Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Promulgated:
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In May 1994, private complainant asked petitioner about the gate pass,
but was told that its issuance was being delayed. Almost everyday,
private complainant called petitioner, but she was told the gate pass was
not yet available. She even went to the house of petitioner who told her
that a case between the NHA and the developer was the cause of the
delay.
Mrs. De Guzman testified she saw pri vate complainant give to petitioner
the amount of P50,000.00 in cash. Thereafter, the contract was signed
and she, together with another officemate, was asked by private
complainant to act as witnesses. During the transaction, she was two
feet away from private complainant and petitioner. After the signing,
she said they appeared before Atty. Nonilo A. Quitangon who notarized
the Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
Petitioner testified that the h ouse and lot, subject matter of this case,
was awarded to her through a raffle at the NHA. She has to pay monthly
amortizations for twenty-five (25) years to the NHA. She said the
property cannot be sold during this period.
Petitioner denied personally k nowing the private complainant. She
insisted that she did not sell the house and lot to private complainant
but merely mortgaged it to her. She narrated that she first mortgaged
the property to Margarita Galang who occupied the property with the
condition that she would vacate the same when the money she loaned is
returned. Petitioner then mortgaged the same property to private
complainant because her kumare was borrowing money from her. She,
however, did not inform private complainant of the first mortgage . She
signed a deed of sale but did not totally read the document. What she
understood was that if she cannot redeem the property within six
months, the property is deemed sold. Since petitioner has not returned
the amount she borrowed from Margarita Galan g, the latter is entitled
to occupy the property which, according to petitioner, is still in her
name.
The Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage (Exh. A) dated April 27, 1994 and
signed by accused Lilibeth L. Aricheta in favor of Margarita Vasquez speaks only
of the mortgage with the National Housing Authority (NHA). Margarita Vasquez,
as vendee, agreed to assume payment of the balance on the loan with NHA. Said
instrument includes the warranty by Lilibeth L. Aricheta, as vendor, that she is the
absolute owner of said property and warrants the vendee from any lawful claim of
whomsoever over the same. (Exhibit A).
xxxx
Petitioner contends that the element of deceit which, in this case is the
making of false representations that she is the owner of the subject
property when she transacted with private complainant, is not present
in the case at bar because at the time she transacted with private
complainant, she was still the owner there of. She claims that nowhere
in the records of the case was it shown that she previously sold or
mortgaged the subject property and that the records of the NHA show
that the property remained in her name at the time she dealt with private
complainant.
As can be gleaned from the allegations in the information, petitioner was charged
with Estafa for allegedly selling to private complainant the subject property knowing
fully well that she had already sold the same to a third party. From this, it is therefore
clear that the supposed false representation or false pretense made by petitioner to
private complainant was that she was still the owner of the property when she sold
it to private complainant.
The prosecution relies heavily on the provision contained in the Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage That the Vendor is the absolute owner of said property
and hereby warrants the Vendee from any lawful claim of whomsoever over the
same. It argues that petitioner, in executing said document in favor of private
complainant, fraudulently represented that she is the absolute owner of the property
and warranted that the transfer of rights over the property is free from any lawful
claim of whomsoever over the same because at the time she made this representation,
she had already sold/mortgaged the property to another person.
The question to be resolved is whether the prosecution was able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the alleged false representation or false pretense contained
in the information.
The prosecution cannot rely on the warranty contained in the Deed of Sale
with Assumption of Mortgage that the Vendor warrants the Vendee from any lawful
claim of whomsoever over the same for the reason that the same is not alleged in the
Information. This is not part of the charge against petitioner. Petitioner was indicted
for making false representations to the private complainant that she is the owner of
the property involved when this property was supposedly already sold to another
person. The allegations were made pursuant to Section 9, Rule 110[19] of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. She was not charged with falsely representing to
private complainant that the property was not mortgaged or being occupied by a
third person. The charge in the information is specific. The charge cannot be
broadened to include what is not alleged to the detriment of the petitioner. If this
were to be done, the petitioners right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against her would be violated.[20]
It is fundamental that every element constituting the offense must be alleged in the
information. The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a crime to be
set out in the information is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense
because he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense. The allegations of facts constituting the offense charged are
substantial matters and an accuseds right to question his conviction based on facts
not alleged in the information cannot be waived. No matter how conclusive and
convincing the evidence of guilt may be, an accused cannot be convicted of any
offense unless it is charged in the information on which he is tried or is necessarily
included therein. To convict him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating
his defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and
underhanded. The rule is that a variance between the allegation in the information
and proof adduced during trial shall be fatal to the criminal case if it is material and
prejudicial to the accused so much so that it affects his substantial rights.
We are not saying that petitioner did not commit any wrongdoing. There was
indeed an injustice committed to private complainant when she was not able to
occupy the property she bought from petitioner. The problem, however, is we cannot
convict petitioner for an act not alleged in the information. To do so would be
violative of the fundamental law of the land.
Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are susceptible of two or more
interpretations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused while
the other may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the Court must acquit the
accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty required for
conviction.[22]
In the present case, the prosecution, which has the burden to prove beyond
reasonable doubt all the essential elements of the felony, failed to discharge this
burden. It failed to establish, as alleged in the information, the false representation
or false pretense that petitioner supposedly committed; that is, the property in
question was previously sold to another person before it was sold to private
complainant. With this failure, the presumption of innocence in favor of petitioner
prevails and we are thus constrained to render an acquittal.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Aurora
Santiago-Lagman, concurring; CA rollo, pp. 160-171
[2]
Records, pp. 132-138.
[3]
Id. at 1.
[4]
Id. at 25.
[5]
Id. at 28.
[6]
Exhibit A, Folder of Exhibits, p. 1.
[7]
Exhibit B, Id. at 3.
[8]
Records, p. 138.
[9]
Id. at 139.
[10]
CA rollo, p. 171.
[11]
Id. at 167-169.
[12]
Paredes v. Calilung, G.R. No. 156055, 5 March 2007.
[13]
People v. Billaber, 465 Phil. 726, 744 (2004).
[14]
Cosme, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 149753, 27 November 2006, 508 SCRA 190, 203-204.
[15]
Sim, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159280, 18 May 2004, 428 SCRA 459, 468.
[16]
Alcantara v. Court of Appeals, 462 Phil. 72, 89 (2003).
[17]
Preferred Home Specialties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 163593, 16 December 2005, 478 SCRA 387, 411-
412.
[18]
People v. Petralba, G.R. No. 137512, 27 September 2004, 439 SCRA 158, 170.
[19]
SECTION 9. Cause of the Accusation. The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the
qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily
in the language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court
to pronounce judgment.
[20]
Section 14(2), Article III, 1987 Constitution; People v. Galido, G.R. Nos. 148689-92, 30 March 2004, 426 SCRA
502, 512; Burgos v. Sandiganbayan, 459 Phil. 794, 806 (2003).
[21]
G.R. No. 168486, 27 June 2006, 493 SCRA 539, 558.
[22]
People v. Malbog, 396 Phil. 784, 807 (2000).