (SGD.) NICHOLAS FELIX L. TY

(SGD.) CONCEPCION L. JARDELEZA (SGD.) EVALYN G. URSUA

(SGD.) ANTONIO G.M. LA VIÑA (SGD.) RAUL T. VASQUEZ

(SGD.) SUSAN D. VILLANUEVA29

(SGD.) CARINA C. LAFORTEZA
(Underscoring supplied.)

Meanwhile, in a letter dated August 18, 2010, Prof. Christian J. Tams made known his sentiments on the
alleged plagiarism issue to the Court.30 We quote Prof. Tams’ letter here:

Glasgow, 18 August 2010

Vinuya, et al. v. Executive Secretary et al. (G.R. No. 162230)

Hon. Renato C. Corona, Chief Justice

Your Excellency,

My name is Christian J. Tams, and I am a professor of international law at the University of Glasgow. I
am writing to you in relation to the use of one of my publications in the above-mentioned judgment of
your Honourable Court.
The relevant passage of the judgment is to be found on p. 30 of your Court’s Judgment, in the section
addressing the concept of obligations erga omnes. As the table annexed to this letter shows, the
relevant sentences were taken almost word by word from the introductory chapter of my book
Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International Law (Cambridge University Press 2005). I note that
there is a generic reference to my work in footnote 69 of the Judgment, but as this is in relation to a
citation from another author (Bruno Simma) rather than with respect to the substantive passages
reproduced in the Judgment, I do not think it can be considered an appropriate form of referencing.

I am particularly concerned that my work should have been used to support the Judgment’s cautious
approach to the erga omnes concept. In fact, a most cursory reading shows that my book’s central thesis
is precisely the opposite: namely that the erga omnes concept has been widely accepted and has a firm
place in contemporary international law. Hence the introductory chapter notes that "[t]he present study
attempts to demystify aspects of the ‘very mysterious’ concept and thereby to facilitate its
implementation" (p. 5). In the same vein, the concluding section notes that "the preceding chapters
show that the concept is now a part of the reality of international law, established in the jurisprudence
of courts and the practice of States" (p. 309).

With due respect to your Honourable Court, I am at a loss to see how my work should have been cited
to support – as it seemingly has – the opposite approach. More generally, I am concerned at the way in
which your Honourable Court’s Judgment has drawn on scholarly work without properly acknowledging
it.

On both aspects, I would appreciate a prompt response from your Honourable Court.

I remain

Sincerely yours

(Sgd.)
Christian J. Tams31

In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares’ exhibits during the August 26, 2010
hearing in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy
of the Restoring Integrity Statement) was not signed but merely reflected the names of certain faculty
members with the letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics Committee directed Atty. Roque to
present the signed copy of the said Statement within three days from the August 26 hearing.32

It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given a copy of the signed UP
Law Faculty Statement that showed on the signature pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law
Faculty, 81 faculty members in all. Indubitable from the actual signed copy of the Statement was that
only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have signed the same. However, the 37 actual
signatories to the Statement did not include former Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented in the previous copies of the Statement submitted by Dean
Leonen and Atty. Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed the
Statement although his name was not included among the signatories in the previous copies submitted
to the Court. Thus, the total number of ostensible signatories to the Statement remained at 37.
The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same Statement, having been
formally submitted by Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was already under consideration by the Court.33

In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following observations regarding
the UP Law Faculty Statement:

Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of
plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a
truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited
the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary conclusion to those of the
authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The
opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered
abuse during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as
a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the
resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.34 x x x.
(Underscoring ours.)

In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic
society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism
leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must
"insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments
except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty,
integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort
women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite
resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their
obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority
of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice.35 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring
supplied.)

Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M.
Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan,
Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F.
Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R. Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J.
Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo,
Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch,
Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G.
Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10) days
from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for
violation of Canons 1,36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.37

Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting through
his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation before
the Ethics Committee, for the consideration of the Court en banc, a dummy which is not a true and
faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement.38

In the same Resolution, the present controversy was docketed as a regular administrative matter.

Summaries of the Pleadings Filed by Respondents in Response to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution

On November 19, 2010, within the extension for filing granted by the Court, respondents filed the
following pleadings:

(1) Compliance dated November 18, 2010 by counsels for 35 of the 37 respondents, excluding Prof.
Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul T. Vasquez, in relation to the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and
Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;

(2) Compliance and Reservation dated November 18, 2010 by Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista in
relation to the same charge in par. (1);

(3) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Raul T. Vasquez in relation to the same
charge in par. (1);

(4) Compliance dated November 19, 2010 by counsels for Dean Leonen, in relation to the charge of
violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03; and

(5) Manifestation dated November 19, 2010 by counsel for Prof. Owen Lynch.

Common Compliance of 35 Respondents (Excluding Prof. Owen Lynch and Prof. Raul Vasquez)

Thirty-five (35) of the respondent UP Law professors filed on November 19, 2010 a common compliance
which was signed by their respective counsels (the Common Compliance). In the "Preface" of said
Common Compliance, respondents stressed that "[they] issued the Restoring Integrity Statement in the
discharge of the ‘solemn duties and trust reposed upon them as teachers in the profession of law,’ and
as members of the Bar to speak out on a matter of public concern and one that is of vital interest to
them."39 They likewise alleged that "they acted with the purest of intentions" and pointed out that
"none of them was involved either as party or counsel"40 in the Vinuya case. Further, respondents "note
with concern" that the Show Cause Resolution’s findings and conclusions were "a prejudgment – that
respondents indeed are in contempt, have breached their obligations as law professors and officers of
the Court, and have violated ‘Canons [1], 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility."41

By way of explanation, the respondents emphasized the following points:

(a) Respondents’ alleged noble intentions

In response to the charges of failure to observe due respect to legal processes42 and the courts43 and of
tending to influence, or giving the appearance of influencing the Court44 in the issuance of their
Statement, respondents assert that their intention was not to malign the Court but rather to defend its
integrity and credibility and to ensure continued confidence in the legal system. Their noble motive was
purportedly evidenced by the portion of their Statement "focusing on constructive
action."45 Respondents’ call in the Statement for the Court "to provide clear and concise guidance to the
Bench and Bar to ensure only the highest quality of legal research and writing in adjudication," was
reputedly "in keeping with strictures enjoining lawyers to ‘participate in the development of the legal
system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of
justice’" (under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility) and to "promote respect for the law
and legal processes" (under Canon 1, id.).46 Furthermore, as academics, they allegedly have a "special
interest and duty to vigilantly guard against plagiarism and misrepresentation because these unwelcome
occurrences have a profound impact in the academe, especially in our law schools."47

Respondents further "[called] on this Court not to misconstrue the Restoring Integrity Statement as an
‘institutional attack’ x x x on the basis of its first and ninth paragraphs."48 They further clarified that at
the time the Statement was allegedly drafted and agreed upon, it appeared to them the Court "was not
going to take any action on the grave and startling allegations of plagiarism and
misrepresentation."49 According to respondents, the bases for their belief were (i) the news article
published on July 21, 2010 in the Philippine Daily Inquirer wherein Court Administrator Jose Midas P.
Marquez was reported to have said that Chief Justice Corona would not order an inquiry into the
matter;50 and (ii) the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo which they claimed "did nothing but to
downplay the gravity of the plagiarism and misrepresentation charges."51 Respondents claimed that it
was their perception of the Court’s indifference to the dangers posed by the plagiarism allegations
against Justice Del Castillo that impelled them to urgently take a public stand on the issue.

(b) The "correctness" of respondents’ position that Justice Del Castillo committed plagiarism and should
be held accountable in accordance with the standards of academic writing

A significant portion of the Common Compliance is devoted to a discussion of the merits of respondents’
charge of plagiarism against Justice Del Castillo. Relying on University of the Philippines Board of
Regents v. Court of Appeals52 and foreign materials and jurisprudence, respondents essentially argue
that their position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo is the correct view and
that they are therefore justified in issuing their Restoring Integrity Statement. Attachments to the
Common Compliance included, among others: (i) the letter dated October 28, 2010 of Peter B. Payoyo,
LL.M, Ph.D.,53 sent to Chief Justice Corona through Justice Sereno, alleging that the Vinuya decision
likewise lifted without proper attribution the text from a legal article by Mariana Salazar Albornoz that
appeared in the Anuario Mexicano De Derecho Internacional and from an International Court of Justice
decision; and (ii) a 2008 Human Rights Law Review Article entitled "Sexual Orientation, Gender Identity
and International Human Rights Law" by Michael O’Flaherty and John Fisher, in support of their charge
that Justice Del Castillo also lifted passages from said article without proper attribution, but this time, in
his ponencia in Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.54

(c) Respondents’ belief that they are being "singled out" by the Court when others have likewise spoken
on the "plagiarism issue"

In the Common Compliance, respondents likewise asserted that "the plagiarism and misrepresentation
allegations are legitimate public issues."55 They identified various published reports and opinions, in
agreement with and in opposition to the stance of respondents, on the issue of plagiarism, specifically:

(i) Newsbreak report on July 19, 2010 by Aries Rufo and Purple Romero;56

(ii) Column of Ramon Tulfo which appeared in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on July 24, 2010;57

(iii) Editorial of the Philippine Daily Inquirer published on July 25, 2010;58

(iv) Letter dated July 22, 2010 of Justice Del Castillo published in the Philippine Star on July 30, 2010;59

(v) Column of Former Intellectual Property Office Director General Adrian Cristobal, Jr. published in the
Business Mirror on August 5, 2010;60

(vi) Column of Former Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on
August 8, 2010;61

(vii) News report regarding Senator Francis Pangilinan’s call for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo
published in the Daily Tribune and the Manila Standard Today on July 31, 2010;62

(viii) News reports regarding the statement of Dean Cesar Villanueva of the Ateneo de Manila University
School of Law on the calls for the resignation of Justice Del Castillo published in The Manila Bulletin, the
Philippine Star and the Business Mirror on August 11, 2010;63

(ix) News report on expressions of support for Justice Del Castillo from a former dean of the Pamantasan
ng Lungsod ng Maynila, the Philippine Constitutional Association, the Judges Association of Bulacan and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines – Bulacan Chapter published in the Philippine Star on August 16,
2010;64 and

(x) Letter of the Dean of the Liceo de Cagayan University College of Law published in the Philippine Daily
Inquirer on August 10, 2010.65

In view of the foregoing, respondents alleged that this Court has singled them out for sanctions and the
charge in the Show Cause Resolution dated October 19, 2010 that they may have violated specific
canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility is unfair and without basis.

(d) Freedom of expression

In paragraphs 28 to 30 of the Common Compliance, respondents briefly discussed their position that in
issuing their Statement, "they should be seen as not only to be performing their duties as members of
the Bar, officers of the court, and teachers of law, but also as citizens of a democracy who are
constitutionally protected in the exercise of free speech."66 In support of this contention, they cited
United States v. Bustos,67In re: Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, 68 and In the Matter of Petition for
Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on Elections.69
(e) Academic freedom

In paragraphs 31 to 34 of the Common Compliance, respondents asserted that their Statement was also
issued in the exercise of their academic freedom as teachers in an institution of higher learning. They
relied on Section 5 of the University of the Philippines Charter of 2008 which provided that "[t]he
national university has the right and responsibility to exercise academic freedom." They likewise
adverted to Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology70 which they claimed
recognized the extent and breadth of such freedom as to encourage a free and healthy discussion and
communication of a faculty member’s field of study without fear of reprisal. It is respondents’ view that
had they remained silent on the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya decision they would have "compromised
[their] integrity and credibility as teachers; [their silence] would have created a culture and generation
of students, professionals, even lawyers, who would lack the competence and discipline for research
and pleading; or, worse, [that] their silence would have communicated to the public that plagiarism and
misrepresentation are inconsequential matters and that intellectual integrity has no bearing or
relevance to one’s conduct."71

In closing, respondents’ Common Compliance exhorted this Court to consider the following portion of
the dissenting opinion of Justice George A. Malcolm in Salcedo v. Hernandez,72 to wit:

Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from the bench
than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or
injudicious exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and
courageous bearing, jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and
the courts will do well tolerantly to overlook occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by
the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome of a case.73

On the matter of the reliefs to which respondents believe they are entitled, the Common Compliance
stated, thus:

WHEREFORE:

A. Respondents, as citizens of a democracy, professors of law, members of the Bar and officers of the
Court, respectfully pray that:

1. the foregoing be noted; and

2. the Court reconsider and reverse its adverse findings in the Show Cause Resolution, including its
conclusions that respondents have: [a] breached their "obligation as law professors and officers of the
Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, … and not to promote distrust in
the administration of justice;" and [b] committed "violations of Canons 10, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02
and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility."

B. In the event the Honorable Court declines to grant the foregoing prayer, respondents respectfully
pray, in the alternative, and in assertion of their due process rights, that before final judgment be
rendered:

1. the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing;

2. respondents be given a fair and full opportunity to refute and/or address the findings and conclusions
of fact in the Show Cause Resolution (including especially the finding and conclusion of a lack of
malicious intent), and in that connection, that appropriate procedures and schedules for hearing be
adopted and defined that will allow them the full and fair opportunity to require the production of and
to present testimonial, documentary, and object evidence bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary (G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010) and In the
Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-
7-17-SC); and

3. respondents be given fair and full access to the transcripts, records, drafts, reports and submissions in
or relating to, and accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who were or could have
been called in In The Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism, etc. Against Associate Justice Mariano C. Del
Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC).74

Compliance and Reservation of Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista

Although already included in the Common Compliance, Prof. Rosa Maria T. Juan-Bautista (Prof. Juan-
Bautista) filed a separate Compliance and Reservation (the Bautista Compliance), wherein she adopted
the allegations in the Common Compliance with some additional averments.

Prof. Juan-Bautista reiterated that her due process rights allegedly entitled her to challenge the findings
and conclusions in the Show Cause Resolution. Furthermore, "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can
be considered indirect contempt, under Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be
punished only after charge and hearing."75

Prof. Juan-Bautista stressed that respondents signed the Statement "in good faith and with the best
intentions to protect the Supreme Court by asking one member to resign."76 For her part, Prof. Juan-
Bautista intimated that her deep disappointment and sadness for the plight of the Malaya Lolas were
what motivated her to sign the Statement.

On the point of academic freedom, Prof. Juan-Bautista cited jurisprudence77 which in her view
highlighted that academic freedom is constitutionally guaranteed to institutions of higher learning such
that schools have the freedom to determine for themselves who may teach, what may be taught, how
lessons shall be taught and who may be admitted to study and that courts have no authority to interfere
in the schools’ exercise of discretion in these matters in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. She
claims the Court has encroached on the academic freedom of the University of the Philippines and other
universities on their right to determine how lessons shall be taught.

Lastly, Prof. Juan-Bautista asserted that the Statement was an exercise of respondents’ constitutional
right to freedom of expression that can only be curtailed when there is grave and imminent danger to
public safety, public morale, public health or other legitimate public interest.78

Compliance of Prof. Raul T. Vasquez

On November 19, 2010, Prof. Raul T. Vasquez (Prof. Vasquez) filed a separate Compliance by registered
mail (the Vasquez Compliance). In said Compliance, Prof. Vasquez narrated the circumstances
surrounding his signing of the Statement. He alleged that the Vinuya decision was a topic of
conversation among the UP Law faculty early in the first semester (of academic year 2010-11) because it
reportedly contained citations not properly attributed to the sources; that he was shown a copy of the
Statement by a clerk of the Office of the Dean on his way to his class; and that, agreeing in principle with
the main theme advanced by the Statement, he signed the same in utmost good faith.79

In response to the directive from this Court to explain why he should not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar under the Show Cause Resolution, Prof. Vasquez also took the position that a lawyer has the
right, like all citizens in a democratic society, to comment on acts of public officers. He invited the
attention of the Court to the following authorities: (a) In re: Vicente Sotto;80 (b) In re: Atty. Vicente Raul
Almacen;81 and (c) a discussion appearing in American Jurisprudence (AmJur) 2d.82 He claims that he
"never had any intention to unduly influence, nor entertained any illusion that he could or should
influence, [the Court] in its disposition of the Vinuya case"83 and that "attacking the integrity of [the
Court] was the farthest thing on respondent’s mind when he signed the Statement."84Unlike his
colleagues, who wish to impress upon this Court the purported homogeneity of the views on what
constitutes plagiarism, Prof. Vasquez stated in his Compliance that:

13. Before this Honorable Court rendered its Decision dated 12 October 2010, some espoused the view
that willful and deliberate intent to commit plagiarism is an essential element of the same. Others, like
respondent, were of the opinion that plagiarism is committed regardless of the intent of the
perpetrator, the way it has always been viewed in the academe. This uncertainty made the issue a fair
topic for academic discussion in the College. Now, this Honorable Court has ruled that plagiarism
presupposes deliberate intent to steal another’s work and to pass it off as one’s own.85 (Emphases
supplied.)

Also in contrast to his colleagues, Prof. Vasquez was willing to concede that he "might have been remiss
in correctly assessing the effects of such language [in the Statement] and could have been more
careful."86 He ends his discussion with a respectful submission that with his explanation, he has faithfully
complied with the Show Cause Resolution and that the Court will rule that he had not in any manner
violated his oath as a lawyer and officer of the Court.

Separate Compliance of Dean Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10 in relation to his
submission of a "dummy" of the UP Law Faculty Statement to this Court

In his Compliance, Dean Leonen claimed that there were three drafts/versions of the UP Law Faculty
Statement, which he described as follows:

"Restoring Integrity I" which bears the entire roster of the faculty of the UP College of Law in its
signing pages, and the actual signatures of the thirty-seven (37) faculty members subject of the Show
Cause Resolution. A copy was filed with the Honorable Court by Roque and Butuyan on 31 August 2010
in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

"Restoring Integrity II" which does not bear any actual physical signature, but which reflects as
signatories the names of thirty-seven (37) members of the faculty with the notation "(SGD.)". A copy of
Restoring Integrity II was publicly and physically posted in the UP College of Law on 10 August 2010.
Another copy of Restoring Integrity II was also officially received by the Honorable Court from the Dean
of the UP College of Law on 11 August 2010, almost three weeks before the filing of Restoring Integrity I.

"Restoring Integrity III" which is a reprinting of Restoring Integrity II, and which presently serves as the
official file copy of the Dean’s Office in the UP College of Law that may be signed by other faculty
members who still wish to. It bears the actual signatures of the thirty- seven original signatories to
Restoring Integrity I above their printed names and the notation "(SGD.") and, in addition, the actual
signatures of eight (8) other members of the faculty above their handwritten or typewritten names.87

For purposes of this discussion, only Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II are relevant since
what Dean Leonen has been directed to explain are the discrepancies in the signature pages of these
two documents. Restoring Integrity III was never submitted to this Court.

On how Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II were prepared and came about, Dean Leonen
alleged, thus:

2.2 On 27 July 2010, sensing the emergence of a relatively broad agreement in the faculty on a draft
statement, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to print the draft and circulate it among the faculty
members so that those who wished to may sign. For this purpose, the staff encoded the law faculty
roster to serve as the printed draft’s signing pages. Thus did the first printed draft of the Restoring
Integrity Statement, Restoring Integrity I, come into being.

2.3. As of 27 July 2010, the date of the Restoring Integrity Statement, Dean Leonen was unaware that a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Honorable Court’s Decision in Vinuya vs. Executive Secretary (G.R. No.
162230, 28 April 2010) had already been filed, or that the Honorable Court was in the process of
convening its Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

2.4. Dean Leonen’s staff then circulated Restoring Integrity I among the members of the faculty. Some
faculty members visited the Dean’s Office to sign the document or had it brought to their classrooms in
the College of Law, or to their offices or residences. Still other faculty members who, for one reason or
another, were unable to sign Restoring Integrity I at that time, nevertheless conveyed to Dean Leonen
their assurances that they would sign as soon as they could manage.

2.5. Sometime in the second week of August, judging that Restoring Integrity I had been circulated long
enough, Dean Leonen instructed his staff to reproduce the statement in a style and manner appropriate
for posting in the College of Law. Following his own established practice in relation to significant public
issuances, he directed them to reformat the signing pages so that only the names of those who signed
the first printed draft would appear, together with the corresponding "(SGD.)" note following each
name. Restoring Integrity II thus came into being.88

According to Dean Leonen, the "practice of eliminating blanks opposite or above the names of non-
signatories in the final draft of significant public issuances, is meant not so much for aesthetic
considerations as to secure the integrity of such documents."89 He likewise claimed that "[p]osting
statements with blanks would be an open invitation to vandals and pranksters."90

With respect to the inclusion of Justice Mendoza’s name as among the signatories in Restoring Integrity
II when in fact he did not sign Restoring Integrity I, Dean Leonen attributed the mistake to a
miscommunication involving his administrative officer. In his Compliance, he narrated that:

2.7. Upon being presented with a draft of Restoring Integrity II with the reformatted signing pages, Dean
Leonen noticed the inclusion of the name of Justice Mendoza among the "(SGD.)" signatories. As Justice
Mendoza was not among those who had physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was previously
circulated, Dean Leonen called the attention of his staff to the inclusion of the Justice’s name among the
"(SGD.)" signatories in Restoring Integrity II.

2.8. Dean Leonen was told by his administrative officer that she had spoken to Justice Mendoza over the
phone on Friday, 06 August 2010. According to her, Justice Mendoza had authorized the dean to sign
the Restoring Integrity Statement for him as he agreed fundamentally with its contents. Also according
to her, Justice Mendoza was unable at that time to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement himself as he
was leaving for the United States the following week. It would later turn out that this account was not
entirely accurate.91(Underscoring and italics supplied.)

Dean Leonen claimed that he "had no reason to doubt his administrative officer, however, and so placed
full reliance on her account"92 as "[t]here were indeed other faculty members who had also authorized
the Dean to indicate that they were signatories, even though they were at that time unable to affix their
signatures physically to the document."93

However, after receiving the Show Cause Resolution, Dean Leonen and his staff reviewed the
circumstances surrounding their effort to secure Justice Mendoza’s signature. It would turn out that this
was what actually transpired:

2.22.1. On Friday, 06 August 2010, when the dean’s staff talked to Justice Mendoza on the phone, he
[Justice Mendoza] indeed initially agreed to sign the Restoring Integrity Statement as he fundamentally
agreed with its contents. However, Justice Mendoza did not exactly say that he authorized the dean to
sign the Restoring Integrity Statement. Rather, he inquired if he could authorize the dean to sign it for
him as he was about to leave for the United States. The dean’s staff informed him that they would, at
any rate, still try to bring the Restoring Integrity Statement to him.

2.22.2. Due to some administrative difficulties, Justice Mendoza was unable to sign the Restoring
Integrity Statement before he left for the U.S. the following week.

2.22.3. The staff was able to bring Restoring Integrity III to Justice Mendoza when he went to the College
to teach on 24 September 2010, a day after his arrival from the U.S. This time, Justice Mendoza declined
to sign.94

According to the Dean:

2.23. It was only at this time that Dean Leonen realized the true import of the call he received from
Justice Mendoza in late September. Indeed, Justice Mendoza confirmed that by the time the hard copy
of the Restoring Integrity Statement was brought to him shortly after his arrival from the U.S., he
declined to sign it because it had already become controversial. At that time, he predicted that the
Court would take some form of action against the faculty. By then, and under those circumstances, he
wanted to show due deference to the Honorable Court, being a former Associate Justice and not wishing
to unduly aggravate the situation by signing the Statement.95 (Emphases supplied.)

With respect to the omission of Atty. Armovit’s name in the signature page of Restoring Integrity II when
he was one of the signatories of Restoring Integrity I and the erroneous description in Dean Leonen’s
August 10, 2010 letter that the version of the Statement submitted to the Court was signed by 38
members of the UP Law Faculty, it was explained in the Compliance that:
Respondent Atty. Miguel Armovit physically signed Restoring Integrity I when it was circulated to him.
However, his name was inadvertently left out by Dean Leonen’s staff in the reformatting of the signing
pages in Restoring Integrity II. The dean assumed that his name was still included in the reformatted
signing pages, and so mentioned in his cover note to Chief Justice Corona that 38 members of the law
faculty signed (the original 37 plus Justice Mendoza.)96

Dean Leonen argues that he should not be deemed to have submitted a dummy of the Statement that
was not a true and faithful reproduction of the same. He emphasized that the main body of the
Statement was unchanged in all its three versions and only the signature pages were not the same. This
purportedly is merely "reflective of [the Statement’s] essential nature as a ‘live’ public manifesto meant
to continuously draw adherents to its message, its signatory portion is necessarily evolving and dynamic
x x x many other printings of [the Statement] may be made in the future, each one reflecting the same
text but with more and more signatories."97 Adverting to criminal law by analogy, Dean Leonen claims
that "this is not an instance where it has been made to appear in a document that a person has
participated in an act when the latter did not in fact so participate"98 for he "did not misrepresent which
members of the faculty of the UP College of Law had agreed with the Restoring Integrity Statement
proper and/or had expressed their desire to be signatories thereto."99

In this regard, Dean Leonen believes that he had not committed any violation of Canon 10 or Rules 10.01
and 10.02 for he did not mislead nor misrepresent to the Court the contents of the Statement or the
identities of the UP Law faculty members who agreed with, or expressed their desire to be signatories
to, the Statement. He also asserts that he did not commit any violation of Rule 10.03 as he "coursed [the
Statement] through the appropriate channels by transmitting the same to Honorable Chief Justice
Corona for the latter’s information and proper disposition with the hope that its points would be duly
considered by the Honorable Court en banc."100 Citing Rudecon Management Corporation v.
Camacho,101 Dean Leonen posits that the required quantum of proof has not been met in this case and
that no dubious character or motivation for the act complained of existed to warrant an administrative
sanction for violation of the standard of honesty provided for by the Code of Professional
Responsibility.102

Dean Leonen ends his Compliance with an enumeration of nearly identical reliefs as the Common
Compliance, including the prayers for a hearing and for access to the records, evidence and witnesses
allegedly relevant not only in this case but also in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethical investigation involving
Justice Del Castillo.

Manifestation of Prof. Owen Lynch (Lynch Manifestation)

For his part, Prof. Owen Lynch (Prof. Lynch) manifests to this Court that he is not a member of the
Philippine bar; but he is a member of the bar of the State of Minnesota. He alleges that he first taught as
a visiting professor at the UP College of Law in 1981 to 1988 and returned in the same capacity in 2010.
He further alleges that "[h]e subscribes to the principle, espoused by this Court and the Supreme Court
of the United States, that ‘…[d]ebate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide open and
that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government
and public officials."103 In signing the Statement, he believes that "the right to speak means the right to
speak effectively."104 Citing the dissenting opinions in Manila Public School Teachers Association v.
Laguio, Jr.,105 Prof. Lynch argued that "[f]or speech to be effective, it must be forceful enough to make
the intended recipients listen"106 and "[t]he quality of education would deteriorate in an atmosphere of
repression, when the very teachers who are supposed to provide an example of courage and self-
assertiveness to their pupils can speak only in timorous whispers."107 Relying on the doctrine in In the
Matter of Petition for Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections,108Prof. Lynch believed that the Statement did not pose any danger, clear or
present, of any substantive evil so as to remove it from the protective mantle of the Bill of Rights (i.e.,
referring to the constitutional guarantee on free speech).109 He also stated that he "has read the
Compliance of the other respondents to the Show Cause Resolution" and that "he signed the Restoring
Integrity Statement for the same reasons they did."110

ISSUES

Based on the Show Cause Resolution and a perusal of the submissions of respondents, the material
issues to be resolved in this case are as follows:

1.) Does the Show Cause Resolution deny respondents their freedom of expression?

2.) Does the Show Cause Resolution violate respondents’ academic freedom as law professors?

3.) Do the submissions of respondents satisfactorily explain why they should not be disciplined as
Members of the Bar under Canons 1, 11, and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility?

4.) Does the separate Compliance of Dean Leonen satisfactorily explain why he should not be disciplined
as a Member of the Bar under Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03?

5.) Are respondents entitled to have the Show Cause Resolution set for hearing and in relation to such
hearing, are respondents entitled to require the production or presentation of evidence bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the ethics case against
Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records and transcripts of, and the
witnesses and evidence presented, or could have been presented, in the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC)?

DISCUSSION

The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression.

It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, has
interfered with respondents’ constitutionally mandated right to free speech and expression. It appears
that the underlying assumption behind respondents’ assertion is the misconception that this Court is
denying them the right to criticize the Court’s decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to
"silence" respondent law professors’ dissenting view on what they characterize as a "legitimate public
issue."

This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither
the fact that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its
members of plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the
contumacious language by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case,
have expressed their opinion in favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper
disposition" and consideration of the Court that gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution
painstakingly enumerated the statements that the Court considered excessive and uncalled for under
the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication, and later submission to this Court of the UP
Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.

To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo
was guilty of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not only as an established fact, but
a truth"111 when it was "[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to
determine the truth of such allegations."112 It was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that
there was a pending motion for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision.113 The Show Cause Resolution
made no objections to the portions of the Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be
"constructive" but only asked respondents to explain those portions of the said Statement that by no
stretch of the imagination could be considered as fair or constructive, to wit:

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The
opening sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:

An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered
abuse during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as
a reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the
resolution of the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged
indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of
concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and respect.114 x x x.
(Underscoring ours.)

To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’ freedom of expression when it
stated that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic
society, there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism
leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially
devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must
"insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from
outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments
except to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty,
integrity and competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort
women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite
resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their
obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority
of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to
promote distrust in the administration of justice.115 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring
supplied.)
Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’ submissions, this Court has held that
the right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial
concern that the independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In
cases where the critics are not only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly
affirmed the authority of this Court to discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and
fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial, have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common
decency.

As early as the 1935 case of Salcedo v. Hernandez,116 the Court found Atty. Vicente J. Francisco both
guilty of contempt and liable administratively for the following paragraph in his second motion for
reconsideration:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our
motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of
Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order that this error may be
corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen,
particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce,
as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and
because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every
member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that
erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily
consider unjust, increase the proselytes of 'sakdalism' and make the public lose confidence in the
administration of justice.117 (Emphases supplied.)

The highlighted phrases were considered by the Court as neither justified nor necessary and further held
that:

[I]n order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his
argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were
sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is
highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has
done, because both means are annoying and good practice can never sanction them by reason of their
natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly
in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more or
less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which
the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the
purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim;
and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the
reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order to make it odious
in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion promote distrust in the
administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism, a movement with seditious and
revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a few
days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the
authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so
devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error
notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with good reasons, that it has acted
erroneously.118 (Emphases supplied.)

Significantly, Salcedo is the decision from which respondents culled their quote from the minority view
of Justice Malcolm. Moreover, Salcedo concerned statements made in a pleading filed by a counsel in a
case, unlike the respondents here, who are neither parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case and
therefore, do not have any standing at all to interfere in the Vinuya case. Instead of supporting
respondents’ theory, Salcedo is authority for the following principle:

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in
duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has
conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what
he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he
neither creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from
harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining
the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved
turn for protection and relief.119 (Emphases supplied.)

Thus, the lawyer in Salcedo was fined and reprimanded for his injudicious statements in his pleading, by
accusing the Court of "erroneous ruling." Here, the respondents’ Statement goes way beyond merely
ascribing error to the Court.

Other cases cited by respondents likewise espouse rulings contrary to their position. In re: Atty. Vicente
Raul Almacen,120 cited in the Common Compliance and the Vasquez Compliance, was an instance where
the Court indefinitely suspended a member of the Bar for filing and releasing to the press a "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title" in protest of what he claimed was a great injustice to his client
committed by the Supreme Court. In the decision, the petition was described, thus:

He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas
for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of
the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's
"unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same
breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying
"that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that "the
people may know of the silent injustices committed by this Court," and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs
and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his petition with a prayer that

"x x x a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney
and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we
regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession."121

It is true that in Almacen the Court extensively discussed foreign jurisprudence on the principle that a
lawyer, just like any citizen, has the right to criticize and comment upon actuations of public officers,
including judicial authority. However, the real doctrine in Almacen is that such criticism of the courts,
whether done in court or outside of it, must conform to standards of fairness and propriety. This case
engaged in an even more extensive discussion of the legal authorities sustaining this view.1awphi1 To
quote from that decision:

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.

For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
conduct himself "with all good fidelity x x x to the courts;" and the Rules of Court constantly remind him
"to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." The first canon of
legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

"x x x the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon
themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and
laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation
is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for
their judicial acts." (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted
with superior intellect — are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

"The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may
tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-
respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an
army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and
the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission." (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl.
481)

xxxx

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications or in the course of a political campaign, if couched in insulting language as to bring into
scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary
action.122 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

In a similar vein, In re: Vicente Sotto,123 cited in the Vasquez Compliance, observed that:

[T]his Court, in In re Kelly, held the following:

The publication of a criticism of a party or of the court to a pending cause, respecting the same, has
always been considered as misbehavior, tending to obstruct the administration of justice, and subjects
such persons to contempt proceedings. Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried
fairly in court, by an impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publications or public clamor. Every citizen has a
profound personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by
the courts, under the protection and forms of law, free from outside coercion or interference. x x x.

Mere criticism or comment on the correctness or wrongness, soundness or unsoundness of the decision
of the court in a pending case made in good faith may be tolerated; because if well founded it may
enlighten the court and contribute to the correction of an error if committed; but if it is not well taken
and obviously erroneous, it should, in no way, influence the court in reversing or modifying its decision.
x x x.

xxxx

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately "so many
blunders and injustices," that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the
law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to
lower or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is,
under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their
grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente
Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he
owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.124 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)

That the doctrinal pronouncements in these early cases are still good law can be easily gleaned even
from more recent jurisprudence.

In Choa v. Chiongson,125 the Court administratively disciplined a lawyer, through the imposition of a fine,
for making malicious and unfounded criticisms of a judge in the guise of an administrative complaint and
held, thus:

As an officer of the court and its indispensable partner in the sacred task of administering justice, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the courts and to show
respect to its officers. This does not mean, however, that a lawyer cannot criticize a judge. As we stated
in Tiongco vs. Hon. Aguilar:

It does not, however, follow that just because a lawyer is an officer of the court, he cannot criticize the
courts. That is his right as a citizen, and it is even his duty as an officer of the court to avail of such right.
Thus, in In Re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562, 579-580 [1970]), this Court explicitly declared:
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but
also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable to a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am Dec. 657, 665).

xxxx

Nevertheless, such a right is not without limit. For, as this Court warned in Almacen:

But it is a cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct, that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.

xxxx

Elsewise stated, the right to criticize, which is guaranteed by the freedom of speech and of expression in
the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, must be exercised responsibly, for every right carries with it a
corresponding obligation. Freedom is not freedom from responsibility, but freedom with
responsibility. x x x.

xxxx

Proscribed then are, inter alia, the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts,
creates or promotes distrust in judicial administration (Rheem, supra), or tends necessarily to
undermine the confidence of people in the integrity of the members of this Court and to degrade the
administration of justice by this Court (In re: Sotto, 82 Phil. 595 [1949]); or of offensive and abusive
language (In re: Rafael Climaco, 55 SCRA 107 [1974]); or abrasive and offensive language (Yangson vs.
Salandanan, 68 SCRA 42 [1975]; or of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious
statements in pleadings or in a letter addressed to the judge (Baja vs. Macandog, 158 SCRA [1988], citing
the resolution of 19 January 1988 in Phil. Public Schools Teachers Association vs. Quisumbing, G.R. No.
76180, and Ceniza vs. Sebastian, 130 SCRA 295 [1984]); or of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for
remarks (Sangalang vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 177 SCRA 87 [1989]).

Any criticism against a judge made in the guise of an administrative complaint which is clearly
unfounded and impelled by ulterior motive will not excuse the lawyer responsible therefor under his
duty of fidelity to his client. x x x.126 (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)

In Saberon v. Larong,127 where this Court found respondent lawyer guilty of simple misconduct for using
intemperate language in his pleadings and imposed a fine upon him, we had the occasion to state:

The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.

Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior
before the Courts.

To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong
language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.

However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does
not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities
for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.

On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive
personalityand to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession, a lawyer’s language even in his pleadings must be dignified.128

Verily, the accusatory and vilifying nature of certain portions of the Statement exceeded the limits of fair
comment and cannot be deemed as protected free speech. Even In the Matter of Petition for
Declaratory Relief Re: Constitutionality of Republic Act 4880, Gonzales v. Commission on
Elections,129 relied upon by respondents in the Common Compliance, held that:

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right is not
susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press.
The realities of life in a complex society preclude however a literal interpretation. Freedom of
expression is not an absolute. It would be too much to insist that at all times and under all
circumstances it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press
for recognition. x x x.130 (Emphasis supplied.)

One such societal value that presses for recognition in the case at bar is the threat to judicial
independence and the orderly administration of justice that immoderate, reckless and unfair attacks on
judicial decisions and institutions pose. This Court held as much in Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan and
Gonzales,131 where we indefinitely suspended a lawyer from the practice of law for issuing to the media
statements grossly disrespectful towards the Court in relation to a pending case, to wit:

Respondent Gonzales is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny
him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and
of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on
occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interest. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of
expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of
dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of
justice which are accepted by the general community. x x x.132 (Emphases supplied.)
For this reason, the Court cannot uphold the view of some respondents133 that the Statement presents
no grave or imminent danger to a legitimate public interest.

The Show Cause Resolution does not interfere with respondents’ academic freedom.

It is not contested that respondents herein are, by law and jurisprudence, guaranteed academic
freedom and undisputably, they are free to determine what they will teach their students and how they
will teach. We must point out that there is nothing in the Show Cause Resolution that dictates upon
respondents the subject matter they can teach and the manner of their instruction. Moreover, it is not
inconsistent with the principle of academic freedom for this Court to subject lawyers who teach law to
disciplinary action for contumacious conduct and speech, coupled with undue intervention in favor of a
party in a pending case, without observing proper procedure, even if purportedly done in their capacity
as teachers.

A novel issue involved in the present controversy, for it has not been passed upon in any previous case
before this Court, is the question of whether lawyers who are also law professors can invoke academic
freedom as a defense in an administrative proceeding for intemperate statements tending to pressure
the Court or influence the outcome of a case or degrade the courts.

Applying by analogy the Court’s past treatment of the "free speech" defense in other bar discipline
cases, academic freedom cannot be successfully invoked by respondents in this case. The implicit ruling
in the jurisprudence discussed above is that the constitutional right to freedom of expression of
members of the Bar may be circumscribed by their ethical duties as lawyers to give due respect to the
courts and to uphold the public’s faith in the legal profession and the justice system. To our mind, the
reason that freedom of expression may be so delimited in the case of lawyers applies with greater force
to the academic freedom of law professors.

It would do well for the Court to remind respondents that, in view of the broad definition in Cayetano v.
Monsod,134lawyers when they teach law are considered engaged in the practice of law. Unlike
professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, respondents are bound by
their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal profession. Thus, their actions as law professors
must be measured against the same canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members
of the Bar as the fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are
lawyers.

Even if the Court was willing to accept respondents’ proposition in the Common Compliance that their
issuance of the Statement was in keeping with their duty to "participate in the development of the legal
system by initiating or supporting efforts in law reform and in the improvement of the administration of
justice" under Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, we cannot agree that they have
fulfilled that same duty in keeping with the demands of Canons 1, 11 and 13 to give due respect to legal
processes and the courts, and to avoid conduct that tends to influence the courts. Members of the Bar
cannot be selective regarding which canons to abide by given particular situations. With more reason
that law professors are not allowed this indulgence, since they are expected to provide their students
exemplars of the Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole and not just their preferred portions
thereof.

The Court’s rulings on the submissions regarding the charge of violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13.
Having disposed of respondents’ main arguments of freedom of expression and academic freedom, the
Court considers here the other averments in their submissions.

With respect to good faith, respondents’ allegations presented two main ideas: (a) the validity of their
position regarding the plagiarism charge against Justice Del Castillo, and (b) their pure motive to spur
this Court to take the correct action on said issue.

The Court has already clarified that it is not the expression of respondents’ staunch belief that Justice
Del Castillo has committed a misconduct that the majority of this Court has found so unbecoming in the
Show Cause Resolution. No matter how firm a lawyer’s conviction in the righteousness of his cause
there is simply no excuse for denigrating the courts and engaging in public behavior that tends to put
the courts and the legal profession into disrepute. This doctrine, which we have repeatedly upheld in
such cases as Salcedo, In re Almacen and Saberong, should be applied in this case with more reason, as
the respondents, not parties to the Vinuya case, denounced the Court and urged it to change its decision
therein, in a public statement using contumacious language, which with temerity they subsequently
submitted to the Court for "proper disposition."

That humiliating the Court into reconsidering the Vinuya Decision in favor of the Malaya Lolas was one
of the objectives of the Statement could be seen in the following paragraphs from the same:

And in light of the significance of this decision to the quest for justice not only of Filipino women, but of
women elsewhere in the world who have suffered the horrors of sexual abuse and exploitation in times
of war, the Court cannot coldly deny relief and justice to the petitioners on the basis of pilfered and
misinterpreted texts.

xxxx

(3) The same breach and consequent disposition of the Vinuya case does violence to the primordial
function of the Supreme Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice to all those who have been left
without legal or equitable recourse, such as the petitioners therein.135 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied.)

Whether or not respondents’ views regarding the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya case had valid basis was
wholly immaterial to their liability for contumacious speech and conduct. These are two separate
matters to be properly threshed out in separate proceedings. The Court considers it highly
inappropriate, if not tantamount to dissembling, the discussion devoted in one of the compliances
arguing the guilt of Justice Del Castillo. In the Common Compliance, respondents even go so far as to
attach documentary evidence to support the plagiarism charges against Justice Del Castillo in the
present controversy. The ethics case of Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC), with the filing of a
motion for reconsideration, was still pending at the time of the filing of respondents’ submissions in this
administrative case. As respondents themselves admit, they are neither parties nor counsels in the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. Notwithstanding their professed overriding interest in said ethics
case, it is not proper procedure for respondents to bring up their plagiarism arguments here especially
when it has no bearing on their own administrative case.

Still on motive, it is also proposed that the choice of language in the Statement was intended for
effective speech; that speech must be "forceful enough to make the intended recipients listen."136 One
wonders what sort of effect respondents were hoping for in branding this Court as, among others,
callous, dishonest and lacking in concern for the basic values of decency and respect. The Court fails to
see how it can ennoble the profession if we allow respondents to send a signal to their students that the
only way to effectively plead their cases and persuade others to their point of view is to be offensive.

This brings to our mind the letters of Dr. Ellis and Prof. Tams which were deliberately quoted in full in
the narration of background facts to illustrate the sharp contrast between the civil tenor of these letters
and the antagonistic irreverence of the Statement. In truth, these foreign authors are the ones who
would expectedly be affected by any perception of misuse of their works. Notwithstanding that they are
beyond the disciplinary reach of this Court, they still obviously took pains to convey their objections in a
deferential and scholarly manner. It is unfathomable to the Court why respondents could not do the
same. These foreign authors’ letters underscore the universality of the tenet that legal professionals
must deal with each other in good faith and due respect. The mark of the true intellectual is one who
can express his opinions logically and soberly without resort to exaggerated rhetoric and unproductive
recriminations.

As for the claim that the respondents’ noble intention is to spur the Court to take "constructive action"
on the plagiarism issue, the Court has some doubts as to its veracity. For if the Statement was primarily
meant for this Court’s consideration, why was the same published and reported in the media first before
it was submitted to this Court? It is more plausible that the Statement was prepared for consumption by
the general public and designed to capture media attention as part of the effort to generate interest in
the most controversial ground in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration filed in the Vinuya case
by Atty. Roque, who is respondents’ colleague on the UP Law faculty.

In this regard, the Court finds that there was indeed a lack of observance of fidelity and due respect to
the Court, particularly when respondents knew fully well that the matter of plagiarism in the Vinuya
decision and the merits of the Vinuya decision itself, at the time of the Statement’s issuance, were still
both sub judice or pending final disposition of the Court. These facts have been widely publicized. On
this point, respondents allege that at the time the Statement was first drafted on July 27, 2010, they did
not know of the constitution of the Ethics Committee and they had issued the Statement under the
belief that this Court intended to take no action on the ethics charge against Justice Del Castillo. Still,
there was a significant lapse of time from the drafting and printing of the Statement on July 27, 2010
and its publication and submission to this Court in early August when the Ethics Committee had already
been convened. If it is true that the respondents’ outrage was fueled by their perception of indifference
on the part of the Court then, when it became known that the Court did intend to take action, there was
nothing to prevent respondents from recalibrating the Statement to take this supervening event into
account in the interest of fairness.

Speaking of the publicity this case has generated, we likewise find no merit in the respondents’ reliance
on various news reports and commentaries in the print media and the internet as proof that they are
being unfairly "singled out." On the contrary, these same annexes to the Common Compliance show
that it is not enough for one to criticize the Court to warrant the institution of disciplinary137 or
contempt138 action. This Court takes into account the nature of the criticism and weighs the possible
repercussions of the same on the Judiciary. When the criticism comes from persons outside the
profession who may not have a full grasp of legal issues or from individuals whose personal or other
interests in making the criticism are obvious, the Court may perhaps tolerate or ignore them. However,
when law professors are the ones who appear to have lost sight of the boundaries of fair commentary
and worse, would justify the same as an exercise of civil liberties, this Court cannot remain silent for
such silence would have a grave implication on legal education in our country.

With respect to the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance, considering that this appears to
be the first time these respondents have been involved in disciplinary proceedings of this sort, the Court
is willing to give them the benefit of the doubt that they were for the most part well-intentioned in the
issuance of the Statement. However, it is established in jurisprudence that where the excessive and
contumacious language used is plain and undeniable, then good intent can only be mitigating. As this
Court expounded in Salcedo:

In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend the court or to
be recreant to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases which need no further
comment. Furthermore, it is a well settled rule in all places where the same conditions and practice as
those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of intention is no excuse from liability (13 C. J., 45). Neither is
the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the facts a valid defense:

"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is
not admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced." (In
re Stewart, 118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an extenuation of
liability in this case, taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind, according to
him when he prepared said motion. This court is disposed to make such concession. However, in order
to avoid a recurrence thereof and to prevent others, by following the bad example, from taking the
same course, this court considers it imperative to treat the case of said attorney with the justice it
deserves.139 (Emphases supplied.)

Thus, the 35 respondents named in the Common Compliance should, notwithstanding their claim of
good faith, be reminded of their lawyerly duty, under Canons 1, 11 and 13, to give due respect to the
courts and to refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on
pending matters or to denigrate the courts and the administration of justice.

With respect to Prof. Vasquez, the Court favorably notes the differences in his Compliance compared to
his colleagues. In our view, he was the only one among the respondents who showed true candor and
sincere deference to the Court. He was able to give a straightforward account of how he came to sign
the Statement. He was candid enough to state that his agreement to the Statement was in principle and
that the reason plagiarism was a "fair topic of discussion" among the UP Law faculty prior to the
promulgation of the October 12, 2010 Decision in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was the uncertainty brought
about by a division of opinion on whether or not willful or deliberate intent was an element of
plagiarism. He was likewise willing to acknowledge that he may have been remiss in failing to assess the
effect of the language of the Statement and could have used more care. He did all this without having to
retract his position on the plagiarism issue, without demands for undeserved reliefs (as will be discussed
below) and without baseless insinuations of deprivation of due process or of prejudgment. This is all
that this Court expected from respondents, not for them to sacrifice their principles but only that they
recognize that they themselves may have committed some ethical lapse in this affair. We commend
Prof. Vaquez for showing that at least one of the respondents can grasp the true import of the Show
Cause Resolution involving them. For these reasons, the Court finds Prof. Vasquez’s Compliance
satisfactory.
As for Prof. Lynch, in view of his Manifestation that he is a member of the Bar of the State of Minnesota
and, therefore, not under the disciplinary authority of this Court, he should be excused from these
proceedings. However, he should be reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine
law school he should strive to be a model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even
without the threat of sanction from this Court. For even if one is not bound by the Code of Professional
Responsibility for members of the Philippine Bar, civility and respect among legal professionals of any
nationality should be aspired for under universal standards of decency and fairness.

The Court’s ruling on Dean Leonen’s Compliance regarding the charge of violation of Canon 10.

To recall, the Show Cause Resolution directed Dean Leonen to show cause why he should not be
disciplinary dealt with for violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 and for submitting a
"dummy" that was not a true and faithful reproduction of the signed Statement.

In his Compliance, Dean Leonen essentially denies that Restoring Integrity II was not a true and faithful
reproduction of the actual signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, because looking at the text or the body,
there were no differences between the two. He attempts to downplay the discrepancies in the signature
pages of the two versions of the Statement (i.e., Restoring Integrity I and Restoring Integrity II) by
claiming that it is but expected in "live" public manifestos with dynamic and evolving pages as more and
more signatories add their imprimatur thereto. He likewise stresses that he is not administratively liable
because he did not misrepresent the members of the UP Law faculty who "had agreed with the
Restoring Integrity Statement proper and/or who had expressed their desire to be signatories
thereto."140

To begin with, the Court cannot subscribe to Dean Leonen’s implied view that the signatures in the
Statement are not as significant as its contents. Live public manifesto or not, the Statement was formally
submitted to this Court at a specific point in time and it should reflect accurately its signatories at that
point. The value of the Statement as a UP Law Faculty Statement lies precisely in the identities of the
persons who have signed it, since the Statement’s persuasive authority mainly depends on the
reputation and stature of the persons who have endorsed the same. Indeed, it is apparent from
respondents’ explanations that their own belief in the "importance" of their positions as UP law
professors prompted them to publicly speak out on the matter of the plagiarism issue in the Vinuya
case.

Further, in our assessment, the true cause of Dean Leonen’s predicament is the fact that he did not from
the beginning submit the signed copy, Restoring Integrity I, to this Court on August 11, 2010 and,
instead, submitted Restoring Integrity II with its retyped or "reformatted" signature pages. It would turn
out, according to Dean Leonen’s account, that there were errors in the retyping of the signature pages
due to lapses of his unnamed staff. First, an unnamed administrative officer in the dean’s office gave the
dean inaccurate information that led him to allow the inclusion of Justice Mendoza as among the
signatories of Restoring Integrity II. Second, an unnamed staff also failed to type the name of Atty.
Armovit when encoding the signature pages of Restoring Integrity II when in fact he had signed
Restoring Integrity I.

The Court can understand why for purposes of posting on a bulletin board or a website a signed
document may have to be reformatted and signatures may be indicated by the notation (SGD). This is
not unusual. We are willing to accept that the reformatting of documents meant for posting to eliminate
blanks is necessitated by vandalism concerns.

However, what is unusual is the submission to a court, especially this Court, of a signed document for
the Court’s consideration that did not contain the actual signatures of its authors. In most cases, it is
the original signed document that is transmitted to the Court or at the very least a photocopy of the
actual signed document. Dean Leonen has not offered any explanation why he deviated from this
practice with his submission to the Court of Restoring Integrity II on August 11, 2010. There was nothing
to prevent the dean from submitting Restoring Integrity I to this Court even with its blanks and unsigned
portions. Dean Leonen cannot claim fears of vandalism with respect to court submissions for court
employees are accountable for the care of documents and records that may come into their custody.
Yet, Dean Leonen deliberately chose to submit to this Court the facsimile that did not contain the actual
signatures and his silence on the reason therefor is in itself a display of lack of candor.

Still, a careful reading of Dean Leonen’s explanations yield the answer. In the course of his explanation
of his willingness to accept his administrative officer’s claim that Justice Mendoza agreed to be indicated
as a signatory, Dean Leonen admits in a footnote that other professors had likewise only authorized him
to indicate them as signatories and had not in fact signed the Statement. Thus, at around the time
Restoring Integrity II was printed, posted and submitted to this Court, at least one purported signatory
thereto had not actually signed the same. Contrary to Dean Leonen’s proposition, that is precisely
tantamount to making it appear to this Court that a person or persons participated in an act when such
person or persons did not.

We are surprised that someone like Dean Leonen, with his reputation for perfection and stringent
standards of intellectual honesty, could proffer the explanation that there was no misrepresentation
when he allowed at least one person to be indicated as having actually signed the Statement when all he
had was a verbal communication of an intent to sign. In the case of Justice Mendoza, what he had was
only hearsay information that the former intended to sign the Statement. If Dean Leonen was truly
determined to observe candor and truthfulness in his dealings with the Court, we see no reason why he
could not have waited until all the professors who indicated their desire to sign the Statement had in
fact signed before transmitting the Statement to the Court as a duly signed document. If it was truly
impossible to secure some signatures, such as that of Justice Mendoza who had to leave for abroad,
then Dean Leonen should have just resigned himself to the signatures that he was able to secure.

We cannot imagine what urgent concern there was that he could not wait for actual signatures before
submission of the Statement to this Court. As respondents all asserted, they were neither parties to nor
counsels in the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo. The Statement was neither a
pleading with a deadline nor a required submission to the Court; rather, it was a voluntary submission
that Dean Leonen could do at any time.

In sum, the Court likewise finds Dean Leonen’s Compliance unsatisfactory. However, the Court is willing
to ascribe these isolated lapses in judgment of Dean Leonen to his misplaced zeal in pursuit of his
objectives. In due consideration of Dean Leonen’s professed good intentions, the Court deems it
sufficient to admonish Dean Leonen for failing to observe full candor and honesty in his dealings with
the Court as required under Canon 10.
Respondents’ requests for a hearing, for production/presentation of evidence bearing on the plagiarism
and misrepresentation issues in G.R. No. 162230 and A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, and for access to the records
of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are unmeritorious.

In the Common Compliance, respondents named therein asked for alternative reliefs should the Court
find their Compliance unsatisfactory, that is, that the Show Cause Resolution be set for hearing and for
that purpose, they be allowed to require the production or presentation of witnesses and evidence
bearing on the plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case (G.R. No. 162230) and the
plagiarism case against Justice Del Castillo (A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC) and to have access to the records of,
and evidence that were presented or may be presented in the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo.
The prayer for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC was substantially echoed
in Dean Leonen’s separate Compliance. In Prof. Juan-Bautista’s Compliance, she similarly expressed the
sentiment that "[i]f the Restoring Integrity Statement can be considered indirect contempt, under
Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, such may be punished only after charge and hearing."141 It is
this group of respondents’ premise that these reliefs are necessary for them to be accorded full due
process.

The Court finds this contention unmeritorious.

Firstly, it would appear that the confusion as to the necessity of a hearing in this case springs largely
from its characterization as a special civil action for indirect contempt in the Dissenting Opinion of
Justice Sereno (to the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution) and her reliance therein on the
majority’s purported failure to follow the procedure in Rule 71 of the Rules of Court as her main ground
for opposition to the Show Cause Resolution.

However, once and for all, it should be clarified that this is not an indirect contempt proceeding and
Rule 71 (which requires a hearing) has no application to this case. As explicitly ordered in the Show
Cause Resolution this case was docketed as an administrative matter.

The rule that is relevant to this controversy is Rule 139-B, Section 13, on disciplinary proceedings
initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court, to wit:

SEC. 13. Supreme Court Investigators.—In proceedings initiated motu proprio by the Supreme Court or in
other proceedings when the interest of justice so requires, the Supreme Court may refer the case for
investigation to the Solicitor General or to any officer of the Supreme Court or judge of a lower court, in
which case the investigation shall proceed in the same manner provided in sections 6 to 11 hereof, save
that the review of the report of investigation shall be conducted directly by the Supreme Court.
(Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provision, it cannot be denied that a formal investigation, through a referral to the
specified officers, is merely discretionary, not mandatory on the Court. Furthermore, it is only if the
Court deems such an investigation necessary that the procedure in Sections 6 to 11 of Rule 139-A will be
followed.

As respondents are fully aware, in general, administrative proceedings do not require a trial type
hearing. We have held that:
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the
action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be
heard, hence, a party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to
present his side. A formal or trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due
process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable
opportunity to explain their side of the controversy.142 (Emphases supplied.)

In relation to bar discipline cases, we have had the occasion to rule in Pena v. Aparicio143 that:

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do
not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of
one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu
proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not
the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an
officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper
and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct
have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining
to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or
a prosecutor.144 (Emphases supplied.)

In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court – Br. 81, Romblon – On the Prohibition
from Engaging in the Private Practice of Law,145 we further observed that:

[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal
investigation where the facts on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their
administrative liability.

In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further investigation after
considering his actions based on records showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast
dishonor on the image of both the Bench and the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and
welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases handled by the errant lawyer and
his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper judicial fees
for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases. The Court held that those cases sufficiently
provided the basis for the determination of respondents' administrative liability, without need for
further inquiry into the matter under the principle of res ipsa loquitur.

Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no evidentiary hearing is required
before the respondent may be disciplined for professional misconduct already established by the facts
on record.

xxxx

These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation of
an errant lawyer do not preclude the Court from immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long
as the errant lawyer or judge has been given the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty.
Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present matter through her letter-query
and Manifestation filed before this Court.146(Emphases supplied.)

Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and their reservation of
a right they do not have has no effect on these proceedings. Neither have they shown in their pleadings
any justification for this Court to call for a hearing in this instance. They have not specifically stated
what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they intend to present in their defense that will
necessitate a formal hearing.

Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and witnesses bearing on the
plagiarism and misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the
assumption that the findings of this Court which were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution were
made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of the Court in the Decision in that
case. This is the primary reason for their request for access to the records and evidence presented in
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the only incident in A.M. No. 10-
7-17-SC that is relevant to the case at bar is the fact that the submission of the actual signed copy of the
Statement (or Restoring Integrity I, as Dean Leonen referred to it) happened there. Apart from that fact,
it bears repeating that the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo, is a separate and independent matter from this case.

To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution that the respondents
issued a Statement with language that the Court deems objectionable during the pendency of the
Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, respondents need to go no further than the
four corners of the Statement itself, its various versions, news reports/columns (many of which
respondents themselves supplied to this Court in their Common Compliance) and internet sources that
are already of public knowledge.

Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the language of the Statement
and the circumstances surrounding the drafting, printing, signing, dissemination, etc., of its various
versions, the Court does not see how any witness or evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo
could possibly shed light on these facts. To be sure, these facts are within the knowledge of respondents
and if there is any evidence on these matters the same would be in their possession.

We find it significant that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance he narrated how as early as September 2010,
i.e., before the Decision of this Court in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo on October 12, 2010 and
before the October 19, 2010 Show Cause Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,
after being shown a copy of the Statement upon his return from abroad, predicted that the Court would
take some form of action on the Statement. By simply reading a hard copy of the Statement, a
reasonable person, even one who "fundamentally agreed" with the Statement’s principles, could
foresee the possibility of court action on the same on an implicit recognition that the Statement, as
worded, is not a matter this Court should simply let pass. This belies respondents’ claim that it is
necessary for them to refer to any record or evidence in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC in order to divine the bases
for the Show Cause Resolution.
If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their respective compliances or
chosen not to make a full defense at this time, because they were counting on being granted a hearing,
that is respondents’ own look-out. Indeed, law professors of their stature are supposed to be aware of
the above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-necessity of a hearing in disciplinary cases. They
should bear the consequence of the risk they have taken.

Thus, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and evidence presented in,
A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC should be denied for lack of merit.

A final word

In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on any
subject, be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their
points of view they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly
not claiming that it should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and
courtesy that one lawyer owes to another under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they
are judges, court employees, professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have
voluntarily taken an oath, as an indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct
themselves with good fidelity towards the courts. There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law
professors, regardless of their status in the academic community or the law school to which they belong.

WHEREFORE, this administrative matter is decided as follows:

(1) With respect to Prof. Vasquez, after favorably noting his submission, the Court finds his Compliance
to be satisfactory.

(2) The Common Compliance of 35 respondents, namely, Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M.
Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T. Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P.
Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L. Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo)
D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R.
Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig,
Sandra Marie O. Coronel, Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C.
Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Rodolfo Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc,
Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Susan D. Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario, is found
UNSATISFACTORY. These 35 respondent law professors are reminded of their lawyerly duty, under
Canons 1, 11 and 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to give due respect to the Court and to
refrain from intemperate and offensive language tending to influence the Court on pending matters or
to denigrate the Court and the administration of justice and warned that the same or similar act in the
future shall be dealt with more severely.

(3) The separate Compliance of Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen regarding the charge of violation of Canon
10 is found UNSATISFACTORY. He is further ADMONISHED to be more mindful of his duty, as a member
of the Bar, an officer of the Court, and a Dean and professor of law, to observe full candor and honesty
in his dealings with the Court and warned that the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

(4) Prof. Lynch, who is not a member of the Philippine bar, is excused from these proceedings. However,
he is reminded that while he is engaged as a professor in a Philippine law school he should strive to be a
model of responsible and professional conduct to his students even without the threat of sanction from
this Court.

(5) Finally, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC are
denied for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
B.M. No. 850 August 22, 2000

MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (MCLE)

ADOPTING THE RULES ON MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

EN BANC

RESOLUTION

Considering the Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for members of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP, endorsed by the Philippine Judicial Academy, and
reviewed and passed upon by the Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby
resolves to adopt, as it hereby adopts, the following rules for proper implementation:

RULE 1
PURPOSE

Section 1. Purpose of the MCLE

Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) to
ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics
of the profession and enhance the standards of the practice of law.

RULE 2
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

Section 1. Constitution of the MCLE Committee

Within two (2) months from the approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court En Banc, the MCLE
Committee shall be constituted in accordance with these Rules.

Section 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE

Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall complete, every three (3) years, at least thirty-six
(36) hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:

(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics.

(b) At least (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills.

(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute resolution.

(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and procedural laws, and
jurisprudence.

(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral advocacy.

(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and international conventions.

(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may be prescribed by the MCLE
Committee.
RULE 3
COMPLIANCE PERIOD

Section 1. Initial compliance period

The initial compliance period shall begin not later than three (3) months from the constitution of the
MCLE Committee. Except for the initial compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after
the establishment of the program, all compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall
begin the day after the end of the previous compliance period.

Section 2. Compliance Group 1.

Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila shall be permanently assigned to
Compliance Group 1.

Section 3. Compliance Group 2.

Members in Luzon outside NCR shall be permanently assigned to Compliance Group 2.

Section 4. Compliance Group 3.

Members in Visayas and Mindanao shall be permanently assigned to Compliance Group 3.

Section 5. Compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after establishment of the program.

Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program shall be
permanently assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group based on their Chapter membership on the
date of admission or readmission.

The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first day of the month of
admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the same
Compliance Group.

(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period after admission or readmission,
the member is not required to comply with the program requirement for the initial compliance.

(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance period after admission or
readmission, the member shall be required to complete a number of hours of approved continuing legal
education activities equal to the number of months remaining in the compliance period in which the
member is admitted or readmitted. Such member shall be required to complete a number of hours of
education in legal ethics in proportion to the number of months remaining in the compliance period.
Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the next whole number.

RULE 4
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS

Section 1. Guidelines

The following are the guidelines for computation of credit units (CU):

PROGRAMS CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE EDUCATION PROGRAMS,
WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND
OTHER RELATED RULES

1.1 PARTICIPANT 1 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATE OF ATTENDANCE WITH NUMBER OF HOURS

1.2 LECTURER 5 CU PER HOUR PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE OR SPONSOR'S CERTIFICATION

1.3 RESOURCE 3 CU PER HOUR PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE OR SPONSOR'S SPEAKER CERTIFICATION

1.4 ASSIGNED 2 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATION FROM SPONSORING PENALIST/ ORGANIZATION

REACTOR/COMMENTATOR

1.5 MODERATOR/ 2 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATION FROM SPONSORING COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION

FACILITATOR

2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW

2.1 RESEARCH/ 5-10 CREDIT UNITS DULY CERTIFIED/PUBLISHED INNOVATIVE TECHNICAL REPORT/PAPER
PROGRAM/CREATIVE PROJECT

2.2 BOOK 50-100 PP 101+ PUBLISHED BOOK SINGLE AUTHOR 12-16 CU 17-20 CU
2 AUTHORS 10-12 CU 13-16 CU
3 OR MORE 5-6 CU 7-11 CU

2.3 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK WITH PROOF AUTHORSHIP AS EDITOR CATEGORY

2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE 5-10 PP 11+ PUBLISHED ARTICLE SINGLE AUTHOR 6 CU 8 CU

2 AUTHORS 4 CU 6 CU
3 OR MORE 2 CU 4 CU

2.5 LEGAL 3-6 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL NEWSLETTER/LAW JOURNAL EDITOR

3. PROFESSIONAL 6 CU PER CHAIR CERTIFICATION OF LAW DEAN CHAIR/BAR 1 CU PER LECTURE OR BAR
REVIEW DIRECTOR REVIEW/ HOUR LECTURE/LAW TEACHING

Section 2. Limitation on certain credit units

In numbers 2 and 3 of the guidelines in the preceding Section, the total maximum credit units shall not
exceed twenty (20) hours per three (3) years.

RULE 5
CATEGORIES OF CREDIT

Section 1. Classes of credits

The credits are either participatory or non-participatory.

Section 2. Claim for participatory credit

Participatory credit may be claimed for:

(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences, symposia, in-house education
programs, workshops, dialogues or round table discussions.

(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor, commentator, resource speaker,
moderator, coordinator or facilitator in approved education activities.

(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.

Section 3. Claim for non-participatory credit

Non-participatory credit may be claimed per compliance period for:

(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or accepted for publication, e.g., in
the form of an article, chapter, book, or book review which contribute to the legal education of the
author member, which were not prepared in the ordinary course of the member's practice or
employment.

(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.

RULE 6
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS

Section 1. Computation of credit hours

Credit hours are computed based on actual time spent in an activity (actual instruction or speaking
time), in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour.

RULE 7
EXEMPTIONS

Section 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE

The following members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:

(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the Secretaries and Undersecretaries of
Executives Departments;

(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;

(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, incumbent and retired members of
the judiciary, incumbent members of the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered
by the Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial education;

(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
Justice;

(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General;

(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant Government Corporate Counsel;

(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;

(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy Ombudsmen and the Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman;

(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;

(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviews and professors of law who have teaching experience for at least 10
years accredited law schools;

(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of Professors and Professorial Lectures of
the Philippine Judicial Academy; and

(l) Governors and Mayors.

Section 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE

The following Members of the Bar are likewise exempt:

(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.

(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the IBP Board of Governors.

Section 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement

A member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such as physical disability,
illness, post graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law, etc.) from compliance with or modification
of any of the requirements, including an extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a
procedure to be established by the MCLE Committee.

Section 4. Change of status

The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month in which a member ceases to be exempt
under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the same day as that of all other members in the
same Compliance Group.

Section 5. Proof of exemption

Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE requirement shall be under oath and
supported by documents.

RULE 8
STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF EDUCATION ACTIVITIES

Section 1. Approval of MCLE program

Subject to the rules as may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal education program
may be granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the provider of the activity is an approved
provider and certifies that the activity meets the criteria of Section 3 of this Rules; and (2) the provider is
specially mandated by law to provide continuing legal education.

Section 2. Standards for all education activities

All continuing legal education activities must meet the following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical content.

(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related to legal subjects and the legal
profession, including cross profession activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that enhance legal
skills or the ability to practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral advocacy.

(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate professional experience.

(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive written materials must be
distributed to all participants. Such materials must be distributed at or before the time the activity is
offered.

(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and location so as to be free from
interruption like telephone calls and other distractions.

RULE 9
APPROVAL OF PROVIDERS

Section 1. Approval of providers

Approval of providers shall be done by the MCLE Committee.

Section 2. Requirements for approval of providers

Any persons or group may be approved as a provider for a term of two (2) years, which may be
renewed, upon written application. All providers of continuing legal education activities, including in-
house providers, are eligible to be approved providers. Application for approval shall:

(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the IBP;

(b) Contain all information requested on the form;

(c) Be accompanied by the approval fee;

Section 3. Requirements of all providers

All approved providers shall agree to the following:

(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be maintained by the provider for at
least four (4) years after the completion date. The provider shall include the member on the official
record of attendance only if the member's signature was obtained at the time of attendance at the
activity. The official record of attendance shall contain the member's name and number in the Roll of
Attorneys and shall identify the time, date, location, subject matter, and length of the education activity.
A copy of such record shall be furnished the IBP.

(b) The provider shall certify that:

(1) This activity has been approved for MCLE by the IBP in the amount of ________ hours of which hours
will apply in (legal ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity;

(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved education activities prescribed by these Rules
and such regulations as may be prescribed by the IBP pertaining to MCLE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants identifying the time, date, location,
subject matter and length of the activity.

(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved continuing legal education activities by
members of the IBP Board of Governors, the MCLE Committee, or designees of the Committee and IBP
staff for purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules.

(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the activity, the time devoted to
each devoted to each topic and identify of the instructors. The provider shall make available to each
participant a copy of IBP-approved Education Activity Evaluation Form.

(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity Evaluation Forms for a period of not
less than one (1) year after the activity, copy furnished the IBP.

(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under this program or issues a spurious
certificate in violation of these Rules shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.

Section 4. Renewal of provider approval

The approval of a provider may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if the provider fails to
comply with any of the requirements of these Rules or fails to provide satisfactory education activities
for the preceding period.

Section 5. Revocation of provider approval

The approval of any provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority vote of the IBP Board of
Governors, upon recommendation of the MCLE Committee, after notice and hearing and for good cause.

RULE 10
ACTIVITY AND PROVIDER APPROVAL FEE

Section 1. Payment of fees

Application for approval of an education activity or as a provider requires payment of an appropriate

fee.

RULE 11
GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

Section 1. Compliance card

Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the end of his
compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath that he has complied with the
education requirement or that he is exempt, specifying the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance
Card must be returned to the address indicated therein not later than the day after the end of the
member's compliance period.

Section 2. Member record keeping requirement

Each member shall maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy furnished the MCLE
Committee. The record required to be provided to the members by the provider pursuant to Section 3(c)
of Rule 9 should be sufficient record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-
participatory activity shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule 5.

RULE 12
NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

Section 1. What constitutes non-compliance

The following shall constitute non-compliance

(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance period;

(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;

(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including evidence of exempt status) within
the prescribed period;

(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of such compliance within sixty
(60) days from receipt of a non-compliance notice;

(e) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or intended to circumvent or evade
compliance with the MCLE requirements.

Section 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance

A member failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the specific deficiency and will
be given sixty (60) days from the date of notification to explain the deficiency or otherwise show
compliance with the requirements. Such notice shall contain, among other things, the following
language in capital letters:

YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF

COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF NOTICE),
SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER.

The Member may use this period to attain the adequate number of credit hours for compliance. Credit
hours earned during this period may only be counted toward compliance with the prior compliance
period requirement unless hours in excess of the requirement are earned, in which case, the excess
hours may be counted toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.lawphil.net

RULE 13
CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE

Section 1. Non-compliance fee

A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the compliance period shall pay
a non-compliance fee.

Section 2. Listing as delinquent member

Any member who fails to satisfactorily comply with Section 2 of Rule 12 shall be listed as a delinquent
member by the IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which
case, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court shall apply.
RULE 14
REINSTATEMENT

Section 1. Process

The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated when the member provides proof of
compliance with the MCLE requirement, including payment of non-compliance fee. A member may
attain the necessary credit hours to meet the requirement for the period of non-compliance during the
period the member is on inactive status. These credit hours may not be counted toward meeting the
current compliance period requirement. Credit hours attained during the period of non-compliance in
excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior compliance period requirement may be counted
toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.lawphil.net

Section 2. Termination of delinquent listing administrative process

The termination of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature but it shall be made with
notice and hearing by the MCLE Committee.

RULE 15
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE

Section 1. Composition

The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members, namely: a retired Justice of the Supreme
Court, as Chair, and four (4) members, respectively, nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial
Academy, a law center designated by the Supreme Court and associations of law schools and/or law
professors.

The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall be appointed by the
Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive such compensation as may be determined
by the Court.

Section 2. Duty of the Committee

The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such implementing rules as may be necessary subject
to the approval by the Supreme Court. It shall, in consultation with the IBP Board of Governors,
prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the approval of the Supreme Court.

Section 3. Staff of the IBP

The IBP shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping, auditing, reporting,
approval and other necessary functions.

Section 4. Submission of annual budget

The IBP shall submit to the Supreme Court an annual budget for a subsidy to establish, operate and
maintain the MCLE Program.

This resolution shall take effect in October 2000, following its publication in two (2) newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines. Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000.
SPOUSES DAVID and A.C. No. 6353

MARISA WILLIAMS,

Complainants,

Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CALLEJO, SR., and

CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

ATTY. RUDY T. ENRIQUEZ, Promulgated:

Respondent.

February 27, 2006

x--------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez stands charged with unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful acts in violation
of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, and with conduct
unbecoming an attorney. The charges are contained in the Joint Complaint-Affidavit for
Disbarment[1] filed by the spouses David W. Williams and Marisa B. Williams.

It appears that respondent is the counsel of record of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 13443[2] pending
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33, Dumaguete City where complainants are the defendants.
According to the complainant-spouses, Marisa Williams bought the lot subject of the controversy. A
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) was then issued in her favor, stating that she is Filipino, married to
David W. Williams, an American citizen.[3] On January 8, 2004, respondent charged her with falsification
of public documents before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dumaguete City. The complaint was
docketed as I.S. No. 2004-34.[4]

The spouses Williams further alleged, thus:

21. That, in malicious violation of the rules governing the practice of law, Attorney Rudy T. Enriquez
cited outdated material in his complaint-affidavit (Annex A-1) and in his comments to counter-affidavit
(Annex A-2). He then knowingly applied this stale law in a perverse fashion to argue that Marisa Batacan
Williams automatically lost her Filipino citizenship when she married an American, and was thus
prohibited to own land in the Philippines, thereby making her guilty of falsification in the Deed she
executed to buy property in Negros Oriental.

2.2. That in paragraph #1 of her counter-affidavit (Annex A-2) Marisa cites Article IV, Section 4 of the
1987 Constitution, which provides that she would not lose her citizenship when she married an
American unless she renounced it in a specific act.

2.3 That, in reply, Attorney Enriquez, quotes more outdated law, declaring that her act of marrying her
husband was equivalent to renouncing her citizenship. He also doggedly attempts to show that the 1987
Constitution supports his position, not Marisas (Annex A-4).[5]

Complainants pointed out that the respondent is a retired judge, who knows that the false charge (that
Marisa Williams is an American) will not prevail in the end.[6]

In his Comments by Way of Motion to Dismiss,[7] respondent enumerated matters which to his mind
were evidence of the acts of falsification of complainant Marisa Williams. He insisted that the complaint
for disbarment was a mere tactic to divert attention from the criminal charges against the complainants,
and that the charges against him were bereft of any factual basis.

On December 1, 2004, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation.[8] Forthwith, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline scheduled
the case for mandatory conference/hearing. However, only the respondent appeared. The parties were
then directed to submit their verified position papers.
In their Position Paper, complainants claimed that respondent had maliciously and knowingly filed
fabricated cases against them and that his acts were forms of attempted extortion. They also adopted
their joint complaint-affidavit by way of incorporation, along with their other pleadings.

For his part, respondent maintained that complainant Marisa Williams was no longer a citizen of the
Republic of the Philippines as a result of her marriage to David Williams.

In her Report and Recommendation dated June 10, 1995, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala ruled
that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of the law and should be suspended for six (6) months.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline adopted the foregoing recommendation in its Resolution No. XVII-
2005-114 dated October 22, 2005, with the modification that respondent be reprimanded, with a
warning and advice to study each and every opinion he may give to his clients.

The Court agrees that respondent is administratively liable for his actuations. As found by the
Investigating Commissioner:

There is no evidence shown by respondent that complainant Marisa Bacatan-Williams has renounced her
Filipino citizenship except her Certificate of Marriage, which does not show that she has automatically
acquired her husbands citizenship upon her marriage to him. The cases cited by respondent are not
applicable in this case as it is clear that they refer to aliens acquiring lands in the Philippines.

The Bar has been integrated for the attainment of the following objectives: (a) elevate the standards of
the legal profession, (b) improve the administration of justice, and (c) to enable the bar to discharge its
public responsibility more effectively (In re: Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, 49 SCRA 22). In line
with these objectives of the Integrated Bar, lawyers must keep themselves abreast of legal
developments. To do this, the lawyer must walk with the dynamic movements of the law and
jurisprudence. He must acquaint himself at least with the newly promulgated laws, the recent
decisions of the Supreme Court and of the significant decisions of the Court of Appeals. There are
other executive orders, administrative circulars, regulations and other rules promulgated by other
competent authorities engaged in the administration of justice. The lawyers life is one of continuous and
laborious study, otherwise, his skill and knowledge of the law and related disciplines will lag behind and
become obscure due to obsoleteness (Canon 5, Code of Professional Responsibility.)[9]

As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
requires that a lawyer be updated in the latest laws and jurisprudence.[10] Indeed, when the law is so
elementary, not to know it or to act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the
law.[11] As a retired judge, respondent should have known that it is his duty to keep himself well-
informed of the latest rulings of the Court on the issues and legal problems confronting a client.[12] In
this case, the law he apparently misconstrued is no less than the Constitution,[13] the most basic law of
the land.[14] Implicit in a lawyers mandate to protect a clients interest to the best of his/her ability and
with utmost diligence is the duty to keep abreast of the law and legal developments, and participate in
continuing legal education programs.[15] Thus, in championing the interest of clients and defending
cases, a lawyer must not only be guided by the strict standards imposed by the lawyers oath, but should
likewise espouse legally sound arguments for clients, lest the latters cause be dismissed on a technical
ground.[16] Ignorance encompasses both substantive and procedural laws.[17]

We find too harsh the recommended penalty of the Investigating Commissioner. It must be stressed that
the power to disbar or suspend must be exercised with great caution. Only in a clear case of misconduct
that seriously affects the standing and character of a lawyer as an officer of the Court and member of
the bar will disbarment or suspension be imposed as a penalty.[18] Pursuant to the IBP Commission on
Bar Disciplines Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions,[19] and considering further that this is
respondents first infraction, we find that the penalty of reprimand as recommended by the IBP
Commission on Bar Discipline, will suffice.

We likewise note that in their pleadings in this case, the parties repeatedly invoked their arguments in
their pending cases below. Thus, we find it unnecessary to rule over such arguments, which have yet to
be determined on the merits in the courts a quo.

WHEREFORE, for gross ignorance of the law, Atty. Rudy T. Enriquez is REPRIMANDED and ADVISED to
carefully study the opinions he may give to his clients. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a
similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
JUAN DULALIA, JR., A.C. No. 6854 [Formerly CBD Case No. 04-
1380]
Complainant,

Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

- versus -
CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

TINGA, and

VELASCO, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
ATTY. PABLO C. CRUZ,
April 27, 2007
Respondent.

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Atty. Pablo C. Cruz, Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan (respondent), is charged by Juan
Dulalia, Jr. (complainant) of violation Rules 1.01,[1] 6.02,[2] and 7.03[3] of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The facts which gave rise to the filing of the present complaint are as follows:

Complainants wife Susan Soriano Dulalia filed an application for building permit for the construction of a
warehouse. Despite compliance with all the requirements for the purpose, she failed to secure a permit,
she attributing the same to the opposition of respondents who wrote a September 13, 2004 letter to
Carlos J. Abacan, Municipal Engineer and concurrent Building Official of Meycauayan, reading as follows,
quoted verbatim:

xxxx
This is in behalf of the undersigned himself and his family, Gregoria F. Soriano, Spouses David Perez and
Minerva Soriano-Perez and Family and Mr. and Mrs. Jessie de Leon and family, his relatives and
neighbors.

It has been more than a month ago already that the construction of the building of the abovenamed
person has started and that the undersigned and his family, and those other families mentioned above
are respective owners of the residential houses adjoining that of the high-rise building under
construction of the said Mrs. Soriano-Dulalia. There is no need to mention the unbearable nuisances
that it creates and its adverse effects to the undersigned and his above referred to clients particularly
the imminent danger and damage to their properties, health and safety.

It was represented that the intended construction of the building would only be a regular and with
standard height building and not a high rise one but an inspection of the same would show otherwise.
Note that its accessory foundation already occupies portion of the vacant airspace of the undersigneds
residential house in particular, which readily poses danger to their residential house and life.

To avert the occurrence of the above danger and damage to property, loss of life and for the protection
of the safety of all the people concerned, they are immediately requesting for your appropriate action
on the matter please at your earliest opportune time.

Being your co-municipal official in the Municipal Government of Meycauayan who is the Chief Legal
Counsel of its Legal Department, and by virtue of Sub par. (4), Paragraph (b), Section 481 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, he is inquiring if there was already full compliance on the part of the
owner of the Building under construction with the requirements provided for in Sections 301, 302 and
308 of the National Building Code and on the part of your good office, your compliance with the
provisions of Sections 303 and 304 of the same foregoing cited Building Code.

Please be reminded of the adverse and unfavorable legal effect of the non-compliance with said
Sections 301, 302, 303 and 304 of the National Building Code by all the parties concerned. (Which are
not confined only to penalties provided in Sections 211 and 212 thereof.)

x x x x[4] (Emphasis and underscoring partly in the original, partly supplied)

By complainants claim, respondent opposed the application for building permit because of a personal
grudge against his wife Susan who objected to respondents marrying her first cousin Imelda Soriano,
respondents marriage with Carolina Agaton being still subsisting.[5]
To the complaint, complainant attached a copy of his Complaint Affidavit[6] he filed against respondent
before the Office of the Ombudsman for violation of Section 3 (e)[7] of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) and Section 4 (a) and (c)[8] of Republic Act No. 6713
(Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees).[9]

By Report and Recommendation dated May 6, 2005,[10] the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, through
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, recommended the dismissal of the complaint in light of the
following findings:

The complaint dealt with mainly on the issue that respondent allegedly opposes the application of his
wife for a building permit for the construction of their commercial building. One of the reason[s] stated
by the complainant was that his wife was not in favor of Imeldas relationship with respondent who is a
married man. And the other reason is that respondent was not authorized to represent his neighbors in
opposing the construction of his building.

From the facts and evidence presented, we find respondent to have satisfactorily answered all the
charges and accusations of complainant. We find no clear, convincing and strong evidence to warrant
the disbarment or suspension of respondent. An attorney enjoys the legal presumption that he is
innocent of the charges preferred against him until the contrary is proved. The burden of proof rests
upon the complainant to overcome the presumption and establish his charges by a clear preponderance
of evidence. In the absence of the required evidence, the presumption of innocence on the part of the
lawyer continues and the complaint against him should be dismissed (In re De Guzman, 55 SCRA 1239;
Balduman vs. Luspo, 64 SCRA 74; Agbayani vs. Agtang, 73 SCRA 283).

x x x x.[11] (Underscoring supplied)

By Resolution of June 25, 2005,[12] the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted and approved the Report
and Recommendation of Commissioner Villanueva-Maala.

Hence, the present Petition for Review[13] filed by complainant.

Complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 1.01 when he contracted a second marriage with
Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 while his marriage with Carolina Agaton, which was solemnized
on December 17, 1967, is still subsisting.
Complainant further maintains that respondent used his influence as the Municipal Legal Officer of
Meycauayan to oppose his wifes application for building permit, in violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

And for engaging in the practice of law while serving as the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan,
complainant maintains that respondent violated Rule 7.03.

To his Comment,[14] respondent attached the July 29, 2005[15]Joint Resolution of the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon dismissing complainants complaint for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 and
Section 4 (a) and (c) of RA 6713, the pertinent portion of which joint resolution reads:

x x x A perusal of the questioned letter dated September 13, 2004 of herein respondent Atty. Pablo Cruz
addressed to the Building official appears to be not an opposition for the issuance of complainants
building permit, but rather to redress a wrong and an inquiry as to whether compliance with the
requirements for the construction of an edifice has been met. In fact, the Office of the Building Official
after conducting an investigation found out that there was [a] violation of the Building Code for
constructing without a building permit committed by herein complainants wife Susan Dulalia. Hence, a
Work Stoppage Order was issued. Records disclose fu[r]ther [that] it was only after the said violation
had been committed that Susan Dulalia applied for a building permit. As correctly pointed out by
respondent, the same is being processed pending approval by the Building Official and not of the
Municipal Zoning Administrator as alleged by complainant. Anent the allegation that respondent was
engaged in the private practice of his law profession despite being employed in the government as
Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, Bulacan, the undersigned has taken into consideration the
explanation and clarification made by the respondent to be justifiable and meritorious. Aside from the
bare allegations of herein complainant, there is no sufficient evidence to substantiate the complaints
against the respondent.[16] (Underscoring supplied)

After a review of the record of the case, this Court finds the dismissal of the charges of violating Rules
6.02 and 7.03 in order.

Indeed, complaint failed to prove that respondent used his position as Municipal Legal Officer to
advance his own personal interest against complainant and his wife.

As for respondents September 13, 2004 letter, there is nothing to show that he opposed the application
for building permit. He just inquired whether complainants wife fully complied with the requirements
provided for by the National Building Code, on top of expressing his concerns about the danger and
damages to their properties, health and safety occasioned by the construction of the building.
Besides, as reflected above, the application for building permit was filed on September 28,
2004,[17] whereas the questioned letter of respondent was priorly written and received on September
13, 2004 by the Municipal Engineer/ Building Official, who on the same day, ordered an inspection and
issued a Cease and Desist Order/Notice stating that [f]ailure to comply with th[e] notice shall cause this
office to instate proper legal action against you.[18]

Furthermore, as the Certification dated April 4, 2005[19] from the Office of the Municipal Engineer
showed, complainants wife eventually withdrew the application as she had not yet secured clearances
from the Municipal Zoning Administrator and from the barangay where the building was to be
constructed.

Respecting complainants charge that respondent engaged in an unauthorized private practice of law
while he was the Municipal Legal Officer of Meycauayan, a position coterminous to that of the
appointing authority, suffice it to state that respondent proffered proof that his private practice is not
prohibited.[20]

It is, however, with respect to respondents admitted contracting of a second marriage while his first
marriage is still subsisting that this Court finds respondent liable, for violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Respondent married Imelda Soriano on September 17, 1989 at the Clark County, Nevada, USA,[21] when
the Family Code of the Philippines had already taken effect.[22] He invokes good faith, however, he
claiming to have had the impression that the applicable provision at the time was Article 83 of the Civil
Code.[23] For while Article 256 of the Family Code provides that the Code shall have retroactive
application, there is a qualification thereunder that it should not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

Immoral conduct which is proscribed under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
opposed to grossly immoral conduct, connotes conduct that shows indifference to the moral norms of
society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the community.[24] Gross immoral conduct
on the other hand must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be
reprehensible to a high degree.[25]

In St. Louis University Laboratory High School v. De la Cruz,[26] this Court declared that the therein
respondents act of contracting a second marriage while the first marriage was still subsisting constituted
immoral conduct, for which he was suspended for two years after the mitigating following
circumstances were considered:
a. After his first failed marriage and prior to his second marriage or for a period of almost seven (7)
years, he has not been romantically involved with any woman;

b. His second marriage was a show of his noble intentions and total love for his wife, whom he
described to be very intelligent person;

c. He never absconded from his obligations to support his wife and child;

d. He never disclaimed paternity over the child and husbandry (sic) with relation to his wife;

e. After the annulment of his second marriage, they have parted ways when the mother and child
went to Australia;

f. Since then up to now, respondent remained celibate.[27]

In respondents case, he being out of the country since 1986, he can be given the benefit of the doubt on
his claim that Article 83 of the Civil Code was the applicable provision when he contracted the second
marriage abroad. From 1985 when allegedly his first wife abandoned him, an allegation which was not
refuted, until his marriage in 1989 with Imelda Soriano, there is no showing that he was romantically
involved with any woman. And, it is undisputed that his first wife has remained an absentee even during
the pendency of this case.

As noted above, respondent did not deny he contracted marriage with Imelda Soriano. The community
in which they have been living in fact elected him and served as President of the IBP-Bulacan Chapter
from 1997-1999 and has been handling free legal aid cases.

Respondents misimpression that it was the Civil Code provisions which applied at the time he
contracted his second marriage and the seemingly unmindful attitude of his residential community
towards his second marriage notwithstanding, respondent may not go scotfree.

As early as 1957, this Court has frowned on the act of contracting a second marriage while the first
marriage was still in place as being contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.[28]

In another vein, respondent violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides:

CANON 5 A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal developments, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical training of
law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and jurisprudence.
Respondents claim that he was not aware that the Family Code already took effect on August 3, 1988 as
he was in the United States from 1986 and stayed there until he came back to the Philippines together
with his second wife on October 9, 1990 does not lie, as ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.

Apropos is this Courts pronouncement in Santiago v. Rafanan:[29]

It must be emphasized that the primary duty of lawyers is to obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes. They are expected to be in the forefront in the observance and
maintenance of the rule of law. This duty carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the
existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is
imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Unless they faithfully comply with such
duty, they may not be able to discharge competently and diligently their obligations as members of
the bar. Worse, they may become susceptible to committing mistakes.[30] (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pablo C. Cruz is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 and Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year. He is WARNED that
a similar infraction will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and all courts throughout the country.

SO ORDERED.
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., A.C. No. 4517

Complainant,

Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

CORONA,

AZCUNA and

GARCIA, JJ.

ATTYS. VITALIANO C. FABROS

and PACIFICO S. PAAS,

Respondents. Promulgated:

September 11, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

A complaint for disbarment was filed against Attys. Vitaliano C. Fabros and Pacifico S. Paas by
Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr. for unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct in relation to the
discharge of their duties as chairman and vice-chairman, respectively, of the provincial board of
canvassers, Province of Isabela (PBC-Isabela) in the 1995 elections.

Complainant alleged that:

xxx xxx xxx

8. Among the duties of the [PBC-Isabela] was to canvass the results of the elections from the
various municipalities and component cities of the Province of Isabela and submit the Provincial
Certificate of Canvass to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). This Provincial Certificate of Canvass
was to be submitted to the COMELEC together with its supporting Statement

of Votes per Municipality for the Province of Isabela, and as required by law, these documents were
prepared under the control and supervision of the [PBC-Isabela] of which herein respondents are
officials.

9. In fact, with respect to the Provincial Certificate of Canvass of Isabela, respondents were
required to certify under oath that they duly canvassed the votes cast for each candidate for Senator in
the election held on May 8, 1995. And with respect to the Statement of Votes per Municipality, they
were required to certify that each entry made is true and correct.

xxx xxx xxx

11. It would appear, however, that the Statement of Votes per Municipality (annex B) prepared
and certified to be true and correct by herein respondents was actually a fraudulent statement which
had been altered and which contain false and untrue entries. By comparing the said statements with the
Municipal/City Certificates of Canvass of some of the municipalities and component cities for the
Province of Isabela, it is clearly apparent that in nine (9) municipalities and one (1) city of the said
province, the votes of candidates Enrile, Honasan and Mitra were padded and increased by some
27,755, 10,000 and 7,000, respectively.

xxx xxx xxx

13. The anomalous, irregular and illegal padding of the votes in the Provincial Certificate of
Canvass for the Province of Isabela cannot be attributed [to] mere computation or recording error, but
was ostensibly the result of a premeditated scheme knowingly implemented by herein respondents.

14. The respondents, chairman and vice chairman of the [PBC-Isabela], willfully, feloniously,
unethically and in wanton and reckless regard of the duties and responsibilities reposed upon them by
virtue of their official positions, signed the Provincial Certificate of Canvass (annex A) and the
Statement of Votes per Municipality (annex B) for the Province of Isabela, well aware that the same
contained false statements which has altered the results of the senatorial elections in said
province. Their submission of these falsified documents to the COMELEC is an act constituting a gross
violation of the Omnibus Election Code and existing penal laws, and a serious breach of public trust
and of their oaths as duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar.

15. For under section 27 of R.A. 6646 it is provided that any member of the board of canvasser
who tampers, increases, or decreases the votes received by a candidate in any election shall be guilty of
[an] election offense.

16. And, under provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. xxx xxx xxx.[1] (Emphasis ours)

In his comment, respondent Fabros reproduced the counter-affidavit he filed with the COMELEC-Manila
since the issues raised in the complaint were identical to those brought before the Commission. He
denied committing any act which violated his oath as a lawyer. Specifically, he stated that: (1) he neither
consented nor allowed any member of PBC-Isabela to increase the votes of
Senators Enrile, Honasan and Mitra; (2) the canvassing was done in public view; (3) he faithfully read the
votes as reflected in the municipal/city certificates of canvass, repeating the same twice or thrice and (4)
the canvassing proceeded in an orderly manner after counsels and watchers were given the chance to
examine the certificates of canvass.[2]

Aside from substantially echoing the statements of Fabros, respondent Paas alleged that he was in no
position to manipulate the figures since Fabros did the reading throughout the canvass, while he
attended to maintaining the integrity of the envelopes containing the statement of votes. Both
attributed to human fatigue or simple negligence any error in the figures since the board and its staff
allegedly worked continuously to finish the canvassing within 72 hours as directed.[3] Paas claimed that if
there were figures in the certificates of canvass which did not match the statement of votes prepared by
the PBC, he honestly believed that this was due to human fatigue.[4] He alleged that, if at all, he could
only be faulted for failing to see for himself if the reading by Fabros of the number of votes and the
tabulation thereof faithfully reflected the figures in the PBCs copy of the election returns.
Both respondents do not, however, deny that they authenticated the provincial certificate of canvass
and signed the statement of votes as true and correct. Their only excuse for any discrepancy was their
alleged reliance on the documents prepared by the secretary of PBC-Isabela, Olympia Marquez.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner George Briones heard the case on
January 20, 1997.[5] By agreement of the parties, the Investigating Commissioner ordered the parties to
submit simultaneous verified position papers with the affidavits of their witnesses.[6] On June 21, 2003,
the IBP board of governors issued a resolution adopting the report and recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner. Respondents were found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and were penalized with a fine of P10,000 each, with a warning that a
violation on similar grounds will be dealt with more severely.

Based on the evidence presented, we find respondents guilty of misconduct. The records reflect, and
respondents admit, the discrepancy between the questioned certificate of canvass and the statement of
votes of the Province of Isabela in the 1995 elections. While there was no question that the
municipal/city certificates of canvass were not tampered with, the tabulation of the figures on the
statement of votes was anomalous. For this, respondents were responsible.[7]

As chairman and vice-chairman of PBC-Isabela, respectively, respondents were mandated to receive the
municipal/city certificates of canvass, and to canvass them for the votes of the members of the Senate,

among others.[8] They were also required to determine the provisional total votes of each candidate as
of each adjournment. On final adjournment, they were tasked to prepare a statement of votes with a
certification of the same as official.[9] In addition, they prepared the provincial certificate of canvass (in
which the padded figures were discovered) with the certification under oath as public officers that the
entries were true and correct.[10]

More than simply affixing their signatures for the purpose of identifying the documents, respondents
signed the documents certifying (and vouching) for the correctness and accuracy of their contents. Even
if they allegedly had no participation in the misdeed, they nevertheless remained responsible for it as
officials of PBC-Isabela. Respondents must bear the consequences of any misstatement or falsehood
arising from such certification.[11] They cannot evade responsibility by pointing to other persons who
supposedly prepared the documents in question.[12] They had the opportunity to check, as they should
have checked, the accuracy of the figures they were certifying to.[13] By certifying to false figures, they
committed misconduct subject to disciplinary action.[14] In fact, by invoking the defenses of honest
mistake, oversight due to fatigue, even simple negligence, respondents virtually admitted the existence
of the discrepancies in the number of votes reflected in the questioned documents.[15]

As public officers, respondents failed to live up to the high degree of excellence, professionalism,
intelligence and skill required of them.[16] As lawyers, they were found to have engaged in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct.[17] They also violated their oath as officers of the court

to foist no falsehood on anyone. Furthermore, by express provision of Canon 6 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility, the avoidance of such conduct is demanded of them as lawyers in the
government service:

CANON 6 These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official
tasks.

As lawyers in the government service, respondents were under an even greater obligation to observe
the basic tenets of the legal profession because public office is a public trust.[18]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondents Atty. Vitaliano C. Fabros and Atty. Pacifico S. Paas GUILTY of
misconduct and imposes on them a FINE in the amount of P10,000 each, with a WARNING that the
commission in the future of a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, and entered in the records of respondents.

SO ORDERED.
Republic Act No. 6713 February 20, 1989

AN ACT ESTABLISHING A CODE OF CONDUCT AND ETHICAL STANDARDS FOR PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND
EMPLOYEES, TO UPHOLD THE TIME-HONORED PRINCIPLE OF PUBLIC OFFICE BEING A PUBLIC TRUST,
GRANTING INCENTIVES AND REWARDS FOR EXEMPLARY SERVICE, ENUMERATING PROHIBITED ACTS
AND TRANSACTIONS AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. - In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

(a) Financial and material interest. - Public officials and employees shall not, directly or indirectly, have
any financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval of their office.

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. - Public officials and employees during
their incumbency shall not:

(1) Own, control, manage or accept employment as officer, employee, consultant, counsel, broker,
agent, trustee or nominee in any private enterprise regulated, supervised or licensed by their office
unless expressly allowed by law;

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; or

(3) Recommend any person to any position in a private enterprise which has a regular or pending official
transaction with their office.

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

(c) Disclosure and/or misuse of confidential information. - Public officials and employees shall not use or
divulge, confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not
made available to the public, either:

(1) To further their private interests, or give undue advantage to anyone; or

(2) To prejudice the public interest.

(d) Solicitation or acceptance of gifts. - Public officials and employees shall not solicit or accept, directly
or indirectly, any gift, gratuity, favor, entertainment, loan or anything of monetary value from any
person in the course of their official duties or in connection with any operation being regulated by, or
any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office.

As to gifts or grants from foreign governments, the Congress consents to:

(i) The acceptance and retention by a public official or employee of a gift of nominal value tendered and
received as a souvenir or mark of courtesy;

(ii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of a gift in the nature of a scholarship or fellowship
grant or medical treatment; or

(iii) The acceptance by a public official or employee of travel grants or expenses for travel taking place
entirely outside the Philippine (such as allowances, transportation, food, and lodging) of more than
nominal value if such acceptance is appropriate or consistent with the interests of the Philippines, and
permitted by the head of office, branch or agency to which he belongs.

The Ombudsman shall prescribe such regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this
subsection, including pertinent reporting and disclosure requirements.

Nothing in this Act shall be construed to restrict or prohibit any educational, scientific or cultural
exchange programs subject to national security requirements.
A.M. No. 10-5-7-SC December 7, 2010

JOVITO S. OLAZO, Complainant,

vs.
JUSTICE DANTE O. TINGA (Ret.), Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before us is the disbarment case against retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga
(respondent) filed by Mr. Jovito S. Olazo (complainant). The respondent is charged of violating Rule
6.02,1 Rule 6.032 and Rule 1.013of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting
interests.

Factual Background

In March 1990, the complainant filed a sales application covering a parcel of land situated in Barangay
Lower Bicutan in the Municipality of Taguig. The land (subject land) was previously part of Fort Andres
Bonifacio that was segregated and declared open for disposition pursuant to Proclamation No.
2476,4 issued on January 7, 1986, and Proclamation No. 172,5 issued on October 16, 1987.

To implement Proclamation No. 172, Memorandum No. 119 was issued by then Executive Secretary
Catalino Macaraig, creating a Committee on Awards whose duty was to study, evaluate, and make a
recommendation on the applications to purchase the lands declared open for disposition. The
Committee on Awards was headed by the Director of Lands and the respondent was one of the
Committee members, in his official capacity as the Congressman of Taguig and Pateros (from 1987 to
1998); the respondent’s district includes the areas covered by the proclamations.

The First Charge: Violation of Rule 6.02

In the complaint,6 the complainant claimed that the respondent abused his position as Congressman
and as a member of the Committee on Awards when he unduly interfered with the complainant’s sales
application because of his personal interest over the subject land. The complainant alleged that the
respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over the complainant’s father, Miguel P. Olazo, for
the latter to contest the complainant’s sales application and claim the subject land for himself. The
complainant also alleged that the respondent prevailed upon Miguel Olazo to accept, on various dates,
sums of money as payment of the latter’s alleged rights over the subject land. The complainant further
claimed that the respondent brokered the transfer of rights of the subject land between Miguel Olazo
and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, who is the nephew of the respondent’s deceased wife.

As a result of the respondent’s abuse of his official functions, the complainant’s sales application was
denied. The conveyance of rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez and his sales application were
subsequently given due course by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

The Second Charge: Violation of Rule 6.03

The second charge involves another parcel of land within the proclaimed areas belonging to Manuel
Olazo, the complainant’s brother. The complainant alleged that the respondent persuaded Miguel Olazo
to direct Manuel to convey his rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. As a result of the
respondent’s promptings, the rights to the land were transferred to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

In addition, the complainant alleged that in May 1999, the respondent met with Manuel for the purpose
of nullifying the conveyance of rights over the land to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The complainant
claimed that the respondent wanted the rights over the land transferred to one Rolando Olazo, the
Barangay Chairman of Hagonoy, Taguig. The respondent in this regard executed an "Assurance" where
he stated that he was the lawyer of Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez.

The Third Charge: Violation of Rule 1.01

The complainant alleged that the respondent engaged in unlawful conduct considering his knowledge
that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez was not a qualified beneficiary under Memorandum No. 119. The
complainant averred that Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez is not a bona fide resident of the proclaimed areas
and does not qualify for an award. Thus, the approval of his sales application by the Committee on
Awards amounted to a violation of the objectives of Proclamation No. 172 and Memorandum No. 119.

The complainant also alleged that the respondent violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713 since he engaged in
the practice of law, within the one-year prohibition period, when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon
Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez before the Committee on Awards.

In his Comment,7 the respondent claimed that the present complaint is the third malicious charge filed
against him by the complainant. The first one was submitted before the Judicial and Bar Council when
he was nominated as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court; the second complaint is now pending
with the Office of the Ombudsman, for alleged violation of Section 3(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended.

With his own supporting documents, the respondent presented a different version of the antecedent
events.

The respondent asserted that Miguel Olazo owned the rights over the subject land and he later
conveyed these rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Miguel Olazo’s rights over the subject land and the
transfer of his rights to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were duly recognized by the Secretary of the DENR
before whom the conflict of rights over the subject land (between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez, on one hand, and the complainant on the other hand) was brought. In its decision, the DENR
found Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez a qualified applicant, and his application over the subject land was given
due course. The respondent emphasized that the DENR decision is now final and executory. It was
affirmed by the Office of the President, by the Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court.

The respondent also advanced the following defenses:

(1) He denied the complainant’s allegation that Miguel Olazo told him (complainant) that the
respondent had been orchestrating to get the subject land. The respondent argued that this allegation
was without corroboration and was debunked by the affidavits of Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo, the
complainant’s sister.

(2) He denied the complainant’s allegation that he offered the complainant ₱50,000.00 for the subject
land and that he (the respondent) had exerted undue pressure and influence on Miguel Olazo to claim
the rights over the subject land. The respondent also denied that he had an inordinate interest in the
subject land.

(3) He claimed that there was nothing wrong in signing as a witness in Miguel Olazo’s affidavit where the
latter asserted his rights over the subject land. The affidavit merely attested to the truth.

(4) He asserted that he and Miguel Olazo were cousins and that the latter decided to sell his rights over
the subject land for the medical treatment of his heart condition and the illness of his daughter,
Francisca Olazo. The respondent insisted that the money he extended to them was a form of loan.

(5) The respondent’s participation in the transaction between Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez involved the payment of the loan that the respondent extended to Miguel Olazo.

(6) Manuel’s belated and secondhand allegation in his Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000,
regarding what his father told him, cannot prevail over his earlier Sinumpaang Salaysay with Francisca
Olazo, dated August 2, 1997. In the said Sinumpaang Salaysay, Manuel categorically asserted that his
father Miguel Olazo, not the complainant, was the farmer-beneficiary. Manuel also expressed his
agreement to the transfer of rights (Pagpapatibay Sa Paglilipat Ng Karapatan) in favor of Joseph Jeffrey
Rodriguez, and the withdrawal of his father’s application to give way to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s
application.

(7) The complainant’s allegation that the respondent had pressured and influenced Miguel Olazo to sell
the subject land was not sufficient as it was lacking in specificity and corroboration. The DENR decision
was clear that the complainant had no rights over the subject land.

The respondent additionally denied violating Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He
alleged that during his third term as Congressman from 1995 to 1997, the conflicting applications of the
complainant, Miguel Olazo and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez were not included in the agenda for
deliberation of the Committee on Awards. Rather, their conflicting claims and their respective
supporting documents were before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR. This office
ruled over the conflicting claims only on August 2, 2000. This ruling became the basis of the decision of
the Secretary of the DENR.

Similarly, the respondent cannot be held liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since the provision applies to lawyers in the government service who are allowed by law
to engage in private law practice and to those who, though prohibited from engaging in the practice of
law, have friends, former associates and relatives who are in the active practice of law.8 In this regard,
the respondent had already completed his third term in Congress and his stint in the Committee on
Awards when he represented Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez on May 24, 1999.

Lastly, the respondent claimed that he cannot be held liable under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility since he did not intervene in the disposition of the conflicting applications of the
complainant and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez because the applications were not submitted to the
Committee on Awards when he was still a member.

The Court’s Ruling

Generally, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of the Bar for
misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official.9 He may be disciplined by this Court
as a member of the Bar only when his misconduct also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer.10

The issue in this case calls for a determination of whether the respondent’s actions constitute a breach
of the standard ethical conduct – first, while the respondent was still an elective public official and a
member of the Committee on Awards; and second, when he was no longer a public official, but a private
lawyer who represented a client before the office he was previously connected with.

After a careful evaluation of the pleadings filed by both parties and their respective pieces of evidence,
we resolve to dismiss the administrative complaint.

Accountability of a government lawyer in public office

Canon 6 of the Code of Professional Responsibility highlights the continuing standard of ethical conduct
to be observed by government lawyers in the discharge of their official tasks. In addition to the standard
of conduct laid down under R.A. No. 6713 for government employees, a lawyer in the government
service is obliged to observe the standard of conduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Since public office is a public trust, the ethical conduct demanded upon lawyers in the government
service is more exacting than the standards for those in private practice. Lawyers in the government
service are subject to constant public scrutiny under norms of public accountability. They also bear the
heavy burden of having to put aside their private interest in favor of the interest of the public; their
private activities should not interfere with the discharge of their official functions.11

The first charge involves a violation of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It imposes
the following restrictions in the conduct of a government lawyer:

A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

The above provision prohibits a lawyer from using his or her public position to: (1) promote private
interests; (2) advance private interests; or (3) allow private interest to interfere with his or her public
duties. We previously held that the restriction extends to all government lawyers who use their public
offices to promote their private interests.12

In Huyssen v. Gutierrez,13 we defined promotion of private interest to include soliciting gifts or anything
of monetary value in any transaction requiring the approval of his or her office, or may be affected by
the functions of his or her office. In Ali v. Bubong,14 we recognized that private interest is not limited to
direct interest, but extends to advancing the interest of relatives. We also ruled that private interest
interferes with public duty when the respondent uses the office and his or her knowledge of the
intricacies of the law to benefit relatives.15

In Vitriolo v. Dasig,16 we found the act of the respondent (an official of the Commission on Higher
Education) of extorting money from persons with applications or requests pending before her office to
be a serious breach of Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.17 We reached the same
conclusion in Huyssen, where we found the respondent (an employee of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation) liable under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, based on the evidence
showing that he demanded money from the complainant who had a pending application for visas before
his office.18

Similarly, in Igoy v. Soriano19 we found the respondent (a Court Attorney of this Court) liable for violating
Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, after considering the evidence showing that he
demanded and received money from the complainant who had a pending case before this Court.

Applying these legal precepts to the facts of the case, we find the absence of any concrete proof that the
respondent abused his position as a Congressman and as a member of the Committee on Awards in the
manner defined under Rule 6.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

First, the records do not clearly show if the complainant’s sales application was ever brought before the
Committee on Awards. By the complaint’s own account, the complainant filed a sales application in
March 1990 before the Land Management Bureau. By 1996, the complainant’s sales application was
pending before the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR due to the conflicting claims of
Miguel Olazo, and, subsequently, of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. The records show that it was only on
August 2, 2000 that the Office of the Regional Director, NCR of the DENR rendered its decision, or after
the term of the respondent’s elective public office and membership to the Committee on Awards, which
expired in 1997.

These circumstances do not show that the respondent did in any way promote, advance or use his
private interests in the discharge of his official duties. To repeat, since the sales application was not
brought before the Committee on Awards when the respondent was still a member, no sufficient basis
exists to conclude that he used his position to obtain personal benefits. We note in this regard that the
denial of the complainant’s sales application over the subject land was made by the DENR, not by the
Committee on Awards.

Second, the complainant’s allegation that the respondent "orchestrated" the efforts to get the subject
land does not specify how the orchestration was undertaken. What appears clear in the records is the
uncorroborated Sinumpaang Salaysay of Miguel Olazo, dated May 25, 2003,20 categorically stating that
the respondent had no interest in the subject land, and neither was he a contracting party in the
transfer of his rights over the subject land. In the absence of any specific charge, Olazo’s disclaimer is
the nearest relevant statement on the respondent’s alleged participation, and we find it to be in the
respondent’s favor.

Third, the other documents executed by Miguel Olazo, that the complainant presented to support his
claim that the respondent exerted undue pressure and influence over his father (namely: the letter,
dated June 22, 1996, to the DENR Regional Director-NCR;21 the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 12,
1996;22 and the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July 17, 199623), do not contain any reference to the alleged
pressure or force exerted by the respondent over Miguel Olazo. The documents merely showed that the
respondent helped Miguel Olazo in having his farm lots (covered by the proclaimed areas) surveyed.
They also showed that the respondent merely acted as a witness in the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated July
17, 1996. To our mind, there are neutral acts that may be rendered by one relative to another, and do
not show how the respondent could have influenced the decision of Miguel Olazo to contest the
complainant’s sales application. At the same time, we cannot give any credit to the Sinumpaang
Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000, of Manuel. They are not only hearsay but are contrary to what Miguel
Olazo states on the record. We note that Manuel had no personal knowledge, other than what Miguel
Olazo told him, of the force allegedly exerted by the respondent against Miguel Olazo.

In turn, the respondent was able to provide a satisfactory explanation - backed by corroborating
evidence - of the nature of the transaction in which he gave the various sums of money to Miguel Olazo
and Francisca Olazo in the year 1995. In her affidavits dated May 25, 200324 and July 21,
2010,25 Francisca Olazo corroborated the respondent’s claim that the sums of money he extended to her
and Miguel Olazo were loans used for their medical treatment. Miguel Olazo, in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay dated May 25, 2003, asserted that some of the money borrowed from the respondent was
used for his medical treatment and hospitalization expenses.

The affidavit of Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez further corroborated the respondent’s claim that the latter’s
involvement was limited to being paid the loans he gave to Miguel Olazo and Francisca Olazo. According
to Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez, he and Miguel Olazo agreed that a portion of the loan would be directly
paid by Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez to the respondent and the amount paid would be considered as part of
the purchase price of the subject land.26

It also bears stressing that a facial comparison of the documentary evidence, specifically the dates when
the sums of money were extended by the respondent – on February 21, 1995, September 2, 1995 and
October 17, 1995, and the date when the Deed of Conveyance27 over the subject land was executed or
on October 25, 1995, showed that the sums of money were extended prior to the transfer of rights over
the subject land. These pieces of evidence are consistent with the respondent’s allegation that Miguel
Olazo decided to sell his rights over the subject land to pay the loans he obtained from the respondent
and, also, to finance his continuing medical treatment.

Private practice of law after separation from public office

As proof that the respondent was engaged in an unauthorized practice of law after his separation from
the government service, the complainant presented the Sinumpaang Salaysay, dated January 20, 2000,
of Manuel and the document entitled "Assurance" where the respondent legally represented Ramon
Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez. Nevertheless, the foregoing pieces of evidence fail to persuade us to
conclude that there was a violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In Cayetano v. Monsod,28 we defined the practice of law as any activity, in and out of court, that requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Moreover, we ruled that to
engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession; to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in
any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

Under the circumstances, the foregoing definition should be correlated with R.A. No. 6713 and Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility which impose certain restrictions on government lawyers to
engage in private practice after their separation from the service.

Section 7(b)(2) of R.A. No. 6713 reads:

Section 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. — In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the
following shall constitute prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are
hereby declared to be unlawful:

xxxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. – Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:

xxxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions; x x x

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be
with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply.

As a rule, government lawyers are not allowed to engage in the private practice of their profession
during their incumbency.29 By way of exception, a government lawyer can engage in the practice of his
or her profession under the following conditions: first, the private practice is authorized by the
Constitution or by the law; and second, the practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with his or her
official functions.30 The last paragraph of Section 7 provides an exception to the exception. In case of
lawyers separated from the government service who are covered under subparagraph (b) (2) of Section
7 of R.A. No. 6713, a one-year prohibition is imposed to practice law in connection with any matter
before the office he used to be with.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility echoes this restriction and prohibits lawyers, after
leaving the government service, to accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the said service. The keyword in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the term "intervene" which we previously interpreted to include an act of a person who
has the power to influence the proceedings.31 Otherwise stated, to fall within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the respondent must have accepted engagement or
employment in a matter which, by virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to
influence the outcome of the proceedings.1avvphi1

As the records show, no evidence exists showing that the respondent previously interfered with the
sales application covering Manuel’s land when the former was still a member of the Committee on
Awards. The complainant, too, failed to sufficiently establish that the respondent was engaged in the
practice of law. At face value, the legal service rendered by the respondent was limited only in the
preparation of a single document. In Borja, Sr. v. Sulyap, Inc.,32we specifically described private practice
of law as one that contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily
holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.

In any event, even granting that respondent’s act fell within the definition of practice of law, the
available pieces of evidence are insufficient to show that the legal representation was made before the
Committee on Awards, or that the Assurance was intended to be presented before it. These are matters
for the complainant to prove and we cannot consider any uncertainty in this regard against the
respondent’s favor.

Violation of Rule 1.01

Rule 1.01 prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, immoral or deceitful conduct. From the above
discussion, we already struck down the complainant’s allegation that respondent engaged in an
unauthorized practice of law when he appeared as a lawyer for Ramon Lee and Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez
before the Committee on Awards.

We find that a similar treatment should be given to the complainant’s claim that the respondent
violated paragraph 4(1)33 of Memorandum No. 119 when he encouraged the sales application of Joseph
Jeffrey Rodriguez despite his knowledge that his nephew was not a qualified applicant. The matter of
Joseph Jeffrey Rodriguez’s qualifications to apply for a sales application over lots covered by the
proclaimed areas has been resolved in the affirmative by the Secretary of the DENR in the decision
dated April 3, 2004,34 when the DENR gave due course to his sales application over the subject land. We
are, at this point, bound by this finding.

As pointed out by the respondent, the DENR decision was affirmed by the Office of the President, the
Court of Appeals35 and, finally, the Court, per our Minute Resolution, dated October 11, 2006, in G.R.
No. 173453. In our Resolution, we dismissed the petition for review on certiorari filed by the
complainant after finding, among others, that no reversible error was committed by the Court of
Appeals in its decision.36

All told, considering the serious consequences of the penalty of disbarment or suspension of a member
of the Bar, the burden rests on the complainant to present clear, convincing and satisfactory proof for
the Court to exercise its disciplinary powers.37 The respondent generally is under no obligation to prove
his/her defense,38 until the burden shifts to him/her because of what the complainant has proven.
Where no case has in the first place been proven, nothing has to be rebutted in defense.39

With this in mind, we resolve to dismiss the administrative case against the respondent for the
complainant’s failure to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the former committed unethical
infractions warranting the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary power.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the administrative case for violation of Rule 6.02, Rule
6.03 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, filed against retired Supreme Court
Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 9115 September 17, 2014

REBECCA MARIE UY YUPANGCO-NAKPIL, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROBERTO L. UY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is an administrative case against respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy (respondent) for unprofessional
and unethical conduct, stemming from a complaint filed by private complainant Rebecca Marie Uy
Yupangco-Nakpil (Rebecca), represented by her attorney-in-fact, Bella Asuncion Pollo (Bella).

The Facts

Rebecca is the natural niece and adopted daughter of the late Dra. Pacita Uy y Lim (Pacita).1 She was
adjudged as the sole and exclusive legal heir of Paci ta by virtue of an Order2 dated August 10, 1999
issued by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 34 in SPEC. PROC. No. 95-7520 l (SP 95-75201). At
the time of her death, Pacita was a stockholder in several corporations primarily engaged in acquiring,
developing, and leasing real properties, namely, Uy Realty Company, Inc. (URCI), Jespajo Realty
Corporation, Roberto L. Uy Realty and Development Corporation, Jesus Uy Realty Corporation,
Distelleria La Jarolina, Inc., and Pacita Lim Uy Realty, Inc.3

In her Complaint4 filed on May 9, 2005,5 Rebecca, through her attorney-in fact, Bella, averred that
respondent, her alleged illegitimate halfcousin,6 continuously failed and refused to comply with the
court order in SP 95-75201 declaring her as the successor-in-interest to all of Pacita’s properties, as well
as her requests for the accounting and delivery of the dividends and other proceeds or benefits coming
from Pacita’s stockholdings in the aforementioned corporations.7 She added that respondent mortgaged
a commercial property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-133606 (subject property) in favor
of Philippine Savings Bank in the total amount of 54,000,000.00,8 despite an existing Trust
Agreement9 executed on October 15, 1993 (subject Trust Agreement) wherein respondent, in his
capacity as President of URCI, already recognized her to be the true and beneficial owner of the
same.10Accordingly, she demanded that respondent return the said property by executing the
corresponding deed of conveyance in her favor together with an inventory and accounting of all the
proceeds therefrom, but to no avail.11 In this relation, Rebecca claimed that it was only on September 2,
2005 or after she had already instituted various legal actions and remedies that respondent and
URCIagreed to transfer the subject property to her pursuant to a compromise agreement.12

In his Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim,13 respondent denied Rebecca’s allegations and raised the
affirmative defenses of forum shopping and prescription. He pointed out that Rebecca had filed several
cases raising the single issue on the correct interpretation of the subject trust agreement. He also
contended that the parties’ transactions in this case were made way back in 1993 and 1995 without a
complaint having been filed until Bella came into the picture and instituted various suits covering the
same issue.14 As such, he sought the dismissal of the complaint, and further prayed for the payment of
moral damages and attorney’s fees by way of counterclaim.15
On September 8, 2005, Rebecca filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaint16 in CBD Case No. 05-1484 for
the reason that "the facts surrounding the same arose out of a misunderstanding and misapprehension
of the real facts surrounding their dispute."17

However, on October 6, 2005, Bella filed a Manifestation with Leave of Court to File Motion for
Intervention,18praying that the investigation of the charges against respondent continue in order to
weed out erring members of the legal profession.19

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

On October 8, 2007, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner issuedhis
Report and Recommendation,20 finding respondent guilty of serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01,
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code), and, thus, recommended the penalty of
suspension for a period of six (6) months.21

On matters of procedure, the Investigating Commissioner opined that Rebecca’s motion to withdraw did
notserve as a bar for the further consideration and investigation ofthe administrative case against
respondent. As basis, he cites Section 5, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court which provides that "[n]o
investigation shall be interrupted or terminated by reason of the desistance, settlement, compromise,
restitution, withdrawal of the charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same." Separately,
the Investigating Commissioner denied the claim of forum shopping, noting that disciplinary cases are
sui generis and may, therefore, proceed independently.22

On the merits of the charge, the Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent lacked the good
moral character required from members of the Bar when the latter failed to comply with the demands
of Rebecca under the subject trust agreement, not to mention his unworthy and deceitful acts of
mortgaging the subject property without the former’s consent. In fine, respondent was found guilty of
serious misconduct in violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, for which the above-stated penalty
was recommended.23

In a Resolution24 dated November 10, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation.

The Issue Before the Court

The basic issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code, as itis applied to the members of the legal profession, engraves an
overriding prohibition against any form of misconduct, viz.:

CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

The gravity of the misconduct – determinative as it is of the errant lawyer’s penalty – depends on the
factual circumstances of each case.
Here, the Court observes that the squabble which gave rise to the present administrative case largely
constitutes an internal affair, which had already been laid to rest by the parties. This is clearly exhibited
by Rebecca’s motion to withdraw filed in this case as well as the compromise agreement forged in Civil
Case No. 04-108887 which involves the subject property’s alleged disposition in violation of the subject
trust agreement. As the Court sees it, his failure to complywith the demands of Rebecca – which she
takes as an invocation of her rights under the subject trust agreement – as well as respondent’s acts of
mortgaging the subject property without the former’s consent, sprung from his own assertion of the
rights he believed he had over the subject property. The propriety of said courses of action eludes the
Court’s determination,for that matter had never been resolved on its merits in view of the
aforementioned settlement. Rebecca even states in her motion to withdraw that the allegations she had
previously made arose out of a "misapprehension of the real facts surrounding their dispute" and even
adds that respondent "had fully explained to [her] the real nature and extent of her inheritance x x x
toher entire satisfaction," leading her to state that she is "now fully convinced that [her] complaint has
no basis in fact and in law."25 Accordingly, with the admitted misstatement of facts, the observations of
the Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP, hardly hold water so as to support the finding of
"serious misconduct" which would warrant its recommended penalty.1âwphi1

Be that as it may, the Court, nonetheless, finds that respondent committed some form of misconduct
by, as admitted, mortgaging the subject property, notwithstanding the apparent dispute over the same.
Regardless of the merits of his own claim, respondent should have exhibited prudent restraint becoming
of a legal exemplar. He should not have exposed himself even to the slightest risk of committing a
property violation nor any action which would endanger the Bar's reputation. Verily, members of the
Bar are expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and refrain from
any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed by the public in the fidelity,
honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.26 By no insignificant measure, respondent blemished not
only his integrity as a member of the Bar, but also that of the legal profession. In other words, his
conduct fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian of law and justice. Although
to a lesser extent as compared to what has been ascribed by the IBP, the Court still holds respondent
guilty of violating Rule 1. 01, Canon 1 of the Code. Considering that this is his first offense as well as the
peculiar circumstances of this case, the Court believes that a fine of ₱15,000.00 would suffice.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Roberto L. Uy is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is ordered to pay a FINE of ₱15,000.00 within ten (10)
days from receipt of this Resolution. Further, he is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let
copies of this Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014

ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
dated March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, who
recommended the suspension of respondent Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent) from the practice of
law for one (1) year for ethical impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to
complainant.

From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), received a
complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster (complainant) against respondent for “unlawful,
dishonest, immoral and deceitful”3 acts as a lawyer.

In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within 15 days from receipt
of the order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a query as to the status of her complaint.
On October 10, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner issued the Order5 setting the case for mandatory
conference/hearing on November 16, 2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before
the scheduled conference when respondent filed his verified Answer.6

During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared. She submitted a set
of documents contained in a folder, copies of which were furnished the respondent. The Investigating
Commissioner7 indicated that the said documents would be reviewed and the parties would be
informed if there was a need for clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted for
resolution based on the documents on file. The Minutes8 of the mandatory conference showed that
respondent arrived at 11:10 o’clock in the morning or after the proceeding was terminated.

On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondent’s Answer.

On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions9 of the Municipal
Trial Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, ordering respondent [defendant
therein] to pay complainant and her husband the sum of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively, with
interest at the rate of 12% per annum from December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit.10

Complainant’s Position

From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in connection with her legal
problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into with Tierra Realty, which respondent had
notarized. After their discussion, complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the
appropriate case in court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 as
acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.11
On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in relation to the legal
problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in her home and asked for a loan of
P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and
confidence on respondent being her lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without interest. A promissory
note13 evidenced the loan.

In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to transfer to its name
a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to respondent who recommended the
immediate filing of a case for reformation of contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent
requested and thereafter received from complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When
asked about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high value of the land and the sheriffs’ travel
expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the summons to the defendant corporation.
Later, complainant confirmed that the fees paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda
Foster v. Tierra Realty and Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court
records.15

During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that respondent was the
one who notarized the document being questioned in the civil case she filed. When asked about this,
respondent merely replied that he would take a collaborating counsel to handle complainant’s case.
Upon reading a copy of the complaint filed by respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that:
1] the major differences in the documents issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the contract to
buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were not attached thereto; 3] the complaint discussed the
method of payment which was not the point of contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies she
complained of were not mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be
brought up during the hearings.

On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter extend to him the
amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency or emergency.” 16 Complainant obliged
the request and gave respondent the sum of P22,000.00.

On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainant’s house and demanded the sum of P50,000.00,
purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable ruling. Complainant expressed her
misgivings on this proposition but she eventually gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was covered by
a receipt,17 stating that “it is understood that the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after
favorable judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster.” On November 2, 2010, respondent insisted that the
remaining amount be given by complainant prior to the next hearing of the case, because the judge was
allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again, complainant handed to respondent the amount of
P25,000.00.18

On September 29, 2010, complainant’s case was dismissed. Not having been notified by respondent,
complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010, when she personally checked the status of
the case with the court. She went to the office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the
office staff gave her a copy of the order of dismissal.
On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the motion for
reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see respondent and requested him to
prepare a reply to the comment filed by Tierra Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include
additional facts because the Land Registration Authority would not accept the documents unless these
were amended; and to make the additional averment that the defendant was using false documents.

On January 18, 2011, respondent’s driver delivered to complainant a copy of the reply with a message
from him that the matters she requested to be included were mentioned therein. Upon reading the
same, however, complainant discovered that these matters were not so included. On the same
occasion, the driver also asked for P2,500.00 on respondent’s directive for the reimbursement of the
value of a bottle of wine given to the judge as a present. Complainant was also told that oral arguments
on the case had been set the following month.19

On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent as her counsel and
wrote him a letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her copies of documents showing that
respondent had been acquainted with Tierra Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant
wrote to respondent, requesting him to pay her the amounts he received from her less the contract fee
and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never replied.

Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been engaged in the practice of
law since March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He
admitted the fact that he notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale subject of complainant’s case, but he
qualified that he was not paid his notarial fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting as counsel for
complainant for which he claimed to have received P10,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for
incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was complainant, at the
behest of her husband, who willingly offered the amount to him for his patience in visiting them at
home and for his services. The transaction was declared as “no loan” and he was told not to worry about
its payment. As regards the amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that
the said amount was suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in covering the incidental
expenses in the handling of the case. He denied having said that the sheriffs of the court would need the
money for their hotel accommodations. Complainant’s husband approved of the amount. In the same
vein, respondent denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received P22,000.00 from
complainant. He also denied having told her that the case would be discussed with the judge who would
rule in their favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it was complainant who was bothered by the
possibility that the other party would befriend the judge. He never said that he would personally
present a bottle of wine to the judge.

Further, respondent belied the Registrar’s comment as to his representation of Tierra Realty in the past.
Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since complainant was fully aware that another counsel
was assisting him in the handling of cases. Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause of
action and the consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the applicable law on reformation of
contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim, respondent demanded just compensation for the services he
had rendered in other cases for the complainant.

Reply of Complainant

In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondent’s defenses by making reference to the receipts
in her possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted the amounts mentioned in the complaint.
Complainant also emphasized that respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she met him.
While respondent was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of Ilocos
Norte, he was involved in the preparation of several documents involving Flying V, an oil company
owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount
of P100,000.00 she extended to respondent was never considered as “no loan.”

On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of the Resolution,
dated June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Laoag City, finding probable cause
against respondent for estafa.23

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner found respondent
guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year.

In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with modification the
recommendation of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner and ordered respondent to return to
complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) the balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00.

Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he filed a motion for
reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto, informing the IBP-BOG that an information
charging respondent for estafa had already been filed in court and that a corresponding order for his
arrest had been issued.26

In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration but
modified the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law by reducing it from one (1) year to three
(3) months. Respondent was likewise ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from
complainant amounting to P127,590.00.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).

The Court’s Ruling

The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with respect to
respondent’s violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his
alleged violation of Rule 15, on representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.” It is well-established that a lawyer’s conduct is “not confined to the performance
of his professional duties. A lawyer may be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his
professional or private capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him unworthy to continue as an
officer of the court.”27

In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct, both in his professional
and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled complainant into believing that the filing fees for her
case were worth more than the prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high
value of the land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other words, he
resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and dishonesty. He demanded the
amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense
that it was complainant who suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly
improbable that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose such
amount that would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the complainant was more
than willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate her complaint with the trial court, still,
respondent should not have accepted the excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be
knowledgeable in the matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the
actual amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all members of the
legal profession.

Moreover, the “fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his client imposes on the
lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his
client.”28Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific purpose but not used for the purpose should be
immediately returned. A lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his
client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the
trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.29

It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received various amounts from
complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse, he could not deny the authenticity of the
receipts presented by complainant. Upon demand, he failed to return the excess money from the
alleged filing fees and other expenses. His possession gives rise to the presumption that he has
misappropriated it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by,
the client.30 When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound
to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for the intended purpose.
Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to the client.31

Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts from his client,
respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the amount of P50,000.00 as
“representation expenses” allegedly for the benefit of the judge handling the case, in exchange for a
favorable decision. Respondent himself signed a receipt showing that he initially took the amount of P
25,000.00 and, worse, he subsequently demanded and received the other half of the amount at the time
the case had already been dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross misconduct that
necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of demanding a sum of money from his
client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of
his client’s trust but an overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession
and the entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers owe their
utmost fidelity to public service and the administration of justice. In no way should a lawyer indulge in
any act that would damage the image of judges, lest the public’s perception of the dispensation of
justice be overshadowed by iniquitous doubts. The denial of respondent and his claim that the amount
was given gratuitously would not excuse him from any liability. The absence of proof that the said
amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate respondent’s actuations would
seriously erode the public’s trust in the courts.

As it turned out, complainant’s case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. At this juncture,
respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to inform his client of the status of the
case, and left the client to personally inquire with the court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of
misconduct but was also remiss in his duty to his client.

Respondent’s unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records reveal that he
likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that “[a] lawyer shall not borrow money
from his client unless the client’s interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by
independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice,
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.” In his private
capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of considerable amounts. The first
time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next
time, he implored her to extend to him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 “in the moment of urgency
or emergency” but was only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced by
promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by respondent. These
acts were committed by respondent in his private capacity, seemingly unrelated to his relationship with
complainant, but were indubitably acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and confidence
reposed in him as a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses raised by respondent,
was it implied that these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the rules. The loans of P100,000.00
and P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Respondent’s assertion that the amounts were given to him out of the liberality of complainant and
were, thus, considered as “no loan,” does not justify his inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting
and receiving money as loans from his client and thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative of his
lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent has not yet paid his obligations
to complainant.

Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers
are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected
to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all
times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and their clients, which include
prompt payment of financial obligations.32

Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of “conduct” or “misconduct,” the reference is not confined
to one’s behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of the lawyer’s professional duties, but
also covers any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show
him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law vest him with.
Unfortunately, respondent must be found guilty of misconduct on both scores.

With respect to respondent’s alleged representation of conflicting interests, the Court finds it proper to
modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who concluded that complainant presented
insufficient evidence of respondent’s “lawyering” for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that “[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The relationship between a
lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is
the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most
confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them.
Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an
expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s
duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests.”33 Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by
prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would
trigger the violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the
rules is a written consent from all the parties after full disclosure.

The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold respondent liable
for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of complainant against Tierra Realty, a
corporation to which he had rendered services in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that
respondent admitted to having notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document being
questioned in complainant’s case. While the Investigating Commissioner found that the complaint in
Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said contract, and that only the intentions of
the parties as to some provisions thereof were challenged, the Court still finds that the purpose for
which the proscription was made exists. The Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of
the complainant as to the allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear
admission of respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed document. Regardless of
whether it was the validity of the entire document or the intention of the parties as to some of its
provisions raised, respondent fell short of prudence in action when he accepted complainant’s case,
knowing fully that he was involved in the execution of the very transaction under question. Neither his
unpaid notarial fees nor the participation of a collaborating counsel would excuse him from such
indiscretion. It is apparent that respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings with each
other. More significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of the parties involved.
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited “not only because the relation of attorney and
client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but also because of the principles of public
policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and
represent him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or violated the entire profession
suffers.”34

Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for
violation of the lawyer’s oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the
CPR.35 For the practice of law is “a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is
entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess good moral character.”36 The appropriate penalty
for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding
facts.37

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of
the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful
appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a lawyer but a wanton
betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the public. Accordingly, the Court finds that the
suspension for three (3) months recommended by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the
unacceptable acts and omissions of respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and
gross misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to his duty to his
client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in him as a
member of the Bar.

For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging in dishonest and
deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for undermining the trust and faith of the
public in the legal profession and the entire judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests,
respondent deserves no less than the penalty of disbarment.38

Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from complainant in his
private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it cannot order the lawyer to return
money to complainant if he or she acted in a private capacity because its findings in administrative cases
have no bearing on liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyer’s professional engagement. In
disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be
allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of the Court is the determination of
respondent’s administrative liability. Its findings have no material bearing on other judicial actions which
the parties may choose against each other.
To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since administrative cases
are filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of evidence required in civil cases is
different from the quantum of evidence required in administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance
of evidence is required. Preponderance of evidence is “a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthier of belief than
that which is offered in opposition thereto.”40 In administrative cases, only substantial evidence is
needed. Substantial evidence, which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one
administratively liable.41Furthermore, the Court has to consider the prescriptive period applicable to civil
cases in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a rule, imprescriptible.42

Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of P127,590.00
representing the balance of the filing fees he received from complainant, as this was intimately related
to the lawyer-client relationship between them. Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which
respondent received from complainant, as representation expenses for the handling of the civil case and
for the purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These were connected to his professional
relationship with the complainant. While respondent’s deplorable act of requesting the said amount for
the benefit of the judge is stained with mendacity, respondent should be ordered to return the same as
it was borne out of their professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already
adjudged as liable for the personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the small claims cases
filed against him.

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, “the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession.”43 The Court likewise aims to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by
“purging the profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.”44

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross misconduct in violation of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby DISBARS him from the practice of law
and ORDERS him to pay the complainant, Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and
P2,500.00.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all courts.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10240 November 25, 2014
[Formerly CBD No. 11-3241]

ESTRELLA R. SANCHEZ, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. NICOLAS C. TORRES, M.D., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before us is a Complaint1 dated November 24, 2011 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty.
Nicolas C. Torres (Atty. Torres) filed by Estrella R. Sanchez (Sanchez) with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 11-3241, now A.C. No.
10240, for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) and non-payment of debt.

In her complaint, Sanchez claimed that she is a friend and close acquaintance of Atty. Torres. That in
2007, Atty. Torres asked Sanchez to lend him money in the amount of Two Million Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱2,200,000.00), and convinced her that he will pay the said amount within a period of
one (1) month, plus interest. On November 8, 2007, persuaded by Atty. Torres' promise that he will pay
immediately, Sanchez was convinced and handed him the cash amounting to Two Million Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (₱2,200,000.00), which Sanchez withdrew from the bank in Atty. Torres' presence. To
bolster Sanchez's trust and confidence, Atty. Torres issued two (2) Allied Bank checks with check nos.
0109386 and 0109387, under Account No. 001941-01285-8, both dated November 8, 2007, amounting
to ₱1,200,000.00 and ₱1,000,000.00, respectively, or in the total amount of ₱2,200,000.00 2

However, after one (1) month,Atty. Torres failed to pay his obligation as promised. When Sanchez called
Atty. Torres over the phone, she was told that she could again deposit the check and assured her that
the checks will be honored upon presentment for payment.

On May 2, 2008, Sanchez deposited the said checks to her account, but the same were returned due to
"ACCOUNT CLOSED."

Despite repeated demands for the last three (3) years, Atty. Torres had yet to pay his obligation since
then, and thus, complainant sought legal assistance. As a consequence, formal demand letters were sent
by the complainant's lawyer which respondent received on August 14, 20083 and November 17,
2008,4 respectively, and the same proved futile as Atty. Torres failed and refused to pay his obligation.
Nonetheless, Atty. Torres, in his letter dated May 9, 2009,5 promised to pay anew the amount of
₱2,200,000.00 in cash on or before May 15, 2009 as replacement for the two checks he previously
issued. But no payment whatsoever was made. Hence, the instant complaint filed on November 28,
2011.

On November 28, 2011, the IBP–Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required Atty. Torres to file an
answer.6

On December 29, 2011, Atty. Torres moved for extension of time to file an answer. He alleged that his
bookkeeper was on a holiday leave and that the receipts of payments and audit report were in the
custody of the bookkeeper which will be available only in the 1st week of January 2012.7 However, in an
Order8 dated March 2, 2012, the IBP-CBD noted that Atty. Torres had yet to file his Answer to the
complaint even after the expiration of the extension period earlier granted; thus, a final extension was
given anew and the case was set for mandatory conference. Despite sufficient time for respondent Atty.
Torres tofile his answer, he failed to do so. Worse, he even failed to appear in the scheduled mandatory
conference despite due notice.

Thus, in its Report and Recommendation9 dated June 15, 2012, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Torres guilty of
willful dishonesty and unethical conduct for failure to pay just debt and for issuing checks without
sufficient funds. It recommended that Atty. Torres be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of
law for at least two (2) years.

On March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Atty. Torres was ordered suspended from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) years, and further ordered to return the amount of ₱2,200,000.00 to Sanchez, with
legal interest.10

On August 5, 2013, respondent, through counsel, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Extension of
Time to File Motion for Reconsideration.11 He claimed that he had proof of receipts to show that he had
already paid his obligation to Sanchez.12

However, despite the lapse of considerable time after the receipt of notice to comply with the said
Resolution, no motion for reconsideration was filed. Hence, in a Resolution dated January 21, 2014, the
Court resolved to note the Report dated December 13, 2013, stating that records of the OBC showed
that no motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed by either party as of November 22,
2013.

RULING

We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD and the IBP-Board of Governors.

In the instant case, the existence of the loan obligation is undisputed. Sanchez was able to discharge her
burden of proving that she loaned ₱2,200,000.00 to Atty. Torres as evidenced by the subject bank
checks. Furthermore, backed by Atty. Torres' admission in his letter dated May 9, 2009, his promise to
pay the amount of ₱2,200,000.00 in cash, as replacement for the two checks he previously issued, is
more than sufficient to establish a valid obligation of Atty. Torres to Sanchez. Atty. Torres’ admission of
the loan he contracted and his failure to pay the same leave no room for interpretation. Likewise, other
than his belated and empty claims of payment, Atty. Torres failed to discharge his burden of proving
that he had indeed paid his obligation to Sanchez.

In Barrientos v. Atty. Libiran-Meteoro,13 we held that:

x x x [the] deliberate failure to pay justdebts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers
are instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected
to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must at all times
faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which include
prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a manner that reflect the
values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states: Canon 1— A lawyer shall upholdthe constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.

Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

We also note Atty. Torres' conduct in the course of the proceedings where he repeatedly asked for
extensions of time to file an answer and a motion for reconsideration, which he failed to submit, and his
failure to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP do not speak well of his standing as a lawyer. In
Ngayan v. Tugade,14 we ruled that "[a lawyer’s] failure to answer the complaint against him and his
failure to appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court
and illustrate his despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138, Rules of Court."

We come to the penalty imposable in this case.

In Lao v. Medel,15 we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless
checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension
from the practice of law. The same sanction was imposedon the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Atty.
Dino,16 having been found guilty of gross misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of
property, the title of which was only entrusted to him by the complainant.

Following the penalty imposed in a similar situation in A-1 Financial Services v. Valerio,17 we deem it
proper to adopt the penalty of two (2) years suspension in light of the amount involved and the brazen
disregard by Atty. Torres of the Orders of the IBP-CBDon the filing of an answer and appearance in the
hearing. We cannot sustain, however, the IBP’s recommendation ordering respondent to return the
amount of ₱2,200,000.00 to complainant. In disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is
whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our only
concern isthe determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no material
bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose to file against each other.18

However, we note that in CF Sharp Crew management, Inc. v. Nicolas C. Torres,19 the Court had already
disbarred Torres from the practice of law for having been found guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1
and Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In view of the foregoing, we can no longer impose the penalty of suspension or disbarment against Atty.
Torres, considering that he has already been previously disbarred. We do not have double or multiple
disbarments in our laws or jurisprudence.20 Nevertheless, considering that the issues and the infraction
committed are different from his previous infraction, we deem it proper to resolve the instant case and
give its corresponding penalty for purposes of recording it in respondent's personal file in the Bar
Confidant's Office.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XX-2013-202 dated March 20, 2013 of the IBP, which found respondent
Atty. Nicolas C. Torres guilty of gross misconduct and of violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, is AFFIRMED and respondent Atty. Nicolas C. Torres is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of
two (2) years from the practice of law. However, considering that respondent has already been
previously disbarred, this penalty can no longer be imposed.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
personal r.ecord of Atty. Torres as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the
Office of the Court Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country, for their information and
guidance.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC

March 10, 2015

A.C. No. 5816

DR. ELMAR 0. PEREZ, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG and ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO, Respondents.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar 0. Perez (Dr. Perez)
with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig)
and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

The Facts

In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid-1960’s
when they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their
graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that
time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez.2

Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having
married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was
followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City.3 Atty. Catindig
however claimed that he only married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that
Gomez would make a scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have
jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law School.4

Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to
dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been
decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from
the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree
was lawful and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage.5

Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of
America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.6

Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce
decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by
Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that
he would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the
laws of the Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son.7
Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a
petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the
consent of Gomez to the said petition.8

Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter9 in the mail informing her of
Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love
letter10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty.
Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his "impediment is removed."
Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to
their affair until such time that he is able to obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001,
Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez.11

On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale
condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen.12

In a Resolution13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their respective
comments, which they separately did on November 25, 2002.14

Atty. Catindig, in his Comment,15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed,
however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying
with her marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their union was
blessed with four children, their relationship simply deteriorated.

Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then consulted
Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate and live apart
could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property regime of complete
separation of property. She likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican
Republic for whatever value it may have and comfort it may provide them.16

Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed
to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to
institute a divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual
consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and
Gomez filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984.17

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed
by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she
knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty.
Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA.18

Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage
to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was
afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their
relationship.19

Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in
October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing.20
He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr.
Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in
September 1999; and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact
rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001.21

For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty.
Catindig began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig’s
romantic overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married and
that he was too old for her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her,
which was the reason why she resigned from his law firm.22

On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from notice.23

On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order24 setting the mandatory
conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During
the conference, the parties manifested that they were already submitting the case for resolution based
on the pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their
respective position papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed
their position papers on October 17, 200325 and October 20, 2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her
position paper27 on October 24, 2003.

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report
and Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality,
violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing
fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct,
which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Investigating Commissioner further opined that:

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig
established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His
conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official and personal
conduct, must display exemplary behavior. Respondent’s bigamous marriage and his proclivity for
extramarital adventurism have definitely caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How can
he hold his head up high and expect his students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a
model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a second
marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig
has made a mockery of an otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the generally accepted
moral standards of the community.29

On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo
be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in
support of the alleged affair between the respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution,30 which adopted and approved
the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.

Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perez’s
uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a
complaint for disbarment must be supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts
therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the
absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez’
testimony.

He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never concealed
the status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had always been
transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez.

The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution32 dated December 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindig’s motion
for reconsideration.

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant
their disbarment.

Ruling of the Court

After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case,
the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP
Board of Governors.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support
the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit,33 the Court held:

[T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is
concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition
precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s
good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the
absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is
right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. This must be so because "vast interests
are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his
client’s property, reputation, his life, his all."34 (Citation omitted)

In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or
suspended from the practice of law, inter alia, for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:

Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or
brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis ours)

"A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his
moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor."35 Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful,
flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable
members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal
act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such
scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. The Court makes
these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral,
not simply immoral, conduct.36

Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct.

The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own
admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and
unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.

Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968,
which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when
their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty.
Catindig claimed that his first marriage was then already falling apart due to Gomez’ serious intimacy
problems.

A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their
conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and
married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that
time that he moved heaven and earth just so he could marry her right away – a marriage that has at
least a semblance of legality.

From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the
Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens
at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his
previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void.
This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty.
Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws
on marriage.

It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA.
Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is
that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by
entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction.

Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is true, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that
their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in order to
render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so
unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree.1âwphi1

Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to
in order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at
that time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently,
he was then already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his
firm.

While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself,
cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his
propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Court’s finding of gross immoral
conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.

"The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes
conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance,
which makes ‘a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.’"37 In various cases, the Court
has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit
relationship with another woman who has borne him a child.38

Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous one definitely manifests a
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and
affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of
marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree
of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.

The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution,
and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as
an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary
suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in
this case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to
be the most appropriate penalty.

Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not credible since they are
uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court,
deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed
married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such
admission provides ample basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.

There is insufficient evidence to prove the affair between the respondents.

The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to
prove the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was
presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that
the respondents were indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was
signed by Atty. Catindig.

The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the
lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to
prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required m suspens10n or disbarment proceedings
is preponderance of evidence.39

The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter
indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents; it does not
prove the veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly,. the supposed love letter, if at all, only
provesAtty.that Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that
Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the
recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty.
Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violating the Lawyer's Oath and Rule 1.01,
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this
Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court
Administrator to all appellate and trial courts.

The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo 1s hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 4697 November 25, 2014

FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

A.C. No. 4728

FLORENCIO A. SALADAGA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARTURO B. ASTORGA, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Membership in the legal profession is a high personal privilege burdened with conditions,1 including
continuing fidelity to the law and constant possession of moral fitness. Lawyers, as guardians of the law,
play a vital role in the preservation of society, and a consequent obligation of lawyers is to maintain the
highest standards of ethical conduct.2 Failure to live by the standards of the legal profession and to
discharge the burden of the privilege conferred on one as a member of the bar warrant the suspension
or revocation of that privilege.

The Factual Antecedents

Complainant Florencio A. Saladaga and respondent Atty. Arturo B. Astorga entered into a "Deed of Sale
with Right to Repurchase" on December 2, 1981 where respondent sold (with rightof repurchase) to
complainant a parcel of coconut land located at Barangay Bunga, Baybay, Leyte covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-662 for ₱15,000.00. Under the said deed, respondent represented that he
has "the perfect right to dispose as owner in fee simple" the subject property and that the said property
is "free from all liens and encumbrances."3 The deed also provided that respondent, as vendor a retro,
had two years within which to repurchase the property, and if not repurchased within the said period,
"the parties shall renew [the] instrument/agreement."4

Respondent failed to exercise his right of repurchase within the period provided in the deed, and no
renewal of the contract was made even after complainant sent respondent a final demand dated May
10, 1984 for the latter to repurchase the property. Complainant remained in peaceful possession of the
property until December 1989 when he received letters from the Rural Bank of Albuera (Leyte), Inc.
(RBAI) informing him that the property was mortgaged by respondent to RBAI, that the bank had
subsequently foreclosed on the property, and that complainant should therefore vacate the property.5

Complainant was alarmed and made aninvestigation. He learned the following:

(1) TCT No. T-662 was already cancelled by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of Philippine National Bank
(PNB) as early as November 17, 1972 after foreclosure proceedings;

(2) TCT No. T-3211 was cancelled by TCT No. T-7235 in the names of respondent and his wife on January
4, 1982 pursuant to a deed of sale dated March 27,1979 between PNB and respondent;
(3) Respondent mortgaged the subject property to RBAI on March 14, 1984, RBAI foreclosed on the
property, and subsequently obtained TCT No. TP-10635 on March 27, 1991.6 Complainant was
subsequently dispossessed of the property by RBAI.7

Aggrieved, complainant instituted a criminal complaint for estafa against respondent with the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte, docketed as I.S. No. 95-144. The Provincial Prosecutor of Leyte
approved the Resolution8dated April 21, 1995 in I.S. No. 95-144 finding that "[t]he facts of [the] case are
sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that Estafa x x x has been committed and that respondent
herein is probably guilty thereof."9 Accordingly, an Information10 dated January 8,1996 was filed before
the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baybay, Leyte, formally charging respondent with the crime of estafa
under Article 316, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Revised Penal Code,11committed as follows:

On March 14, 1984, accused representing himself as the owner of a parcel of land known as Lot No.
7661 of the Baybay Cadastre, mortgaged the same to the Rural Bank of Albuera, Albuera, Leyte, within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, knowing fully well that the possessor and owner at that time
was private complainant Florencio Saladaga by virtue of a Pacto de Retro Sale which accused executed
in favor of private complainant on 2nd December, 1981, without first redeeming/repurchasing the
same. [P]rivate complainant knowing of accused[’s] unlawful act only on or about the last week of
February, 1991 when the rural bank dispossessed him of the property, the mortgage having been
foreclosed, private complainant thereby suffered damages and was prejudiced by accused[’s] unlawful
transaction and misrepresentation.

The aforementioned estafa case against respondent was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3112-A.

Complainant likewise instituted the instant administrative cases against respondent by filing before this
Court an Affidavit-Complaint12 dated January 28, 1997 and Supplemental Complaint13 dated February
27, 1997, which were docketed as A.C. No. 4697 and A.C. No. 4728, respectively. In both complaints,
complainant sought the disbarment of respondent.

The administrative cases were referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation.14

In his Consolidated Answer15 dated August 16, 2003 filed before the IBP, respondent denied that his
agreement with complainant was a pacto de retrosale. He claimed that it was an equitable mortgage
and that, if only complainant rendered an accounting of his benefits from the produce of the land, the
total amount would have exceeded ₱15,000.00.

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors

In a Report and Recommendation16 dated April 29, 2005, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP’s
Commission on Bar Discipline found that respondent was in bad faith when he dealt with complainant
and executed the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" but later on claimed that the agreement was
one of equitable mortgage. Respondent was also guilty of deceit or fraud when he represented in the
"Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 that the property was covered by TCT
No. T-662, even giving complainant the owner’s copy of the said certificate of title, when the said TCT
had already been cancelled on November 17, 1972 by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of Philippine National
Bank (PNB). Respondent made matters even worse, when he had TCT No. T-3211 cancelled with the
issuance of TCT No. T-7235 under his and his wife’s name on January 4,1982 without informing
complainant. This was compounded by respondent’s subsequent mortgage of the property to RBAI,
which led to the acquisition of the property by RBAI and the dispossession thereof of complainant. Thus,
the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be (1) suspended from the practice of
law for one year, with warning that a similar misdeed in the future shall be dealt with more severity, and
(2) ordered to return the sum of ₱15,000.00, the amount he received as consideration for the pacto de
retrosale, with interest at the legal rate.

Considering respondent’s "commission of unlawful acts, especially crimes involving moral turpitude,
actsof dishonesty, grossly immoral conduct and deceit," the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved the Investigating Commissioner’s Report and Recommendation with modification as follows:
respondent is(1) suspended from the practice of law for two years, with warning that a similar misdeed
in the future shall be dealt with more severity, and (2) ordered to return the sum of ₱15,000.00 received
in consideration of the pacto de retrosale, with legal interest.17

The Court’s Ruling

The Court agrees with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend respondent from
the practice of law for two years, but it refrains from ordering respondent to return the ₱15,000.00
consideration, plus interest.

Respondent does not deny executing the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December 2,
1981 in favor of complainant. However, respondent insists that the deed is not one of sale with pacto de
retro, but one of equitable mortgage. Thus, respondent argues that he still had the legal right to
mortgage the subject property to other persons. Respondent additionally asserts that complainant
should render an accounting of the produce the latter had collected from the said property, which
would already exceed the ₱15,000.00 consideration stated in the deed.

There is no merit in respondent’s defense.

Regardless of whether the written contract between respondent and complainant is actually one of sale
with pacto de retroor of equitable mortgage, respondent’s actuations in his transaction with
complainant, as well as in the present administrative cases, clearly show a disregard for the highest
standards of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing required from lawyers, for
which respondent should be held administratively liable.

When respondent was admitted to the legal profession, he took an oath where he undertook to "obey
the laws," "do no falsehood," and "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion."18 He gravely violated his oath.

The Investigating Commissioner correctly found, and the IBP Board of Governors rightly agreed, that
respondent caused the ambiguity or vagueness in the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" as he was
the one who prepared or drafted the said instrument. Respondent could have simply denominated the
instrument as a deed of mortgage and referred to himself and complainant as "mortgagor" and
"mortgagee," respectively, rather than as "vendor a retro" and "vendee a retro." If only respondent had
been more circumspect and careful in the drafting and preparation of the deed, then the controversy
between him and complainant could havebeen avoided or, at the very least, easily resolved. His
imprecise and misleading wording of the said deed on its face betrayed lack oflegal competence on his
part. He thereby fell short of his oath to "conduct [him]self as a lawyer according to the best of [his]
knowledge and discretion."

More significantly, respondent transgressed the laws and the fundamental tenet of human relations
asembodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

Respondent, as owner of the property, had the right to mortgage it to complainant but, as a lawyer, he
should have seen to it that his agreement with complainant is embodied in an instrument that clearly
expresses the intent of the contracting parties. A lawyer who drafts a contract must see to it that the
agreement faithfully and clearly reflects the intention of the contracting parties. Otherwise, the
respective rights and obligations of the contracting parties will be uncertain, which opens the door to
legal disputes between the said parties. Indeed, the uncertainty caused by respondent’s poor
formulation of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" was a significant factor in the legal
controversy between respondent and complainant. Such poor formulation reflects at the very least
negatively on the legal competence of respondent.

Under Section 63 of the Land Registration Act,19 the law in effect at the time the PNB acquired the
subject property and obtained TCT No. T-3211 in its name in 1972, where a decree in favor of a
purchaser who acquires mortgaged property in foreclosure proceedings becomes final, such purchaser
becomes entitled to the issuance of a new certificate of title in his name and a memorandum thereof
shall be "indorsed upon the mortgagor’s original certificate."20 TCT No. T-662, which respondent gave
complainant when they entered into the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December 2,
1981, does not bearsuch memorandum but only a memorandum on the mortgage of the property to
PNB in 1963 and the subsequent amendment of the mortgage.

Respondent dealt with complainant with bad faith, falsehood, and deceit when he entered into the
"Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" dated December 2, 1981 with the latter. He made it appear that
the property was covered by TCT No. T-662 under his name, even giving complainant the owner’s copy
of the said certificate oftitle, when the truth is that the said TCT had already been cancelled some nine
years earlier by TCT No. T-3211 in the name of PNB. He did not evencare to correct the wrong statement
in the deed when he was subsequently issued a new copy of TCT No. T-7235 on January 4, 1982,21 or
barely a month after the execution of the said deed. All told, respondent clearly committed an act of
gross dishonesty and deceit against complainant.

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Codeof Professional Responsibility provide:

CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Under Canon
1, a lawyer is not only mandated to personally obey the laws and the legal processes, he is moreover
expected to inspire respect and obedience thereto. On the other hand, Rule 1.01 states the norm of
conduct that is expected of all lawyers.22
Any act or omission that is contrary to, prohibited or unauthorized by, in defiance of, disobedient to, or
disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily imply the element of
criminality although the concept is broad enough to include such element.23

To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be untrustworthy;
lacking inintegrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straightforwardness. On the other
hand, conduct that is "deceitful" means as follows:

[Having] the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used
upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon.
In order to be deceitful, the person must either have knowledge of the falsity or acted in reckless and
conscious ignorance thereof, especially if the parties are not on equal terms, and was done with the
intent that the aggrieved party act thereon, and the latter indeed acted in reliance of the false
statement or deed in the manner contemplated to his injury.24 The actions of respondent in connection
with the execution of the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase" clearly fall within the concept of
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct. They violate Article 19 of the Civil Code. They show a
disregard for Section 63 of the Land Registration Act. They also reflect bad faith, dishonesty, and deceit
on respondent’s part. Thus, respondent deserves to be sanctioned.

Respondent’s breach of his oath, violation of the laws, lack of good faith, and dishonesty are
compounded by his gross disregard of this Court’s directives, as well as the orders of the IBP’s
Investigating Commissioner (who was acting as an agent of this Court pursuant to the Court’s referral of
these cases to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation), which caused delay in the
resolution of these administrative cases.

In particular, the Court required respondent to comment on complainant’s Affidavit-Complaint in A.C.

No. 4697 and Supplemental Complaint in A.C. No. 4728 on March 12, 1997 and June 25, 1997,
respectively.25 While he requested for several extensions of time within which to submit his comment,
no such comment was submitted prompting the Court to require him in a Resolution dated February
4,1998 to (1) show cause why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such
failure, and (2) submit the consolidated comment.26 Respondent neither showed cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure, nor submitted the consolidated
comment.

When these cases were referred to the IBP and during the proceedings before the IBP’s Investigating
Commissioner, respondent was again required several times to submit his consolidated answer. He only
complied on August 28, 2003, or more than six years after this Court originally required him to do so.
The Investigating Commissioner also directed the parties to submit their respective position papers.
Despite having been given several opportunities to submit the same, respondent did not file any
position paper.27

Respondent’s disregard of the directives of this Court and of the Investigating Commissioner, which
caused undue delay in these administrative cases, contravenes the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:

CANON 11 – A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
and should insist on similar conduct by others.
xxxx

CANON 12 – A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.

xxxx

Rule 12.03 – A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or
briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so.

Rule 12.04 – A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court
processes.

Respondent’s infractions are aggravated by the fact that he has already been imposed a disciplinary
sanction before.1âwphi1 In Nuñez v. Atty. Astorga,28 respondent was held liable for conduct
unbecoming an attorney for which he was fined ₱2,000.00.

Given the foregoing, the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two years, as
recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, is proper.

The Court, however, will not adopt the recommendation of the IBP to order respondent to return the
sum of ₱15,000.00 he received from complainant under the "Deed of Sale with Right to Repurchase."
This is a civil liability best determined and awarded in a civil case rather than the present administrative
cases.

In Roa v. Moreno,29 the Court pronounced that "[i]n disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only
issue is whether the officer of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. Our
only concern is the determination of respondent’s administrative liability. Our findings have no material
bearing on other judicial action which the parties may choose to file against each other."While the
respondent lawyer’s wrongful actuations may give rise at the same time to criminal, civil, and
administrative liabilities, each must be determined in the appropriate case; and every case must be
resolved in accordance with the facts and the law applicable and the quantum of proof required in each.
Section 5,30 in relation to Sections 131 and 2,32 Rule 133 of the Rules of Court states that in administrative
cases, such as the ones atbar, only substantial evidence is required, not proof beyond reasonable doubt
as in criminal cases, or preponderance of evidence asin civil cases. Substantial evidence is that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.33

The Court notes that based on the same factual antecedents as the present administrative cases,
complainant instituted a criminal case for estafa against respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No.
3112-A, before the MTC. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action.34 Unless the complainant waived the civil action, reserved the right to
institute it separately, or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then his civil action for
the recovery of civil liability arising from the estafa committed by respondent is deemed instituted with
Criminal Case No. 3112-A. The civil liability that complainant may recover in Criminal Case No. 3112-A
includes restitution; reparation of the damage caused him; and/or indemnification for consequential
damages,35which may already cover the ₱15,000.00 consideration complainant had paid for the subject
property.

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found GUILTY of the following: breach of the Lawyer’s Oath;
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct; and disrespect for the Court and causing undue delay of
these cases, for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, reckoned
from receipt of this Decision, with WARNING that a similar misconduct in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for their information and guidance. The Court Administrator is directed to circulate this
Decision to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 8000 August 5, 2014

CHAMELYN A. AGOT, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LUIS P. RIVERA, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

For the Court's resolution is a Complaint-Affidavit1 dated August 30, 2008 filed by complainant
Chamelyn A. Agot (complainant) against respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent), charging him of
violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer's oath for misrepresentation,
deceit, and failure to account for and return her money despite several demands.

The Facts

In her Complaint-Affidavit, complainant alleged that she was invited as maid of honor in her best
friend’s wedding on December 9, 2007 at the United States of America. To facilitate the issuance of her
United States (US) visa, complainant sought the services of respondent who represented himself as an
immigration lawyer. Thus, on November 17, 2007, they entered into a Contract of Legal Services
(Contract),2 whereby respondent undertook to facilitate and secure the release of a US immigrant visa in
complainant’s favor prior to the scheduled wedding. In consideration therefor, complainant paid
respondent the amount of ₱350,000.00 as downpayment and undertook to pay the balance of
₱350,000.00 after the issuance of the US visa.3 The parties likewise stipulated that should complainant’s
visa application be denied for any reason other than her absence on the day of the interview and/or for
records of criminal conviction and/or any court-issued hold departure order, respondent is obligated to
return the said downpayment.4 However, respondent failed to perform his undertaking within the
agreed period. Worse, complainant was not even scheduled for interview in the US Embassy. As the
demand for refund of the downpayment was not heeded, complainant filed a criminal complaint for
estafa and the instant administrative complaint against respondent.5

In his Comment6 dated December 5, 2008, respondent claimed that his failure to comply with his
obligation under the Contract was due to the false pretenses of a certain Rico Pineda (Pineda), who he
had believed to be a consul for the US Embassy and to whom he delivered the amount given by the
complainant. Respondent elaborated that he had a business relationship with Pineda on the matter of
facilitating the issuance of US visas to his friends and family, including himself. He happened to disclose
this to a certain Joseph Peralta, who in turn referred his friend, the complainant, whose previous US visa
application had been denied, resulting in the execution of the Contract. Respondent claimed that Pineda
reneged on his commitments and could no longer be located but, nonetheless, assumed the
responsibility to return the said amount to complainant.7 To buttress his claims, respondent attached
pictures supposedly of his friends and family with Pineda as well as electronic mail messages (e-mails)
purportedly coming from the latter.8

The IBP’s Report and Recommendation

In a Report and Recommendation9 dated April 17, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and accordingly, recommended
that he be meted the penalty of suspension for a period of four (4) months, with a warning that a
repetition of the same would invite a stiffer penalty.10

The Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of engaging in deceitful conduct for: (a)
misrepresenting himself as an immigration lawyer; (b) failing to deliver the services he contracted; and
(c) being remiss in returning complainant’s downpayment of ₱350,000.00. The Investigating
Commissioner did not lend credence to respondent’s defense anent his purported transactions with
Pineda considering that the latter’s identity was not proven and in light of respondent’s self-serving
evidence, i.e., photographs and e-mails, which were bereft of any probative value.11

In a Resolution dated December 14, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and
approved the aforesaid report and recommendation with the modification increasing the period of
suspension to six (6) months and ordering respondent to return the amount of ₱350,000.0012 to
complainant within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice, with legal interest from the date of demand.13

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for
violating the CPR.

The Court’s Ruling

After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings, subject to the
modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.

As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but
also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing.14 In this regard, Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR,
provides:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LANDAND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

In the instant case, respondent misrepresented himself as an immigration lawyer, which resulted to
complainant seeking his assistance to facilitate the issuance of her US visa and paying him the amount of
₱350,000.00 as downpayment for his legal services. In truth, however, respondent has no specialization
in immigration law but merely had a contact allegedly with Pineda, a purported US consul, who
supposedly processes US visa applications for him. However, respondent failed to prove Pineda’s
identity considering that the photographs and e-mails he submitted were all self-serving and thus, as
correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, bereft of any probative value and consequently
cannot be given any credence. Undoubtedly, respondent’s deception is not only unacceptable,
disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; it reveals a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit
to practice law.15

Corollary to such deception, respondent likewise failed to perform his obligations under the Contract,
which is to facilitate and secure the issuance of a US visa in favor of complainant. This constitutes a
flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 – A
lawyer shall not neglecta legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.

Under Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound
to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client’s cause with diligence, care, and
devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him.16 Therefore, a lawyer’s neglect of a legal matter
entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held
administratively liable,17 as in this case.

Furthermore, respondent violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when he failed to refund
the amount of ₱350,000.00 that complainant paid him, viz.:

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTTHAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

xxxx

Rule 16.03 – A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. x x x.

Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a
great fidelity and good faith.18 The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer
the duty to account for the money or property collected or received for or from his client.19 Thus, a
lawyer’s failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client, as in this case,
gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust
reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality as well as of professional
ethics.20

Anent the proper penalty for respondent’s acts, jurisprudence provides that in similar cases where
lawyers neglected their client’s affairs and, at the same time, failed to return the latter’s money and/or
property despite demand, the Court imposed upon them the penalty of suspension from the practice of
law. In Segovia-Ribaya v. Lawsin,21 the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of one (1) year for his
failure to perform his undertaking under his retainership agreement with his client and to return the
money given to him by the latter. Also, in Jinon v. Jiz,22the Court suspended the lawyer for a period of
two (2) years for his failure to return the amount his client gave him for his legal services which he never
performed. In this case, not only did respondent fail to facilitate the issuance of complainant’s US visa
and return her money, he likewise committed deceitful acts in misrepresenting himself as an
immigration lawyer, resulting in undue prejudice to his client. Under these circumstances, a graver
penalty should be imposed upon him. In view of the foregoing, the Court deems it appropriate to
increase the period of suspension from the practice of law of respondent from six (6) months, as
recommended by the IBP, to two (2) years.

Finally, the Court sustains the IBP's recommendation ordering respondent to return the amount of
₱350,000.00 he received from complainant as downpayment. It is well to note that "while the Court has
previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only revolve around the determination of the
respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his civil liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains
applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature - for instance, when the claim
involves moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and
not intrinsically linked to his professional engagement."23 Hence, since respondent received the
aforesaid amount as part of his legal fees, the Court finds the return thereof to be in order.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Luis P. Rivera (respondent) is found guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon
1, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2)
years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a stem warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.1âwphi1

Furthermore, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainant Chamelyn A. Agot the legal fees he
received from the latter in the amount of ₱350,000.00 within ninety (90) days from the finality of this
Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of a more severe
penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent's record in this Court as attorney. Further, let
copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court
Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. VICENTE RAUL
ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,

vs.

VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:

Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," filed on
September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice committed against
his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as a tribunal "peopled by men
who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity." His client's he continues, who was
deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the
altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the
members of this Court, saying "that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme
Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the
people's forum," so that "the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and
that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends
his petition with a prayer that

... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney
and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at any time in the future and in the event we
regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest
profession.

He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:

Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the

tribunal's "unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without
any reason.

Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay
P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.

xxx xxx xxx

There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where our Supreme Court is
composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reason their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.

xxx xxx xxx

He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present
members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all cases brought to its attention without
discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied
resolutions. (Emphasis supplied)

Atty. Almacen's statement that

... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of [sic] justice, who
ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity

was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of September 28,
1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had "accused the high tribunal of
offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his charge is one of the constitutional
bases for impeachment."

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs. Antonio H.
Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after due hearing,
rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a copy of the decision.
Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He served on the adverse
counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and place of hearing on said
motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For "lack of
proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a
copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for
reconsideration to which he attached the required registry return card. This second motion for
reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal
motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier, that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the
appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial
court elevated the case to the Court of Appeals.

But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the following words:

Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee praying that the
appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED
TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses, the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated
July 5, 1966 (pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and place of
hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu
Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June 24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period
to appeal, and, consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.

Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not
decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in Support
of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A. Venturanza, L-20417,
decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the Court of Appeals denied the
motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the supplement thereto of the
same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967,
dismissing the appeal.

Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case and that of Manila
Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by
this Court in its resolution of May 8, 1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case, Republic vs.
Venturanza, L-20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question raised by
appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.,
Inc. case.

There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety & Fidelity Co.

In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to dismiss the appeal, based
on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier
than the date of promulgation of the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965.
Further, the resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court issued it
"without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the main decision in said case (Rep.
vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior
decisions contrary to the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety and
Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the matter in issue.

Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by minute
resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for reconsideration as well as his
petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and for extension of time. Entry of
judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second motion for reconsideration filed by him
after the Said date was ordered expunged from the records.

It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to — a pleading that is interspersed from
beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory remarks
hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a behavior that is as
unprecedented as it is unprofessional.

Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his petition until
he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to make good his proffer.
No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate, which he had earlier
vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his petition. To said reminder he
manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs.
Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did
not require him to do either a positive or negative act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he
"chose to pursue the negative act."

In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause "why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the November 17
resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court resolved (on December 7) "to require
Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof, his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral
argument shall be deemed waived and incident submitted for decision." To this resolution he
manifested that since this Court is "the complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard
and to answer questions "in person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe
his sincerity and candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has
no time to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file
a written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.

His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from being
contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time embellishing it with
abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:

At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew: —

"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and
with what measure you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see the speck in thy
brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother,
"Let me cast out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy own eye? Thou hypocrite,
first cast out the beam from thy own eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy
brother's eyes."

"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also to them: for this is the Law and the
Prophets."

xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his petition. On the
contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with his lawyer's oath that he will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the
underscored statements contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the entire Court, without
justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of
law.

xxx xxx xxx

Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has been asserted with NO
MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly motivated with the highest interest of justice that in
the particular case of our client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE,
our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...

xxx xxx xxx

To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity, generosity, fairness,
understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest interest of JUSTICE, — what did we get from this
COURT? One word, DENIED, with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court
towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our particular case.
xxx xxx xxx

Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that notwithstanding the
violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this Court in the reverse order of natural things,
is now in the attempt to inflict punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.

Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE, CHARITY, GENEROSITY and
FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER.
Now that your respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement with
emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that even our own President,
said: — "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the
Philippines today is not what it is used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly
and brutally that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."

xxx xxx xxx

We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR. We attack the decision of
this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We were compelled by force of necessity. We were
angry but we waited for the finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties.
We never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end, after seeing that the
Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our client and sensing that you have not
performed your duties with "circumspection, carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent
rise to claim his God given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.

xxx xxx xxx

The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further violations we sought to be
prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .

xxx xxx xxx

What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling Madam
Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are committed in thy
name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in thy name' or more
appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."

xxx xxx xxx

We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but who would correct such
abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A strong public opinion must be generated so as
to curtail these abuses.

xxx xxx xxx

The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all courts and government
offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no
members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy
and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings to give us
reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer to no human
defect or ailment in the above statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing
more.

xxx xxx xxx

As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which
reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost
today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we
alone may decide as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and
to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we
must uphold the latter.

But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a studied
disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.

He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions. We have
been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the reasons for denial. We
have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject frustration of a lawyer who
tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously marshalls his arguments, only to
have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth to tell, however, most petitions rejected
by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-
impression cogency, but fail to, withstand critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in
giving due course to petitions for certiorari.

Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we reject, we
would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the Constitution. The proper role
of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S. Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide
"only those cases which present questions whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond
the particular facts and parties involved." Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter
in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:

A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same petition different reasons
may read different justices to the same result ... .

Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons for denying petitions
for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that the Court indicate its reasons for denial.
Practical considerations preclude. In order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable
duties, Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the Court's discretion.
During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217, 224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For
the same three terms the Court denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for
discretionary review. If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however
brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is prohibitive. Apart from the
fact that as already indicated different reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court in
concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G. 8099), this
Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view on this matter.
There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates Section 12 of Article VIII of
the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:

In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised before; and we held
that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above constitutional requirement. They merely
hold that the petition for review should not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the
Rules of Court; and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be remembered
that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound
judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and
the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.

By the way, this mode of disposal has — as intended — helped the Court in alleviating its heavy docket;
it was patterned after the practice of the U.S. Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often
merely ordered "dismissed".

We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to buttress
such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that the supervisory
jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to give every losing party
another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which recites:

Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.—A review is not a matter of right but of sound
judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The
following, while neither controlling nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of
reasons which will be considered:

(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not theretofore determined by the
Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court;

(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial
proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower court, as to call for the exercise of the
power of supervision.

Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the
pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the dismissal of his
appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from straying away from the
"accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the procedural lines etched by this Court
in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.

As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew — or ought
to have known — that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of appeal, the
movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he did), but also notify
the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did not). This rule was
unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction & Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5
(formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall
be served upon all the Parties concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of
the same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such notice. Indeed it has
been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a useless piece of paper (Philippine National
Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28, 1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of
Lipa v. Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil. 117). The reason is
obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing the Court would have no way to
determine whether that party agrees to or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his
objection, since the Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or
opposition.

If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has only
himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which, incidentally,
is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his carelessness, he looked for a
"whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of a martyr, and, in offering to
surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying this Court and inflicting his
exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear that there is no justification for his
scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.

Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect consideration. We
know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he loses what he sanguinely
believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide latitude to differ with, and voice
their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the manner in which they are handed down.

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public officers.
This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority,4 or that it is
articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the criticism concerns a concluded
litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open to public consumption.7 "Our decisions
and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press
and the people have the undoubted right to comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see
fit. Judicial officers, like other public servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery
of public opinion."

The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity, competence
and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason why courts have
been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This danger lurks especially in
such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire Court are themselves collectively the
aggrieved parties.

Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their actuations. 10 For
courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into the tapestry of justice.
Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also
to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of
democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is expected to serve.

Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. The
reason is that

An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him in the administration
of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and
the independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In
re Ades, 6 F Supp. 487) .

Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In the
prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he dissects
with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for -all to see that
flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As aptly stated by Chief Justice
Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:

No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or publication of opinions
as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than members of the bar. They have the best
opportunities for observing and forming a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the
courts. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to
account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or judges whom he may
consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be
entertained. ... .

Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also
to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he "professionally
answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal
animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).

Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become conversant with the
character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely to abuse the privilege, as no other class has
as great an interest in the preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v.
Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)

To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips of those
in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak disparagingly. "Under
such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge may be rehearsed, but as to his
demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit Court, 72 N.W. 196)

But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One hand, and abuse
and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary
action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere flux and
ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden more basic, more
exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the courts. He vows solemnly to
conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the Rules of Court constantly remind him
"to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers." 15 The first canon of
legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance."

As Mr. Justice Field puts it:

... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express declaration take upon
themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not merely to be obedient to the Constitution and
laws, but to maintain at all times the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation
is not discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but includes
abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward judges personally for
their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20 Law. 4d. 647, 652)

The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the — assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers — even those gifted
with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.

The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than the judge, and it may
tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-
respect are as necessary to the orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an
army. The decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to decide, and
the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl.
481)

We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is his privilege. And he
may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it. That is his misfortune. Some such frame of
mind, however, should not be allowed to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in
words calculated to jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per Justice
Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)

In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at one
time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private conversations or
communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in insulting language as to bring
into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject the attorney to disciplinary action.

Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.

1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism of his
conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608, nevertheless
declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the administration of
justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties," adding that:

It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is beyond bona fide
comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of decency and truth or which are not aimed
at. the destruction of public confidence in the judicial system as such. However, when the likely
impairment of the administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations then
the rule is otherwise.

2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a leaflet
entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having committed judicial error,
of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of being subject to the control of a
group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They say that Justice is BLIND, but it took
Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that
the leaflet went much further than the accused, as a lawyer, had a right to do.

The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle and besmirch the court
and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.

3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year suspension of
an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a candidate for re-election
to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the judge concluded with a statement
that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to keep that money." Said the court:

We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism members of the bar
may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of the courts, even though it extends to the
deliberate publication by the attorney capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the
intelligence and integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17 LRA (N.S.)
585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40 Am. Rep. 637. In the first case
mentioned it was observed, for instance:

"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous publication by an attorney, directed against a
judicial officer, could be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its author."

Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character than those made by the
respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that which requires of those who are permitted to
enjoy the privilege of practicing law the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth,
honesty and fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public confidence in
the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and usefulness of the courts be maintained.
In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.

4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a woman who
had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of review. He wrote the
judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel suit against the judge and
others. The letter began:

Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is protected from the libel,
lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall be compelled to resort to such drastic action as
the law allows and the case warrants.

Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of Illinois
declared:

... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint
against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but
the public interest and the administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence
and respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct toward the judges
personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which tend to bring the courts and the law into
disrepute and to destroy public confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to
the judge was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial functions,
and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in the Sunday papers, was
intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute with the public.

5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced by
corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not appear that
the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer was charged with
unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two years. The Court said:

A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the court against whose
members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt, undermine its influence as an unbiased
arbiter of the people's right, and interfere with the administration of justice. ...

Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of disciplinary proceedings,
deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which he possesses as a citizen. The acts and
decisions of the courts of this state, in cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from
fair and honest comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of legitimate
criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of speech. We well understand that
an independent bar, as well as independent court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy,
111 Atl. 723. 725.

6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to an
appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the appeal was
taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying suspension from
practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements, and asserted that the
affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave injustice. The Court said:

We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession of criticising the
motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their duties, and thereby reflecting on the
administration of justice and creating the impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or
improper motives. Every attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his
duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove judicial officers for
any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a violation of his duties, or would justify an
inference that he is false to his trust, or has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and
such charges to the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the person
making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case decided against him, or the
right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions of the courts, or the reasons announced for them,
the habit of criticising the motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when
the proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends to subvert the
confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the administration of justice; and when such
charges are made by officers of the courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of
justice, the attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.

7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:

I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible temporary observations
more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as my clients were foreigners, it might have been
expecting too much to look for a decision in their favor against a widow residing here.

The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:

... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and privileged criticism,
but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of
this court, and make out a prima facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a
license from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to the court as
well as to his client.

The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.

8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper an article
in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging the court of
having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The Court
suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:

The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive of the public good, if
the conduct of such members does not measure up to the requirements of the law itself, as well as to
the ethics of the profession. ...

The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of prime importance under
our system and ideals of government. No right thinking man would concede for a moment that the best
interest to private citizens, as well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or
otherwise, would be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such right does
not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act honestly and honorably both
with their client and with the courts where justice is administered, if administered at all, could ever
properly serve their client or the public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the
law. Truth and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary. The health of
a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply than is the health of the thought of a
community toward the judiciary by the filthy wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of
the confidence the public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the
affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his strength and money to
maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the members of the bar the law itself demands
retribution — not the court.

9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an attorney in a
pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt, and wicked
conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal prosecution,"
"calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered conduct unbecoming of
a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered stricken from the roll of attorneys.

10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater latitude
should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending. This lawyer
wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota impugning both the
intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in the decisions of certain
appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The letters were published in a
newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:

You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than the burglar to his
plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with the court acting as a fence, or umpire,
watchful and vigilant that the widow got no undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable, short of assigning to
the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar
association, or a committee chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by
the researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the court, or any other
person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the decision, which shall not require
fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of
the state to read it.

The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months, delivered
its opinion as follows:

The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct in sending to the Chief
Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we have found, for the very purpose of insulting
him and the other justices of this court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally
because of acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a communication, so
made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect in any case would be to gratify the spite of
an angry attorney and humiliate the officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the
public in regard to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced by passion, could
ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer, with due regard to his position, can resent
such an insult otherwise than by methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written,
however abusive, vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress in any
action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or libelous matter to the person
defamed does not constitute an actionable publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In
these respects the sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different from his
other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly different principles are applicable
thereto.

The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he exercised the rights of a
citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned by considerations of public policy, to which
reference has been made, he was immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To
that extent his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as an officer
of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief Justice personally, he exercised
no right which the court can recognize, but, on the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain
the respect due to courts and judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the
rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court from all insulting
language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally for their official acts." Bradley v. Fisher, 13
Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved,
between the indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act, and a
personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the judge in his chambers or at
his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts
addressed or spoken to others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by
authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that case, as has been shown,
fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings of the court in actions which are ended, it held
that one might be summarily punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the
court, for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said the court, "by
insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the assailant restrains his passion until
the judge leaves the building, to compel the judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of
the people by tame submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of
punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded, manly man would hold
judicial office under such conditions."

That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally, constitutes professional
delinquency for which a professional punishment may be imposed, has been directly decided. "An
attorney who, after being defeated in a case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of
his conduct and reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be disciplined by
the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87 The same is held in Re Griffin (City
Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3 N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had
addressed a sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in reference
to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I have been robbed of 80." And it
was decided that, while such conduct was not a contempt under the state, the matter should be "called
to the attention of the Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court,
"counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of judges, to charge them
with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery, either as principals or accessories, it will not be
long before the general public may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner,
and thus the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of justice will fall
into bad repute."

The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect much the same as the case
at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter
received by due course of mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting
terms to the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the attorneys. For
this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having "willfully failed to maintain respect due
to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the
same principle, and in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex
parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark. 149; Commonwealth v. Dandridge,
2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237, 244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa.
14, 36 Atl. 134; Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far sustained as to make it our duty
to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...

11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months for
publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister influence of a
gang that had paralyzed him for two years.

12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against the official
acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was disbarred for
criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge was dishonest in
reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.

13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of cases,
criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of propaganda, said the
court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into disrepute with the public, for
which reason the lawyer was disbarred.

14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case, prepared over a
period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court declared that his acts involved
such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of the bar. His disbarment was ordered,
even though he expressed an intention to resign from the bar.

The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial pronouncements is
indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers, critical of the courts and their
judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which transcend the permissible bounds of fair
comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to bring them into disrepute or to subvert public
confidence in their integrity and in the orderly administration of justice, constitute grave professional
misconduct which may be visited with disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by
the Supreme Court in the exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of
the morals and ethics of the legal fraternity.

Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts of
counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable nature have
generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which, although resting on
different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless illustrates that universal
abhorrence of such condemnable practices.

A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.

1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court, although conceding
that

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so
with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to
exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which
the dignity of the courts requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the
stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a very shaky
foundation,

found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed

... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity,
because the court is thereby charged with no less than having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws,
the rights to the parties, and 'of the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and
mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .

2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law, reaching to,
the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law, refused to divulge the
source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i local newspaper a statement
expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once
more putting in evidence the incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and
his belief that "In the wake of so many blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last
years, ... the only remedy to put an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme
Court," which tribunal he denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from
the impregnable bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa,
Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He
there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming session of
Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. Finding him in
contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the guarantee of free speech, this
Court declared:

But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in the press, the
respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision of the Parazo case, which was then
and still is pending consideration by this Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to
intimidate the members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of which he is
one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing the number of Justices from eleven,
so as to change the members of this Court which decided the Parazo case, who according to his
statement, are incompetent and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by
this Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the respondent also attacks
the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court
into disrepute and degrading the administration. of justice ... .

To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing deliberately so many
blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the
law and justice is on the part of the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was
rendered, in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to undermine the
confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court, and consequently to
lower ,or degrade the administration of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is,
under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their
grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their
confidence in the honesty and integrity of the members of this Court and believe that they cannot
expect justice therefrom, they might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and
perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts, Atty. Vicente
Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he
owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that

... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct and
communication to the courts; he may be removed from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as
being guilty of flagrant misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)

3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al., supra,
where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly adhering to
its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of the Court of
Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal. Articulating the
sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:

As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for reconsideration,
implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It speaks of one pitfall into which this Court
has repeatedly fallen whenever the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question.
That pitfall is the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the law on
jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings
without as much as making any reference to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the
jurisdiction of the industrial court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that
in determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and continuously repeated
that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court as one which refuses to hew to the line
drawn by the law on jurisdictional boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the
pronouncements of this Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect.
Those statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They bring into question
the capability of the members — and some former members of this Court to render justice. The second
paragraph quoted yields a tone of sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against
splitting of jurisdiction."

Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of brevity,
need not now be reviewed in detail.

Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases — all of them involved contumacious
statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the doctrinal rule that the
protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against scurrilous remarks or malicious
innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty.
Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the
remarks for which he is now called upon to account were made only after this Court had written finis to
his appeal. This is of no moment.

The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its vitality. For
sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a modification thereof,
however, came when, in People vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran dissented with
the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P. Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted
to. A complete disengagement from the settled rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a
contempt proceeding, where the editor of the Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for
publishing an editorial which asserted that the 1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical
manner after the question of the validity of the said examinations had been resolved and the case
closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent
in Alarcon to the effect that them may still be contempt by publication even after a case has been
terminated. Said Chief Justice Moran in Alarcon:

A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in administering
justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal contempt which is 'summarily punishable by
courts. A publication which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that
which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt, and is
equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt, to be shielded against the
influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important duty of the courts to administer justice in the
decision of a pending case. In the second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to
vindicate the courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy public
confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there is no
decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication. In the second, the
contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and
its dignity. Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.

Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal had
attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been perpetrated during
the pendency of the said appeal.

More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for such
post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution of
November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it concerns Atty.
Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an officer of this Court, in
the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority and duty to safeguard and
ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy
disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is
altogether of no consequence. The sole objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal
profession, by removing or suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.

Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the solemn
duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law. Inherent in this
prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the practice of law those who
have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the Bar. Thus —

The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent and incidental power in
courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. To deny its
existence is equivalent to a declaration that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not
subject to restraint. Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be
tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this state that power is vested
in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion to exclude them from
practice. 23

This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy
of their confidence and respect. So much so that —

... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy of the trust and
confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only the right, but the duty, of the court
which made him one of its officers, and gave him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw
the privilege. Therefore it is almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of
attorneys are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions as an attorney,
not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own behavior and the exercise of a just and
sound judicial discretion. 24

Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere inherent or
incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of Court. 25

Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an assessment of
whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question are properly the object
of disciplinary sanctions.

The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty. Almacen's
part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond making the mere
offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually availed of the said move as
a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated entirety of his petition bristles with vile
insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and disrespect to the Court and its members.
Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the
justice administered by this Court to be not only blind "but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated
acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the
perpetration of "silent injustices" and "short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members
as "calloused to pleas of justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in
the people's forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a
calculated effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called
upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with characteristic
arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the Scriptures, virtually
tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites incapable of administering
justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.

The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation speaks for
itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far transcend the
permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose but to gratify the spite of
an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important of all, bring ;this Court and its
members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to the detriment of the orderly
administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture presents no redeeming feature, and
completely negates any pretense of passionate commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a
classic example of gross misconduct, gross violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the
Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our
disciplinary powers is thus laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism. But a
critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the court of last
resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous to obloquy, and
requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only through constant striving to
attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of judiciousness and must be informed -
by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26

It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants, prosecutors and
judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total distortion,
not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.

Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not — and does not involve — a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. 27 Not being intended to.
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls
upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by
purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In such
posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.

Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against the
Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof. But in
the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the
individual members act not as such individuals but. only as a duly constituted court. Their distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. 30So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof — as
well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at
grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit
to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.

Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the power
to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in this
Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally
invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense the
aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of that power
because public policy demands that they., acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for
disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one
entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.

Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon Atty.
Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range from mere
suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the circumstances the
imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion of the Court which, being
neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or prejudice, should ever be
controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of the Bar be scrupulously guarded
and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously maintained.

That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be overemphasized.
However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be decreed where a lesser sanction
would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may not perhaps be futile to hope that in the
sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize that abrasive language never fails to do
disservice to an advocate and that in every effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added
glow of respect, it is our view that suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated
persistence in his misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us
no way of determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree
that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because jurisprudence
grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the comforting support of
precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a person from the practice of
law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in degree and effect, can be regarded
as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit of this choice is best shown by the fact that
it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for himself how long or how short that suspension shall
last. For, at any time after the suspension becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once
again fit to resume the practice of law.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is hereby,
suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.

Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the Court of
Appeals for their information and guidance.
Bar Matter No. 1153

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 9, 2010

"B.M. No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations
Through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). - The Court Resolved to APPROVE the
proposed amendments to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138, to wit:

SEC. 5.Additional Requirement for Other Applicants. — All applicants for admission other than those
referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily
show that they have successfully completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of
Laws or its equivalent degree, in a law school or university officially recognized by the Philippine
Government or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.

No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be admitted to the bar
examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the following course in a law school or
university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law,
public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence,
taxation and legal ethics.

A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the bar examination only
upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses leading to
the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law
school by the proper authority; and (c) completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws
academic program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government.

SEC. 6.Pre-Law. — An applicant for admission to the bar examination shall present a certificate issued by
the proper government agency that, before commencing the study of law, he or she had pursued and
satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission
thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences.

A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her Bachelor of Laws degree or its equivalent in a
foreign law school must present proof of having completed a separate bachelor's degree course.

The Clerk of Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, is hereby directed to CIRCULARIZE this
resolution among all law schools in the country."
B.M. Nos. 979 and 986 December 10, 2002

RE: 1999 BAR EXAMINATIONS,

MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Petitioner was conditionally admitted to take the 1999 Bar Examinations. Like many others he was
directed "to submit the required certification of completion of the pre-bar review course within sixty
(60) days from the last day of the examinations."

Petitioner passed the 1999 Examinations. But in a Resolution dated 13 April 2000 the Court disqualified
him from becoming a member of the Philippine Bar and declared his examinations null and void on two
(2) grounds: (a) Petitioner failed to submit the required certificate of completion of the pre-bar review
course under oath for his conditional admission to the 1999 Bar Examinations; and (b) He committed a
serious act of dishonesty which rendered him unfit to become a member of the Philippine Bar when he
made it appear in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations that he took his pre-bar review course
at the Philippine Law School (PLS) when, as certified by Acting Registrar Rasalie G. Kapauan, PLS had not
offered such course since 1967.

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the 13 April 2000 Resolution but his motion was denied.

On 29 October 2001, retired Regional Trial Court Judge Amante P. Purisima, father of petitioner, filed a
Petition to Reopen Bar Matter 986. However, the Court in its Resolution of 27 November 2001 "noted
without action" the said petition and further resolved "that no further pleadings will be entertained."

On 2 July 2002 petitioner filed a Motion for Due Process stating, among others, his reasons why in his
Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations it was stated that he was enrolled in and regularly attending
the pre-bar review course at the PLS and not at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where he in fact
took the said course as evidenced by the Certification dated 22 July 1999 of Dean Amado L. Damayuga
of the UST Faculty of Civil Law.

Petitioner claimed that the statement in paragraph 8 of his Petition that "he x x x enrolled in and passed
the regular fourth year (law) review classes at the Phil. Law School x x x x" was a "self-evident clerical
error and a mere result of an oversight which is not tantamount to a deliberate and willful declaration of
a falsehood."

Petitioner explained that upon obtaining a "ready-made form" of the Petition and affixing his signature
on the space provided therefor, he requested his schoolmate/friend Ms. Lilian A. Felipe to fill up the
form, have it notarized and then to file it for him with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC). Being
"consumed with his preparations for the upcoming bar examinations," petitioner admitted that he did
not have the opportunity to check the veracity of the information supplied by Ms. Felipe. Had he done
this he could have readily seen that Ms. Felipe had erroneously typed "Philippine Law School," instead of
UST, on the space provided for the school where petitioner attended his pre-bar review course.
Petitioner further averred that on 26 July 1999, a week after the filing of the Petition to take the bar, he
(thru Ms. Felipe) submitted the Certification of Completion of the Pre-Bar Review as Annex "D" of his
Petition to prove that he actually enrolled and attended the pre-bar review course in UST.

To corroborate his enrollment in UST, petitioner submitted (a) the Official Receipt of his payment of
tuition fee for the course; (b) his identification card for the course; (c) car pass to the UST campus; (d)
individual affidavits of classmates in the pre-bar review course in UST that petitioner was their classmate
and that he attended the review course; (e) separate affidavits of five (5) UST students/acquaintances of
petitioner that they saw him regularly attending the review lectures; (f) affidavit of Professor Abelardo
T. Domondon attesting to the attendance of petitioner in his review classes and lectures in Taxation and
Bar Review Methods at the UST Faculty of Civil Law; (g) affidavit of Ms. Gloria L. Fernandez, maintenance
staff at the UST Law Department that she knew petitioner very well as he was among those who would
arrive early and request her to open the reading area and turn on the airconditioning before classes
started; and, (h) affidavit of Ms. Melicia Jane Parena, office clerk at the UST Faculty Civil Law, that Dean
Dimayuga issued the Certification dated 22 July 1999 to the effect that petitioner was officially enrolled
in and had completed the pre-bar review course in UST which started on 14 April 1999 and ended 24
September 1999.

Petitioner also explained that he did not submit the required certification of completion of the pre-bar
review course within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations because he thought that it
was already unnecessary in view of the Certification of Completion (Annex "D" of his Petition) issued by
Dean Dimayuga which not only attested to his enrollment in UST but also his completion of the pre-bar
review course.

In a letter dated 17 September 2002, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., thru Senior
Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, who took over as Chairman of the 1995 Committee on Bar
Examinations, retired Judge Purisima expressed his concern for his son and stated that his son took the
pre-bar review course in UST and that he entry in his son’s Petition that he took it in PLS is a "self-
evident clerical error." He then poised the question that if there was really a falsehood and forgery in
paragraph 8 and Annex "D" of the Petition, which would have been a fatal defect, why then was his son
issued permit to take the 1999 Bar examinations?

Pursuant to the Court Resolution of 1 October 2002, the OBC conducted a summary hearing on 30
October 2002 during which the Bar Confidant asked clarificatory questions from petitioner who
appeared together with his father, retired Judge Purisima, and Ms. Lilian Felipe.

On 7 November 2002 the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation the pertinent portions of
which are quoted hereunder:

"Considering petitioner’s explanation fortified by unquestionably genuine documents in support

thereof, we respectfully submit that petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt.

The Resolution of the Court dated April 2, 2002, in Bar Matter 890, may be cited. In the said case, Victor
Rey T. Gingoyon was given the benefit of the doubt and allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath.

In said case, Mr. Gingoyon stated in his Petition to take the 1998 Bar that the charge of Grave Threats
(Criminal Case No. 9693) against him was still pending before the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities,
Mandaue City, Branch 3, when in fact, in the decision of MTC dated April 8, 1998, he was already
convicted. But the Court believed his explanation that he had no actual knowledge of his conviction.

In allowing Mr. Gingoyon to take the Lawyer’s Oath, the Court stated, thus:

‘It had been two (2) years past since he first filed the petition to take the lawyer’s oath. Hopefully, this
period of time of being deprived the privilege had been long enough for him to do some introspection.’

In his letter, petitioner’s father also pleaded that the three (3) years denial of his son’s request for oath-
taking should be enough penalty, if there may be any wrong that his son may have unwittingly
committed.

It is submitted that the same kindness and compassion extended to Mr. Gingoyon in Bar Matter 890 be
given to petitioner. Three years deprivation of the privilege to practice law may be considered an ample
penalty, not to mention that petitioner has not been convicted of any crime.

As regards petitioner’s failure to submit within sixty days the required certification of completion of the
pre-bar review course, his explanation that there was no need for him to submit another certification
because the July 22, 1999 Certification of Dean Dimayuga certified not only his enrollment but also his
completion of the course, is impressed with truth.

Let it be also noted that, in the Resolution dated April 13, 2000, in this Bar Matter 986, the Court
declared DISQUALIFIED from the 1999 Bar examinations not only Purisima but also Josenio Marquez
Reoma, Ma. Salvacion Sucgang Revilla and Victor Estell Tesorero for their failure to submit within sixty
days from the last day of the examinations the certification of completion of the pre-bar review course.
However, the Court, in its Resolution dated June 20, 2000, acting on the separate motions for
reconsideration of the Court Resolution dated April 13, 2000 filed by Reoma and Revilla, both were
allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath.

In the case of Reoma, his explanation that his failure to submit the required certification was due to his
honest belief and assumption that the UP College of Law, where he took his review course, had filed the
required certification together with other required documents, was accepted.

In the case of Revilla, her claim that her failure to submit the required certification within the 60-day
period was due to her erroneous impression that only the certification of enrollment and attendance
was arequired, was likewise accepted.

The Court also allowed Mr. Tesorero to take his oath, as he stated that his f ailure to submit within the
60-day period was due to his honest and mistaken belief that he had substantially complied with the
requirements for admission to the Bar Examinations because he thought that the required certificate of
compleltition of the pre-bar review course is the same as the certificate of enrollment and attendance in
the said course.

The OBS respectfully submits that pertitioner’s explanation should also be given credit just like his three
co-examinees.

Let it be finally cited that in Bar Matter No. 832, in the Matter of Admission to the Bar of Blas Antonio M.
Tuliao, the Court also favorably considered the report of the Committee on Legal Education which
recommended the admission to the Bar of Mr. Tuliao on grounds of fairness, equal treatment and
protection, considering that his co-accused in a criminal case have been allowed to take the lawyer’s
oath. This Court stated, in its Resolution dated November 27, 2001, that there was no reason to accord a
different treatment to Mr. Tuliao, and that the dispensation of justice should be even-handed and
consistent."

The recommendation is well taken.

The foremost question to be resolved is whether petitioner did enrol in and complete his pre-bar review
course in UST as he herein avows.

The testimony of petitioner and Ms. Felipe during the 30 October 2002 hearing that the subject
Certification of Dean Dimayuga was duly submitted to the OBC a week after the filing of the Petition to
take the bar appears to be credible. It is supported by documentary evidence showing that petitioner
actually enrolled and completed the required course in UST.

Granting that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga was defective as it certified completion of the pre-bar
review course which was still on-going, this defect should not be attributed to petitioner considering
that he had no participation in the preparation thereof. Whatever it is, the fact remains that there is
such a certification issued by the UST which appears to be genuine. This finding is backed by the affidavit
of Ms. Parena, office clerk at the UST Faculty of Civil Law, that she was the one who released the
Certification to petitioner on 26 July 1999.

Indeed, it must be stressed that there is nothing on record which impugns the authenticity of the
subject Certification as well as that of the other documentary evidence proferred by petitioner to
establish that he was duly enrolled and took the pre-bar review course in UST, not in PLS. As to the
argument that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga did not include the "taking and completion" of the
pre-bar review course, the realities of our bar reviews render it difficult to record the attendance
religiously of the reviewees every single day for several months.

Considering petitioner’s explanation, fortified by undisputedly genuine documents, at the very least,
petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt and be allowed to take his oath.

The Court is well aware of instances in the past when ,as a measure of compassion and kindness, it has
acted favorably on similar petitions. In his letter petitioner’s father pleaded that "the denial of
permission for Mark to take his oath for about three (3) years now should be enough penalty." It is time
to move on.

At this juncture it may be well to note the Court’s growing concern over the apparent laxity of law
schools in the conduct of their pre-bar review classes. Specifically, it has been observed that the
attendance of reviewees is not closely monitored, such that some reviewees are able to comply with the
requisite with minimal attendance. Enrollment and completion of pre-bar review course is an additional
requirement under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for those who failed the bar examinations for three
(3) or more times.

For the Court to insist on strict compliance may be literally asking for the moon but it can be done. We
just have to bear in mind that this requirement is not an empty or idle ceremony; it is intended to
ensure the quality and preparedness of those applying for admission to the bar.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, as recommended by the Office of the Bar Confidant in its Report and
Recommendation dated 7 November 2002, the prayer in Bar Matters Nos. 979 and 986 is granted and
examinee MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA who passed the 1999 Bar Examinations is now allowed to take
the Lawyer’s Oath and be admitted to the Philippine Bar. He is further allowed to sign the Roll of
Attorneys upon payment of the required fees.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1053 September 7, 1979

SANTA PANGAN, complainant

vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, respondent,

RESOLUTION

ANTONIO, J.:

This has reference to the motion of complainant, Santa Pangan, to cite respondent Dionisio Ramos for
contempt. It appears from the record that on September 7, 1978 and March 13, 1979, the hearings in
this administrative case were postponed on the basis of respondent's motions for postponement. These
motions were predicated on respondent's allegations that on said dates he had a case set for hearing
before Branch VII, Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled People v. Marieta M. Isip (Criminal Case No.
35906). Upon verification, the attorney of record of the accused in said case is one "Atty. Pedro D.D.
Ramos, 306 Dona Salud Bldg., Dasmarinas Manila." Respondent admits that he used the name of "Pedro
D.D. Ramos" before said court in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906, but avers that he had a right
to do so because in his Birth Certificate (Annex "A"), his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos", and -his
parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and that the D.D. in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an
abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw his other given name and maternal surname.

This explanation of respondent is untenable. The name appearing in the "Roll of Attorneys" is "Dionisio
D. Ramos". The attorney's roll or register is the official record containing the names and signatures of
those who are authorized to practice law. A lawyer is not authorized to use a name other than the one
inscribed in the Roll of Attorneys in his practice of law.

The official oath obliges the attorney solemnly to swear that he will do no falsehood". As an officer in
the temple of justice, an attorney has irrefragable obligations of "truthfulness, candor and
frankness". 1 Indeed, candor and frankness should characterize the conduct of the lawyer at every stage.
This has to be so because the court has the right to rely upon him in ascertaining the truth. In
representing himself to the court as "Pedro D.D. Ramos" instead of "Dionisio D. Ramos", respondent has
violated his solemn oath.

The duty of an attorney to the courts to employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to
him, such means as are consistent with truth and honor cannot be overempahisized. These injunctions
circumscribe the general duty of entire devotion of the attorney to the client. As stated in a case, his I
nigh vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case, and to aid it in
doing justice and arriving at correct conclusions. He violates Ms oath of office ,when he resorts to
deception or permits his client to do so." 2

In using the name of' Pedro D.D. Ramos" before the courts instead of the name by which he was
authorized to practice law - Dionisio D. Ramos - respondent in effect resorted to deception. The
demonstrated lack of candor in dealing with the courts. The circumstance that this is his first aberration
in this regard precludes Us from imposing a more severe penalty.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Dionisio D. Ramos is severely REPRIMANDED and
warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspencion or disbarment from the
practice of law.

It appearing that the hearing of this case has been unduly delayed, the Investigator of this Court is
directed forthwith to proceed with the hearing to terminate it as soon as possible. The request of
complainant to appear in the afore-mentioned hearing, assisted by her counsel, Atty. Jose U. Lontoc, is
hereby granted.

SO ORDERED
B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT
AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan
stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as
part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea
bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to the lesser offense
of homicide through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated
11 February 1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment
for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower
court. The application for probation was granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial
Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.

Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the 1993
Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation
status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14
August 1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath
of office.

On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his
probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994. We note that his probation period did not
last for more than ten (10) months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation
dated 18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his
Petition for Admission to the Bar.

The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special
educational qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.2 The essentiality of good moral character in
those who would be lawyers is stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and
which we regard as having persuasive effect:

In Re Farmer: 3

xxx xxx xxx

This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the applicant's right to
receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which he must, in addition to other requisites,
satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary to make up such a character. It is something more
than an absence of bad character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have
acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have conducted himself as a man
of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. Such character expresses itself, not in negatives
nor in following the line of least resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is
right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. Consider for a
moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his advice comes home, in its ultimate
effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded
trust and confidence; he deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is
a sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .

xxx xxx xxx4

In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW 710:

It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to deviate from the straight
and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances that arise in the practice of profession. For
these reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral
standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is
required to cause a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each candidate for
admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to arrive at the conclusion that the
highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character of a candidate who presents
himself for admission to the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and
prevented, for, after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has
established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court when proceedings are
instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment of his license.

In Re Keenan:6

The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an
ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and continued only to those who
demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an
absolutely equal basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by
standards fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are allowed to
enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are allowed to remain in it.

Re Rouss:7

Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and professional
character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past
offense: an examination into character, like the examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.

Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8

Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not only protect the rights
and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to
clients or assistance to courts could such agents give? They are required to be of good moral
character, so that the agents and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the
due administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both those who have
not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be
permitted to appear in courts to aid in the administration of justice.

It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance
so far as the general public and the proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession
of legal learning:

. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):

The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of the law unless he
covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the attorney is more important, if
anything, to the public and to the proper administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may
be acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character
the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a disgrace instead of an
ornament to his great calling — a curse instead of a benefit to his community — a Quirk, a Gammon or a
Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission
to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be properly broader than inquiry into the moral
proceedings for disbarment:

Re Stepsay: 10

The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his admission to practice
is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.

Re Wells: 11

. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the California Bar the court
cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it appears that he has been guilty of acts
which would be cause for his disbarment or suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is
broader in its scope than that in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which
tends to show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and may no
doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of any of the acts declared to be
causes for disbarment.

The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar
must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general
public. There is a very real need to prevent a general perception that entry into the legal profession is
open to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal
the progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our legal system as
we know it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far short of the required
standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent)
infliction of severe physical injuries which proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul
Camaligan, certainly indicated serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries.
Mr. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and well-
being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved, reposed trust and
confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to death like a
useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral character.

Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to
consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character referred to above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement
possession of which must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the
bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for admission to the bar and
to take the attorney's oath of office.

Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and consideration, evidence that
he may be now regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon
those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from
responsible members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have actually
known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was
rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless
killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr.
Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person now, that
he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned profession of the law.

Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of
the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of
Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the
parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH

RESOLUTION

PADILLA, J.:

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred
his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.

The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during
fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially
entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas
and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each
of the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four
(4) years.

On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.

On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the
Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation

On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath
based on the order of his discharge from probation.

On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a
resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be
regarded as complying with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking
admission to the bar.

In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15)
certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6)
members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had
been established in honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's
family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.

On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on
petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.

In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:

a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was
deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the
accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage
of superior strength and treachery.

b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who
went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying
and begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused
had died of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.

c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a
loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels
the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.

d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He
therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration o f
justice. It is the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to
the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the
lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has
undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or
disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul
Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they
were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.

In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding
that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character."[1]

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question
of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.

Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The
death of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more
pronounced and profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but
due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and
anger directed at the cause of death.

Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than
praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to
find room for forgiveness.

However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit
to be a lawyer.

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take
the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following
admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not
inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout
Catholic with a genuine concern for civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul
Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law.
Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when
taking the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and
the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer
and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the
more unfortunate members of society.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath
on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal
profession.

SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1)

RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J.:

The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in the Philippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors
unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the
Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of
the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal to pay his membership
dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.

On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to
the Court for consideration and approval, pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws
of the IBP, which reads:

.... Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire
into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by registered mail to
the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.

On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter
adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the
membership fees due from him.

On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply.

Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to
submit memoranda in amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution.

At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings would show that the propriety
and necessity of the integration of the Bar of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent,
however, objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the Court
Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of
par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).

The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a
delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP
By-Laws (supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10
of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in
the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated
Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the
delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in these words of the Court
Rule:

SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the
'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter
be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words of the Court Rule:

SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board
of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. ...

The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his
constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status
as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as
a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by
the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the
IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.

The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name from the Roll of
Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is
rather of an "administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."

The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to constitutional issues that
inevitably and inextricably come up to the surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice
of law, define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for the exercise of the legal
profession.

The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case before the Court,
entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the
Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in
that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on
January 9, 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was

... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case
No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report
of the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is 'perfectly
constitutional and legally unobjectionable'. ...

Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.

An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as distinguished from
bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary.
Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded an
opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion
of its responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official
national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all the
rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable
annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of
professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or
disbarment of the offending member. 2

The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding considerations of public
interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than constitutionally and legally justifies the
restrictions that integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individual
lawyers. 3

Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the integration of the Bar have
been uniformly and universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an important
profession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with
public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in
the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of
the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the court. 4 The practice of law being clothed
with public interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common
good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court through Mr. Justice
Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the
exercise of the police power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).

When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt
rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it
did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in
ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the
President of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through
Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental considerations of
public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.

The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personal liberty,
property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to
secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil 218), for, as the
Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this
fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing
without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then
society win fall into anarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State
to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and validity of Bar integration in the
Philippines is the explicit unequivocal grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of
Article X of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,

and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court
to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise the
standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge
its public responsibility more effectively.

Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397),
and looking solely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the
power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and the admission
to the practice of law," it at once becomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the
Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the
practice of law.

Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law and his
exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of
the body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the proper
authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did
not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed
the public with an interest in his concerns.

On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.

The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with them seriatim.

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to compel him to
become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is
unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to associate).
Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his
constitutional freedom to associate. 6

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does
is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group
of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend
the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to
further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require
that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of
the regulatory program — the lawyers.9

Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. 10

2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the Court Rule requiring payment
of a membership fee is void. We see nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its
constitutional power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law and
the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the
respondent acknowledges — from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a
reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is
quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for
carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11

3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty provisions would amount to a
deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights.
Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of a
license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the
police power of the State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its
existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the courts of this country should be and is a
matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by
payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. 12

But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, 13 and
as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's
public responsibilities.

4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike the name of a
lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension,
disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are
indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and the authorities holding
such are legion. 14

In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Board of Bar Commissioners in
a disbarment proceeding was confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar
Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers
does not depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as
a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice ... the argument that
this is an arbitrary power which the court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise
misconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are inherent. It is an
unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the
facts are disputed. It is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to uphold the
Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect the public from overreaching and fraud.
The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution when it explicitly granted to the
Court the power to "Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice
of law and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass upon the fitness of the
respondent to remain a member of the legal profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.

We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A and of the By-Laws of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Court that the respondent Marcial
A. Edillon should be as he is hereby disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.
A.C. No. 2387 September 10, 1998

CLETO DOCENA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DOMINADOR Q. LIMON, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

On April 15, 1982, a complaint for disbarment was filed by Cleto Docena against Atty. Dominador Q.
Limon, Sr., on grounds of malpractice, gross misconduct, and violation of attorney's oath.

It appears that respondent Atty. Limon was complainant's lawyer on appeal in Civil Case No. 425 for
Forcible Entry. While the appeal was pending before the then Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar,
Branch I, respondent required therein defendants-appellants Docena spouses to post a supersedeas
bond in the amount of P10,000.00 allegedly to stay the execution of the appealed decision.

To raise the required amount complainant Cleto Docena obtained a loan of P3,000.00 from the
Borongan, Eastern Samar Branch of the Development Bank of the Philippines; borrowed P2,140.00 from
a private individual; and applied for an agricultural loan of P4,860.00 from the Borongan, Samar Branch
of the Philippine National Bank, wherein respondent himself acted as guarantor (tsn, Session of July 8,
1983, pp. 33-34). The amount of P4,860.00 was produced by complainant in response to respondent's
letter dated September 2, 1979 (Exh. "C", tsn, p. 26, ibid.) demanding delivery of the aforesaid amount,
thus:

Dear Mr. and Mrs. Docena:

I wish to remind you that today is the last day for the deposit of the balance of P4,860.00.

Atty. Batica was in court yesterday verifying whether you have deposited the said balance and the
Honorable Judge informed him that you have until today to deposit the said amount.

I wish to inform you also that the Honorable Judge will be in Sta. Fe tomorrow for rural service.

We will be waiting for you tomorrow September 22, 1979, at Sta. Fe as you promised.

Very truly yours,

(Signed)

On November 14, 1980, the Court of First Instance of Eastern Samar rendered a decision on the
appealed case in favor of the Docena spouses.

After receipt of said decision, complainant went to the CFI to withdraw the supersedeas bond of
P10,000.00, but he thereupon discovered that no such bond was ever posted by respondent.

When confronted, respondent promised to restitute the amount, but he never complied with such
undertaking despite repeated demands from the Docena spouses.
In his answer to the herein complaint, respondent claimed that the P10,000.00 was his attorney's fees
for representing the Docena spouses in their appeal. But this self-serving allegation is belied by the
letter (quoted above) of respondent himself demanding from the Docena spouses the balance of
P4,860.00 supposedly to be deposited in court to stay the execution of the appealed decision of the
MTC. Moreover, the fact that he had promised to return the P10,000.00 to the Docena spouses is also
an admission that the money was never his, and that it was only entrusted to him for deposit.

After due investigation and hearing, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year and ordered to return the amount of
P8,500.00 (he had earlier paid complainant P1,500.00, but nothing more) within 1 month from notice,
and should he fail to do so, he shall be suspended indefinitely.

The Court finds the recommended penalty too light. Truly, the amount involved may be small, but the
nature of the transgression calls for a heavier sanction. The Code of Professional Responsibility
mandates that:

Canon 1. xxx xxx xxx

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 16. xxx xxx xxx

Canon 16.01 — A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received from the client.

Respondent infringed and breached these rules. Verily, good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the legal profession, but it must also be possessed at all times in order to
maintain one's good standing in character that exclusive and honored fraternity (Villanueva vs. Atty.
Teresita Sta. Ana , 245 SCRA 707 [1995]).

It has been said time and again, and this we cannot overemphasize, that the law is not a trade nor a
craft but a profession (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, 1983, p. 1). Its basic ideal is to render public service and to
secure justice for those who seek its aid. [Mayer vs. State Bar, 2 Call2d 71, 39 P2d 206 (1934), cited in
Agpalo, id.] If it has to remain an honorable profession and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its
ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, by their lives, accord continuing
fidelity to them. (Agpalo, id.) By extorting money from his client through deceit and misrepresentation,
respondent Limon has reduced the law profession to a level so base, so low and dishonorable, and most
contemptible. He has sullied the integrity of his brethren in the law and has, indirectly, eroded the
peoples' confidence in the judicial system. By his reprehensible conduct, which is reflective of his
depraved character, respondent has made himself unworthy to remain in the Roll of Attorneys. He
should be disbarred.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dominador Q. Limon, Sr. is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of
Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys. Respondent is likewise ordered to
return the amount of P8,500.00, the balance of the money entrusted to him by complainant Docena,
within one (1) month from the finality of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12426 February 16, 1959

PHILIPPINE LAWYER'S ASSOCIATION, petitioner,

vs.
CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office, respondent.

Arturo A. Alafriz for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for respondent.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is the petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer's Association for prohibition and injunction against
Celedonio Agrava, in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

On may 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27,
1957 an examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys
before the Philippines Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the
rules of practice before said office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers
and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training are qualified to take the said
examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent Director has been holding similar
examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer's Association that one who has passed the bar
examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good
standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that consequently, the cat
of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to take and pass an
examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice
before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for
patent, is in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of
patent cases "does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of
scientific and technical knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the
prosecution of patent cases may be handled not only by lawyers, but also engineers and other persons
with sufficient scientific and technical training who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the
Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial
body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to handle cases
before the Patent Office which, as stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of
scientific and technical knowledge than the mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action
taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law
of the Philippines, which similar to the United States Patent Law, in accordance with which the United
States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as that prescribed by respondent. . . .

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent law of the United States of America authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who practice before the United
States Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No.
165.
Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests
or examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the
Patent Office, to our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so,
specially as regards members of the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And
we have given it careful thought and consideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice
of law in the Philippines1 and to any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law
anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.
Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not appearance before the patent Office and the
preparation and the prosecution of patent applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of
law.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the management
of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a
judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied).

Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of
legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions
may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions
of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between
that part which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the
welfare of the public that these manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust
obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3
(1953 ed.), p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.), 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar
Assoc. vs. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I. ) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis ours).

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications
for patent, their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first
place, although the transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of
technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance
with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the
interpretation and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be
established in accordance with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent
Law provides that an invention shall not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to
public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it
was known or used by others in the Philippines before the invention thereof by the inventor named in
any printed publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year before the
application for a patent therefor, or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more
than one year before the application for the patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to patent
belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26
refer to connection of any mistake in a patent. Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a
patent; that although any person may apply for such cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor
General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section 30 mentions the requirements
of a petition for cancellation. Section 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the petition for
cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under
Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any
person patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not being worked in the
Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines on a
commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is not being met to an
adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee's refusal to grant a license on
reasonable terms or by reason of the condition attached by him to the license, purchase or use of the
patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a
new trade or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or
medicine or is necessary to public health or public safety. All these things involve the applications of
laws, legal principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for
which a member of the bar has been prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the act, orders and decisions of the
Patent Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent
Law, Republic Act No. 165, Section 61, provides that:

. . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a
patent or to obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may
appeal to the Supreme Court from any final order or decision of the director.

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office
and the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and
scientific knowledge and training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial
body, but rather to a board of scientists, engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the
Head of the Patent Office.

. . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions,

exercises quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to
give authenticated copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees. (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis
supplied).
. . . . The Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and
delivering of a patent, and it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper
subject of a patent; and his action in awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on an
application the commissioner should decide not only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as
whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article invented. . . . (60 C.J.S. 460). (Emphasis
supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold
that a member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice
before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of
Patents, if he deems it advisable or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before
him enlist the assistance of technical men and scientist in the preparation of papers and documents,
such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention or machine sought to be patented, in the
same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel of land on behalf of his
clients, is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a licensed
surveyor.

But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to
practice or to do business before him to submit an examination, even if they are already members of the
bar. He contends that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent
Law; and of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar to that
which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following
provisions of said Rules of Practice:

Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of an attorneys and a register agents are kept in the
Patent Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent
applicants before the Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of applicants for patent.
Registration in the Patent Office under the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person
registered to practice before the Patent Office.

(a) Attorney at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United
States Court or the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the
requirements and complied with the provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the
Patent Office and have his name entered on the register of attorneys.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall
apply to the Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and
furnish all requested information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the
Commissioner that he is of good moral character and of good repute and possessed of the legal and
scientific and technical qualifications necessary to enable him to render applicants for patent valuable
service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in the presentation and prosecution of
their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may determine whether a
person seeking to have his name placed upon either of the registers has the qualifications specified,
satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and
technical matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken
and passed. The taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for
three years in the examining corps of the Patent Office.

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in
Patent Cases is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:

The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules
and regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants
or other parties before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being
recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good
moral character and in good repute, are possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to
render to applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise to competent to advise and assist
applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business
before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing,
suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case from further practice before his office any
person, agent or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or
who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any
matter, deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having
immediate or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or prospective business before
the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such suspension or exclusion
shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition of the
person so refused recognition or so suspended by the district court of the United States for the District
of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules
determine. (Emphasis supplied)

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of
law just reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons
desiring to practice before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section
78, Republic Act No. 165, for purposes of comparison:

SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all
business in the Patent Office.

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United
States Patent Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those
allowed to practice before the Patent Office. While the U.S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of
Patents to require attorneys to show that they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to
render valuable service to and advise and assist their clients in patent cases, which showing may take
the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner, our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent
on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express provision of our Patent Law,
giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice before the Patent
Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and
make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient
administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within
the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code
of the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the
Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code.
Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that
the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate
all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We
understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and
Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business
in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the
necessary sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before
they are allowed to practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other
bureaus specially the Bureau of Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are
more or less complicated, such as the presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc.,
assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the
classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation, etc., as regards the Bureau
of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise transacting
business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this
Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office,
for the reason that much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of
the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of
evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent director are judicial or
quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the
Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby
prohibited from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass
the same before being permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.
[B.M. No. 553. June 17, 1993.]

MAURICIO C. ULEP, Petitioner, v. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC., Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; PRACTICE OF LAW, MEANING AND EXTENT OF. — Practice of law means
any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service
that involves legal knowledge or skill. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court.
It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which
legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court. In the practice of
his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional
activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations,
preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary
layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and authority to
determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in proper interpretation
and enforcement of law. When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in
the practice of law. One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the
business to an attorney and asks the latter to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. Giving
advice for compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect
thereto constitutes a practice of law. One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law.

2. ID.; ID.; LEGAL SUPPORT SERVICES IN CASE AT BAR CONSTITUTE PRACTICE OF LAW. — The practice of
law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the aforementioned
criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of the aforestated bar
associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of law." The contention
of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously considered nor
sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent’s own description of the services it has been
offering, to wit: . . . While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve
mechanical and technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the
efficient management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will
not suffice to justify an exception to the general rule. What is palpably clear is that respondent
corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers. Its contention that such function is non-
advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In providing information, for example, about
foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoptation, it strains the credulity of this Court that all that
respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a copy thereof to the client, and stop
there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so called paralegals, it will necessarily have
to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him or her on the proper course of action to
be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its advertisements represent and for which
services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity falls squarely within the jurisprudential
definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be altered by the fact that respondent
corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as the weight of authority holds, is not
limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research, giving legal advice, contract drafting,
and so forth. The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13,
1991 issue of the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled "Rx for Legal
Problems," where an insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation
was given by its own "proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales: . . .

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; PARALEGAL OR LEGAL ASSISTANT; CONCEPT IN THE UNITED STATES. — Paralegals in the
United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools and universities
there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in the Philippines. As
the concept of the "paralegal" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States, standards and guidelines
also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards or guidelines was developed by
the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of Legal Assistant Education
Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal assistants. There are also
associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of professional ethics, such as the
National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal Association.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCEPT IN THE PHILIPPINES. — In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept
and limited acceptance of what may be considered as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some
persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have been allowed limited representation in behalf of
another or to render legal services, but such allowable services are limited in scope and extent by the
law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. (Illustrations: . . .)

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE JUDICIAL POLICY ON PARALEGAL. — We have to necessarily and definitely
reject respondent’s position that the concept in the United States of paralegals as an occupation
separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction. Whatever may be its merits,
respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for judicial rules or legislative action,
and not of unilateral adoption as it has done. . . . Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial
policy that, in the absence of constitutional or statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted
as an attorney cannot practice law for the proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the
unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized and unskilled person into the practice of law. That policy
should continue to be one of encouraging persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to
seek legal assistance only from persons licensed to practice law in the state.

6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRACTICE OF LAW IN CASE AT BAR CANNOT BE PERFORMED BY PARALEGALS;
REASON. — It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent
which constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of
Court, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. . . .
7. ID.; ADVERTISEMENT BY LAWYER; RULE. — Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned
advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal
services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts. He is
not supposed to use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-
laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualifications or legal services. Nor shall he pay or
give something of value to representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for,
publicity to attract legal business. Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
Canons of Professional Ethics had also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements
for professional employment, such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or
concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the
lawyer’s position, and all other like self-laudation.

8. ID.; ID.; ID.; CHARACTER AND CONDUCT AS BEST ADVERTISEMENT. — We repeat, the canons of the
profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for
professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and
conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of publicizing itself
and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which is right
and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda.

9. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION ON ADVERTISEMENT OF TALENT OR SKILL. — The standards of the legal
profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his
goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. . . .

10. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTIONS. — The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists,
in a manner consistent with the standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and
informative data. "Such data must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s
name and the names of his professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses;
branches of law practiced; date and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates
of graduation, degrees and other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor;
legal authorships; legal teaching positions; memberships and offices in bar associations and committees
thereof, in legal and scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law
lists; the names and addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients
regularly represented.." . . The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card
may contain only a statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple
announcement of the opening of a law firm or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or
office address, being for the convenience of the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have
his name listed in a telephone directory but not under a designation of special branch of law.
11. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENT FOR LAW LIST. — The law list must be a reputable law list
published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere supplemental feature of a paper, magazine,
trade journal or periodical which is published principally for other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer
may not properly publish his brief biographical and informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade
journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit his name to be published in a law list the conduct,
management or contents of which are calculated or likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to
lower the dignity or standing of the profession.

12. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the
advertisements for which respondent is being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees
charged by said respondent corporation for services rendered, we find and so hold that the same
definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

13. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EXCEPTION IN BATES, ET AL. v. STATE BAR OF ARIZONA (433 U.S. 350, 53 L Ed
2d 810, 97 S Ct. 2691) AS TO PUBLICATION OF LEGAL FEES, NOT APPLICABLE; REASONS. — The ruling in
the case of Bates, Et. Al. v. State Bar of Arizona, which is repeatedly invoked and constitutes the
justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar. Foremost is the
fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an exception to the
prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for an initial
consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the fee to be
charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly, whether in
our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility. Besides,
even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein are "not
applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." This goes to
show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein respondent, can be
made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception. Otherwise, the prohibition
stands, as in the case at bar. It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar
Association after the decision in Bates, on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing
television commercials, it was found that public opinion dropped significantly with respect to these
characteristics of lawyers: . . . Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal
and judicial systems, to allow the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would
only serve to aggravate what is already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose
integrity has consistently been under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point
in time, it is of utmost importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to
adopt and maintain that level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts
to regain the high esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

RESOLUTION

REGALADO, J.:
Petitioner prays this Court "to order the respondent to cease and desist from issuing advertisements
similar to or of the same tenor as that of Annexes `A’ and `B’ (of said petition) and to perpetually
prohibit persons or entities from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession
other than those allowed by law." chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The advertisements complained of by herein petitioner are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Annex A

SECRET MARRIAGE?

P560.00 for a valid marriage.

Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE.

ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE Please call: 521-0767,

LEGAL 5217232, 5222041

CLINIC, INC. 8:30 am-6:00 pm

7-Flr. Victoria Bldg.UN Ave., Mla.

Annex B

GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

an Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday
to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children. Call Marivic.

THE 7 F Victoria Bldg. 429 UN Ave.

LEGAL Ermita, Manila nr. US Embassy

CLINIC, INC. 1 Tel. 521-7232521-7251

522-2041; 521-0767

It is the submission of petitioner that the advertisements above reproduced are champertous, unethical,
demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of
the members of the bar and that, as a member of the legal profession, he is ashamed and offended by
the said advertisements, hence the reliefs sought in his petition as herein before quoted.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary

In its answer to the petition, respondent admits the fact of publication of said advertisements at its
instance, but claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support
services" through paralegals with the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Respondent
further argues that assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of advertising these
services should be allowed supposedly in the light of the case of John R. Bates and Van O’Steen v. State
Bar of Arizona, 2 reportedly decided by the United States Supreme Court on June 7, 1977.

Considering the critical implications on the legal profession of the issues raised herein, we required the
(1) Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), (2) Philippine Bar Association (PBA), (3) Philippine Lawyers’
Association (PLA), (4) U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle (WILOCI), (5) Women Lawyers Association of the
Philippines (WLAP), and (6) Federation International de Abogadas (FIDA) to submit their respective
position papers on the controversy and, thereafter, their memoranda. 3 The said bar associations readily
responded and extended their valuable services and cooperation of which this Court takes note with
appreciation and gratitude.

The main issues posed for resolution before the Court are whether or not the services offered by
respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law and, in either case,
whether the same can properly be the subject of the advertisements herein complained of.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary

Before proceeding with an in-depth analysis of the merits of this case, we deem it proper and
enlightening to present hereunder excerpts from the respective position papers adopted by the
aforementioned bar associations and the memoranda submitted by them on the issues involved in this
bar matter.

1. Integrated Bar of the Philippines:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two terms, i.e.,
"legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", common sense would readily dictate that the same are
essentially without substantial distinction. For who could deny that document search, evidence
gathering, assistance to layman in need of basic institutional services from government or non-
government agencies like birth, marriage, property, or business registration, obtaining documents like
clearance, passports, local or foreign visas, constitute practice of law?

x x x

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) does not wish to make issue with respondent’s foreign
citations. Suffice it to state that the IBP has made its position manifest, to wit, that it strongly opposes
the view espoused by respondent (to the effect that today it is alright to advertise one’s legal services).

The IBP accordingly declares in no uncertain terms its opposition to respondent’s act of establishing a
"legal clinic" and of concomitantly advertising the same through newspaper publications.

The IBP would therefore invoke the administrative supervision of this Honorable Court to perpetually
restrain respondent from undertaking highly unethical activities in the field of law practice as
aforedescribed 4 .

x x x

A. The use of the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent corporation is being
operated by lawyers and that it renders legal services.

While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The Petition in fact simply
assumes this to be so, as earlier mentioned, apparently because this (is) the effect that the
advertisements have on the reading public.

The impression created by the advertisements in question can be traced, first of all, to the very name
being used by respondent — "The Legal Clinic, Inc." Such a name, it is respectfully submitted connotes
the rendering of legal services for legal problems, just like a medical clinic connotes medical services for
medical problems. More importantly, the term "Legal Clinic" connotes lawyers, as the term medical
clinic connotes doctors.

Furthermore, the respondent’s name, as published in the advertisements subject of the present case,
appears with (the) scale(s) of justice, which all the more reinforces the impression that it is being
operated by members of the bar and that it offers legal services. In addition, the advertisements in
question appear with a picture and name of a person being represented as a lawyer from Guam, and
this practically removes whatever doubt may still remain as to the nature of the service or services being
offered.

It thus becomes irrelevant whether respondent is merely offering "legal support services" as claimed by
it, or whether it offers legal services as any lawyer actively engaged in law practice does. And it becomes
unnecessary to make a distinction between "legal services" and "legal support services," as the
respondent would have it. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt in the minds of the
reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

B. The advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals,
public order and public policy.

It may be conceded that, as the respondent claims, the advertisements in question are only meant to
inform the general public of the services being offered by it. Said advertisements, however, emphasize a
Guam divorce, and any law student ought to know that under the Family Code, there is only one
instance when a foreign divorce, is recognized, and that is:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Article 26. . . .

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine Law.

It must not be forgotten, too, that the Family Code (defines) a marriage as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered into
in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relation during
the marriage within the limits provided by this Code.

By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that
Filipinos can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by
simply going to Guam for a divorce. This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce,
violation of Philippine law. At the very least, this can be considered "the dark side" of legal practice,
where certain defects in Philippine laws are exploited for the sake of profit. At worst, this is outright
malpractice.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Rule 1.02. — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

In addition, it may also be relevant to point out that advertisements such as that shown in Annex "A" of
the Petition, which contains a cartoon of a motor vehicle with the words "Just Married" on its bumper
and seems to address those planning a "secret marriage," if not suggesting a "secret marriage," makes
light of the "special contract of permanent union," the inviolable social institution," which is how the
Family Code describes marriage, obviously to emphasize its sanctity and inviolability. Worse, this
particular advertisement appears to encourage marriages celebrated in secrecy, which is suggestive of
immoral publication of applications for a marriage license.chanrobles law library : red
If the article "Rx for Legal Problems" is to be reviewed, it can readily be concluded that the above
impressions one may gather from the advertisements in question are accurate. The Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion example alone confirms what the advertisements suggest. Here it can be seen that
criminal acts are being encouraged or committed (a bigamous marriage in Hong Kong or Las Vegas) with
impunity simply because the jurisdiction of Philippine courts does not extend to the place where the
crime is committed.

Even if it be assumed, arguendo, that the "legal support services" respondent offers do not constitute
legal services as commonly understood, the advertisements in question give the impression that
respondent corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it offers legal services, as earlier
discussed. Thus, the only logical consequence is that, in the eyes of an ordinary newspaper reader,
members of the bar themselves are encouraging or inducing the performance of acts which are contrary
to law, morals, good customs and the public good, thereby destroying and demeaning the integrity of
the Bar.

x x x

It is respectfully submitted that respondent should be enjoined from causing the publication of the
advertisements in question, or any other advertisements similar thereto. It is also submitted that
respondent should be prohibited from further performing or offering some of the services it presently
offers, or, at the very least, from offering such services to the public in general.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering,
storage and retrieval, standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services
will greatly benefit the legal profession and should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However,
when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar encroaches upon the practice of law,
there can be no choice but to prohibit such business.

Admittedly, many of the services involved in the case at bar can be better performed by specialists in
other fields, such as computer experts, who by reason of their having devoted time and effort
exclusively to such field cannot fulfill the exacting requirements for admission to the Bar. To prohibit
them from "encroaching" upon the legal profession will deny the profession of the great benefits and
advantages of modern technology. Indeed, a lawyer using a computer will be doing better than a lawyer
using a typewriter, even if both are (equal) in skill.

Both the Bench and the Bar, however, should be careful not to allow or tolerate the illegal practice of
law in any form, not only for the protection of members of the Bar but also, and more importantly, for
the protection of the public. Technological development in the profession may be encouraged without
tolerating, but instead ensuring prevention of, illegal practice.

There might be nothing objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if
such services are made available exclusively to members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then
be offering technical assistance, not legal services. Alternatively, the more difficult task of carefully
distinguishing between which service may be offered to the public in general and which should be made
available exclusively to members of the Bar may be undertaken. This, however, may require further
proceedings because of the factual considerations involved.

It must be emphasized, however, that some of respondent’s services ought to be prohibited outright,
such as acts which tend to suggest or induce celebration abroad of marriages which are bigamous or
otherwise illegal and void under Philippine law. While respondent may not be prohibited from simply
disseminating information regarding such matters, it must be required to include, in the information
given, a disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law, that certain course of action may be illegal
under Philippine law, that it is not authorized or capable of rendering a legal opinion, that a lawyer
should be consulted before deciding on which course of action to take, and that it cannot recommend
any particular lawyer without subjecting itself to possible sanctions for illegal practice of law.

If respondent is allowed to advertise, advertising should be directed exclusively at members of the Bar,
with a clear and unmistakable disclaimer that it is not authorized to practice law or perform legal
services.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The benefits of being assisted by paralegals cannot be ignored. But nobody should be allowed to
represent himself as a "paralegal" for profit, without such term being clearly defined by rule or
regulation, and without any adequate and effective means of regulating his activities. Also, law practice
in a corporate form may prove to be advantageous to the legal profession, but before allowance of such
practice may be considered, the corporation’s Articles of Incorporation and By-laws must conform to
each and every provision of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rules of Court 5

2. Philippine Bar Association:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

Respondent asserts that it "is not engaged in the practice of law but engaged in giving legal support
services to lawyers and laymen, through experienced paralegals, with the use of modern computers and
electronic machines" (pars. 2 and 3, Comment). This is absurd. Unquestionably, respondent’s acts of
holding out itself to the public under the trade name "The Legal Clinic, Inc.," and soliciting employment
for its enumerated services fall within the realm of a practice which thus yields itself to the regulatory
powers of the Supreme Court. For respondent to say that it is merely engaged in paralegal work is to
stretch credulity. Respondent’s own commercial advertisement which announces a certain Atty. Don
Perkinson to be handling the fields of law belies its pretense. From all indications, respondent "The Legal
Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve of lawyers. It has been held that
the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal rights and then take them to an
attorney and ask the latter to look after their case in court (See Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, 1948
ed., p. 39).

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot
be evaded by a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the
scheme or device by which respondent "The Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits
employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception, especially so when the public
cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit. Precisely, the limitation of
practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar (Sec. 1, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court) is to subject the members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although
respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who act for it are subject to court
discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be
assigned to another (See 5 Am. Jur. 270). It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified
themselves under the law. It follows that not only respondent but also all the persons who are acting for
respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice. 6

3. Philippine Lawyers’ Association:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The Philippine Lawyers’ Association’s position, in answer to the issues stated herein, are, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law;

2. Such practice is unauthorized;

3. The advertisements complained of are not only unethical, but also misleading and patently immoral;
and

4. The Honorable Supreme Court has the power to suppress and punish the Legal Clinic and its corporate
officers for its unauthorized practice of law and for its unethical, misleading and immoral advertising.

x x x

Respondent posits that it is not engaged in the practice of law. It claims that it merely renders "legal
support services" to lawyers, litigants and the general public as enunciated in the Primary Purpose
Clause of its Article(s) of Incorporation. (See pages 2 to 5 of Respondent’s Comment). But its advertised
services, as enumerated above, clearly and convincingly show that it is indeed engaged in law practice,
albeit outside the court.

As advertised, it offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and Family Relations Law,
particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and
adoption; Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the
Investment Law of the Philippines and such other related laws.

Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid laws, the legal principles
and procedures related thereto, the legal advises based thereon and which activities call for legal
training, knowledge and experience.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the aforecited Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall
squarely and are embraced in what lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7

4. U.P. Women Lawyers’ Circle:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In resolving the issues before this Honorable Court, paramount consideration should be given to the
protection of the general public from the danger of being exploited by unqualified persons or entities
who may be engaged in the practice of law.

At present, becoming a lawyer requires one to take a rigorous four-year course of study on top of a four-
year bachelor of arts or sciences course and then to take and pass the bar examinations. Only then, is a
lawyer qualified to practice law.

While the use of a paralegal is sanctioned in many jurisdictions as an aid to the administration of justice,
there are in those jurisdictions, courses of study and/or standards which would qualify these paralegals
to deal with the general public as such. While it may now be the opportune time to establish these
courses of study and/or standards, the fact remains that at present, these do not exist in the Philippines.
In the meantime, this Honorable Court may decide to take measures to protect the general public from
being exploited by those who may be dealing with the general public in the guise of being "paralegals"
without being qualified to do so.

In the same manner, the general public should also be protected from the dangers which may be
brought about by advertising of legal services. While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the
present Code of Professional Responsibility from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal
services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by "paralegals." Clearly, measures
should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal services
without being qualified to offer such services." 8

A perusal of the questioned advertisements of Respondent, however, seems to give the impression that
information regarding validity of marriages, divorce, annulment of marriage, immigration, visa
extensions, declaration of absence, adoption and foreign investment, which are in essence, legal
matters, will be given to them if they avail of its services. The Respondent’s name — The Legal Clinic,
Inc. — does not help matters. It gives the impression again that Respondent will or can cure the legal
problems brought to them. Assuming that Respondent is, as claimed, staffed purely by paralegals, it also
gives the misleading impression that there are lawyers involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc., as there are
doctors in any medical clinic, when only "paralegals" are involved in The Legal Clinic, Inc.

Respondent’s allegations are further belied by the very admissions of its President and majority
stockholder, Atty. Nogales, who gave an insight on the structure and main purpose of Respondent
corporation in the aforementioned "Starweek" article." 9

5. Women Lawyer’s Association of the Philippines:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases for the purpose of gain
which, as provided for under the above cited law, (are) illegal and against the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Annex "A" of the petition is not only illegal in that it is an advertisement to solicit cases, but it is illegal in
that in bold letters it announces that the Legal Clinic, Inc., could work out/cause the celebration of a
secret marriage which is not only illegal but immoral in this country. While it is advertised that one has
to go to said agency and pay P560 for a valid marriage it is certainly fooling the public for valid marriages
in the Philippines are solemnized only by officers authorized to do so under the law. And to employ an
agency for said purpose of contracting marriage is not necessary.

No amount of reasoning that in the USA, Canada and other countries the trend is towards allowing
lawyers to advertise their special skills to enable people to obtain from qualified practitioners legal
services for their particular needs can justify the use of advertisements such as are the subject matter of
this petition, for one (cannot) justify an illegal act even by whatever merit the illegal act may serve. The
law has yet to be amended so that such as act could become justifiable.chanrobles law library

We submit further that these advertisements that seem to project that secret marriages and divorce are
possible in this country for a fee, when in fact it is not so, are highly reprehensible.

It would encourage people to consult this clinic about how they could go about having a secret marriage
here, when it cannot nor should ever be attempted, and seek advice on divorce, where in this country
there is none, except under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws in the Philippines. It is also against good
morals and is deceitful because it falsely represents to the public to be able to do that which by our laws
cannot be done (and) by our Code of Morals should not be done.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

In the case (of) In re Taguda, 53 Phil. 37, the Supreme Court held that solicitation for clients by an
attorney by circulars of advertisements, is unprofessional and offenses of this character justify
permanent elimination from the Bar. 10

6. Federacion International de Abogadas:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x

1.7 That entities admittedly not engaged in the practice of law, such as management consultancy firms
or travel agencies, whether run by lawyers or not, perform the services rendered by Respondent does
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Respondent is not unlawfully practicing law. In the same vein,
however, the fact that the business of respondent (assuming it can be engaged in independently of the
practice of law) involves knowledge of the law does not necessarily make respondent guilty of unlawful
practice of law.

". . . Of necessity, no one . . . acting as a consultant can render effective service unless he is familiar with
such statutes and regulations. He must be careful not to suggest a course of conduct which the law
forbids. It seems . . . clear that (the consultant’s) knowledge of the law, and his use of that knowledge as
a factor in determining what measures he shall recommend, do not constitute the practice of law . . .. It
is not only presumed that all men know the law, but it is a fact that most men have considerable
acquaintance with the broad features of the law . . .. Our knowledge of the law — accurate or inaccurate
— moulds our conduct not only when we are acting for ourselves, but when we are serving others.
Bankers, liquor dealers and laymen generally possess rather precise knowledge of the laws touching
their particular business or profession. A good example is the architect, who must be familiar with
zoning, building and fire prevention codes, factory and tenement house statutes, and who draws plans
and specifications in harmony with the law. This is not practicing law.

"But suppose the architect, asked by his client to omit a fire tower, replies that it is required by the
statute. Or the industrial relations expert cites, in support of some measure that he recommends, a
decision of the National Labor Relations Board. Are they practicing law? In my opinion, they are not,
provided no separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information, and the legal question is
subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem.

"It is largely a matter of degree and of custom.

"If it were usual for one intending to erect a building on his land to engage a lawyer to advise him and
the architect in respect to the building code and the like, then an architect who performed this function
would probably be considered to be trespassing on territory reserved for licensed attorneys. Likewise, if
the industrial relations field had been pre-empted by lawyers, or custom placed a lawyer always at the
elbow of the lay personnel man. But this is not the case. The most important body of industrial relations
experts are the officers and business agents of the labor unions and few of them are lawyers. Among the
larger corporate employers, it has been the practice for some years to delegate special responsibility in
employee matters to a management group chosen for their practical knowledge and skill in such
matters, and without regard to legal training or lack of it. More recently, consultants like the defendant
have tendered to the smaller employers the same service that the larger employers get from their own
specialized staff.

"The handling of industrial relations is growing into a recognized profession for which appropriate
courses are offered by our leading universities. The court should be very cautious about declaring [that]
a widespread, well-established method of conducting business is unlawful, or that the considerable class
of men who customarily perform a certain function have no right to do so, or that the technical
education given by our schools cannot be used by the graduates in their business.

"In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any particular client or
customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining
his client’s obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted by law. This, of
course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant’s
primary efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within
which he must work, just as the zoning code limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The
incidental legal advice or information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the
practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor feature of his work, he performed services which are
customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. For instance, if as part of a
welfare program, he drew employees’ wills.

"Another branch of defendant’s work is the representation of the employer in the adjustment of
grievances and in collective bargaining, with or without a mediator. This is not per se the practice of law.
Anyone may use an agent for negotiations and may select an agent particularly skilled in the subject
under discussion, and the person appointed is free to accept the employment whether or not he is a
member of the bar. Here, however, there may be an exception where the business turns on a question
of law. Most real estate sales are negotiated by brokers who are not lawyers. But if the value of the land
depends on a disputed right-of-way and the principal role of the negotiator is to assess the probable
outcome of the dispute and persuade the opposite party to the same opinion, then it may be that only a
lawyer can accept the assignment. Or if a controversy between an employer and his men grows from
differing interpretations of a contract, or of a statute, it is quite likely that defendant should not handle
it. But I need not reach a definite conclusion here, since the situation is not presented by the
proofs.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"Defendant also appears to represent the employer before administrative agencies of the federal
government, especially before trial examiners of the National Labor Relations Board. An agency of the
federal government, acting by virtue of an authority granted by the Congress, may regulate the
representation of parties before such agency. The State of New Jersey is without power to interfere with
such determination or to forbid representation before the agency by one whom the agency admits. The
rules of the National Labor Relations Board give to a party the right to appear `in person, or by counsel,
or by other representative.’ Rules and Regulations, September 11th, 1946, S. 203.31. `Counsel’ here
means a licensed attorney, and `other representative’ one not a lawyer. In this phase of his work,
defendant may lawfully do whatever the Labor Board allows, even arguing questions purely legal."
(Auerbacher v. Wood, 53 A. 2d 800, cited in Statsky, Introduction to Paralegalism [1974], at pp. 154-
156.).

1.8 From the foregoing, it can be said that a person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve
knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;

(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar;

(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

All these must be considered in relation to the work for any particular client as a whole.

1.9. If the person involved is both lawyer and non-lawyer, the Code of Professional Responsibility
succinctly states the rule of conduct:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Rule 15.08 — A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation concurrently with the
practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is acting as a lawyer or in another
capacity."cralaw virtua1aw library

1.10. In the present case, the Legal Clinic appears to render wedding services (See Annex "A", Petition).
Services on routine, straightforward marriages, like securing a marriage license, and making
arrangements with a priest or a judge, may not constitute practice of law. However, if the problem is as
complicated as that described in Rx for Legal Problems" on the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion-
Richard Gomez case, then what may be involved is actually the practice of law. If a non-lawyer, such as
the Legal Clinic, renders such services, then it is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

1.11. The Legal Clinic also appears to give information on divorce, absence, annulment of marriage and
visas (See Annexes "A" and "B", Petition). Purely giving informational materials may not constitute
practice of law. The business is similar to that of a bookstore where the customer buys materials on the
subject and determines by himself what courses of action to take.

It is not entirely improbable, however, that aside from purely giving information, the Legal Clinic’s
paralegals may apply the law to the particular problem of the client, and give legal advice. Such would
constitute unauthorized practice of law.

"It cannot be claimed that the publication of a legal text which purports to say what the law is amounts
to legal practice. And the mere fact that the principles or rules stated in the text may be accepted by a
particular reader as a solution to his problem does not affect this. . . . Apparently it is urged that the
conjoining of these two, that is, the text and the forms, with advice as to how the forms should be filled
out, constitutes the unlawful practice of law. But that is the situation with many approved and accepted
texts. Dacey’s book is sold to the public at large. There is no personal contact or relationship with a
particular individual. Nor does there exist that relation of confidence and trust so necessary to the status
of attorney and client. THIS IS THE ESSENTIAL OF LEGAL PRACTICE — THE REPRESENTATION AND
ADVISING OF A PARTICULAR PERSON IN A PARTICULAR SITUATION. At most the book assumes to offer
general advice on common problems, and does not purport to give personal advice on a specific
problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified person. Similarly the defendant’s publication does
not purport `to give personal advice on a specific problem peculiar to a designated or readily identified
person in a particular situation — in the publication and sale of the kits, such publication and sale did
not constitute the unlawful practice of law . . .. There being no legal impediment under the statute to
the sale of the kit, there was no proper basis for the injunction against defendant maintaining an office
for the purpose of selling to persons seeking a divorce, separation, annulment or separation agreement
any printed material or writings relating to matrimonial law or the prohibition in the memorandum of
modification of the judgment against defendant having an interest in any publishing house publishing
his manuscript on divorce and against his having any personal contact with any prospective purchaser.
The record does fully support, however, the finding that for the charge of $75 or $100 for the kit, the
defendant gave legal advice in the course of personal contacts concerning particular problems which
might arise in the preparation and presentation of the purchaser’s asserted matrimonial cause of action
or pursuit of other legal remedies and assistance in the preparation of necessary documents (The
injunction therefore sought to) enjoin conduct constituting the practice of law, particularly with
reference to the giving of advice and counsel by the defendant relating to specific problems of particular
individuals in connection with a divorce, separation, annulment of separation agreement sought and
should be affirmed." (State v. Winder, 348, NYS 2d 270 [1973], cited in Statsky, supra at p. 101.)

1.12. Respondent, of course, states that its services are "strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory." It is not
controverted, however, that if the services "involve giving legal advice or counselling," such would
constitute practice of law (Comment, par. 6.2). It is in this light that FIDA submits that a factual inquiry
may be necessary for the judicious disposition of this case.

2.10. Annex "A" may be ethically objectionable in that it can give the impression (or perpetuate the
wrong notion) that there is a secret marriage. With all the solemnities, formalities and other requisites
of marriages (See Articles 2, et seq., Family Code), no Philippine marriage can be secret.

2.11. Annex "B" may likewise be ethically objectionable. The second paragraph thereof (which is not
necessarily related to the first paragraph) fails to state the limitation that only "paralegal services" or
"legal support services", and not legal services, are available." 11

A prefatory discussion on the meaning of the phrase "practice of law" becomes exigent for a proper
determination of the issues raised by the petition at bar. On this score, we note that the clause "practice
of law" has long been the subject of judicial construction and interpretation. The courts have laid down
general principles and doctrines explaining the meaning and scope of the term, some of which we now
take into account.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedures, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give advice or render any
kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill. 12

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel,
and the preparation of legal instruments and contracts by which legal rights are secured, although such
matter may or may not be pending in a court. 13

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of
professional activity: legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and
obligations, preparation for clients of documents requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed
by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals which possess power and
authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, inorder to assist in proper
interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

When a person participates in a trial and advertises himself as a lawyer, he is in the practice of law. 15
One who confers with clients, advises them as to their legal rights and then takes the business to an
attorney and asks the later to look after the case in court, is also practicing law. 16 Giving advice for
compensation regarding the legal status and rights of another and the conduct with respect thereto
constitutes a practice of law. 17 One who renders an opinion as to the proper interpretation of a
statute, and receives pay for it, is, to that extent, practicing law. 18
In the recent case of Cayetano v. Monsod, 19 after citing the doctrines in several cases, we laid down
the test to determine whether certain acts constitute "practice of law," thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

Black defines "practice of law" as:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law."cralaw virtua1aw library

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650). A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising persons, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings, pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee,
or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative
capacity, performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v.
C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)."cralaw virtua1aw library

This Court, in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava (105 Phil. 173, 176-177),
stated:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management
of, such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before
a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263).

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of
legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions
may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions
of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between
that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1973 ed.], pp. 665-666, citing In Re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service
Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139, 144)."cralaw virtua1aw library

The practice of law, therefore, covers a wide range of activities in and out of court. Applying the
aforementioned criteria to the case at bar, we agree with the perceptive findings and observations of
the aforestated bar associations that the activities of respondent, as advertised, constitute "practice of
law."cralaw virtua1aw library

The contention of respondent that it merely offers legal support services can neither be seriously
considered nor sustained. Said proposition is belied by respondent’s own description of the services it
has been offering, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Legal support services basically consist of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and
lawyers, which are strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and
modern information technology in the gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of
information and communication, such as computerized legal research; encoding and reproduction of
documents and pleadings prepared by laymen or lawyers; document search; evidence gathering;
locating parties or witnesses to a case; fact finding investigations; and assistance to laymen in need of
basic institutional services from government or non-government agencies, like birth, marriage, property,
or business registrations; educational or employment records or certifications, obtaining documentation
like clearances, passports, local or foreign visas; giving information about laws of other countries that
they may find useful, like foreign divorce, marriage or adoption laws that they can avail of preparatory
to emigration to that foreign country, and other matters that do not involve representation of clients in
court; designing and installing computer systems, programs, or software for the efficient management
of law offices, corporate legal departments, courts, and other entities engaged in dispensing or
administering legal services." 20

While some of the services being offered by respondent corporation merely involve mechanical and
technical know-how, such as the installation of computer systems and programs for the efficient
management of law offices, or the computerization of research aids and materials, these will not suffice
to justify an exception to the general rule.
What is palpably clear is that respondent corporation gives out legal information to laymen and lawyers.
Its contention that such function is non-advisory and non-diagnostic is more apparent than real. In
providing information, for example, about foreign laws on marriage, divorce and adoption, it strains the
credulity of this Court that all that respondent corporation will simply do is look for the law, furnish a
copy thereof to the client, and stop there as if it were merely a bookstore. With its attorneys and so
called paralegals, it will necessarily have to explain to the client the intricacies of the law and advise him
or her on the proper course of action to be taken as may be provided for by said law. That is what its
advertisements represent and for which services it will consequently charge and be paid. That activity
falls squarely within the jurisprudential definition of "practice of law." Such a conclusion will not be
altered by the fact that respondent corporation does not represent clients in court since law practice, as
the weight of authority holds, is not limited merely to court appearances but extends to legal research,
giving legal advice, contract drafting, and so forth.

The aforesaid conclusion is further strengthened by an article published in the January 13, 1991 issue of
the Starweek/The Sunday Magazine of the Philippine Star, entitled "Rx for Legal Problems," where an
insight into the structure, main purpose and operations of respondent corporation was given by its own
"proprietor," Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

This is the kind of business that is transacted everyday at The Legal Clinic, with offices on the seventh
floor of the Victoria Building along U.N. Avenue in Manila. No matter what the client’s problem, and
even if it is as complicated as the Cuneta-Concepcion domestic situation, Atty. Nogales and his staff of
lawyers, who, like doctors, are "specialists" in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has
specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These
specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counsellors and attorneys.

Atty. Nogales set up The Legal Clinic in 1984. Inspired by the trend in the medical field toward
specialization, it caters to clients who cannot afford the services of the big law firms.

The Legal Clinic has regular and walk-in clients. "When they come, we start by analyzing the problem.
That’s what doctors do also. They ask you how you contracted what’s bothering you, they take your
temperature, they observe you for the symptoms, and so on. That’s how we operate, too. And once the
problem has been categorized, then it’s referred to one of our specialists."cralaw virtua1aw library

There are cases which do not, in medical terms, require surgery or follow-up treatment. These The Legal
Clinic disposes of in a matter of minutes. "Things like preparing a simple deed of sale or an affidavit of
loss can be taken care of by our staff or, if this were a hospital, the residents or the interns. We can take
care of these matters on a while you wait basis. Again, kung baga sa ospital, out-patient, hindi
kailangang ma-confine. It’s just like a common cold or diarrhea," explains Atty. Nogales.

Those cases which require more extensive "treatment" are dealt with accordingly. "If you had a rich
realtive who died and named you her sole heir, and you stand to inherit millions of pesos of property,
we would refer you to a specialist in taxation. There would be real estate taxes and arrears which would
need to be put in order, and your relative is even taxed by the state for the right to transfer her
property, and only a specialist in taxation would be properly trained to deal with that problem. Now, if
there were other heirs contesting your rich relative’s will, then you would need a litigator, who knows
how to arrange the problem for presentation in court, and gather evidence to support the case." 21

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. What is
important is that it is engaged in the practice of law by virtue of the nature of the services it renders
which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against the advertisements which
it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.chanrobles.com : virtual law
library

Further, as correctly and appropriately pointed out by the U.P. WILOCI, said reported facts sufficiently
establish that the main purpose of respondent is to serve as a one-stop-shop of sorts for various legal
problems wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation
and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals,
but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. 22

It should be noted that in our jurisdiction the services being offered by private respondent which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member
of the bar, or hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court, and
who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 23

Public policy requires that the practice of law be limited to those individuals found duly qualified in
education and character. The permissive right conferred on the lawyers is an individual and limited
privilege subject to withdrawal if he fails to maintain proper standards of moral and professional
conduct. The purpose is to protect the public, the court, the client and the bar from the incompetence
or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not subject to the disciplinary control of the court.
24

The same rule is observed in the American jurisdiction where from respondent would wish to draw
support for his thesis. The doctrines there also stress that the practice of law is limited to those who
meet the requirements for, and have been admitted to, the bar, and various statutes or rules specifically
so provide. 25 The practice of law is not a lawful business except for members of the bar who have
complied with all the conditions required by statute and the rules of court. Only those persons are
allowed to practice law who, by reason of attainments previously acquired through education and study,
have been recognized by the courts as possessing profound knowledge of legal science entitling them to
advise, counsel with, protect, or defend the rights, claims, or liabilities of their clients, with respect to
the construction, interpretation, operation and effect of law. 26 The justification for excluding from the
practice of law those not admitted to the bar is found, not in the protection of the bar from
competition, but in the protection of the public from being advised and represented in legal matters by
incompetent and unreliable persons over whom the judicial department can exercise little control. 27

We have to necessarily and definitely reject respondent’s position that the concept in the United States
of paralegals as an occupation separate from the law profession be adopted in this jurisdiction.
Whatever may be its merits, respondent cannot but be aware that this should first be a matter for
judicial rules or legislative action, and not of unilateral adoption as it has done.
Paralegals in the United States are trained professionals. As admitted by respondent, there are schools
and universities there which offer studies and degrees in paralegal education, while there are none in
the Philippines. 28 As the concept of the "paralegal" or "legal assistant" evolved in the United States,
standards and guidelines also evolved to protect the general public. One of the major standards, or
guidelines was developed by the American Bar Association which set up Guidelines for the Approval of
Legal Assistant Education Programs (1973). Legislation has even been proposed to certify legal
assistants. There are also associations of paralegals in the United States with their own code of
professional ethics, such as the National Association of Legal Assistants, Inc. and the American Paralegal
Association. 29

In the Philippines, we still have a restricted concept and limited acceptance of what may be considered,
as paralegal service. As pointed out by FIDA, some persons not duly licensed to practice law are or have
been allowed limited representation in behalf of another or to render legal services, but such allowable
services are limited in scope and extent by the law, rules or regulations granting permission therefor. 30

Accordingly, we have adopted the American judicial policy that, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory authority, a person who has not been admitted as an attorney cannot practice law for the
proper administration of justice cannot be hindered by the unwarranted intrusion of an unauthorized
and unskilled person into the practice of law. 31 That policy should continue to be one of encouraging
persons who are unsure of their legal rights and remedies to seek legal assistance only from persons
licensed to practice law in the state. 32

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts. 33 He is not supposed to use or permit the use
of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services. 34 Nor shall he pay or give something of value to
representatives of the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal business.
35 Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Canons of Professional Ethics had
also warned that lawyers should not resort to indirect advertisements for professional employment,
such as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be published in
connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of their
conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer’s position, and all other
like self-laudation. 36

The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of his talents. A lawyer
cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar
to a merchant advertising his goods. 37 The proscription against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession.
Thus, in the case of The Director of Religious Affairs v. Estanislao R. Bavot 38 an advertisement, similar
to those of respondent which are involved in the present proceeding, 39 was held to constitute
improper advertising or solicitation.
The pertinent part of the decision therein reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the
ethics of his profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127
expressly provides among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or thru paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for
an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and
not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession who stoops to and adopts the practices of
mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As a member of the bar, he
defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled the temple
of Jehovah. The most worthy and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be
forced but must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

We repeat, the canons of the profession tell us that the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-
merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome
of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way of
publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service
which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to
magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the
unwholesome result of propaganda. 40

Of course, not all types of advertising or solicitation are prohibited. The canons of the profession
enumerate exceptions to the rule against advertising or solicitation and define the extent to which they
may be undertaken. The exceptions are of two broad categories, namely, those which are expressly
allowed and those which are necessarily implied from the restrictions. 41

The first of such exceptions is the publication in reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with the
standards of conduct imposed by the canons, of brief biographical and informative data. "Such data
must not be misleading and may include only a statement of the lawyer’s name and the names of his
professional associates; addresses, telephone numbers, cable addresses; branches of law practiced; date
and place of birth and admission to the bar; schools attended with dates of graduation, degrees and
other educational distinction; public or quasi-public offices; posts of honor; legal authorships; legal
teaching positions; membership and offices in bar associations and committees thereof, in legal and
scientific societies and legal fraternities; the fact of listings in other reputable law lists; the names and
addresses of references; and, with their written consent, the names of clients regularly represented."
42

The law list must be a reputable law list published primarily for that purpose; it cannot be a mere
supplemental feature of a paper, magazine, trade journal or periodical which is published principally for
other purposes. For that reason, a lawyer may not properly publish his brief biographical and
informative data in a daily paper, magazine, trade journal or society program. Nor may a lawyer permit
his name to be published in a law list the conduct, management or contents of which are calculated or
likely to deceive or injure the public or the bar, or to lower the dignity or standing of the profession. 43
The use of an ordinary simple professional card is also permitted. The card may contain only a statement
of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with, address, telephone number and
special branch of law practiced. The publication of a simple announcement of the opening of a law firm
or of changes in the partnership, associates, firm name or office address, being for the convenience of
the profession, is not objectionable. He may likewise have his name listed in a telephone directory but
not under a designation of special branch of law. 44

Verily, taking into consideration the nature and contents of the advertisements for which respondent is
being taken to task, which even includes a quotation of the fees charged by said respondent corporation
for services rendered, we find and so hold that the time definitely do not and conclusively cannot fall
under any of the above-mentioned exceptions.

The ruling in the case of Bates, Et. Al. v. State Bar of Arizona, 45 which is repeatedly invoked and
constitutes the justification relied upon by respondent, is obviously not applicable to the case at bar.
Foremost is the fact that the disciplinary rule involved in said case explicitly allows a lawyer, as an
exception to the prohibition against advertisements by lawyers, to publish a statement of legal fees for
an initial consultation or the availability upon request of a written schedule of fees or an estimate of the
fee to be charged for the specific services. No such exception is provided for, expressly or impliedly,
whether in our former Canons of Professional Ethics or the present Code of Professional Responsibility.
Besides, even the disciplinary rule in the Bates case contains a proviso that the exceptions stated therein
are "not applicable in any state unless and until it is implemented by such authority in that state." 46
This goes to show that an exception to the general rule, such as that being invoked by herein
respondent, can be made only if and when the canons expressly provide for such an exception.
Otherwise, the prohibition stands, as in the case at bar.chanrobles law library : red

It bears mention that in a survey conducted by the American Bar Association after the decision in Bates,
on the attitude of the public about lawyers after viewing television commercials, it was found that public
opinion dropped significantly 47 with respect to these characteristics of lawyers:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

Trustworthy from 71% to 14%

Professional from 71% to 14%

Honest from 65% to 14%

Dignified from 45% to 14%

Secondly, it is our firm belief that with the present situation of our legal and judicial systems, to allow
the publication of advertisements of the kind used by respondent would only serve to aggravate what is
already a deteriorating public opinion of the legal profession whose integrity has consistently been
under attack lately by media and the community in general. At this point in time, it is of utmost
importance in the face of such negative, even if unfair, criticisms at times, to adopt and maintain that
level of professional conduct which is beyond reproach, and to exert all efforts to regain the high
esteem formerly accorded to the legal profession.

In sum, it is undoubtedly a misbehavior on the part of the lawyer, subject to disciplinary action, to
advertise his services except in allowable instances 48 or to aid a layman in the unauthorized practice of
law. 49 Considering that Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales, who is the prime incorporator, major stockholder and
proprietor of The Legal Clinic, Inc. is a member of the Philippine Bar, he is hereby reprimanded, with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts which are involved in this proceeding will be dealt
with more severely.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which
the Legal Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain
from lapsing into an obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the
present proceeding which is merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter
be promptly determined, albeit in a different proceeding and forum, since, under the present state of
our law and jurisprudence, a corporation cannot be organized for or engage in the practice of law in this
country. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be subverted by
employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.chanrobles
lawlibrary : rednad

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the
Solicitor General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action, 50 after due ascertainment
of the factual background and basis for the grant of respondent’s corporate charter, in light of the
putative misuse thereof. That spin-off from the instant bar matter is referred to the Solicitor General for
such action as may be necessary under the circumstances.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc.,
from issuing or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of
the same or similar tenor and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting,
directly or indirectly, any activity, operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional
Ethics as indicated herein. Let copies of this resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Office of the Solicitor General for appropriate action
in accordance herewith.
G.R. No. L-51813-14 November 29, 1983

ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN, NELSON B. MALANA, and ROBERT V. LUCILA, petitioners,

vs.
HON. NICANOR J. CRUZ, JR., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, and
FISCAL LEODEGARIO C. QUILATAN, respondents.

Froilan M. Bacungan and Alfredo F. Tadiar for petitioners.

The Solicitor General for respondents.

RELOVA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the then
Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B.
Malana and Robert V. Lucila as private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for
less serious physical injuries, filed against Pat. Danilo San Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as
well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying the motion for reconsideration holding, among
others, that "the fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of party-litigants should be allowed only in
places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded. For, if we are to allow non-
members of the bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being
friends of the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the additional requirement of paying professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to
naught. " (p. 25, Rollo)

Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints
against Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively,
and were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court of Parañaque,
Metro Manila.

Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the
U.P.assistance to the needy clients in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979, petitioners
Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances, as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan.
Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the appearances of said petitioners, and
respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent fiscal and disallowed
the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal cases. Likewise,
on September 4, 1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others, that the
Orders of respondent judge, dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside as they are in
plain violation of Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on November 8, 1979, issued a
temporary restraining order "enjoining respondent judge and all persons acting for and in his behalf
from conducting any proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo San
Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Diaz) of the Municipal Court of Parañaque,
Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on any such dates as may be fixed by said
respondent judge.

Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states: têñ.£îhqwâ£

SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid
of an attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney,
and his appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar — a party to an action is authorized to appear in court and
conduct his own case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an
attorney. However, in the Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only by an
attorney.

On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110
of the Rules of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the private prosecutor
as was done by respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila.
Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provide: têñ.£îhqwâ£

SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. — All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or
by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.

xxx xxx xxx

SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. — Unless the offended party has waived
the civil action or expressly reserved the right to institute it separately from the criminal action, and
subject to the provisions of section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the
prosecution of the offense.

And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the direction and
control of the fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the case later on,
requires the prior approval of the fiscal.

We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in the
municipal court a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him
for the purpose. Thus, in the case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to
represent the accused in a case pending before the then Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila, who
was charged for damages to property through reckless imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error
was committed in the municipal court in not allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of
Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary
for one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the first place, the law does not impose this
condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally is to disallow the private
prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the other hand, if
the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court that
the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his supervision
and control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the
accused in a case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to appear as
private prosecutor under the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.

In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the
offended party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately and,
therefore, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant
Romulo Cantimbuhan has personal interest in the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of
the same, he cannot be deprived of his right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.

WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979
which disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as friends of
party-litigant petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan. are hereby SET ASIDE and respondent judge is hereby
ordered to ALLOW the appearance and intervention of petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of
Romulo Cantimbuhan. Accordingly, the temporary restraining order issued on November 8, 1979 is
LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.1äwphï1.ñët

Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

Senior law students should study their lessons anti prepare for the bar. They have no business appearing
in court.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a party" who may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose in the Court of
a Justice of the Peace. Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549
and 58550 of the then Municipal Court of Parañaque, Metro Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning
of the said Rule. The parties in a criminal case are the accused and the People. A complaining witness or
an offended party only intervene in a criminal action in respect of the civil liability. The case of Laput
and Salas vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only in respect of the accused, as a "party", in a criminal
case.

Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more specific provisions in respect of
criminal cases, should take precedence over Section 34, Rule 138 and should be controlling (Bagatsing
vs. Hon. Ramirez, 74 SCRA 306 [1976]). Section 4 provides that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the Fiscal, while Section 15 specifically provides that the offended
party may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.
I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated August 16, 1979,
disallowing the appearances of petitioners as private prosecutors in the abovementioned criminal cases.
Orders set aside.
A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015

SPOUSES WILLIE AND AMELIA UMAGUING, Complainants, v. ATTY. WALLEN R. DE VERA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint1 for the alleged betrayal of trust, incompetence,
and gross misconduct of respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De Vera) in his handling of the
election protest case involving the candidacy of MariecrisUmaguing (Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie
and Amelia Umaguing (complainants), for the SangguniangKabataan (SK) Elections, instituted before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 36 (MeTC), docketed as ELEC. CASE No. 07-
1279.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Facts

As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections for the
year 2007 but lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote.3 Because of this, complainants
lodged an election protest and enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. On November 7, 2007,
complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his acceptance fee of P30,000.00, plus various court
appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount of P30,000.00.4 According to the
complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough time to prepare and file the case but the former
moved at a glacial pace and only took action when the November 8, 2008 deadline was looming.5 Atty.
De Vera then rushed the preparation of the necessary documents and attachments for the election
protest. Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits6 of material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica
(Lachica) and Angela Almera (Almera), which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that
the aforesaid affidavits were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they were unfortunately
unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De Vera allegedly instructed AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip) and
Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the nearest kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera and ask them
to sign over the names.7 The signing over of Lachica’s and Almera’s names were done by Christina Papin
(Papin) and Elsa Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then had all the documents notarized
before one Atty. DonatoManguiat (Atty. Manguiat).8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the signature affixed in
the affidavit and submitted his own Affidavit,9 declaring that he did not authorize Papin to sign the
document on his behalf. Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the MeTC and drew the ire of Presiding
Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were
falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed out that while Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to rectify this error (i.e., an
Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion,10 seeking, among others, the withdrawal of Lachica’s
and Almera’s affidavits), it was observed that such was a mere flimsy excuse since Atty. De Vera had
ample amount of time to have the affidavits personally signed by the affiants but still hastily filed the
election protest with full knowledge that the affidavits at hand were
falsified.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not appear
before the MeTC, although promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and did not
offer any explanation as to why he was not able to attend.12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an explanation regarding his non-
appearance in the court. Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the particular case
because of the alleged favoritism of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera, Judge Belosillo received
P60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty. Carmelo Culvera, in order to acquire a favorable decision for
his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only appear for the case if the complainants would give
him P80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to Judge Belosillo to secure a favorable decision for
Umaguing.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty. De
Vera, as well as his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to withdraw as their
counsel and to reimburse them the P60,000.00 in excessive fees he collected from them, considering
that he only appeared twice for the case.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s disbarment.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In his Counter-Affidavit,16 Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the accusations lodged against him by
complainants. He averred that he merely prepared the essential documents for election protest based
on the statements of his clients.17 Atty. De Vera then explained that the signing of Lachica’s falsified
Affidavit was done without his knowledge and likewise stated that it was Christina Papin who should be
indicted and charged with the corresponding criminal offense. He added that he actually sought to
rectify his mistakes by filing the aforementioned Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion in order
to withdraw the affidavits of Lachica and Almera. As he supposedly felt that he could no longer serve
complainants with his loyalty and devotion in view of the aforementioned signing incident, Atty. De Vera
then withdrew from the case.18 To add, he pointed out that along with his Formal Notice of Withdrawal
of Counsel, complainants executed a document entitled “Release Waiver & Discharge,”19 which, to him,
discharges him and his law firm from all causes of action that complainants may have against him,
including the instant administrative case.

After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, the matter was submitted for report and recommendation.

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In a Report and Recommendation20 dated December 5, 2009, the IBP Commissioner found the
administrative action to be impressed with merit, and thus recommended that Atty. De Vera be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

While no sufficient evidence was found to support the allegation that Atty. De Vera participated in the
falsification of Lachica’s affidavit, the IBP Commissioner ruled oppositely with respect to the falsification
of Almera’s affidavit, to which issue Atty. De Vera deliberately omitted to comment on. The Investigating
Commissioner pointed out that the testimony of Elsa Almera-Almacen, Almera’s sister – attesting that
Lalong-Isip approached her and asked if she could sign the affidavit, and her vivid recollection that Atty.
De Vera was present during its signing, and that Lalong-Isip declared to Atty. De Vera that she was not
Almera – was found to be credible as it was too straightforward and hard to ignore.22 It was also
observed that the backdrop in which the allegations were made, i.e., that the signing of the affidavits
was done on November 7, 2007, or one day before the deadline for the filing of the election protest,
showed that Atty. De Vera was really pressed for time and, hence, his resort to the odious act of
advising his client’s campaigners Lalong-Isip and Fielding to look for kin and relatives of the affiants for
and in their behalf in his earnest desire to beat the deadline set for the filing of the election protest.23 To
this, the IBP Investigating Commissioner remarked that the lawyer’s first duty is not to his client but to
the administration of justice, and therefore, his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of the law and ethics of the profession.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt the
findings of the IBP Commissioner. Hence, for knowingly submitting a falsified document in court, a two
(2) month suspension was imposed against Atty. De Vera.

On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution27 dated February 11,
2014, affirming with modification their December 14, 2012 Resolution, decreasing the period of
suspension from two (2) months to one (1) month.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly substantiated by the
records. However, the Court finds it apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6) months.

Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected
to be honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding,
are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been
given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as
a bona fide member of the Law Profession, thus:28

I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will
not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent
to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to
the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I
impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from
doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct
himself according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well
as to his clients. Every lawyer is a servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as
well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that
the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by the Code of
Professional Responsibility.30 In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.”

After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court finds itself in complete agreement with the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, who was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors, in holding that Atty. De
Vera sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit, i.e.,Almera’s affidavit, before the court in his
desire to beat the November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the election protest of Umaguing. To this, the
Court is wont to sustain the IBP Investigating Commissioner’s appreciation of Elsa Almera-Almacen’s
credibility as a witness given that nothing appears on record to seriously belie the same, and in
recognition too of the fact that the IBP and its officers are in the best position to assess the witness’s
credibility during disciplinary proceedings, as they – similar to trial courts – are given the opportunity to
first-hand observe their demeanor and comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera authorized the
falsification of Almera’s affidavit is rendered more believable by the absence of Atty. De Vera’s
comment on the same. In fact, in his Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors’
Resolution dated December 14, 2012, no specific denial was proffered by Atty. De Vera on this score.
Instead, he only asserted that he was not the one who notarized the subject affidavits but another
notary public, who he does not even know or has seen in his entire life,31 and that he had no knowledge
of the falsification of the impugned documents, much less of the participation in using the
same.32 Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court views the same to be a mere general denial which
cannot overcome Elsa Almera-Almacen’s positive testimony that he indeed participated in the
procurement of her signature and the signing of the affidavit, all in support of the claim of falsification.

The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of Governors rendered its recommendation – is that
Almera’s affidavit was submitted to the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated retraction of the
questioned affidavits, through the Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion, does not, for this
Court, merit significant consideration as its submission appears to be a mere afterthought, prompted
only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it is highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have
remained in the dark about the authenticity of the documents he himself submitted to the court when
his professional duty requires him to represent his client with zeal and within the bounds of the
law.33 Likewise, he is prohibited from handling any legal matter without adequate preparation34 or allow
his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case.35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned “Release Waiver &
Discharge” which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged him from all causes
of action that complainants may have against him, such as the present case, would not deny the Court
its power to sanction him administratively. It was held in Ylaya v.
Gacott36 that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the
complainant. What matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of
deceit and grossly immoral conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a
plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest
and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public
welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official
administration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his
conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court
to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.37

All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court.

As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v. Atty. Abellana38 (Samonte), suspended the
lawyer therein from the practice of law for six (6) months for filing a spurious document in court. In view
of the antecedents in this case, the Court finds it appropriate to impose the same here.

Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for reimbursement39 for the return of the amount of
P60,000.00,40comprised of Atty. De Vera’s acceptance fee and other legal expenses intrinsically related
to his professional engagement,41 for he had actually admitted his receipt thereof in his Answer before
the IBP.42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation in Samonte:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to
practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers
preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or
deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the
rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law
and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer
stern disciplinary sanctions.43

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating the Lawyer’s
Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he
is SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a
stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar acts will be punished more severely.

Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants Spouses Willie and Amelia Umaguing the
amount of P60,000.00 which he admittedly received from the latter as fees intrinsically linked to his
professional engagement within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply
with the foregoing directive will warrant the imposition of further administrative penalties.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s
personal record as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in
the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7474 September 9, 2014

PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, SORSOGON
CITY,Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the respondent, a law
practitioner, who had engaged in the unethical practice of filing frivolous administrative cases against
judges and personnel of the courts because the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant from
hearing a pending case. Hence, the complainant has initiated this complaint for the disbarment of
respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and gross violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Antecedents

On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S.Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795,
entitled "People of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault" then pending in Branch 51 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid.1 Atty. Dealca sought to
replace Atty. Vicente Judar who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused. But aside
from entering his appearance as counsel for the accused, Atty. Dealca also moved that Criminal Case No.
2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC "[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the
incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned," where" he does not appear before the incumbent
Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned."2

Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-raffle through an order issued on February 14,
2007,3 viz:

xxxx

This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the personal sentiments of
counsel who was not even the original counsel of the litigant.

Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this Court and the other Courts in
this province as hewould like it to appear that jurisdiction over a Family Court case is based on his
whimsical dictates.

This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases against this Presiding
Judge which were all dismissed by the Hon. Supreme Court for utter lack ofmerit. This is why he should
not have accepted this particular case so as not to derail the smooth proceedings in this Court with his
baseless motions for inhibition. It is the lawyer’s duty to appear on behalf of a client in a case but not to
appear for a client to remove a case from the Court. This is unethical practice in the first order.

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby DENIED. Relative to the
Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty. Vicente C. Judar dated January 29, 2007,
the same is hereby DENIED for being violative of the provisions of Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.

So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for accused Philip William Arsenault is
likewise DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint4 in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty.
Dealca’sunethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the presiding
judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents between them.

On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular administrative complaint, and required Atty.
Dealca to submit his comment.5

In his comment-complaint,6 Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid’s issuance of the February 14, 2007
order unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the right to counsel, to due process,
and to a fair and impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act on the motion to lift
and set aside the warrant ofarrest issued against the accused; and that it should be Judge Madrid
himself who should be disbarred and accordingly dismissed from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the
law.

On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate investigation,report and
recommendation.7Several months thereafter, the Court also indorsed pertinent documents in
connection with A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ, entitled "Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and Court
Stenographer MerlynD. Dominguez, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51, Sorsogon City"
(Yap v. Judge Madrid).8

On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madriddismissed for its lack of merit the administrative
complaint against Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying the transcript of stenographic notes of the
hearing on March 4, 2005 in Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H. Yap III,
but referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation
the propensity of Atty. Dealca to file administrative or criminal complaints against judges and court
personnel whenever decisions, orders or processes were issued adversely to him and his clients.9

In compliance with the referral,the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report with the following
findings and recommendation:10

xxxx

The documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca filed by
himself (1) Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as counsel for the complainants (2) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No.
04-2113-RTJ; (3) OMB-L-C-05-0478-E;(4) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and (5) Adm. Matter OCA
IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ. These five (5) cases are factual evidence of the cases that respondent had filed by
himself and as counsel for the complainants against court officers, judges and personnel as a
consequence of the IBP Election and incidents in cases that respondent had handled as counselfor the
parties in the said cases.
It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges (Judge Jose L. Madrid & Judge
Honesto A. Villamor) and lawyers in IBP Sorsogon Chapters, who are no doubt officers of the court, and
the case aroused (sic) out ofthe unfavorable consensus of the IBP chapter members that was adverse to
the position of the respondent. The other four (4) cases aroused [sic] out of the cases handled by
respondent for the complainants who failed to secure a favorable action from the court.

Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case before the sala of Judge Jose
L. Madrid (RTC 51) entitled "Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo Jarabo, et al.," for: Accion Publiciana and
Damages, that was handled by respondent for the complainant Alita Gomez. OMB-L-C-0478-E was an off
shoot of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III"
for: Support pending before the sala ofcomplainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51). Respondent, after an
unfavorable decision against defendant Joseph H. Yap III, entered his appearance and pleaded for the
latter. As a result of an adverse order, this ombudsman case arose.

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil Case No. 5403 entitled
"Salve Dealca Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, with Our Lady’s Village Foundation and Most
Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as third party defendant that was heard, tried, decided and pending
execution before the sala of Judge Honesto A. Villamor (RTC 52).

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was also a consequence of Civil Case No. 2001-6842
entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for Support pending before the
sala of complainant JudgeJose L. Madrid (RTC 51).

All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court against the clients of
the respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies available under the Rules of Procedure,
respondent assisted his clients in filing administrative and criminal case against the judges and
personnel of the court.

The other documentary evidence of the complainants such as the (a) VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated March
7, 2003 in Civil Service Case entitled "EDNA GOROSPE-DEALCA vs. JULIANA ENCINASCARINO, et al.; (b)
NOTICE OF RESOLUTION on October 22, 2005 in Adm. Case No. 6334 entitled "SOFIAJAO vs. ATTY.
EPIFANIA RUBY VELACRUZ-OIDA" passed by the Board ofGovernors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines which Resolution No. XVII-2005-92 provides: "RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE the Report
and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit; (c)
RESOLUTION of the Third Division of the Supreme Court dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative Case
No. 6334 (Sofia Jao vs. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida) – The notice of resolution dated October 22, 2005
ofthe Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines (IBP) dismissing the case for lack of merit; (d) VERIFIED
COMPLAINT in Adm. Case No. 6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled "Sofia Jao vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby
Velacruz-Oida" for: Malpractice (Forum Shopping), and (e) ORDER dated January 18, 2007 by Acting
Presiding Judge RAUL E. DE LEON in Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454 entitled "People of the Philippines
vs. Cynthia Marcial, et al. For: Falsification of Medical Records" which provides for the dismissal of the
cases against all the accused, do not show participation on the part of the respondent that he signed the
pleadings, although the verified complaint is one executed by the wife of the respondent. Moreover,
these cases are pertaining to persons other than judges and personnel of the court that are not squarely
covered by the present investigation against respondent, although, it is an undeniable fact that
respondent had appeared for and in behalf of his wife, the rest of the complainants in the Civil Service
Case and Sofia Jao against Land Bank of the Philippines, the latter case resulted in the administrative
case of Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida, respondent’s sister member of the Bar. All these documentary
evidence from (a) to (e) are helpful in determining the "PROPENSITY" of the respondent as a member of
the bar in resorting to harassment cases instead of going through the procedures provided for by the
Rules of Court in the event of adverse ruling, order or decision of the court.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in view of the above-foregoings [sic], a penalty
of SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six (6) monthsfrom finality of the decision be
ordered against respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca.

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and Recommendation11 finding
Atty. Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing
frivolous administrative and criminalcomplaints; and recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended
from the practice of law for one year because his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of factual
or legal basis, and was grounded on purely personal whims.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41,12 the IBP Board of Governors modified the recommendation and
dismissed the administrative complaint for its lack of merit, thus:

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating

Commissioner, and APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit. Judge Madrid
filed a petition,13 which the IBP Board of Governors treated as a motion for reconsideration, and soon
denied through its Resolution No. XX-2012-545.14

Issues

(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolousadministrative and criminal complaints against judges and court
personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility?

(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal
Case No. 2006-6795?

Ruling of the Court

We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.

Atty. Dealca must guard against his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits

Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed against judges and
court personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring
and prosecute cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel.15

We see no merit in Atty. Dealca’s arguments.

Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance
to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving court personnel,
any acts taken in that direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self interest. The noble
cause of cleansing the ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty.
Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any
trace of idealism or altruismin the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his
proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner
Hababag pointed out,16 his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his colleagues
in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side.
He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither
vindictiveness nor harassment could be a substitute for resorting tothe appropriate legal remedies. He
should now be reminded that the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties
according to law, not to harass them.17

The Lawyer’s Oath is a source ofobligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by an
attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action.18 The oath
exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be
upheld and keep inviolable.19

As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate
groundless, false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied inRule 1.03, Canon 1 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility thuswise:

Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or
delay any man’s cause.

His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly administration of
justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and caprices ofhis clients and
temper his clients’ propensities to litigate,20 so must he equally guard himself against his own impulses
of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Court’s duty to investigate and uncover the truth
behindcharges against judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that
are intended to vex and harass them, among other things.21

Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the proper administration
of justice. He disregarded his mission because his filing of the unfounded complaints, including this one
against Judge Madrid, increased the workload of the Judiciary. Although no person should be penalized
for the exercise ofthe right to litigate, the right must nonetheless be exercised in good faith.22 Atty.
Dealca’s bringing of the numerous administrative and criminal complaints against judges, court
personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince any good faith on his part, considering that he made
allegations against them therein that he could not substantially prove, and are rightfully deemed
frivolous and unworthy of the Court’s precious time and serious consideration.

Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various complaints, Atty. Dealca had the temerity to
confront even the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to wit:

With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases filed against erring judges
and court personnel ‘for lack of merit’, i.e. without even discussing the facts and the law of the case.23
Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court could have promulgated in
frequently dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant posturing would not advance his cause
now. He thereby demonstrated his plain ignorance of the rules of procedure applicable to the Court.The
minute resolutions have been issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions by the Court.24 Whenever
the Court then dismisses a petition for review for its lack of merit through a minute resolution, it is
understood that the challenged decision or order, together with all its findings of fact and law, is
deemed sustained or upheld,25 and the minute resolution then constitutes the actual adjudication on
the merits of the case. The dismissal of the petition, or itsdenial of due course indicates the Court’s
agreement with and its adoption of the findings and conclusions of the court a quo.26

The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the minute resolutions that the
Court issuesin disposing of a case. The Court explained why in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals:27

The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as
final and executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in
nature, where the decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the
facts of the case and the applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed
merely to forestall the early execution of judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The
resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition always gives the legal basis.

xxxx

The Court is not ‘duty bound’ to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to
formulate Decisions and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its
evaluation of a case.

The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the issue raised in Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v.
Court of Appeals.28 The petitioner contended that the minute resolutions violated Section 14,29 Article
VIII of the Constitution. The Court, throughJustice Regalado, declared that resolutions were not
decisions withinthe constitutional contemplation, for the former "merely hold that the petition for
review should not be entertained and even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it; and the
petition to review the decisionof the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but of sound judicial
discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for one thing, the facts and
the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeal’s decision." It pointed out that the constitutional
mandate was applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course to and after the filing
of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition was being refused due
course, with the resolutions for that purpose stating the legal basis of the refusal. Thus, when the Court,
after deliberating on the petition and the subsequent pleadings, decided to deny due course to the
petition and stated that the questions raised were factual, or there was no reversible error in the lower
court’s decision, there was a sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.30

II

Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace inhibited himself" upon his motion
toinhibit in order to preserve "confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary."31 However, IBP
Commissioner Hababag has recommended that Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to
inhibit considering that the motion, being purely based on his personal whims, was bereft of factual and
legal bases.32

The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the legal causes
for their clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon
them by law. Verily, their membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon them.33

In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently state:

Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

xxxx

Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or haveno
materiality to the case.1âwphi1

In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts,
and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that
guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very
shaky foundation.34

The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit:

Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned, he does
not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, andthe latter does not also hear cases handled by the
undersignedx x x.35 (Bold emphasis supplied)

Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him directly insinuated
that judges could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse to hear the cases in which hostility
existed between the judges and the litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have
been assiduously substantiated by him because it put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges in
general. Yet, he did not even include any particulars that could have validated the averment. Nor did he
attach any document to support it.

Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who
does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must
be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was
incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias and
prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca
was participating as a counsel.36 The latter’s bare allegations of Judge Madrid’s partiality or hostility did
not suffice,37 because the presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense
justice according to law and the evidence and without fear or favor should only be overcome by clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary.38 As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a
lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.

On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first administrative complaint to be
ever brought against Atty. Dealca.1avvphi1 In Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines,39 we
reprimanded him for violating Canon 22 and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and warned him that a repetition of the same offense would be dealt with more severely.
Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court imposed on erring lawyers found violating Canon 1, Rule
1.03,40 and Canon 11, Rule 11.0441 of the Code, we deem appropriate to suspend Atty. Dealca from the
practice of law for a period one year. ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY.
JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11. 04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year effective from
notice of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with
more severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty.
Dealca's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 10573 January 13, 2015

FERNANDO W. CHU, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE C. GUICO, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Fernando W. Chu invokes the Court's disciplinary authority in resolving this disbarment complaint
against his former lawyer, respondent Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr., whom he has accused of gross
misconduct.

Antecedents

Chu retained Atty. Guico as counsel to handle the labor disputes involving his company, CVC San
Lorenzo Ruiz Corporation (CVC).1 Atty. Guico’s legal services included handling a complaint for illegal
dismissal brought against CVC (NLRC Case No. RAB-III-08-9261-05 entitled Kilusan ng Manggagawang
Makabayan (KMM) Katipunan CVC San Lorenzo Ruiz Chapter, Ladivico Adriano, et al. v. CVC San Lorenzo
Ruiz Corp. and Fernando Chu).2 On September 7, 2006, Labor Arbiter Herminio V. Suelo rendered a
decision adverse to CVC.3 Atty. Guico filed a timely appeal in behalf of CVC.

According to Chu, during a Christmas party held on December 5, 2006 at Atty. Guico’s residence in
Commonwealth, Quezon City, Atty. Guico asked him to prepare a substantial amount of money to be
given to the NLRC Commissioner handling the appeal to insure a favorable decision.4 On June 10, 2007,
Chu called Atty. Guico to inform him that he had raised ₱300,000.00 for the purpose. Atty. Guico told
him to proceed to his office at No. 48 Times Street, Quezon City, and togive the money to his assistant,
Reynaldo (Nardo) Manahan. Chu complied, and later on called Atty. Guico to confirm that he had
delivered the money to Nardo. Subsequently, Atty. Guico instructed Chu to meet him on July 5, 2007 at
the UCC Coffee Shop on T. Morato Street, Quezon City. Atthe UCC Coffee Shop, Atty. Guico handed Chu
a copy of an alleged draft decision of the NLRC in favor of CVC.5 The draft decision6was printed on the
dorsal portion of used paper apparently emanating from the office of Atty. Guico. On that occasion, the
latter told Chu to raise another ₱300,000.00 to encourage the NLRC Commissioner to issue the decision.
But Chu could only produce ₱280,000.00, which he brought to Atty. Guico’s office on July 10, 2007
accompanied by his son, Christopher Chu, and one Bonifacio Elipane. However, it was Nardo who
received the amount without issuing any receipt.7

Chu followed up on the status of the CVC case with Atty. Guico in December 2007. However, Atty. Guico
referred him to Nardo who in turn said that he would only know the status after Christmas. On January
11, 2008, Chu again called Nardo, who invited him to lunch at the Ihaw Balot Plaza in Quezon City. Once
there, Chu asked Nardo if the NLRC Commissioner had accepted the money, but Nardo replied in the
negative and simply told Chu to wait. Nardo assured that the money was still with Atty. Guico who
would return it should the NLRC Commissioner not accept it.8

On January 19, 2009, the NLRC promulgated a decision adverse to CVC.9 Chu confronted Atty. Guico,
who in turn referred Chu to Nardo for the filing of a motion for reconsideration. After the denial of the
motion for reconsideration, Atty. Guico caused the preparation and filing of an appeal in the Court of
Appeals. Finally, Chu terminated Atty. Guico as legal counsel on May 25, 2009.10

In his position paper,11 Atty. Guico described the administrative complaint as replete with lies and
inconsistencies, and insisted that the charge was only meant for harassment. He denied demanding and
receiving money from Chu, a denial that Nardo corroborated with his own affidavit.12 He further denied
handing to Chu a draft decision printed on used paper emanating from his office, surmising that the
used paper must have been among those freely lying around in his office that had been pilfered by Chu’s
witnesses in the criminal complaint he had handled for Chu.13

Findings and Recommendation of the

IBP Board of Governors

IBP Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva found that Atty. Guico had violated Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon
I of the Code of Professional Responsibility for demanding and receiving ₱580,000.00 from Chu; and
recommended the disbarment of Atty. Guico in view of his act of extortion and misrepresentation that
caused dishonor to and contempt for the legal profession.14

On February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the findings of IBP Commissioner Villanueva
in its Resolution No. XX-2013-87,15 but modified the recommended penalty of disbarment to three years
suspension, viz.:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A," and finding the recommendation fully supported
by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent’s violation of
Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Jose C. Guico, Jr. is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years with Warning that a repetition of the same or
similar act shall be dealt with more severely and Ordered to Return the amount of Five Hundred Eighty
Thousand (₱580,000.00) Pesos with legal interest within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.

Atty. Guico moved for reconsideration,16 but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion for
reconsideration on March 23, 2014 in Resolution No. XXI-2014-173.17

Neither of the parties brought a petition for review vis-à-vis Resolution No. XX-2013-87 and Resolution
No. XXI-2014-173.

Issue

Did Atty. Guico violate the Lawyer’s Oath and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for demanding and receiving ₱580,000.00 from Chu to guarantee a favorable decision
from the NLRC?

Ruling of the Court

In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the complainant to establish respondent
attorney’s liability by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence. Indeed, this Court has consistently
required clearly preponderant evidence to justify the imposition of either disbarment or suspension as
penalty.18
Chu submitted the affidavits of his witnesses,19 and presented the draft decision that Atty. Guico had
represented to him as having come from the NLRC. Chu credibly insisted that the draft decision was
printed on the dorsal portion of used paper emanating from Atty. Guico’s office,20 inferring that Atty.
Guico commonly printed documents on used paper in his law office. Despite denying being the source of
the draft decision presented by Chu, Atty. Guico’s participation in the generation of the draft decision
was undeniable. For one, Atty. Guico impliedly admitted Chu’s insistence by conceding that the used
paper had originated from his office, claiming only that used paper was just "scattered around his
office."21 In that context, Atty. Guico’s attempt to downplay the sourcing of used paper from his office
was futile because he did not expressly belie the forthright statement of Chu. All that Atty. Guico stated
by way of deflecting the imputation was that the used paper containing the draft decision could have
been easily taken from his office by Chu’s witnesses in a criminal case that he had handled for
Chu,22 pointing out that everything in his office, except the filing cabinets and his desk, was "open to the
public xxx and just anybody has access to everything found therein."23 In our view, therefore, Atty. Guico
made the implied admission because he was fully aware that the used paper had unquestionably come
from his office.

The testimony of Chu, and the circumstances narrated by Chu and his witnesses, especially the act of
Atty. Guico of presenting to Chu the supposed draft decision that had been printed on used paper
emanating from Atty. Guico’s office, sufficed to confirm that he had committed the imputed gross
misconduct by demanding and receiving ₱580,000.00 from Chu to obtain a favorable decision. Atty.
Guico offered only his general denial of the allegations in his defense, but such denial did not overcome
the affirmative testimony of Chu. We cannot but conclude that the production of the draft decision by
Atty. Guico was intended to motivate Chu to raise money to ensure the chances of obtaining the
favorable result in the labor case. As such, Chu discharged his burden of proof as the complainant to
establish his complaint against Atty. Guico. In this administrative case, a fact may be deemed
established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.24

What is the condign penalty for Atty. Guico?

In taking the Lawyer’s Oath, Atty. Guico bound himself to:

x x x maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; x x x support its Constitution and obey the
laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; x x x do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; x x x delay no man for money or malice x x x. The Code of
Professional Responsibility echoes the Lawyer’s Oath, to wit:

CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and for legal processes.1âwphi1

Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Rule 1.02 — A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.

The sworn obligation to respect the law and the legal processes under the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code
of Professional Responsibility is a continuing condition for every lawyer to retain membership in the
Legal Profession. To discharge the obligation, every lawyer should not render any service or give advice
to any client that would involve defiance of the very laws that he was bound to uphold and obey,25 for
he or she was always bound as an attorney to be law abiding, and thus to uphold the integrity and
dignity of the Legal Profession.26 Verily, he or she must act and comport himself or herself in such a
manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the Legal Profession.27 Any lawyer
found to violate this obligation forfeits his or her privilege to continue such membership in the legal
profession.

Atty. Guico willingly and wittingly violated the law in appearing to counsel Chu to raise the large sums of
money in order to obtain a favorable decision in the labor case. He thus violated the law against bribery
and corruption. He compounded his violation by actually using said illegality as his means of obtaining a
huge sum from the client that he soon appropriated for his own personal interest. His acts constituted
gross dishonesty and deceit, and were a flagrant breach of his ethical commitments under the Lawyer’s
Oath not to delay any man for money or malice; and under Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility that forbade him from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. His
deviant conduct eroded the faith of the people in him as an individual lawyer as well as in the Legal
Profession as a whole. In doing so, he ceased to be a servant of the law.

Atty. Guico committed grave misconduct and disgraced the Legal Profession. Grave misconduct is
"improper or wrong conduct, the transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies a wrongful intent and not mere
error of judgment."28 There is no question that any gross misconduct by an attorney in his professional
or private capacity renders him unfit to manage the affairs of others, and is a ground for the imposition
of the penalty of suspension or disbarment, because good moral character is an essential qualification
for the admission of an attorney and for the continuance of such privilege.29

Accordingly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to suspend him from the practice of
law for three (3) years would be too soft a penalty. Instead, he should be disbarred,30 for he exhibited
his unworthiness of retaining his membership in the legal profession. As the Court has reminded in
Samonte v. Abellana:31

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to
practice law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers
preserve their fitness to remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or
deception, including adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the
rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to practice law
and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer
stern disciplinary sanctions.

Lastly, the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Guico be ordered to return the
amount of ₱580,000.00 to Chu is well-taken. That amount was exacted by Atty. Guico from Chu in the
guise of serving the latter’s interest as the client. Although the purpose for the amount was unlawful, it
would be unjust not to require Atty. Guico to fully account for and to return the money to Chu. It did not
matter that this proceeding is administrative in character, for, as the Court has pointed out in Bayonla v.
Reyes:32

Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical
responsibility on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court’s silence about the respondent lawyer’s legal
obligation to restitute the complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical
misconduct concerning the client’s funds or property should be required to still litigate in another
proceeding what the administrative proceeding has already established as the respondent’s liability. x x
x

ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and DECLARES respondent ATTY. JOSE S. GUICO, JR. GUILTY of the
violation of the Lawyer’s Oath, and Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon I of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and DISBARS him from membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His name is
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty.
Guico’s personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts and
quasi-judicial offices in the country for their information and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
RESOLUTION

Acting on the compliance dated 05 July 2004

and on the proposed Rules on Notarial
Practice of 2004 submitted by the Sub-
Committee for the Study, Drafting and
Formulation of the Rules Governing the
Appointment of Notaries Public and the
Performance and Exercise of Their Official
Functions, of the Committees on Revision of
the Rules of Court and on Legal Education and
Bar Matters, the Court Resolved to APPROVE
the proposed Rules on Notarial Practice of
2004, with modifications,
thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

2004 RULES ON NOTARIAL PRACTICE

RULE I
IMPLEMENTATION

SECTION 1. Title. - These Rules shall be known

as the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice.

SEC. 2. Purposes. - These Rules shall be applied

and construed to advance the following
purposes:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) to promote, serve, and protect public

interest; chan robles virtual law library
(b) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the rules
governing notaries public; and
(c) to foster ethical conduct among notaries
public. chan robles virtual law library

SEC. 3. Interpretation. - Unless the context of

these Rules otherwise indicates, words in the
singular include the plural, and words in the
plural include the singular.

RULE II
DEFINITIONS

SECTION 1. Acknowledgment. -
“Acknowledgment” refers to an act in which
an individual on a single
occasion:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) appears in person before the notary public
and presents an integrally complete
instrument or document;
chan robles virtual law library
(b) is attested to be personally known to the
notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as
defined by these Rules; and -
chan robles virtual law library
(c) represents to the notary public that the
signature on the instrument or document was
voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes
stated in the instrument or document,
declares that he has executed the instrument
or document as his free and voluntary act and
deed, and, if he acts in a particular
representative capacity, that he has the
authority to sign in that capacity.

SEC. 2. Affirmation or Oath. - The term

“Affirmation” or “Oath” refers to an act in
which an individual on a single occasion: chan
robles virtual law library

(a) appears in person before the notary

public; chan robles virtual law library
(b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules; and chan robles virtual law
library
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole
truth of the contents of the instrument or
document.

SEC. 3. Commission. - “Commission” refers to

the grant of authority to perform notarial acts
and to the written evidence of the authority.

SEC. 4. Copy Certification. - “Copy

Certification” refers to a notarial act in which a
notary public:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) is presented with an instrument or

document that is neither a vital record, a
public record, nor publicly recordable;
(b) copies or supervises the copying of the
instrument or document;
(c) compares the instrument or document
with the copy; and
(d) determines that the copy is accurate and
complete.

SEC. 5. Notarial Register. - “Notarial Register”

refers to a permanently bound book with
numbered pages containing a chronological
record of notarial acts performed by a notary
public. chan robles virtual law library

SEC. 6. Jurat. - “Jurat” refers to an act in which

an individual on a single
occasion:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) appears in person before the notary public

and presents an instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules; chan robles virtual law library
(c) signs the instrument or document in the
presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the
notary public as to such instrument or
document.

SEC. 7. Notarial Act and Notarization.

- “Notarial Act” and “Notarization” refer to
any act that a notary public is empowered to
perform under these Rules.

SEC. 8. Notarial Certificate. - “Notarial

Certificate” refers to the part of, or
attachment to, a notarized instrument or
document that is completed by the notary
public, bears the notary's signature and seal,
and states the facts attested to by the notary
public in a particular notarization as provided
for by these Rules.chan robles virtual law
library

SEC. 9. Notary Public and Notary. - “Notary

Public” and “Notary” refer to any person
commissioned to perform official acts under
these Rules.cralaw

SEC. 10. Principal. - “Principal” refers to a

person appearing before the notary public
whose act is the subject of notarization. chan
robles virtual law library

SEC. 11. Regular Place of Work or Business. -

The term “regular place of work or business”
refers to a stationary office in the city or
province wherein the notary public renders
legal and notarial services. chan robles virtual
law library

SEC. 12. Competent Evidence of Identity. - The

phrase “competent evidence of identity”
refers to the identification of an individual
based on:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) at least one current identification

document issued by an official agency bearing
the photograph and signature of the
individual; or chan robles virtual law library
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible
witness not privy to the instrument, document
or transaction who is personally known to the
notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither
of whom is privy to the instrument, document
or transaction who each personally knows the
individual and shows to the notary public
documentary identification.

SEC. 13. Official Seal or Seal. - “Official seal” or

“Seal” refers to a device for affixing a mark,
image or impression on all papers officially
signed by the notary public conforming the
requisites prescribed by these Rules.

SEC. 14. Signature Witnessing. - The term

“signature witnessing” refers to a notarial act
in which an individual on a single
occasion: chan robles virtual law library

(a) appears in person before the notary public

and presents an instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or
identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by
these Rules; and chan robles virtual law
library
(c) signs the instrument or document in the
presence of the notary public.

SEC. 15. Court. - “Court” refers to the Supreme

Court of the Philippines.

SEC. 16. Petitioner. - “Petitioner” refers to a

person who applies for a notarial
commission.cralaw

SEC. 17. Office of the Court Administrator. -

“Office of the Court Administrator” refers to
the Office of the Court Administrator of the
Supreme Court.cralaw

SEC. 18. Executive Judge. - “Executive Judge”

refers to the Executive Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of a city or province who issues a
notarial commission.cralaw

SEC. 19. Vendor. - “Vendor” under these Rules

refers to a seller of a notarial seal and shall
include a wholesaler or retailer. chan robles
virtual law library

SEC. 20. Manufacturer. - “Manufacturer”

under these Rules refers to one who produces
a notarial seal and shall include an engraver
and seal maker. chan robles virtual law library

RULE III
COMMISSIONING OF NOTARY PUBLIC

SECTION 1. Qualifications. - A notarial

commission may be issued by an Executive
Judge to any qualified person who submits a
petition in accordance with these Rules. chan
robles virtual law library

To be eligible for commissioning as notary

public, the
petitioner:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) must be a citizen of the Philippines; chan
robles virtual law library
(2) must be over twenty-one (21) years of
age; chan robles virtual law library
(3) must be a resident in the Philippines for at
least one (1) year and maintains a regular
place of work or business in the city or
province where the commission is to be
issued; chan robles virtual law library
(4) must be a member of the Philippine Bar in
good standing with clearances from the Office
of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
(5) must not have been convicted in the first
instance of any crime involving moral
turpitude.

SEC. 2. Form of the Petition and Supporting

Documents. - Every petition for a notarial
commission shall be in writing, verified, and
shall include the
following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) a statement containing the petitioner's

personal qualifications, including the
petitioner's date of birth, residence, telephone
number, professional tax receipt, roll of
attorney's number and IBP membership
number;

(b) certification of good moral character of the

petitioner by at least two (2) executive officers
of the local chapter of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines where he is applying for
commission;

(c) proof of payment for the filing of the

petition as required by these Rules; and

(d) three (3) passport-size color photographs

with light background taken within thirty (30)
days of the application. The photograph
should not be retouched. The petitioner shall
sign his name at the bottom part of the
photographs.
SEC. 3. Application Fee. - Every petitioner for a
notarial commission shall pay the application
fee as prescribed in the Rules of Court. chan
robles virtual law library

SEC. 4. Summary Hearing on the Petition. - The

Executive Judge shall conduct a summary
hearing on the petition and shall grant the
same if:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) the petition is sufficient in form and

substance;
(b) the petitioner proves the allegations
contained in the petition; and
(c) the petitioner establishes to the
satisfaction of the Executive Judge that he has
read and fully understood these Rules.

The Executive Judge shall forthwith issue a

commission and a Certificate of Authorization
to Purchase a Notarial Seal in favor of the
petitioner. chan robles virtual law library

SEC. 5. Notice of Summary Hearing. -

(a) The notice of summary hearing shall be

published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the city or province where the
hearing shall be conducted and posted in a
conspicuous place in the offices of the
Executive Judge and of the Clerk of Court. The
cost of the publication shall be borne by the
petitioner. The notice may include more than
one petitioner.

(b) The notice shall be substantially in the

following form:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

NOTICE OF HEARING

Notice is hereby given that a summary

hearing on the petition for notarial
commission of (name of petitioner) shall be
held on (date) at (place) at (time). Any person
who has any cause or reason to object to the
grant of the petition may file a verified
written opposition thereto, received by the
undersigned before the date of the summary
hearing.chanrobles virtual law library chan
robles virtual law library

_____________________
Executive Judge

SEC. 6. Opposition to Petition. - Any person

who has any cause or reason to object to the
grant of the petition may file a verified written
opposition thereto. The opposition must be
received by the Executive Judge before the
date of the summary hearing. chan robles
virtual law library

SEC. 7. Form of Notarial Commission. - The

commissioning of a notary public shall be in a
formal order signed by the Executive Judge
substantially in the following
form:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ______________

This is to certify that (name of notary public)

of (regular place of work or business) in (city
or province) was on this (date) day of (month)
two thousand and (year) commissioned by
the undersigned as a notary public, within
and for the said jurisdiction, for a term ending
the thirty-first day of December (year) chan
robles virtual law library

________________________
Executive Judge

SEC. 8. Period Of Validity of Certificate of

Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal. -
The Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a
Notarial Seal shall be valid for a period of three
(3) months from date of issue, unless extended
by the Executive Judge.

A mark, image or impression of the seal that

may be purchased by the notary public
pursuant to the Certificate shall be presented
to the Executive Judge for approval prior to
use.cralaw

SEC. 9. Form of Certificate of Authorization to

Purchase a Notarial Seal. - The Certificate of
Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal shall
substantially be in the following
form:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF_____________ chan robles virtual law
library

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORIZATION
TO PURCHASE A NOTARIAL SEAL chan robles
virtual law library

This is to authorize (name of notary public) of

(city or province) who was commissioned by
the undersigned as a notary public, within
and for the said jurisdiction, for a term
ending, the thirty-first of December (year) to
purchase a notarial seal.chanrobles virtual
law library chan robles virtual law library

Issued this (day) of (month) (year).

________________________
Executive Judge

SEC. 10. Official Seal of Notary Public. - Every

person commissioned as notary public shall
have only one official seal of office in
accordance with these Rules.

SEC. 11. Jurisdiction and Term. - A person

commissioned as notary public may perform
notarial acts in any place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a
period of two (2) years commencing the first
day of January of the year in which the
commissioning is made, unless earlier revoked
or the notary public has resigned under these
Rules and the Rules of Court. chan robles
virtual law library

SEC. 12. Register of Notaries Public. - The

Executive Judge shall keep and maintain a
Register of Notaries Public in his jurisdiction
which shall contain, among others, the dates
of issuance or revocation or suspension of
notarial commissions, and the resignation or
death of notaries public. The Executive Judge
shall furnish the Office of the Court
Administrator information and data recorded
in the register of notaries public. The Office of
the Court Administrator shall keep a
permanent, complete and updated database
of such records. chan robles virtual law library

SEC. 13. Renewal of Commission. - A notary

public may file a written application with the
Executive Judge for the renewal of his
commission within forty-five (45) days before
the expiration thereof. A mark, image or
impression of the seal of the notary public
shall be attached to the application.cralaw

Failure to file said application will result in the

deletion of the name of the notary public in
the register of notaries public.cralaw

The notary public thus removed from the

Register of Notaries Public may only be
reinstated therein after he is issued a new
commission in accordance with these
Rules. chan robles virtual law library

SEC. 14. Action on Application for Renewal of

Commission. - The Executive Judge shall, upon
payment of the application fee mentioned in
Section 3 above of this Rule, act on an
application for the renewal of a commission
within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof. If
the application is denied, the Executive Judge
shall state the reasons therefor.cralaw
RULE IV
POWERS AND LIMITATIONS OF NOTARIES
PUBLIC

SECTION 1. Powers. - (a) A notary public is

empowered to perform the following notarial
acts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) acknowledgments;
(2) oaths and affirmations;
(3) jurats; chan robles virtual law library
(4) signature witnessings;
(5) copy certifications; and
(6) any other act authorized by these Rules.

(b) A notary public is authorized to certify the

affixing of a signature by thumb or other mark
on an instrument or document presented for
notarization if:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) the thumb or other mark is affixed in the

presence of the notary public and of two (2)
disinterested and unaffected witnesses to the
instrument or document;
(2) both witnesses sign their own names in
addition to the thumb or other mark;
(3) the notary public writes below the thumb
or other mark: "Thumb or Other Mark affixed
by (name of signatory by mark) in the
presence of (names and addresses of
witnesses) and undersigned notary public";
and chan robles virtual law library
(4) the notary public notarizes the signature
by thumb or other mark through an
acknowledgment, jurat, or signature
witnessing.

(c) A notary public is authorized to sign on

behalf of a person who is physically unable to
sign or make a mark on an instrument or
document if:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) the notary public is directed by the person

unable to sign or make a mark to sign on his
behalf;
(2) the signature of the notary public is affixed
in the presence of two disinterested and
unaffected witnesses to the instrument or
document;
(3) both witnesses sign their own names ;
(4) the notary public writes below his
signature: “Signature affixed by notary in
presence of (names and addresses of person
and two [2] witnesses)”; and
(5) the notary public notarizes his signature by
acknowledgment or jurat.

SEC. 2. Prohibitions. - (a) A notary public shall

not perform a notarial act outside his regular
place of work or business; provided, however,
that on certain exceptional occasions or
situations, a notarial act may be performed at
the request of the parties in the following sites
located within his territorial jurisdiction: chan
robles virtual law library

(1) public offices, convention halls, and similar

places where oaths of office may be
administered;
(2) public function areas in hotels and similar
places for the signing of instruments or
documents requiring notarization;
(3) hospitals and other medical institutions
where a party to an instrument or document is
confined for treatment; and
(4) any place where a party to an instrument
or document requiring notarization is under
detention.

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if

the person involved as signatory to the
instrument or document -

(1) is not in the notary's presence personally

at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary
public or otherwise identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity
as defined by these Rules.chan robles virtual
law library
SEC. 3. Disqualifications. - A notary public is
disqualified from performing a notarial act if
he:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) is a party to the instrument or document

that is to be notarized; chan robles virtual law
library
(b) will receive, as a direct or indirect result,
any commission, fee, advantage, right, title,
interest, cash, property, or other
consideration, except as provided by these
Rules and by law; or
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner,
ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the
fourth civil degree. chan robles virtual law
library

SEC. 4. Refusal to Notarize. - A notary public

shall not perform any notarial act described in
these Rules for any person requesting such an
act even if he tenders the appropriate fee
specified by these Rules
if:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) the notary knows or has good reason to

believe that the notarial act or transaction is
unlawful or immoral;
(b) the signatory shows a demeanor which
engenders in the mind of the notary public
reasonable doubt as to the former's
knowledge of the consequences of the
transaction requiring a notarial act; and
(c) in the notary's judgment, the signatory is
not acting of his or her own free will.

SEC. 5. False or Incomplete Certificate. - A

notary public shall not: chan robles virtual law
library

(a) execute a certificate containing

information known or believed by the notary
to be false.
(b) affix an official signature or seal on a
notarial certificate that is incomplete.chan
robles virtual law library
SEC. 6. Improper Instruments or Documents. -
A notary public shall not
notarize:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) a blank or incomplete instrument or

document; or chan robles virtual law library
(b) an instrument or document without
appropriate notarial certification.

RULE V
FEES OF NOTARY PUBLIC

SECTION 1. Imposition and Waiver of Fees. -

For performing a notarial act, a notary public
may charge the maximum fee as prescribed by
the Supreme Court unless he waives the fee in
whole or in part.
chan robles virtual law library
SEC. 2. Travel Fees and Expenses. - A notary
public may charge travel fees and expenses
separate and apart from the notarial fees
prescribed in the preceding section when
traveling to perform a notarial act if the notary
public and the person requesting the notarial
act agree prior to the travel.cralaw

SEC. 3. Prohibited Fees. – No fee or

compensation of any kind, except those
expressly prescribed and allowed herein, shall
be collected or received for any notarial
service.cralaw

SEC. 4. Payment or Refund of Fees. - A notary

public shall not require payment of any fees
specified herein prior to the performance of a
notarial act unless otherwise agreed
upon. chan robles virtual law library

Any travel fees and expenses paid to a notary

public prior to the performance of a notarial
act are not subject to refund if the notary
public had already traveled but failed to
complete in whole or in part the notarial act
for reasons beyond his control and without
negligence on his part.cralaw
SEC. 5. Notice of Fees. - A notary public who
charges a fee for notarial services shall issue a
receipt registered with the Bureau of Internal
Revenue and keep a journal of notarial fees.
He shall enter in the journal all fees charged
for services rendered. chan robles virtual law
library

A notary public shall post in a conspicuous

place in his office a complete schedule of
chargeable notarial fees.cralaw

RULE VI
NOTARIAL REGISTER

SECTION 1. Form of Notarial Register. - (a) A

notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and
provide for lawful inspection as provided in
these Rules, a chronological official notarial
register of notarial acts consisting of a
permanently bound book with numbered
pages. chan robles virtual law library

The register shall be kept in books to be

furnished by the Solicitor General to any
notary public upon request and upon payment
of the cost thereof. The register shall be duly
paged, and on the first page, the Solicitor
General shall certify the number of pages of
which the book consists.cralaw

For purposes of this provision, a Memorandum

of Agreement or Understanding may be
entered into by the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Office of the Court
Administrator. chan robles virtual law library

(b) A notary public shall keep only one active

notarial register at any given time.cralaw

SEC. 2. Entries in the Notarial Register. - (a) For

every notarial act, the notary shall record in
the notarial register at the time of notarization
the following: chan robles virtual law library

(1) the entry number and page number; chan

robles virtual law library
(2) the date and time of day of the notarial
act;
(3) the type of notarial act; chan robles virtual
law library
(4) the title or description of the instrument,
document or proceeding;
(5) the name and address of each
principal; chan robles virtual law library
(6) the competent evidence of identity as
defined by these Rules if the signatory is not
personally known to the notary; chan robles
virtual law library
(7) the name and address of each credible
witness swearing to or affirming the person's
identity;
(8) the fee charged for the notarial act;
(9) the address where the notarization was
performed if not in the notary's regular place
of work or business; and
(10) any other circumstance the notary public
may deem of significance or relevance.

(b) A notary public shall record in the notarial

register the reasons and circumstances for not
completing a notarial act.

(c) A notary public shall record in the notarial

register the circumstances of any request to
inspect or copy an entry in the notarial
register, including the requester's name,
address, signature, thumbmark or other
recognized identifier, and evidence of identity.
The reasons for refusal to allow inspection or
copying of a journal entry shall also be
recorded.cralaw

(d) When the instrument or document is a

contract, the notary public shall keep an
original copy thereof as part of his records and
enter in said records a brief description of the
substance thereof and shall give to each entry
a consecutive number, beginning with number
one in each calendar year. He shall also retain
a duplicate original copy for the Clerk of
Court.cralaw
(e) The notary public shall give to each
instrument or document executed, sworn to,
or acknowledged before him a number
corresponding to the one in his register, and
shall also state on the instrument or document
the page/s of his register on which the same is
recorded. No blank line shall be left between
entries.cralaw

(f) In case of a protest of any draft, bill of

exchange or promissory note, the notary
public shall make a full and true record of all
proceedings in relation thereto and shall note
therein whether the demand for the sum of
money was made, by whom, when, and
where; whether he presented such draft, bill
or note; whether notices were given, to whom
and in what manner; where the same was
made, when and to whom and where directed;
and of every other fact touching the
same.cralaw

(g) At the end of each week, the notary public

shall certify in his notarial register the number
of instruments or documents executed, sworn
to, acknowledged, or protested before him; or
if none, this certificate shall show this
fact.cralaw

(h) A certified copy of each month's entries

and a duplicate original copy of any instrument
acknowledged before the notary public shall,
within the first ten (10) days of the month
following, be forwarded to the Clerk of Court
and shall be under the responsibility of such
officer. If there is no entry to certify for the
month, the notary shall forward a statement
to this effect in lieu of certified copies herein
required.cralaw

SEC. 3. Signatures and Thumbmarks. - At the

time of notarization, the notary's notarial
register shall be signed or a thumb or other
mark affixed by
each:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) principal;
(b) credible witness swearing or affirming to
the identity of a principal; and
(c) witness to a signature by thumb or other
mark, or to a signing by the notary public on
behalf of a person physically unable to sign.

SEC. 4. Inspection, Copying and Disposal. - (a)

In the notary's presence, any person may
inspect an entry in the notarial register, during
regular business hours, provided;

(1) the person's identity is personally known to

the notary public or proven through
competent evidence of identity as defined in
these Rules;
(2) the person affixes a signature and thumb or
other mark or other recognized identifier, in
the notarial register in a separate, dated
entry;
(3) the person specifies the month, year, type
of instrument or document, and name of the
principal in the notarial act or acts sought; and
(4) the person is shown only the entry or
entries specified by him.

(b) The notarial register may be examined by a

law enforcement officer in the course of an
official investigation or by virtue of a court
order.

(c) If the notary public has a reasonable

ground to believe that a person has a criminal
intent or wrongful motive in requesting
information from the notarial register, the
notary shall deny access to any entry or entries
therein.cralaw

SEC. 5. Loss, Destruction or Damage of Notarial

Register. - (a) In case the notarial register is
stolen, lost, destroyed, damaged, or otherwise
rendered unusable or illegible as a record of
notarial acts, the notary public shall, within ten
(10) days after informing the appropriate law
enforcement agency in the case of theft or
vandalism, notify the Executive Judge by any
means providing a proper receipt or
acknowledgment, including registered mail
and also provide a copy or number of any
pertinent police report.cralaw

(b) Upon revocation or expiration of a notarial

commission, or death of the notary public, the
notarial register and notarial records shall
immediately be delivered to the office of the
Executive Judge.cralaw

SEC. 6. Issuance of Certified True Copies. - The

notary public shall supply a certified true copy
of the notarial record, or any part thereof, to
any person applying for such copy upon
payment of the legal fees.cralaw

RULE VII
SIGNATURE AND SEAL OF NOTARY PUBLIC

SECTION 1. Official Signature. – In notarizing a

paper instrument or document, a notary public
shall:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) sign by hand on the notarial certificate only

the name indicated and as appearing on the
notary's commission; chan robles virtual law
library
(b) not sign using a facsimile stamp or printing
device; and
(c) affix his official signature only at the time
the notarial act is performed.

SEC. 2. Official Seal. - (a) Every person

commissioned as notary public shall have a
seal of office, to be procured at his own
expense, which shall not be possessed or
owned by any other person. It shall be of
metal, circular in shape, two inches in
diameter, and shall have the name of the city
or province and the word “Philippines” and his
own name on the margin and the roll of
attorney's number on the face thereof, with
the words "notary public" across the center. A
mark, image or impression of such seal shall be
made directly on the paper or parchment on
which the writing appears.

(b) The official seal shall be affixed only at the

time the notarial act is performed and shall be
clearly impressed by the notary public on
every page of the instrument or document
notarized. chan robles virtual law library

(c) When not in use, the official seal shall be

kept safe and secure and shall be accessible
only to the notary public or the person duly
authorized by him. chan robles virtual law
library

(d) Within five (5) days after the official seal of

a notary public is stolen, lost, damaged or
other otherwise rendered unserviceable in
affixing a legible image, the notary public, after
informing the appropriate law enforcement
agency, shall notify the Executive Judge in
writing, providing proper receipt or
acknowledgment, including registered mail,
and in the event of a crime committed,
provide a copy or entry number of the
appropriate police record. Upon receipt of
such notice, if found in order by the Executive
Judge, the latter shall order the notary public
to cause notice of such loss or damage to be
published, once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the city or province where the
notary public is commissioned. Thereafter, the
Executive Judge shall issue to the notary public
a new Certificate of Authorization to Purchase
a Notarial Seal.cralaw

(e) Within five (5) days after the death or

resignation of the notary public, or the
revocation or expiration of a notarial
commission, the official seal shall be
surrendered to the Executive Judge and shall
be destroyed or defaced in public during office
hours. In the event that the missing, lost or
damaged seal is later found or surrendered, it
shall be delivered by the notary public to the
Executive Judge to be disposed of in
accordance with this section. Failure to effect
such surrender shall constitute contempt of
court. In the event of death of the notary
public, the person in possession of the official
seal shall have the duty to surrender it to the
Executive Judge.cralaw

SEC. 3. Seal Image. - The notary public shall

affix a single, clear, legible, permanent, and
photographically reproducible mark, image or
impression of the official seal beside his
signature on the notarial certificate of a paper
instrument or document.cralaw

SEC. 4. Obtaining and Providing Seal. - (a) A

vendor or manufacturer of notarial seals may
not sell said product without a written
authorization from the Executive Judge.cralaw

(b) Upon written application and after

payment of the application fee, the Executive
Judge may issue an authorization to sell to a
vendor or manufacturer of notarial seals after
verification and investigation of the latter's
qualifications. The Executive Judge shall charge
an authorization fee in the amount of PhP
4,000 for the vendor and PhP 8,000 for the
manufacturer. If a manufacturer is also a
vendor, he shall only pay the manufacturer's
authorization fee.cralaw

(c) The authorization shall be in effect for a

period of four (4) years from the date of its
issuance and may be renewed by the
Executive Judge for a similar period upon
payment of the authorization fee mentioned in
the preceding paragraph.cralaw

(d) A vendor or manufacturer shall not sell a

seal to a buyer except upon submission of a
certified copy of the commission and the
Certificate of Authorization to Purchase a
Notarial Seal issued by the Executive Judge. A
notary public obtaining a new seal as a result
of change of name shall present to the vendor
or manufacturer a certified copy of the
Confirmation of the Change of Name issued by
the Executive Judge.cralaw

(e) Only one seal may be sold by a vendor or

manufacturer for each Certificate of
Authorization to Purchase a Notarial
Seal.cralaw

(f) After the sale, the vendor or manufacturer

shall affix a mark, image or impression of the
seal to the Certificate of Authorization to
Purchase a Notarial Seal and submit the
completed Certificate to the Executive Judge.
Copies of the Certificate of Authorization to
Purchase a Notarial Seal and the buyer's
commission shall be kept in the files of the
vendor or manufacturer for four (4) years after
the sale.cralaw

(g) A notary public obtaining a new seal as a

result of change of name shall present to the
vendor a certified copy of the order confirming
the change of name issued by the Executive
Judge.cralaw

RULE VIII
NOTARIAL CERTIFICATES

SECTION 1. Form of Notarial Certificate. - The

notarial form used for any notarial instrument
or document shall conform to all the requisites
prescribed herein, the Rules of Court and all
other provisions of issuances by the Supreme
Court and in applicable laws. chan robles
virtual law library

SEC. 2. Contents of the Concluding Part of the

Notarial Certificate. – The notarial certificate
shall include the
following:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) the name of the notary public as exactly

indicated in the commission;
(b) the serial number of the commission of the
notary public;
(c) the words "Notary Public" and the province
or city where the notary public is
commissioned, the expiration date of the
commission, the office address of the notary
public; and
(d) the roll of attorney's number, the
professional tax receipt number and the place
and date of issuance thereof, and the IBP
membership number.

RULE IX
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY OF NOTARIES
PUBLIC

SECTION 1. Certificate of Authority for a

Notarial Act. - A certificate of authority
evidencing the authenticity of the official seal
and signature of a notary public shall be issued
by the Executive Judge upon request in
substantially the following form: chan robles
virtual law library

CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORITY FOR A NOTARIAL

ACT

I, (name, title, jurisdiction of the Executive

Judge), certify that (name of notary public),
the person named in the seal and signature
on the attached document, is a Notary Public
in and for the (City/Municipality/Province) of
the Republic of the Philippines and
authorized to act as such at the time of the
document's notarization.chanrobles virtual
law librarychan robles virtual law library

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have affixed below

my signature and seal of this office this (date)
day of (month) (year).chanrobles virtual law
library chan robles virtual law library
_________________
(official signature)
(seal of Executive Judge)

RULE X
CHANGES OF STATUS OF NOTARY PUBLIC

SECTION 1. Change of Name and Address. -

Within ten (10) days after the change of name
of the notary public by court order or by
marriage, or after ceasing to maintain the
regular place of work or business, the notary
public shall submit a signed and dated notice
of such fact to the Executive Judge.

The notary public shall not notarize

until:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) he receives from the Executive Judge a

confirmation of the new name of the notary
public and/or change of regular place of work
or business; and

(b) a new seal bearing the new name has been

obtained.

The foregoing notwithstanding, until the

aforementioned steps have been completed,
the notary public may continue to use the
former name or regular place of work or
business in performing notarial acts for three
(3) months from the date of the change, which
may be extended once for valid and just cause
by the Executive Judge for another period not
exceeding three (3) months.

SEC. 2. Resignation. - A notary public may

resign his commission by personally submitting
a written, dated and signed formal notice to
the Executive Judge together with his notarial
seal, notarial register and records. Effective
from the date indicated in the notice, he shall
immediately cease to perform notarial acts. In
the event of his incapacity to personally
appear, the submission of the notice may be
performed by his duly authorized
representative.cralaw

SEC. 3. Publication of Resignation. - The

Executive Judge shall immediately order the
Clerk of Court to post in a conspicuous place in
the offices of the Executive Judge and of the
Clerk of Court the names of notaries public
who have resigned their notarial commissions
and the effective dates of their
resignation.cralaw

RULE XI
REVOCATION OF COMMISSION AND
DISCIPLINARY SANCTIONS

SECTION 1. Revocation and Administrative

Sanctions. - (a) The Executive Judge shall
revoke a notarial commission for any ground
on which an application for a commission may
be denied. chan robles virtual law library

(b) In addition, the Executive Judge may

revoke the commission of, or impose
appropriate administrative sanctions upon,
any notary public
who:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(1) fails to keep a notarial register;

(2) fails to make the proper entry or entries in
his notarial register concerning his notarial
acts;
(3) fails to send the copy of the entries to the
Executive Judge within the first ten (10) days
of the month following;
(4) fails to affix to acknowledgments the date
of expiration of his commission;
(5) fails to submit his notarial register, when
filled, to the Executive Judge;
(6) fails to make his report, within a
reasonable time, to the Executive Judge
concerning the performance of his duties, as
may be required by the judge;
(7) fails to require the presence of a principal
at the time of the notarial act;
(8) fails to identify a principal on the basis of
personal knowledge or competent evidence;
(9) executes a false or incomplete certificate
under Section 5, Rule IV;
(10) knowingly performs or fails to perform
any other act prohibited or mandated by these
Rules; and
(11) commits any other dereliction or act
which in the judgment of the Executive Judge
constitutes good cause for revocation of
commission or imposition of administrative
sanction.

(c) Upon verified complaint by an interested,

affected or aggrieved person, the notary public
shall be required to file a verified answer to
the complaint. If the answer of the notary
public is not satisfactory, the Executive Judge
shall conduct a summary hearing. If the
allegations of the complaint are not proven,
the complaint shall be dismissed. If the
charges are duly established, the Executive
Judge shall impose the appropriate
administrative sanctions. In either case, the
aggrieved party may appeal the decision to the
Supreme Court for review. Pending the appeal,
an order imposing disciplinary sanctions shall
be immediately executory, unless otherwise
ordered by the Supreme Court.

(d) The Executive Judge may motu proprio

initiate administrative proceedings against a
notary public, subject to the procedures
prescribed in paragraph (c) above and impose
the appropriate administrative sanctions on
the grounds mentioned in the preceding
paragraphs (a) and (b).cralaw

SEC. 2. Supervision and Monitoring of Notaries

Public. - The Executive Judge shall at all times
exercise supervision over notaries public and
shall closely monitor their activities. chan
robles virtual law library

SEC. 3. Publication of Revocations and

Administrative Sanctions. - The Executive
Judge shall immediately order the Clerk of
Court to post in a conspicuous place in the
offices of the Executive Judge and of the Clerk
of Court the names of notaries public who
have been administratively sanctioned or
whose notarial commissions have been
revoked.cralaw

SEC. 4. Death of Notary Public. - If a notary

public dies before fulfilling the obligations in
Section 4(e), Rule VI and Section 2(e), Rule VII,
the Executive Judge, upon being notified of
such death, shall forthwith cause compliance
with the provisions of these sections. chan
robles virtual law library

RULE XII
SPECIAL PROVISIONS

SECTION 1. Punishable Acts. - The Executive

Judge shall cause the prosecution of any
person who:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

(a) knowingly acts or otherwise impersonates

a notary public; chan robles virtual law library
(b) knowingly obtains, conceals, defaces, or
destroys the seal, notarial register, or official
records of a notary public; and
(c) knowingly solicits, coerces, or in any way
influences a notary public to commit official
misconduct.

SEC 2. Reports to the Supreme Court. - The

Executive Judge concerned shall submit
semestral reports to the Supreme Court on
discipline and prosecution of notaries public.

RULE XIII
REPEALING AND EFFECTIVITY PROVISIONS

SECTION 1. Repeal. - All rules and parts of

rules, including issuances of the Supreme
Court inconsistent herewith, are hereby
repealed or accordingly modified. chan robles
virtual law library

SEC. 2. Effective Date. - These Rules shall take

effect on the first day of August 2004, and
shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines which provides
sufficiently wide circulation.

Promulgated this 6th day of July, 2004. chan

robles virtual law library

Davide, Jr. C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban,

Quisumbing, Ynarez-Santiago, Sandoval-
Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna and
Tinga, JJ.cralaw
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,

vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.

Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.

Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:

We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political
aspect of our national existence.

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:

There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be
natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of
age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(Emphasis supplied)

The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which
similarly provides:

There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight

Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis supplied)

Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a

legal qualification to an appointive office.

Black defines "practice of law" as:

The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and technique
to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court, or advising and
assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings, and other papers
incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal instruments of all
kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken
for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in the practice of law by maintaining
an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an attorney,
counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing
and collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when
he:

... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee, board, body, committee,
or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there, in such representative
capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients
under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity, engages in the business of
advising clients as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in
court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick
v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)

This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management
of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition,
conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the
law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before
a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and
guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal
effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)

Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any
court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of
legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments
covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions
may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in
litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and
affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex situations. These customary functions
of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the
courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between
that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves
advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re
Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc.
[R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-
1975) listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and
public service.

One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what he does
exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active practice of their
profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing
attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW 312)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those
acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any
kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111
ALR 23)

The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal
interpretation of the term "practice of law."

MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I forgot to do during our
review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to make a very brief statement?

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).

The Commissioner will please proceed.

MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the Commission on Audit. Among
others, the qualifications provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar"
— I am quoting from the provision — "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years".

To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now
employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision
on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of
law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in
the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are
qualified to be considered for appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the
Commission on Audit.

This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and we deem it
important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar engaging in the practice of law
for at least ten years is taken up.

MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a
law practice that is set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is auditing, will necessarily involve
legal work; it will involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have
the necessary qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on
the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.

MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to the practice of law.

MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.

MR. OPLE. Thank you.

... ( Emphasis supplied)

Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not
less than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)

Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the
majority of lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career
Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means
"an individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who
practice alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is
usually a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as
professional corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm
are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried
attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).

The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially
tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W.
Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is
defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice
of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform
almost every function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would
obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).

The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for
lawyers as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in
courtrooms, and a large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593).
Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both
the public image and the self perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).

In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.).
Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the
importance of a lawyer as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed
laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members
of the bench and bar and the informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed
societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms.
General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-litigation work also know that in most cases
they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business counseling
than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the planner, the diagnostician and the
trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be
avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks,
each involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at
least some legal services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice,
a lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such
as representing a client before an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).

By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types
— a litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require
the lawyer to have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving,
document drafting, and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and
mediation are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).

Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very
important ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial
litigation. Of these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the
constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized
into a social unit to perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice
and government legal service. (Ibid.).

In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in
corporate law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.

We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate law
practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating in various
legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.

Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate understanding of

the nature and implications of the corporate law research function accompanied by an accelerating rate
of information accumulation. The recognition of the need for such improved corporate legal policy
formulation, particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has impressed upon us the
inadequacy of traditional procedures in many decisional contexts.

In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in situations of
acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow theory, operational
analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the policy-making process, wherein a
"model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected alternative
courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing therefrom.

Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the trends
of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and formalized
attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary
approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.

Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the law can
be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the various
approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree
in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level of decision-making now
have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are
currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.

Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of an
astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every necessary step
in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).

In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de

campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business and industry.

Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that a
corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will vary
with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm out all their
legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for certain matters. Other
corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-house.

A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax
laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both courts and
other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission), and in other capacities
which require an ability to deal with the law.

At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the business
of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining policy and becoming
involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)

In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be frustrating to
someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes
offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational corporation
(MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate lawyers to enter
the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a relatively small number of
companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by many as glamorous, tills
is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced
attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star,
"Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).

This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the lines of
Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot problems, a
good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them."
(Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No longer are
we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the Corporation Code
and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern management issues.

Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of
insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate counsel; (2) an
introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's management
responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the legal function itself.

These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking them.
Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for the
corporate counsel's total learning.

Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that matter, the
corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic repositioning that
the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think about a corporation's;
strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced as firms deal both with
global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each other — often with those who are
competitors in other arenas.

Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on boards and
other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal institutions and
laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as corporations organize for global
operations. ( Emphasis supplied)

The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the promotion and
management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting specific technologies or
competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that differ from older, more
adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence governmental policies. And there
are lessons to be learned from other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of
collaborative efforts between governmental and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis
supplied)

Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct
group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both long-term and
temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the
group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their knowledge of the environment
coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements within the organization. In general,
such external activities are better predictors of team performance than internal group processes.

In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial
mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to anticipate effective
managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability and insurance
considerations. (Emphasis supplied)

Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:

First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of the
role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to simulate all sorts of
systematic problems — physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New programming
techniques now make the system dynamics principles more accessible to managers — including
corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)

Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity and
uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value of
litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in managing a portfolio
of cases. (Emphasis supplied)

Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by parties
and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent and effective
negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.

[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three pointed areas
of consideration, thus:

Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of the
general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive lawyering is
concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at
that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and made.

Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of the firm
to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's evolving economic
and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent environment.
The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to
make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has emerged in the
last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate counsel hear
responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including structuring its global operations,
managing improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of employees, managing
expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.

This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make one a
good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system shapes corporate
activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working knowledge of the management issues
if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation.
"Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel," April 10, 1991, p. 4).

The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing knowledge of
financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of vast tracts of
the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer
admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of
Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on
April 25, 1991. Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the
required qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's

nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the
Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more
than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)

After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the
law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an
operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with
the laws of member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of
the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief
executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986,
has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer.
As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved
being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the
Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the
Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under privileged
sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative
action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his
legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast judicial body, which conducted
numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of
the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government
functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of
Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)

Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.

In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials of the
Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the finance manager, and
an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts) who comprise the
members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country
Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)

After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the
loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be compartmentalized into
five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing;
(4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).

In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside from
performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national development policies
as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled
"Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal
adviser of the United States Agency for International Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace
Through Law Center on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)

Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies, demand
expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in renegotiation. Necessarily,
a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring contract agreements contain such a mixture
of technical language that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the advise of competent
counsel in conjunction with the guidance of adequate technical support personnel. (See International
Law Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of
Law, 1987, p. 321). ( Emphasis supplied)

A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and conditions
which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more elements of the
contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state
the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an obligation. For a compleat debt
restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for
foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law in domestic and international affairs of whose
kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat
no drums; but where they are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and
serene mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar
of the Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern
concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of
the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a
lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the
rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged
in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is
vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that
there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving
considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)

No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744)
where it stated:

It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on
the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no authority to
direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an encroachment on the
discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the discretionary
power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)

The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc.
. . . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)

The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the
Constitution which provides:

The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last
Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the
unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity.

Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the practice of law
is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the modern concept of the
practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the
1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require generally a habitual law practice,
perhaps practised two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for
ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent.

Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I
made use of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law
practice " . . . is what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only
by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas
of law practice is essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being
defined.

Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals,
in making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that
sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the
Philippine Bar, who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons
practising law, without first becoming lawyers.

Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines,
say, on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing,
how can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed
disqualified, how can the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?

We now proceed:

The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law.
The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond
judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion
is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is
no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the
writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Additionally, consider the following:

(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme Court
reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in the
negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed? The
answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a
Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would still reverse the U.S.
Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.

Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who
was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —

No blade shall touch his skin;

No blood shall flow from his veins.

When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning
white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing
of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous
fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade
touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not
the spirit of the agreement.

In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 ALAN F. PAGUIA, G.R. No. 176278

Petitioner,

Present:

CORONA, C.J.,

CARPIO,

CARPIO MORALES,

- versus - VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BRION,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,

DEL CASTILLO,

ABAD,

VILLARAMA, JR.,

PEREZ, and

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, MENDOZA, JJ.

SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

and HON. HILARIO DAVIDE, JR.,

in his capacity as Permanent

Representative of the Philippines to the Promulgated:

United Nations,

Respondents. June 25, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:

At issue is the power of Congress to limit the Presidents prerogative to nominate ambassadors by
legislating age qualifications despite the constitutional rule limiting Congress role in the appointment of
ambassadors to the Commission on Appointments confirmation of nominees.[1] However, for lack of a
case or controversy grounded on petitioners lack of capacity to sue and mootness,[2] we dismiss the
petition without reaching the merits, deferring for another day the resolution of the question raised,
novel and fundamental it may be.

Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of
certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyos nomination of respondent former Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide) as Permanent Representative to the United Nations
(UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No. 7157 (RA 7157), the Philippine Foreign Service Act of
1991. Petitioner argues that respondent Davides age at that time of his nomination in March 2006, 70,
disqualifies him from holding his post. Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA 7157
pegging the mandatory retirement age of all officers and employees of the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) at 65.[3] Petitioner theorizes that Section 23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA
employees, career or non-career; thus, respondent Davides entry into the DFA ranks discriminates
against the rest of the DFA officials and employees.

In their separate Comments, respondent Davide, the Office of the President, and the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs (respondents) raise threshold issues against the petition. First, they question petitioners
standing to bring this suit because of his indefinite suspension from the practice of law.[4] Second, the
Office of the President and the Secretary of Foreign Affairs (public respondents) argue that neither
petitioners citizenship nor his taxpayer status vests him with standing to question respondent Davides
appointment because petitioner remains without personal and substantial interest in the outcome of a
suit which does not involve the taxing power of the state or the illegal disbursement of public funds.
Third, public respondents question the propriety of this petition, contending that this suit is in truth a
petition for quo warranto which can only be filed by a contender for the office in question.

On the eligibility of respondent Davide, respondents counter that Section 23s mandated retirement age
applies only to career diplomats, excluding from its ambit non-career appointees such as respondent
Davide.

The petition presents no case or controversy for petitioners lack of capacity to sue and mootness.
First. Petitioners citizenship and taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring this suit. We
have granted access to citizens suits on the narrowest of ground: when they raise issues of
transcendental importance calling for urgent resolution.[5] Three factors are relevant in our
determination to allow third party suits so we can reach and resolve the merits of the crucial issues
raised the character of funds or assets involved in the controversy, a clear disregard of constitutional or
statutory prohibition, and the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest to bring
the suit.[6] None of petitioners allegations comes close to any of these parameters. Indeed, implicit in a
petition seeking a judicial interpretation of a statutory provision on the retirement of government
personnel occasioned by its seemingly ambiguous crafting is the admission that a clear disregard of
constitutional or statutory prohibition is absent. Further, the DFA is not devoid of personnel with more
direct and specific interest to bring the suit. Career ambassadors forced to leave the service at the
mandated retirement age unquestionably hold interest far more substantial and personal than
petitioners generalized interest as a citizen in ensuring enforcement of the law.

The same conclusion holds true for petitioners invocation of his taxpayer status. Taxpayers contributions
to the states coffers entitle them to question appropriations for expenditures which are claimed to be
unconstitutional or illegal.[7] However, the salaries and benefits respondent Davide received
commensurate to his diplomatic rank are fixed by law and other executive issuances, the funding for
which was included in the appropriations for the DFAs total expenditures contained in the annual
budgets Congress passed since respondent Davides nomination. Having assumed office under color of
authority (appointment), respondent Davide is at least a de facto officer entitled to draw
salary,[8] negating petitioners claim of illegal expenditure of scarce public funds.[9]

Second. An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to petitioner also obtains. Petitioners suspension
from the practice of law bars him from performing any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.[10] Certainly, preparing a
petition raising carefully crafted arguments on equal protection grounds and employing highly legalistic
rules of statutory construction to parse Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed conduct.

Third. A supervening event has rendered this case academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent
Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.

SO ORDERED.
[A.M. No. P-99-1287. January 26, 2001]

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.

RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:

In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L.
Benipayo, for authority to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal
Case No. 84885, entitled People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga for Falsification of Public Document pending
before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40.[1] While respondents letter-request was
pending action, Lisa Payoyo Andres, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to
the Court Administrator, dated September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to
respondents authority to appear as counsel for the accused in the said criminal case.[2] On September 7,
1998, the Office of the Court Administrator referred the matter to respondent for comment.[3]

In his Comment,[4] dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in Criminal
Case No. 84885 without prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual circumstances surrounding
the criminal case compelled him to handle the defense of his cousin who did not have enough resources
to hire the services of a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private complainant was a member
of a powerful family who was out to get even with his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his
appearance in the criminal case did not prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since he did not
take advantage of his position. In any case, his appearances in court were covered by leave application
approved by the presiding judge.

On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a resolution denying respondents request for authorization to
appear as counsel and directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges against him
for appearing in court without the required authorization from the Court.[5] On January 25, 1999, the
Court Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for violating Sec.
7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees, which provides:

Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and
employees now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute
prohibited acts and transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.- Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:

xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the administrative
complaint.

In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are close blood cousins who belong to a
powerless family from the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he
finished his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported and guided him while he looked up to her as a
mentor and an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondents help and
advice when she was charged in Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification by the private complainant,
Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only purpose in filing the said criminal case was to seek vengeance on her
cousin. He explained that his cousins discord with Ms. Andres started when the latters husband, SPO4
Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair,
SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3) children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the
subject of the falsification charge against Ms. Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer
in their family, he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms. Ladagas plea to be her counsel since she did not
have enough funds to pay for the services of a lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7)
years of untainted government service, initially with the Commission on Human Rights and now with the
judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty and integrity and that it was only in this particular
case that he had been administratively charged for extending a helping hand to a close relative by giving
a free legal assistance for humanitarian purpose. He never took advantage of his position as branch clerk
of court since the questioned appearances were made in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City
and not in Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that during the hearings of the criminal case,
he was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications attached to his comment.

In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondents comment and referred the administrative
matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga,
for investigation, report and recommendation.

In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and
recommendation:

There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin,
Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents
before the METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case
was without the previous permission of the Court.

An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent appeared as such
counsel before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding
Judge, Judge Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the respondent appeared
as pro bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively
declared that the respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and
respondent being the only lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and
high regard for her.

It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member
of his family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case
amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On
top of this, during all the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his integrity
and independence.

RECOMMENDATION

In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin without
first securing permission from the court, and considering that this is his first time to do it coupled with
the fact that said appearance was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is
hereby respectfully recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of
such act would be dealt with more severely.[6]

We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.

Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their
profession. A similar prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which
disallows certain attorneys from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The said section
reads:

SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice.- No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts
or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give
professional advise to clients.

However, it should be clarified that private practice of a profession, specifically the law profession in this
case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a
succession of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a
lawyer.

In the case of People vs. Villanueva,[7] we explained the meaning of the term private practice prohibited
by the said section, to wit:

We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within
the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it
consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is
frequent habitual exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768) Practice of law to
fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self
out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of
engagement in the private practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to
the public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his
immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a
relative.[8]
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro
bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the private practice of the law
profession contemplated by law.

Nonetheless, while respondents isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice of law,
he failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this Court
as required by Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or
be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written
permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the
case of those officers and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be
at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to
engage in outside activities, time so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the
end that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That
no permission is necessary in the case of investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not
involve real or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in any way influence
him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part in the management of the enterprise or
become an officer of the board of directors.[9]

Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e., May
4-15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is
true that he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However, he failed
to obtain a prior permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which
respondent is assigned is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with
a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.