368. Tanada vs.

Tuvera , 146 SCRA 44

FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the
principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, Petitioners filed
for writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and "or cause to publish various
presidential decrees letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders. The Solicitor General representing the respondents moved
for the dismissal of the case contending that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant
petition. Moreover, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right
and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, the need not show any specific interest for
their petition to be given due course.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner may file a petition for mandamus against the respondents to compel
them to publish the unpublished laws on the basis of their right to be informed on matters of public
concern.

HELD:

Yes. Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectively. The clear object of this provision is
to give the general public ade0uate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of
the maxim ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever not even a
constructive one. The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 234 reads: there shall be published in the
Official Gazette, The word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty
must been forced if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is
to be given substance and validity The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of
general applicability is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before law may bind a
person, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that
presidential issuances of general application which have not been published have no force and effect.

369. Bantay Republika vs. COMELEC , 523 SCRA 1

FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and mandamus to nullify and set aside
certain issuances of the Commission on Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have
manifested their intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.

A number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations and subsequently were accredited by the
Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections. Bantay Republic Act (BA-RA 7941) and the Urban Poor for Legal
Reforms (UP-LR) filed with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, seeking to disqualify the nominees
of certain party-list organizations. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has
yet to be resolved.
Meanwhile petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed 2 letters to the Director of the Comelec’s Law
Department requesting a list of that groups’ nominees. Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al.,
was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the
nominees’ names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales’ basic disclosure request.

1
Comelec’s reason for keeping the names of the party list nominees away from the public is deducible from
the excerpts of the news report appearing in the April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, is that there is
nothing in R.A. 7941 that requires the Comelec to disclose the names of nominees, and that party list
elections must not be personality oriented according to Chairman Abalos.
In the first petition (G.R. No. 177271), BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR assail the Comelec resolutions accrediting
private respondents Biyaheng Pinoy et al., to participate in the forthcoming party-list elections without
simultaneously determining whether or not their respective nominees possess the requisite qualifications
defined in R.A. No. 7941, or the "Party-List System Act" and belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector each seeks to.

In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales, Kilosbayan Foundation and
Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec Resolution dated April 3, 2007.

While both petitions commonly seek to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups named in the petitions, BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR have the additional
prayers that the 33 private respondents named therein be "declare[d] as unqualified to participate in the
party-list elections and that the Comelec be enjoined from allowing respondent groups from participating in
the elections.

ISSUE:

1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the respondent party-list groups
named in their petition on the ground that these groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be
qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list
groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the
Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said
nominees.

HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents
named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the
nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007
elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately
disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups,

1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR for cancellation of
accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their petition. The exercise would require the Court to make
a factual determination, a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil action
for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to decide factual issues and the case
must be decided on the undisputed facts on record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address
issues of want of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the tribunal’s
evaluation of the evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is there a requirement that the
qualification of a party-list nominee be determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization.
)

2. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution, viz:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well
to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

Section 28, Article II of the Constitution reading:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

COMELEC’s basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject party-list groups, Section 7
of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the

2
certified list" is certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure. There is
absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from disclosing or even publishing through
mediums other than the "Certified List" of the names.

It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right to elect their representatives
on the basis of an informed judgment. While the vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such
vote, in the end, would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually sit in the
House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law or rules that would hinder in
any way the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list
groups named in the herein petitions. The right to information is a public right where the real parties in
interest are the public, or the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, however, the
right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not absolute. The people’s right
to know is limited to "matters of public concern" and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided
by law. But no national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees
of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing
the legitimate demands of the petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their
respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.
370. Baldoza vs. Dimaano, 71 SCRA 14

FACTS:

In a verified letter-complaint dated September 9, 1975, the Municipal Secretary of Taal,

Batangas, charges Municipal Judge Rodolfo B. Dimaano, of the same municipality, with abuse
of authority in refusing to allow employees of the Municipal Mayor to examine the criminal
docket records of the Municipal Court to secure data in connection with their contemplated
report on the peace and order conditions of the said municipality. Respondent, in answer to the
complaint, stated that there has never been an intention to refuse access to official court
records; that although court records are among public documents open to inspection not only by
the parties directly involved but also by other persons who have legitimate interest to such
inspection, yet the same is always subject to reasonable regulation as to who, when, where and
how they may be inspected. He further asserted that a court has unquestionably the power to
prevent an improper use or inspection of its records and the furnishing of copies therefrom may
be refused where the person requesting is not motivated by a serious and legitimate interest but
acts out of whim or fancy or mere curiosity or to gratify private spite or to promote public
scandal. In his answer, the respondent significantly observed:

Restrictions are imposed by the Court for fear of an abuse in the exercise of the
right. For fear that the dirty hands of partisan politics might again be at play,
Some of the cases filed and decided by the Court after the declaration of Martial
Law and years after the election still bore the stigma of partisan politics as shown
in the affidavits and testimonies of witnesses.

Without casting aspersion on any particular individual, it is worth mentioning, that

the padlocks of the door of the Court has recently been tampered by inserting
papers and matchsticks.

Under the circumstances, to allow an indiscriminate and unlimited exercise of the

right to free access, might do more harm than good to the citizenry of Taal.
Disorder and chaos might result defeating the very essence of their request. The
undersigned is just as interested as Mr. Baldoza in the welfare of the community
and the preservation of our democratic principles.

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 Be that as it may, a request of this magnitude cannot be immediately granted
without adequate deliberation and upon advisement, especially so in this case
where the undersigned doubts the propriety of such request. Hence, it is believed
that authority should first be secured from the Supreme Court, through the
Executive Judge, for the formulation of guidelines and policies on this matter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the right to information has been violated.
HELD:
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on
matters of public concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as
documents of official acts, or transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by
law. The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of
free exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public
of the nation's problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision making if they are denied
access to information of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of
society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed: "Maintaining the
flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination
since, if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases. " However, restrictions on
access to certain records may be imposed by law. Thus, access restrictions imposed to control
civil insurrection have been permitted upon a showing of immediate and impending danger that
renders ordinary means of control inadequate to maintain order.

371. Lantaco vs. Lllamas, 108 SCRA 50

FACTS: Criminal Cases were filed, all for estafa against Ricardo Paredes, an officer of the PASCAMASCON, an
association of jeepney operators, for "non-remittance of SSS contribution premiums." These cases were assigned to
Judge Llamas. After the prosecution had rested its case, the defense moved to dismiss all the criminal cases on the
ground that the evidence presented by the prosecution is insufficient to convict the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. The prosecution opposed the motion. After the reading of (the) Decision a recess was made by Judge Llamas
and complainants requested Judge Llamas to furnish a copy of said Decision. Judge Llamas told that there are no
more copy and complainants told Judge Llamas if there is no more copy to xerox the original and Judge Llamas told
that xerox copy are not permitted and Judge Llamas instructed one of the employees in his office – a- steno-typist to
type another copy but the steno-typist failed to furnish the copy as agreed.

ISSUE: WON Judge Llamas committed grave abuse of authority in refusing to give the complainants a copy of his
decision.

HELD: Yes. Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of authority in refusing to give the complainants a copy of his
decision in said Criminal Cases. The complainants were understandably interested in securing a copy of the decision
as they were the complaining witnesses in the four criminal cases. The request was made during office hours. It was
relayed personally to the respondent. The decision in question was already promulgated. Copies were already
furnished the counsel for the prosecution and the defense. It was already part of the public record which the citizen
has a right to scrutinize. And if there was "no more copy," the complainants were amenable to have a xerox copy of
the original on file, copies of which, as part of court records, are allowed to be given to interested parties upon
request, duly certified as a true copy of the original on file. What aggravates the situation, as seen from the
sequence of events narrated by the complainants which were never denied or rebutted by the respondent, is that
respondent, without just cause, denied complainants access to public records and gave the complainants the run-
around, which is oppressive as it is arbitrary.

4
The New Constitution now expressly recognizes that the people are entitled to information on matters of public
concern and thus are expressly granted access to official records, as well as documents of official acts, or
transactions, or decisions, subject to such limitations imposed by law (Article IV, Section 6, New Constitution). The
incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free exchange of
information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the nation's problems, nor a
meaningful democratic decision- making if they are denied access to information of general interest. Information is
needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of the times. As has been aptly observed:
Maintaining the flow of such information depends on protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since,
if either process is interrupted, the flow inevitably ceases.

372. Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383

Facts:
The petitioner, editor of the Manila Post, a morning daily, prays that an order issue "commanding the
respondents to furnish (petitioner) the list of real estates sold to aliens and registered with the Register
of Deeds of Manila since the promulgation of the Department of Justice Circular No. 128 or to allow the
petitioner or his duly accredited representatives to examine all records in the respondents' custody
relative to the (said) transactions.
On the contrary the Solicitor General contends that "the examination or inspection of the records in the
office of the register of deeds may be made only by those having special interest therein and subject to
such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed by the Chief of the Land Registration Office

Held:
The case is governed by statute and to a certain degree be general principles of democratic institutions.
It has been expressly stated that the right to examine or inspect public records is purely a question of
statutory construction. (80 A. L. R., 761 citing cases.)
The right of inspection of title records is a subject of express statutory regulation in the Philippines.
Section 56 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3300, provides that "All records relating to registered
lands in the office of the Register of Deeds shall be open to the public subject to such reasonable
regulations as may be prescribed by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office with the approval
of the Secretary of Justice."
The refusal by the respondents does not constitute a restriction upon or censorship or publication. It
only affects facilities of publication, and the respondents are correct in saying that freedom of
information or freedom to obtain information for publication is not guaranteed by the constitution.
Upon the foregoing considerations, mandamus is the appropriate remedy, and the petition will be
granted commanding the respondents to allow the petitioner or his accredited representatives to
examine, extract, abstract or make memoranda of the records of sales of real properties to aliens
subject to such restriction and limitation as may be deemed necessary not incompatible with his
decision, without costs.

373. GONZALES VS. NARVASA, 337 SCRA 733

Facts: Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a petition for
prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the constitutionality of the

5
creation of the Preparatory Commission on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions
of presidential consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission on
Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on November 26, 1998 by
virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order “to study and recommend proposed
amendments and/or revisions to the 1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the
same.” Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that it is a
public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 43

HELD: The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can establish that
he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to
be redressed by a favorable action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in
danger of sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all, it is
only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any “injury” in this case since, according to
petitioner, the President has encroached upon the legislature’s powers to create a public office
and to propose amendments to the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no
direct, or even any indirect, injury.

CHAPTER IX

Freedom of Association, 100 SCRA 100

The fundamental right of self-organization, 108 SCRA 390

The right of self-organization of managerial employees,47 SCRA 434

Read:

374. In re ATTY : EDILLON,84 SCRA 554

FACTS:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP
Board of Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of
Attorneys for stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of the Rule of Court

6
139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the
organization of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense
that he is being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a
member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being
deprived of the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the
respondent concludes the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no
legal force and effect.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to pay his membership fee to the IBP.

HELD:
The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished
from bar associations in which membership is merely optional and voluntary. All lawyers are subject to
comply with the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a reasonable annual
fees as one of the requirements. The Rules of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not
in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to
associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or
refuse to vote in its election as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment
of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to further the State’s legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the regulatory program – the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The right to practice law
before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and inquiry. And if the
power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore, the Court has jurisdiction over matters of
admission, suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation as part of its
inherent judicial functions and responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the Integrated
Bar to pay their annual dues.

375. TARNATE VS NORIEL 100 SCRA 93

Respondent Director Carmelo C. Noriel at first ruled that they could not, apparently
relying on the applicable provision of the Labor Code, which reads thus: "Any employee,
whether employed for a definite period or not, with at least one year of service, whether
such service is continuous or broken, shall be considered a regular employee for
purposes of membership in any labor union., When, however, a motion for
reconsideration was filed, he granted it and allowed the votes to be counted. Hence this
suit for certiorari.
In the election of union officers on October 23, 1977, there were two strong contenders,
Arthur Ternate and Lucerio Fajardo. Petitioner received 308 votes and respondent 285
votes. Forty ballots cast by employees who classified as second helpers were
challenged. They were included in the list of qualified voters upon the motion of the
Fajardo faction and over the opposition of the Ternate group. It was imposed as a
condition that the challenged ballots would be segregated and would be counted only
after passing upon the question of membership of the such second helpers. The

7
Ternate group finally agreed to allow them to participate in the election. On October 27,
1977, after the decision, the Fajardo group moved to have the challenged votes
opened. The Med-Arbiter granted the prayer.
Issue: whether or not probationary employees are entitled to vote in the election of
officers and board members of a labor union
Ruling :
The Solicitor General when asked to comment, after stressing the constitutional right to
form associations, a corollary of which in the case of labor is the right to self-
organization, pointed to Article 3 of the New Labor Code in sustaining the power of
respondent Director to issue the assailed order. Thus: "These constitutional mandates
are recognized in Article 3 of the New Labor Code. Further, Article 244 thereof is of the
same tenor: ... — All persons employed in commercial, industrial and agricultural
enterprises, including religious, medical or educational institutions operating for profit,
shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or assist labor organizations
for purposes of collective bargain. Reference to the constitutional right to freedom of
association is not without relevance. The more decisive question, however, is the force
and effect of the Labor Code provision as to when a probationary employee could in the
language thereof "be considered a regular employee for purposes of membership in any
labor union."

In reaching such a conclusion, this Court is not unaware of the implication for freedom
of association. There is plausibility on its face to the contention of the Solicitor General
that to bar the probationary employees from voting for union officials would run counter
to such constitutional right. Nor should it be forgotten that in U.E. Automotive
Employees and Workers Union vs. Noriel, it was stressed that "freedom of association
is explicitly ordained; it is not merely derivative, peripheral or penumbral, as is the case
in the United States. It can trace its origin to the Malolos Constitution. A more realistic
appraisal, however, of the labor situation would serve to clarify matters. (The right to join
a labor union remains undisputed. In the meanwhile however, for purposes of electing
the union officers, assuming it would be chosen as the sole bargaining unit in the
negotiation for a collective bargaining contract, the right of probationary employees
could be thus restricted as provided for in the Labor Code. The justification lies in the
fact that management could, by the simple device of appointing probationary employees
in the labor union expected to prevail in the choice of the sole collective bargaining
agent, attain the result that would serve best its interests, not necessarily that of labor).
It must have been such a purpose that inspired a provision on this character. At any
rate, there being no attack on its validity, it must be given full force and effect.

376. SAMAHAN vs. LAGUESMA and MNMPP

*SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA VS NORIEL 108 SCRA 381
(note: yan po nakalagay sa notes, pero ibang case lumalabas SAMAHAN vs.
LAGUESMA and MNMPP)

FACTS: Petitioner Samahan Ng Manggagawa Sa Pacific Plastic (SAMAHAN) and respondent Malayang

8
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa Ng Pacific Plastic (MNMPP) are labor unions of rank and file employees at
the Pacific Plastic Corporation (PPC) in Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
MNMPP filed a Petition for Certification Election. Accordingly, the representation officer of the
Secretary of Labor held a pre-election conference, during which the PPC was required to submit the list
of its rank and file employees based on the company payroll 3 months prior to the filing of the
petition. Respondent company failed to submit the list.
The certification election was held, using as voter’s list the list of PPC employees requested from the
SSS. MNMPP won.
ISSUE: Was the use of the SSS list in violation of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which
prescribe the use of the company payroll as basis for the voter’s list?
HELD: No.
It should ideally be the payroll which should have been used for the purpose of the election. However,
the unjustified refusal of a company to submit the payroll in its custody, despite efforts to make it
produce it, compelled resort to the SSS list as the next best source of information. After all, the SSS list is
a public record whose regularity is presumed.
It is the policy of the Labor Code to encourage the holding of a certification election as the definitive and
certain way of ascertaining the choice of employees as to the labor organization in a collective
bargaining unit. In Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services World Federation of Trade Unions
v. Laguesma, 16 we reiterated this policy thus:
It bears stressing that no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification elections, for it is a
statutory policy that should not be circumvented. We have held that whenever there is doubt as to
whether a particular union represents the majority of the rank and file employees, in the absence of a
legal impediment, the holding of a certification election is the most democratic method of determining
the employees’ choice of their bargaining representative. It is the appropriate means whereby
controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal vote of the
employees themselves. Indeed, it is the keystone of industrial democracy.
Insistence on the application of the Omnibus Implementing Rules could defeat this policy. Worse, it
could facilitate fraud by employers who can easily suppress the payroll to prevent certification elections
from being held.
Considering all the arguments presented above, we find no substantial reason to nullify the certification
election conducted on the basis of a mere technicality which finds no justification considering the facts
of the case nor upon close examination of the true intent of the law to remove all impediments to the
conduct of certification elections

377. VILLAR VS INCIONG APRIL 20 1983

Facts:
Petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, a duly registered labor organization
which, was the existing bargaining agent of the employees in private respondent Amigo Manufacturing,
Inc. (Company).
The Company and the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU had a CBA governing their labor relations, which
agreement was then about to expire on February 28, 1977. Within the last 60 days of the CBA, upon
written authority of at least 30% of the employees in the company, including the petitioners, the
Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR) filed a petition for certification election with MOLE. The petition was
opposed by the PAFLU with whom the Amigo Employees Union was at that time affiliated. The same
employees who had signed the petition filed by FUR signed a joint resolution disaffiliating from PAFLU.

9
Dolores Villar, representing herself to be the authorized representative of the Amigo Employees Union,
filed a petition for certification election in the Company. The Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU intervened
and moved for the dismissal of the petition for certification election filed by Villar, on the ground,
among others that Villar had no legal personality to sign the petition since she was not an officer of the
union nor is there factual or legal basis for her claim that she was the authorized representative of the
local union.
Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition filed by Villar, which dismissal is still pending appeal before BLR.
Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU called a special meeting of its general membership. A Resolution was
thereby unanimously approved which called for the investigation by the PAFLU national president, of all
of the petitioners and one Felipe Manlapao, for continuously maligning the union spreading false
propaganda that the union officers were merely appointees of the management; and for causing
divisiveness in the union. PAFLU formed a Trial Committee to investigate the local union's charges
against the petitioners for acts of disloyalty.
PAFLU and the Company concluded a new CBA which also reincorporated the same provisions of the
existing CBA, including the union security clause. PAFLU President rendered a decision finding the
petitioners guilty of the charges. PAFLU demanded the Company to terminate the employment of the
petitioners pursuant to the security clause of the CBA. Acting on PAFLU's demand, the Company
informed PAFLU that it will first secure the necessary clearances to terminate petitioners. PAFLU
requested the Company to put petitioners under preventive suspension pending the application for said
clearances to terminate the petitioners. The Company filed the request for clearance to terminate the
petitioners before DOLE which was granted. DOLE Secretary Inciong denied the appeal, hence, this
petition for review.
Issue:
Whether petitioner’s constitutional right to self-organization had been impaired.

Ruling:
NO. It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal objection. It is implicit in the
freedom of association ordained by the Constitution. But the Court has laid down the ruling that a
closed shop is a valid form of union security, and such provision in a CBA is not a restriction of the right
of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.
Petitioners insist that their disaffiliation from PAFLU and filing a petition for certification election are not
acts of disloyalty but an exercise of their right to self-organization. They contend that these acts were
done within the 60-day freedom period when questions of representation may freely be raised. Under
the peculiar facts of the case, we find petitioners' insistence untenable.
In the first place, had petitioners merely disaffiliated from the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, there
could be no legal objections thereto for it was their right to do so. But what petitioners did by the very
clear terms of their "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan" was to disaffiliate the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU
from PAFLU, an act which they could not have done with any effective consequence because they
constituted the minority in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.
Simply put, the Amigo Employees Union (Independent) which petitioners claim to represent, not being a
legitimate labor organization, may not validly present representation issues. Therefore, the act of
petitioners cannot be considered a legitimate exercise of their right to self-organization. Hence, we
affirm and reiterate the rationale explained in Phil Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Sec. of Labor
case, supra, in order to protect legitimate labor and at the same time maintain discipline and
responsibility within its ranks.

378. P. V FERRER, 48 SCRA 382

10
Facts: Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that declared RA1700 or the
Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion
against the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the Communist Party of the
Philippines (CPP) aggravated by circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers,
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity. 2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for
being members/leaders of the NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the
Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances of Aid or Armed Men, Craft,
and Fraud. The trial court is of opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge
2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the CPP without any forms of
safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It created a presumption of organizational guilt by being
members of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It is an act to outlaw the CPP and
similar associations penalizing membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the
Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an organized conspiracy to overthrow
the Government, not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal
means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present danger to the security of the Philippines.
Section 4 provided that affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is punishable.
Section 5 states that due investigation by a designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice
be made prior to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for furnishing false
evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in open court for acts penalized by prision mayor
to death. Section 8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through writing under
oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the statute and its valid exercise under freedom
if thought, assembly and association.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto law.

(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Held: The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of 1957.

A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without the benefit of the trial. It is the
substitution of judicial determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a statute
be measured as a bill of attainder, the following requisites must be present: 1.) The statute
specifies persons, groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past conduct. (A bill
of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto law.)

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an organized conspiracy for the
overthrow of the Government for purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act
applies not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the same purpose and their
successors. The Act’s focus is on the conduct not person.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be shown that membership was

acquired with the intent to further the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element
of MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is the required proof of a

11
member’s direct participation. Why is membership punished. Membership renders aid and
encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself party to its unlawful acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4 prohibits acts committed after
approval of the act. The members of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act
is given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing membership in accordance with Section
8. The statute applies the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes having
been made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to overthrow the Philippine
Government should not be the basis of guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the
Act. The EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to the exercise of
“Freedom of Expression and Association” in this matter. Before the enactment of the statute and
statements in the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done. The court further
stresses that whatever interest in freedom of speech and association is excluded in the
prohibition of membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL SECURITY and
PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution under RA1700. In addition to
proving circumstances/ evidences of subversion, the following elements must also be
established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven that the organization purpose
is to overthrow the present Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a
FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive purpose. Membership is willfully
and knowingly done by overt acts.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the accused under the Act. The Supreme
Court set aside the resolution of the TRIAL COURT.
FERNANDO, J., dissenting: (please read na lang the whole dissenting opinion kasi im not sure
with this)
As was explained by the then Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel in his address on
November19, 1934 as Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights quoted in the opinion of
the Court: "A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial.
The teaching of the above cases (Cummings v. Missouri, United States v. Brown, Ex
parte Garland), which I find highly persuasive considering what appeared to be in the minds of
the framers of the 1934 Constitutional Convention yields for me the conclusion that the Anti-
Subversion Act falls within the ban of the bill of attainder clause. It should be noted that three
subsequent cases upholding the Cummings and Garland doctrine were likewise cited in the
opinion of the Court. The interpretation accorded to them by my brethren is, of course, different
but I am unable to go along with them especially in the light of the categorical language
appearing in Lovett. This is not to lose sight of the qualification that for them could deprive such
a holding of its explicit character as shown by this excerpt from the opinion of the Court:
"Indeed, were the Anti-Subversion Act a bill of attainder it would be totally unnecessary to
charge communists in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure their
conviction and punishment. But the fact is that their guilt still has to be judicially established. The
Government has yet to prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly, willfully
and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party knowing its subversive character and with
specific intent to further its objective, i.e., to overthrow the existing Government by force, deceit,
and other illegal means and place it under the control and domination of a foreign power. While

12
not implausible, I find difficulty in yielding acceptance. In Cummings, there was a criminal
prosecution of the Catholic priest who refused to take the loyalty oath. Again in Brown, there
was an indictment of the labor leader who, judging by his membership in the Communist Party,
did transgress the statutory provision subsequently found offensive to the bill attainder clause. If
the construction I would place on the off-repeated pronouncement of the American Supreme
Court is correct, then the mere fact that a criminal case would have to be instituted would not
save the statute. It does seem clear to me that from the very title of the Anti-Subversion Act, "to
outlaw the Communist Party of the Philippines and similar associations," not to mention other
specific provisions, the taint of invalidity is quite marked. Hence, my inability to concur in the
judgment reached as the statute not suffering from any fatal infirmity in view of the
Constitutional prohibition against bills of attainder.

379. P VS FERRER , 56 SCRA 793 (read dissenting Opinion of Justice

Fernando in both cases

FACTS:

The respondents Feliciano Co and Nilo Tayag separately seek a reconsideration of our decision in this
case dated December 27, 1972. The motion for reconsideration filed by Co, being a mere reiteration of
arguments previously advanced, need not detain us. It is the motion filed by Tayag that requires detailed
consideration.

The burden of Tayag's motion is that knowing membership alone in the Communist Party of the Philippines
or in any other subversive organization cannot, consistently with the Constitution, be made the basis of
criminal prosecution under the Anti-Subversion Act. He argues that such membership must be coupled with
direct participation by the defendant in the illegal activities of the organization. Thus, he seeks the inclusion
in the guidelines set forth in our decision of a requirement that in prosecutions under the Act the State must
prove that the defendant joined or remained a member of the CPP or of the subversive organization,
knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to further its basic objectives as shown by direct
participation in the organization's unlawful activities.

RESOLUTION:

As we noted in our decision, the requirement that membership in the CPP or in any other subversive
organization be shown by overt acts was intended no more than to preclude the possibility that conviction
may be obtained solely on the basis of incriminating evidence rather than positive acts of the defendant.
As Senator Cea explained in the course of the deliberations on the bill: "I have inserted the words "overt
acts" because we are punishing membership in the Communist Party. I would like that membership to be
proved by overt acts, by positive acts, because it may happen that one's name may appear in the list of
membership."6

Thus, where one is shown to have taken an oath of membership or signed affiliation papers in a subversive
organization, knowing its illegal purposes, the requirement of the law is satisfied. Of course where, as it
often happens, it cannot be shown that the defendant explicitly or expressly entered into the conspiracy,
his agreement may be inferred from circumstances demonstrating concert of action. It is then that the
defendant's participation in the illegal activities of the organization would constitute proof of his specific
intent.

Nor is there a constitutional compulsion that the overt acts of conspiracy be evidenced by direct participation
of the defendant in the illegal objectives of the organization. In the first place, there is no reason why one

13
who actively and knowingly works in the ranks of the organization, intending to contribute to the success of
its specific illegal activities, should be any more immune from prosecution than one to whom the
organization has assigned or entrusted the task of carrying out the substantive criminal acts. In United
States vs. Vergara, 10 for instance, it was shown that the defendants organized the Katipunan, a society for
the purpose of overthrowing the Government by force, and that in pursuance of the conspiracy the
defendants solicited public contributions. No overt acts of insurrection were shown, but the defendants were
nevertheless held guilty of conspiracy to overthrow the Government.

In the second place, the requirement of proof of specific intent precisely limits the operation of the statute
only to illegal conduct. There need be no apprehension that unless direct participation by the defendant in
the illegal activities of the association is shown, the statute may sweep unnecessarily broadly into protected
activities, as the association may have both legal and illegal aims. In the case of the Communist Party of
the Philippines, this apprehension is without basis, for the very nature of that organization as a conspiracy
for the violent overthrow of the Government defines the character of its objectives.

Indeed, as was held in Scales vs. United States, 11 in answer to a similar contention,

If it is said that the mere existence of such an enactment tends to inhibit the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights, in that it engenders an unhealthy fear that one may find
himself unwittingly embroiled in criminal liability, the answer surely is that the statute
provides that a defendant must be proven to have knowledge of the proscribed advocacy
before he may be convicted. It is, of course, true that quasi-political parties or other groups
that may embrace both legal and illegal aims differ from a technical conspiracy, which is
defined by its purpose, so that all knowing association with the conspiracy is a proper
subject for criminal proscription as far as the First Amendment liberties are concerned. If
there were a similar blanket prohibition of association with a group having both legal and
illegal aims, there would indeed be real danger that legitimate political expression or
association would be impaired, but the membership clause, as here construed, does not
cut deeper into the freedom of association than is necessary to deal with "the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to prevent." Schenk v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52. The
clause does not make criminal all association with an organization which has been shown
to engage in illegal advocacy. There must be clear proof that a defendant "specifically
intend[s] to accomplish [the aims of the organization] by resort to violence." Noto v. United
States [367 U.S. at 299]. Thus the member for whom the organization is a vehicle for the
advancement of legitimate aims and policies does not fall within the ban of the statute; he
lacks the requisite specific intent "to bring about the overthrow of the government as
speedily as circumstances would permit." Such a person may be foolish, deluded or
perhaps merely optimistic, but he is not by this statute made a criminal.'

ACCORDINGLY, the two motions for reconsideration are denied. Our decision of December 27, 1972 is
hereby declared final and executory

CHAPTER X

THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

14
The inherent power of eminent domain, 93 SCRA 663

Who may exercise it? How about a barangay? Read:

380. Barangay Matictic vs. Elbinias, 148 SCRA 83

Facts:

1. On December 7, 1968, Barrio Matictic filed with the then Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch V, an action for injunction, entitled Barrio Matictic vs. Zosimo Serapio, et al. praying that
the defendants be enjoined from placing obstructions and closing the barrio road and to allow
plaintiff to remove the obstructions and repair the barrio road (the Poblacion-Tomana-Canyakan
barrio road) so as "to enable the people and motorized vehicles the free use thereof and convenient
passage through it. "; On January 28, 1969, Barrio Matictic filed a motion to dismiss the case on
the ground that an expropriation proceeding, not an injunction, is the better remedy. In the same
date, a complaint for Eminent Domain was filed by the Municipality of Norzagaray with the same
court entitled "Municipality of Norzagaray vs. Jose Serapio, which involves the same property of
the defendants that was the subject of the case filed mentioned above. The defendants then filed to
dismiss the latter case alleging that the CFI of Bulacan has no jurisdiction over the subject of the
action; that the complaint states no cause of action; and that plaintiff (municipality of Norzagaray
has no capacity to sue;)
2. On February 11, 1969, the Court issued an order allowing plaintiff to take possession of the property
subject of the expropriation proceedings. The defendants (Serapio, et al) contended that that the
plaintiff municipality, in the absence of an approval from the Office of the President, may not
properly file the subject expropriation case; They reiterated the plaintiff's lack of cause of action
and that a subsequent authorization, even if obtained, would not cure the jurisdictional defect.
3. On August 18 and 19, 1969, the Court issued orders requiring plaintiff municipality to submit plans
of the land to be expropriated, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands; but they failed to comply to
such order so the Court dismissed the case for failure of plaintiff to take the necessary steps to
prosecute its case. Said order was reversed by the CA. The CFI of Bulacan was ordered to proceed
with the expropriation case. The case went back to the court a quo, with Judge J.M. Elbinias
presiding. The municipal mayor of Norzagaray displayed reluctance to prosecute the said case for
eminent domain. In fact, he requested the Municipal Council to withdraw the expropriation
proceedings. The Municipal Council, however, refused to accede to the wishes of the mayor.
Petitioner herein, Barangay Matictic, chagrined and confronted by the attitude of its mayor, and on
its averment that the result of the expropriation case will greatly affect the social and economic
development of the area in and around Barangay Matictic, filed a Motion for Intervention.
Respondent Judge issued an order taking notice of the Motion for Intervention and denied the
motion to dismiss filed by the defendants until the motion for intervention shall have been
considered by the trial court;
4. On May 12, 1978, respondent Judge, without taking any further action on petitioner's motion for
intervention, issued an order dismissing, but without prejudice, the expropriation case —on the
singular reason that at the time the expropriation case was initially filed there was no showing of
any prior Presidential approval-a requisite that should have been first complied with, pursuant to
Section 2245 of the Revised Administrative Code. A motion for reconsideration of this decision
was filed by plaintiff municipality. It insisted that presidential approval was, after all, secured and
that this fact was alleged in the plaintiff's amended complaint. This petition was given due course,
under the resolution of this Court. A temporary restraining order was issued enjoining respondents
from exacting, charging and collecting toll fees for the use of the feeder road, subject of the
expropriation proceedings until further orders from this Court

15
Issue:
WON Barangay Matictic can intervene in the case.
Held:
Regarding the annulment and setting aside orders of the public respondent, dismissing the expropriation
proceedings, the proper party to appeal the same or seek a review of such dismissal, would be the
Municipality of Norzagaray. Petitioner Barrio Matictic, which is a different political entity, and although a
part and parcel of the aforesaid municipality, has no legal personality to question the aforestated orders
because by itself, it may not continue the expropriation case. It must be considered that the subject orders
of the court a quo were not appealed by the Municipality of Norzagaray. The dismissal of the expropriation
case, insofar as said municipality is concerned, became final. The expropriation case ceased to exist and
there is consequently no more proceeding wherein Barangay Matictic may possibly intervene.

Consequently, it will be illogical and of no useful purpose to grant or even consider further herein
petitioner's prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the lower court to allow and admit the
petitioner's complaint in intervention. The dismissal of the expropriation case has no less the inherent effect
of also dismissing the motion for intervention which is but the unavoidable consequence.

We are constrained to reject petitioner's averment that public respondent Judge "acted with grave and
manifest abuse of discretion." Firstly, nothing is lost to the petitioner. If at all petitioner can rightfully
establish that it is allowed by law to institute a separate and independent action of its own, then there would
be no necessity for it to intervene in the case initiated by the Municipality of Norzagaray which is now
apparently no longer interested in continuing the expropriation proceedings. The dismissal of the
expropriation case was without prejudice. The municipality of Norzagaray, Bulacan can revive its action.
There is no need for the proposed intervention of Barrio Matictic. What it may do is to urge the municipality
to file its case anew. If the Barangay has obtained authority for itself to pursue the action of eminent domain,
then the more reason there is to refuse its intervention.

Procedure for the exercise of said power and when may a writ of possession
be issued in favor of the government

381. BIGLANG-AWA VS . JUDGE BACALLA, 354 SCRA 562

FACTS:
Spouses Salvador Biglang-awa and Remedios Biglang-awa are registered owners of the parcels of
land in Talipapa, Novaliches Quezon City. 769 sq. m. was owned by Remedios and 2,151 sq. m. was
owned by Salvador. The government needed to expropriate 558 sq. m. from the property of Remedios and
881 sq. m. from Salvador’s property. They received a notic from the DPWH requiring them to submit
documents for the construction of the Mindanao Avenue Extension. The court issued writ of possession
and gave out a notice for the Biglang-awa’s to vacate their property.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the Judge committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the writ of
possession.

16
HELD:
The petitioners contends that sections 2, 3, 4, and 6 are substantial procedures in expropriating
proceedings. However, nothing in the following procedures support their contention. The conduct of
feasibility studies, information campaign, and detailed engineering are conditions that precedent to the
issuance of writ of possession against the property. Although compliance with these activities should
indeed be made prior to the decision to expropriate private property, the requirements for issuance of a
writ of possession once the expropriation case is filed, are expressly and specifically governed by Section
2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Expropriation proceedings are governed by revised Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which took effect on July 1, 1997. Previous doctrines inconsistent with this Rule are deemed reversed or
modified. Specifically, (1) an answer, not a motion to dismiss, is the responsive pleading to a complaint in
eminent domain; (2) the trial court may issue a writ of possession once the plaintiff deposits an amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the property, pursuant to Section 2 of said Rule, without need of a
hearing to determine the provisional sum to be deposited; and (3) a final order of expropriation may not
be issued prior to a full hearing and resolution of the objections and defenses of the property owner.
There is no prohibition against a procedure whereby immediate possession of the land involved in
expropriation proceedings may be taken, provided always that due provision is made to secure the prompt
adjudication and payment of just compensation to the owners. However, the requirements for authorizing
immediate entry in expropriation proceedings have changed.
Hence, the issuance of writs of possession by the respondent court in favor of the respondent
Republic after the latter, through the DPWH, filed complaints for expropriation and deposited the
amounts of P3,964,500.00 and P2,511,000.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the properties of the
petitioners is proper.

382. CITY OF ILOILO VS. JUDGE LEGASPI, 444 SCRA 269

FACTS:
This is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order, the City of Iloilo, represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treas, seeks
the nullification and/or modification of the Order of Honorable Emilio Legaspi, Presiding Judge, RTC,
denying its Motion for Reconsideration of the court’s Order holding in abeyance the resolution of the
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession until after it shall have rested its case.
Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of Iloilo enacted Regulation Ordinance, granting authority to its
City Mayor to institute expropriation proceedings on Lot No. 935, registered in the name of Manuela Yusay.
The regulation ordinance was approved by then City Mayor Mansueto A. Malabor.
Mayor Malabor wrote the heirs of Manuela Yusay, through Mrs. Sylvia Yusay del Rosario,
Administratrix of the estate of Manuela Yusay, making a formal offer to purchase their property known as
Cadastral Lot No. 935 with an area of 85,320 square meters covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
of the Registry of Deeds for P250 per square meter for the purpose of converting the same as an on-site
relocation for the poor and landless residents of the city in line with the citys housing development program.
Mayor Malabor informed Administrators Sylvia Y. del Rosario and Enrique Yusay, Jr. that their
counter-proposal to the Citys proposal to purchase Lot No. 935 was not acceptable to the City Government,
particularly to the City Council, which insisted, that an expropriation case be filed per SP Resolution. With
their apparent refusal to sell the property, the City terminated further proceedings on the matter. City of
Iloilo, represented by Mayor Jerry P. Treas, filed an Amended Complaint for Eminent Domain against
private respondents Heirs of Manuela Yusay, represented by Sylvia Yusay del Rosario and Enrique Yusay,
Jr. The subject of the same is Lot No. 935 of the Cadastral Survey of Arevalo.

17
 Private respondents filed a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative
Defenses they have raised in the Answer. Petitioner opposed the motion to which private respondents filed
a Reply.
Hon. Emilio B. Legaspi, found the motion to be in order and meritorious, and the grounds of the
opposition to be untenable; thus, he set the case for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and Affirmative
Defenses.
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the order which private respondents opposed. Judge
Legaspi set the case for Pre-Trial after Atty. Amelita K. del Rosario-Benedicto, counsel for private
respondents, manifested she was withdrawing the Motion for Preliminary Hearing on the Special and
Affirmative Defenses. Petitioner did not interpose any objection. Petitioner filed a Motion for Issuance of
Writ of Possession alleging that since it has deposited with the Court the amount of P2, 809,696.50
representing fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property sought to be expropriated based
on its current tax declaration, it may immediately take possession of the property in accordance with Section
19 of RA 7160 Judge Legaspi issued an Order with the following disposition:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Benedicto is given ten (10) days from today within which
to file an Opposition to the pending Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, furnishing copy of the
same to plaintiff’s counsel who has the same period to file a Reply.

Parties agreed that the Court will resolve the Motion For Issuance of Writ of Possession after the
plaintiffs shall have rested their case after the trial on the merits.

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration praying that the lower court reconsider its order, and to
consider its Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession submitted for resolution after the filing of its Reply
to private respondents Opposition to the motion. Citing the case of Robern Development Corp. v. Judge
Jesus V. Quitain, et al., it maintains there is no need for a hearing before the Honorable Court can grant its
Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession. Private respondents filed an Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration with Rejoinder to Reply to Opposition. They vehemently opposed the motion arguing that
counsels of the parties had agreed that the lower court will resolve the Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Possession after petitioner shall have rested its case after trial on the merits. They added that in view of the
defects as to form and substance of the amended complaint, the issuance of a writ of possession ceases to
be a ministerial duty on the court; hence, there is a need for a court hearing.

The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED and resolution of the Motion for Writ of Possession is
hereby held in abeyance until further orders from this Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner has a right to exercise the Power of Eminent Domain?
HELD:
YES, Petitioner has the irrefutable right to exercise its power of eminent domain. It being a local
government unit, the basis for its exercise is granted under Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160, to wit:

Sec. 19. Eminent Domain. - A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant
to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the
benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the

18
property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court
of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time
of the taking of the property.

The requisites for authorizing immediate entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for
expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to fifteen
percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax
declaration. Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of a writ of possession becomes
ministerial
For a writ of possession to issue, only two requirements are required: the sufficiency in form and
substance of the complaint and the required provisional deposit. In fact, no hearing is required for the
issuance of a writ of possession. The sufficiency in form and substance of the complaint for expropriation
can be determined by the mere examination of the allegations of the complaint. In this case, the sufficiency
of the Amended Complaint was further confirmed by public respondent when he set the case for pre-trial
and hearing.
We likewise find private respondents claim that petitioner cannot change its position regarding the
immediate issuance of the writ of possession on the ground of estoppel, to be untenable.
First, estoppel may be successfully invoked only if the party fails to raise the question in the early
stages of the proceedings. In the case before us, petitioner, through its counsel, undeniably committed a
mistake when it agreed that the resolution of its Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession be made by
public respondent after a hearing is conducted and after it has adduced its evidence. To remedy this,
petitioner immediately filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The filing thereof was precisely for the purpose
of rectifying the error it committed. With the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration, petitioner
cannot be held in estoppel because it right away asked the court to nullify the agreement it entered into. The
filing of the motion for reconsideration which was done at the earliest possible time clearly negates the
presence of estoppel.
Second, under the facts of the case, estoppel should not apply because petitioner is simply following
the procedure laid down by the rules and jurisprudence. Under Section 19 of Rep. Act No. 7160 (law
governing exercise of eminent domain by local government units [LGU]) and Section 2 of Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure (law governing exercise of eminent domain by entities other than LGUs),
and in the cases of Robern Development Corporation v. Quitain, et al., and Biglang-awa v. Bacalla, et al.,
a prior hearing is not required before a writ of possession can be issued. As above discussed, a complaint,
sufficient in form and substance, and the required deposit, are the only requirements before a writ of
possession can be issued. Thus, petitioner should not be prevented from changing and correcting its position
when the same is in accord with the rules and jurisprudence.

383. REPUBLIC VS. JUDGE GINGOYON, 478 SCRA 474

FACTS
The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Court’s decision in Agan v.
PIATCO, promulgated in2003 (2003 Decision). This decision nullified the
“Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport Passenger Terminal III” entered into between the Philippine Government
(Government) and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), as well as
the amendments and supplements thereto. The agreement had authorized PIATCO to build a

19
new international airport terminal (NAIA 3), as well as a franchise to operate and maintain the
said terminal during the concession period of 25 years. The contracts were nullified and that the
agreement was contrary to public policy. At the time of the promulgation of the 2003 Decision,
the NAIA 3 facilities had already been built by PIATCO and were nearing completion. However,
the ponencia was silent as to the legal status of the NAIA 3 facilities following the nullification of
the contracts, as well as whatever rights of PIATCO for reimbursement for its expenses in the
construction of the facilities. After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities
have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to
put the airport terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO conducted
several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities. In 2004, the Government filed a
Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay RTC. The Government sought upon the filing of the
complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate possession and
control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The Government also declared that it had deposited the
amount of P3,002,125,000.00 (3 Billion) in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines,
representing the NAIA 3 terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes. The Government
insists that Rule 67 of the Rules of Court governs the expropriation proceedings in this case to
the exclusion of all other laws. On the other hand, PIATCO claims that it is Rep. Act No. 8974
which does apply.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the
expropriation proceedings in this case?
HELD: The 2004 Resolution in Agan sets the base requirement that has to be observed before
the Government may take over the NAIA 3, that there must be payment to PIATCO of just
compensation in accordance with law and equity. Any ruling in the present expropriation case
must be conformable to the dictates of the Court as pronounced in the Agan cases. Rule 67
outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Rep.
Act No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government
infrastructure projects. Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more
favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the
national government expropriates property “for national government infrastructure projects.”
Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than
national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed
in Rule 67 continues to apply. Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it
requires the immediate payment by the Government of at least the proffered value of the NAIA 3
facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standards or methods for the determination
of just compensation. Applying Rep. Act No. 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in
favor of the Government over NAIA 3 is held in abeyance until PIATCO is directly paid the
amount of P3 Billion, representing the proffered value of NAIA 3 under Section4(c) of the law.

384. REPUBLIC VS. HOLY TRINITY, April 14, 2008

Facts:
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB), filed with the
RTC a Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation against landowners whose properties would be
affected by the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon Expressway.
Respondent Holy Trinity Realty and Development Corporation (HTRDC) was one of the affected
landowners.
TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a Writ of Possession, manifesting that it
deposited a sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the affected

20
properties. TRB maintained that since it had already complied with the provisions of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 89745 in relation to Section 2 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the issuance of the
writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the RTC.
“Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized government depositary. –
Upon the filing of the complaint or at anytime thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the
plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he
deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value
of the property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to the orders of the court.
Such deposit shall be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate
of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines payable on demand to the
authorized government depositary.”

Held:
the case at bar, however, does not involve interest as damages for delay in payment of just
compensation. It concerns interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation account.

There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under Rep. Act No.
8974 and Rule 67. Under the statute, the Government is required to make immediate payment
to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession,
whereas in Rule 67, the Government is required only to make an initial deposit with an
authorized government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be
equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep. Act No. 8974
which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as
stated in the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the
replacement cost method.

There is no question that the proceedings in this case deal with the expropriation of properties
intended for a national government infrastructure project. Therefore, the RTC correctly applied the
procedure laid out in Republic Act No. 8974, by requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to
100% of the zonal value of the properties sought to be expropriated before the issuance of a writ of
possession in favor of the Republic.

385. Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. CA, 441 SCRA 637

FACTS
The National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain, seeking to expropriate a
portion of petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) property located in Barrio Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite, for the
purpose of constructing and maintaining its Dasmarias-Zapote 230 KV Transmission Line Project. The NAPOCOR
deposited with the Philippine National Bank, the amount of P3,013.60, equivalent to the assessed value of the
property. Then also NAPOCOR notified BPI, through registered mail, of its intention to take possession of the
property. The trial court granted such expropriation proceeding. The trial court assigned 3 commissioner to assess
the just value of the property on value of the land is based on sales and listings of comparable property registered
within the immediate vicinity without any evidence to support the market data providedand rendered a decision
that the value of the property was ruled in favor of the BPI that the amount would be 10,000 per square meters
and 10,000 for each commissioner. The napocor moved for reconsideration which the court of appeals reversed
the decision and granted 3,000 per square meter and 3,000 for each commissioner.
Whether or not there was a valid procedure of expropriation made by the napocor
Ruling: Yes
just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the
expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. To compensate is to render something which

21
is equal in value to that taken or received. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation;
to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample.
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation which the
owner of condemned property is entitled to is the market value. Market value is that sum of money which a person
desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be
given and received therefor.

386. Gabatin vs. Land Bank of the Philippines , 444 SCRA 176

FACTS: Petitioners Fernando, Alberto, and Jose, all surnamed Gabatin, were registered owners of three
parcels of rice land situated in Sariaya, Quezon, under separate certificates of title. In 1989, the properties,
pursuant to the Land Reform Program of the Government as defined under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
27 and Executive Order (E.O.) No. 228, were placed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) under
its Operation Land Transfer (OLT). The properties were distributed to deserving farmer beneficiaries
through the issuance of emancipation patents.
The formula prescribed under P.D. No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 for computing the Land Value (LV) of rice
lands is 2.5 x Average Gross Production (AGP) x Government Support Price (GSP). Otherwise stated, the
formula is as follows:
LV = 2.5 x AGP x GSP

The AGP for the lots covered under TCTs No. T-107863 and No. T-107864 was at 94.64 cavans per
hectare while that of TCT No. T-107865 was at 118.47. The DAR and respondent Land Bank of the
Philippines (Land Bank), fixed the GSP at P35 which was the price of each cavan of palay in 1972, when
the lots were deemed taken for distribution. Hence, respondents valuation of the properties:
Acquired Property Area in hectares Land Value

TCT No. T-107864 1.4272 P 11,818.47

TCT No. T-107865 1.4330 14,854.66

TCT No. T-107863 .3965 3,283.41

TOTAL P 29,956.54

Petitioners rejected the valuation.

On 16 April 1996, petitioners filed a case for the determination of just compensation of their lands
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, naming the DAR and Land Bank as respondents. The
case was raffled to Branch 56, the designated Special Agrarian Court. Petitioners prayed that the just
compensation be fixed in accordance with the formula in P.D. No. 27, with 6% compounded annual
interest to be paid based on the price of palay at the time of payment and not at the time of taking. The
SAC, in its order, fixed the GSP of palay at the current price of P400 as basis for the computation of the
payment, and not the GSP at the time of taking, thus:

22
TCT T-107863 P 37,524.76

TCT T-107864 P 135,070.20

TCT T-107865 P 169,767.50

TOTAL P 342,362.46

Respondent Land Bank filed a motion for reconsideration dated 04 June 1998 which was denied by
the trial court in its Order dated 23 July 1998. Of the two respondents in the trial court, only Land Bank
appealed to the Court of Appeals under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court. On 10 July 2000, petitioners filed a
motion to remand the records to the SAC and to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the decision of
the SAC became final and executory, and that the appeal raised issues involving purely questions of law.
They maintained that the appeal of respondent, not being an indispensable party, did not stop the running
of the period to appeal, thereby making the decision final. They also claimed that the appeal should be
dismissed because the proper venue is the Supreme Court via a petition for review under Rule 45, and
not the Court of Appeals.
On 15 September 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision denying the motion to dismiss and
reversing the decision of the SAC. It ruled it has jurisdiction over the appeal reasoning that its jurisdiction
over appeals from RTCs cannot simply be disregarded on the submission that the issues presented before
it are purely legal in nature. As to the personality of Land Bank to file the said appeal, the Court of Appeals
made a finding that respondent was a necessary party; hence, it had a personality to appeal the SAC
decision. It also fixed the GSP at the time of taking of the land in 1972, instead of the GSP at the time of
payment. Thus:
Based on the foregoing, the appropriate land valuation formula for the appellees property should be two
and a half (2) multiplied by the average gross production multiplied by the price of palay (P35.00), (P.D.
No. 27). In addition, the said amount shall accumulate compounded interest at 6% per annum, pursuant
to A.O. No. 13, (1994) (supra) computed from the time of taking, i.e., when P.D. No. 27 came into effect
in October, 1972, until the full amount is paid.

ISSUE: Whether just compensation in kind (palay) at the time of the taking of the properties shall be
appraised at the price of the commodity at the time of the taking or at the time it was ordered paid by
the SAC?
HELD: In the instant case, the said taking of the properties was deemed effected on 21 October 1972,
when the petitioners were deprived of ownership over their lands in favor of qualified beneficiaries,
pursuant to E.O. No. 228 and by virtue of P.D. No. 27. The GSP for one cavan of palay at that time was at
P35. Prescinding from the foregoing discussion, the GSP should be fixed at said rate, which was the GSP
at the time of the taking of the subject properties.
Petitioners are not rendered disadvantaged by the computation inasmuch as they are entitled to
receive the increment of six percent (6%) yearly interest compounded annually pursuant to DAR
Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994. As amply explained by this Court.
The purpose of AO No. 13 is to compensate the landowners for unearned interests. Had they been paid in
1972 when the GSP for rice and corn was valued at P35.00 and P31.00, respectively, and such amounts
were deposited in a bank, they would have earned a compounded interest of 6% per annum. Thus, if the
PARAD used the 1972 GSP, then the product of (2.5 x AGP x P35.00 or P31.00) could be multiplied by

23
(1.06) to determine the value of the land plus the additional 6% compounded interest it would have
earned from 1972.

Petitioners reliance on Land Bank v. CA where Land Bank was ordered to pay the just compensation
based on the GSP at the time the PARAD rendered the decision, and not at the time of the taking, is not
well taken. In that case, PARAD, in its decision, used the GSP at the time of payment in determining the
land value. When the decision became final and executory, Land Bank, however, refused to pay the
landowner arguing that the PARADs valuation was null and void for want of jurisdiction. We ruled therein
that the PARAD has the authority to determine the initial valuation of lands involving agrarian reform.
Thus, the decision of the PARAD was binding on Land Bank. Land Bank was estopped from questioning
the land valuation made by PARAD because it participated in the valuation proceedings and did not appeal
the said decision. Hence, Land Bank was compelled to pay the land value based on the GSP at the time of
payment.
The factual milieu of the case relied upon by petitioners is different from the case at bar. In the case
on hand, respondent insisted from the very start that the land valuation be based on the GSP at the time
of the taking - 1972. It stood firm on that ground. When SAC ordered Land Bank to pay petitioners the
land value based on the GSP at the time of payment, respondent vehemently disagreed and questioned
the valuation before the Court of Appeals. PETITION DENIED.

Basis of just compensation

Read:
387. HACIENDA LUISITA VS. PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL, GR NO. 171101, APRIL 24, 2012

FACTS:
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted unanimously (11-0) to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed
by HLI and AFFIRM with MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of the PARC revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution
Plan (SDP) and placing the subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government.
The Court however did not order outright land distribution. Voting 6-5, the Court noted that there are
operative facts that occurred in the interim and which the Court cannot validly ignore. Thus, the Court
declared that the revocation of the SDP must, by application of the operative fact principle, give way to
the right of the original 6,296 qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) to choose whether they want
to remain as HLI stockholders or [choose actual land distribution]. It thus ordered the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) to “immediately schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs and explain to them
the effects, consequences and legal or practical implications of their choice, after which the FWBs will be
asked to manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the ballot, signing their signatures or placing their
thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their printed names.”
The parties thereafter filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Court decision.
ISSUES:
(1) Is the operative fact doctrine available in this case?
(2) Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657 unconstitutional?
(3) Can’t the Court order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the full 6,443

24
hectares allegedly covered by RA 6657 and previously held by Tarlac Development Corporation (Tadeco),
and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP?
(4) Is the date of the “taking” (for purposes of determining the just compensation payable to HLI)
November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP?
(5) Has the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 lapsed on May 10,
1999 (since Hacienda Luisita were placed under CARP coverage through the SDOA scheme on May 11,
1989), and thus the qualified FWBs should now be allowed to sell their land interests in Hacienda Luisita
to third parties, whether they have fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an
option to remain as stockholders of HLI be reconsidered?

RULING:

[The Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the motions for reconsideration of respondents PARC, et al. with
respect to the option granted to the original farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs) of Hacienda Luisita to
remain with petitioner HLI, which option the Court thereby RECALLED and SET ASIDE. It reconsidered its
earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as stockholders of HLI,
and UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate land distribution to the qualified FWBs.]

1. YES, the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case.

[The Court maintained its stance that the operative fact doctrine is applicable in this case since, contrary
to the suggestion of the minority, the doctrine is not limited only to invalid or unconstitutional laws but
also applies to decisions made by the President or the administrative agencies that have the force and
effect of laws. Prior to the nullification or recall of said decisions, they may have produced acts and
consequences that must be respected. It is on this score that the operative fact doctrine should be applied
to acts and consequences that resulted from the implementation of the PARC Resolution approving the
SDP of HLI. The majority stressed that the application of the operative fact doctrine by the Court in its July
5, 2011 decision was in fact favorable to the FWBs because not only were they allowed to retain the
benefits and homelots they received under the stock distribution scheme, they were also given the option
to choose for themselves whether they want to remain as stockholders of HLI or not.]

2. NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT unconstitutional.

[The Court maintained that the Court is NOT compelled to rule on the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA
6657, reiterating that it was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the resolution thereof is not
the lis mota of the case. Moreover, the issue has been rendered moot and academic since SDO is no longer
one of the modes of acquisition under RA 9700. The majority clarified that in its July 5, 2011 decision, it
made no ruling in favor of the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, but found nonetheless that there
was no apparent grave violation of the Constitution that may justify the resolution of the issue of
constitutionality.]

3. NO, the Court CANNOT order that DAR’s compulsory acquisition of Hacienda Lusita cover the
full 6,443 hectares and not just the 4,915.75 hectares covered by HLI’s SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before the Court is the propriety of the revocation of the SDP, which only involves
4,915.75 has. of agricultural land and not 6,443 has., then the Court is constrained to rule only as regards
the 4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.Nonetheless, this should not prevent the DAR, under its mandate

25
under the agrarian reform law, from subsequently subjecting to agrarian reform other agricultural lands
originally held by Tadeco that were allegedly not transferred to HLI but were supposedly covered by RA
6657.

However since the area to be awarded to each FWB in the July 5, 2011 Decision appears too restrictive –
considering that there are roads, irrigation canals, and other portions of the land that are considered
commonly-owned by farmworkers, and these may necessarily result in the decrease of the area size that
may be awarded per FWB – the Court reconsiders its Decision and resolves to give the DAR leeway in
adjusting the area that may be awarded per FWB in case the number of actual qualified FWBs decreases.
In order to ensure the proper distribution of the agricultural lands of Hacienda Luisita per qualified FWB,
and considering that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation and enforcement of
agrarian reform laws are within the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the latter which shall determine the area
with which each qualified FWB will be awarded.

On the other hand, the majority likewise reiterated its holding that the 500-hectare portion of Hacienda
Luisita that have been validly converted to industrial use and have been acquired by intervenors Rizal
Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Luisita Industrial Park Corporation (LIPCO), as well as the
separate 80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired by the government, should be excluded from the coverage of
the assailed PARC resolution. The Court however ordered that the unused balance of the proceeds of the
sale of the 500-hectare converted land and of the 80.51-hectare land used for the SCTEX be distributed to
the FWBs.]

4. YES, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989, when PARC approved HLI’s SDP.

[For the purpose of determining just compensation, the date of “taking” is November 21, 1989 (the date
when PARC approved HLI’s SDP) since this is the time that the FWBs were considered to own and possess
the agricultural lands in Hacienda Luisita. To be precise, these lands became subject of the agrarian reform
coverage through the stock distribution scheme only upon the approval of the SDP, that is, on November
21, 1989. Such approval is akin to a notice of coverage ordinarily issued under compulsory acquisition. On
the contention of the minority (Justice Sereno) that the date of the notice of coverage [after PARC’s
revocation of the SDP], that is, January 2, 2006, is determinative of the just compensation that HLI is
entitled to receive, the Court majority noted that none of the cases cited to justify this position involved
the stock distribution scheme. Thus, said cases do not squarely apply to the instant case. The foregoing
notwithstanding, it bears stressing that the DAR's land valuation is only preliminary and is not, by any
means, final and conclusive upon the landowner. The landowner can file an original action with the RTC
acting as a special agrarian court to determine just compensation. The court has the right to review with
finality the determination in the exercise of what is admittedly a judicial function.]

5. NO, the 10-year period prohibition on the transfer of awarded lands under RA 6657 has NOT lapsed
on May 10, 1999; thus, the qualified FWBs should NOT yet be allowed to sell their land interests in
Hacienda Luisita to third parties.

[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the awarded lands may only be transferred or conveyed after 10 years from
the issuance and registration of the emancipation patent (EP) or certificate of land ownership award
(CLOA). Considering that the EPs or CLOAs have not yet been issued to the qualified FWBs in the instant
case, the 10-year prohibitive period has not even started. Significantly, the reckoning point is the issuance
of the EP or CLOA, and not the placing of the agricultural lands under CARP coverage. Moreover, should
the FWBs be immediately allowed the option to sell or convey their interest in the subject lands, then all

26
efforts at agrarian reform would be rendered nugatory, since, at the end of the day, these lands will just
be transferred to persons not entitled to land distribution under CARP.]

6. YES, the ruling in the July 5, 2011 Decision that the qualified FWBs be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI should be reconsidered.

[The Court reconsidered its earlier decision that the qualified FWBs should be given an option to remain as
stockholders of HLI, inasmuch as these qualified FWBs will never gain control [over the subject lands] given
the present proportion of shareholdings in HLI. The Court noted that the share of the FWBs in the HLI
capital stock is [just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the holders of this 33.296% unanimously vote to remain as
HLI stockholders, which is unlikely, control will never be in the hands of the FWBs. Control means the
majority of [sic] 50% plus at least one share of the common shares and other voting shares. Applying the
formula to the HLI stockholdings, the number of shares that will constitute the majority is 295,112,101
shares (590,554,220 total HLI capital shares divided by 2 plus one [1] HLI share). The 118,391,976.85
shares subject to the SDP approved by PARC substantially fall short of the 295,112,101 shares needed by
the FWBs to acquire control over HLI.]

388. CITY OF ILOILO VS . JUDGE BESANA, G.R. No. 168967, February 12,
2010

FACTS:
In an expropriation case filed by petitioner against private respondent (Javellana), the
plaintiff was able to take possession of two parcels of land owned by Javellana for the purpose of
making the said lots the site for Lapaz High School. A writ of possession was issued to plaintiff
after it allegedly made a deposit of the amount of the value of the said lots (Php 40,000). Such was
issued by the trial court in an order dated May 17, 1983. On April 2000, private respondent found
out that the amount of Php 40,000 was not deposited by the petitioner when he tried to withdraw
the said amount (as proved by a certification issued by the PNB). When no amicable resolution
and a negotiated sale was successful, he (Javellana) filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession,
Fixing and Recovery of Rental and Damages. He alleged that since he was not compensated for
the expropriation of his property, the possession by the plaintiff was illegal. This argument was
opposed by the petitioner, claiming that Javellana can no longer file an action for the recovery of
the possession of the lots since the same was already utilized for public use, therefore can only
demand for the payment of just compensation. The RTC then issued an order (2003 order) which
nullified the 1983 order, ordering the petitioner to immediately deposit the 10% of the just
compensation after determining the value of the property at the time the complaint was filed. This
was amended six months later (2004 order), changing the reckoning point from the time of the
filing of the complaint to the date of the issuance of this order. A motion for reconsideration was
filed by the petitioner, arguing that there was no legal basis for its issuance. This was denied by
the trial court, ruling that since no deposit was made, the reckoning point for the determination of
the fair market value of the property should be the date of the issuance of the order. On April 15,
2004, the commission created for this case submitted a report determining estimates of the fair

27
market value of the properties in question in different reckoning points, as shown in the table
below. Reckoning Point Value per square meter Fair Market Value Basis 1981 - at the time the
complaint was filed P110.00/sqm P79,860.00 based on three or more recorded sales of similar
types of land in the vicinity in the same year 1981 – at the time the complaint was filed
P686.81/sqm P498,625.22 Appraisal by Southern Negros Development Bank based on market
value, zonal value, appraised value of other banks, recent selling price of neighboring lots 2002
P3,500.00/sqm P2,541,000.00 Appraisal by the City Appraisal Committee, Office of the City
Assessor 2004 P4,200.00/sqm PhP3,049,200.00 Private Appraisal Report (Atty. Roberto Cal
Catolico dated April 6, 2004) Petitioner assailed the aforementioned orders claiming that the trial
court gravely abused its discretion in overturning the 1983 order which was already final and
executory, and that the just compensation for the expropriation should be based on the fair market
value of the property at the time of the taking or at the time of the filing of the complaint. Private
respondent argued that there was no error committed by the trial court, and that the said orders
were subject to amendment and nullification at the court’s discretion.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N an expropriation order becomes final (W/N the trial court erred in overturning the
1983 Order). (2) W/N the reckoning point of the determination of just compensation is the time of
the taking or the time of the filing of the complaint.
HELD:
(1) YES. The Court, in its ruling, defined the two stages in an expropriation proceeding.
The first stage ends in an order of dismissal or a determination that the property in question is to
be acquired for public use. These orders are deemed final but appealable by the aggrieved party.
The second phase is the determination of just compensation, which ends in an order fixing the
amount to be paid to the landowner. This order is also a final one, but appealable. In the case at
bar, private respondent did not file an appeal assailing the 1983 order. Therefore, the said order
had become final, and the petitioner’s right to expropriate is no longer subject to review. The trial
court therefore erred in issuing the orders which nullified the 1983 Order. (2) NO. As established
in a long line of cases, the Court constantly affirmed that: “x x x just compensation is to be
ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action precedes entry into the property, the
just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the filing of the complaint.” It is also
provided in Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Procedure that just compensation is to be determined
“as of the date of the filing of the complaint.” In the case at bar, no exception was found based on
the pertinent facts. The Court also held that since the expropriation proceedings are final, and no
appeal was made, the said legality of the petitioner’s possession of the lots in question can no
longer be subject to review, hence, private respondent cannot re-claim the said lots. However, he
is still subject to just compensation. Additionally, since he was not paid for just compensation by
the petitioner, he is also entitled to exemplary damages.

389. NAPOCOR VS. BERNAL, December 15, 2010

FACTS:

Respondent Teresita Diato-Bernal is the registered owner of a parcel of land. In order to

complete the construction of structures and steel posts for NAPOCORs Dasmaris-Zapote

28
230 KV Transmission Line Project, it had to acquire an easement of right of way over
respondents property. NAPOCOR filed an expropriation suit against respondent,
alleging,inter alia,that: the project is for public purpose; NAPOCOR negotiated with
respondent for the price of the property, as prescribed by law, but the parties failed to
reach an agreement; and NAPOCOR is willing to deposit the amount representing the
assessed value of the property for taxation purposes.

With the first phase of the expropriation proceedings having been laid to rest by the partial
compromise agreement, the RTC proceeded to determine the amount of just
compensation. To assist in the evaluation of the fair market value of the subject property,
the RTC appointed three (3) commissioners,viz.:(1) the Provincial Assessor of Cavite; (2) the
Municipal Assessor of Imus,Cavite, upon recommendation of NAPOCOR; and (3) Soledad
Zamora, respondents representative.The commissioners submitted their report to the RTC
on September 14, 1999. In the main, they recommended that the just compensation due
from NAPOCOR be pegged atP10,000.00 per sq m, based on the propertys fair market
value.

NAPOCOR filed an Oppositionto the Commissioners Valuation Report, asserting that it was
not substantiated by any official documents or registered deeds of sale of the subject
propertys neighboring lots. The RTC issued an Order adopting the recommendation of the
commissioners. On appeal, the CA rendered its Decision affirming the RTCs judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in relying on the unsubstantiated and insufficient
findings contained in the commissioners report.

HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed.

POLITICAL LAW: power of eminent domain

The CA and the RTC erred in relying on the unsubstantiated and insufficient findings
contained in the commissioners report. First, the market values of the subject propertys
neighboring lots were mere estimates and unsupported by any corroborative documents,
such as sworn declarations of realtors in the area concerned, tax declarations or zonal
valuation from the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the contiguous residential dwellings and
commercial establishments. The report also failed to elaborate on how and by how much
the community centers and convenience facilities enhanced the value of respondents
property. Finally, the market sales data and price listings alluded to in the report were not
even appended thereto. As correctly invoked by NAPOCOR, a commissioners report of land
prices which is not based on any documentary evidence is manifestly hearsay and should
be disregarded by the court. The trial court adopted the flawed findings of the
commissioners hook, line, and sinker. It did not even bother to require the submission of
the alleged market sales data and price listings. Further, the RTC overlooked the fact that
the recommended just compensation was gauged as of September 10, 1999 or more than
two years after the complaint was filed on January 8, 1997. It is settled that just

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 compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually coincides with
the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution of the action
precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time
of the filing of the complaint. Clearly, the recommended just compensation in the
commissioner’s report is unacceptable.

390. NPC vs. Jocson, February 25 , 1992

“expropriation case – amt. for just compensation in dispute – judge held in abeyance the write of
possession order due to petitioner while increasing outright provisional value of land without
hearing.”
Facts: The petitioner files a special civil action for certiorari to annul the order issued by respondent
judge in violation of deprivation of the right of the petitioner for due process. The petitioner filed 7
eminent domain cases in the acquisition of right of way easement over 7 parcels of land in relation to
the necessity of building towers and transmission line for the common good with the offer of
corresponding compensation to landowners affected with the expropriation process. However, both
parties did not come to an agreement on just compensation thereby prompting petitioner to bring the
eminent domain case. Respondent judge found existing paramount public interest for the expropriation
and thereby issued an order determining the provisional market value of the subject areas based on tax
declaration of the properties. The petitioner, in compliance to the order of respondent judge, deposited
corresponding amount of the assessed value of said lands in the amount of P23,180,828.00 with the
Philippine National Bank. Respondents land owners filed motion for reconsideration asserting that the
assessed value is way too low and that just compensation due them is estimated as P29,970,000.00.
Immediately the following day, respondent judge increased the provisional value to that stated in the
motion for reconsideration and ordered petitioner to deposit the differential amount within 24 hours
from receipt of order while holding in abeyance the writ of possession order pending compliance to said
order which the petitioner immediately complied. Thereafter, respondent judge ordered petitioner to
pay in full amount the defendants for their expropriated property. Petitioner assailed such order to be in
violation of due process and abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion and whether or not the
petitioner was deprived of due process of law.
Held: The court ruled that PD No. 42 provides that upon filing in court complaints on eminent domain
proceeding and after due notice to the defendants, plaintiff will have the right to take possession of the
real property upon deposit of the amount of the assessed value with PNB to be held by the bank subject
to orders and final disposition of the court. The respondent judge failed to observe this procedure by
failure to issue the writ of possession to the petitioner despite its effort to deposit the amount in
compliance to the mandate of law. Furthermore, the respondent judge erred in increasing the
provisional value of properties without holding any hearing for both parties. The instant petition was
granted by the court setting aside the temporary restraining order and directing respondent judge to
cease and desist from enforcing his orders.
There are 2 stages in the action of expropriation:
1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain and the
propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit.
2. Eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by the Court of the "just compensation
for the property sought to be taken." This is done by the Court with the assistance of not more than

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three (3) commissioners whose findings are deemed to be final.

391. Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, Aug. 3, 1990

FACTS:
The lots belong to the petitioners, Jose Ma. Ansaldo and Maria Angela Ansaldo, are covered by
title in their names and have an aggregate area of 1,041 square meters. These lots were taken
from the Ansaldos sometime in 1947 by the Department of Public Work Transportation and
Communication and made part of what used to be Sta. Mesa Street and is now Ramon
Magsaysay Avenue at San Juan, Metro Manila. This, to repeat, without demur on the part of the
owners.
Said owners made no move whatever until twenty-six years later. They wrote to ask for
compensation for their land on January 22, 1973. Their claim was referred to the Secretary of
Justice who in due course rendered an opinion dated February 22, 1973, that just compensation
should be paid in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 76. The Decree provided that the
basis for the payment of just compensation of property taken for public use should be the current
and fair market value thereof as declared by the owner or administrator, or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever was lower. The Secretary of Justice thus advised that the
corresponding expropriation suit be forthwith instituted to fix the just compensation to be paid to
the Ansaldos.

Pursuant to this opinion, the Commissioner of Public Highways requested the Provincial
Assessor of Rizal to make a redetermination of the market value of the Ansaldos' property in
accordance with PD 76. The new valuation was made, after which the Auditor of the Bureau of
Public Highways forwarded the Ansaldos' claim to the Auditor General with the
recommendation that payment be made on the basis of the "current and fair market value, . . .
and not on the fair market value at the time of taking.

While not decisive of this case, it may be stressed that the provisions of Presidential Decree No.
76 and its related or successor decrees (Numbered 464, 794 and 1533) no longer determine the
just compensation payable to owners of expropriated property. Said provisions were, it may be
recalled, struck down as unconstitutional and void in 1988, in Export Processing Zone Authority
v. Dulay, which declared that the mode therein prescribed for determining just compensation, i.
e., on the basis of the value declared by the owner or administrator or on that determined by the
assessor, whichever is lower, constituted an impermissible encroachment on the judicial
prerogative to resolve the issue in an appropriate proceeding of eminent domain.

ISSUE: Whether there is Basis of just compensation

HELD:
There are instances, however, where the expropriating agency takes over the property prior to the
expropriation suit, as in this case although, to repeat, the case at bar is quite extraordinary in that
possession was taken by the expropriator more than 40 years prior to suit. In these instances, this
Court has ruled that the just compensation shall be determined as of the time of taking, not as of
the time of filing of the action of eminent domain.
Clearly, then, the value of the Ansaldos' property must be ascertained as of the year 1947, when

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it was actually taken, and not at the time of the filing of the expropriation suit, which, by the
way, still has to be done. It is as of that time that the real measure of their loss may fairly be
adjudged. The value, once fixed, shall earn interest at the legal rate until full payment is effected,
conformably with other principles laid down by case law.

392. Mun. of Makati vs. CA, Oct. 1, 1990

FACTS:
Petitioner Municipality of Makati expropriated a portion of land owned by private
respondents, Admiral Finance Creditors Consortium, Inc. After proceedings, the RTC of Makati
determined the cost of the said land which the petitioner must pay to the private respondents
amounting to P5,291,666.00 minus the advanced payment of P338,160.00. It issued the
corresponding writ of execution accompanied with a writ of garnishment of funds of the petitioner
which was deposited in PNB. However, such order was opposed by petitioner through a motion
for reconsideration, contending that its funds at the PNB could neither be garnished nor levied
upon execution, for to do so would result in the disbursement of public funds without the proper
appropriation required under the law, citing the case of Republic of the Philippines v. Palacio. The
RTC dismissed such motion, which was appealed to the Court of Appeals; the latter affirmed said
dismissal and petitioner now filed this petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not funds of the Municipality of Makati are exempt from garnishment and levy
upon execution.

HELD:
YES. It is petitioner's main contention that the orders of respondent RTC judge involved
the net amount of P4,965,506.45, wherein the funds garnished by respondent sheriff are in excess
of P99,743.94, which are public fund and thereby are exempted from execution without the proper
appropriation required under the law. There is merit in this contention. In this jurisdiction, well-
settled is the rule that public funds are not subject to levy and execution, unless otherwise
provided for by statute. Municipal revenues derived from taxes, licenses and market fees, and
which are intended primarily and exclusively for the purpose of financing the governmental
activities and functions of the municipality, are exempt from execution. Absent a showing that the
municipal council of Makati has passed an ordinance appropriating the said amount from its public
funds deposited in their PNB account, no levy under execution may be validly effected. However,
this court orders petitioner to pay for the said land which has been in their use already. This Court
will not condone petitioner's blatant refusal to settle its legal obligation arising from expropriation
of land they are already enjoying. The State's power of eminent domain should be exercised
within the bounds of fair play and justice.

393. Reublic vs. IAC,.185 SCRA 572

Facts:
Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Internal Revenue, commenced an action in the Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), to collect from the spouses Antonio Pastor and Clara Reyes-
Pastor deficiency income taxes for the years 1955 to 1959 with surcharge and monthly interest, and costs.
The Pastors filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, but the motion was denied. They filed an answer

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admitting there was an assessment against them for income tax deficiency but denying liability therefor.
They contended that they had availed of the tax amnesty under P.D.’s Nos. 23, 213 and 370 and had paid
the corresponding amnesty taxes amounting of their reported untaxed income under P.D. 23, and a final
payment on October 26, 1973 under P.D. 370 evidenced by the Government’s Official Receipt. The trial
court held that the respondents had settled their income tax deficiency for the years 1955 to 1959, not
under P.D. 23 or P.D. 370, but under P.D. 213.
The Government appealed to the Intermediate Appellant Court, alleging that the private respondents
were not qualified to avail of the tax amnesty under P.D. 213 for the benefits of that decree are available
only to persons who had no pending assessment for unpaid taxes, as provided in Revenue Regulations
Nos. 8-72 and 7-73. Since the Pastors did in fact have a pending assessment against them, they were
precluded from availing of the amnesty granted in P.D.’s Nos. 23 and 213. The Government further argued
that “tax exemptions should be interpreted strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. The Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) rendered a decision dismissing the Government’s appeal and
holding that the payment of deficiency income taxes by the Pastors under PD. No. 213, and the acceptance
thereof by the Government, operated to divest the latter of its right to further recover deficiency income
taxes from the private respondents pursuant to the existing deficiency tax assessment against them.
Issue: Whether or not the tax amnesty payments made by the private respondents bar an action for
recovery of deficient income taxes under P.D.’s Nos. 23, 213 and 370.
HELD:
A tax amnesty, being a general pardon or intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to impose
penalties on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of a revenue or tax law, partakes of an
absolute forgiveness or waiver by the Government of its right to collect what otherwise would be due it,
and in this sense, prejudicial thereto, particularly to give tax evaders, who wish to relent and are willing
to reform a chance to do so and thereby become a part of the new society with a clean slate (Commission
of Internal Revenue vs. Botelho Corp. and Shipping Co., Inc., 20 SCRA 487).
The finding of the appellate court that the deficiency income taxes were paid by the Pastors, and accepted
by the Government, under P.D. 213, granting amnesty to persons who are required by law to file income
tax returns but who failed to do so, is entitled to the highest respect and may not be disturbed except
under exceptional circumstances which have already become familiar (Rule 45, Sec. 4, Rules of Court; e.g.,
where: (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjecture; (2) the
inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based
on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (6) the findings of fact of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence in which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and (9) when the finding of fact of
the Court of Appeals is premised on the absense of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record
(Thelma Fernan vs. CA, et al., 181 SCRA 546, citing Tolentino vs. de Jesus, 56 SCRA 67; People vs. Traya,
147 SCRA 381), none of which is present in this case.

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